1

Marcoso vs. court of appeals

G.R. No. 96605. May 8, 1992
FACTS:
In 1984, private respondent Rosa Tirol (now Rosa Tirol-Maquirang) filed a complaint against the petitioner
Feliciano Morcoso for the recovery of possession and declaration of ownership of a fishpond situated in
Barangay Aslum, Ibajay, Aklan.

Inhercomplaint,sheallegedthatthesaidfishpondisapartofthe4.5hectareoflandsheinheritedfrom
her father Eriberto Tirol in 1930; that in December 28, 1979, she entered into a lease agreement with
Morcoso,allowingthelatterwithoutpayingrentalandforaperiodofsixyears,todevelopintoafishponda
5,880sq.m.portionofthelandsheinherited,withusufructuaryrights(Exhibit"A");thatwhileworkingonthe
fishpond,MorcosowasinformedbythepersonneloftheBureauofFisheriesandAquaticResources(BFAR,
forbrevity)thatsaidportionofthelandofTirolleasedtohimiswithintheareaofalienableanddisposable
publicland;thatin1973,MorcosoappliedforafishpondpermitwiththeBFAR;thatthelattersubsequently
refusedtosurrenderthepossessionofthefishpondtoTirolin1976whenthetermoftheleaseexpired,and
thatTirolfiledanunlawfuldetainercaseagainstMorcosobutthesamewasdismissedfornothavingbeen
timely filed.

Ashisdefense,Morcosoclaimedthatthefishpondindisputefromwhichheisbeingevictedisnotthe
fishpondsubjectofthecontractoflease;thathedevelopedtwofishponds:(a)thefishpondsubjecttothe
lease,fromwhichhewasforciblyejectedbyTirolin1971asaresultofadisagreementwithher;and(b)
thefishpondindispute,whichadjoinsthefirstfishpondandwhichhedevelopedaftertheBFARpersonnel
assuredhimthattheareahehadmovedtoisaforestedarea,suitableforfishponddevelopment;thathe
appliedforafishpondpermitin1973;andthathedeclaredsaidfishpondinhisnamefortaxationpurposes.
Morcosoalsoassailedthejurisdictionofthetrialcourtbecauseofapendingadministrativecasebeforethe
BFARregardingtheirconflictingclaims.
ThetrialcourtruledthatthefishpondindisputebelongstoTirol.
ISSUE:
whetherornotthedoctrineofadministrativeexhaustionisapplicableincaseswhenthepropertyin
disputeisprivate?
HELD:
The doctrine requiring prior exhaustion of administrative remedies before recourse to courts is
inapplicabletotheinstantcasebecausethefishpondindisputeisprivateandnotpublicland
Wefindtheforegoingconclusionsdrawnbythetrialcourtfromthedocumentaryevidencesubmitted
bythepartiestobeinorder.Thetechnicaldescriptionsofthefishpondstatedintheleasecontractandin
thesketchplanoftheBFARpersonnelwhoconductedanocularinspectionofthefishpondareaappliedfor
byMorcosoexplicitlyshowthatthelatterwasthesubjectoftheleasecontractbetweenTirolandMorcoso.
Thefishpondnothavingbeenpartofthepublicdomain,thetrialcourtcorrectlyadjudgedTirolastherightful
ownerthereof.c
hanrobles

2

INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 88550. April 18, 1990

FACTS:
PetitionerIndustrialEnterprisesInc.(IEI)wasgrantedacoaloperatingcontractbytheGovernment
throughtheBureauofEnergyDevelopment(BED).Itwasalsograntedacoaloperatingcontractintheso-
calledGiporlosArea.IEIwaslateradvisedthatinlinewiththeobjectiveofrationalizingthecountryscoal
supply-demand balance, the logical coal operator in the area would be Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation(MMIC).IEIassignedandtransferredtoMMICitsrightsintheareabutlaterfiledanactionfor
rescissionwithdamagesagainstMMICforfailureofthelattertocomplywithitsobligations.IEIprayedthat
theEnergyMinisterapprovethereturnofthecontractfromMMICtoIEI.Strangelyenough,Mr.JesusS.
CabarrusisthePresidentofbothIEIandMMIC.TrialCourtorderedtherescissionanddeclaredthecontinued
efficacy of the coalcontract in favorof IEIandordered the BED to issue itswrittenaffirmation of the
contractandtogiveduecoursetoIEIsapplication.CAreversedthedecisionandruledthatthetrialcourt
hadnojurisdictionovertheactionconsideringthatunderPD1206,itistheBEDthathasthepowerto
decidecontroversiesrelativetotheexploration,exploitationanddevelopmentofcoalblocks.

