ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

MADALI VS PEOPLE 2009

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners Raymund Madali
(Raymund) and Rodel Madali (Rodel) seek the reversal of the 29 August 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 27757; and its 23 October 2007 Resolution,[2] affirming with modifications the 28 July 2003 Decision[3] of
the Romblon, Romblon, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81, in Criminal Case No. 2179, finding petitioners guilty of
homicide.
For the death of AAA,[4] Raymund, Rodel and a certain Bernardino Jojo Maestro (Bernardino) were
charged before the RTC with the crime of Murder. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 13
th
day of April 1999, at around 11:00 oclock in the
evening, in the Barangay XXX, Municipality of Romblon, province of Romblon, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, did then and there by means of treachery and
with evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, strike with a
coconut frond and llave inglesa and strangle with a dog chain, one AAA, inflicting upon the
latter mortal wounds in different parts of his body which caused his untimely death.[5]


During the arraignment on 31 May 2000, the three accused, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not
guilty.[6]

On trial, the prosecution presented eight witnesses, namely: (1) Jovencio Musa (Jovencio), 16 years old,
the victims cousin and the alleged lone eyewitness to the killing; (2) Senior Police Officer (SPO) 3 Rogelio Madali, the
designated Deputy Chief of Police of the Romblon Police Station; (3) Police Officer (PO) 3 Nicolas Molo, the police
investigator assigned to the case; (4) BBB, the mother of the deceased victim; (5) Dr. Carmen Lita P. Calsado, Chief of
the Romblon District Hospital, the physician who issued the death certificate of AAA; (6) Emerson de Asis, the alleged
companion of witness Jovencio on the night in question, who later became a hostile witness; (7) Michael Manasan, also a
companion of witness Jovencio before the killing of the victim occurred; (8) Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr., a forensic expert from
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Manila, who conducted the examination of the corpse of the victim after the
same was exhumed.

As documentary and object evidence, the prosecution offered the following: (1) Exhibit A Affidavit of
Jovencio executed on 22 April 1999, detailing the circumstances prior to, during and after the killing of the victim
perpetrated by Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino; (2) Exhibit B Sinumpaang Salaysay of Jovencio dated 8 May 1999,
a recantation of the 22 April 1999 Affidavit; (3) Exhibit C Amended Affidavit of Jovencio dated 28 May 1999, which was
substantially the same on material points as the 22 April 1999 Affidavit; (4) Exhibit D Undated Reply Affidavit of
Jovencio insisting that the death of the victim was authored by Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino; (5) Exhibit E Joint
Affidavit of prosecution witnesses SPO3 Rogelio Madali and a certain SPO2 Teresito M. Sumadsad; (6) Exhibit F the
coconut frond recovered by the police officers from the scene of the incident; (7) Exhibit G a dog chain used as part of
a strap that was tied to the victims neck while he was hanging from a tree; (8) Exhibit H the handkerchief that was
tied around the victims neck; (9) Exhibit I empty bottles of gin; (10) Exhibit J cellophanes with rugby; (10) Exhibit
K pictures taken from the crime scene including the picture of the body of the victim tied to a tree; (11) Exhibit L
Letter of Request for the NBI to conduct an examination of the body of the victim; (12) Exhibits M to O NBI routing
slips; (14) Exhibit P Death Certificate issued by Dr. Carmen Lita P. Calsado; (15) Exhibit Q Exhumation Report
issued by Dr. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr.; (16) Exhibit R the Autopsy Report submitted by Dr. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr.; (17)
Exhibit S Sketch of the head of the victim showing the injuries thereon; and (18) Exhibit T handwritten draft of the
exhumation report.

Taken together, the evidence offered by the prosecution shows that at around 5:30 in the afternoon of 13
April 1999, BBB, who made a living by selling goods aboard ships docked at the Romblon Pier, and who was constantly
assisted by her 15-year-old son AAA, was on a ship plying her wares. AAA, together with Jovencio and Raymund, was
there helping his mother.[7] Sometime later, Raymund and AAA left the ship. Jovencio stayed a little longer.[8]

At about 9:00 p.m. of the same day, Jovencio and another friend named Michael Manasan sat beside the
Rizal monument in the Poblacion of Romblon, located between the Roman Catholic Church and Lovers Inn. Michael had
just left Jovencio when Raymund, Rodel, Bernardino and the victim AAA arrived. After meandering around, the group
proceeded to climb the stairs, atop of which was the reservoir just beside the Romblon National High School. The victim,
AAA, ascended first; behind him were Rodel, Raymund, Bernardino and witness Jovencio. As soon as they reached the
reservoir, Bernardino blindfolded AAA with the handkerchief of Raymund. Bernardino at once blurted out, Join the rugby
boys. AAA replied, Thats enough. Bernardino then struck AAA thrice with a fresh and hard coconut frond. AAA lost his
balance and was made to stand up by Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino. Raymund took his turn clobbering AAA at the
back of his thighs with the same coconut frond. AAA wobbled. Before he could recover, he received punches to his head
and body from Rodel, who was wearing brass knuckles. The punishments proved too much, as AAA lost consciousness.

Not satisfied, Raymund placed his handkerchief around the neck of AAA, with its ends tied to a dog
chain. With the contraption, the three malefactors pulled the body up a tree.

Stunned at the sight of his cousin being ill-treated, Jovencio could only muster a faint voice saying Enough
every single-time AAA received the painful blows. Bernardino, who seemed to suggest finishing off the victim, remarked,
Since were all here, lets get on with it. Before leaving the scene, the three assailants warned Jovencio not to reveal the
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incident to anyone, or he would be next.

Tormented and torn between the desire to come clean and the fear for his life, Jovencio hardly slept that
night. He did not divulge the incident to anyone for the next few days. BBB, the victims mother, was worried when her
son did not come home. She started asking relatives whether they had seen her son, but their reply was always in the
negative.

It was three days later that a certain Eugenio Murchanto reported to the police authorities about a dead man
found in Barangay ZZZ near the Romblon National High School. When the policemen went there, they found the cadaver
emitting a foul odor, with maggots crawling all over, hanging from a tree with a handkerchief tied around the neck and a
dog chain fastened to the handkerchief. Also found in the area were paraphernalia for inhaling rugby, as well as empty
bottles of gin and a coconut frond.

The provincial hospital refused to conduct an autopsy, since AAAs corpse was already decomposing and
stank so badly. It was through the intercession of the NBI that the body was eventually exhumed and examined by
medico-legal experts. Dr. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr., who conducted the examination, opined that the victim died due to head
injuries and not to asphyxiation by hanging. He declared that the victim was already dead when he was tied to the tree,
and that the variety of injuries sustained by the victim could be attributed to more than one assailant.

Upon investigation, Jovencio narrated the incident and pointed to Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino as the
perpetrators of the crime. Thereafter, Jovencio executed his first affidavit, which was dated 22 April 1999. Because of the
threat made on him by a certain Wilson, an uncle of Raymund and Rodel, Jovencio executed a second affidavit dated 8
May 1999, repudiating his first affidavit. On 28 May 1999, Jovencio made his third sworn statement substantially reverting
to his first affidavit.

The accused, on the other hand, advanced the defense of denial and alibi. They claimed they had nothing
to do with the death of AAA, and that they were nowhere near the locus criminis when the killing occurred.

According to Rodel, 16 years old, he was with his father Rodolfo Madali in the house of a friend named Noel
Mindoro, located more or less 14 kilometers from the place where the victim was slain where they spent the whole
evening until the following morning. Rodels testimony was corroborated by his father and Noel Mindoro.

On their part, Raymund, 14 years of age, and Bernardino declared that they were in their respective houses
on the night in question. Raymunds place was allegedly five kilometers away from the scene of the crime, while
Bernardinos was one kilometer away. Bernardinos testimony was supported by his father Bernardino Maestro, Sr. and
by his neighbor Diana Mendez. Raymunds friend, Pastor Mario Fajiculay backed up the formers alibi.

Convinced by the version of the prosecution, the RTC rendered a guilty verdict against the three
accused. On account of the prosecutions failure to prove the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation, they were only convicted of homicide. The RTC observed that the incident was a sort of initiation, in which
the victim voluntarily went along with the perpetrators, not totally unaware that he would be beaten. The RTC also
appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of the three accused. The dispositive portion of the
RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused BERNARDO (sic) Jojo MAESTRO, JR.,
RODEL MADALI AND RAYMUND MADALI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide, they are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, two
(2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years and to indemnify the heirs of AAA jointly and
severally the amount of PhP 50,000.00.[9]


On 6 August 2003, Bernardino applied for probation. Thus, only Raymund and Rodel elevated their
convictions to the Court of Appeals.

In a Decision dated 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC that Rodel and
Raymund killed the victim. However, pursuant to Section 64 of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, which exempts from criminal liability a minor fifteen (15) years or below at the time of
the commission of the offense, Raymunds case was dismissed. Rodels conviction was sustained, and he was sentenced
to six months and one day of prision correccional to eight years and one day of prision mayor, but the imposition of said
penalty was suspended pursuant to Republic Act No. 9344. The judgment provides:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 28, 2003, rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Romblon, Romblon (Branch 81) is Criminal Case No. 2179, is affirmed with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

1) Appellant Raymund Madali is declared EXEMPT from criminal
liability and the case, insofar as he is concerned is hereby
DISMISSED pursuant to R.A. No. 9344.

2) Appellant Rodel Madali is found guilty of homicide, the proper
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penalty for which is fixed at six (6) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor. Imposition of this penalty should, however, be
SUSPENDED, also pursuant to R.A. No. 9344.

3) In addition to the civil indemnity imposed by the trial court in the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), moral damages in
the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) is hereby
awarded in favor of the heirs of the victim, AAA.

4) x x x x

5) Finally, this case is referred to the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DWSD) for further proceedings in accordance
with R.A. No. 9344.[10]


Hence, the instant case.

Petitioners Raymund and Rodel assail both the RTC and the Court of Appeals findings, which gave weight
and credence to the account of the incident given by prosecution witness Jovencio, whose testimony according to them
was replete with patent and substantial inconsistencies. First, petitioners set their sights on the conflicting affidavits
executed by Jovencio. The first affidavit implicated the three accused in the death of AAA, which was controverted by the
second affidavit where Jovencio denied having seen the three accused butcher the victim, while the third affidavit restated
the material points in the first affidavit. Petitioners also pointed out the discrepancy between the first and the third
affidavits, as the former stated that Jovencio was not seen by the three accused when they executed the victim; whereas
in the latter affidavit, Jovencio stated he was with the three when the killing took place. Second, petitioners assert that the
testimony of Jovencio relating to the alleged fact that his companions, Michael Manasan and Emerson de Asis, saw the
three accused and the deceased during the night in question was debunked by the very testimonies of Michael Manasan
and Emerson de Asis wherein they declared otherwise.

Moreover, petitioners contend that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in disbelieving the defense
of alibi they interposed, considering that the prosecution failed to muster the required quantum of proof, and that said
defense was corroborated by testimonies of the other defense witnesses.

The elemental question in this case is the credibility of the parties and their witnesses.

Well-entrenched is the rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best
and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimonies in light
of the declarants demeanor, conduct and position to discriminate between truth and falsehood.[11] This is especially true
when the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, because said findings are generally conclusive
and binding upon this Court, unless it be manifestly shown that the lower courts had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily
the facts and circumstances of significance in the case.[12]

The RTC and the Court of Appeals did not overlook any significant facts in the case.

This Court itself, in its effort to ferret out the truth based on the evidence on records has diligently pored over
the transcripts of stenographic notes of this case and, like the RTC, finds the testimony of Jovencio credible. Subjected to
the grueling examinations on the witness stand, Jovencio steadfastly pointed to Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino as the
persons who slaughtered the victim. He testified as follows:

Q: Mr. Witness, will you tell us where were you on April 13, 1999?

x x x x

A: I was at the Rizal standing by.

x x x x

PROS. BENEDICTO continuing:

Q: While you were at Rizal on April 13, 1999 in the evening, [who was your
companion]?

A: Only Michael.

Q: And what were you doing with Michael?

A: Only standing by there.

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Q: Did anything happen while you were standing by with Michael?

A: None, sir.

Q: Did anyone arrive while you were there?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who?

A: Jojo [Bernardino] followed by Raymund then AAA, then Rodel.

Q: And what happened when they arrived?

A: They were also standing by there.

Q: How long did they stand by in that place?

A: I do not know how many hours?

Q: Then, what happened next?

A: Around 10:30 oclock we went there.

Q: When you said we, to whom you are referring as your companions?

A: Jojo [Bernardino], Rodel, Raymund and AAA.

Q: What happened to Michael?

A: He went home.

Q: When you said you went there, to which place are you referring?

A: Near the high school at hagdan-hagdan.

Q: There are three (3) main streets in the Poblacion of Romblon, which street did you take
in going to hagdan-hagdan near the high school?

A: In the middle.

Q: Did you climb the stairs?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who was ahead?

A: AAA.

Q: And who came next?

A: Rodel.

Q: Then, after Rodel, who?

A: Raymund.

Q: Then?

A: [Bernardino].

Q: [Bernardino] who?

A: Maestro.

Q: What is the relation of this Jojo Maestro to Bernardino Maestro you pointed a while
ago?

A: That Jojo is his alias.

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Q: Did you reach the top of the stairs?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Upon reaching the top of the stairs, what did you do, if any?

A: [Bernardino] blindfolded AAA.

Q: With what?

A: Handkerchief.

Q: Where did he get that handkerchief?

A: From Raymund.

Q: After AAA, what is the family name of this AAA?

A: AAA.

Q: After AAA was blindfolded, what happened next?

A: Then [Bernardino] told him Join the rugby boys!

Q: Did AAA make any reply?

A: AAA said Thats enough.

Q: What happened after Jojo Maestro said you join the rugby boys?

A: AAA was struck by a coconut frond three (3) times.

Q: Who struck him with the coconut frond?

A: [Bernardino].

Q: What happened to AAA when he was struck three (3) times with the coconut fronds?

A: He was made to stand.

Q: After standing, what happened next?

A: AAA was again struck with the coconut frond byRaymund.

Q: Was AAA hit?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where?

A: Here (witness is pointing to the posterior aspect of his right thigh).

Q: What happened to AAA when he was hit by the coconut frond?

A: As if he became weak.

Q: How about Rodel, what did Rodel do, if any?

A: He boxed the body and the head.

Q: Of whom?

A: Of Rodel.

Q: Who was boxed by Rodel?

A: AAA.

Q: In Exhibit C you mentioned about llave inglesa, what is this llave inglesa?

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A: Lead llave inglesa.

Q: And how does it look like?

A: I forgot already but it was a brass knuckle.

Q: Did Exh. C mention that Rodel punched him in different parts of his body with a llave
inglesa causing him to fall to the ground, how did Rodel use this llave inglesa?

A: Worn in his hand (witness raising his right hand and motioning the left as if wearing
something in his right hand), then punched him.

Q: When he was punched on different parts of his body by Rodel using llave inglesa, what
happened to AAA?

A: He lost consciousness.

Q: When AAA lost consciousness, what did Bernardino Maestro, Raymund Madali and
Rodel Madali do, if any?

A: Raymund used his handkerchief in tying the neck of my cousin.

Q: Who is this cousin of yours?

A: AAA.

Q: What is the family name?

A: AAA.

COURT:

How about Bernardino as part of the question?

PROS. BENEDICTO continuing:

Q: Bernardino, what did he do, if any?

A: The chain for the dog was tied to the handkerchief.

COURT:

How about Rodel?

A: They helped in lifting him and making him stand and hooked the tie to the tree.

