ABAKADA GURO vs.

PURISIMA
FACTS:

Republic Act No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). It provides a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund)
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to BIR and BOC officials and employees
if they exceed their revenue targets. It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of
RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that the limiting the scope of the system of
rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or
distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other
government agencies.

Respondent contends that the allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere
speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared
objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they
perform are distinct from those of the other government agencies and instrumentalities.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not there is a violation of equal protection clause.

HELD:

Equality protection is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are
classified based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. When
things or persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in law differently.

The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law
as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed.

The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.
22
With respect to RA 9335, its
expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the BIR and the BOC.
23
Since the subject of the law is the revenue- generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should
logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC
because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national
government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.

Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special
function of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great
inherent functions taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately
related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR
and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.

Fernandez vs. Sto. Tomas (1995)Facts: CSC Commissioner Sto. Tomas with SCS Chairman
Ereneta issued Resolution No. 94-3710 which re-organized the offices of CSC. CSC
Directors De Lima and Fernandez were reassigned from the Central Office in Quezon City to
Pampanga and Legazpi, respectively. They now file this petition for certiorari assailing the
validity of the resolution, saying that (1) CSC Commissioner had no legal authority to issue the
resolution, and (2) it violated their constitutional right to security of tenure.Held:

( 1 ) T h e R e v i s e d A d m i n C o d e o f 1 9 8 7 p r o v i d e s f o r t h e
o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e C S C while the Resolution re-arranged the administrative units
with the goal of streamlining operations and improving delivery of service. It appears that
the two were the most qualified to act as regional directors to where they were assigned.Hence,
the reorganization was made with legitimate considerations. Also, theAdmin Code provides that
the CSC has the power to make internal changes in its organization, which is precisely what
happened in this case. The Congress, by enumerating the Offices in the Admin Code did not
mean to freeze its organizationand validly delegated to the CSC the power to reorganize
itself.( 2 ) F i r s t l y , a p p o i n t m e n t s t o t h e s t a f f o f t h e C o m m i s s i o n
a r e n o t a p p o i n t m e n t s to a specified public office but rather appointments to
particular positions or ranks. Hence, they are appointed to specific positions but not to
specific stations. Also, reassignment is a prerogative of the CSC as provided in the AdminCode
as long as it does not involve reduction in salary and rank status. Hencethe reassignment in this
case does not constitute removal from office as the petitioners remained as Directors and would
enjoy the same rank and salary. Security of tenure is constitutionally protected. However, its
availability depends on the nature of appointment. Those who are not appointed to a particular
station but only to a particular position are only therefore secure in so far as theirposition is
concerned but they may be assigned to different stations as required by exigencies because
this is not part of their appointment.

TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES V. CAPresident Estrada issued Executive Order No.
102, entitledRedirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health, which
provided for the changes in the roles, functions,and organizational processes of the
DOH. Under the assailedexecutive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being thesole
provider of health services to being a provider of specifichealth services and technical
assistance, as a result of thedevolution of basic services to local government units.Issue: WON
EO102 is constitutional?Held: YES. Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declaredvoid,
since it runs counter to the aspiration and ideals of theFilipino people as embodied in the
Constitution. They claim thatthe HSRAs policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation,
andrevenue enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and18 of Article II, Section 1 of
Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the
1987Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in makinginaccessible free medicine and free
medical services. Thiscontention is unfounded.As a general rule, the provisions of the
Constitution areconsidered self-executing, and do not require future legislationfor their
enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law
can be easilynullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisionshave already been
categorically declared by this Court as nonself-executing.In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation,this Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II;Section 13 of
Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the1987 Constitution are not self-executing
provisions. In Tolentinov. Secretary of Finance, the Court referred to Section 1 of ArticleXIII and
Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moralincentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights.These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle,are
distinguished from other constitutional provisions as nonself-executing and, therefore, cannot
give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially
enforceableconstitutional rights.Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the presentcase
were taken from Article II of the Constitution -- specifically,Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 --
the provisions of whichthe Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing in theaforecited
case of Taada v. Angara.Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how theHSRA
supposedly violated the equal protection and dueprocess clauses that are embodied in Section
1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of
due process in connection with the HSRA. Sincethey failed to substantiate how these
constitutional guaranteeswere breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing
therelevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently, inannulling the HSRA.In the
remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIIIand Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the
State accordsrecognition to the protection of working women and theprovision for safe and
healthful working conditions; to theadoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach
tohealth; to the Filipino family; and to the right of children toassistance and special protection,
including proper care andnutrition. Like the provisions that were declared as non self-executory
in the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement andGaming Corporation and Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, theyare mere statements of principles and policies. As such, theyare
mere directives addressed to the executive and thelegislative departments. If unheeded, the
remedy will not lie withthe courts; but rather, the electorates displeasure may bemanifested in
their vote
People vs vera
Political Law Delegation of Powers
Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was
elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While
awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was
convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation
Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by
petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that
Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act
No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to
provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is
applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are
covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of
the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to
provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said
probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon
because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power.
HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a
way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set
standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of
probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the
constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity
so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which
reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower
than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed
by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation
Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer
may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in
provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.

US vs BArrias
Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies
Barrias is the captain of a lighter (casco or ship) named Maude operating in the Pasig River.
The said Maude is not being powered by steam engine or a similar source of adequate power.
The Maude is in fact being navigated manually by use of bamboo poles. This is in clear violation
of Circular No. 397 issued by the Insular Collector of Customs. This said circular issued by the
Collector is in pursuant to Secs 5 and 8 of Act No. 1136 which empowered the Collector to
regulate those engaged in lighterage or any other similar harbor business. On the other hand,
Barrias challenged the acts of the Collector with reference to Secs 19 and 311 of Act No. 355
(Phil Customs Administrative Act) as amended by Act 1235 and Act 1480. Under Act No. 1235,
the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations, but also to fix penalties for
violation thereof, not exceeding a fine of P500.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Collector.
HELD: The SC acknowledged that the issue raised by Barrias indeed poses a serious question
and the SC discussed that one of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power
conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any
other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there
it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the
constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high
prerogative has been entrusted can not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other
agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom,
and patriotism of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this
sovereign trust. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of
his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the
intervening mind of another. However, the question of undue delegation must be passed upon
because of the fact that the prosecution is sustained by the validity of the other law cited which
is sections 5 and 8 of Act No 1136. The reference to Act No 355 as amended is not material to
the disposition of the case.

US vs PAnililo

1.

US VS. PANLILIO
The orders (rules and regulations) of an administrative officers or body issued pursuant to
astatute have the force of law but are not penal in nature and a violation of such orders isnot an
offense punishable by law unless the statute expressly penalizes such violation.
FACTS:
The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of
animalssuffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him
to paya fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of
trial.It is alleged that the accused illegally and without being authorized to do so, and
whilequarantine against the said carabaos exposed to rinder pest was still in effect,
permittedand ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were quarantined
anddrove them from one place to another. The accused contends that the facts alleged in
theinformation and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760
ISSUE:
Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture?
HELD:
NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agricultureprohibited or
made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of suchorders. Section 8 of
Act No. 1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon
conviction, be punished. However, the only sections of the Act whichprohibit acts and
pronounce them as unlawful are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fallwithin any of them.
A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized byparagraph, is not a
violation of the provision of the Act. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may
possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes andparticularly not penal statutes, and a
violation of such orders is not a penal offense unlessthe statute itself somewhere makes a
violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowherein Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of
the Bureau of Agriculture made a penaloffense, nor is such violation punished in any
way therein. However, the accused did violateArt. 581, 2 of the Penal Code which punishes
any person who violates regulations orordinances with reference to epidemic disease among
animals