ISSUE:
whetherornotthedoctrineofprimaryjurisdictionshouldapplyinthiscase?
HELD:
It has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases
involvingmattersthatdemandthespecialcompetenceofadministrativeagencies.ItmayoccurthattheCourt
hasjurisdictiontotakecognizanceofaparticularcase,whichmeansthatthematterinvolvedisalsojudicial
incharacter.However,ifthecaseissuchthatitsdeterminationrequirestheexpertise,specializedskillsand
knowledge of the properadministrative bodies becausetechnical matters or intricate questionsof facts are
involved,thenreliefmustfirstbeobtainedinanadministrativeproceedingbeforearemedywillbesuppliedby
thecourtseventhoughthematteriswithintheproperjurisdictionofacourt.Thisisthedoctrineofprimary
jurisdiction.Itapplies"whereaclaimisoriginallycognizableinthecourts,andcomesintoplaywhenever
enforcementoftheclaimrequirestheresolutionofissueswhich,underaregulatoryscheme,havebeenplaced
within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case the judicial process is suspended
pendingreferralofsuchissuestotheadministrativebodyforitsview.

3

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS vs. PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 110526. February 10, 1998
FACTS:
OnNovember5,1992,sevendesiccatedcoconutprocessingcompaniesbelongingtotheAPCDbrought
suitintheRegionalTrialCourt,NationalCapitalJudicialRegioninMakati,MetroManila,toenjointhePCA
fromissuingpermitstocertainapplicantsfortheestablishmentofnewdesiccatedcoconutprocessingplants.
PetitionerallegedthattheissuanceoflicensestotheapplicantswouldviolatePCAsAdministrativeOrderNo.
02,seriesof1991,astheapplicantswereseekingpermitstooperateinareasconsideredcongestedunder
theadministrativeorder.
[1]

OnNovember6,1992,thetrialcourtissuedatemporaryrestrainingorderand,onNovember25,
1992, a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the PCA from processing and issuing licenses to Primex
Products,Inc.,CocoManila,Superstar(Candelaria)andSuperstar(Davao)uponthepostingofabondinthe
amountofP100,000.00.
[2]

SubsequentlyandwhilethecasewaspendingintheRegionalTrialCourt,theGoverningBoardofthe
PCAissuedonMarch24,1993ResolutionNo.018-93,providingforthewithdrawalofthePhilippineCoconut
Authorityfromallregulationofthecoconutproductprocessingindustry.Whileitcontinuestheregistrationof
coconutproductprocessors,theregistrationwouldbelimitedtothemonitoringoftheirvolumesofproduction
andadministrationofqualitystandards.
ThePCAthenproceededtoissuecertificatesofregistrationtothosewishingtooperatedesiccated
coconutprocessingplants,promptingpetitionertoappealtotheOfficeofthePresidentofthePhilippineson
April26,1993nottoapprovetheresolutioninquestion.Despitefollow-upletterssentonMay25andJune
2,1993,petitionerreceivednoreplyfromtheOfficeofthePresident.Thecertificatesofregistrationissued
inthemeantimebythePCAhasenabledanumberofnewcoconutmillstooperate.
ISSUE:
whetherornotrespondentpcasboardresolutionno.018-93isnullandvoidforbeinganundue
exerciseoflegislativepowerbyanadministrativebody?
HELD:
Theruleofrequiringexhaustionofadministrativeremediesbeforeapartymayseekjudicialreview,so
strenuouslyurgedbytheSolicitorGeneralonbehalfofrespondent,hasobviouslynoapplicationhere.The
resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule- making or legislative
power.However,onlyjudicialreviewofdecisionsofadministrativeagenciesmadeintheexerciseoftheir
quasi-judicialfunctionissubjecttotheexhaustiondoctrine.Theexhaustiondoctrinestandsasabartoan
action which is not yet complete
[4]
and it is clear, in the case at bar,that after its promulgation the
resolutionofthePCAabandoningregulationofthedesiccatedcoconutindustrybecameeffective.Tobesure,
thePCAisunderthedirectsupervisionofthePresidentofthePhilippinesbutthereisnothinginP.D.No.
232,P.D.No.961,P.D.No.1468andP.D.No.1644definingthepowersandfunctionsofthePCAwhich
requiresrulesandregulationsissuedbyittobeapprovedbythePresidentbeforetheybecomeeffective.
Inanyevent,althoughtheAPCDhasappealedtheresolutioninquestiontotheOfficeofthePresident,
consideringthefactthattwomonthsaftertheyhadsenttheirfirstletteronApril26,1993theystillhadto
hear from the Presidents office, meanwhile respondent PCA was issuing certificates of registration
indiscriminatelytonewcoconutmillers,weholdthatpetitionerwasjustifiedinfilingthiscaseonJune25,
1993.
[5]
Indeed,afterwritingtheOfficeofthePresidentonApril26,1993
[6]
petitionersentinquiriestothatoffice
notonce,buttwice,onMay26,1993
[7]
andonJune2,1993,
[8]
butpetitionerdidnotreceiveanyreply
4

REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
255 SCRA 438 (1996)
FACTS:
PetitionerPCGGissuedseparateordersagainstprivaterespondentsSipalayTradingCorporationand
AlliedBankingCorporation(hereinafterreferredtoasSIPALAYandALLIED)toeffecttheirsequestration.Two
(2)separatepetitionswerefiledbySIPALAYandALLIEDbeforethisCourtassailingthesequestrationorders.
Aftertheconsolidationofthesepetitionsandthefilingofthecomments,otherpleadingsandcertainmotions
bytheparties,thisCourtreferredthecasestopublicrespondentSANDIGANBAYANforproperdisposition1,
whereSIPALAYspetitionwasdocketedasS.B.0095,andthatofALLIEDasS.B.0100.
ConcerningSIPALAY(S.B.0095),its360,875,513sharesofstockinMaranawHotelsandResort
CorporationwhichownstheCenturyParkSheratonHotelare,accordingtothePCGG,partofLucioC.Tans
ill-gottenwealth.ThePCGGonJuly24,1986thussequesteredtheseSIPALAYsharesundera"Sequestration
OrderandSupervisoryCommittee.
SIPALAYwasforcedtolitigateafterthePCGGsoughttoimplementthesequestrationwithoutacting
onitsmotion."..ToLiftSequestrationOrder"and."..ForHearingForSpecificationOfChargesAndFor
CopiesOfEvidence."SIPALAYmaintainedthatthesequestrationwaswithoutevidentiarysubstation,violativeof
dueprocess,anddeemedautomaticallyliftedwhennojudicialproceedingwasbroughtagainstitwithinthe
periodmandatedunderArticleXVIII,Section26oftheConstitution.
AnentALLIED(S.B.0100),itsValenzuelabranchonAugust13,1986wasserveda"Searchand
SeizureOrder"byagentsofthePCGG.Theorderwasdirectedtosubmitforsearchandseizureallbank
documentsintheabovementionedpremiseswhichourrepresentativemayfindnecessaryandrelevanttothe
investigation being conducted by this Commission.
ALLIEDwenttocourtforthesamereasonthatthePCGGwasbentonimplementingtheorder.
ALLIEDcontendedthatthisorderisnotoneforsequestrationbutispartiallyageneralsearchwarrantwhich
failstomeettheconstitutionalrequisitesforitsvalidissuance.
For the PCGGs part, its witnesses were Commissioner Dr. Quintin Doromal, former PCGG
Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista, now deceased, and Atty. Benjamin Alonte, Director IV, Legal
Department of the PCGG who headed the team that served the search and seizure order on ALLIED.
CommissionerDoromalidentifiedvoluminousdocuments.FormerCommissionerBautistadiedmidwayhercross-
examination.ThePCGGalmostfailedtopresentAtty.Alonte,hadtheSANDIGANBAYANnotreconsideredits
OrderofMarch8,19936declaringthecasessubmittedfordecisionafterthePCGGwasdeemedtohave
waivedpresentationofitsevidenceforitsrepeatedpostponementsofthehearing.AfterAtty.Alontestestimony
anduponthePCGGsmanifestationthatitwasnolongerpresentinganywitness,theSANDIGANBAYAN7
gavethePCGGtwenty(20)days(fromJuly1,1993)withinwhichtosubmititsformalevidenceinwriting.
SIPALAYandALLIEDweregiventhesameperiod(20days)fromreceiptofsuchwrittenformalofferof
evidencewithinwhichtofiletheirformalcommentsand/orobjectionsthereto,andafterwhich,theincidentwill
bedeemedsubmittedforresolution.
WhatthePCGGfiledonJuly7,1993wasnotawrittenformalofferofitsevidenceasdirectedby
theSANDIGANBAYAN,buta"MotionToDismiss"theSIPALAYandALLIEDpetitions.Admittedly,thismotionto
dismisscamenearlyseven(7)yearsafterSIPALAYandALLIEDoriginallyfiledtheirpetitionsbeforethisCourt
onSeptember16,1986andAugust26,1986,respectively.ThegroundwasSIPALAYsandALLIEDsalleged
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The PCGG argued that SIPALAY and ALLIED should have first
appealedthesequestrationorderstotheOfficeofthePresidentbeforechallengingthemincourt,invoking
5