Q: What is this tie which was hooked to the tree made of?

A: The chain.

Q: Referring to the dog chain?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: While all these things were happening, what was Jovencio Musa doing who is a cousin
of AAA?

A: I got shock upon seeing it.

Q: Did Jovencio Musa utter anything or do something?

A: Everytime AAA was being struck I said Enough!
(Tama na!).

Q: How many times did you say that is enough?

A: Twice.

Q: How did the three (3) react to your saying Tama na, tama na!?

ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
A: It is already here so we will proceed.

COURT:

Translate that.

A: Yari na ini, idiretso na.

x x x x

Q: After tying the dog chain to the tree, what happened next?

A: I was told by the three (3) that if I would reveal I would be the next to be killed.

Q: After that, what happened?

A: No more, we went home already.[13]


Jovencio saw at close range the incident as it was unfolding before his very eyes as he was there when it
happened. He was in the company of the perpetrators and the victim. Thus, the incident could not have escaped his
attention. The prosecution adequately established in graphic detail, through the eyewitness, the circumstances that
transpired before, during and after the killing of AAA. At around 11:30 p.m. of 13 April 1999, Jovencio, together with the
victim, as well as with Rodel, Raymund and Bernardino, went to a place near the Romblon National High
School. Jovencios earlier companion, Michael Manasan, did not go with the group, as he had already left a little
earlier. As they reached their destination, the group ascended the stairs leading to a reservoir near the said school. AAA
was ahead, followed by Rodel, Raymund, Bernardino and Jovencio. Upon reaching the top, Bernardino blindfolded the
victim with a handkerchief and told the latter, Join the rugby boys! The victim responded, Thats enough! Bernardino
then hit the victim thrice, using a green and hard coconut frond. Unable to withstand the beatings, the victim hit the ground
and was lifted to his feet by Bernardino, Raymund and Rodel. With the same coconut frond, Raymund hit the victim on
his right thigh. Rodel followed by punching the body and the head of the victim with a brass knuckle (llave inglesa)
wrapped around the formers right fist. Feeling for his cousin, Jovencio shouted Tama na! Tama na! Bernardino
responded, Yari na ini, ideretso na, (We have come this far, we have to finish it.) The victims strength was no match to
the injuries he received. He passed out. Raymund then tied a handkerchief around the victims neck, fastened a dog
chain to the ends of the said handkerchief and, with the aid of Raymund and Rodel, hoisted the victims body to and
hanged it from a nearby tree. Shocked at what was happening, Jovencio just watched the whole incident, failing to
muster enough courage to help his dying cousin.

The perpetrators warned Jovencio not to divulge to anyone what he saw, or he would be the next
victim. Then they all left the place, leaving the victims body hanging from a tree.

The testimony of Jovencio was substantiated by the medical findings indicating that the victim was hit in the
head by hard blows, causing his death. Other pieces of evidence such as the coconut frond, the dog chain and the
handkerchief found in the scene also supported Jovencios account.

Against the damning evidence adduced by the prosecution, petitioners Raymund and Rodel could only
muster mere denial. Unfortunately for them, their defense was much too flaccid to stay firm against the weighty evidence
for the prosecution. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence
that deserves no weight in law. It cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible witness who
testifies on affirmative matters.[14] Between the self-serving testimonies of petitioners and the positive identification by
the eyewitness, the latter deserves greater credence.[15]

Petitioners alibi, which was supported by the testimonies of close relatives and friends, cannot overcome
the convincing evidence adduced by the prosecution. Such corroborative testimonies of relatives and friends are viewed
with suspicion and skepticism by the Court.[16]

Furthermore, for alibi to prosper, two elements must concur: (a) the accused was in another place at the
time the crime was committed; and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it
was committed. In the case under consideration, Raymund was within a 5-kilometer distance from the scene, while Rodel
was within a 14-kilometer distance. Even assuming arguendo that Raymund and Rodels defense were true, still, it was
not physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene and to be participants in the gruesome crime. It was not
difficult for them to travel from where they allegedly were and arrive at the scene during the killing episode.

Petitioners made an issue of the affidavit of recantation repudiating the earlier one laying the blame on
them. The affidavit of recantation executed by a witness prior to the trial cannot prevail over the testimony made during
the trial.[17] Jovencio effectively repudiated the contents of the affidavit of recantation. The recantation would hardly
suffice to overturn the trial courts finding of guilt, which was based on a clear and convincing testimony given during a full-
blown trial. As held by this Court, an affidavit of recantation, being usually taken ex parte, would be considered inferior to
the testimony given in open court.[18] A recantation is exceedingly unreliable, inasmuch as it is easily secured from a
poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration.[19] Considering the age, the social
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
standing and the economic status of witness Jovencio, it is not far-fetched that the combination of these factors impelled
him to affix his signature to the recanting affidavit. Besides, Jovencio explained why he executed the second affidavit or
the affidavit of recantation, which supposedly exonerated petitioners. He had been threatened by a certain Wilson, who
was a relative of petitioners. Jovencio testified:

Q: Alright, in Exh. C specifically C-1, you mentioned that, you said that somebody fetched
me in the evening of May 7, 1999 who told me that Rey Andrade wanted to talk
to me regarding the incident, who was that somebody who fetched you in the
house?

A: I do not know but he is known as Andrade.

x x x x

Q: What was the subject of your conversation with Andrade?

A: About the Nephew of Wilson.

x x x x

Q: How about this Wilson you were referring to?

A: Wilson all of a sudden arrived there.

Q: Did Wilson say anything?

A: Wilson said, if we will lose, all our expenses will be paid and if he wins I will be the
next.[20]


Petitioners also place much premium on the alleged contradiction between Jovencios narrative -- which
claimed that Emerson de Asis and Michael Manasan saw the victim in the company of the malefactors immediately prior
to the killing -- and the testimonies of these two witnesses denying such allegation.

Unfortunately, this is just a minor inconsistency. The common narration of Emerson de Asis and Michael
Manasan that they did not see the perpetrators with the victim prior to the killing are too insignificant, since their narration
did not directly relate to the act of killing itself. Said inconsistency does not dilute the declarations of Jovencio. Given the
natural frailties of the human mind and its incapacity to assimilate all material details of a given incident, slight
inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly weaken their probative value. It is well settled that
immaterial and insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on the very material and significant point bearing on the
very act of accused-appellants.[21] As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another on material
points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine
the integrity of a prosecution witness.[22] The minor inconsistencies and contradictions only serve to attest to the
truthfulness of the witnesses and the fact that they had not been coached or rehearsed.[23]

The declaration of Michael Manasan -- that he did not see the petitioners together with Jovencio and the
victim immediately prior the incident -- does not help a bit the cause of petitioners. As the Court of Appeals correctly
pointed out, Michael could not have seen the malefactors in the company of the victim because according to Jovencio,
Michael had gone home earlier that evening.

In fine, this Court defers to the findings of the trial court, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, there
being no cogent reason to veer away from such findings.

As to the criminal liability, Raymond is exempt. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Raymund, who
was only 14 years of age at the time he committed the crime, should be exempt from criminal liability and should be
released to the custody of his parents or guardian pursuant to Sections 6 and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen (15) years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.
However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this
Act.

x x x x

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption
from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.


SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility. If it has been
determined that the child taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the authority
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
which will have an initial contact with the child has the duty to immediately release the child to
the custody of his/her parents or guardian, or in the absence thereof, the child's nearest
relative. Said authority shall give notice to the local social welfare and development officer who
will determine the appropriate programs in consultation with the child and to the person having
custody over the child. If the parents, guardians or nearest relatives cannot be located, or if
they refuse to take custody, the child may be released to any of the following: a duly registered
nongovernmental or religious organization; a barangay official or a member of the Barangay
Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC); a local social welfare and development officer;
or, when and where appropriate, the DSWD. If the child referred to herein has been found by
the Local Social Welfare and Development Office to be abandoned, neglected or abused by
his parents, or in the event that the parents will not comply with the prevention program, the
proper petition for involuntary commitment shall be filed by the DSWD or the Local Social
Welfare and Development Office pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as
"The Child and Youth Welfare Code."


Although the crime was committed on 13 April 1999 and Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only on 20 May
2006, the said law should be given retroactive effect in favor of Raymund who was not shown to be a habitual
criminal. This is based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in
Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.


While Raymund is exempt from criminal liability, his civil liability is not extinguished pursuant to the second paragraph of
Section 6, Republic Act No. 9344.

As to Rodels situation, it must be borne in mind that he was 16 years old at the time of the commission of
the crime. A determination of whether he acted with or without discernment is necessary pursuant to Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 9344, viz:

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. x x x.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has
acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.


Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful
act.[24] Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances afforded by the records in each case.

The Court of Appeals could not have been more accurate when it opined that Rodel acted with
discernment. Rodel, together with his cohorts, warned Jovencio not to reveal their hideous act to anyone; otherwise, they
would kill him. Rodel knew, therefore, that killing AAA was a condemnable act and should be kept in secrecy. He fully
appreciated the consequences of his unlawful act.

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed upon a person under 18 but above
15 shall be the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, but always in the proper period.

The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Pursuant to
Article 68, the maximum penalty should be within prisionmayor, which is a degree lower than reclusion temporal. Absent
any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the maximum penalty should be in the medium period of prision mayor or 8
years and 1 day to 10 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum should be anywhere within the
penalty next lower in degree, that is, prision correccional. Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, which
is 6 months and one day of prision correccional to 8 years and one day of prision mayor, is in order. However, the
sentence to be imposed against Rodel should be suspended pursuant to Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which
states:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have
resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of
conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,
without need of application. Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be
applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of
the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.


The Court of Appeals awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages in
favor of the heirs of the victim. In addition, Rodel and Raymund are ordered to pay P25,000.00 as temperate damages in
lieu of the actual damages for funeral expenses, which the prosecution claimed to have incurred but failed to support by
receipts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29 August 2007 in CA-G.R.
No. 27757, exempting Raymund Madali from criminal liability is hereby AFFIRMED. With respect to Rodel Madali, being a
child in conflict with the law, this Court suspends the pronouncement of his sentence and REMANDS his case to the court
a quo for further proceedings in accordance with Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344. However, with respect to the civil
liabilities, Rodel Madali and Raymund Madali are solidarily liable to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS. SARCIA 2009
On automatic review is the decision
1
dated July 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00717
which affirmed, with modifications, an earlier decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao City, Branch 13, in
Criminal Case No. 4134, finding herein accused-appellant Richard O. Sarcia alias "Nogi" guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape
3
committed against AAA,
4
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay
the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the cost of the suit. However, the CA
modified the penalties imposed by the RTC by imposing the death penalty, increasing the award of civil indemnity to
P75,000.00, and awarding P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, aside from the P50,000.00 for moral damages.
The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in 1996 against AAA, a five (5) year old girl. After almost four (4)
years, AAAs father filed a complaint
5
for acts of lasciviousness against herein accused-appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon
review of the evidence, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay upgraded the charge to rape.
6
The
Information
7
dated September 5, 2000 reads:
That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doa Tomasa, Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design, and by means of
force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with [AAA],
who was then 6 years of age, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty.
8
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim AAA; her minor cousin; her father; and Dr. Joana Manatlao,
the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. The defense presented the accused-appellant himself, who
vehemently denied committing the crimes imputed to him and Manuel Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial
Court at Guinobatan, Albay.
On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision
9
finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape and
imposed the penalty mentioned above.
The record of this case was forwarded to this Court in view of the Notice of Appeal filed by the accused- appellant.
10

Accused-appellant filed his Appellants Brief
11
on July 15, 2004, while the People, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed its Appellees Brief
12
on December 15, 2004.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,
13
modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases in which the penalty imposed by
the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the Resolution dated September 19, 1995 in "Internal
Rules of the Supreme Court," the case was transferred, for appropriate action and disposition, to the CA where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717.
As stated at the beginning hereof, the CA, in its decision of July 14, 2005, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 000717, affirmed with
modification the judgment of conviction pronounced by the trial court. We quote the fallo of the CA decision:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. The accused, Richard Sarcia y Olivera, is ordered to suffer the
penalty of DEATH, and to pay the victim, [AAA], the amount of (1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and (3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC
(Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases), which took effect on October
15, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
On September 30, 2005, the case was elevated to this Court for further review.
14

In our Resolution
15
of November 15, 2005, we required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental
briefs. Accused-appellant filed his Supplemental Brief
16
on April 7, 2006. Having failed to submit one, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) was deemed to have waived the filing of its supplemental brief.
In his Brief filed before the CA, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF [AAA], [her cousin] and [her
father].
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
II
THE LOWER COURT GLARINGLY ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI INTERPOSED BY THE
ACCUSED WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE.
III
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED RICHARD SARCIA.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the OSG in the Appellee's Brief, as follows:
On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her [cousin and two other playmates], was playing in the yard
of Saling Crisologo near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to the backyard of Saling Crisologos house. She agreed.
Unknown to appellant, [AAAs cousin] followed them.
Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAAs] shorts and underwear. He also removed his trousers and brief.
Thereafter, he ordered [AAA] to lie down on her back. Then, he lay on top of her and inserted his penis into [AAAs]
private organ. Appellant made an up-and-down movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt severe pain inside her private
part and said "aray." She also felt an intense pain inside her stomach.
[AAAs cousin], who positioned herself around five (5) meters away from them, witnessed appellants dastardly act.
Horrified, [AAAs cousin] instinctively rushed to the house of [AAAs] mother, her aunt Emily, and told the latter what she
had seen. [AAAs] mother answered that they (referring to {AAA and her cousin} were still very young to be talking about
such matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and ordered [AAA] to put on her clothes. Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAAs cousin] immediately returned to the backyard of Saling Crisologo where she found [AAA] crying.
Appellant, however, was gone. [AAAs cousin] approached [AAA] and asked her what appellant had done to her. When
[AAA] did not answer, [her cousin] did not ask her any further question and just accompanied her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant had done to her because she feared that her mother might slap her.
Later, when her mother washed her body, she felt a grating sensation in her private part. Thereafter, [AAA] called for [her
cousin]. [AAAs cousin] came to their house and told [AAAs] mother again that appellant had earlier made an up-and-
down movement on top of [AAA]. [AAAs mother], however did not say anything. At that time, [AAAs] father was working
in Manila.
Dr. Joana Manatloa is the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. She testified that: (1) it was the rural health
officer, Dr. Reantaso, who conducted a physical examination on [AAA]; (2) Dr. Reantaso prepared and signed a medico-
legal certificate containing the result of [AAA]s examination; (3) Dr. Reantaso, however, had already resigned as rural
health officer of Guinobatan, Albay; (4) as a medical doctor, she can interpret, the findings in said medico-legal certificate
issued to [AAA]; (5) [AAA]s medical findings are as follows: "negative for introital vulvar laceration nor scars, perforated
hymen, complete, pinkish vaginal mucosa, vaginal admits little finger with resistance; (6) the finding "negative for introital
bulvar laceration nor scars" means, in laymans language, that there was no showing of any scar or wound, and (7) there
is a complete perforation of the hymen which means that it could have been subjected to a certain trauma or pressure
such as strenuous exercise or the entry of an object like a medical instrument or penis.
17

On the other hand, the trial court summarized the version of the defense as follows:
Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single, student and a resident of Doa Tomasa, Guinobatan, Albay denied he raped [AAA].
While he knows [AAAs] parents, because sometimes they go to their house looking for his father to borrow money, he
does not know [AAA] herself. His father retired as a fireman from Crispa in 1991 while his mother worked as an
agriculturist in the Municipality of Teresa, Antipolo, Rizal. As an agriculturist of the Department of Agriculture, his mother
would bring seedlings and attend seminars in Batangas and Baguio. They were residing in Cainta, Rizal when sometime
in 1992 they transferred residence to Guinobatan, Albay. His father is from barangay Masarawag while his mother is from
barangay Doa Tomasa both of Guinobatan, Albay. After their transfer in Guinobatan, his mother continued to be an
agriculturist while his father tended to his 1-hectare coconut land. Richard testified he was between fourteen (14) and
fifteen (15) years old in 1992 when they transferred to Guinobatan. Between 1992 and 1994 he was out of school. But
from 1994 to 1998 he took his high school at Masarawag High School. His daily routine was at about 4:00 oclock in the
afternoon after school before proceeding home he would usually play basketball at the basketball court near the church in
Doa Tomasa about 1 kilometer away from their house. When her mother suffered a stroke in 1999 he and his father took
turns taking care of his mother. Richard denied molesting other girls ... and was most surprised when he was accused of
raping [AAA]. He knows Saling Crisologo and the latters place which is more than half kilometer to their house. Richard
claimed Salvacion Bobier, grandmother of Mae Christine Camu, whose death on May 7, 2000 was imputed to him and for
which a case for Murder under Criminal Case No. 4087 was filed against him with the docile cooperation of [AAAs]
parents who are related to Salvacion, concocted and instigated [AAAs] rape charge against him to make the case for
Murder against him stronger and life for him miserable. He was incarcerated on May 10, 2000 for the Murder charge and
two (2) months later while he already in detention, the rape case supposedly committed in 1996 was filed against him in
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Guinobatan, Albay. He was to learn about it from his sister, Marivic, on a Sunday
afternoon sometime on July 20, 2000 when his sister visited him in jail. He naturally got angry when he heard of this rape
charge because he did not do such thing and recalled telling his sister they can go to a doctor and have the child examine
to prove he did not rape her. Subsequently, from his sister again he was to learn that the rape case was ordered
dismissed.
On cross-examination, Richard admitted [AAAs] mother, is also related to his father, [AAA mothers] father, being a
second cousin of his father. Richard is convinced it is not the lending of money by his father to the AAAs family as the
motive for the latter to file the rape case against him but the instigation of Salvacion Bobier.
Manuel A. Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Guinobatan, Albay, testified on the records of
Criminal Case No. 7078 filed in MTC Guinobatan, Albay against Richard Sarcia for Rape in relation to RA 7610 relative to
the alleged withdrawal of said rape case but the accused through counsel failed to formally offer the marked exhibits
relative to said case.
18

Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him, as the prosecution was not able to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He assailed the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, AAA, her cousin and her father on the
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
following grounds: (1) the testimonies of AAA and her cousin were inconsistent with each other; (2) the victim was
confused as to the date and time of the commission of the offense; (3) there was a four-year delay in filing the criminal
case, and the only reason why they filed the said case was "to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this same
accused in a murder case filed by said Salvacion Bobier for the death of her granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May
7, 2000." Accused-appellant stressed that the same Salvacion Bobier helped AAAs father in filing the said case for rape.
Accused-appellant also claimed that the prosecution failed to prove that he employed force, threats or intimidation to
achieve his end. Finally, accused-appellant harped on the finding in the medical certificate issued by Dr. Reantaso and
interpreted by Dr. Joana Manatlao, stating "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scar which means that there was no
showing of any scar or wound."
In his Appellee's Brief accused-appellant pointed out the inconsistencies between AAAs and her cousins testimonies as
follows: (1) the cousin testified that she played with AAA at the time of the incident, while AAA testified that she was doing
nothing before accused-appellant invited her to the back of the house of a certain Saling; (2) the cousin testified that when
she saw accused-appellant doing the push-and-pull motion while on top of AAA, the latter shouted in a loud voice contrary
to AAAs testimony that when accused-appellant was inside her and started the up-and-down motion, she said "aray"; (3)
when the cousin returned to AAA after telling the latters mother what accused-appellant had done to AAA, she found AAA
crying. AAA however testified that, after putting on her clothes, she invited the cousin to their house; and (4) the cousin
testified that other children were playing at the time of the incident, but AAA testified that there were only four of them who
were playing at that time.
As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor details and collateral
matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal
occurrence and the positive identification of the accused. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the
credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even
improbabilities, unusual, for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses.
19
The alleged inconsistencies in this case
are too inconsequential to overturn the findings of the court a quo. It is important that the two prosecution witnesses were
one in saying that it was accused-appellant who sexually abused AAA. Their positive, candid and straightforward
narrations of how AAA was sexually abused by accused-appellant evidently deserve full faith and credence. When the
rape incident happened, AAA was only five (5) years old; and when she and her cousin testified, they were barely 9 and
11 years old, respectively. This Court has had occasion to rule that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
witnesses can be explained by their age and their inexperience with court proceedings, and that even the most candid of
witnesses commit mistakes and make confused and inconsistent statements. This is especially true of young witnesses,
who could be overwhelmed by the atmosphere of the courtroom. Hence, there is more reason to accord them ample
space for inaccuracy.
20

Accused-appellant capitalizes on AAAs inability to recall the exact date when the incident in 1996 was committed. Failure
to recall the exact date of the crime, however, is not an indication of false testimony, for even discrepancies regarding
exact dates of rapes are inconsequential and immaterial and cannot discredit the credibility of the victim as a witness.
21
In
People v. Purazo,
22
We ruled:
We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the
offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately
stated. As early as 1908, we already held that where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential
element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the
crime was not committed at the precise time or place alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of some
immaterial fact set out in the complaint, provided it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to
the date of the filing of the complaint or information within the period of the statute of limitations and at a place within the
jurisdiction of the court.
Also in People v. Salalima,
23
the Court held:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on
its face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or time when the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The
gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date
when the offense was committed an information is sufficient. In previous cases, we ruled that allegations that rapes were
committed "before and until October 15, 1994," "sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter," "sometime in
November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto" and "on or about and sometime in the year 1988"
constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In this case, AAAs declaration that the rape incident took place on December 15, 1996 was explained by the trial court,
and we quote:
The rape took place in 1996. As earlier noted by the Court the date December 15, 1996 mentioned by [AAA] may have
been arbitrarily chosen by the latter due to the intense cross-examination she was subjected but the Court believes it
could have been in any month and date in the year 1996 as in fact neither the information nor [AAAs] sworn statement
mention the month and date but only the year.
24

Likewise, witnesses credibility is not affected by the delay in the filing of the case against accused-appellant. Neither does
the delay bolster accused-appellants claim that the only reason why this case was filed against him was "to help
Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this same accused-appellant in the case of murder filed by Salvacion Bobier for the
death of her granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000."
The rape victims delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the charge nor is it an indication of
deceit. It is common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear of her aggressor and the lack of courage to face the public
stigma of having been sexually abused. In People v. Coloma
25
we even considered an 8-year delay in reporting the long
history of rape by the victims father as understandable and not enough to render incredible the complaint of a 13-year-old
daughter. Thus, in the absence of other circumstances that show that the charge was a mere concoction and impelled by
some ill motive, delay in the filing of the complainant is not sufficient to defeat the charge. Here, the failure of AAAs
parents to immediately file this case was sufficiently justified by the complainants father in the latters testimony, thus:
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Q But, did you not say, please correct me if I am wrong, you got angry when your wife told you that something happened
to Hazel way back in 1996?
A Yes, sir.
Q Yet, despite your anger you were telling us that you waited until June to file this case?
A After I heard about the incident, I and my wife had a talk for which reason that during that time we had no money yet to
use in filing the case, so we waited. When we were able to save enough amounts, we filed the case.
26

Accused-appellant also contends that he could not be liable for rape because there is no proof that he employed force,
threats or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of AAA. Where the girl is below 12 years old, as in this case, the only
subject of inquiry is whether "carnal knowledge" took place. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary, since
none of these is an element of statutory rape. There is a conclusive presumption of absence of free consent when the
rape victim is below the age of twelve.
27

Accused-appellant harps on the medical report, particularly the conclusion quoted as follows: "negative for introital bulvar
laceration nor scars, which means, in layman language, that there was no showing of any scar or wound." The Court has
consistently ruled that the presence of lacerations in the victims sexual organ is not necessary to prove the crime of rape
and its absence does not negate the fact of rape. A medical report is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.
28
What is
important is that AAAs testimony meets the test of credibility, and that is sufficient to convict the accused.
Accused-appellants defense of denial was properly rejected. Time and time again, we have ruled that denial like alibi is
the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. Furthermore, it cannot prevail over the
positive and unequivocal identification of appellant by the offended party and other witnesses. Categorical and consistent
positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over
the appellants defense of denial and alibi.
29
The shallow hypothesis put forward by accused-appellant that he was
accused of raping AAA due to the instigation of Salvacion Bobier hardly convinces this Court. On this score, the trial court
aptly reached the following conclusion:
True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAAs family file the instant case against the accused, but the Court believes
[AAAs] parents finally decided to file the rape case because after they have come to realize after what happened to Mae
Christine Camu that what previously [AAA and her cousin] told her mother and which the latter had continually ignored is
after all true.
AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. It has been stressed often enough that the testimony of rape victims
who are young and immature deserve full credence. It is improbable for a girl of complainants age to fabricate a charge
so humiliating to herself and her family had she not been truly subjected to the painful experience of sexual abuse. At any
rate, a girl of tender years, innocent and guileless, cannot be expected to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to
any man if it were not true.
30
Parents would not sacrifice their own daughter, a child of tender years at that, and subject
her to the rigors and humiliation of public trial for rape, if they were not motivated by an honest desire to have their
daughters transgressor punished accordingly.
31
Hence, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and
that her testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
The guilt of accused-appellant having been established beyond reasonable doubt, we discuss now the proper penalty to
be imposed on him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
32
was the governing law at the time the
accused-appellant committed the rape in question. Under the said law, the penalty of death shall be imposed when the
victim of rape is a child below seven years of age. In this case, as the age of AAA, who was five (5) years old at the time
the rape was committed, was alleged in the information and proven during trial by the presentation of her birth certificate,
which showed her date of birth as January 16, 1991, the death penalty should be imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. We cannot agree with the CAs conclusion
that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2)
33
of the Revised Penal Code. When accused
appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in 1996, he was 18 years
of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place "in any month and date in the year 1996."
Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain that
the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the
mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the
latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the
accused regarding his age.
34

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper
penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be
reckoned with.
35
Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in awarding damages provided in the Civil Code, in case a crime is
committed. Specifically, Article 2204 of the Civil Code provides that "in crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be
respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances." The issue now is whether
the award of damages should be reduced in view of the presence here of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority of the accused at the time of the commission of the offense.
A review of the nature and purpose of the damages imposed on the convicted offender is in order. Article 107 of the
Revised Penal Code defines the term "indemnification," which is included in the civil liability prescribed by Article 104 of
the same Code, as follows:
Art. 107. Indemnification-What is included. Indemnification for consequential damages shall include not only those
caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime.
Relative to civil indemnity, People v. Victor
36
ratiocinated as follows:
The lower court, however, erred in categorizing the award of P50,000.00 to the offended party as being in the nature of
moral damages. We have heretofore explained in People v. Gementiza that the indemnity authorized by our criminal law
as civil liability ex delicto for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and aside from
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. It is not to be considered
as moral damages thereunder, the latter being based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the
exercise of sound discretion.
One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue unabated and the legislative response has
been in the form of higher penalties. The Court believes that, on like considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil
aspect should follow the same direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or
effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the present amended law,
the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not less than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the
apathetic societal perception of the penal law, and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the
displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity. (Emphasis Supplied)
The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature. In San Andres v. Court
of Appeals,
37
we held:
x x x Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate
the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. (Emphasis Supplied)
In another case, this Court also explained:
What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as compensatory damages awarded for mental pain
and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong (25 C.J.S. 815).
38
(Emphasis Supplied)
Thus, according to law and jurisprudence, civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and compensatory damages for the
injury caused to the offended party and that suffered by her family, and moral damages are likewise compensatory in
nature. The fact of minority of the offender at the time of the commission of the offense has no bearing on the gravity and
extent of injury caused to the victim and her family, particularly considering the circumstances attending this case. Here,
the accused-appelant could have been eighteen at the time of the commission of the rape. He was accorded the benefit of
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority because of a lack of proof regarding his actual age and the date of the
rape rather than a moral or evidentiary certainty of his minority.
In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, which warrants the
lowering of the public penalty by one degree, there is no justifiable ground to depart from the jurisprudential trend in the
award of damages in the case of qualified rape, considering the compensatory nature of the award of civil indemnity and
moral damages. This was the same stance this Court took in People v. Candelario,
39
a case decided on July 28, 1999,
which did not reduce the award of damages. At that time, the damages amounted to P75,000.00 for civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 for moral damages, even if the public penalty imposed on the accused was lowered by one degree, because
of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v. Salome
40
and People v. Quiachon
41
is
the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually
imposed on the offender.
Regarding the civil indemnity and moral damages, People v. Salome explained the basis for increasing the amount of said
civil damages as follows:
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the Court of Appeals to Sally in accordance with the ruling in
People v. Sambrano which states:
"As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending qualifying circumstances that
require the imposition of the death penalty, the civil indemnity for the victim shall P75,000.00 Also, in rape cases, moral
damages are awarded without the need proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has
suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. However, the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as moral damages
should also be increased to P75,000 pursuant to current jurisprudence on qualified rape."
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a
heinous offense is still death and the offense is still heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still
P75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing jurisprudence, correctly awarded the
following amounts; P75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances warranting
the imposition of the death penalty; P75,000.00.00 as moral damages because the victim is assumed to have suffered
moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral damages even without proof thereof, x x x
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil
indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the ratiocination in People v. Victor, the said award is not
dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense. The Court declared that the award of P75,000.00
shows "not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but
also the expression of the displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."
The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed, which
would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced
to reclusion perpetua.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary or corrective damages are
imposed in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Exemplary damages are not
recoverable as a matter of right. The requirements of an award of exemplary damagees are: (1) they may be imposed by
way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimants right to them has been established;
(2) they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory
damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton,
fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.
42
Since the compensatory damages, such as the civil indemnity and moral
damages, are increased when qualified rape is committed, the exemplary damages should likewise be increased in
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.
43

In sum, the increased amount of P75,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages should be maintained. It is also
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
proper and appropriate that the award of exemplary damages be likewise increased to the amount of P30,000.00 based
on the latest jurisprudence on the award of damages on qualified rape. Thus, the CA correctly awarded P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity. However the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages is increased to P75,000.00
44
and that of P25,000.00
as exemplary damages is likewise increased to P30,000.00.
45

Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid Prison pending the outcome of his appeal before this
Court, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC
decision and CA decision were promulgated on January 17, 2003 and July 14, 2005, respectively. The promulgation of
the sentence of conviction of accused-appellant handed down by the RTC was not suspended as he was about 25 years
of age at that time, in accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare
Code
46
and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
47
Accused-appellant is now
approximately 31 years of age. He was previously detained at the Albay Provincial Jail at Legaspi City and transferred to
the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City on October 13, 2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. Persons who have been convicted and are
serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of
the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the
retroactive application of this Act. x x x
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been convicted and are serving
sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the
commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court
is still under review. Hence, it is necessary to examine which provisions of R.A. No. 9344 shall apply to accused-
appellant, who was below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law, even if
he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is found guilty of the offense charged. It reads:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability
which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the
court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided,
however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or more at
the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the
appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.
The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict with the
law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.
48
The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit
of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of
an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court
is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish.
49
Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and
another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic
suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with
the law can be gleaned from the Senate deliberations
50
on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent portion of which is quoted below:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious
offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be recommended by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office
of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of
the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the
childs restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied)1avvphi1
Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in
conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec.
40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court finds that the objective of the disposition
measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has
willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law
shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the court
shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
(emphasis ours)
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been promulgated, even before
the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and
academic.
51
However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344,
which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with
the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a
regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by the appropriate disposition measures and
shall be enforced in accordance with law.
52

ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua;
53

and (2) accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim the amount of P75,000.00 and P30,000.00 as moral damages and
exemplary damages, respectively. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is maintained. However, the
case shall be REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS. MANTALABA 2011
For this Court's consideration is the Decision[1] dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment[2] dated September 14, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No. 10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan
Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) 9165.