Sections5and6ofthePCGGRulesandRegulations.An"Oppositions"anda"Reply"werefiledinrelation
tothemotion.
Atsomeearliertime(May21,1992),thePCGGfileda"MotionForTheConsolidationOrJointTrial"
ofSIPALAYsandALLIEDspetitions(S.B.0095andS.B.0100)withCivilCase0005 acomplaintfor
"Reversion,Reconveyance,Restitution,AccountingandDamages"datedJuly17,1987likewisefiledbeforethe
SANDIGANBAYANbythePCGGagainstLucioTan,FerdinandandImeldaMarcos,andotherdefendants.8
TheSANDIGANBAYANformallydeniedthismotioninanextendedResolutiondatedJuly6,1993.ThePCGG
filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" thereof. This motion was deemed submitted for resolution when no
oppositionandreplywerefiled.SIPALAYandALLIEDthenfileda"MotionToConsiderCasesSubmittedFor
Decision",towhichanoppositionandreplywerefiled.
ISSUE:
whetherornotnon-exhaustionofadministrativeremediesisdeemedforfailuretoinvokeat
propertime?
HELD:
A direct action in court without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, when required, is
premature,warrantingitsdismissalonamotiontodismissgroundedonlackofcauseofaction.However,the
peculiaritiesofthiscaseprecludetherightfulapplicationoftheprincipleaforestated.WhenthePCGGdecided
tofileitsmotiontodismiss,nearlyseven(7)yearsalreadycametopassinbetweenthatsomuchhas
already transpired in the proceedings during the interregnum. The motion to dismiss came only at the
penultimatestageoftheproceedingswheretheremainingtaskleftforthePCGGwastofileitswrittenformal
offerofevidenceasrequiredbytheSANDIGANBAYAN.ThisCourt,in"Sottov.Jareno,"144SCRA116,119
hasmaditquiteclearthat:"Failuretoobservethedoctrineofexhaustionofadministrativeremediesdoesnot
affectthejurisdictionoftheCourt.Wehaverepeatedlystressedthisinalonglineofdecisions.Theonly
effectofnon-compliancewiththisruleisthatitwilldeprivethecomplainantofacauseofaction,whichisa
groundforamotiontodismiss.Ifnotinvokedatthepropertime,thisgroundisdeemedwaivedandthe
courtcantakecognizanceofthecaseandtryit."PCGGisguiltyofestoppelbylaches.Withitsundenied
belatedaction,itisonlytopresumewithconclusivenessthatthePCGGhasabandonedordeclinedtoassert
whatitbewailedlackofcauseofaction.PCGGshouldbedeemedtohavewaivedsuchperceiveddefectfor
"propertime"cannotmeanorsanctionanunexplainedandunreasonedlengthoftime.Theleniencyextended
bytheRulesandbyjurisprudencecannotbeinvokedtocover-upandvalidatetheonsetoflachesorthe
failuretodosomethingwhichshouldbedoneortoclaimorenforcearightatapropertime.