The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report from
an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years old at the time, was selling shabu at Purok 4,
Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust team was organized, composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric
Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers who were provided with two (2) pieces of P100 marked bills to be used in the purchase.

Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked money, proceeded to
Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust operation. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen who
was sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to
each other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the
marked money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to the police officers and told them that the transaction has
been completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he was leaving the
place.

The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangay officials Richard S. Tandoy
and Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the appellant and found a big sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to the
barangay officials the marked money, two pieces of P100 bill, thrown by the appellant on the ground.

After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the police officers made an inventory
of the items recovered from the appellant which are: (1) one big sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP-1-10-01-03;
(2) one small sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP 2-10-01-03; and (3) two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos
marked money and a fifty peso (P50) bill. Thereafter, a letter-request was prepared by Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo for
the laboratory examination of the two (2) sachets containing a crystalline substance, ultra-violet examination on the
person of the appellant as well as the two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money. The request was brought by
PO1 Pajo and personally received by Police Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, Forensic Chemical Officer of the Regional
Crime Laboratory Office XII Butuan City, who immediately conducted the examination. The laboratory examination
revealed that the appellant tested positive for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and the
crystalline substance contained in two sachets, separately marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were
positively identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against appellant for
violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, stating the following:

Criminal Case No. 10250
That on or about the evening of October 1, 1003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3,
Agao, Butuan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously sell zero point zero four one two (0.0412) grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu which is a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW : (Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).[3]

Criminal Case No. 10251
That on or about the evening of October 1, 2003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3,
Agao, Butuan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously possess zero point six one three one (0.6131) grams of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, which is a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW: (Violation of Section 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).[4]


Eventually, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

In its Omnibus Judgment[5] dated September 14, 2005, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged, the dispositive portion of which, reads:
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 10250 for selling shabu, a dangerous
drug, as defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. As
provided for in Sec. 98 of R.A. 9165, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts
punishable by life imprisonment to death shall be reclusion perpetua to death. As such, Allen
Mantalaba y Udtojan is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 10251, the Court likewise finds accused Allen Mantalaba
y Udtojan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for illegally possessing shabu, a dangerous
drug, weighing 0.6131 gram as defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 and accused being a minor at the time of the commission of the offense, after
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is accordingly sentenced to six (6) years and
one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum of prision mayor and to pay a fine
of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).

SO ORDERED.[6]


The CA affirmed intoto the decision of the RTC. It disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City
dated September 14, 2005 appealed from finding the accused-appellant Allen Udtojan
Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of Violation of Section 5 and
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act, is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Thus, the present appeal.

Appellant states the lone argument that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime charged
despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

According to appellant, there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the poseur-buyer. He also
argues that the chain of custody of the seized shabu was not established. Finally, he asserts that an accused should be
presumed innocent and that the burden of proof is on the prosecution.

The petition is unmeritorious.

Appellant insists that the prosecution did not present any evidence that an actual sale took place. However,
based on the testimony of PO1 Randy Pajo, there is no doubt that the buy-bust operation was successfully conducted,
thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: Will you explain to this Honorable Court why did you conduct and how did you conduct
your buy-bust operation at the time?
A: We conducted a buy-bust operation because of the report from our civilian assets that Allen
Mantalaba was engaged in drug trade and selling shabu. And after we evaluated this
Information we informed Inspector Dacillo that we will operate this accused for possible
apprehension.

Q: Before you conducted your buy-bust operation, what procedure did you take?
A: We prepared the operational plan for buy-bust against the suspect. We prepared a request
for powder dusting for our marked moneys to be used for the operation.

Q: Did you use marked moneys in this case?

x x x x

Q: Then armed with these marked moneys, what steps did you take next?
A: After briefing of our team, we proceeded immediately to the area.

Q: You mentioned of poseur-buyer, what would the poseur-buyer do?
A: We made an arrangement with the poseur-buyer that during the buying of shabu there
should be a pre-arranged signal of the poseur-buyer to the police officer.


Q: What happened when your poseur-buyer who, armed with this marked moneys,
approached the guy who was selling shabu at that time?
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
A: The poseur-buyer during that time gave the marked moneys to the suspect.

Q: Where were you when this poseur-buyer gave the moneys to the suspect?
A: We positioned ourselves about 10 meters away from the area of the poseur-buyer and the
suspect.

Q: You mentioned of the pre-arranged signal, what would this be?
A: This is a case-to-case basis, your Honor, in the pre-arrangement signal because in
the pre-arranged signal we used a cap and a towel. (sic) In the case, of this suspect,
there was no towel there was no cap at the time of giving the shabu and the marked
moneys to the suspect and considering also that that was about 7:00 o'clock in the
evening. The poseur-buyer immediately proceeded to us and informed us that the
shabu was already given by the suspect.

Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white
[crystalline] substance, we immediately approached the suspect.

Q: Who was with a (sic) suspect when you conducted the buy-bust operation[?] Was he alone
or did he had (sic) any companion at that time?
A: He was alone.

Q: When you rushed up to the suspect what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this constitutional rights
and we immediately handcuffed him.

Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did
not immediately searched in. We called the attention of the barangay officials to witness the
search of the suspect.

Q: How many sachets of shabu have you taken from the suspect during the buy-bust
operation?
A: We took from the possession of the suspect one big sachet of shabu.

x x x x

Q: What was the result of the searched (sic) for him?
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of 100 peso
bills as marked moneys.[8]

What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the concurrence
of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[9] From the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was
well established that the elements have been satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly
identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well as the marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The
testimony was also clear as to the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted.

To corroborate the testimony of PO2 Pajo, the prosecution presented the testimony of Police Inspector Virginia
Sison-Gucor, a forensic chemical officer, who confirmed that the plastic containing white crystalline substance was
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride and that the petitioner was in possession of the marked money used in the
buy-bust operation, thus:

PROS. RUIZ:
Q: What was the result of your examination or what were your findings on the sachets
of suspected shabu?
A: After the preliminary and confirmatory tests were conducted on the stated
specimen, the result was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

x x x x

Q: What were your findings when you examined the living person of the accused,
as well as the marked money mentioned in this report?
A: According to my report, the findings for the living person of Allen Udtojan Mantalaba
is positive to the test for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet flourescent powder. x x
x[10]

The above only confirms that the buy-bust operation really occurred. Once again, this Court stresses that a
buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and
distributors.[11] It is often utilized by law enforcers for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
of their nefarious activities.[12] In People v. Roa,[13] this Court had the opportunity to expound on the nature and
importance of a buy-bust operation, ruling that:

In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable
requirement before police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that
Section 86[14] of Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP
and the Bureau of Customs to maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug-related
matters," the provision does not, by so saying, make PDEA's participation a condition sine qua
non for every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest
sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113[15] of the Rules of the Court, which police authorities may
rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the
PDEA.[16] A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.
Neither is the lack of prior surveillance fatal. The case of People v.
Lacbanes[17] is quite instructive:

In People v. Ganguso,[18] it has been held that prior
surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment
operation, especially when the buy-bust team members were
accompanied to the scene by their informant. In the instant case,
the arresting officers were led to the scene by the poseur-buyer.
Granting that there was no surveillance conducted before the buy-
bust operation, this Court held in People v. Tranca,[19] that there is
no rigid or textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations.
Flexibility is a trait of good police work. The police officers may
decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the need for
prior surveillance.[20]

The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect because
trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify. This is more true if such
findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court,
said findings are generally binding upon this Court.[21]

In connection therewith, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was also correct in finding that the appellant is equally
guilty of violation of Section 11 of RA 9165, or the illegal possession of dangerous drug. As an incident to the lawful
arrest of the appellant after the consummation of the buy-bust operation, the arresting officers had the authority to search
the person of the appellant. In the said search, the appellant was caught in possession of 0.6131 grams of shabu. In
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.[22]
As a defense, appellant denied that he owns the shabu and the marked money confiscated from him. However,
based on his cross-examination, such denial was not convincing enough to merit reasonable doubt, thus:

PROS. RUIZ:
Q: So it is true now that when these police officers passed you by they
recovered from your possession one sachet of shabu?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And it is true that after you were arrested and when you were searched they also
found another sachet of shabu also in your pocket?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you mentioned in your counter-affidavit marked as Exhibit H for the prosecution that
no money was taken from you because you have none at that time, is it not?
A: None sir, only the P250.00 which Jonald Ybanoso left to me.

Q: This P250.00 which Jonald left to you was also confiscated from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Were not P200 of the P250.00 was thrown to the ground during the time you were
arrested by the police?
A: No, sir.

Q: It was taken from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when the policemen brought you to the crime laboratory and had your hands tested
for ultra-violet fluorescent powder, your hands tested positively for the presence of the said
powder?
A: Yes, sir.[23]

ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

Incidentally, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it
can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.[24]

Another contention raised by the appellant is the failure of the prosecution to show the chain of custody of the
recovered dangerous drug. According to him, while it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed the request for
laboratory examination, only police officers Pajo and Simon were present in the buy-bust operation.

Section 21 of RA 9165 reads:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required
to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground
therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team.[25] Its non-compliance will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.[26] What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.[27] In this particular case, it is undisputed that police officers Pajo and Simon were members of the buy-bust
operation team. The fact that it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed the letter-request for laboratory
examination does not in any way affect the integrity of the items confiscated. All the requirements for the proper chain of
custody had been observed. As testified to by PO2 Pajo regarding the procedure undertaken after the consummation of
the buy-bust operation:

Prosecutor
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white
[crystalline] in substance, we immediately approached the suspect.

x x x x

Q: When you rushed up to the suspect, what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this
[constitutional] rights and immediately handcuffed him.

Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the
suspect, we did not immediately searched in. We called the attention of the barangay officials
to witness the search of the suspect.

x x x x

Q: Now, before you searched the suspect you requested the presence of the
barangay officials. Now, when these barangay officials were present, what did you do on the
suspect?
A: We immediately searched the suspect.

Q: What was the result of the searched for him? (sic)
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of
P100.00 peso bills as marked moneys.

Q: You said the suspect threw the marked moneys when you searched him, where
were the marked moneys?
A: On the ground.

ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Q: Who picked these marked moneys?
A: I was the one who picked the marked moneys.

Q: And then after you had picked the marked moneys and after you had the 2 pieces
of sachets of shabu; one during the buy-bust and the other one during the search, what did
you do [with] these 2 pieces of sachets of shabu and the marked moneys?
A: I recorded those items recovered, sir, during the search to the Certificate of
Inventory.[28]

As ruled by this Court, what is crucial in the chain of custody is the marking of the confiscated item which, in the
present case, was complied with, thus:

Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking[29] of the seized drugs or other
related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the
starting point in the custodial link, thus, it is vital that the seized contraband are immediately
marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference.
The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all
other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are
disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or
contamination of evidence.[30]

Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court finds it appropriate to discuss the effect of his
minority in his suspension of sentence. The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took
place or when the said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the RTC's
Decision.

It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on this case on
September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance
with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code[31] and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law,[32]the laws that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of judgment,because
the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.

It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under
Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application, thus:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have
resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of
conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,
without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be
applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances
of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

x x x x


Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentence. - Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the
commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall
likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x


However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia[33] that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides
that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of
age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of
sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. The provision states:

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that
the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have
not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the
condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall
be brought before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended
sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of
twenty-one (21) years.

Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the provisions of
Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic. It is
highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the
sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence,
when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the
latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of Section
38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as
opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603.[34]

Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA No. 9344,
which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:[35]

SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other
Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the
court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution,
in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.


In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, the RTC imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetua as mandated in Section 98[36] of the same law. A violation of Section 5 of RA 9165
merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death; however, in Section 98, it is provided that, where the offender is a
minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be reclusion perpetua
to death. Basically, this means that the penalty can now be graduated as it has adopted the technical nomenclature of
penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code. The said principle was enunciated by this Court in People v.
Simon,[37] thus:

We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing
the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of
such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was
because the special laws involved provided their own specific penalties for the offenses
punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in
the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned did
not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would consequently be
impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to
determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.

This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions
of the Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary
application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not components of or
contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory
effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former,
cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the
special law against, such supplementary application.

The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in
and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the
Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration,
correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in
this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the
Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise.

x x x x

Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently
determine the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as
applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and the
nature of the participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when
there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance,
the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating
circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty by one or two
degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in
toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of
section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
contemplated by the legislature.

Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a
penalty in some manner not specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof,
the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the
crime consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower
in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the former in the scale in
Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this case consists
of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is, prision correccional, prision mayor and
reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto menor, destierro and arresto
mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which must
each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure
remain in the scale.

The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be
appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the
penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable
penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three
component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an
independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision
correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda
est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may
continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an
imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to
Congress.[38]


Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority[39] can now be appreciated in fixing the penalty
that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without considering
the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than
reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been
appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium
period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.[40] The ISLAW
is applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua
to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the
proper imposable penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN,
affirming the Omnibus Judgment dated September 14, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal
Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No. 10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
penalty that should be imposed on appellant's conviction of violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, is six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE VS AGACER 2013
This case involves a man who was killed by his own relatives. Convicted for the crime of murder by the lower courts, the
indicted relatives are now before us assailing their guilty verdict.
Factual Antecedents
This is an appeal from the November 17, 2006 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01543,
affirming with modification the August 7, 2001 Decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Aparri, Cagayan which
found appellants Florencio Agacer (Florencio), Franklin Agacer (Franklin), Elynor Agacer (Elynor), Eric Agacer (Eric) and
Eddie Agacer (Eddie), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the killing of Cesario Agacer (Cesario).
As mentioned, all the appellants were related to Cesario. Florencio was Cesarios nephew and is the father of Franklin
while the brothers Elynor, Eric and Eddie are his nephews.
On March 2, 1999, an Information
3
for Murder was filed against the five appellants, the accusatory portion of which reads
as follows:
That on or about April 2, 1998, in the municipality of Sta. Ana, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction [of] this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a long firearm, a bow and arrow, a bolo and stones, with intent
to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, conspiring together and helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, stone and shoot one Cesario Agacer, inflicting upon the latter [bruises]
and multiple gunshot wounds in his body which caused his death.
That the killing was aggravated by the use of an unlicensed firearm.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
4

On October 14, 1999, Florencio, Elynor, Franklin and Eric entered separate pleas of "not guilty" during their arraignment.
5

ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
On January 11, 2000, Eddie likewise pleaded "not guilty".
6
Thereafter, trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecutions version of the events is as follows:
Cesario was a 55-year old farmer and owner of a ricefield situated in Dungeg, Santa Ana, Cagayan. On April 2, 1998, at
around 9:00 a.m., he was clearing a section of his farm and preparing the beddings for the rice seedlings intended for the
coming planting season. Farm laborers Genesis Delantar (Genesis), his brother Andy, Rafael Morgado and brothers
Roden (Roden) and Ric (Ric) Vallejo were nearby in a separate section of the same ricefield harvesting Cesarios palay.
According to prosecution witnesses Genesis and Roden, it was at that moment while Cesario was tending to his farm
when appellants suddenly emerged from a nearby banana plantation and surrounded Cesario. Visibly intimidated, Cesario
moved backwards and retreated to where the other farm laborers were working. However, Franklin set afire the rice
straws that covered Cesarios rice seedlings. This prompted Cesario to return to put out the fire and save his rice
seedlings. At this point, Franklin and Eric started throwing stones at Cesario which forced the latter to retreat again.
Thereafter, Florencio, while standing side by side with Eric, signaled Cesario to come closer. Cesario obliged but when he
was just around five meters away from the group, Eddie suddenly pulled out a gun concealed inside a sack and, without
warning, shot Cesario hitting him in the left portion of his chest. Almost simultaneously, Elynor took aim at Cesario with his
bow and arrow but missed his mark. As Cesario fell, appellants fled towards the irrigation canal, where another gunshot
rang. Thereafter, a short firearm was thrown from where the appellants ran towards the direction of Cesarios fallen body.
Appellants then immediately left the scene of the crime onboard a hand tractor and a tricycle.
After these events unfolded, Genesis and the other farm laborers scampered away in different directions. Genesis then
reached Barangay Capanikian and informed Cesarios son, Neldison Agacer (Neldison), of the death of his father. At
around 3:00 p.m., Cesarios friends in said barangay went to the scene of the crime and retrieved his corpse. During the
autopsy, a total of eight entrance wounds were found, mostly on the chest of Cesarios cadaver. According to the Medico-
Legal Officer, the fatal gunshot wounds were inflicted by the use of a firearm capable of discharging several slugs
simultaneously.
Version of the Defense
The appellants denied the accusations against them and claimed that Florencio only acted in self-defense and in defense
of relatives. As proof, appellants presented Florencio who testified that on April 2, 1998, he proceeded to Dungeg, Sta.
Ana, Cagayan, from his residence in Merde, also in Sta. Ana, Cagayan, to prepare seed beddings in the ricefield over
which he and his uncle Cesario had an existing dispute. At around 8:00 a.m., he claimed that Cesario attempted to
prevent him from preparing the seed beds. When Florencio persisted and argued that he inherited the land from his
father, Cesario departed through a cogonal area. Moments later, Cesario returned and shouted at him not to continue
working on the land. At that time, Florencio noticed that Cesario was holding an object. Suspecting that Cesario may be
armed, he shouted to Eric, Franklin, Eddie and Elynor, who had just arrived, to run away. The four heeded his warning
and scampered in different directions. Cesario then chased Florencio who ran and jumped into the irrigation canal to hide
in the tall cogon grasses. However, Cesario was not deterred and continued to search for him. When Florencio saw that
Cesario was already close, he suddenly grabbed Cesarios buckshot gun and successfully disarmed him. Thereupon,
Cesario drew another firearm and shot Florencio several times. As Cesario was shooting him, Florencio also fired the gun
he earlier grabbed from Cesario and hit the latter. Finding out that he too was hit in the arm, he shouted to his nephews
for help. They responded by taking him to a hospital for treatment. On April 16, 1998, he went to the police to surrender.
Elynor and Eddie corroborated this version in their respective testimonies.
7

Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court found the prosecutions evidence sufficient to prove
appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It held that appellants acted in conspiracy in inflicting upon Cesario, in a
treacherous manner, multiple gunshot wounds. However, the trial court did not appreciate evident premeditation as a
qualifying aggravating circumstance for failure to establish its elements as clearly as the criminal act itself. It also did not
consider as aggravating circumstance the use of an unlicensed firearm since the firearm used in the killing was not
presented in evidence.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision
8
of August 7, 2001, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds all the accused FLORENCIO AGACER, EDDIE AGACER, ELYNOR AGACER, FRANKLIN
AGACER and ERIC AGACER GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER qualified [by] treachery and
hereby sentence[s] them to:
1. suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties;
2. indemnify the heirs of the victim, the amount of P75,000.00 as death indemnity; the amount of P40,000.00 as actual
damages and the amount of P30,000.00 as and by way of Attorneys fees.
3. pay the costs of litigation.
SO ORDERED.
9

Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal,
10
which was approved by the trial court in its Order
11
of August 17, 2001. Pursuant
thereto, the records of the case were elevated to this Court. However, in view of the Courts ruling in People v. Mateo
12

allowing an intermediate review by the CA where the penalty involved is death, reclusion perpetua as in this case, or life
imprisonment, the case was transferred to said court for appropriate action and disposition.
13

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court in all respects. It also awarded moral damages pursuant to the rule laid down
in People v. Dela Cruz
14
and People v. Panela.
15
The dispositive portion of the November 17, 2006 Decision
16
of the CA
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the instant appeal, and accordingly
AFFIRMING in toto the herein impugned August 7, 2001 Decision of the RTC, Branch 08, of Aparri, Cagayan.
Additionally, the amount of P50,000.00 is hereby awarded in favor of Cesario Agacers surviving heirs as and by way of
moral damages pursuant to the doctrine in the cases of Dela Cruz and Panela, as heretofore stated.
SO ORDERED.
17

Hence, the present appeal.
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Assignment of Errors
In their Brief,
18
appellants assigned the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED [AMONG] THE HEREIN ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS IN THE KILLING OF CESARIO AGACER.
II
THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN FINDING THAT
TREACHERY AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
III
THE LOWER COURT FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
19

Appellants contend that both lower courts erred in finding that they conspired to kill Cesario. They argue that there was no
evidence sufficient to establish their intentional participation in the crime to achieve a common purpose. Thus, they claim
that the criminal culpability arising from their acts, even if the same were all directed solely against one victim, is individual
and not collective. Put differently, each of them is liable only for his own acts.
Appellants also contend that treachery did not attend the commission of the crime. They assert that treachery cannot be
appreciated when an altercation precedes the killing. Here, Cesario already had a previous heated altercation with
Florencio. Appellants aver that Cesario had only himself to blame for obliging when Florencio summoned him to come
near considering that they just had a heated argument. According to them, Cesario literally courted danger by
approaching Florencio instead of running away from him.
Lastly, appellants posit that they cannot be held guilty of murder since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
alleged with clarity nor specified in the Information as required by Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
In its Brief,
20
the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that there was
conspiracy among the appellants as shown by their collective acts before, during, and after the perpetration of the crime.
Their specific acts are in fact indicative of a common design and intent to ensure the commission of the crime.
21
The OSG
also belies the assertion of the appellants that treachery does not exist in this case. It insists that their attack on Cesario
was sudden and unexpected, thereby depriving him of a chance to defend himself and ensuring its commission without
risk to the appellants and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.
22

Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Conspiracy was sufficiently established
"Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it."
23
In conspiracy, it is not necessary to adduce direct evidence of a previous agreement to commit a crime.
24
It
"may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action, and community of interest."
25
Proof of a previous agreement and decision to commit the crime is not essential but
the fact that the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same objective suffices.
26

Here, while there is no proof of any previous agreement among appellants to commit the crime and while it was
established during trial that Eddie alone shot Cesario, the acts of all appellants before, during and after the incident
establish the existence of conspiracy to kill Cesario beyond reasonable doubt. First, all of them emerged at the same time
from a banana plantation beside the ricefield. Second, they surprised Cesario by immediately surrounding him. Third, all
of them were armed at the time of the incident. Eddie had a shotgun concealed in a sack, Florencio was armed with a
bolo, Elynor had a bow and arrow, while Eric and Franklin had stones in their hands. Fourth, Eric and Franklin struck
Cesario with stones moments before the shooting. Fifth, Eddie immediately shot Cesario at close range while the latter
was approaching the group of appellants upon being summoned by Florencio. Sixth, Florencio, Franklin, Eric and Elynor
stood just a meter away from Eddie when he shot Cesario, but did not do anything to stop or dissuade Eddie from the
assault. Seventh, after Cesario was shot, all appellants departed from the scene of the crime together.
Undoubtedly, the acts of the assailants constitute proof of their unanimity in design, intent and execution.
27
They
"performed specific acts with closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and design"
28
to
ensure the death of Cesario. We thus uphold the lower courts finding that appellants conspired to commit the crime of
murder against Cesario.
Having established conspiracy, appellants assertion that each of them can only be made liable for his own acts deserves
no merit. Evidence as to who among the appellants delivered the fatal blow is therefore no longer indispensable since in
conspiracy, a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another.
29
In a conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act
of all.
30

Essence of Treachery; Elements
We are also unimpressed with appellants contention that both the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that treachery
qualified the killing of Cesario to murder. They maintain that since the attack on Cesario was frontal, there was therefore
no element of surprise on the victim or suddenness of the assault that characterizes treachery.
"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any
defense which the offended party might make."
31
Two conditions must concur for treachery to be appreciated. First, is the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. Second,
the means of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted.
32
"The essence of treachery is the sudden attack by an
aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend
himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor."
33

In this case, treachery is evident from the same circumstances we have already discussed above. From the facts, Cesario
could not have been aware that he would be surrounded, attacked and killed by the appellants who were all related to
him. He could not have also been aware that Eddie had a shotgun concealed in a sack because if he was, he would not
have casually approached Florencio when the latter summoned him. Unfortunately, while Cesario was advancing towards
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Florencio, Eddie shot him at close range without any warning whatsoever. Evidently, the crime was committed in a
manner that there was no opportunity for Cesario to defend himself. Also, the mode of attack did not spring from the
unexpected turn of events but was clearly thought of by the appellants. Hence, it no longer matters that the assault was
frontal since its swiftness and unexpectedness deprived Cesario of a chance to repel it or offer any resistance in defense
of his person.
34

Appellants contention that treachery was not alleged with certainty in the Information is also devoid of merit. In People v.
Villacorta
35
the Court appreciated treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it having been alleged in the Information and
proved during trial that the "x x x accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one DANILO
SALVADOR CRUZ x x x."
Similarly, we hold that treachery was sufficiently alleged in the Information when it reads, viz:
x x x the above-name[d] accused, armed with a long firearm, a bow and arrow, a bolo and stones, with intent to kill, with
evident premeditation and with treachery, conspiring together and helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, stone and shoot one Cesario Agacer, inflicting upon the latter [bruises] and
multiple gunshot wounds in his body which caused his death.
36
(Emphasis supplied.)
"Well-settled is the rule that when x x x treachery x x x is present and alleged in the Information, it qualifies the killing and
raises it to the category of murder."
37

Appellants failed to discharge their burden to prove Florencios claim that he acted in self-defense and in defense of
relatives.
Florencio admits that he shot Cesario but invokes defense of himself and of his relatives to escape criminal liability.
The Court is not convinced.
While it is the burden of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, this burden shifts
when the accused admits the killing and pleads self-defense by way of justification. It therefore becomes vital for the
accused to show clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense. In so doing, he must rely on the strength of
his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions evidence.
38

The accused must also prove the following elements of self-defense: (1) there was unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) there was reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) the lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
39
In the justifying circumstance of self-defense, unlawful
aggression is a condition sine qua non.
40
Self-defense, complete or incomplete, cannot be considered a justification,
unless the victim commits an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself.
41

Here, Florencio failed to prove that he defended himself against the unlawful aggression of Cesario. He failed to present
any evidence to substantiate his claim that there was an actual or imminent peril to his life or limb. Aside from his
unreliable and self-serving claim, there is no proof that Cesario assaulted and shot him with a firearm during their struggle
or, if at all, that there was indeed a struggle between them. On the other hand, the separate testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Genesis and Roden negate Florencios claim of unlawful aggression. The testimonies of these witnesses
established that it was the appellants who emerged from a nearby banana plantation; that they surrounded Cesario and
set to fire the rice straws covering his rice seedlings; that appellants were armed with different kinds of weapons, while
Cesario was not; that Franklin and Elynor cast stones upon Cesario; and, that the one who pulled a gun from a sack and
shot Cesario was Eddie, not Florencio. We thus hold that if there was unlawful aggression here, it came from appellants
end and not from Cesario. Hence, there being no unlawful aggression on the part of Cesario, Florencios claim of self-
defense must fail.
Another basis for appellants conviction is the finding of the medico-legal expert that the cause of Cesarios death was
multiple gunshot wounds found mostly at the "infero-lateral portion of the anterior chest, right side." This corroborates the
testimonies of Genesis and Roden that Cesario was shot in his chest. These dovetailing findings of the medico-legal
expert and the eyewitness accounts of Genesis and Roden also deserve more credence than the unsubstantiated claim of
self-defense of Florencio, who, interestingly, gave contradictory testimony. Florencio claimed that he could not see the
gun used by Cesario in shooting him as tall cogonal grass obstructed his view, yet he could clearly recall that he saw the
bullet-riddled Cesario fall.
42
These contradictory statements of Florencio all the more convince us to believe the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses that no exchange of gunfire actually transpired between Cesario and Florencio.
Rather, it was only Eddie who wielded a gun and shot Cesario.1avvphi1
Florencio also invokes the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives, which has three elements, to wit, (1) there was
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) there was reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and (3) in case of provocation given by the person being attacked, the person making defense had no part
therein.
43
Like in the case of self-defense, unlawful aggression is also an indispensable element in defense of relative. As
discussed, there is no unlawful aggression on the part of Cesario. Hence, Florencios reliance on this justifying
circumstance is likewise unavailing.
Similarly, Florencios subsequent presentation of himself at the police station cannot be considered as a "voluntary
surrender" which would mitigate the penalty imposed. "A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the
intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because (a) he acknowledges his guilt or
(b) he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture."
44
Here, Florencio
cannot be considered to have surrendered voluntarily since his act did not emanate from a natural impulse to admit the
killing of Cesario or to save the police officers the effort and expense that would be incurred in his search and
incarceration. Although he submitted a medico-legal certificate purportedly to show that his injuries prevented him from
immediately surrendering to the authorities, same, however, does not certify as to the period of his incapacity or the
period during which he required medical attendance. Thus, there can be no explanation why he surrendered only on April
16, 1998 or 14 days after the commission of the crime. To us, Florencios surrender was a mere afterthought undeserving
of any consideration. Indeed, the failure of Florencio to immediately surrender militates against his claim that he killed
Cesario in self-defense and in defense of relatives since an innocent person will not hesitate to take the prompt and
necessary action to exonerate himself of the crime imputed to him.
All told, we find no reason to disturb the conclusion of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA. The testimonies of the
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution were given in a clear, natural and spontaneous manner. Their positive
identification of the appellants as the persons responsible for the death of Cesario has been clearly, categorically and
consistently established on record. Moreover, we note that no evidence was presented to establish that these
eyewitnesses harbored any ill-will against the appellants or that they have reasons to fabricate their testimonies.
45
These
kinds of testimonies are accepted as true for being consistent with the natural order of events, human nature and the
presumption of good faith.
46

The Proper Penalty
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. As
correctly imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the CA, appellants must suffer the prison term of reclusion
perpetua, the lower of the said two indivisible penalties, due to the absence of an aggravating circumstance attending the
commission of the crime.
The Civil Liability
For the victims death resulting from the crime, the heirs are entitled to the following awards: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto
for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5)
temperate damages.
47

Civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is mandatory and is granted without need of evidence other than the
commission of the crime.
48
Moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00 shall be awarded despite the absence of proof of
mental and emotional suffering of the victims heirs.
49
"As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death
invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family."
50
Also under Article
2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances, like treachery,
51
as in this case. Thus, the award of P30,000.00 for exemplary damages is in
order.
52

As regards actual damages, the son of Cesario, Neldison, testified that the sum of P40,000.00 was spent for the coffin of
his father but was unable to present receipts to substantiate such claim. Where the amount of actual damages for funeral
expenses cannot be ascertained due to the absence of receipts to prove them, temperate damages in the sum of
P25,000.00 may be granted, as it is hereby granted, in lieu thereof.
53
"Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate
damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact
amount was not proved."
54

The heirs of Cesario are also entitled to an interest on all the amounts of damages we have awarded at the legal rate of
6% from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
55

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the November 17, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01543 which affirmed the August 7, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Aparri, Cagayan, finding
appellants Florencio, Franklin, Elynor, Eddie and Eric, all surnamed Agacer, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder, with the following modifications:
(1) actual damages is DELETED;
(2) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and
(3) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum on all the amounts of damages awarded, commencing from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.