6

ANG TIBAY VS. CIR
G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940
FACTS:
ThatToribioTeodoro'sclaimthatonSeptember26,1938,therewasshortageofleathersolesinANG
TIBAYmakingitnecessaryforhimtotemporarilylayoffthemembersoftheNationalLaborUnionInc.,is
entirelyfalseandunsupportedbytherecordsoftheBureauofCustomsandtheBooksofAccountsofnative
dealersinleather.wlibrary
That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematicallyprevent the forfeiture of thisbond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine
Army.c]virtuallawlibrary
ThatToribioTeodoro'slettertothePhilippineArmydatedSeptember29,1938,(resupposeddelayof
leathersolesfromtheStates)wasbutaschemetosystematicallypreventtheforfeitureofthisbonddespite
thebreachofhisCONTRACTwiththePhilippineArmy.virtuallawlibra
ThattheNationalWorker'sBrotherhoodofANGTIBAYisacompanyoremployeruniondominatedby
ToribioTeodoro,theexistenceandfunctionsofwhichareillegal.
That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective
representationarehighlyessentialandindispensable.(
ThatthecenturyprovisionsoftheCivilCodewhichhadbeen(the)principalsourceofdissensions
andcontinuouscivilwarinSpaincannotandshouldnotbemadeapplicableininterpretingandapplyingthe
salutaryprovisionsofamodernlaborlegislationofAmericanoriginwheretheindustrialpeacehasalwaysbeen
therule.ThattheemployerToribioTeodorowasguiltyofunfairlaborpracticefordiscriminatingagainstthe
NationalLaborUnion,Inc.,andunjustlyfavoringtheNationalWorkers'Brotherhood.lawlibrary
Thattheexhibitsheretoattachedaresoinaccessibletotherespondentsthatevenwiththeexercise
ofduediligencetheycouldnotbeexpectedtohaveobtainedthemandofferedasevidenceintheCourtof
IndustrialRelations.lawlibrary
Thattheattacheddocumentsandexhibitsareofsuchfar-reachingimportanceandeffectthattheir
admissionwouldnecessarilymeanthemodificationandreversalofthejudgmentrenderedherein.
ISSUE:
WhetherornotspecialcourtslikeCourtofIndustrialRelationsshouldobservedueprocess.
HELD:
Yes. The Court ofIndustrial Relationsis not narrowly constrained by technical rules ofprocedure, and
CommonwealthActNo.103requiresittoactaccordingtojusticeandequityandsubstantialmeritsofthe
case,withoutregardtotechnicalitiesorlegalevidencebutmayinformitsmindinsuchmannerasitmay
deem just and equitable.

Therearecardinalprimaryrightswhichmustberespectedeveninproceedingsofthischaracter.Thefirstof
theserightsistherighttoahearing,whichincludestherightofthepartyinterestedoraffectedtopresent
hisowncaseandsubmitevidenceinsupportthereof.Notonlymustthepartybegivenanopportunityto
presenthiscaseandtoadduceevidencetendingtoestablishtherightswhichheassertsbutthetribunal
mustconsidertheevidencepresented.Whilethedutytodeliberatedoesnotimposetheobligationtodecide
7

right,itdoesimplyanecessitywhichcannotbedisregarded,namely,thatofhavingsomethingtosupport
itsdecision.Notonlymusttherebesomeevidencetosupportafindingorconclusion,buttheevidencemust
besubstantial.Thedecisionmustberenderedontheevidencepresentedatthehearing,oratleastcontained
intherecordanddisclosedtothepartiesaffected.TheCourtofIndustrialRelationsoranyofitsjudges,
therefore,mustactonitsorhisownindependentconsiderationofthelawandfactsofthecontroversy,and
not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at adecision. The Court ofIndustrial
Relationsshould,inallcontroversialquestions,renderitsdecisioninsuchamannerthatthepartiestothe
proceedingcanknowthevariousissuesinvolved,andthereasonsforthedecisionsrendered.Theperformance
ofthisdutyisinseparablefromtheauthorityconferreduponit.