PEOPLE VS BALDOGO 2003
This is an automatic review of the Joint Judgment,[i] dated October 18, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
52, Puerto Princesa City, finding accused-appellant Gonzalo Baldogo alias Baguio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder in Criminal Case No. 12900 and Kidnapping in Criminal Case No. 12903. The trial court imposed on
accused-appellant the supreme penalty of death in Criminal Case No. 12900 and reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No.
12903.
I. The Indictments
Two Informations were filed against accused-appellant and Edgar Bermas alias Bunso which read:
That on or about the 22
nd
day of February, 1996 in the evening at the residence of Mr. Julio Camacho of Iwahig Prison
and Penal Farm, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
who were both convicted by final judgment of the offense of Homicide and while already serving sentence, committed the
above name offense by conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation and while armed with a bolo, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and hack one JORGE CAMACHO, hitting him and inflicting upon him mortal wounds at the different parts
of his body, which was the direct and immediate cause of his death shortly thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident[,] premeditation and recidivism. Puerto
Princesa City, Philippines, March 5, 1996.[1]
x x x
That on Thursday, February 22, 1996 at more or less 8:15 in the evening at the Victims residence, Iwahig Prison and
Penal Farm, Puerto Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused while
serving sentence at the Central Sub-Colony both for the offense of Homicide, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, commits (sic) another offense, kidnapping one JULIE E. CAMACHO, a girl 12 years of age,
and brought her to the mountains, where said Julie E. Camacho was detained and deprived of her liberty fro [sic] more
than five days.
CONTRARY TO LAW and attended by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism.[2]
Accused-appellant was arraigned on June 28, 1996 and entered a plea of not guilty to both charges.[3] Edgardo
Bermas died before he could be arraigned.[4] The two cases were ordered consolidated and a joint trial thereafter
ensued.
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, Julie Camacho, Dr. Edilberto Joaquin, Esteban Mamites and
Julio Camacho, Sr., and offered documentary and object evidence on its evidence-in-chief.
II. The Antecedent Facts
Julio Camacho, Sr. and his wife, Heather Esteban, had four children, namely: Julio, Jr., a student of the Palawan
State University in Puerto Princesa City and who stayed in Guaygo, Puerto Princesa City; Jorge, who was fourteen years
old;[5] Julie, who was 12 years old and a grade six elementary pupil at the Iwahig Elementary School and Jasper, who
was eight years old. Julio Sr. was employed as a security guard in the Iwahig Prison and Penal Colony. He and his
family lived in a compound inside the sub-colony. Edgardo Bermas alias Bunso, an inmate of the penal colony, was
assigned as a domestic helper of the Camacho spouses. Accused-appellant alias Baguio, also an inmate of the colony,
was assigned in January 1996 as a domestic helper of the Camacho family. Both helpers resided in a hut located about
ten meters away from the house of the Camacho family.
In the evening of February 22, 1996, accused-appellant and Bermas served dinner to Julio Sr., Jorge and Julie in
the house of the Camachos. At about 7:30 p.m., Julio Sr. left the house to attend a bible study at the dormitory in the
Agronomy Section of the Penal Farm. Heather and her son, Jasper, were in Aborlan town. Only Jorge and his sister Julie
were left in the house.
After Julio Sr. had left the house, Julie went to the sala to study her assignment. Momentarily, Bermas called
Julie from the kitchen saying: Jul, tawag ka ng kuya mo. Julie ignored him. After five minutes, Bermas called her again
but Julie again ignored him. Julie was perturbed when she heard a loud sound, akin to a yell, Aahh! Ahh! coming from
the kitchen located ten meters from the house. This prompted Julie to stand up and run to the kitchen. She was appalled
to see Jorge sprawled on the ground near the kitchen, face down and bloodied. The vicinity was lighted by a fluorescent
lamp. Standing over Jorge were accused-appellant and Bermas, each armed with a bolo.[6] The shirt of Bermas was
bloodied.[7] Julie was horrified and so petrified that although she wanted to shout, she could not. She ran back to the
sala with accused-appellant and Bermas in pursuit. Accused-appellant overtook Julie, tied her hands at her back with a
torn t-shirt and placed a piece of cloth in her mouth to prevent her from shouting for help from their neighbors. Bermas
went to the room of Julies brothers. Accused-appellant dragged Julie outside the house and towards the
mountain. Bermas tarried in the house.
With the aid of a flashlight, accused-appellant, with Julie in tow, walked for hours towards the direction of the
mountain. About a kilometer away from the house of the Camachos, accused-appellant and Julie stopped under a big
tamarind tree at the foot of the mountain. After about thirty minutes, Bermas arrived with a kettle and raw rice. Accused-
appellant and Bermas retrieved a bag containing their clothing and belongings from the trunk of the tamarind tree. They
untied Julie and removed the gag from her mouth. The three then proceeded to climb the mountain and after walking for
six hours or so, stopped under a big tree where they spent the night. When the three woke up in the morning of the
following day, February 23, 1996, they continued their ascent of the mountain. Seven hours thereafter, they started to
follow a descending route. Accused-appellant and Bermas told Julie that they would later release her. At about 3:00
p.m., Bermas left accused-appellant and Julie. However, accused-appellant did not let go of Julie. The two survived on
sugar and rice cooked by accused-appellant. Once, they saw uniformed men looking for Julie. However, accused-
appellant hid Julie behind the tree. She wanted to shout but he covered her mouth.
In the early morning of February 28, 1996, accused-appellant told Julie that he was leaving her as he was going to
Puerto Princesa City. He told her to fend for herself and return to the lowland the next day. After their breakfast,
accused-appellant left Julie alone to fend for herself. A few hours after accused-appellant had left, Julie decided to return
to the lowlands. She found a river and followed its course toward Balsaham until she saw a hut. She called upon its
occupant who introduced himself as Nicodemus. Julie sought help from him. When asked by Nicodemus if she was the
girl whom the police authorities were looking for, she replied in the affirmative. Nicodemus brought Julie to Balsaham
where they met some personnel of the penal colony and police officers, and Nicodemus turned Julie over for custody to
them.
Meanwhile, Julio, Sr. arrived home after his bible study at about 9:00 p.m. on February 22, 1996. He noticed that
the television set was switched on but no one was watching it. He looked for his children but they were nowhere to be
found. He then proceeded to the hut occupied by accused-appellant and Bermas but he also failed to find them. Julio Sr.
then rushed to the house of his older brother, Augusto Camacho, to look for his children, but Augusto told him that Jorge
and Julie were not there. Julio Sr. then sought the help of Romualdo Esparagoza, a trustee of the penal farm. The two
rushed back to the Camacho residence and proceeded to the kitchen where they noticed blood on the floor. The two
proceeded to the dirty kitchen and saw the bloodied body of Jorge dumped about three meters away from the dirty
kitchen. Julio Sr. and Esparagoza then brought Jorge to the Iwahig Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival at
12:40 a.m. of February 23, 1996. Dr. Edilberto Joaquin examined the cadaver and found that the victim was stabbed on
the breast once and at the back seven times. He sustained a lacerated wound on the neck. The layers of the neck,
trachea and esophagus of Jorge had been cut. Jorge did not sustain any defensive wound. Dr. Joaquin performed an
autopsy of the cadaver and signed a medical certificate with his findings, thus:
MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
GENERAL DATA:
JORGE CAMACHO y ESTEBAN, 14 years old, student, resident of Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm, approximately 53
inches in-height, was brought to the hospital, (DOA) dead on arrival at 12:40 AM, 23 February 1996, approximate time of
death 8:00 P.M. February 22, 1996.
FINDINGS
1. Stab wound, deep, penetrating, approximately 1 inch in length, at the level of the xyphoid process,
anteriorly.
2. Stab wound, chest, back, approximately 1 inch length, right midclavicular line, level of the 3
rd
rib.
3. Stab wound, back, right midclavicular line, level of the 5
th
rib.
4. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length level of the 5
th
rib, left midclavicular line.
5. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length, right midclavicular line, 6
th
rib.
6. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch length, right midclavicular line, level of the 4
th
lumbar region.
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
7. Stab wound, back, approximately 1 inch in length, right third lumbar region, deep, penetrating involving
the liver.
8. Stab wound, back, approximately 3/4 inch, at the level of the 2
nd
lumbar region.
9. Lacerated wound, neck, anteriorly, deep, penetrating, cutting the layers of the neck and the trachea
and esophagus.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Hypovolemia due to severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds and laceration of the neck.[8]
Wounds numbers 7 and 9 were fatal. It was possible that two sharp-edged and sharp pointed weapons were
used in stabbing Jorge and that two assailants stabbed the victim.[9]
On February 29, 1996, Julie gave her sworn statement and a supplemental sworn statement to the police
investigators.[10] Julio Sr. suffered mental anguish and sleepless nights because of the death of Jorge.
The prosecution adduced in evidence excerpts of the personal file of accused-appellant kept in the penal colony
showing that he had been convicted of homicide by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and that he commenced
serving sentence on November 19, 1992 and that the minimum term of his penalty was to expire on August 16, 1997.[11]
III. The Defenses and Evidence of Accused-Appellant
Accused-appellant denied killing Jorge and kidnapping Julie. Accused-appellant asserted that Julie implicated
him because she was coached and rehearsed. He testified that he was assigned as a helper in the house of Augusto
Camacho, the Chief of the Industrial Section of the colony and the older brother of Julio Sr. Augusto told accused-
appellant that his brother, Julio Sr., wanted to have accused-appellant transferred as his domestic helper. However,
accused-appellant balked because he had heard from Edgardo Bermas, the helper of Julio Sr., that the latter was cruel
and had been maltreating Bermas. Nonetheless, in December 1995, accused-appellant was transferred as a domestic
helper of Julio Sr. Accused-appellant confirmed that indeed Julio Sr. was cruel because whenever the latter was angry,
he maltreated accused-appellant by spanking and boxing him. These would occur about two times a week.
On February 22, 1996, at about 6:30 p.m., accused-appellant took his dinner in the kitchen. At about 7:00 p.m.,
while he was already in his quarters and preparing to sleep, Bermas arrived, armed with a bloodied bolo measuring about
1 feet long and told accused-appellant that he (Bermas) had just killed Jorge to avenge the maltreatment he received
from Julio Sr. Bermas warned accused-appellant not to shout, otherwise he will also kill him. Petrified, accused-appellant
kept silent. Bermas then brought accused-appellant to the kitchen in the house of the Camachos where accused-
appellant saw the bloodied body of Jorge sprawled near the kitchen. Bermas called Julie three times, telling her that her
brother was calling for her but Julie at first ignored Bermas. Julie later relented and went to the kitchen where Bermas
grabbed her and threatened to kill her if she shouted. Bermas tied the hands of Julie with a piece of cloth and placed a
piece of cloth around her face to prevent her from shouting.
Bermas, still armed with his bolo tucked on his waist and a knife on his hand, brought accused-appellant and Julie
outside the house. The three then trekked towards the mountain. On the way, Bermas picked a bag containing food
provisions and his and accused-appellants clothings. Accused-appellant thought of escaping but could not because
Bermas was watching him. With the help of a flashlight brought by Bermas, the three walked towards the mountain, with
Julie walking ahead of accused-appellant and Bermas. After walking for hours, they stopped by a tree to which Bermas
tied Julie. At one time, while Bermas and accused-appellant were scouring for water, Bermas kicked accused-appellant
and pushed him into a ten feet deep ravine. The right hand and foot of accused-appellant sustained bruises. He likewise
sustained a sprain on his foot. Bermas left accused-appellant and Julie after 1 days.
In the meantime, accused-appellant managed to climb out of the ravine and heard Julie calling his name. Julie
later told accused-appellant that before Bermas left, the latter told her that he was going to kill accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant and Julie remained in the mountain after Bermas had left. At one time, accused-appellant and
Julie saw soldiers who were looking for her. Accused-appellant did not reveal his and Julies location to the soldiers
because he was afraid that he might be killed. On February 25, 1996, accused-appellant untied Julie. He told her that he
will set her free as soon as his foot shall have healed.
On February 27, 1996, accused-appellant told Julie that she can go home already. He ordered her to go down
the mountain and proceed to Balsaham on her way back home. Although his foot was still aching, accused-appellant
went down from the mountain ahead of Julie and proceeded to Balsaham. He then walked to Irawan where he took a
tricycle to the public market in the poblacion in Puerto Princesa City. He then took a passenger jeepney and alighted at
Brookes Point where he was arrested after one week for the killing of Jorge and the kidnapping of Julie.
Accused-appellant maintained that he did not intend to hurt Julie or deprive her of her liberty. He averred that
during the entire period that he and Julie were in the mountain before Bermas left him, he tried to protect her from
Bermas. Accused-appellant asserted that he wanted to bring Julie back to her parents after Bermas had left them and to
surrender but accused-appellant was afraid that Julio Sr. might kill him.
IV. The Verdict of the Trial Court
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered its decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, a Joint Judgment is hereby rendered in:
A. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 12900 finding the accused Gonzalo Baldogo, alias Baguio, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the crime of murder as defined and penalized in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659, and appreciating against him the specific aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage and use of superior strength, without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, and pursuant to the
provisions of the second paragraph, No. 1, of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to death in
the manner prescribed by law; to pay the heirs of the deceased Jorge Camacho;
1. Actual and compensatory damages:
For expenses incurred for funeral and
other expenses incident to his death ---P45,000.00
2. Moral damages ----------------------------- 100,000.00
3. Civil indemnity for the death of the
victim, Jorge Camacho ------------------- 50,000.00
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
or the aggregate amount of ------------- 195,000.00
B. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 12903 finding the accused GONZALO BALDOGO, alias, Baguio, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, and there being no modifying circumstance
appreciated and pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph, No. 2, of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, and
not being entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with
the accessory penalties of civil interdiction for life, and of perpetual absolute disqualification; to pay the offended party,
Julie Camacho for physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and moral shock, moral damages of
P100,000; and to pay the costs.
The case as against co-accused Edgar Bermas is ordered dismissed by reason of extinction of criminal liability
occasioned by his death pending conclusion of the proceedings as against him.
SO ORDERED.[12]
V. Assignment of Error
In his appeal brief, accused-appellant avers that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AND KIDNAPPING.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF DENIAL.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AND GENERIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TAKING
ADVANTAGE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE THE SAME.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
IN THE (SIC) CRIMINAL CASE #12900.[13]
VI. Resolution of this Court
The first two assignments of errors being interrelated, the Court will delve into and resolve the same
simultaneously.
Accused-appellant avers that he had nothing to do with, and hence should not be claimed for, the death of Jorge
and the kidnapping and detention of Julie. Accused-appellant claims that he was acting under duress because he was
threatened by Bermas with death unless he did what Bermas ordered him to do. Accused-appellant was even protective
of Julie. He insists that the latter was not a credible witness and her testimony is not entitled to probative weight because
she was merely coached into implicating him for the death of Jorge and her kidnapping and detention by Bermas.
We find the contention of accused-appellant farcical. At the heart of the submission of accused-appellant is the
credibility of Julie, the 12-year old principal witness of the prosecution and the probative weight of her testimony.
This Court has held in a catena of cases that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonial
evidence of the parties, its assessment of the probative weight of the collective evidence of the parties and its conclusions
anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate court great respect, if not conclusive effect. The raison detre of
this principle is that this Court has to contend itself with the mute pages of the original records in resolving the issues
posed by the parties:
x x x The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush
of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the
forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession
or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in
anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and
on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict.[14]
In contrast, the trial court has the unique advantage of monitoring and observing at close range the attitude,
conduct and deportment of witnesses as they narrate their respective testimonies before said court. Echoing a foreign
courts observation, this Court declared:
Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked, but modest withal, in a printed abstract in a court of last resort. She oft
hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the minds eye of the judge who tries the case. To him appears the furtive
glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness,
the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and
mien. The brazen face of the liar, the glibness of the schooled witness in reciting a lesson, or the itching overeagerness
of the swift witness, as well as the honest face of the truthful one, are alone seen by him.[15]
The rule, however, is not iron clad. This Court has enumerated exceptions thereto, namely: (a) when patent
inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court; (b) when the conclusions arrived at are
clearly unsupported by the evidence; (c) when the trial court ignored, misunderstood, misinterpreted and/or misconstrued
facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case.[16] In this case, the trial
court found the youthful Julie credible and her testimony entitled to full probative weight. Accused-appellant has not
sufficiently demonstrated to this Court the application of any of the aforestated exceptions.
The Court agrees with accused-appellant that the prosecution was burdened to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of the felonies for which he is charged. This Court has held that accusation is not synonymous with guilt. It is
incumbent on the prosecution to prove the corpus delicti, more specifically, that the crimes charged had been committed
and that accused-appellant precisely committed the same. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence
and not on the weakness of the evidence of the accused.[17] The reasonable standard rule which was adopted by the
United States way back in 1978 is a requirement and a safeguard, in the words of Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter of the
United States Supreme Court, of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of due process. The United
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
States Supreme Court emphasized in Re: Winship[18] that in a criminal prosecution, the accused has at stake interests of
immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty or even his life upon conviction and
because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.
In the cases at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence to prove that accused-appellant killed
Jorge. However, the prosecution adduced indubitable proof that accused-appellant conspired with Bermas not only in
killing Jorge but also in kidnapping and detaining Julie.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy if two or more persons agree to commit a
felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. Conspiracy
may be inferred from the acts of the accused, before, during and after the commission of a felony pointing to a joint
purpose and design and community of intent.[19] It is not required that there be an agreement for an appreciable period
prior to the commission of a felony; rather, it is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense, all the
conspira`tors had the same purpose and were united in its execution.[20] In a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of
all.[21] All the accused are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation.[22] For a
conspirator to be criminally liable of murder or homicide, it is not necessary that he actually attacks or kills the victim. As
long as all the conspirators performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a
common purpose or design in bringing about the death of the victim, all the conspirators are criminally liable for the death
of said victim.[23]
In these cases, the prosecution adduced conclusive proof that accused-appellant indeed conspired with Bermas
to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie as shown by the following cogent facts and circumstances:
1. When Julie responded to the repeated calls of Bermas for her to go to the kitchen on his pretext that Jorge
wanted to talk to her, Julie saw accused-appellant and Bermas, each armed with a bolo, about half a meter from Jorge
who was sprawled on the ground, bloodied all over.[24]
2. Even as Julie fled from the kitchen for dear life to the sala of their house, accused-appellant and Bermas ran
after her. Accused-appellant tied the hands of Julie with a piece of cloth and inserted a piece of cloth into her mouth to
prevent her from shouting for help from their neighbors.[25]
3. With a flashlight on hand, accused-appellant then exited from the house, dragged Julie towards the direction of
the mountain while Bermas remained in the house to rummage through the things in the bedroom of her
brothers. Accused-appellant stopped for a while for Bermas to join him.[26]
4. Before the killing of Jorge, accused-appellant and Bermas placed their clothing and personal belongings in a
bag and buried the bag under a tree, and when accused-appellant and Bermas were on their way to the mountain after
killing Jorge, they excavated and retrieved the bag from under the tree.[27]
5. Accused-appellant and Bermas brought with them to the mountain a kettle filled with raw rice which they
cooked in the forest.[28]
6. When Julie saw uniformed men who were looking for her and wanted to shout for help, accused-appellant
covered her mouth to prevent her from shouting for help.[29]
7. Even after Bermas had left accused-appellant and Julie in the forest in the afternoon of February 23, 1991,
accused-appellant continued detaining Julie in the forest until February 27, 1996, when he abandoned Julie in the forest
to fend for herself.
The evidence of the prosecution was even buttressed by the judicial admissions of accused-appellant, thus:
1. After releasing Julie on February 27, 1996, accused-appellant proceeded to Puerto Princesa City and on to
Brookes Point where he was arrested a week after said date.[30]
2. Both accused-appellant and Bermas had a motive to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie, that is, to avenge the repeated
maltreatment and physical abuse on them by Julio Sr., the father of Jorge and Julie.[31]
The flight of both accused-appellant and Bermas from the house of Julio Sr. to the mountain where they found
refuge after killing Jorge, and their motive to kill Jorge Jr. and kidnap and detain Julie in conjunto constitute potent
evidence of their confabulation and of their guilt for the death of Jorge and kidnapping and detention of Julie.[32]
The bare denial by accused-appellant of criminal liability for the crimes charged is inherently weak. Accused-
appellants claims that he even protected Julie from harm and that he was forced by Bermas to kidnap Julie are of the
same genre.[33] The bare denial by accused-appellant of the crimes charged constitutes self-serving negative evidence
which cannot prevail over the categorical and positive testimony of Julie and her unequivocal identification of accused-
appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes charged.[34]
Accused-appellants insistence that he was forced by Bermas, under pain of death, to cooperate with him in killing
Jorge and kidnapping and detaining Julie is merely an afterthought. For duress to exempt accused-appellant of the
crimes charged, the fear must be well-founded, and immediate and actual damages of death or great bodily harm must
be present and the compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to accused for escape or interpose
self-defense in equal combat.[35] Accused-appellant is burdened to prove by clear and convincing evidence his defense
of duress. He should not be shielded from prosecution for crime by merely setting up a fear from, or because of, a threat
of a third person.[36] As Lord Dennan declared in Reg. Vs. Tyler,[37] No man from fear of circumstances to himself has
the right to make himself a party to committing mischief on mankind. In these cases, in light of the testimony of Julie and
the inculpatory acts of accused-appellant no less, there is no doubt that the latter acted in concert with Bermas and is
himself a principal by direct participation. That accused-appellant abandoned Julie after six days of captivity does not
lessen his criminal culpability much less exempt him from criminal liability for the killing of Jorge and the kidnapping and
detention of Julie.
Accused-appellant failed to prove his claim that Julie was coached on how and what to testify on. Indeed, when
asked to identify the person or persons who coached Julie, accused-appellant failed to mention any person:
Q You heard the testimony of Julie Camacho that she is pointing to you to have kidnapped her and
participated in the killing of her brother Jorge, what can you say to that?
A That is not true.
Q You donot (sic) know the reason why? In fact you treated her well, why she pointed you as one of the
authors of the crime?
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
A Maybe somebody coached her.
Q Who do you think coached her?
A I cannot mention the name but I am sure that somebody coached her.[38]
It bears stressing that when she testified, Julie was merely 12 years old. The Court has repeatedly held that the
testimony of a minor of tender age and of sound mind is likewise to be more correct and truthful than that of an older
person so that once it is established that they have fully understood the character and nature of an oath, their testimony
should be given full credence and probative weight.[39] Julie had no ill motive to tergiversate the truth and falsely testify
against accused-appellant. Hence, her testimony must be accorded full probative weight.[40]
VII. Crimes Committed by Accused-Appellant
The Court shall now delve into and resolve the issue of what crime or crimes accused-appellant is guilty of. The
trial court convicted accused-appellant of two separate crimes and not the special complex crime of kidnapping with
murder or homicide under the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act
7659.[41] The trial court is correct. There is no evidence that Jorge was kidnapped or detained first by accused-appellant
and Bermas before he was killed. The last paragraph of Article 267 of the Code is applicable only if kidnapping or serious
illegal detention is committed and the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the kidnapping or serious illegal
detention.
Re: Criminal Case No. 12900
(For Murder)
The trial court convicted accused-appellant of murder with the qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation, based on the following findings and ratiocination:
The slaying of Jorge Camacho took place about 8:30 oclock in the evening of February 22, 1996. It was carried out after
the accused have been through tidying-up the kitchen, the dining room and the kitchen wares the family of the Camachos
used in their early dinner before 7:00 oclock that evening. But even before dinner, the accused have already made
preparations for their flight, shown by the fact that they already had their clothes, other personal belongings and food
provisions stacked in their respective travelling bags then placed in a spot where they can just pick them up as they take
to flight.[42]
The trial court also appreciated against accused-appellant the qualifying aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength with the following disquisition:
The victim, Jorge Camacho, is a lad only 14 years of age and unarmed when brutally slain. On the contrary, both
accused are of age and confirmed convicted felons. Any one of them would already be superior in strength and
disposition to their hapless and innocent victim. How much more with the combined strength and force of the two of them.
Their choice of the object of their brutality is indicative of their unmistakable intent of taking advantage of their superior
strength. The likely object of their resentment, for purported cruelty to them, is Prison Guard Julio Camacho, father of the
victim. They could have directed their criminal intent on Julio Camacho himself. But Julio Camacho could be a match in
strength and agility to any of them or even to the combined force of both of them. So, to insure execution of their criminal
intent without risk to them for the defense which the offended party might put up, they directed their criminal acts against
the deceased who is very much inferior in physical combat even only to any one of them.[43]
While the Court agrees that accused-appellant is guilty of murder, it does not agree with the rulings of the trial
court that the crime was qualified by evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. To warrant a finding of evident
premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the following requisites:
x x x (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender
clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime
to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. x x x[44]
The qualifying aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, like any other qualifying circumstance, must be
proved with certainty as the crime itself. A finding of evident premeditation cannot be based solely on mere lapse of time
from the time the malefactor has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he actually commits it.[45] The
prosecution must adduce clear and convincing evidence as to when and how the felony was planned and prepared before
it was effected.[46] The prosecution is burdened to prove overt acts that after deciding to commit the felony, the felon
clung to his determination to commit the crime. The law does not prescribe a time frame that must elapse from the time
the felon has decided to commit a felony up to the time that he commits it. Each case must be resolved on the basis of
the extant factual milieu.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation. The barefaced fact that accused-appellant and
Bermas hid the bag containing their clothing under a tree located about a kilometer or so from the house of Julio Sr. does
not constitute clear evidence that they decided to kill Jorge and kidnap Julie. It is possible that they hid their clothing
therein preparatory to escaping from the colony. There is no evidence establishing when accused-appellant and Bermas
hid the bag under the tree. The prosecution even failed to adduce any evidence of overt acts on the part of accused-
appellant, nor did it present evidence as to when and how he and Bermas planned and prepared to kill Jorge and kidnap
Julie and to prove that the two felons since then clung to their determination to commit the said crimes. Although
accused-appellant and Bermas were armed with bolos, there is no evidence that they took advantage of their numerical
superiority and weapons to kill Jorge. Hence, abuse of superior strength cannot be deemed to have attended the killing of
Jorge.[47] Nighttime cannot likewise be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because there is no evidence that
accused-appellant and Bermas purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the killing or to insure its execution or
accomplishment or to evade their arrest.[48] Neither is dwelling aggravating because there is no evidence that Jorge was
killed in their house or taken from their house and killed outside the said house.
In light of the evidence on record, it is clear that the killing of Jorge was qualified by treachery. When Jorge was
killed by accused-appellant and Bermas, he was barely 14 years old. The Court has previously held that the killing of
minor children who by reason of their tender years could not be expected to put up a defense is attended by
treachery.[49] Since treachery attended the killing, abuse of superior strength is absorbed by said circumstance.[50]
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 is
reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances in the commission of the crime,
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
accused-appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.[51] Conformably with current jurisprudence,
accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay to the heirs of the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and the
amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages. Although Julio Sr. testified that he spent P45,000.00 during the wake
and burial of the victim, the prosecution failed to adduce any receipts to prove the same. Hence, the award of P45,000.00
by way of actual damages has no factual basis and should thus be deleted.
Re: Criminal Case No. 12903
(For Kidnapping)
The trial court convicted accused-appellant of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court is correct.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code was taken from Article 267 of the Spanish Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 267Detencin ilegal grave.Ser castigado con la pena de reclusin temporal el particular que secuestrare o
encerrare a otro o en cualquier forma le privare de libertad.
Secuestrare means sequestration.[52] To sequester is to separate for a special purpose, remove or set apart,
withdraw from circulation.[53] It also means to lock-up or imprison. Encerrare is a broader concept than
secuestrare.[54] Encerrare includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in
whatever form and for whatever length of time. As explained by Groizard, encerrar es meter una persona cosa en
parte de donde no pueda salir; detener o arrestar, poner en prisin, privar de la libertad alguno. He continued that la
detencin, la prisin, la privacin de la libertad de una persona, en cualquier forma y por cualquier medio por cualquier
tiempo en virtud de la cual resulte interrumpido el libre ejercicio de su actividad.[55] On his commentary on the Spanish
Penal Code, Cuello Calon says that the law preve dos modalidades de privacion de libertad, el encierro y la
detencion. Encerrar significa recluir a una persona en un lugar de donde no puede salir, detener a una persona equivale
a impedirle o restringirle la libertad de movimiento. Para que el sujeto pasivo no quiera permanecer en el sitio donde esta
recluido, pues no es posible llamar encierro ni detencion a la estancia de un a persona en lugar del que no quiere
salir.[56]
In this case, Julie, a minor, was not locked up. However, she was seized and taken from her house through force
and dragged to the mountain. Since then, she was restrained of her liberty by and kept under the control of accused-
appellant and Bermas. She was prevented from going back home for a period of about six days. Patently then, accused-
appellant is guilty of kidnapping and illegally detaining Julie. The crime was aggravated by dwelling because Julie was
taken from their house by accused-appellant and Bermas. However, dwelling was not alleged in the Information as an
aggravating circumstance as required by Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which reads:
SEC. 9. Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the
statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If
there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.[57]
Even if dwelling is proven but is not alleged in the Information as an aggravating circumstance, the same will not
serve to aggravate the penalty.[58]
Quasi-recidivism as defined in Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code[59] is alleged in both
Informations. Accused-appellant is alleged to have committed murder and kidnapping while serving sentence in the penal
colony by final judgment for the crime of homicide. Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance.[60] The
prosecution is burdened to prove the said circumstance by the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. In the
present case, to prove quasi-recidivism, the prosecution was burdened to adduce in evidence a certified copy of the
judgment convicting accused-appellant of homicide and to prove that the said judgment had become final and
executory.[61] The raison detre is that:
x x x Since the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to such information, there was a joinder of issues not only
as to his guilt or innocence, but also as to the presence or absence of the modifying circumstances so alleged. The
prosecution was thus burdened to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and the existence of the
modifying circumstances. It was then grave error for the trial court to appreciate against the accused-appellant the
aggravating circumstance of recidivism simply because of his failure to object to the prosecutions omission as mentioned
earlier.[62]
In this case, the prosecution adduced in evidence merely the excerpt of the prison record of accused-appellant
showing that he was convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 10357-R by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio (Branch
6) with a penalty of from six years and one day as minimum to fourteen years, eight months and one day as maximum
and that the sentence of accused-appellant commenced on November 19, 1992 and that the minimum term of the penalty
was to expire on August 16, 1997.[63] The excerpt of the prison record of accused-appellant is not the best evidence
under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court[64] to prove the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City and to prove that said judgment had become final and executory. Said excerpt is merely secondary or substitutionary
evidence which is inadmissible absent proof that the original of the judgment had been lost or destroyed or that the same
cannot be produced without the fault of the prosecution. The barefaced fact that accused-appellant was detained in the
penal colony does prove the fact that final judgment for homicide has been rendered against him.[65] There being no
modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime, accused-appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised penal Code.[66]
VIII. Civil Liability of Accused-Appellant for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
The trial court awarded the amount of P100,000.00 to Julie by way of moral damages for the felony of kidnapping
with serious illegal detention, predicated on her having suffered serious anxiety and fright when she was kidnapped and
dragged to the mountain where she was detained for several days. The trial court is correct. Julie is entitled to moral
damages.[67] In light of the factual milieu in this case, the amount is reasonable. Julie is also entitled to exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000.00.[68]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION:
1. In Criminal Case No. 12900, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder defined in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, there being no
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the felony. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay to the
heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and the amount of P50,000.00 as of moral damages. The
award of P45,000.00 as of actual damages is deleted.
2. In Criminal Case No. 12903, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping with
serious illegal detention defined in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, and there
being no modifying circumstances attendant to the commission of the felony is hereby meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay moral damages to the victim, Julie Camacho, in the amount of
P100,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00.SO ORDERED.