8

REMOLONA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
362 SCRA 304 (2001)
FACTS:
petitionerEstelitoV.RemolonaisthePostmasteratthePostalOfficeServiceinInfanta,Quezon,while
hiswifeNeryRemolonaisateacherattheKiborosaElementarySchool.
Inaletter
3
datedJanuary3,1991,FranciscoR.America,DistrictSupervisoroftheDepartmentof
Education,Culture&SportsatInfanta,Quezon,inquiredfromtheCivilServiceCommission(CSC)astothe
statusofthecivilserviceeligibilityofMrs.Remolonawhopurportedlygotaratingof81.25%asperReportof
RatingissuedbytheNationalBoardforTeachers.
4
Mr.Americalikewisedisclosedthathereceivedinformation
thatMrs.RemolonawascampaigningforafeeofP8,000.00perexamineeforapassingmarkintheteacher's
boardexaminations.
OnFebruary11,1991,thenCSCChairmanPatriciaA.Sto.TomasissuedanOrderdirectingCSC
RegionIVDirectorBellaAmilhasantoconductaninvestigationonMrs.Remolona'seligibility,afterverification
fromtheRegisterofEligiblesintheOfficeforCentralPersonnelRecordsrevealed"thatRemolona'snameis
notinthelistofpassingandfailingexaminees,andthatthelistofexamineesforDecember10,1989does
notincludethenameofRemolona.Furthermore,ExaminationNo.061285asindicatedinherreportofrating
belongstoacertainMarlouC.Madelo,whotooktheexaminationinCagayandeOroandgotaratingof
65.00%."
5
crlwvirtualibrry
During the preliminary investigation conducted by Jaime G. Pasion, Director II, Civil Service Field
Office, Lucena City, Quezon, only petitioner Remolona appeared. He signed a written statement of
facts
6
regardingtheissuanceofthequestionedReportofRatingofMrs.Remolona.
Furthermore,Remolonaadmittedthathewasresponsibleinacquiringtheallegedfakeeligibility,thathiswife
has no knowledge thereof, and that he did it because he wanted them to be together. Based on the
foregoing,DirectorPasionrecommendedthefilingoftheappropriateadministrativeactionagainstRemolonabut
absolvedMrs.NeryRemolonafromanyliabilitysinceithasnotbeenshownthatshewillfullyparticipatedin
thecommissionoftheoffense.
Consequently,aFormalChargedatedApril6,1993wasfiledagainstpetitionerRemolona,NeryC.
Remolona,andAtty.HadjiSalupadinforpossessionoffakeeligibility,falsificationanddishonesty.
8
Aformal
hearingensuedwhereinthepartiespresentedtheirrespectiveevidence.Thereafter,CSCRegionalDirectorBella
A.AmilhasanissuedaMemorandumdatedFebruary14,1995
9
recommendingthatthespousesEstelitoand
NeryRemolonabefoundguiltyaschargedandbemetedthecorrespondingpenalty.
SaidrecommendationwasadoptedbytheCSCwhichissuedResolutionNo.95-2908onApril20,
1995, finding the spouses Estelito and Nery Remolona guilty of dishonesty and imposing the penalty of
dismissalandallitsaccessorypenalties.ThecaseagainstAtty.HadjiSalupadinwasheldinabeyancepending
proof of his identity.
10
In its Resolution No. 965510
11
dated August 27, 1996, the CSC, acting on the
motionforreconsiderationfiledbythespousesRemolona,absolvedNeryRemolonafromliability.
ISSUE:
Whetherornotacivilserviceemployeecanbedismissedfromthegovernmentserviceforanoffense
whichisnotworkrelatedorwhichisnotconnectedwiththeperformanceofhisofficialduty?
HELD:
9