TY VS PEOPLE 2004
Petitioner Vicky C. Ty (Ty) filed the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45, seeking to set aside the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals Eighth Division in CA-G.R. CR No. 20995, promulgated on 31 July 2001. The
Decision affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 19, dated 21 April
1997, finding her guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22[2] (B.P. 22), otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law.
This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against Ty before the RTC of
Manila. The Informations were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 93-130459 to No. 93-130465. The accusatory portion of
the Information in Criminal Case No. 93-130465 reads as follows:
That on or about May 30, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously make or draw and issue to Manila Doctors Hospital to apply on account or for value to Editha L. Vecino
Check No. Metrobank 487712 dated May 30, 1993 payable to Manila Doctors Hospital in the amount of P30,000.00, said
accused well knowing that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from
the date hereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of
such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of the check or to make arrangement
for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
Contrary to law.[3]
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the number of the checks and dates of issue. The data are
hereunder itemized as follows:
Criminal Case No. Check No. Postdated Amount
93-130459 487710 30 March 1993 30,000.00
93-130460 487711 30 April 1993 P30,000.00
93-130461 487709 01 March 1993 P30,000.00
93-130462 487707 30 December 1992 P30,000.00
93-130463 487706 30 November 1992 P30,000.00
93-130464 487708 30 January 1993 P30,000.00
93-130465 487712 30 May 1993 P30,000.00[4]
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At her arraignment, Ty pleaded not guilty.[5]
The evidence for the prosecution shows that Tys mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila Doctors
Hospital (hospital) from 30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992. Being the patients daughter, Ty signed the Acknowledgment
of Responsibility for Payment in the Contract of Admission dated 30 October 1990.[6] As of 4 June 1992, the Statement
of Account[7] shows the total liability of the mother in the amount of P657,182.40. Tys sister, Judy Chua, was also
confined at the hospital from 13 May 1991 until 2 May 1992, incurring hospital bills in the amount of P418,410.55.[8] The
total hospital bills of the two patients amounted to P1,075,592.95. On 5 June 1992, Ty executed a promissory note
wherein she assumed payment of the obligation in installments.[9] To assure payment of the obligation, she drew several
postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital. The seven (7) checks, each covering the amount of
P30,000.00, were all deposited on their due dates. But they were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid
to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the Account Closed advice. Soon thereafter, the complainant hospital
sent demand letters to Ty by registered mail. As the demand letters were not heeded, complainant filed the seven (7)
Informations subject of the instant case.[10]
For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of a greater
injury. She averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the hospital
inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. She alleged that her mother
was deprived of room facilities, such as the air-condition unit, refrigerator and television set, and subject to
inconveniences such as the cutting off of the telephone line, late delivery of her mothers food and refusal to change the
latters gown and bedsheets. She also bewailed the hospitals suspending medical treatment of her mother. The
debasing treatment, she pointed out, so affected her mothers mental, psychological and physical health that the latter
contemplated suicide if she would not be discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to comply
with the demands of the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a promissory note, open an account with Metrobank and issue
the checks to effect her mothers immediate discharge.[11]
Giving full faith and credence to the evidence offered by the prosecution, the trial court found that Ty issued the
checks subject of the case in payment of the hospital bills of her mother and rejected the theory of the defense.[12] Thus,
on 21 April 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision finding Ty guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. 22 and
sentencing her to a prison term. The dispositive part of the Decision reads:
CONSEQUENTLY, the accused Vicky C. Ty, for her acts of issuing seven (7) checks in payment of a valid obligation,
which turned unfounded on their respective dates of maturity, is found guilty of seven (7) counts of violations of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX MONTHS per count or a total of
forty-two (42) months.
SO ORDERED.[13]
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Ty interposed an appeal from the Decision of the trial court. Before the Court of Appeals, Ty reiterated her
defense that she issued the checks under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a
greater evil or injury. She also argued that the trial court erred in finding her guilty when evidence showed there was
absence of valuable consideration for the issuance of the checks and the payee had knowledge of the insufficiency of
funds in the account. She protested that the trial court should not have applied the law mechanically, without due regard
to the principles of justice and equity.[14]
In its Decision dated 31 July 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification. It
set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos (P60,000.00)
equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each case.[15]
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Tys defenses of involuntariness in the issuance of the
checks and the hospitals knowledge of her checking accounts lack of funds. It held that B.P. 22 makes the mere act of
issuing a worthless check punishable as a special offense, it being a malum prohibitum. What the law punishes is the
issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance.[16]
Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced that there was no valuable consideration for the issuance of the
checks as they were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Tys mother.[17]
In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term, the appellate court applied the case of Vaca v. Court of
Appeals[18] wherein this Court declared that in determining the penalty imposed for violation of B.P. 22, the philosophy
underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be observed, i.e., redeeming valuable human material and preventing
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness, with due regard to the protection of the social
order.[19]
Petitioner now comes to this Court basically alleging the same issues raised before the Court of Appeals. More
specifically, she ascribed errors to the appellate court based on the following grounds:
A. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WAS FORCED TO OR
COMPELLED IN THE OPENING OF THE ACCOUNT AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT
CHECKS.
B. THE CHECKS WERE ISSUED UNDER THE IMPULSE OF AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF
A GREATER INJURY OR IN AVOIDANCE OF A GREATER EVIL OR INJURY.
C. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PATENTLY SHOW[S] ABSENCE OF VALUABLE
CONSIDERATION IN THE ISSUANCE OFTHE SUBJECT CHECKS.
D. IT IS AN UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE PAYEE OF THE CHECKS WAS FULLY AWARE OF
THE LACK OF FUNDS IN THE ACCOUNT.
E. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT [,]
SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED CRIMINAL LAW MECHANICALLY, WITHOUT DUE REGARD TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
In its Memorandum,[20] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), citing jurisprudence, contends that a check
issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended to be presented for payment, has the same effect as an ordinary
check; hence, it falls within the ambit of B.P. 22. And when a check is presented for payment, the drawee bank will
generally accept the same, regardless of whether it was issued in payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee said
obligation. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.[21]
We find the petition to be without merit and accordingly sustain Tys conviction.
Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are
entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial
court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would substantially affect the disposition of the case.[22]
Jurisdiction of this Court over cases elevated from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law
ascribed to the Court of Appeals whose factual findings are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court
affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the record or that
they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.[23]
In the instant case, the Court discerns no compelling reason to reverse the factual findings arrived at by the trial
court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Ty does not deny having issued the seven (7) checks subject of this case. She, however, claims that the
issuance of the checks was under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil
or injury. She would also have the Court believe that there was no valuable consideration in the issuance of the checks.
However, except for the defenses claim of uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or avoidance of a greater evil or
injury, all the grounds raised involve factual issues which are best determined by the trial court. And, as previously
intimated, the trial court had in fact discarded the theory of the defense and rendered judgment accordingly.
Moreover, these arguments are a mere rehash of arguments unsuccessfully raised before the trial court and the
Court of Appeals. They likewise put to issue factual questions already passed upon twice below, rather than questions of
law appropriate for review under a Rule 45 petition.
The only question of law raisedwhether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption
from criminal liabilityhas to be resolved in the negative. For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the
following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3)
the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.[24]
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that the
ordinary man would have succumbed to it.[25] It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or
limb.[26] A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote.[27] A person
invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument
acting not only without will but against his will as well.[28] It must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the
accused for escape.[29]
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was
compelled to issue the checksa condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be
dischargedfor fear that her mothers health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or
worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so life-threatening such that her continued stay
in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded apprehension of her
death. Secondly, it is not the laws intent to say that any fear exempts one from criminal liability much less petitioners
flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable
as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospitals threats
or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit a crime. She did not take
advantage of the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. By her very own words, she admitted that
the collateral or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated checks
or jewelry.[30] And if indeed she was coerced to open an account with the bank and issue the checks, she had all the
opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.
Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without funds may result in a violation of
B.P. 22. She even testified that her counsel advised her not to open a current account nor issue postdated checks
because the moment I will not have funds it will be a big problem.[31] Besides, apart from petitioners bare assertion, the
record is bereft of any evidence to corroborate and bolster her claim that she was compelled or coerced to cooperate with
and give in to the hospitals demands.
Ty likewise suggests in the prefatory statement of her Petition and Memorandum that the justifying circumstance
of state of necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may find application in this case.
We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the actor from liability under this
paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one done to
avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.[32]
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be
avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable.[33] Ty could have
taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her own admission, she had the choice to give
jewelry or other forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have been
brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor.[34] In this case, the issuance of
the bounced checks was brought about by Tys own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills.
The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear and the
justifying circumstance of state of necessity to absolve her of liability. It would not have been half as bizarre had Ty been
able to prove that the issuance of the bounced checks was done without her full volition. Under the circumstances,
however, it is quite clear that neither uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a greater evil or injury prompted the issuance of
the bounced checks.
Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Decision of the trial court in the Civil Case[35] for damages filed by Tys
mother against the hospital is wholly irrelevant for purposes of disposing the case at bench. While the findings therein
may establish a claim for damages which, we may add, need only be supported by a preponderance of evidence, it does
not necessarily engender reasonable doubt as to free Ty from liability.
As to the issue of consideration, it is presumed, upon issuance of the checks, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that the same was issued for valuable consideration.[36] Section 24[37] of the Negotiable Instruments Law
creates a presumption that every party to an instrument acquired the same for a consideration[38] or for value.[39] In
alleging otherwise, Ty has the onus to prove that the checks were issued without consideration. She must present
convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption.
A scrutiny of the records reveals that petitioner failed to discharge her burden of proof. Valuable consideration
may in general terms, be said to consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the party who makes
the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or
undertaken by the other aide. Simply defined, valuable consideration means an obligation to give, to do, or not to do in
favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.[40]
In this case, Tys mother and sister availed of the services and the facilities of the hospital. For the care given to
her kin, Ty had a legitimate obligation to pay the hospital by virtue of her relationship with them and by force of her
signature on her mothers Contract of Admission acknowledging responsibility for payment, and on the promissory note
she executed in favor of the hospital.
Anent Tys claim that the obligation to pay the hospital bills was not her personal obligation because she was not
the patient, and therefore there was no consideration for the checks, the case of Bridges v. Vann, et al.[41] tells us that it
is no defense to an action on a promissory note for the maker to say that there was no consideration which was beneficial
to him personally; it is sufficient if the consideration was a benefit conferred upon a third person, or a detriment suffered
by the promisee, at the instance of the promissor. It is enough if the obligee foregoes some right or privilege or suffers
some detriment and the release and extinguishment of the original obligation of George Vann, Sr., for that of appellants
meets the requirement. Appellee accepted one debtor in place of another and gave up a valid, subsisting obligation for
the note executed by the appellants. This, of itself, is sufficient consideration for the new notes.
At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued
nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.[42] B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as to whether the checks
within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to merely guarantee the obligation.[43] The thrust of the
law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation.[44] As this Court held in Lim v. People
of the Philippines,[45] what is primordial is that such issued checks were worthless and the fact of its worthlessness is
known to the appellant at the time of their issuance, a required element under B.P. Blg. 22.
The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. Section 2 of B.P. 22
ART 12 EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which
is refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90)
days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless
such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for insufficiency of funds.[46] If not rebutted,
it suffices to sustain a conviction.[47]
Petitioner likewise opines that the payee was aware of the fact that she did not have sufficient funds with the
drawee bank and such knowledge necessarily exonerates her liability.
The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the drawer with the drawee bank is immaterial
as deceit is not an essential element of an offense penalized by B.P. 22. The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of
a bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance thereof is inconsequential.[48]
In addition, Ty invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of Appeals[49] wherein this Court inquired into the true nature
of transaction between the drawer and the payee and finally acquitted the accused, to persuade the Court that the
circumstances surrounding her case deserve special attention and do not warrant a strict and mechanical application of
the law.
Petitioners reliance on the case is misplaced. The material operative facts therein obtaining are different from
those established in the instant petition. In the 1992 case, the bounced checks were issued to cover a warranty deposit
in a lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the financier of the deposit. It was a modus operandi whereby the
supplier was able to sell or lease the goods while privately financing those in desperate need so they may be
accommodated. The maker of the check thus became an unwilling victim of a lease agreement under the guise of a
lease-purchase agreement. The maker did not benefit at all from the deposit, since the checks were used as collateral for
an accommodation and not to cover the receipt of an actual account or credit for value.
In the case at bar, the checks were issued to cover the receipt of an actual account or for value. Substantial
evidence, as found by the trial court and Court of Appeals, has established that the checks were issued in payment of the
hospital bills of Tys mother.
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals in deleting the penalty of imprisonment, absent any proof that
petitioner was not a first-time offender nor that she acted in bad faith. Administrative Circular 12-2000,[50] adopting the
rulings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals[51] and Lim v. People,[52] authorizes the non-imposition of the penalty of
imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases subject to certain conditions. However, the Court resolves to modify the penalty in view of
Administrative Circular 13-2001[53] which clarified Administrative 12-2000. It is stated therein:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative
penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
Thus, Administrative Circular 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P.
Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear
mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate
penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely
upon the Judge. Should the judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No.
12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
It is therefore understood that: (1) Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty for violations of B.P. 22; (2) the judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking
into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best
serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the
offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice; (3) should only a fine be
imposed and the accused unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code
provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.[54]
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 31 July
2001, finding petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C. Ty is ORDERED to pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each
dishonored check subject of the seven cases at bar with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with
Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. She is also ordered to pay private complainant, Manila Doctors Hospital, the
amount of Two Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P210,000.00) representing the total amount of the dishonored
checks. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.