Itcannotbedeniedthatdishonestyisconsideredagraveoffensepunishablebydismissalforthefirst
offenseunderSection23,RuleXIVoftheRulesImplementingBookVofExecutiveOrderNo.292.Andthe
ruleisthatdishonesty,inordertowarrantdismissal,neednotbecommittedinthecourseoftheperformance
ofdutybythepersoncharged.Therationalefortheruleisthatifagovernmentofficeroremployeeis
dishonestorisguiltyofoppressionorgravemisconduct,evenifsaiddefectsofcharacterarenotconnected
withhisoffice,theyaffecthisrighttocontinueinoffice.TheGovernmentcannottolerateinitsservicea
dishonestofficial,evenifheperformshisdutiescorrectlyandwell,becausebyreasonofhisgovernment
position,heisgivenmoreandampleopportunitytocommitactsofdishonestyagainsthisfellowmen,even
againstofficesandentitiesofthegovernmentotherthantheofficewhereheisemployed;andbyreasonof
hisoffice,heenjoysandpossessesacertaininfluenceandpowerwhichrendersthevictimsofhisgrave
misconduct,oppressionanddishonestylessdisposedandpreparedtoresistandtocounteracthisevilactsand
actuations.Theprivatelifeofanemployeecannotbesegregatedfromhispubliclife.Dishonestyinevitably
reflectsonthefitnessoftheofficeroremployeetocontinueinofficeandthedisciplineandmoraleofthe
service.
14
crlwvirtualibrry
The principle is that when an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the
punishmentofsuchofficeroremployeebuttheimprovementofthepublicserviceandthepreservationofthe
publicsfaithandconfidenceinthegovernment.
15
crlwvirtualibrry



















10

LUMIQUED VS. EXCEVEA
282 SCRA 125 (1997)
FACTS:
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform
CordilleraAutonomousRegion(DAR-CAR)untilPresidentFidelV.Ramosdismissedhimfromthat
positionpursuanttoAdministrativeOrderNo.52datedMay12,1993.InviewofLumiquedsdeath
on May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this petition forcertiorariandmandamus, questioning such
order.
thedismissalwastheaftermathofthreecomplaintsfiledbydar-carandprivaterespondent
Jeannettewiththeboardofdisciplineofthedar.allegingthereinthelumiquedwaschargedwith
malversation through falsification of gasoline receipts, unliquadated cash advances in the total
amountofP116,000.00andoppressionandharassment.andaccordingtoprivaterespondenther
twopreviouscomplaintspromptedlumiquedtoretaliatedbyrelievingherfromherpostasregional
cashierwithoutjustcause.
The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the Department of Justice
(DOJ)forappropriateaction.OnMay20,1992,ActingJusticeSecretaryEduardoG.Montenegro
issued Department Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the complaints against
Lumiqued.TheorderappointedRegionalStateProsecutorApolinarioExeveaascommitteechairman
withCityProsecutorErdolfoBalajadiaandProvincialProsecutorFelixCabadingasmembers.They
weremandatedtoconductaninvestigationwithinthirtydaysfromreceiptoftheorder,andto
submittheirreportandrecommendationwithinfifteendaysfromitsconclusion.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but
Lumiquedwasnotassistedbycounsel.Onthesecondhearingdate,hemovedforitsresettingto
July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the
motion,butneitherLumiquednorhiscounselappearedonthedatehehimselfhadchosen,so
thecommitteedeemedthecasesubmittedforresolution.
TheInvestigatingCommitteerecommendedthedismissalofLumiquedorremovalfromoffice
withoutprejudicetothefillingoftheappropriatecriminalcharges.DOJSecDrilonadoptedthe
recommendation.FidelRamosissuedAO52findinglimquedadministrativelyliablefordishonestyin
thealterationoffifteengasolinereceipts,anddismissinghimfromtheservicewithforfeitureofhis
retirementandotherbenefits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrativeinquiry?
HELD:
TheSCruledagainstLumiqued.Therighttocounsel,whichcannotbewaivedunlessthe
waiverisinwritingandinthepresenceofcounsel,isarightaffordedasuspectoranaccused
duringcustodialinvestigation.Itisnotanabsoluterightandmay,thus,beinvokedorrejectedina
criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in anadministrative inquiry. In the case at bar,
petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to havecompetent and
11

independentcounselofhisownchoice.Lumiqued,however,wasnotaccusedofanycrimein
theproceedingsbelow.TheinvestigationconductedbythecommitteecreatedbyDepartmentOrder
No.145wasforthepurposeofdeterminingifhecouldbeheldadministrativelyliableunderthe
lawforthecomplaintsfiledagainsthim.Therighttocounselisnotindispensabletodueprocess
unlessrequiredbytheConstitutionorthelaw.ThereisnothingintheConstitutionthatsaysthata
partyinanon-criminalproceedingisentitledtoberepresentedbycounselandthat,withoutsuch
representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. Theassistance of lawyers, while
desirable,isnotindispensable.Thelegalprofessionwasnotengraftedinthedueprocessclause
suchthatwithouttheparticipationofitsmembers,thesafeguardisdeemedignoredorviolated.The
ordinarycitizenisnotthathelplessthathecannotvalidlyactatallexceptonlywithalawyerat
his side.In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunityto
explainonesside.Whateverirregularityattendedtheproceedingsconductedbythecommitteewas
curedbyLumiquedsappealandhissubsequentfilingofmotionsforreconsideration.

12

FORTICH VS. CORONA
289 SCRA 624 (1992)
FACTS:
Thiscaseinvolvesa144-hectarelandlocatedatSanVicente,Sumilao,Bukidnon,ownedby
theNorbertoQuisumbing,Sr.ManagementandDevelopmentCorporation(NQSRMDC),oneofthe
petitioners.ThepropertyiscoveredbyaTransferCertificateofTitleNo.14371
[3]
oftheRegistry
ofDeedsoftheProvinceofBukidnon.
In1984,thelandwasleasedasapineappleplantationtothePhilippinePackingCorporation,
nowDelMontePhilippines,Inc.(DMPI),amultinationalcorporation,foraperiodoften(10)years
undertheCropProducerandGrowersAgreementdulyannotatedinthecertificateoftitle.The
leaseexpiredinApril,1994.
InOctober,1991,duringtheexistenceofthelease,theDepartmentofAgrarianReform(DAR)
placedtheentire144-hectarepropertyundercompulsoryacquisitionandassessedthelandvalue
atP2.38million.
[4]

NQSRMDCresistedtheDARsaction.InFebruary,1992,itsoughtandwasgrantedbythe
DARAdjudicationBoard(DARAB),throughitsProvincialAgrarianReformAdjudicator(PARAD)in
DARABCaseNo.X-576,awritofprohibitionwithpreliminaryinjunctionwhichorderedtheDAR
Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal
AgrarianReformOffice(MARO)ofSumilao,Bukidnon,the LandBank ofthePhilippines(Land
Bank), and their authorized representatives to desist from pursuing any activity or activities
concerningthesubjectlanduntilfurtherorders.
[5]

Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional Director issued a
memorandum,datedMay21,1992,directingtheLandBanktoopenatrustaccountforP2.38
millioninthenameofNQSRMDCandtoconductsummaryproceedingstodeterminethejust
compensationofthesubjectproperty.NQSRMDCobjectedtothesemovesandfiledonJune9,
1992an OmnibusMotiontoenforcetheDARABorderofMarch31,1992andtonullifythe
summaryproceedingsundertakenbytheDARRegionalDirectorandLandBankonthevaluationof
thesubjectproperty.
TheDARAB,onOctober22,1992,actedfavorablyontheOmnibusMotionby(a)ordering
theDARRegionalDirectorandLandBanktoseriouslycomplywiththetermsoftheorderdated
March31,1992;(b)nullifyingtheDARRegionalDirectorsmemorandum,datedMay21,1992,
andthesummaryproceedingsconductedpursuantthereto;and(c)directingtheLandBankto
returntheclaimfolderofPetitionerNQSRMDCssubjectpropertytotheDARuntilfurtherorders.
[6]

TheLandBankcompliedwiththeDARABorderandcancelledthetrustaccountitopenedin
thenameofpetitionerNQSRMDC.
[7]

Inthemeantime,theProvincialDevelopmentCouncil(PDC)ofBukidnon,headedbyGovernor
CarlosO.Fortich,passedResolutionNo.6,
[8]
datedJanuary7,1993,designatingcertainareas
alongBukidnon-SayreHighwayaspartoftheBukidnonAgro-IndustrialZoneswherethesubject
propertyissituated.

ISSUE:
HELD: