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Nuc|ear bus|ness makes
peop|e pay and suffer
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Oontents
, !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
./01"+&20 $"''(34 5
6%(7+03 89 8:
Fukush|ma two years |ater: ||ves st||| |n ||mbo
by -$ -&./0 123"/44
6%(7+03 ,9 ,,
Summary and ana|ys|s of |nternat|ona| nuc|ear ||ab|||ty
by ;<+*<4 !3*==(++
6%(7+03 >9 >?
The nuc|ear power p|ant supp|y cha|n
by 5$67"886$ 9:";<"= ><6?&8
!6$ ?6$" /=76$?&:/6= 26=:&2:@ pressdesk.|nt@greenpeace.org
A$/::"= #'@ Antony Froggatt, Dr Dav|d McNe|||, Prof Stephen Thomas and Dr R|anne Teu|e
B0/:"0 #'@ Br|an B|omme, Steve Erwood, N|na Schu|z, Dr R|anne Teu|e
C2D=6E4"0F"?"=:8@ Jan Beranek, Kr|st|n Oasper, Jan Haverkamp, Yasush| H|gash|zawa, Greg McNev|n,
J|m R|cc|o, Ayako Sek|ne, Shawn-Patr|ck Stens||, Kazue Suzuk|, H|sayo Takada, As||han Tumer
C$: -/$"2:/6=G-"8/F= #'@ Sue Oowe||/Atomo Des|gn
H6."$ /?&F"@ Empty roads run through the southeastern part of Kawamata, as most res|dents were
evacuated due to rad|oact|ve contam|nat|on. Robert Knoth / Greenpeace

JN 444
5%#4/8<"0 !"#$%&$' )*+, #' Greenpeace lnternat|ona|
Ottho He|dr|ngstraat 5, 1066 AZ Amsterdam, The Nether|ands
Te|: +31 20 7182000
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toys, wa|t|ng for
Greenpeace to carry out
rad|at|on |eve| test|ng.
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!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer >
Governments have
created a system that
protects the benef|ts
of compan|es wh||e
those who suffer from
nuc|ear d|sasters end
up pay|ng the costs..
0/01"+&20 $"''(34
5 !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
The nuc|ear |ndustry
evades respons|b|||ty
for |ts fa||ures.
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1
@'(=09 Aer|a| v|ew
of the Fukush|ma
Da||ch| nuc|ear
p|ant fo||ow|ng the
2011 d|saster.
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer A
0/01"+&20 $"''(34
From the beg|nn|ng of the use of nuc|ear power to produce e|ectr|c|ty 60 years
ago, the nuc|ear |ndustry has been protected from pay|ng the fu|| costs of
|ts fa||ures. Governments have created a system that protects the prof|ts of
compan|es wh||e those who suffer from nuc|ear d|sasters end up pay|ng
the costs.
The d|saster at the Fukush|ma Da||ch| nuc|ear power p|ant |n March 2011 proves aga|n that |ndustry
prof|ts and peop|e pay. A|most two years after the re|ease of mass|ve amounts of rad|at|on from the
Fukush|ma nuc|ear d|saster, hundreds of thousands of peop|e are st||| exposed to the |ong-term rad|oact|ve
contam|nat|on caused by the acc|dent. The da||y ||ves of v|ct|ms are d|srupted. They have |ost the|r homes,
the|r jobs, the|r bus|nesses, the|r farms, the|r commun|t|es, and a way of ||fe they enjoyed.
They are st||| unab|e to get fa|r and t|me|y compensat|on. Yet at the same t|me, the nuc|ear |ndustry cont|nues
to evade |ts respons|b|||t|es for the d|saster. lt |s bus|ness as usua|: nuc|ear compan|es are st||| operat|ng as
a|ways by creat|ng nuc|ear r|sks.
How |s |t poss|b|e that, apart from the now nat|ona||sed Fukush|ma operator TEPOO, the nuc|ear |ndustry
|s not pay|ng for the mu|t|b||||ons |n damages of Fukush|ma? How |s |t poss|b|e that compan|es, such as
GE and H|tach|, that got |arge contracts by bu||d|ng, supp|y|ng and serv|c|ng the Fukush|ma nuc|ear power
p|ant, can s|mp|y cont|nue the|r bus|ness as |f noth|ng happened?
lt has become pa|nfu||y c|ear that system|c f|aws |n the nuc|ear sector make the suffer|ng of v|ct|ms worse.
Many of them surv|ve |n |mprov|sed cond|t|ons, unab|e to return home or to rebu||d the|r ||ves e|sewhere.
Why does th|s happen? The nuc|ear |ndustry and governments have des|gned a nuc|ear ||ab|||ty system that
protects the |ndustry, and forces peop|e to p|ck up the b||| for |ts m|stakes and d|sasters. To safeguard the
pub||c from nuc|ear r|sks, the system needs to be fundamenta||y reformed to ho|d the ent|re nuc|ear |ndustry
fu||y accountab|e for |ts act|ons and fa||ures.
ln February 2012, Greenpeace re|eased |esso|s /|om F0|0s||ma, a report that uncovered the key causes
of the Fukush|ma acc|dent, wh|ch ||e |n |nst|tut|ona| fa||ures of governments, regu|ators, and the nuc|ear
|ndustry. These |nc|uded: fa||ure to acknow|edge nuc|ear r|sks, fa||ure to enforce appropr|ate nuc|ear
safety standards, fa||ure to protect the pub||c |n an emergency s|tuat|on, and fa||ure to ensure appropr|ate
compensat|on for the v|ct|ms.
Th|s new Greenpeace report demonstrates how +%0 <"1)0(3 $01+*3 02(B0$ 30$7*<$&C&)&+4 D*3 &+$
D(&)"30$. The nuc|ear |ndustry |s un||ke any other |ndustry: |t |s not requ|red to fu||y compensate |ts v|ct|ms
for the effects of |ts |arge, |ong-|ast|ng, and trans-boundary d|sasters.
ln th|s report, the current status of compensat|on for v|ct|ms of the Fukush|ma d|saster |s ana|ysed as an
examp|e of the ser|ous prob|ems due to |ack of accountab|||ty for nuc|ear acc|dents. The report a|so |ooks
|nto the ro|e of nuc|ear supp||ers |n the fa||ure of the Fukush|ma reactors.
Execut|ve summary
E !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
ln add|t|on, th|s report addresses two ma|n protect|ons for the |ndustry:
||ab|||ty convent|ons and nat|ona| |aws ||m|t the tota| amount of compensat|on ava||ab|e and protect
nuc|ear supp||ers, the compan|es that prof|t from the construct|on and operat|on of reactors, from any
||ab|||ty. Th|s caps the funds ava||ab|e for v|ct|ms at a fract|on of rea| costs and removes |ncent|ves for
supp||er compan|es to take measures to reduce nuc|ear r|sks.
The comp|ex|ty of and mu|t|p|e |ayers |n the nuc|ear supp|y cha|n exacerbate the |ack of accountab|||ty for
nuc|ear supp||ers. Even though hundreds of d|fferent supp||ers are prov|d|ng components and serv|ces that
are cr|t|ca| for reactor safety, these compan|es cannot be he|d accountab|e |n case of prob|ems.
!"#"$%&'( +F* 40(3$ )(+03 G 70*7)0 )0D+ &< )&'C*
Ohapter 1 of th|s report deta||s the $+3"==)0 *D <"1)0(3 2&1+&'$ D*3 D(&3 1*'70<$(+&*<. Author Dr Dav|d
McNe||, (Japan correspondent and co-author of 5||o| || ||e |a||. 50|.|.|| !aoa|'s Ea|||q0a|e, 7s0|am|
a|d F0|0s||ma ^0c|ea| D|sas|e|} eva|uates the ongo|ng human consequences of the Fukush|ma acc|dent.
v|ct|ms and w|tnesses te|| stor|es about the mu|t|p|e prob|ems w|th the compensat|on process. As Mrs Kameya
(68} states: 'Peop|e th|nk we w||| get a |ot of money when someth|ng ||ke th|s happens but they`re wrong."
ln the wake of the d|saster, the 160,000 |nvo|untary and tens of thousands of vo|untary evacuees f|ed
from the rad|oact|ve|y contam|nated zone. For them, start|ng a new ||fe seems a|most |mposs|b|e and the
compensat|on process |s comp||cat|ng, not eas|ng peop|e`s ||ves.
Peop|e are |eft |n ||mbo, stuck between past and future. The prob|ems w|th the compensat|on process are
man|fo|d: the process|ng of c|a|ms |s de|ayed, and the month|y payments are not enough to ensure peop|e
a ||v|ng, |et a|one enough to set up a new ||fe. Not everyone |s e||g|b|e for compensat|on, and the |ucky
ones on|y get a fract|on of the va|ue of the|r |ost homes. There has not yet been a s|ng|e payment that fu||y
compensates anyone for the |oss of a house and property.
The compensat|on scheme |s set up |n a way that compensat|on |s f|rst pa|d w|th government-backed
f|nanc|ng. But TEPOO`s nat|ona||sat|on |n June 2012 makes |t c|ear that eventua||y ord|nary Japanese peop|e
w||| pay the b||| for Fukush|ma. The ut|||ty`s demand on the state-backed Nuc|ear Damage ||ab|||ty Fac|||tat|on
Fund for compensat|on payments mounted to 3.24 tr||||on ($36.5bn S do||ars} by December 2012. At the
same t|me, the Japanese government |njected 1tn (about $12.5bn at 2012 exchange rates} |nto the ut|||ty
|n May 2012 to save |t from bankruptcy, wh|ch tota||ed an est|mated 3.5tn |n pub||c money to the ut|||ty
s|nce the Fukush|ma d|saster began.
H"1)0(3 $"77)&03$ 0$1(70 30$7*<$&C&)&+4
Ohapter 1 a|so |nvest|gates the 3*)0 *D +%0 <"1)0(3 $"77)&03 1*'7(<&0$ |n the Fukush|ma reactors. The
Fukush|ma Da||ch| nuc|ear power p|ant cons|sted of s|x reactors, w|th un|ts 1 to 5 based on the f|awed
Mark l des|gn by the S company Genera| E|ectr|c (GE}. GE supp||ed the reactors for un|ts 1, 2, and 6, and
two Japanese compan|es supp||ed the others - Tosh|ba prov|ded un|ts 3 and 5, and H|tach| un|t 4.
A|| supp||ers that were |nvo|ved |n the Fukush|ma nuc|ear power p|ants, |nc|ud|ng GE, H|tach| and Tosh|ba,
are current|y exempted from respons|b|||ty for the March 11 d|saster. ln contrast, many are even 73*D&+&<=
D3*' +%0 B&$($+03. GE, H|tach| and Tosh|ba, a|ong w|th many other supp||ers, are current|y |nvo|ved |n the
c|ean up, wh|ch |nc|udes decomm|ss|on|ng the Fukush|ma reactors and decontam|nat|on of rad|oact|ve|y
contam|nated areas.
0/01"+&20 $"''(34
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer I
A report by the |ndependent |nvest|gat|on comm|ss|on of the Nat|ona| D|et of Japan says that reactor
n|t 1 of the Fukush|ma power p|ant was purchased by TEPOO under a 'turnkey" contract for construct|on
'that p|aced a|| respons|b|||ty" on GE. Fukush|ma n|t 1 was the f|rst Mark l reactor ever bu||t, and
exper|enced numerous d|ff|cu|t|es. The se|sm|c des|gn cr|ter|a |n Japan were str|cter than for the or|g|na|
des|gn, but |ncorporat|on of the Japanese spec|f|cat|ons was prob|emat|c and ad hoc re|nforcements were
made dur|ng construct|on.
ln the 1970s, GE eng|neer Da|e G Br|denbaugh pub||c|y quest|oned whether GE`s Mark l reactor wou|d
stand up to a |oss-of-coo|ant acc|dent. The D|et report adds that the Mark l conta|nment vesse|s at
Fukush|ma were re|nforced |n the 1980s, 'but the re|nforcement d|d not cover severe acc|dents of th|s
sca|e." The report conc|udes that dur|ng the Fukush|ma acc|dent, the pressure |ns|de the conta|nment
vesse|s substant|a||y exceeded the|r des|gned capac|ty, up to a|most tw|ce the capac|ty |n the case of n|t 1.
Former GE emp|oyees reca|| how TEPOO e|ected to overru|e |ts own eng|neers and fo||ow GE`s or|g|na|
construct|on des|gn and put the p|ant`s emergency d|ese| generators and batter|es |n the basement of the
turb|ne bu||d|ngs, w|th devastat|ng consequences dur|ng the acc|dent. Former H|tach| eng|neer turned
wh|st|eb|ower M|tsuh|ko Tanaka he|ped bu||d the reactor pressure vesse| for Fukush|ma reactor n|t 4. ln the
f|na| stages of construct|on, the vesse|`s |ntegr|ty was dangerous|y comprom|sed, |ega||y ob||g|ng H|tach| to
scrap |t. Fac|ng bankruptcy, the company covered up the defect and the vesse| was |nsta||ed at Fukush|ma.
ln September 1989, the S Nuc|ear Regu|atory Oomm|ss|on (NRO} encouraged owners of Mark l reactors
to |nsta|| hardened vents to prevent catastroph|c fa||ure of the conta|nment |n case of an acc|dent. These
vents wou|d enab|e contro||ed reduct|on of pressure. Dur|ng the Fukush|ma acc|dent, the hardened vents
proved |neffect|ve, and the absence of f||ters exacerbated the rad|oact|ve re|eases.
H"1)0(3 )&(C&)&+4 1*<20<+&*<$ 73*+01+ +%0 &<B"$+34J
<*+ +%0 70*7)0
The nuc|ear |ndustry |s granted "<7(3())0)0B (<B "<D(&3 73&2&)0=0$. ln contrast to many other r|sk-
|nvo|v|ng |ndustr|es, nuc|ear ||ab|||ty convent|ons have been estab||shed w|th the |ntent to protect the nuc|ear
|ndustry - th|s |nc|udes operators, supp||ers as we|| as |nvestors. The current agreements do not ensure that
v|ct|ms rece|ve fu|| and t|me|y compensat|on |n the event of a major acc|dent.
ln Ohapter 2, Antony Froggatt (|ndependent consu|tant, Sen|or Research Fe||ow at Ohatham House, K}
g|ves an overv|ew of the ex|st|ng |nternat|ona| nuc|ear ||ab|||ty convent|ons, and maps the |mpact of these
prob|emat|c ru|es, such as capp|ng tota| compensat|on, exc|ud|ng supp||ers from accountab|||ty, and
a||ow|ng operators not to have suff|c|ent f|nanc|a| secur|ty to cover the damages.
The core prob|ems of nuc|ear ||ab|||ty are:
The object|ves of |nternat|ona| ||ab|||ty convent|ons are compet|ng, |f not mutua||y exc|us|ve. F|rst, they
||m|t the extent of poss|b|e compensat|on c|a|ms, creat|ng an econom|c env|ronment that a||owed the
nascent nuc|ear |ndustry to f|our|sh. Second|y, they are supposed to grant v|ct|ms access to fu|| and t|me|y
compensat|on |n the event of an acc|dent.
On|y the operator of a nuc|ear power p|ant can be he|d respons|b|e for pay|ng for damages. Nuc|ear
supp||ers, who bu||d and serv|ce p|ants, do not have to pay anyth|ng.
The tota| amount of compensat|on ava||ab|e |s ||m|ted, but these ||m|ts are we|| be|ow the true cost of a
nuc|ear acc|dent.
Def|n|t|ons of nuc|ear damage do not cover a|| damages caused by a nuc|ear d|saster.
Potent|a| v|ct|ms |n other countr|es can on|y sue for compensat|on |n the country where the nuc|ear
acc|dent happened, <*+ |n the|r own courts.
0/01"+&20 $"''(34
? !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
The exper|ences of the Fukush|ma d|saster show that even the Japanese ||ab|||ty reg|me |s h|gh|y |nadequate
and unjust, desp|te the |ega| requ|rement of un||m|ted ||ab|||ty for an operator. The f|nanc|a| extent of the damage
|s genera||y far beyond what an operator can pay. S|nce the Japanese |aw exc|udes supp||er accountab|||ty,
the magn|tude of funds prov|ded by the nuc|ear |ndustry |s restr|cted to a very sma|| fract|on of the costs of
Fukush|ma.
lt |s c|ear that ho|d|ng on|y the operator respons|b|e for a nuc|ear acc|dent: 'm|n|m|ses the burden upon the
nuc|ear |ndustry as a who|e, as the var|ous persons who contr|bute to the operat|on of a nuc|ear |nsta||at|on,
such as supp||ers and carr|ers, do not requ|re |nsurance coverage add|t|ona| to that he|d by the operator"
1
,
as was po|nted out by OEOD`s Nuc|ear Energy Agency |n 1993. Th|s needs to be changed; 70*7)0 '"$+
C0 +%0 D&3$+ 73&*3&+4, not the benef|ts of the nuc|ear |ndustry.
Mak|ng nuc|ear supp||ers pay for the|r m|stakes wou|d not on|y benef|t the potent|a| v|ct|ms by mak|ng more
funds ava||ab|e, but wou|d a|so |ncrease accountab|||ty and transparency and create |ncent|ves for the
compan|es across the nuc|ear supp|y cha|n to prevent fa||ures.
There are on|y a few except|ons to the protect|on of the nuc|ear supp||er |ndustry. Recogn|s|ng the
fundamenta| unfa|rness, lnd|a adopted a nuc|ear |aw that a||ows nuc|ear operators to seek recourse |n the
event of 'w||fu| act or gross neg||gence on the part of the supp||er". A|so the ex|st|ng |aws |n both Russ|a and
South Korea a||ow operators to recover damages from supp||ers |n the event of neg||gence.
Ohernoby| and Fukush|ma are examp|es of how cost|y nuc|ear acc|dents can be, w|th est|mated damages
|n the order of severa| hundreds of b||||ons of euros. These f|gures deep|y contrast w|th what the |ndustry |s
current|y requ|red to pay (between t0.3-1.5bn}.
To create a system that |s fa|rer and puts peop|e ahead of bus|ness, the fo||ow|ng must happen:
No ||m|ts to the tota| amount of compensat|on.
Ho|d the who|e nuc|ear |ndustry, |nc|ud|ng supp||ers, accountab|e.
Ensure adequate f|nanc|a| coverage by compan|es. A major nuc|ear acc|dent wou|d a|most certa|n|y
bankrupt any pr|vate ut|||ty.
A||ow peop|e to recover a|| damages caused by a nuc|ear d|saster.
lncrease transparency |nto costs and ||ab|||ty |nsurances.
H"1)0(3 $"77)4 1%(&< )(1#$ (11*"<+(C&)&+4 (<B +3(<$7(30<14
ln Ohapter 3, Professor Stephen Thomas (professor at the n|vers|ty of Greenw|ch Bus|ness Schoo|, K,
work|ng |n the area of energy po||cy} exp|ores the |nvo|vement of supp||ers throughout the ||fet|me of a
nuc|ear reactor, and the|r respons|b|||t|es |n terms of nuc|ear r|sks. R|sks of nuc|ear acc|dents are not on|y
caused by the reactor operat|on, but a|so by des|gn cho|ces, construct|on qua||ty, and ma|ntenance, wh|ch
are of cr|t|ca| |mportance.
The cause of a s|gn|f|cant acc|dent at a nuc|ear power p|ant |s se|dom c|ear cut, and may |nvo|ve a
comb|nat|on of des|gn, construct|on, operat|on, and ma|ntenance errors. By compar|son, |t |s usua||y
re|at|ve|y easy to apport|on pr|mary respons|b|||ty for, say a car or a|rp|ane acc|dent, to des|gn construct|on,
operator or ma|ntenance error.
A nuc|ear power p|ant |s un|que |n terms of comp|ex|ty, safety requ|rements, p|ant ||fet|me, costs and on-s|te
construct|on work.
0/01"+&20 $"''(34
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer K
The supp|y cha|n for a nuc|ear power p|ant |s very comp|ex and |n many cases non-transparent. The owner/
operator of a p|ant carr|es f|na| respons|b|||ty, but des|gn, construct|on and ma|ntenance |nc|ude many
d|fferent part|es through many |ayers of contract|ng and subcontract|ng. D|fferent supp||ers are respons|b|e
for |mp|ement|ng e|ements cr|t|ca| for a p|ant`s safety, but current|y these supp||ers u|t|mate|y cannot be he|d
accountab|e |n case of an acc|dent.
Th|s |ack of accountab|||ty |s further enab|ed by a |ack of transparency regard|ng contracts and company
re|at|onsh|ps. Th|s s|tuat|on creates major cha||enges |n ensur|ng suff|c|ent qua||ty contro| on cr|t|ca| safety
features. lt |s often unc|ear (at |east to the outs|de wor|d} who carr|es the f|na| respons|b|||ty |n case prob|ems
were to occur w|th certa|n equ|pment or des|gns.
Many of those further down the supp|y cha|n w||| ex|t the bus|ness |ong before the end of the ||fe of the p|ant,
as was the case w|th the Dutch supp||er of the f|awed pressure vesse|s for the Be|g|an T|hange 2 and Doe|
3 p|ants. ln the case of the Fukush|ma d|saster, even though |t |s known that certa|n des|gn features caused
ser|ous prob|ems dur|ng the course of the acc|dent, those respons|b|e for the des|gn and eng|neer|ng are
not be|ng he|d accountab|e.
L0$$*<$ +* C0 )0(3<0B
We |earned from Fukush|ma that nuc|ear power can never be safe. The nuc|ear |ndustry, |arge|y protected
from the f|nanc|a| ||ab|||ty for the Fukush|ma acc|dent, cont|nues to do bus|ness, wh||e the Fukush|ma
v|ct|ms st||| |ack proper compensat|on and support. Wou|d th|ngs be d|fferent |f the next b|g nuc|ear d|saster
happened |n your country? You wou|d ||ke|y be fac|ng the very same prob|ems.
We have to phase out dangerous nuc|ear power ent|re|y, and do so as soon as poss|b|e. Yet, |f there |s
another major nuc|ear acc|dent, peop|e cou|d be g|ven better protect|on |f we ho|d the nuc|ear |ndustry fu||y
accountab|e and ||ab|e. We need to |earn the |essons from Fukush|ma, and change the system |n order to
'(#0 ()) 1*'7(<&0$ &< +%0 <"1)0(3 &<B"$+34 30$7*<$&C)0 D*3 +%0 3&$#$ +%04 130(+0.
More |mportant|y, we have to use th|s cr|t|ca| moment to f|na||y sw|tch to a safe and affordab|e supp|y
of e|ectr|c|ty - renewab|e energy. Mature, robust and affordab|e renewab|e energy techno|og|es are
ava||ab|e and up to the task of rep|ac|ng hazardous nuc|ear reactors. Over the |ast f|ve years, 22 t|mes
more new power generat|ng capac|ty based on w|nd and so|ar was bu||t (281,000MW} compared to
nuc|ear (11,750 MW}.
2
W|nd and so|ar p|ants a|one, bu||t |n just one s|ng|e year of 2012, are capab|e of
generat|ng as much e|ectr|c|ty as 20 |arge nuc|ear reactors. Th|s |s where the opportun|ty stands for a
future free of nuc|ear hazards.
8 NEA (1993}, 'NEA lssue Br|ef: An ana|ys|s of pr|nc|pa| |pa| nuc|ear |ssues
lnternat|ona| nuc|ear th|rd party ||ab|||ty, No. 4 - 1st rev|s|on", Nuc|ear Energy
Agency November 1993, accessed November 2012
http://www.oecd-nea.org/br|ef/br|ef-04-1.htm|
, lAEA/PRlS (http://pr|s.|aea.org/pub||c}; G|oba| W|nd Energy Out|ook 2012,
GWEA (http://www.gwec.net/wp-content/up|oads/2012/11/GWEO_2012_
|owRes.pdf}; G|oba| Market Out|ook for Photovo|ta|cs unt|| 2016, EPlA
(http://www.ep|a.org/|ndex.php?elD=tx_nawsecured|&u=0&f||e=/up|oads/
tx_ep|apub||cat|ons/G|oba|-Market-Out|ook-2016.pdf&t=1359035167&hash=
390c31d6e803e7c10b066e9ef72271831cf54c0d}
0/01"+&20 $"''(34
!"#$%&' !"#
The Fukush|ma
nuc|ear d|saster
|s a story about
how the system
fa||s to support
peop|e.
@'(=09 Ms Satsuk|
lkeda and her sons
were evacuated
from the|r farm
|n l|tate, 40km
northwest of the
Fukush|ma nuc|ear
p|ant. The farm
had been run by
the fam||y for n|ne
generat|ons.
J

L
K
S
B
L
>

N
3
K
>
O

G

Q
L
B
B
3
5
B
C
H
B
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer 88
!"#$%&' !"#
=1
Dr Dav|d McNe||| |s the Japan correspondent for 7|e C||o||c|e o/ |||e|
Ed0ca||o| and wr|tes for 7|e ||deoe|de|| and |||s| 7|mes newspapers.
He |s the co-author of 5||o| || ||e |a||. 50|.|.|| !aoa|'s Ea|||q0a|e,
7s0|am| a|d F0|0s||ma ^0c|ea| D|sas|e|.
8M8 @<+3*B"1+&*<
The story about ||ab|||ty fo||ow|ng the Fukush|ma nuc|ear d|saster |s rea||y a story about peop|e. lt`s a story
about how the system, that |s supposed to he|p peop|e after such a d|saster, fa||s to support them. lt`s a
story about how bureaucrac|es - government and company - p|ay by ru|es that at m|n|mum are terr|b|y
frustrat|ng for peop|e, and at the|r worst are an |mped|ment to gett|ng he|p.
Near|y two years after the d|saster, peop|e are st||| desperate for the he|p they deserve. The v|ct|ms are
|gnored, |eft to fend for themse|ves, and wa|t|ng and wa|t|ng for compensat|on and fa|r treatment. Some
have res|gned to gett|ng ||tt|e. Others are f|ght|ng the system. Th|s story of the f|aws |n the system that |s
supposed to he|p peop|e |s ||ke|y to be repeated w|th any nuc|ear d|saster anywhere |n the wor|d.
8M, N+"1# C0+F00< 7($+ (<B D"+"30
Yuk|ko Kameya (68} was one of the 7,400 peop|e ||v|ng |n Futaba town, Fukush|ma Prefecture, when the 11
March 2011 earthquake and tsunam| struck, cr|pp||ng the nearby Fukush|ma Da||ch| nuc|ear p|ant.
'There was no |nformat|on afterwards at a||," she says, reca|||ng how pub||c safety off|c|a|s to|d her the
fo||ow|ng freez|ng co|d morn|ng that '|t was poss|b|e" that some rad|at|on has escaped.
She f|ed w|th her husband, f|rst to Nam|e, about seven k||ometres away, then to the Tokyo suburbs. A|most
two years |ater, she |s st||| there. ||ke 160,000 nuc|ear refugees ordered to evacuate and tens of thousands
of peop|e who vo|untar||y |eft Fukush|ma Prefecture, she ||ves |n temporary hous|ng and has yet to be fu||y
compensated for the |oss of her o|d ||fe.
1

Four months after be|ng forced to abandon her home and a|| she owned, |n Ju|y 2011, the owner and
operator of the Fukush|ma reactors, Tokyo E|ectr|c Power (TEPOO}, sent the f|rst of |ts payments. A tota|
of 1.6m (about $18,000 S do||ars} was depos|ted |n Kameya`s account
2
, |nc|ud|ng 1m |n 'temporary"
compensat|on. When she ca||ed TEPOO, she was to|d that that money was an 'advance" and wou|d have
to be re|mbursed from future payments. 'lt wasn`t compensat|on," she says. 'That`s when l started to f|ght
them." Wh||e those advance payments are common pract|ce as the tota| damage |s be|ng determ|ned, th|s
term|no|ogy cont|nues to confuse v|ct|ms of the catastrophe.
Fukush|ma two years |ater:
||ves st||| |n ||mbo
by Dr Dav|d McNe|||
8, !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
!"#$%&' !"#
Mrs. Kameya and her husband subsequent|y rece|ved 100,000 a month ($ 1,130} for 'menta| d|stress" for
the f|rst n|ne months (March - November 2011}, p|us ||v|ng expenses, after subm|tt|ng a comp|ex app||cat|on
form. The or|g|na| 'advance" was subtracted from that payment. |ate |n 2011, she made another c|a|m,
pat|ent|y f|||ng hundreds of rece|pts for petro|, tax| fares, c|othes and even househo|d utens||s.
|ast February, fed up w|th the compensat|on process, she h|red a |awyer and demanded compensat|on
of 350,000 a month ($4,000} for da||y expenses. She says many of her Futaba ne|ghbours are do|ng the
same. 'l accepted the|r way tw|ce but l can`t do that anymore." TEPOO has to|d her that they 'cannot" pay
350,000.
3
||ke most of the refugees, she has ca|cu|ated her own one-off round f|gure to reboot her ||fe and cut a|| t|es
to TEPOO, the government and the end|ess paperwork: 20m (about $225,000}. 'lt doesn`t matter what
the government says, we`|| never go home. Most of us accept that." lf awarded the money, Mrs. Kameya
says she wou|d move to Sa|tama (|n Tokyo`s northern suburbs}, buy a sma|| house and ||ve out the rest of her
||fe. But ||ke many other v|ct|ms, she |s doubtfu| that the current compensat|on scheme w||| he|p her to set up
a new ||fe.
Other nuc|ear refugees are a|so |os|ng hope. H|tosh| Sega ran a sma|| restaurant near the power p|ant and
now works as a pub||c schoo| cook |n lwak| c|ty, about 40km south of the str|cken p|ant. He has yet to be
compensated for h|s |ost bus|ness, s|nce compensat|on for substant|a| assets |s st||| |n the assessment
stage. Others have stopped c|a|m|ng expenses, ||ke Fum|taka Na|to, who bought a farm |n l|tate v|||age |n
2009. l|tate v|||age, 40km northwest of the Fukush|ma nuc|ear p|ant, was |n|t|a||y des|gnated outs|de the
20km compu|sory evacuat|on zone, but |ater ordered to evacuate because of h|gh |eve|s of rad|oact|ve
contam|nat|on.
4
He says TEPOO w||| on|y pay h|m an average of 14,000 to take a month|y tr|p home. 'The
money does not even pay for my gas."
And some do not know |f they w||| ever get any compensat|on for the|r |ost ||ve||hoods, ||ke Farmer Katsuzo
Shoj|. He was to|d to |eave l|tate v|||age |n Apr|| 2011 and st||| ||ves w|th h|s w|fe |n temporary hous|ng |n Date,
40km from h|s contam|nated home. Both have g|ven up any thought of return|ng home. Shoj| and h|s w|fe
||ve on 100,000 a month from TEPOO, and have begun se|||ng vegetab|es from a rented a||otment. He has
no |dea when, how and how much he w||| get compensated for h|s house, farm, crops, and s|aughtered
an|ma|s. 'What cou|d |t be worth now?" he asks - even though the bas|s for compensat|on w||| be what
everyth|ng was worth before the acc|dent occurred. 'Even |f we were a||owed to return, nobody wou|d buy
my food."
5
And so on.
The quest|ons of v|ct|ms |||ustrate how TEPOO`s comp||cated compensat|on process |s mak|ng ||fe more
d|ff|cu|t for those affected by the acc|dent. Many of the tens of thousands who were e|ther ordered to f|ee or
who f|ed vo|untar||y from the contam|nated zone around the Da||ch| p|ant |n March and Apr|| 2011 te|| s|m||ar
stor|es. They note mu|t|p|e prob|ems w|th the compensat|on process: de|ayed process|ng of c|a|ms; month|y
payments too sma|| to ensure a ||v|ng, |et a|one start new ||ves; app||cat|on forms too d|ff|cu|t to comp|ete.
Refugees |n the appea| process have started to demand mu|t|p|e t|mes the amount TEPOO a||ocated to
them. There has not yet been a s|ng|e payment for assets and the hous|ng eva|uat|ons are regarded as too
|ow. The amount of potent|a| demands for compensat|on has forced TEPOO to |engthen Japan`s standard
three-year |ega| t|me ||m|t for c|a|ms.
6
The |n|t|a| cr|t|c|sm focused on TEPOO`s comp||cated app||cat|on
forms. ln order to f||e c|a|ms for damages, v|ct|ms needed to read through a 156-page |nstruct|on manua|
and f||| out an app||cat|on form extend|ng to 60 pages. Now the forms have been s|mp||f|ed.
7
TEPOO`s
constant response to ongo|ng cr|t|c|sm of the process |s 'We are do|ng our best."
8
The compensat|on scheme has been set up |n such a way that compensat|on |s f|rst pa|d w|th government-
backed f|nanc|ng.
9
Th|s 'Governmenta| Support|ng Scheme for the Damages Oaused by Nuc|ear Acc|dent"
was created |n May 2011, and a|ms 'to enhance governmenta| support for TEPOO to rea||se smooth
compensat|on procedures for nuc|ear acc|dent v|ct|ms."
10

!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer 8>
!"#$%&' !"#
ln September 2011, Japan`s government set up a new pub||c-pr|vate agency, the Nuc|ear Damage ||ab|||ty
Fac|||tat|on Fund, to keep TEPOO on ||fe support and oversee compensat|on, from a m|x of pub||c cash,
bank |oans (underwr|tten by the government}, government-backed bonds and money from Japan`s 10
e|ectr|c power compan|es.
11
TEPOO has stead||y |ncreased |ts demands on the Fund to over 3tn (rough|y
$34bn}, and more |s expected. The cost of dea||ng w|th the acc|dent forced the government to nat|ona||se
TEPOO |n June 2012, 'the b|ggest state |ntervent|on |nto a pr|vate, non-bank asset s|nce Amer|ca`s 2009
ba||-out of Genera| Motors," sa|d 7|e Eco|om|s|.
12
The ut|||ty`s nat|ona||sat|on makes |t c|ear: ord|nary
Japanese peop|e w||| pay the f|na| b||| for the Fukush|ma d|saster.
8M> OP03'(<0<+Q 1*'70<$(+&*< 7)(<
ln Ju|y 2012, a year and a ha|f after the tr|p|e me|tdown at Fukush|ma, TEPOO drew up |ts |ong-awa|ted
p|an on 'permanent compensat|on", ma|n|y for the assets of approx|mate|y 160,000 peop|e ordered to
evacuate.
13
The ut|||ty wou|d pay f|xed-asset pr|ces for property but |n most cases on|y 'for the per|od
dur|ng wh|ch the property |s unusab|e."
14
The compensat|on scheme |s based on a comp|ex and d|sputed
government system that d|v|des the contam|nated evacuated areas |nto three zones based on annua|
rad|at|on |eve|s of more than 50, 20-50mSv or |ess than 20mSv.
The government says that areas show|ng annua| read|ngs of |ess than 20mSv of rad|at|on are 'be|ng
prepared" for the evacuees` return.
15
What th|s means |s that decontam|nat|on of these areas, des|gnated
|||a| s|||| |a||o |0||| ('areas that w||| have the ban ||fted"} |s 'progress|ng", and |s expected to f|n|sh |n years
or |n some cases even months. ln the meant|me, evacuees can request two years` worth of compensat|on
(a tota| of 2.4m} |n advance. The government assumpt|on that ||es at the heart of th|s po||cy - that
decontam|nated areas can become hab|tab|e aga|n - cou|d keep many refugees` ||ves |n a state of ||mbo for
a |ong t|me. There are ser|ous concerns about the eff|c|ency of the decontam|nat|on efforts and the ab|||ty to
make the areas safe to ||ve |n.
16,17
Former res|dents from these '|ess contam|nated" areas can c|a|m on|y for
the use of the|r |and, houses or bus|nesses, not for the market va|ue of the|r property. Many have protested
th|s des|gnat|on.
18
For areas deemed 'un|nhab|tab|e for at |east f|ve years" (over 50mSv}, TEPOO announced that |t wou|d pay
mandatory evacuees for the fu|| cost of re|ocat|ng and for f|xed assets, but here aga|n the ca|cu|at|on formu|a
|s m|red |n controversy. TEPOO uses |oca| government taxat|on records to determ|ne f|xed-asset base
pr|ces, resu|t|ng |n eva|uat|ons that are much too |ow, say many refugees. For examp|e, Masum| Kowata
(57}, from Okuma, a town |n Fukush|ma Prefecture, just 5km from the cr|pp|ed p|ant, has been offered
on|y 700,000 ($8,000} for her 180-year-o|d, 300m
2
house. She wants a rea| estate agent to assess the
property, wh|ch she be||eves was worth at |east e|ght t|mes that amount before the acc|dent, but she cannot
persuade anyone to v|s|t the contam|nated zone.
19
Such stor|es are r|fe. Many thousands of evacuees
have outstand|ng |oans on |and that was va|ued much h|gher than the property |s worth today.
20
lf the
current va|ue |s used to determ|ne the max|mum compensat|on, these peop|e w||| not be ab|e to pay for the
outstand|ng property |oan, |et a|one pay for rebu||d|ng the|r ||ves e|sewhere.
The stage |s set for mu|t|p|e |awsu|ts that w||| drag on for years, says Yasush| Tadano, a Tokyo-based |awyer
who |aunched a c|ass-act|on compensat|on |awsu|t aga|nst TEPOO |n December 2012.
21
'The v|ct|ms of
th|s d|saster often had |arge houses, r|ce f|e|ds, ||vestock and |and and most had to move from that |nto
sma|| urban apartments or temporary hous|ng," he po|nts out. 'The amount of compensat|on be|ng offered
|s tota||y |nsuff|c|ent." He says |awyers w||| be ask|ng for the d|fference between the government-assessed
property va|ues and the amount of money needed to bu||d the same houses e|sewhere.
!"#$%&' !"#
85 !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
||ke many e|der|y refugees, Kowata says her hea|th has been worsened by the stress of evacuat|on. Her
husband has suffered k|dney fa||ure s|nce the d|saster. To pay for the costs of treatment, they have f||ed
a compensat|on c|a|m w|th TEPOO of 370,000 a month for the per|od between 11 March 2011 and
November 2012, |ns|st|ng that h|s cond|t|on |s re|ated to the enormous stress of the |ast two years. She
has not rece|ved a penny from the company. But Kowata says she |s |ucky, s|nce she |s one of the sma||
percentage of v|ct|ms who were |nsured for the earthquake. So, she |s rece|v|ng money from her pr|vate
|nsurance company for the damage caused by the earthquake. Wh||e th|s covers her da||y ||v|ng expenses,
|t does not |nc|ude the hea|th treatment. 'Many of the o|d peop|e around here cannot even f||| out the
compensat|on form," she says.
TEPOO says |t emp|oys 12,200 peop|e to d|rect|y process such compensat|on c|a|ms, |nc|ud|ng 3,500 of |ts
own staff. But |t cannot or w||| not answer the most cruc|a| quest|ons: Exact|y how many peop|e have app||ed
for permanent compensat|on? What are the ||ke|y grounds for refusa| or approva|? How many refugees from
the most contam|nated areas are e||g|b|e for fu|| compensat|on?
22
Off the record, company sources say most
peop|e who app|y w||| get someth|ng but that few are ||ke|y to be comp|ete|y sat|sf|ed.
Refugees who d|sagree w|th TEPOO`s compensat|on scheme and have the energy to f|ght can take the|r
comp|a|nts to the government-run Oentre for D|spute Reso|ut|on for Oompensat|ng Damages from the
Nuc|ear Power P|ant lnc|dent.
23
Estab||shed |n September 2011 to ease the expected burden of |awsu|ts
on pub||c courts, the Oentre has hand|ed over 5,000 c|a|ms. About a quarter have been 'sett|ed", mean|ng
d|sputes over ||v|ng expenses (but not assets} have been reso|ved.
24
Accord|ng to peop|e c|ose to the
compensat|on |ssue, however, a grow|ng number of refugees are bypass|ng both TEPOO and the Oentre
and negot|at|ng d|rect|y w|th the a|d of |awyers.
8M5 R.P6ST$ 30$7*<$0
TEPOO has stead||y |ncreased |ts demands on the state-backed Nuc|ear Damage ||ab|||ty Fac|||tat|on Fund,
from an |n|t|a| 1tn |n October 2011, to a tota| amount of 3.24tn ($36.5bn} by December 2012. TEPOO
made |ts |atest demand of an add|t|ona| 697bn for the Fund on 27 December. lt |s a|most certa|n|y not the
|ast c|a|m. The |awyer and head of the Japanese Bar Assoc|at|on, Yu|ch| Ka|do prev|ous|y to|d Greenpeace
that the reported f|gure of 4tn |n f|na| compensat|on costs has 'abso|ute|y no bas|s |n rea||ty", mean|ng
|t |s a comp|ete|y unrea||st|c assessment of eventua| compensat|on c|a|ms. TEPOO b|ames the r|se on
add|t|ona| 'compensat|on accord|ng to the redef|ned evacuat|on zone", add|t|ona| 'compensat|on for
vo|untary evacuees" and the 'extended compensat|on ca|cu|at|on per|od", among other factors.
25
'lf our
current funds do not cover c|a|ms, we w||| app|y to the ||ab|||ty Fund for more," says TEPOO`s compensat|on
spokesperson H|rok| Kawamata.
The ut|||ty says that, by the end of 2012, |t had pa|d out a tota| of 1,662.9bn |n compensat|on to 160,000
'forc|b|y evacuated" refugees and to 'vo|untary evacuees," and to former or current res|dents ma|n|y |n
Fukush|ma Prefecture who have been '|nconven|enced" by the d|saster.
26
lt says women who were pregnant
or fam|||es w|th young ch||dren |n the prefecture at the t|me of the acc|dent have rece|ved about 400,000
each; others have rece|ved one-off payments of 80,000.
27
Whether these payments are cond|t|ona| on
wa|v|ng future c|a|ms for |||nesses caused by exposure to rad|at|on, and menta| d|stress, rema|ns unc|ear.
TEPOO sa|d on one occas|on that peop|e cannot f||e future compensat|on for further |||nesses ar|s|ng from
the acc|dent, |f they accept one-off payments now. On another occas|on, TEPOO stated that |t 'does not |n
pr|nc|p|e' ru|e out future c|a|ms.
TEPOO says a typ|ca| fam||y of two adu|ts and one dependent |n the most heav||y contam|nated zone w|||
rece|ve a one-off payment of about 57m ($643,000}.
28
That f|gure |nc|udes the |oss of the use of the|r house
!"#$%&' !"#
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer 8A
and 6m per v|ct|m for 'psycho|og|ca| damage" over the f|ve-year evacuat|on. But the company adm|ts that
|t has yet to pay a penny of compensat|on for f|xed assets. 'lt has taken t|me to ask |oca| governments to
est|mate the cost of assets," exp|a|ns TEPOO`s Kawamata.
29
He says payment w||| start 'w|th|n the year."
|ega||y, Japan has a three-year t|me ||m|t on app||cat|ons for compensat|on, a ||m|tat|on c|ear|y des|gned to
he|p shareho|ders, says Tadano, and wh|ch |s |n any case unworkab|e. 'S|xty-seven years after the bomb|ng
of H|rosh|ma and Nagasak| there are st||| peop|e who c|a|m the|r hea|th has been harmed. Three years
|s c|ear|y not |ong enough."
30
TEPOO Pres|dent Naom| H|rose has been forced to agree. He |s a|so ||ke|y
m|ndfu| of compar|sons w|th Ohernoby|, where v|ct|ms who m|ssed a dead||ne for app||cat|ons were shut out
of the compensat|on process. 'We do not |ntend at a|| to say 'that`s |t` after three years ... We hope not to
create concerns among the peop|e affected," H|rose to|d Fukush|ma Governor Yuhe| Sato dur|ng a January
2013 v|s|t to Fukush|ma Prefecture.
31
Japan`s Act on Oompensat|on for Nuc|ear Damage (1961} ob||ges TEPOO and other nuc|ear ut|||t|es to
arrange pr|vate |nsurance of rough|y 120bn per s|te - now accepted as woefu||y |nadequate, as the tota|
costs of an acc|dent wou|d be much h|gher. Oompensat|on and decontam|nat|on a|one are current|y
est|mated at 10tn ($113bn} by TEPOO off|c|a|s, doub|e the est|mate of a few months ago.
32
A|though
mode||ed on the S Pr|ce-Anderson Nuc|ear lndustr|es lndemn|ty Act, the Japanese |eg|s|at|on has a
d|fference, |t p|aces un||m|ted ||ab|||ty on a ut|||ty that causes an acc|dent.
33
lf, however, ||ab|||ty exceeds the
f|nanc|a| secur|ty amount, the government cou|d support the ut|||ty |f necessary.
34
ln the event of a 'grave
natura| d|saster of except|ona| character," the company may be exempted from ||ab|||ty a|together. Where
th|s exonerat|on app||es, the government sha|| take 'the necessary measures to re||eve v|ct|ms and to
prevent the damage from spread|ng".
35
A|though TEPOO has not |nvoked th|s c|ause, the company has
been nat|ona||sed, |n effect transferr|ng ||ab|||ty to the pub||c.
ln May 2012, the Japanese government |njected 1tn (about $12.5bn at 2012 exchange rates} |nto the
ut|||ty, 'the b|ggest state |ntervent|on |nto a pr|vate non-bank asset s|nce Amer|ca`s 2009 ba||-out of Genera|
Motors," sa|d 7|e Eco|om|s|.
36
The |nject|on capped an est|mated 3.5tn |n pub||c money g|ven to the
ut|||ty s|nce the Fukush|ma d|saster began. On 27 June, shareho|ders |n the company off|c|a||y accepted
|ts nat|ona||sat|on, g|v|ng the government major|ty contro|.
37
The government back|ng a||ows TEPOO to
cont|nue as a ||m|ted company w|th shares traded on the stock exchange, wh||e prevent|ng |t from go|ng
bankrupt.
8MA N"77)&03$ 0$1(70 )&(C&)&+4
What about the ||ab|||ty of supp||ers to the Fukush|ma p|ant? Ever s|nce the Japanese nuc|ear programme
began |n 1955, Japan has pursued a fam|||ar |ndustr|a| strategy of m|m|ck|ng fore|gn techno|ogy (ma|n|y S,
Br|t|sh and French}, wh||e |ncubat|ng |ts own domest|c manufacturers and supp||ers.
38
By 2011, th|s strategy
had made Japan |nto one of the wor|d`s |ead|ng nuc|ear powers, |ed by Tosh|ba, H|tach| and M|tsub|sh|
Heavy lndustr|es. Oonstruct|on g|ant Kaj|ma, wh|ch he|ped bu||d the Fukush|ma p|ant and many others, has
a|so benef|tted from th|s strategy.
39
ln 1957, Japan`s Wh|te Paper on Nuc|ear Energy set out the nat|on`s |ong-term goa|s of deve|op|ng 7,000
megawatts (MW} of nuc|ear power by 1975. E|ectr|c|ty ut|||t|es were persuaded to |nvest |n the Japan Atom|c
Power Oompany. The a|m was to use 90% of domest|c components and human resources.
40
M|tsub|sh|
Atom|c Power lndustr|es and Sum|tomo Atom|c Energy lndustr|es were |naugurated |n 1958 and 1959,
respect|ve|y, to deve|op nuc|ear techno|ogy. Tosh|ba and H|tach| began the same |n the 1960s. n|vers|t|es
and manufacturers began tra|n|ng eng|neers |n the 1960s.
chapter *<0
The supp||ers
|nvo|ved |n the
Fukush|ma
d|saster cont|nue
|n bus|ness, and |n
some cases prof|t
from the d|saster.
@'(=09 Pub||c protest
|n Sh|buya aga|nst the
government`s nuc|ear
energy po||c|es, and
the restart|ng of nuc|ear
p|ants.
8E !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer 8I
chapter *<0
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H
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M

K
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8? !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
!"#$%&' !"#
ln 1963, Japanese manufacturers began part|a||y construct|ng a Bo|||ng Water Reactor (BWR} des|gned
by Genera| E|ectr|c (GE}-Ebasco. The dec|s|ons on what techno|ogy to use depended on commerc|a| t|es
between S and Japanese compan|es. For examp|e, H|tach| and Tosh|ba used techno|og|es prov|ded
by GE, and M|tsub|sh| Heavy lndustr|es (MHl} re||ed on West|nghouse. S f|rms qu|ck|y began to |ag |n
|nvestment and after the 1979 Three M||e Acc|dent, wh|ch effect|ve|y froze S nuc|ear deve|opment; they
fe|| we|| beh|nd the|r Japanese compet|tors. ln the words of former H|tach| eng|neer-turned wh|st|eb|ower
M|tsuh|ko Tanaka, 'the student became the teacher."
41
Tanaka`s exper|ence |||ustrates the stakes, and r|sks |n the then f|edg|ng |ndustry. ln the ear|y 1970s, he
he|ped bu||d the 20 metre ta|| reactor pressure vesse| |ns|de the Fukush|ma n|t 4 at a huge foundry |n Kure
O|ty, H|rosh|ma run by Babcock-H|tach| (the same foundry used to bu||d the gun turrets for the wor|d`s
b|ggest batt|esh|p, the Yama|o}. ln the f|na| stages of mak|ng the $250m vesse|, a b|ast furnace warped the
meta|, dangerous|y comprom|s|ng |ts |ntegr|ty and |ega||y ob||g|ng the company to scrap |t. The vesse| |s st|||
at the core of Fukush|ma Da||ch| n|t 4.
42

Fac|ng bankruptcy, H|tach| covered up the defect w|th Tanaka`s he|p, he says. 'l suspect there are many
more eng|neers ||ke me |n Japan." The vesse| was part of the n|t 4 reactor of the Fukush|ma Da||ch| p|ant.
GE supp||ed the reactors for n|ts 1, 2, and 6, and Tosh|ba for n|ts 3 and 5 (a|| s|x were GE des|gns}.
Tanaka |eft the company |n 1977 to become a sc|ence wr|ter and put the |nc|dent out h|s m|nd unt|| he had
a cr|s|s of consc|ence watch|ng the 1986 Ohernoby| nuc|ear d|saster unfo|d on Tv. After he went pub||c
w|th h|s know|edge, H|tach| threatened h|m, he says. 'They sa|d: 'Th|nk about your fam||y.`" Japan`s nuc|ear
author|t|es re|eased a statement a day |ater |ns|st|ng there was no prob|em. 'And that was the end of |t,"
reca||s Mr. Tanaka.
43
Nobody pursued H|tach| for th|s cover-up he po|nts out.
Ke| Sugaoka, a Japanese eng|neer who worked at the n|t 1 s|te, and Katsunobu Onda, author of 7eoco.
7|e Da|| Emo||e, quest|oned the |ntegr|ty of the reactor after the 11 March quake, but before the tsunam|.
44

The lnvest|gat|on Oomm|ttee on the Acc|dent at the Fukush|ma Nuc|ear Power Stat|ons of Tokyo E|ectr|c
Power Oompany (or the D|et Oomm|ss|on on the Fukush|ma D|saster}, conc|uded that |t was '|mposs|b|e to
||m|t the d|rect cause of the acc|dent to the tsunam|" w|thout further ev|dence.
45
The D|et Oomm|ss|on report notes that n|t 1 of the Fukush|ma Da||ch| Nuc|ear Power P|ant was purchased
by TEPOO under a 'turnkey" contract for construct|on |n December 1966 'that p|aced a|| respons|b|||ty" on
GE. The report says TEPOO chose GE not just because of the company`s techn|ca| ach|evements but a|so
because they be||eved |t wou|d be cheaper to adopt a des|gn of an a|ready comm|ss|oned GE reactor |n
Spa|n, but Fukush|ma n|t 1 ended up be|ng bu||t f|rst. 'lnstead of hav|ng the Span|sh exper|ence ava||ab|e
to draw on, the Fukush|ma p|ant became the f|rst fac|||ty to exper|ence numerous d|ff|cu|t|es."
46
The prob|ems |nc|uded se|sm|c des|gn standards that were str|cter than for the or|g|na| des|gn of the
Span|sh reactor, enta|||ng p|ecemea| mod|f|cat|ons of support|ng structures. Work|ng |ns|de the cramped
n|t 1 conta|nment vesse| was cons|dered part|cu|ar|y prob|emat|c. 'The major prob|em here was whether
the Japanese des|gn spec|f|cat|ons for ant|-se|sm|c des|gn at the t|me were |ncorporated appropr|ate|y |n
the product des|gn package from GE," says the report, c|t|ng a former TEPOO v|ce-pres|dent, Ryo lkegame,
who worked at the Da||ch| p|ant dur|ng |nsta||at|on. 'Accord|ng to lkegame, they were not, and he |nd|cated
that ad hoc re|nforcements were made dur|ng the construct|on."
47
ln the 1970s, GE eng|neer Da|e G Br|denbaugh pub||c|y quest|oned whether the GE Mark l reactor used |n
Fukush|ma n|ts 1-5 wou|d stand up to a |oss-of-coo|ant acc|dent.
48
The D|et report adds that Mark l
conta|nment vesse|s |n Japan were re|nforced aga|nst dynam|c |oads |n case of |oss-of-coo|ant |n the
1980s, 'but the re|nforcement d|d not cover severe acc|dents of th|s sca|e."
49
The ser|es of re|nforcements
|mp|emented |nc|uded enhanc|ng p|pe penetrat|on po|nts where the strength marg|n was sma||, and add|ng
parts to m|t|gate the dynam|c |oads. The report conc|udes that dur|ng the acc|dent, the pressure |ns|de
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer 8K
!"#$%&' !"#
the conta|nment vesse|s substant|a||y exceeded the|r des|gned capac|ty, up to a|most tw|ce the capac|ty
|n the case of n|t 1.
50
'We shou|d a|so note that the MARK l type POvs [pressure conta|nment vesse|s| at
the Fukush|ma Da||ch| p|ant |s sma||er |n vo|ume than the |mproved vers|on of MARK l, wh|ch contr|buted to
the fast r|se |n pressure." ln November 1987, Japan`s NlSA (Nuc|ear and lndustr|a| Safety Agency} began
an eva|uat|on of the Mark l reactors to cons|der how much stress they cou|d take before a |oss-of-coo|ant
acc|dent wou|d occur. The resu|ts of that eva|uat|on have not been made pub||c.
Another prob|em |nherent to the Mark l reactor des|gn |s the occurrence of cyc||ca| waves on the water
surface of the reactor pressure-suppress|on poo| dur|ng earthquakes.
51
The poo| |s meant to condense
steam |n case of an acc|dent. When earthquake mot|on causes cyc||ca| waves (ca||ed 's|osh|ng"}, the water
surface |n the suppress|on chamber sh|fts. As a resu|t, the t|ps of 'downcomer" p|pes, through wh|ch steam
|s re|eased |nto the water, cou|d be exposed, re|eas|ng steam |nto the gaseous space of the suppress|on
chamber. Th|s causes the des|gned funct|on of suppress|on to fa||, resu|t|ng |n over-pressure. Oompared to
other reactor des|gns, the Mark l type has the h|ghest poss|b|||ty of downcomer exposure. The D|et report
recommends a 'thorough study" on th|s prob|em.
From the start, former GE emp|oyees reca|| how TEPOO e|ected to overru|e |ts own eng|neers and fo||ow
GE`s or|g|na| construct|on des|gn by putt|ng the p|ant`s emergency d|ese| generators and batter|es |n the
basement of the turb|ne bu||d|ngs, w|th devastat|ng resu|ts on 11 March 2011.
52
Throughout the operat|on of Mark l reactors at Fukush|ma Da||ch|, a steady stream of a||egat|ons emerged
suggest|ng that prob|ems were f|xed ad |oc, or |n some cases not at a||, w|th the co||us|on of or|g|na|
supp||ers and ma|ntenance compan|es. Onda has spoken to a TEPOO eng|neer who sa|d often p|p|ng
wou|d not match up to the b|uepr|nts.
53
ln that case, the on|y so|ut|on was to use heavy mach|nery to pu|| the
p|pes c|ose enough together to we|d them shut.
54
lnspect|on of p|p|ng was often cursory and the backs of
the p|pes, wh|ch were hard to reach, were |gnored. Repa|r jobs were rushed; no one wanted to be exposed
to nuc|ear rad|at|on |onger than necessary.
55
ln September 1989 the S Nuc|ear Regu|atory Oomm|ss|on (NRO} encouraged owners of nuc|ear p|ants
w|th GE Mark l and ll conta|nment des|gns to |nsta|| hardened (pressure-res|stant} vents.
56
The NRO v|ewed
contro||ed vent|ng (re|ease of rad|oact|ve gases to reduce pressure} as preferab|e to catastroph|c fa||ure
of the conta|nment. However, the NRO d|d not order the |nsta||at|on, but |eft the dec|s|on up to the reactor
operators. On|y after Fukush|ma has the NRO ordered that a|| GE Mark l and ll reactors |nsta|| re||ab|e
hardened vents.
57
But the NRO has not yet requ|red that those vents be f||tered, wh||e most nuc|ear p|ants
outs|de the S and Japan have |nc|uded f||ters to reduce the re|ease of rad|oact|ve contam|nants. ln January
2013, the comm|ss|oner of the new Japanese Nuc|ear Regu|at|on Author|ty sa|d that a|| Japanese BWR`s
w||| be requ|red to |nsta|| f||ters |n the|r vent||at|on systems before they w||| be a||owed to restart.
58
Some eng|neers have ca||ed the |nsta||at|on of vents |n the or|g|na| f|awed des|gn a 'Band-A|d f|x" that fa||ed
at Fukush|ma.
59
ln Japan, the hardened vents were eventua||y |nsta||ed |n the 90s, but f||ters were never
|nsta||ed even though the |neff|c|ency of the ex|st|ng f||ter system |n Fukush|ma-type reactors was known
and the techno|ogy was ava||ab|e.
60
Dur|ng the Fukush|ma acc|dent, the ex|st|ng f||ter|ng system cou|d not
be used due to ra|sed water |eve|s |n the conta|nment vesse| of the reactor. A|so the hardened vents proved
|neffect|ve, as no manua| operat|ons were descr|bed for power |oss s|tuat|ons.
Accord|ng to Tanaka, there |s a fundamenta| contrad|ct|on at the heart of pressure vesse|s: they are
des|gned to keep rad|at|on |n dur|ng an emergency, but the same emergency can generate such pressures
that an exp|os|on |s a r|sk. lt was TEPOO`s respons|b|||ty to |nsta|| f||ters but |t d|dn`t, he says, because of the|r
proh|b|t|ve cost.
61
Dur|ng the Fukush|ma acc|dent, then Pr|me M|n|ster Naoto Kan famous|y had to order the
Da||ch| vents to be opened by hand on 12 March 2011.
62
ln the end, vent|ng |n n|t 1 eventua||y succeeded,
but vent|ng |n n|t 2 fa||ed and |n 3 on|y part|a||y succeeded, accord|ng to Tanaka.
,: !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
!"#$%&' !"#
There are current|y 10 Mark l-type reactors rema|n|ng |n Japan, and 17 very s|m||ar GE Mark ll reactors.
63

Accord|ng to Tanaka, each one |s the equ|va|ent of a t|ck|ng t|me bomb. Not on|y are the compan|es |nvo|ved
|n bu||d|ng, |nsta|||ng or ma|nta|n|ng these reactors a|| current|y exempted from respons|b|||ty for the 11 March
d|saster, they are prof|t|ng from |t, says |awyer Tadano. Tosh|ba and H|tach| |ead the decomm|ss|on|ng of the
Da||ch| p|ant and Kaj|ma |s |n charge of decontam|nat|on. The TEPOO group of compan|es |s heav||y |nvo|ved
|n the c|ean up
64
, wh|ch |nc|udes decomm|ss|on|ng of the Fukush|ma Da||ch| p|ant and decontam|nat|on.
8ME 6*<1)"$&*<
Thousands of nuc|ear refugees from the wor|d`s worst nuc|ear d|saster s|nce Ohernoby| report mu|t|p|e
prob|ems, |nc|ud|ng:
De|ays |n process|ng the|r c|a|ms
lnadequate amounts be|ng offered
nc|ear procedures about wa|v|ng of future c|a|ms
Not a s|ng|e payment yet for |ost or damaged assets
Ourrent three-year |ega| ||m|t for c|a|ms
The supp||ers and compan|es |nvo|ved |n the d|saster, however, cont|nue |n bus|ness and |n some cases
prof|t from the d|saster, backed by pub||c money.
Japan`s nuc|ear acc|dent |aw ||m|ts ||ab|||ty to TEPOO, b|ock|ng v|ct|ms from go|ng after |ts supp||ers. There
|s no mechan|sm |n the |aw e|ther for target|ng execut|ves of TEPOO or any of the supp||ers. Then Pr|me
M|n|ster Yosh|h|ko Noda wa|ved respons|b|||ty for the d|saster |ast year when he sa|d 'no |nd|v|dua|" |s to
b|ame and that everyone has to 'share the pa|n."
65
The D|et comm|ss|on report took the same approach,
b|am|ng 'cu|ture".
66
Over ha|f of the TEPOO board has s|nce taken |ucrat|ve post-TEPOO pos|t|ons
e|sewhere.
67
Kameya says the d|saster has taught her to f|ght for her r|ghts, and stay t|ght||pped. 'lf l say how much l`m
gett|ng, or demand|ng, peop|e w||| say, 'Why are you gett|ng so much?` Peop|e th|nk we w||| get a |ot of
money when someth|ng ||ke th|s happens, but they`re wrong, and |t w||| probab|y take f|ve or ten years to be
compensated."
'l asked a TEPOO guy, 'lf you had to run for your ||fe and became a refugee, cou|d you ||ve ||ke th|s, sav|ng
every rece|pt for food, gaso||ne and c|othes?` He d|dn`t answer me."
8 Persona| |nterv|ew, Tokyo, 28 December 2012
, A|| currency convers|ons are approx|mate and were done around 22 January
2013, un|ess otherw|se |nd|cated.
> Persona| |nterv|ew, lb|d.
5 Govt off|c|a||y sets new evacuat|on zone, Yom|ur| Sh|mbun, 23 Apr|| 2011.
http://www.yom|ur|.co.jp/dy/nat|ona|/T110422004127.htm
A Persona| |nterv|ew, 3 January 2013
E The Ma|n|ch|. 2013. TEPOO |ntends to accept compensat|on c|a|ms beyond
|ega| t|me ||m|t. 10 January 2013. http://ma|n|ch|.jp/eng||sh/eng||sh/newsse|ect/
news/20130110p2g00m0dm071000c.htm|
I Japan Today. 2012. TEPOO aga|n cr|t|c|sed over comp||cated compensat|on
process. 13 March 2012.
http://www.japantoday.com/category/nat|ona|/v|ew/tepco-aga|n-cr|t|c|zed-
over-comp||cated-compensat|on-forms
? Persona| |nterv|ew w|th H|rok| Kawamata. TEPOO Oompensat|on
spokesperson, and Yosh|kazu Naga|, corporate re|at|ons, 10 January 2013
K Tokyo E|ectr|c Power Oompany (TEPOO}. 2011. Annua| Report 2011. pp.6
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/corp|nfo/|r/too|/annua|/pdf/ar2011-e.pdf
8: lb|d.
88 The Asah|. 2011. Government Oks TEPOO compensat|on framework, 13
May 2011.
8, 'TEPOO`s nat|ona||sat|on: state power," 11 May 2012. http://www.
econom|st.com/b|ogs/schumpeter/2012/05/tepco`s-nat|ona||sat|on (4 January
2013}.
8> Exp|anat|on and or|g|na| press re|ease on TEPOO homepage here: http://
www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/re|ease/2012/1206837_1870.htm|
(accessed 7 January 2013}.
85 See J|j|, 'v|ct|ms d|ssat|sf|ed w|th TEPOO Oompensat|on," 15 September
2012, |n The Japan T|mes: http://www.japant|mes.co.jp/text/nn20120915a8.
htm| (3 January 2013}.
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer ,8
!"#$%&' !"#
8A The re-zon|ng |s exp|a|ned here: M|n|stry of Economy, Trade and lndustry
(METl}. 2012. Evacuat|on Map. 15 June 2012. http://www.met|.go.jp/eng||sh/
earthquake/nuc|ear/roadmap/pdf/evacuat|on_map_120615.pdf. See a|so: http://
www.yom|ur|.co.jp/dy/nat|ona|/T111217003401.htm
8E ln Japan, a Pa|nfu||y S|ow Sweep. New York T|mes, 7 January 2013. http://
www.nyt|mes.com/2013/01/08/bus|ness/japans-c|eanup-after-a-nuc|ear-
acc|dent-|s-denounced.htm|?n|=todayshead||nes&emc=ed|t_th_20130108&_
r=1&
8I As Fukush|ma O|eanup Beg|ns, |ong-term lmpacts are We|ghed. 9 January
2012. http://e360.ya|e.edu/feature/as_fukush|ma_c|eanup_beg|ns_|ong-term_
|mpacts_are_we|ghed/2482
8? See J|j|, lb|d.
8K Persona| |nterv|ew, 10 January 2013.
,: The Da||y Yom|ur|, 'TEPOO must compensate nuc|ear v|ct|ms qu|ck|y," 2
October 2012, http://www.yom|ur|.co.jp/dy/ed|tor|a|/T121001002720.htm (12
January 2013}
,8 Persona| |nterv|ew, 10 January 2013
,, TEPOO says |t has rece|ved a tota| of about 1,250,000 separate compensat|on
c|a|ms but |ns|sts |t cannot say how many |nd|v|dua|s are |nvo|ved because some
are mu|t|p|e c|a|ms. See: http://www.tepco.co.jp/comp/j|ssek|/|ndex-j.htm| (13
January 2013}.
,> Oentre for D|spute Reso|ut|on for Oompensat|ng Damages from the Nuc|ear
Power P|ant lnc|dent . 2011. http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/anzenkakuho/
ba|sho/1310412.htm
,5 Persona| |nterv|ew w|th H|rok| Kawamata. TEPOO Oompensat|on
spokesperson, and Yosh|kazu Naga|, corporate re|at|ons, 10 January 2013
,A Summary of amounts c|a|med and press re|ease can be found here: http://
www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/re|ease/2012/1223937_1870.htm|
(Accessed 12 January 2013}
,E TEPOO persona| |nterv|ew, lb|d.
,I Persona| |nterv|ew, 11 January 2013. lnter|m Gu|de||ne of the Funso S|nsaka|
dated 6 December 2011. http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/sh|ng|/chousa/
ka|hatu/016/|ndex.htm
,? 'TEPOO may start |ump-sum compensat|on |n August," The Da||y Yom|ur|,
26 Ju|y 2012. Ava||ab|e on||ne at: http://www.yom|ur|.co.jp/dy/nat|ona|/
T120725005729.htm|. The compensat|on scheme assumes a140m
2
house
va|ued at 8.61m bu||t |n 2007 on a 300m
2
hous|ng |ot va|ued at 3m.
,K Persona| |nterv|ew, 11 January 2013.
>: Accord|ng to the recent OEOD/NEA report, Japan`s Oompensat|on Act does
not set a t|me ||m|t on r|ghts to c|a|m compensat|on for nuc|ear damage. Wh||e
Japan`s O|v|| Oode prov|des the terms for the ext|nct|on of r|ghts to c|a|m the
genera| tort ||ab|||ty, a recent exam|nat|on found that the 20-year t|me ||m|t to c|a|m
compensat|on 'wou|d not substant|a||y bar c|a|ms" by v|ct|ms of |ate |njur|es. See:
OEOD/NEA (2012}. Japan`s Oompensat|on System for Nuc|ear Damages. |ega|
Affa|rs 2012, pg. 19.
>8 See 'TEPOO |ntends to accept compensat|on c|a|ms beyond |ega| t|me ||m|t,"
Ma|n|ch| Da||y, 10 January 2013. http://ma|n|ch|.jp/eng||sh/eng||sh/newsse|ect/
news/20130110p2g00m0dm071000c.htm| (Accessed 13 January 2013}.
>, Asah| Sh|mbun (2012}, 'TEPOO seeks more government support
as Fukush|ma costs soar', 7 November 2012. http://ajw.asah|.com/
art|c|e/0311d|saster/fukush|ma/AJ201211070086
>> See Kazuko Goto, 'Japan`s ro|e as |eader for nuc|ear non-pro||ferat|on,"
Federat|on of Amer|can Sc|ent|sts," December 2012. A copy of the Japanese act
can be found at: http://www.oecd-nea.org/|aw/|eg|s|at|on/japan-docs/Japan-
Nuc|ear-Damage-Oompensat|on-Act.pdf (23 January 2012}.
>5 lb|d
>A See See vasquez-Ma|gnan, 'Fukush|ma: ||ab|||ty and Oompensat|on,"
pub||shed by the Nuc|ear Energy Agency: http://www.oecd-nea.org/nea-
news/2011/29-2/nea-news-29-2-fukush|ma-e.pdf, (6 January 2013}.
>E 'TEPOO`s nat|ona||sat|on: state power," 11 May 2012. http://www.econom|st.
com/b|ogs/schumpeter/2012/05/tepco`s-nat|ona||sat|on (4 January 2013}.
>I 'TEPOO shareho|ders agree to nat|ona||sat|on," The BBO, 27 June 2012.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/bus|ness-18606808 (4 January 2013}
>? See Goto, lb|d.
>K Kaj|ma Oorporat|on boasts of |ts own prowess and h|story |n construct|on of
nuc|ear power p|ants here: http://www.kaj|ma.co.jp/|r/annua|/2010/feature03.htm|
(13 January 2013}
5: Goto, lb|d.
58 Persona| |nterv|ew, 10 January 2013
5, Jason O|enf|e|d, 'Fukush|ma Eng|neer Says He He|ped Oover p F|aw at Da|-
lch| Reactor No. 4," B|oomberg, 23 March 2011. http://www.b|oomberg.com/
news/2011-03-23/fukush|ma-eng|neer-says-he-covered-up-f|aw-at-shut-reactor.
htm|
5> Persona| |nterv|ew, lb|d; H|tach| updates |ts defense of how |t hand|es
the Tanaka a||egat|ons here: Jason O|enf|e|d, 'Fukush|ma Eng|neer Says He
He|ped Oover p F|aw at Da|-lch| Reactor No. 4," B|oomberg, 23 March 2011.
http://www.b|oomberg.com/news/2011-03-23/fukush|ma-eng|neer-says-he-
covered-up-f|aw-at-shut-reactor.htm| (12 January 2013}.
55 See Dav|d McNe||| & Jake Ade|ste|n, 'The exp|os|ve truth beh|nd what
happened at Fukush|ma," The lndependent, 17 August 2011. http://www.
|ndependent.co.uk/news/wor|d/as|a/the-exp|os|ve-truth-beh|nd-fukush|mas-
me|tdown-2338819.htm (12 January 2013}.
5A H|roko Tabuch|, 'lnqu|ry dec|ares Fukush|ma cr|s|s a man-made d|saster,"
The New York T|mes, 5 Ju|y 2012. http://www.nyt|mes.com/2012/07/06/
wor|d/as|a/fukush|ma-nuc|ear-cr|s|s-a-man-made-d|saster-report-says.
htm|?_r=3& (13 January 2013}.
The Nat|ona| D|et of Japan Fukush|ma Nuc|ear Acc|dent lndependent
lnvest|gat|on Oomm|ss|on (NAllO}. 2012. The Execut|ve Summary and Ma|n
Report can be found here: http://warp.da.nd|.go.jp/|nfo:nd|jp/p|d/3856371/
na||c.go.jp/en/|ndex.htm|
5E The Nat|ona| D|et of Japan Oomm|ss|on Report, lb|d, Ohapter 1, p.9
5I The Nat|ona| D|et of Japan Oomm|ss|on Report, lb|d, Ohapter 1, p.8,9.
5? Mosk, M. 2011. Fukush|ma: Mark 1 Nuc|ear Reactor des|gn caused
GE sc|ent|st to qu|t |n protest. ABO News, 15 March 2011. http://abcnews.
go.com/B|otter/fukush|ma-mark-nuc|ear-reactor-des|gn-caused-ge-sc|ent|st/
story?|d=13141287
5K The Nat|ona| D|et of Japan Oomm|ss|on Report, lb|d, Ohapter 2, p.9.
A: The Nat|ona| D|et of Japan Oomm|ss|on Report, lb|d, Ohapter 2, p.95
A8 The Nat|ona| D|et of Japan Oomm|ss|on Report, lb|d, Ohapter 2, p.97
A, Re|j| Yosh|da, 'GE p|an fo||owed w|th |nf|ex|b|||ty," The Japan T|mes, 14
Ju|y 2011. http://www.japant|mes.co.jp/text/nn20110714a2.htm| (12 January
2013}
A> See TEPOO: The Dark Emp|re, Nanatsumor| Shokan, 2007.
A5 McNe|||, Ade|ste|n, lb|d.
AA lb|d.
AE lnsta||at|on of a Hardened Wetwe|| vent (Gener|c |etter 89-16}. http://www.
nrc.gov/read|ng-rm/doc-co||ect|ons/gen-comm/gen-|etters/1989/g|89016.
htm|
AI S Nuc|ear Regu|atory Oomm|ss|on SEOY -12-157 Oons|derat|on of
Add|t|ona| Requ|rements for Oonta|nment vent|ng Systems for Bo|||ng
Water Reactors w|th Mark l and Mark ll Oonta|nments. http://www.nrc.gov/
read|ng-rm/doc-co||ect|ons/comm|ss|on/secys/2012/2012-0157scy.pdf
A? Nuc|ear watchdog to requ|re f||tered vent||at|on system for bo|||ng-water
reactors. Ma|n|ch|, 18 January 2013. http://ma|n|ch|.jp/eng||sh/eng||sh/
newsse|ect/news/20130118p2a00m0na008000c.htm|
AK Matt Sm|th, 'S nuc|ear p|ants s|m||ar to Fukush|ma spark concerns,"
ONN, 17 February 2012.
E: The Nat|ona| D|et of Japan Oomm|ss|on Report, Ohapter 1, pg 34.
E8 Persona| |nterv|ew, lb|d.
E, NO|EAR ORlSlS: HOW lT HAPPENED / Kan`s v|s|t 'wasted t|me`,
The Yom|ur| Sh|mbun, 9 June 2012. http://www.yom|ur|.co.jp/dy/nat|ona|/
T110608005066.htm
E> OEOD-NEA, 'lmp|ementat|on of Severe Acc|dent Management Measures,
lSAMM 2009`, Workshop Proceed|ngs, October 2010, Pg. 96. https://www.
oecd-nea.org/nsd/docs/2010/csn|-r2010-10-vo|1.pdf
E5 ln add|t|on to Tosh|ba and H|tach|, among the compan|es |nvo|ved |n
decomm|ss|on|ng the Da||ch| p|ant are GE Nuc|ear Energy, Ta|se| Kensetsu
Kaj|ma Kensetsu, Goyo Kensetsu (Penta-Ocean Oonstruct|on Oo.}, Maeda
Oorporat|on, Takenaka Obayash| Oorporat|on, Kumaga|gum| Oo. and Hazama
Oorporat|on. TEPOO Group compan|es |nc|ude Kandenko, Todenkogyo Oo.,
Tokyo Energy & Systems lnc., Tokyo E|ectr|c Power Env|ronmenta| Eng|neer|ng
Oo., Nakazatokoumuten Oo., Atox Oo, Ta|he| Dengyo Ka|sha, Kataoka Oo.,
Sh|n N|ppon Techno|og|es Oo, toc Oorporat|on, Sh|bakogyo Oo., Japan
Nuc|ear Secur|ty System Oo., Tokyo Bosa| Setsub| Oo., Soush|n Oo., tsue
va|ve Serv|ce Oo. and Hanwa |td.
See: http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukush|ma-np/roadmap/|mages/
m121203_05-j.pdf (17 January 2013}
EA Huw Gr|ff|th (AFP}, 'Japan PM: No |nd|v|dua| to b|ame for Fukush|ma," 3
March 2012. http://www.ft.com/|nt|/cms/s/0/6cecbfb2-c9b4-11e1-a5e2-
00144feabdc0.htm| (17 January 2013}.
EE See Gera|d Ourt|s, 'Stop b|am|ng Fukush|ma on Japan`s cu|ture," The
F|nanc|a| T|mes, 10 Ju|y 2012. http://www.ft.com/|nt|/cms/s/0/6cecbfb2-
c9b4-11e1-a5e2-00144feabdc0.htm| (17 January 2013}.
EI W|||acy, M. 2012. 'Fukush|ma p|ant d|rectors res|gn w|th go|den
parachutes," ABO News, 27 June 2012. http://www.abc.net.au/pm/
content/2012/s3534291.htm
chapter +F*
,, !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
The current nuc|ear
||ab|||ty convent|ons are
|ntended to protect the
nuc|ear |ndustry, and
do not offer suff|c|ent
compensat|on to
v|ct|ms.
@'(=09 A Greenpeace s|gn
|nd|cates a rad|oact|ve hot
spot |n a storm water dra|n
between houses |n Watar|,
approx|mate|y 60km from
the Fukush|ma Da||ch|
nuc|ear p|ant.
J

3
K
L
M
N
K

O
C
P
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9
O
M

G

Q
L
B
B
3
5
B
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H
B
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer ,>
Antony Froggatt |s an |ndependent consu|tant on |nternat|ona| nuc|ear and
energy po||cy and a Sen|or Research Fe||ow at Ohatham House, K.
,M8 @<+3*B"1+&*<
Nuc|ear power stat|ons, as w|th a|| bus|nesses, can damage the hea|th and safety of the|r workers and, under
more extreme c|rcumstances, the genera| pub||c and the w|der env|ronment. However, g|ven the nature of
the techno|ogy and fue|, nuc|ear power a|so has the potent|a| for acc|dents that cou|d |ead to |arge and |ong-
term trans-boundary |mpacts. Th|s potent|a| was recogn|sed r|ght at the start of the c|v|| nuc|ear |ndustry and
|nternat|ona| agreements were sought, both to enab|e potent|a| v|ct|ms to rap|d|y have access to compensat|on
and to ||m|t the extent to wh|ch the |ndustry cou|d be exposed to poss|b|e compensat|on c|a|ms.
At the heart of the prob|ems around the approach to creat|ng an |nternat|ona| nuc|ear ||ab|||ty reg|me are
compet|ng object|ves. To |ntroduce a comprehens|ve ||ab|||ty reg|me |t wou|d be necessary for states that
operate nuc|ear fac|||t|es, states |nvo|ved |n the supp|y of nuc|ear mater|a|s or serv|ces for these programmes
and a|| other states that m|ght be affected by a nuc|ear acc|dent to be under the umbre||a of the same ||ab|||ty
and compensat|on reg|me. Ourrent|y, that |s not the case.
For a ||ab|||ty and compensat|on reg|me to be attract|ve to states seek|ng to ma|nta|n or |ncrease the|r
nuc|ear power programmes, the requ|rements |mposed by a ||ab|||ty and compensat|on reg|me must not
be too burdensome
1
. Therefore, the s|gnator|es to the current convent|ons agree to a number of cond|t|ons
such as: narrow def|n|t|ons of nuc|ear damage and the |ength of t|me that compensat|on can be sought; that
c|a|ms for compensat|on are channe||ed so|e|y towards the operator; and that ||m|ts can be set on the tota|
amount of compensat|on ava||ab|e. However, converse|y, |n order to be attract|ve for a state w|thout nuc|ear
power p|ants, ||ab|||ty and compensat|on convent|ons must offer suff|c|ent compensat|on, and a reg|me must
not |ntroduce unacceptab|e restr|ct|ons or burdens for those seek|ng to obta|n compensat|on for |osses
|ncurred. For such states, becom|ng party to one of the nuc|ear-||ab|||ty convent|ons current|y |s not an
attract|ve propos|t|on.
The current nuc|ear ||ab|||ty convent|ons are un||ke those of many other |ndustr|es, as they are |ntended
to protect the nuc|ear |ndustry, and do not offer suff|c|ent compensat|on to v|ct|ms. Th|s chapter g|ves an
overv|ew of the ex|st|ng |nternat|ona| nuc|ear ||ab|||ty convent|ons, and ana|yses the |mpacts of spec|f|c
|ssues, such as capp|ng the compensat|on ava||ab|e, and channe|||ng of ||ab|||ty so|e|y to the operator. ln the
conc|us|ons, d|rect|ons are g|ven for the reform of domest|c |eg|s|at|on on nuc|ear ||ab|||ty.
Summary and ana|ys|s of
|nternat|ona| nuc|ear ||ab|||ty
by Antony Froggatt
chapter +F*
=2
,5 !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
chapter +F*
,M, S2032&0F *D )&(C&)&+4 30=&'0$
2
)I)I+ M=:"$=&:/6=&4
There are two bas|c |nternat|ona| |ega| frameworks contr|but|ng to the attempt to put |n p|ace the bas|s
for an |nternat|ona| reg|me on nuc|ear ||ab|||ty: F|rst|y, the Organ|sat|on for Econom|c Oo-operat|on and
Deve|opment`s (OEOD} 1960 Oonvent|on on Th|rd Party ||ab|||ty |n the F|e|d of Nuc|ear Energy (Par|s
Oonvent|on}, and the assoc|ated 'Brusse|s Supp|ementary Oonvent|on"
3
of 1963, and second|y, the
lnternat|ona| Atom|c Energy Agency`s (lAEA} 1963 Oonvent|on on O|v|| ||ab|||ty for Nuc|ear Damage (v|enna
Oonvent|on}
4
. The v|enna and Par|s ||ab|||ty convent|ons are a|so ||nked by a Jo|nt Protoco|, adopted |n
1988
5
. Desp|te th|s, however, on|y about ha|f the wor|d`s 438 operat|ona| reactors are |ocated |n states that
are contract|ng part|es to one of the nuc|ear ||ab|||ty convent|ons
6
, as many countr|es such as the S and
Japan have not become part of e|ther convent|on. A|| countr|es that operate nuc|ear power p|ants a|so have
the|r own |ega| frameworks, wh|ch are not a|ways fu||y compat|b|e w|th the |nternat|ona| convent|ons.
Negot|ated at the t|me when the nuc|ear power |ndustry was |n |ts |nfancy, the v|enna and Par|s Oonvent|ons
had two pr|mary goa|s: f|rst, to create an econom|c env|ronment where the nascent nuc|ear |ndustry cou|d
f|our|sh; and second, to ensure that c|ear procedures and some compensat|on wou|d be ava||ab|e |n the
event of an acc|dent. The f|rst a|m wou|d be ach|eved by remov|ng |ega| and f|nanc|a| uncerta|nt|es over
potent|a||y enormous ||ab|||ty c|a|ms that cou|d ar|se |n the event of an acc|dent. For the |ndustry, |t was c|ear
that nuc|ear power wou|d on|y be v|ab|e |f there were some f|nanc|a| protect|on for compan|es |nvo|ved |n the
supp|y cha|n, as we|| as for |nvestors who were p|ac|ng the|r f|nanc|a| resources |n a potent|a||y dangerous
and ||t|g|ous|y expens|ve sector.
Wh||e there are some d|fferences |n deta||, the v|enna and Par|s Oonvent|ons have features |n common. ln
part|cu|ar they:
A||ow ||m|tat|ons to be p|aced on the amount, durat|on and types of damage for wh|ch nuc|ear operators
are ||ab|e;
lmpose a restr|ct|ve def|n|t|on of nuc|ear damage
7
;
Requ|re |nsurance or other surety to be obta|ned by the operator;
Ohanne| ||ab|||ty exc|us|ve|y to the operator of the nuc|ear |nsta||at|on;
lmpose str|ct ||ab|||ty on a nuc|ear operator, regard|ess of fau|t, but subject to except|ons;
Grant exc|us|ve jur|sd|ct|on to the courts of one country for any g|ven |nc|dent, norma||y the country |n
whose terr|tory the |nc|dent occurs.
The acc|dent at the Ohernoby| nuc|ear power stat|on |n kra|ne |n 1986 revea|ed a number of def|c|enc|es
|n the |nternat|ona| ||ab|||ty convent|ons. Most str|k|ng was that, compared w|th the damage caused by the
Ohernoby| acc|dent, |t was obv|ous that the ||ab|||ty ce|||ngs were |nadequate and that not a|| of the damage
caused by Ohernoby| was covered by the def|n|t|on of damage app||cab|e under e|ther Oonvent|on. There
were a|so prob|ems w|th the ||m|ts on the t|me |n wh|ch c|a|ms for compensat|on cou|d be brought, the
c|a|ms procedures, and the ||m|tat|ons on wh|ch courts had jur|sd|ct|on to hear c|a|ms. An |nternat|ona|
||ab|||ty reg|me was not the on|y |nternat|ona| framework that was seen to be |ack|ng, and fo||ow|ng
Ohernoby| efforts were made by the |nternat|ona| commun|ty to modern|se a number of convent|ons,
|nc|ud|ng those on nuc|ear safety standards, on not|f|cat|on of the |nternat|ona| commun|ty and on
rad|oact|ve waste management.
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer ,A
On nuc|ear ||ab|||ty, as an |nter|m step to creat|ng a s|ng|e treaty w|th g|oba| adherence, three steps have been
taken. F|rst|y, the part|es to both the v|enna and Par|s Oonvent|ons adopted the 1988 Jo|nt Protoco|, wh|ch
entered |nto force |n 1992. The Jo|nt Protoco| created a 'br|dge" between the two convent|ons, effect|ve|y
expand|ng the|r geograph|ca| scope. Do|ng so ensured that on|y one of the two convent|ons wou|d be
exc|us|ve|y app||cab|e to a nuc|ear acc|dent. Second|y, some of the e|ements of the ex|st|ng convent|ons were
rev|sed. The process of negot|at|ng amendments to the v|enna Oonvent|on began |n 1990 and conc|uded
|n 1997. Work then began off|c|a||y |n 1997 on rev|s|ons to the Par|s Oonvent|on and |n 1999 for the Brusse|s
Supp|ementary Oonvent|on.
8
The rev|s|ons to the v|enna and Par|s/Brusse|s Oonvent|ons |ncrease the
amount of compensat|on ava||ab|e (see Tab|e 1}, expand the t|me per|ods dur|ng wh|ch c|a|ms m|ght be
made and expand the range of damage covered by the convent|ons. The new ||ab|||ty and compensat|on
amounts requ|red under the rev|sed Par|s Oonvent|on wou|d be at |east t700m ($920m S do||ars} and
tota| compensat|on ava||ab|e under the rev|sed Brusse|s Supp|ementary Oonvent|on wou|d be t1,500m.
Nonethe|ess, the overa|| amounts rema|n |ow when compared w|th the costs of the Ohernoby| or Fukush|ma
acc|dents. For Ohernoby|, a |arge number of stud|es est|mate the costs at between $75bn and $360bn (w|th
cons|derab|e var|at|on |n exchanges rates}. For Fukush|ma pre||m|nary est|mates from the Japanese Oentre
for Econom|c Research (JOER} suggested that the tota| costs wou|d be |n the range of 5,700-20,000bn
(t48bn-169bn}. Further, sett|ng f|xed compensat|on sums |s not on|y arb|trary (|n the absence of genu|ne|y
robust est|mates of probab|e damage} but |t |s a|so un||ke|y to be va||d over the |onger term.
F|na||y, a new Oonvent|on on Supp|ementary Oompensat|on (OSO}
9
was adopted |n 1997 and |s |ntended
to be a free-stand|ng |nstrument that may be adhered to by a|| states |rrespect|ve of whether or not they are
Party to e|ther of the ex|st|ng nuc|ear ||ab|||ty convent|ons. lts object|ve |s to prov|de add|t|ona| compensat|on
for nuc|ear damage beyond that estab||shed by the ex|st|ng convent|ons and nat|ona| |eg|s|at|on.
Furthermore, |t a|ms at broaden|ng the number of countr|es w|th|n an |nternat|ona| convent|on.
As a resu|t, the |ndustry wou|d be protected from compensat|on c|a|ms outs|de these reg|mes. The OSO
f|xes the f|rst t|er of compensat|on at 300 m||||on Spec|a| Draw|ng R|ghts (SDRs}
10
(rough|y equ|va|ent to
t300m}. lf the operator |s unab|e to meet th|s, the state |n wh|ch the reactor |s |nsta||ed |s requ|red to make
pub||c funds ava||ab|e to cover the d|fference. lf c|a|ms for compensat|on for nuc|ear damage exceed 300
m||||on SDRs, the OSO requ|res that |ts member countr|es contr|bute to an |nternat|ona| fund to prov|de
add|t|ona| compensat|on
11,12
.
chapter +F*
N*"310: lnternat|ona| Atom|c Energy Agency and Nuc|ear Energy Agency 2012
R(C)0 89
Summary tab|e
show|ng ||ab|||ty
and compensat|on
amounts for d|fferent
convent|ons (m||||ons
of euros (t}}.
6*<20<+&*< S703(+*3 )&(C&)&+4
U @<$+())(+&*<
$+(+0
R*+() 1*'C&<0B
1*<+3&C"+&*<$
D3*' S+%03
N+(+0$ 7(3+4
R*+() '&<&'"'
1*'70<$(+&*<
(2(&)(C)0
H"'C03 *D
P(3+&0$
Par|s, 1960 t6 to t18 - t6 to t18 15
Brusse|s, 1963 t202 t149 t357 12
Par|s, 2004 t700 - t700 3
Brusse|s, 2004 t1200 t300 t1500 3
v|enna, 1963 t50 - t50 38
v|enna, 1997 t357 - t357 10
OSO*, 1997 t357 Depends t713 4
,E !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
chapter +F*
A|though there are un|fy|ng features, the nuc|ear ||ab|||ty convent|ons do not prov|de a s|ng|e comprehens|ve
and un|f|ed |nternat|ona| |ega| reg|me for nuc|ear acc|dents. As has been seen above, d|fferent countr|es
be|ong to a var|ety of |nternat|ona| agreements.
The goa| of ensur|ng broad part|c|pat|on |n the |mproved |nternat|ona| convent|ons has not been ach|eved.
As of May 2012, s|x countr|es have rat|f|ed the 1997 v|enna Oonvent|on; w|th a further four part|es to th|s
convent|on.
13
Th|s was enough to br|ng the Jo|nt Protoco| to amend the v|enna Oonvent|on |nto force |n 2003,
but the |ack of w|de adopt|on rema|ns prob|emat|c. There has a|so been a de|ay |n the rat|f|cat|on of the rev|sed
Par|s Oonvent|on and the rev|sed Brusse|s Supp|ementary Oonvent|on.
14
ln order for the Protoco| amend|ng
the Par|s Oonvent|on to enter |nto force |t must be rat|f|ed by two-th|rds of the Oontract|ng Part|es. For E
Member States, th|s was supposed to have taken p|ace s|mu|taneous|y by the end of 2006
15
, but |t has not yet
been done. lt |s suggested that th|s w||| occur and that |t w||| enter |nto force at the beg|nn|ng of 2014
16
.
For the Protoco| amend|ng the Brusse|s Oonvent|on, rat|f|cat|on by a|| contract|ng part|es |s requ|red. On|y
four countr|es out of 15 (Argent|na, Morocco, Roman|a and the S} have rat|f|ed the OSO
17
, however, the
OSO |s set to enter |nto force on the 90th day after date of rat|f|cat|on by at |east f|ve states that have a
m|n|mum of 400,000 un|ts of |nsta||ed nuc|ear capac|ty (|e MWt -therma|
18
}
19
. A|though on|y four countr|es
have rat|f|ed the convent|on, press reports suggest that Japan |s now cons|der|ng jo|n|ng the convent|on
20
.
(For a summary ||st of wh|ch countr|es have rat|f|ed each convent|on, see Tab|e 2.} What |s remarkab|e |s that
near|y 27 years after Ohernoby|, 16 years after the adopt|on of the OSO, and n|ne years after the adopt|on
of the 2004 Protoco|s to amend the Par|s/Brusse|s convent|on, those enhancements have not entered |nto
force. As a resu|t, the s|tuat|on has not changed s|gn|f|cant|y s|nce the Ohernoby| acc|dent of 26 Apr|| 1986
21
.
Dur|ng the negot|at|ons to rev|se the v|enna and Par|s Oonvent|ons, representat|ves of the nuc|ear |nsurance
|ndustry stated that some of the proposed amendments wou|d be prob|emat|c. ln part|cu|ar, the nuc|ear
|nsurance |ndustry was concerned that there was:
|nsuff|c|ent pr|vate |nsurance market capac|ty to |nsure nuc|ear operators aga|nst ra|sed ||ab|||ty amounts;
an unw||||ngness of the market to cover extended/ext|nct|on per|ods dur|ng wh|ch an operator wou|d be
||ab|e; and
a d|ff|cu|ty |n that pr|vate |nsurance cou|d not cover a|| the categor|es |nc|uded |n the expanded def|n|t|on of
damage
22
, such as damage to the env|ronment.
The prob|ems w|th pr|vate |nsurance can be seen to be, at |east part|y, a f|nanc|a| quest|on. The K
government |a|d out the current d|ff|cu|t|es |n |ts 2007 consu|tat|on paper on the rev|s|on of the ||ab|||ty ||m|t,
when |t sa|d: 'To the extent that commerc|a| cover cannot be secured for a|| aspects of the new operator
||ab|||t|es, the Government w||| exp|ore the a|ternat|ve opt|ons ava||ab|e - |nc|ud|ng prov|d|ng cover from
pub||c funds |n return for a charge"
23
. A|ready th|s has occurred as |n the Nether|ands the max|mum ||ab|||ty |s
|n ||ne w|th the rev|sed Par|s Oonvent|on; however, under Dutch |aw a |ower amount may be set for '|ow-r|sk"
|nsta||at|ons by m|n|ster|a| order. So far, f|ve |nsta||at|ons have |ower requ|rements, of between t22.5m and
t45m. Furthermore, |f an operator cannot obta|n the f|nanc|a| secur|ty requ|red by the Oonvent|on or |t |s on|y
obta|nab|e at 'unreasonab|e cost", the m|n|ster may enter |nto contracts on beha|f of the state
24
.
)I)I) 3&:/6=&4
25
A number of countr|es have on|y domest|c nuc|ear ||ab|||ty |aws (e.g. Japan}, therefore, the extent of the
potent|a| compensat|on to v|ct|ms and the requ|rements on the operators are dependent on these nat|ona|
|aws. ln the event of an acc|dent |n a nuc|ear fac|||ty |n one of these countr|es, the requ|rements and terms of
the |nternat|ona| convent|ons wou|d not be app||cab|e.
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer ,I
Some countr|es that do not have commerc|a| nuc|ear power, but may have nuc|ear research reactors, a|so
have nat|ona| ||ab|||ty reg|mes. One of the most prom|nent |s Austr|a, wh|ch |s a|so act|ve |n |ts oppos|t|on to
the use of nuc|ear power |n ne|ghbour|ng countr|es. ln 1995 |ts par||ament adopted a reso|ut|on |n wh|ch the
government was asked to rev|se |ts nuc|ear ||ab|||ty |aw. Th|s |ed to a |aw |n 1998 that was '|n sharp contrast
to the bas|c pr|nc|p|es of |nternat|ona| |aw", |n that ||ab|||ty was un||m|ted, |ega| channe|||ng to the operator
was |arge|y e||m|nated, |nc|ud|ng a broadened def|n|t|on of nuc|ear damage, and Austr|an courts were
g|ven jur|sd|ct|on, |f the damage occurs |n Austr|a, regard|ess of the cause
26
. Even as rev|sed, the |eve|s of
compensat|on are re|at|ve|y |ow when compared to the ||ke|y costs of a ser|ous acc|dent (see sect|on 2.3}.
By becom|ng a party to an |nternat|ona| convent|on, a non-nuc|ear-power-generat|ng state m|ght actua||y
restr|ct |ts poss|b|||t|es for obta|n|ng |ega| remed|es |n the event of an acc|dent
27
. Th|s |s why the Austr|an
par||ament`s 1995 reso|ut|on spec|f|ca||y ordered the government not to present the Par|s Oonvent|on for
rat|f|cat|on unt|| essent|a| |mprovements, name|y the e||m|nat|on of |ega| channe|||ng, were made
28
.
,M> 6(77&<= *D <"1)0(3 )&(C&)&+4 2$ 1*$+$ *D <"1)0(3 (11&B0<+$
One of the key e|ements of the |nternat|ona| ||ab|||ty convent|ons |s to just|fy nat|ona| |eg|s|at|on by putt|ng
|n p|ace a ce|||ng on the costs that a nuc|ear operator must pay |n the event of a nuc|ear acc|dent that
has |mpacts that requ|re compensat|on to th|rd part|es. The ||m|ts put |n p|ace under the |nternat|ona|
convent|ons are |n fact the m|n|mum that a ut|||ty |s ||ab|e for, but |n most cases th|s has been taken to be
the max|mum. On|y |n a few cases does nat|ona| |eg|s|at|on go beyond that requ|red by the convent|ons, for
examp|e |n Germany, Japan, and Sw|tzer|and, there |s no ||m|t on the ||ab|||ty of an operator
29,30
.
As noted |n Tab|e 1, the m|n|mum requ|rements range between the d|fferent reg|mes, from t350m to
t1.5bn. Even |n an un||m|ted c|v|| ||ab|||ty reg|me, the pract|ca| ||m|ts to the capac|ty of the nuc|ear |nsurance
market and the assets of an operator (and, where these are a|so the object of channe|||ng: supp||ers and
f|nanc|ers} together |mpose a constra|nt on the magn|tude of the funds that may be ra|sed to compensate
v|ct|ms. ln pract|ce, the channe|||ng of ||ab|||ty exc|us|ve|y to the operator restr|cts the sca|e of the
access|b|e funds to a very sma|| fract|on of the poss|b|e costs of a ser|ous nuc|ear acc|dent. Many nuc|ear
countr|es have recogn|sed th|s state of affa|rs and prov|de for guarantees of supp|ementary compensat|on
for domest|c v|ct|ms us|ng pub||c funds. Th|s |s the case, for |nstance, |n Germany and Sw|tzer|and (wh|ch
have un||m|ted operator ||ab|||ty} as we|| as |n the K and France (wh|ch |mpose re|at|ve|y |ow ||m|ts on
operator ||ab|||ty}.
However, these are |ns|gn|f|cant |n compar|son to the d|fferences between these thresho|ds and the
theoret|ca| costs of a |arge-sca|e acc|dent, as can be seen |n F|gure 1.
ln add|t|on to the est|mated cost of actua| acc|dents, a number of theoret|ca| assessments of acc|dents
ex|st, |nc|ud|ng:
The 1995 study by the E ExternE project cons|dered four reactor acc|dent scenar|os, wh|ch |ed to cost
est|mates for damage rang|ng from t431m to t83,252m.
31
lt shou|d be noted that these cost est|mates
exc|ude decontam|nat|on, a|though |t |s acknow|edged that these costs 'can rap|d|y be very h|gh", and
that that there are major ||m|tat|ons to the econom|c eva|uat|on
32
, ar|s|ng from:
- ncerta|nt|es on the |mpact (eva|uat|on of source term, d|ff|cu|t|es to est|mate the env|ronmenta| |mpacts
due to the |ong-term contam|nat|on, uncerta|nt|es on the rad|at|on hea|th effects, etc.};
- ncerta|nt|es on the eff|c|ency of countermeasures;
- Econom|c eva|uat|on of some soc|a| consequences |s near|y |mposs|b|e.
chapter +F*
,? !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
chapter +F*
!&= 89
Oompar|son of
||ab|||ty amounts
|n |nternat|ona|
convent|ons vs
est|mated costs
of acc|dents.
N*"3109 Greenpeace 2012. Note: The h|gh est|mates for the costs of Ohernoby| and Fukush|ma are used as a reference (Ohernoby|: t270bn, Fukush|ma:
t169bn}. The costs of the Fukush|ma acc|dent are based on pre||m|nary est|mates.
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!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer ,K
chapter +F*
Fo||ow|ng the Ohernoby| acc|dent, |n 1987, the S Genera| Account|ng Off|ce (GAO} conducted an
ana|ys|s of the off-s|te f|nanc|a| consequences of a major nuc|ear acc|dent for a|| 119 nuc|ear power p|ants
then operat|ng |n the S. The est|mates ranged per acc|dent between a |ow of $67m S do||ars (t50m} to
a h|gh of $15,536m (t11,758m}.
33
An assessment conducted by Prognos AG |n 1992 for the federa| German government est|mated the
worst case acc|dent scenar|o for the B|b||s-PWR power stat|on at $6.8tn (t5,100bn}.
34
The so-ca||ed 'Sand|a Report" from 1982 conc|uded that a very |arge acc|dent cou|d cause damages |n
the order of $695bn (t525bn}.
35

A study undertaken by vers|cherungsforen |e|pz|g, for the German renewab|e energy sector |n 2011,
fo||ow|ng Fukush|ma, assumed a cost range for a nuc|ear acc|dent |n Germany of between t150bn and
t6.3tn.
36
The lnst|tut de Rad|oprotect|on et de Srete Nuc|ea|re (lRSN}, wh|ch |s the French pub||c safety author|ty`s
Techn|ca| Support Organ|sat|on (TSO} on nuc|ear and rad|at|on r|sks, |n |ts November 2012 report on a
major acc|dent |n France, suggested that the cost cou|d exceed t540bn. Th|s f|gure |nc|udes the cost
of c|ean-up and compensat|on, |oss of e|ectr|c|ty, and the |mpact on the |mage of products, |ead|ng to a
reduct|on |n va|ue. The |eader of the study, Patr|ck Moma| was quoted as suggest|ng that |t wou|d be an
'unmanageab|e European catastrophe". He suggested that |t cou|d be cost||er than that of Fukush|ma
due to the h|gher popu|at|on dens|ty and the fact that many power p|ants are |n|and.
37
The actua| costs assoc|ated w|th the Ohernoby| acc|dent are d|ff|cu|t to assess, and range from $75bn-
$360bn (a|though exchanges rates vary cons|derab|y}. An ear|y est|mate put the m|n|mum near-term costs
of the Ohernoby| acc|dent to be |n the ne|ghbourhood of $15bn, w|th |onger-term costs of $75bn-$150bn.
38

A 1990 report prepared by Yur| Koryak|n, the then ch|ef econom|st of the Research and Deve|opment
lnst|tute of Power Eng|neer|ng of the Sov|et n|on, est|mated that the costs from 1986 through to 2000 for
the former Sov|et Repub||cs of Be|arus, Russ|a, and kra|ne, wou|d be 170bn-215bn roub|es (at the then
off|c|a| exchange rate th|s wou|d be equ|va|ent to $283bn-$358bn}
39
. The Be|arus government est|mated the
tota| econom|c damage caused between 1986 and 2015 wou|d be $235bn (1992 June pr|ces}
40
. Another
est|mate suggests overa|| econom|c costs |n kra|ne a|one of $130bn
41
. ln part due to the chang|ng po||t|ca|
s|tuat|on |n the reg|on |n the ear|y 1990s and the chang|ng currenc|es and exchange rates, |t |s |mposs|b|e
to put a prec|se f|gure on the cost of the Ohernoby| acc|dent. However, what seems c|ear |s that |t was the
most cost|y nuc|ear acc|dent to date, w|th costs |n the order of hundreds of b||||ons of do||ars S, a f|gure
wh|ch far exceeds most |eg|s|at|ve requ|rements.
The f|na| costs of the Fukush|ma acc|dent are a|so unc|ear g|ven the uncerta|nt|es over the number of affected
peop|e and the future for evacuated areas and the|r popu|at|ons. An ear|y est|mate by the Japanese Oentre
for Econom|c Research suggested that the tota| costs wou|d be |n the range of 5,700bn-20,000bn
(t48bn-t169bn}. The est|mated cost was broken down |nto three cost components: compensat|on for the
purchase of |and 4,300bn (t36bn}; compensat|on for |ack of |ncome 630bn (t5.3bn}; and the costs of
decomm|ss|on|ng and decontam|nat|on between 740bn-15,000bn (t6.3bn-t127bn}
42
.
ln Apr|| 2012, |n |ts annua| report, TEPOO stated that the company was comm|tted to prov|d|ng prompt
compensat|on for those affected by the acc|dent |n accordance w|th the 1961 Nuc|ear Damage
Oompensat|on Act. Based on gu|de||nes from the Oomm|ttee for Adjustment of Oompensat|on for Nuc|ear
Damages D|sputes of 5 August 2011, TEPOO has assumed that the |n|t|a| cost of compensat|on amounts
to 2,644bn (t22bn}
43
. Th|s |nc|udes 1,174bn (t10bn} for |nd|v|dua| compensat|on, 986bn (t8bn} for
bus|nesses, p|us 484bn (t4bn} for other expenses
44
. Of th|s, TEPOO w||| be respons|b|e for nuc|ear
damages amount|ng to 2,524bn (t21bn} after deduct|ng 120bn |t rece|ved |n compensat|on pursuant to
the prov|s|on of 1961 Nuc|ear Damage Oompensat|on Act
45
.
>: !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
chapter +F*
However, the 2,644bn |s not the f|na| f|gure, and annua| payments are a|so expected, w|th 161bn (t1.4bn}
a||ocated |n the company accounts for further compensat|on |n the f|rst quarter of FY 2012
46
. lt |s noted
by TEPOO that: 'The Oompany records the est|mated amount as far as reasonab|e est|mat|on |s poss|b|e
at th|s moment, a|though the est|mated compensat|on amounts m|ght vary depend|ng on the extent of
accuracy of reference data and agreements w|th the v|ct|ms from now on."
47
ln November 2012, TEPOO
off|c|a|s suggested the costs of compensat|on and decontam|nat|on cou|d reach 10tn (t85bn}
48
.
The Oomm|ttee for Adjustment of Oompensat|on for Nuc|ear Damages D|sputes est|mated that the tota|
costs of decomm|ss|on|ng the s|x un|ts at Fukush|ma Da||ch| wou|d be around t13bn. However, the
Oomm|ss|on was unab|e to determ|ne and d|d not |nc|ude the costs of decontam|nat|on
49
.
To put these f|gures |nto context, accord|ng to the Japanese Oab|net Off|ce`s report re|eased three months
after the nuc|ear acc|dent, the tota| est|mated |oss to tang|b|e (d|rect} assets from the earthquake and tsunam|,
not |nc|ud|ng those ar|s|ng out of the nuc|ear acc|dent, was around 16.9tn (t143bn}, wh|ch represents around
3.3% of GDP. Wh||e the |nsured |oss stemm|ng from the earthquake and tsunam| |s est|mated at 3,000bn
(t25bn}, poss|b|y mak|ng |t the wor|d`s second most cost|y |nsurance |oss s|nce the 1970s
50
.
,M5 .1*<*'&1 &'7(1+ *D 1(77&<= )&(C&)&+4
Actua| exper|ence and numerous stud|es have shown that the compensat|on requ|red |n the event of
an acc|dent w|th |arge-sca|e, off-s|te re|eases far exceeds even the rev|sed ||m|ts of the |nternat|ona|
convent|ons. Therefore, |n an age of |ncreas|ng awareness of the consequences of env|ronmenta| damage
and a market economy, the concept of creat|ng an art|f|c|a| ce|||ng on the amount of compensat|on that
ut|||t|es are requ|red to pay out |s unjust|f|ed.
As the compensat|on costs of acc|dents w|th off-s|te consequences exceed by orders of magn|tude
the ||ab|||ty requ|rements on the ut|||t|es |n the |nternat|ona| convent|ons, |t m|ght be assumed that the
convent|ons were unf|t for purpose and need to be adjusted to ref|ect the greater poss|b|e compensat|on
c|a|m. However, |n fact |t has the reverse |mpact: the convent|ons are successfu| |n protect|ng an operator
from damage c|a|ms.
The th|rd-party ||ab|||ty ce|||ngs p|aced upon nuc|ear operators by nat|ona| |eg|s|at|on reduce the|r |nsurance
prem|ums. ||tt|e data |s pub||c|y ava||ab|e on the actua| costs of |nd|v|dua| ut|||t|es for the|r th|rd-party
|nsurance ||ab|||ty and the spec|f|c deta||s of the ||ab|||ty cover, and there |s certa|n|y no pub||shed compar|son.
However, ad |oc country data |s ava||ab|e and |nc|udes:
ln the S, the Nuc|ear Regu|atory Oomm|ss|on (NRO} requ|res a|| ||censees of nuc|ear power p|ants
to show proof that they have the pr|mary and secondary |nsurance coverage mandated by the Pr|ce-
Anderson Act. ||censees obta|n the|r pr|mary |nsurance through Amer|can Nuc|ear lnsurers. The average
annua| prem|um for a s|ng|e-un|t reactor s|te |s $830,000 (t630,000}
51
.
ln 2011 |n Oanada, Ontar|o Power Generat|on |td pa|d $809,626 Oanad|an do||ar (t623,000} for |ts
nuc|ear ||ab|||ty, wh|ch covered 10 un|ts at two power stat|ons
52
.
The tota| |nsurance costs |n the K are est|mated |n a study comm|ss|oned by the Department of Energy
and O||mate Ohange (DEOO} to be 10,000 per annum per MW of |nsta||ed generat|ng capac|ty. DEOO`s
conc|us|on was that: 'th|s demonstrates that tota| |nsurance costs, of wh|ch nuc|ear th|rd party ||ab|||ty |s
on|y one e|ement (other e|ements |nc|udes non-nuc|ear th|rd party cover, bus|ness |nterrupt|on, mach|nery
breakdown, construct|on r|sks, cr|me etc.} are a very sma|| proport|on of the costs of e|ectr|c|ty generat|on
from nuc|ear p|ant"
53
.
The stud|es c|ted be|ow present data on the econom|c |mpact of |ncreas|ng or remov|ng the ce|||ngs on
||ab|||ty. Some a|so present the costs for requ|r|ng pr|vate |nsurance.
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer >8
chapter +F*
A br|ef ana|ys|s pub||shed |n 2003 suggested that |f E|ectr|c|te de France (EDF}, the ma|n French e|ectr|c
ut|||ty, were requ|red to fu||y |nsure |ts power p|ants w|th pr|vate |nsurance but us|ng the current |nternat|ona||y
agreed ||m|t on ||ab|||t|es of approx|mate|y t420m, |t wou|d |ncrease EDF`s |nsurance prem|ums from
tc0.0017/kWh
54
, to tc0.019/kWh, thus add|ng around 0.8% to the cost of generat|on. However, |f there
were no ce|||ng |n p|ace and an operator had to cover a s|gn|f|cant off-s|te re|ease of rad|at|on, |t wou|d
|ncrease the |nsurance prem|ums to tc5.0/kWh, thus tr|p||ng the current tota| generat|ng costs
55
.
A more comprehens|ve ana|ys|s, undertaken by vers|cherungsforen |e|pz|g, |ooked at the |nsurance costs
|n Germany. Th|s both h|gh||ghted the var|ab|es and costs assoc|ated w|th a cost-ref|ect|ve |nsurance
reg|me, and conc|uded that the |nsurance prem|um wou|d |ncrease the cost by a range of around t0.14 to
t67.3/kWh
56
.
The JOER study suggests that, |f the ant|c|pated costs for Fukush|ma (5.7tn-20tn, t48bn-t169bn} were
requ|red to be met by a|| of TEPOO`s reactors operat|ng for a 10-year per|od, |t wou|d add 6.8-23.9/kWh
(t0.06-t0.22/kWh}, wh||e, |f the cost were a||ocated to a|| nuc|ear power p|ants, |t wou|d add between 2.0-
6.9/kWh (t0.02-t0.06/kWh}, compared to quoted nuc|ear generat|ng cost of around 6/kWh
57
(t0.05/kWh}.
The K Government undertook an assessment on extend|ng the ||ab|||ty cover requ|red by nuc|ear operators
to meet the new requ|rements of the rev|sed Par|s Oonvent|on. Fo||ow|ng d|scuss|ons w|th the |ndustry,
DEOO suggested: 'that meet|ng the proposed changes to the reg|me, name|y that operators w||| now
be ||ab|e for 6 categor|es of damage |nstead of three (consequent|a| econom|c |oss |s a|ready covered},
|nc|ud|ng persona| |njury now extended to 30 years, and that the |eve| of ||ab|||ty w||| |ncrease substant|a||y
from 140m to t1,200m. The est|mates prov|ded by |ndustry suggest there wou|d be an |ncrease |n
|nsurance prem|um costs from 2 to 10 t|mes the current |eve|s, averag|ng 7.5 t|mes current costs"
58
.

,MA L&(C&)&+4 1%(<<0))&<=
The v|enna Oonvent|on states (Art|c|e ll, Par 5}: 'Except as otherw|se prov|ded |n th|s Oonvent|on, no person
other than the operator sha|| be ||ab|e for nuc|ear damage."
The major reg|mes a|| act to channe| ||ab|||ty exc|us|ve|y towards the operator and no other part|es |nvo|ved |n
the construct|on and ma|ntenance of a nuc|ear |nsta||at|on may be he|d ||ab|e for any damages. The v|enna
Oonvent|on prov|des for very ||m|ted r|ghts of recourse of the operator towards any th|rd party. Bas|ca||y,
accord|ng to |ts Art|c|e , the operator sha|| have a r|ght of recourse on|y '|f th|s |s express|y prov|ded for by
a contract |n wr|t|ng". Oonsequent|y, |f a c|a|m for damages |s f||ed d|rect|y aga|nst such a th|rd party, such
c|a|m shou|d be bas|ca||y d|sm|ssed by the court
59
.
The just|f|cat|on for the channe|||ng of ||ab|||ty onto the operator |s that |t s|mp||f|es and, therefore, exped|tes
act|ons for damages brought by v|ct|ms. lt |s further sa|d that channe|||ng a|so 'secures as far as poss|b|e a
fa|r and equa| treatment of a|| potent|a| v|ct|ms, and |s therefore a|so advantageous for every s|ng|e v|ct|m"
60
.
However, as the Nuc|ear Energy Agency po|nts out, |t a|so 'm|n|m|ses the burden upon the nuc|ear |ndustry
as a who|e, as the var|ous persons who contr|bute to the operat|on of a nuc|ear |nsta||at|on, such as
supp||ers and carr|ers, do not requ|re |nsurance coverage add|t|ona| to that he|d by the operator"
61
.
The ab|||ty to seek compensat|on recourse w|th part|es other than the operator |n the event of an acc|dent wou|d
not on|y benef|t the potent|a| v|ct|ms, but wou|d a|so |ncrease accountab|||ty and transparency and he|p ensure
an adequate safety cu|ture |s adhered to across the supp|y cha|n. Furthermore, the channe|||ng of ||ab|||ty restr|cts
the number of avenues open to potent|a| v|ct|ms to seek recourse, and, w|th a |arge number of c|a|ms and ||m|ted
funds ava||ab|e, may mean that those affected are unab|e to rece|ve adequate compensat|on.
A ||ab|||ty reg|me and |n some cases be|ng a s|gnatory to the |nternat|ona| convent|ons are often a requ|rement for
fore|gn part|c|pat|on |n nuc|ear projects. For examp|e, the European Bank for Reconstruct|on and Deve|opment,
one of the few lnternat|ona| F|nanc|a| lnst|tut|ons to |end for nuc|ear power, has a requ|rement that the government
|n wh|ch the project |s |ocated must have acceded to the v|enna Oonvent|on and have correspond|ng nat|ona|
>, !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
chapter +F*
|eg|s|at|on
62
. The S Export Ored|t Agency
63
on|y requ|res that 'the host country must have a reg|me acceptab|e to
Exlm Bank govern|ng ||ab|||ty for nuc|ear damage"
64
, rather than becom|ng party to a spec|f|c convent|on.
However, not a|| nat|ona| reg|mes recogn|se the necess|ty for channe|||ng ||ab|||ty. lnd|a`s new nuc|ear |aw, of
2011, spec|f|ca||y a||ows nuc|ear operators to seek recourse |n the event of 'w||fu| act or gross neg||gence on
the part of the supp||er", wh||e the ex|st|ng |aws |n both Russ|a and South Korea a||ow operators to recover
damages from supp||ers |n the event of neg||gence
65
.
ln other, non-nuc|ear, sectors the |ega| and econom|c ram|f|cat|ons are not restr|cted to the operator, as has
been seen |n the case of the Deeowa|e| |o||zo| o|| sp|||, where affected part|es have sought compensat|on
not on|y from BP, the operator of the r|g, but a|so from the r|g owner, Transocean, and from Ha|||burton, the
supp||er of cement for the we||
66
.
,ME S+%03 (30($ *D 1*<+0<+&*<
There are a number of gaps and restr|ct|ons |n the current nat|ona| and |nternat|ona| ||ab|||ty reg|mes. One
of the most |mportant re|ates to the env|ronment. The rev|sed convent|ons have changed the scope of
||ab|||ty and |nc|ude |oss of ||fe or persona| |njury, |oss of or damage to property, econom|c |osses, |oss of
|ncome, cost of preventat|ve measures and the cost of measures of re|nstatement of |mpa|red env|ronment.
On th|s |ast po|nt, however, |t has been noted that 'a|most a|| forms of env|ronmenta| ||ab|||ty are current|y
un|nsurab|e"
67
. Th|s |s sa|d to be for a number of reasons, |nc|ud|ng that there |s not d|rect econom|c |nterest
|n the env|ronment, and |t |s, therefore, |mposs|b|e to prov|de an '|nsurab|e |nterest"
68
.
As we|| as |ssues around the def|n|t|ons of damage, prob|ems rema|n |n the current convent|ons re|at|ng to
the |ength of t|me that c|a|ms can be made. The 1963 v|enna Oonvent|on states (Art|c|e vl} that: 'R|ghts of
compensat|on under th|s Oonvent|on sha|| be ext|ngu|shed |f an act|on |s not brought w|th|n ten years from
the date of the nuc|ear |nc|dent." Th|s was rev|sed |n the Jo|nt Protoco| so that |n respect to |oss of ||fe and
persona| |njury c|a|ms may be made 30 years from the date of a nuc|ear |nc|dent, and, w|th respect to other
damage, 10 years from the date of the nuc|ear |nc|dent. The extens|on of |oss of ||fe and persona| |njury
c|a|m per|ods ref|ects the |atency per|od of many rad|at|on-|nduced |||nesses; however, restr|ct|ng a|| other
potent|a| c|a|ms to 10 years does not ref|ect the extent of poss|b|e secondary effects of rad|at|on |n the w|der
env|ronment. However, even th|s rev|s|on |s an area of concern for |nsurers as the |ndustry`s '|oss h|story
from so ca||ed '|ong-ta||` ||ab|||ty |nsurance (|.e. where |nsurance exposure |s not ext|ngu|shed after a per|od
of a few years} has been poor and |t cont|nues to be a cha||eng|ng env|ronment"
69
as |t can potent|a||y requ|re
compensat|on decades after |nc|dents wh|ch |ncreases the econom|c r|sks.
The |nternat|ona| convent|ons a|so act to make the courts |n whose terr|tory the nuc|ear acc|dent occurred
have exc|us|ve jur|sd|ct|on. Th|s, therefore, restr|cts the ab|||ty of potent|a| v|ct|ms |n other countr|es to seek
recourse |n the|r own courts. Th|s |s one reason why 'there |s a c|ear percept|on among non-nuc|ear states
that the Par|s and Brusse|s convent|ons are ba|anced |n favour of the nuc|ear |ndustry"
70
.
chapter +F*
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer >>
@'(=09 Greenpeace
checks rad|at|on |eve|s |n
l|tate v|||age, 40km from
the Fukush|ma nuc|ear
p|ant. Greenpeace has
been conduct|ng ongo|ng
rad|at|on mon|tor|ng |n the
Fukush|ma reg|on s|nce the
d|saster |n 2011 to mon|tor
and assess the ongo|ng
threat to the popu|at|on and
env|ronment.
J

1
C
L
N
B
R

L
B
-
K
3
-
K

G

Q
L
B
B
3
5
B
C
H
B
The ab|||ty to seek
compensat|on recourse
w|th part|es other than
the operator wou|d a|so
|ncrease accountab|||ty
and transparency, and
he|p ensure an adequate
safety cu|ture..
>5 !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
chapter +F*
,MI 6*<1)"$&*<
The current nat|ona| and |nternat|ona| nuc|ear ||ab|||ty |aws and convent|ons do not ensure that v|ct|ms rece|ve
fu|| and t|me|y compensat|on, and that a|| ||ab|||t|es are |ndeed covered |n the event of a major acc|dent.
The ||ab|||ty reg|mes do not ensure that ut|||t|es are ab|e to meet the|r econom|c respons|b|||t|es to
compensate and to 'c|ean up" |n the event of a major acc|dent. Rather, the current reg|mes pr|mar||y serve
to protect the |ndustry - th|s |nc|udes operators as we|| as nuc|ear supp||ers - and are d|scr|m|natory aga|nst
potent|a| v|ct|ms and the env|ronment.
The exper|ences of Fukush|ma, as we|| as academ|c stud|es, show that even the Japanese ||ab|||ty reg|me
|s h|gh|y |nadequate and unjust, desp|te the un||m|ted and str|ct ||ab|||ty to the operator, pr|mar||y g|ven the
operator`s ||m|ted f|nanc|a| secur|ty compared to the f|nanc|a| extent of the damage. Th|s |s exp|a|ned |n more
deta|| |n Ohapter 1.
Fo||ow|ng the Ohernoby| nuc|ear acc|dent, the reform of the |nternat|ona| nuc|ear ||ab|||ty reg|mes was begun,
but more than 25 years |ater very ||tt|e progress has been made. What |s remarkab|e |s that near|y 27 years
after Ohernoby|, 16 years after the adopt|on of the OSO and n|ne years after the adopt|on of the 2004
Protoco|s to amend the Par|s/Brusse|s convent|ons, those enhancements have not entered |nto force. As a
resu|t, the s|tuat|on has not changed s|gn|f|cant|y.
71
Most |mportant|y, on|y about ha|f of the wor|d`s nuc|ear
power p|ants are operat|ng |n states that are part|es to one of the nuc|ear ||ab|||ty convent|ons. Furthermore,
many of the proposed def|c|enc|es acknow|edged at the t|me of Ohernoby| have not been addressed; as
on|y the rev|sed v|enna Oonvent|on has entered |nto force, w|th a|| other convent|ons rema|n|ng as they
were pr|or to 1986. The fu|| |mp||cat|ons of th|s s|tuat|on have not been adequate|y h|gh||ghted fo||ow|ng
Fukush|ma, |n part due to ||m|ted transboundary contam|nat|on resu|t|ng from Japan`s geograph|ca|
|so|at|on.
Nat|ona| governments, par||aments and nuc|ear operators shou|d seek to reform the|r domest|c |eg|s|at|on to
|nc|ude the fo||ow|ng factors:
The current ce|||ngs on compensat|on to th|rd part|es affected by nuc|ear acc|dents, fac|||tated by
the |nternat|ona| reg|mes, w||| restr|ct potent|a| v|ct|ms and those affected by the acc|dent ga|n|ng the
necessary compensat|on and shou|d be removed.
The channe||ng of ||ab|||ty so|e|y towards the operator |s unnecessary and unreasonab|e. The ab|||ty to
seek compensat|on recourse |n the event of an acc|dent wou|d not on|y benef|t the potent|a| v|ct|ms, but
wou|d a|so |ncrease accountab|||ty and transparency |n such an event and wou|d he|p ensure an adequate
safety cu|ture was adhered too across the supp|y cha|n.
lncrease transparency |nto the costs and scope of ut|||t|es and nuc|ear compan|es nuc|ear ||ab|||ty
|nsurance. Th|s wou|d enab|e compar|son, both w|th|n the nuc|ear |ndustry and between hazardous
|ndustr|es.
Ensure adequate f|nanc|a| coverage. The |ack of adequate f|nanc|a| coverage |s a s|gn|f|cant d|stort|on
of the e|ectr|c|ty market. Other energy sources are requ|red to make add|t|ona| payments or pay h|gher
taxes for the po||ut|on or env|ronmenta| damage they cause, for examp|e for the costs of the|r em|ss|ons.
W|thout state |ntervent|on, even |arge and prev|ous|y f|nanc|a||y v|ab|e ut|||t|es, such as TEPOO, wou|d be
unab|e to surv|ve a major nuc|ear acc|dent. A major nuc|ear acc|dent, as a resu|t of the extens|ve |oss of
conf|dence, revenues and reputat|on, wou|d a|most certa|n|y bankrupt any pr|vate ut|||ty.
There |s a grow|ng recogn|t|on that the f|nanc|a| |mpact of off-s|te rad|o|og|ca| re|eases goes beyond
those areas actua||y d|rect|y affected. ln part|cu|ar, the comp|ex nature of manufactur|ng processes can
mean that |oss of a part|cu|ar |ndustr|a| p|ant has much w|der econom|c |mp||cat|ons due to d|srupt|on of
components |n supp|y cha|ns. Furthermore, restr|ct|ons on agr|cu|ture produce or a fa|| |n the|r va|ue has
been seen to occur we|| beyond the areas of |n|t|a| contam|nat|on.
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer >A
chapter +F*
R(C)0 ,9
S|gnator|es on
|nternat|ona|
convent|ons and
the|r operator
||ab|||ty and
f|nanc|a| secur|ty
||m|ts
6*"<+34 P(3&$
6*<20<+&*<
V3"$$0)$
N"77)0'0<+(34
6*<20<+&*<
W&0<<(
6*<20<+&*<
P3*+*1*)
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6*<20<+&*< S<
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Argent|na 54.9 54.9
Armen|a - Not Spec|f|ed
Be|arus n||m|ted Not Spec|f|ed
Be|g|um 297 324
Bo||v|a n||m|ted Not Spec|f|ed
Bosn|a-
Herzegov|na
n||m|ted Not Spec|f|ed
Braz|| SD 160 m||||on SD 160 m||||on
Bu|gar|a 49 49
Oameroon n||m|ted Not Spec|f|ed
Oh||e 51 51
Oroat|a 44 44
Ouba n||m|ted Not Spec|f|ed
Ozech Repub||c 307 307
Denmark 65 65
Egypt n||m|ted Not Spec|f|ed
Eston|a n||m|ted Not Spec|f|ed
F|n|and 191 191
France 91 91
Germany n||m|ted 2,500
Greece 16 Not Spec|f|ed
Hungary 109 109
lnd|a x 252 Not Spec|f|ed
lta|y 5 5
Japan n||m|ted 920
Korea 325 30
|atv|a 6 6
|ebanon n||m|ted Not Spec|f|ed
||thuan|a 5 5
Macedon|a n||m|ted Not Spec|f|ed
Mex|co n||m|ted Not Spec|f|ed
Mo|dova n||m|ted Not Spec|f|ed
Montenegro n||m|ted Not Spec|f|ed
Morocco n||m|ted Not Spec|f|ed
Nether|ands 340 340
N|ger n||m|ted Not Spec|f|ed
N|ger|a n||m|ted Not Spec|f|ed
Norway 65 65
Peru n||m|ted Not Spec|f|ed
Ph|||pp|nes 3 Oase by case
Portuga| 16 Not Spec|f|ed
Po|and 164 164
Roman|a 164 164
Russ|a n||m|ted Not Spec|f|ed
Serb|a n||m|ted Not Spec|f|ed
S|ovak Repub||c 75 75
S|oven|a 164 164
Sweden 326 326
Sw|tzer|and n||m|ted 661
Turkey 16 Not Spec|f|ed
kra|ne 164 164
n|ted
K|ngdom
156 156
n|ted States 11,900 300
ruguay n||m|ted Not Spec|f|ed
N*"310: NEA (2011}. Nuc|ear Operator ||ab|||ty Amounts and F|nanc|a| Secur|ty ||m|ts. As of June 2011.
Amounts |n t m||||on, un|ess otherw|se |nd|cated.
>E !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
chapter +F*
8 Oarro||, S. (2008} 'Perspect|ve on the Pros and Oons of a Poo||ng-type
Approach to Nuc|ear Th|rd Party ||ab|||ty" Nuc|ear |aw Bu||et|n 81 (2008}
, Parts of th|s text are taken from 'Nuc|ear Th|rd Party lnsurance The Nuc|ear
Sector`s 'S||ent" Subs|dy
State of P|ay and Opportun|t|es |n Europe", by S|mon Oarro|| and Antony
Froggatt, March 2008
> 'Oonvent|on Supp|ementary to the Par|s Oonvent|on of 29th Ju|y 1960
on Th|rd Party ||ab|||ty |n the F|e|d of Nuc|ear Energy'. http://www.|aea.org/
Pub||cat|ons/Documents/Treat|es/par|sconv.htm|
5 'v|enna Oonvent|on on O|v|| ||ab|||ty for Nuc|ear Damage", adopted |n 1963,
see http://www.|aea.org/Pub||cat|ons/Documents/lnfc|rcs/1996/|nf500.shtm|
A 'The Jo|nt Protoco| Re|at|ng to the App||cat|on of the v|enna Oonvent|on
and the Par|s Oonvent|on', September 1988. The Jo|nt Protoco| entered |nto
force on 27 Apr|| 1992. http://www.|aea.org/Pub||cat|ons/Documents/lnfc|rcs/
Others/|nf402.shtm|
E lNE|, 'O|v|| ||ab|||ty for Nuc|ear Damage: Advantages and D|sadvantages of
Jo|n|ng the lnternat|ona| Nuc|ear ||ab|||ty Reg|me A paper by the lnternat|ona|
Expert Group on Nuc|ear ||ab|||ty (lN|E} http://o|a.|aea.org/o|a/treat|es/
documents/||ab|||ty_reg|me.pdf
I Nuc|ear damage" means -
|oss of ||fe, any persona| |njury or any |oss of, or damage to, property wh|ch
ar|ses out of or resu|ts from the rad|oact|ve propert|es or a comb|nat|on of
rad|oact|ve propert|es w|th tox|c, exp|os|ve or other hazardous propert|es of
nuc|ear fue| or rad|oact|ve products or waste |n, or of nuc|ear mater|a| com|ng
from, or|g|nat|ng |n, or sent to, a nuc|ear |nsta||at|on;
any other |oss or damage so ar|s|ng or resu|t|ng |f and to the extent that the |aw
of the competent court so prov|des; and
|f the |aw of the lnsta||at|on State so prov|des, |oss of ||fe, any persona| |njury
or any |oss of, or damage to, property wh|ch ar|ses out of or resu|ts from other
|on|z|ng rad|at|on em|tted by any other source of rad|at|on |ns|de a nuc|ear
|nsta||at|on.
? 'The 1997 Protoco| to Amend the 1963 v|enna Oonvent|on', see
http://www.|aea.org/Pub||cat|ons/Documents/lnfc|rcs/1998/|nfc|rc566.pdf;
the 2004 Protoco| to Amend the 1960 Par|s Oonvent|on see
http://www.oecd-nea.org/|aw/par|s_convent|on.pdf; and
the 2004 Protoco| to amend the 1963 Brusse|s Supp|ementary Supp|ementary
Oonvent|on, see
http://www.oecd-nea.org/|aw/brusse|s-supp|ementary-convent|on-protoco|.
htm|
K '1998 Oonvent|on on Supp|ementary Oompensat|on for Nuc|ear Damage',
see
http://www.|aea.org/Pub||cat|ons/Documents/lnfc|rcs/1998/|nfc|rc567.pdf
8: The SDR |s an |nternat|ona| reserve asset, created by the lMF |n 1969 to
supp|ement |ts member countr|es` off|c|a| reserves. lts va|ue |s based on a
basket of four key |nternat|ona| currenc|es, and SDRs can be exchanged
for free|y usab|e currenc|es. (for more exp|anat|on see: http://www.|mf.org/
externa|/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm
88 McRae, B. (2007} 'The Oonvent|on on Supp|ementary Oompensat|on for
Nuc|ear Damage: Oata|yst for a G|oba| Nuc|ear ||ab|||ty Reg|me", Nuc|ear |aw
Bu||et|n No. 79 (June 2007}
8, The spec|f|c formu|a of contr|but|ons to th|s fund |s exp|a|ned |n Art|c|e
lv of the OSO http://www.|aea.org/Pub||cat|ons/Documents/lnfc|rcs/1998/
|nfc|rc567.pdf
8> lAEA (2012}, 'Protoco| to Amend the v|enna Oonvent|on on O|v|| ||ab|||ty
for Nuc|ear Damage', 29 May 2012. http://www.|aea.org/Pub||cat|ons/
Documents/Oonvent|ons/protamend_status.pdf
85 The Protoco| to the Par|s Oonvent|on and the Protoco| to the Brusse|s
Supp|ementary Oonvent|on were opened for s|gnature on 12 February 2004,
but ne|ther of these |nstruments had entered |nto force.
8A OJ (2004}, 'Oounc|| Dec|s|on of 8 March 2004 author|s|ng the Member
States wh|ch are Oontract|ng Part|es to the Par|s Oonvent|on of 29 Ju|y 1960
on Th|rd Party ||ab|||ty |n the F|e|d of Nuc|ear Energy to rat|fy, |n the |nterest
of the European Oommun|ty, the Protoco| amend|ng that Oonvent|on, or to
accede to |t', Off|c|a| Journa| of the European Oommun|t|es, 2004/294/EO of
8 March 2004
8E Burges Sa|mon (2012}, 'Rev|sed Energy B||| Pub||shed", Nuc|ear |aw
News|etter, Burges Sa|mon, December 2012 http://www.burges-sa|mon.
com/Sectors/energy_and_ut|||t|es/nuc|ear/Pub||cat|ons/Nuc|ear_|aw_
December_2012.pdf
8I lAEA (2011}, 'Oonvent|on on Supp|ementary Oompensat|on for Nuc|ear
Damage", 20th September 2011 http://www.|aea.org/Pub||cat|ons/
Documents/Oonvent|ons/supcomp_status.pdf
8? The power |n MW of an e|ectr|c|ty generat|ng p|ant may be expressed as
MWe or MWt (a|ternat|ve|y MWth}. MWe |s the more common and represents
the e|ectr|ca| output power of the p|ant. MWt |s the therma| |nput power
deve|oped by the furnace or nuc|ear reactor. The output power MWe |s
genera||y on|y about 30% or 40% of the |nput power MWt. The operat|ng
capac|t|es of the four countr|es are Argent|na (935 MWe}, Morocco (0 MWe},
Roman|a (1300 MWe} and the n|ted States (101 465 MWe}.
8K Wor|d Nuc|ear Assoc|at|on (2012}, '||ab|||ty for Nuc|ear Damage", Wor|d
Nuc|ear Assoc|at|on, November 2012 http://www.wor|d-nuc|ear.org/|nfo/|nf67.
htm|
,: Asah| Sh|mbun (2012}, 'Japan wants |n on nuc|ear acc|dent compensat|on
pact", 3 February 2012, http://ajw.asah|.com/art|c|e/beh|nd_news/po||t|cs/
AJ201202030021
,8 Kus (2011}, 'lnternat|ona| nuc|ear |aw |n the 25 years between Ohernoby|
and Fukush|ma and beyond", Se|ma Kus Nuc|ear |aw Bu||et|n, Nuc|ear Energy
Agency No 87, 2011/1,
,, Tet|ey M (2006} 'Rev|sed Par|s and v|enna Nuc|ear ||ab|||ty Oonvent|ons -
Oha||enges for Nuc|ear lnsurers' Nuc|ear |aw Bu||et|n No. 77, June 2006, pp.
27-39
,> HMG (2007} 'The Ro|e of Nuc|ear Power', K Government Oonsu|tat|on
2007.
,5 OEOD (2011}, 'OEOD (2011}, 'Nuc|ear |eg|s|at|on |n OEOD Oountr|es,
Regu|atory and lnst|tut|ona| Framework for Nuc|ear Act|v|t|es -Nether|ands",
http://www.oecd-nea.org/|aw/|eg|s|at|on/Nether|ands.pdf
,A OEOD (2011}, 'Nuc|ear |eg|s|at|on |n OEOD Oountr|es, Regu|atory and
lnst|tut|ona| Framework for Nuc|ear Act|v|t|es". http://www.oecd-nea.org/|aw/
|eg|s|at|on/
,E H|nteregger M (1998}, 'The new Austr|an Act on Th|rd Party ||ab|||ty for
Nuc|ear Damage", Nuc|ear |aw Bu||et|n: December No. 62 vo|ume 1998 lssue
2, 1998.
,I See, for examp|e, Sands, Ph|||ppe and Ga||zz|, Pao|o, 'The 1968 Brusse|s
Oonvent|on and ||ab|||ty for Nuc|ear Damage', Nuc|ear |aw Bu||et|n No. 64,
December 1999, pp. 7 - 27;
,? H|nteregger M (1998}, 'The new Austr|an Act on Th|rd Party ||ab|||ty for
Nuc|ear Damage", Nuc|ear |aw Bu||et|n: December No. 62 vo|ume 1998 lssue
2, 1998
,K Note that desp|te the un||m|ted ||ab|||ty |n Japan, the ||ab|||ty system does not
a||ow for proper accountab|||ty as the operator has |nsuff|c|ent funds to cover a||
costs of the Fukush|ma d|saster.
>: NEA (2011}, 'Nuc|ear Operator ||ab|||ty Amounts and F|nanc|a| Secur|ty
||m|ts", as of June 2011, unoff|c|a| |nformat|on. http://www.oecd-nea.org/
|aw/2011-tab|e-||ab|||ty-coverage-||m|ts.pdf
>8 European Oomm|ss|on (2005}, 'Externa||t|es of Fue| Oyc|es 'ExternE`
Project,' Report Number 5, Nuc|ear Fue| Oyc|e, European Oomm|ss|on, DGll,
Sc|ence, Research and Deve|opment (JO|E}, 1995, p.5.
>, Soh|er, A (2002}, 'A European Manua| for 'Off-s|te Emergency P|ann|ng
and Response to Nuc|ear Acc|dents`, prepared for the European Oomm|ss|on
D|rectorate-Genera| Env|ronment (Oontract SBv/00/277065}, SOK-OEN
Report R-3594, December 2002, Ohapter 13 - Econom|c lmpact, |n part|cu|ar
pp. 245-248.
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer >I
chapter +F*
>> GAO (1987} 'Nuc|ear Regu|at|on, A Perspect|ve on ||ab|||ty Protect|on for a
Nuc|ear Power P|ant Acc|dent', GAO/ROED-87-124 p. 20 and Append|x ll.
>5 O|ted |n: Greenpeace lnternat|ona| (1994}, 'Rev|ew of Est|mates of the
Oosts of Major Nuc|ear Acc|dents', Prepared for the 9th Sess|on of the
Stand|ng Oomm|ttee on Nuc|ear ||ab|||ty of the lnternat|ona| Atom|c Energy
Agency 7-11 February 1994 Prognos AG, (1992}. E|ne Prognos-Stud|e aus
dem Jahr 1992 fr das Bundesw|rtschaftsm|n|ster|um errechnete fr e|nen
Super-GA |n e|nem deutschen Atomkraftwerk mehrere Hundertausend
d|rekt Getotete und b|s zu 4,8 M||||onen Krebskranke. D|e Sach- und
vermogensschden wrden ber 5000 M||||arden t betragen.
>A O|ted |n: Faure, M (1995}, 'Econom|c Mode|s of Oompensat|on for Damage
Oaused by Nuc|ear Acc|dent: Some |essons for the Rev|s|on of the Par|s and
v|enna Oonvent|ons", European Journa| of |aw and Econom|cs 2 (1995}, pp.
21-43.
>E vers|cherungsforen |e|pz|g (2011}, 'Oa|cu|at|on of a r|sk-adjusted |nsurance
prem|um to cover the ||ab|||ty
r|sks resu|t|ng from the operat|on of nuc|ear p|ants", Apr|| 2011
>I Nuc|eon|cs Week, (2012}, 'Major French nuc|ear acc|dent wou|d be a
'European catastrophe`: lRSN", 15 November 2012.
>? S Oongress (1990}, 'Report to the Oongress from the Pres|dent|a|
Oomm|ss|on on Oatastroph|c Nuc|ear Acc|dents' (vo|ume One}, August 1990,
p. 73 http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/news/rpccna/pcrcna01.htm
>K Hudson R (1990}, 'Study Says Ohernoby| M|ght Oost 20 t|mes more than
Pr|or Est|mates", Wa|| Street Journa| Europe, 29 March 1990.
5: Be|arus Government (1995}, 'The Repub||c of Be|arus: 9 years after
Ohernoby|. S|tuat|on, Prob|ems, Act|ons". Nat|ona| Report, M|n|stry for
Emergenc|es and Popu|at|on Protect|on from the Ohernoby| NPP Oatastrophe
Oonsequences 1995.
58 See: vargo, G.J. (ed} (2001}, 'The Ohornoby| Acc|dent: A Oomprehens|ve
R|sk Assessment', Bate||e Press (2000}, c|ted |n: Thorne, M.O., Anna|s of
Nuc|ear Energy 28 (2001}, pp. 89-91.
5, JOER (2011}, 'FY2020 Nuc|ear Generat|ng Oost Treb|e Pre-Acc|dent
|eve| - Huge Pr|ce Tag on Fukush|ma Acc|dent O|eanup", Japanese Oentre for
Econom|c Research, Ju|y 19, 2011. http://www.jcer.or.jp/eng/research/pdf/
pe(kobayash|20110719}e.pdf
5> TEPOO (2012},'Spec|a| Bus|ness P|an', May 2012 http://www.tepco.co.jp/
en/press/corp-com/re|ease/betu12_e/|mages/120509e0103.pdf
55 TEPOO (2012}, 'FY2012 1st uarter Earn|ngs Resu|ts" 1 Apr||-30 June
2012
5A TEPOO (2012}, 'Annua| Report 2012", Year End|ng 31 March 2012
5E TEPOO (2012}, 'FY2012 1st uarter Earn|ngs Resu|ts" 1 Apr||-30 June
2012
5I TEPOO (2012}, 'Annua| Report 2012", Year End|ng 31 March 2012
5? Asah| Sh|mbun (2012}, 'TEPOO seeks more government support
as Fukush|ma costs soar', 7 November. http://ajw.asah|.com/
art|c|e/0311d|saster/fukush|ma/AJ201211070086
5K N|sh|yama, K. (2012}, 'An lns|der`s v|ew on Po||cy Processes and Po||cy
Recommendat|ons on Japanese E|ectr|c|ty lndustry', Ke|ta N|sh|yama
lnnovat|on Network Oorporat|on of Japan, v|s|t|ng Professor, Ohuo Graduate
Schoo| of Pub||c Po||cy. 2012
A: Nagamura (2012}, '11th March Japanese earthquake, tsunam| and
nuc|ear emergency; how |nsurance responded |n post-d|saster recovery",
Masaak| Nagamura, |n The Geneva Report, R|sk and lnsurance Research,
Extreme events and |nsurance: 2011 annu|s horr|b|||s, March 2012 http://
genevaassoc|at|on.org/PDF/Geneva_Reports/GA-2012-Geneva_report[5|.
pdf=page=71
A8 NRO (2011}, 'Fact Sheet on Nuc|ear lnsurance and D|saster Re||ef Funds"
S Nuc|ear Regu|atory Oomm|ss|on June 2011.
A, Marsh (2011}, 'lnsurance lnvo|ce", dated 11 Ju|y 2011
A> DEOO (2012}, 'lmpact Statement on Proposed |eg|s|at|on to |mp|ement the
amended Par|s and
Brusse|s Oonvent|ons on 3rd party nuc|ear ||ab|||ty", March 2012, K
Government Department of Energy and O||mate Ohange http://www.decc.gov.
uk/assets/decc/Oonsu|tat|ons/par|s-brusse|s-convent|on-changes/4878-f|na-
|mpact-assessment--par|s-brusse|s-convent|on.pdf
A5 c/kWh refers to Eurocent per k||owatt hour
AA European Oomm|ss|on (2003}, 'So|ut|ons for env|ronment, economy and
techno|ogy', Report for DG Env|ronment, Env|ronmenta||y harmfu| support
measures |n E Member States, European Oomm|ss|on, January 2003, page
132.
AE vers|cherungsforen |e|pz|g (2012},'Oa|cu|at|on of a r|sk-adjusted |nsurance
prem|um to cover the ||ab|||ty r|sks resu|t|ng from the operat|on of nuc|ear
p|ants' comm|ss|oned by the German Renewab|e Energy Federat|on (BEE,
Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energ|e e.v} 2012
AI JOER (2011}, 'FY2020 Nuc|ear Generat|ng Oost Treb|e Pre-Acc|dent
|eve| - Huge Pr|ce Tag on Fukush|ma Acc|dent O|eanup", Japanese Oentre for
Econom|c Research, 19 Ju|y 2011
A? DEOO (2012}, 'lmpact Statement on Proposed |eg|s|at|on to |mp|ement the
amended Par|s and
Brusse|s Oonvent|ons on 3rd party nuc|ear ||ab|||ty", March 2012 http://
www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/Oonsu|tat|ons/par|s-brusse|s-convent|on-
changes/4878-f|na-|mpact-assessment--par|s-brusse|s-convent|on.pdf
AK Handr|||ca, J. (2011}, 'Ohanne|||ng Of Nuc|ear Th|rd Party ||ab|||ty Towards
The Operator Jeopard|sed By The Brusse|s Regu|at|on", Ozech Soc|ety for
lnternat|ona| |aw, 2011, pages 69-82
E: lN|E 'O|v|| ||ab|||ty for Nuc|ear Damage: Advantages and D|sadvantages
of Jo|n|ng the lnternat|ona| Nuc|ear ||ab|||ty Reg|me A paper by the lnternat|ona|
Expert Group on Nuc|ear ||ab|||ty (lN|E} http://o|a.|aea.org/o|a/treat|es/
documents/||ab|||ty_reg|me.pdf
E8 NEA (1993}, 'NEA lssue Br|ef: An ana|ys|s of pr|nc|pa| nuc|ear |ssues
lnternat|ona| nuc|ear th|rd party ||ab|||ty, No. 4 - 1st rev|s|on", Nuc|ear Energy
Agency November 1993, accessed November 2012 http://www.oecd-nea.
org/br|ef/br|ef-04-1.htm|
E, EBRD (2006}, 'Energy Operat|ons Po||cy, as approved by the Board
of D|rectors 11th Ju|y 2006", European Bank for Reconstruct|on and
Deve|opment.
E> n|ted States Export lmport Bank or Ex-lm Bank
E5 E-lM (2006}, 'Bank Nuc|ear Gu|de||nes - Annex A'. n|ted States Export
lmport Bank, August 2006 http://www.ex|m.gov/products/po||c|es/nuc|ear/
envnuc.htm|=gu|de||nes
EA varadarajan S (2010}, 'Turn the nuc|ear b||| from ||ab|||ty to asset", S|ddharth
varadarajan, H|ndu T|mes, 16 June 2010.
EE Fue|f|x (2012}, 'BP, Transocean and Ha|||burton sett|ng as|de b||||ons
for poss|b|e Deepwater sett|ement", 3 August 2012 http://fue|f|x.com/
b|og/2012/08/03/bp-transocean-and-ha|||burton-sett|ng-as|de-b||||ons-for-
poss|b|e-deepwater-sett|ement/
EI Tet|ey M (2006} 'Rev|sed Par|s and v|enna Nuc|ear ||ab|||ty Oonvent|ons -
Oha||enges for Nuc|ear lnsurers' Nuc|ear |aw Bu||et|n No. 77, June 2006, pp.
27-39
E? lb|d.
EK lb|d.
I: O`H|gg|ns P, McGrath P (2002}. 'Th|rd Party ||ab|||ty |n the F|e|d of Nuc|ear
|aw, An lr|sh Perspect|ve", Nuc|ear |aw Bu||et|n No 70, 2002
I8 Kus (2011}, 'lnternat|ona| nuc|ear |aw |n the 25 years between Ohernoby|
and Fukush|ma and beyond", Se|ma Kus Nuc|ear |aw Bu||et|n, Nuc|ear Energy
Agency No 87, 2011/1
>? !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
chapter +%300
@'(=09 The Angra nuc|ear
power stat|on 150km from
R|o de Jane|ro |s |n one
of Braz||`s most beaut|fu|
areas. Peop|e have
protested about safety
and |ocat|ng the p|ant |n
a top tour|st dest|nat|on.
J


5
B
>
B
L

H
C
>
K
3

G

Q
L
B
B
3
5
B
C
H
B
D|fferent supp||ers
are respons|b|e
for |mp|ement|ng
e|ements cr|t|ca| for
the p|ant`s safety,
but cannot be he|d
accountab|e |n the
case of an acc|dent.
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer >K
Professor Stephen Thomas |s D|rector of Research at the Bus|ness Schoo| of the
n|vers|ty of Greenw|ch, K, and he has carr|ed out research on energy po||cy
and part|cu|ar|y nuc|ear power for more than 30 years.
>M8 @<+3*B"1+&*<
Th|s chapter exam|nes the supp|y cha|n for each of the three ma|n e|ements - construct|on, operat|on
and ma|ntenance, and decomm|ss|on|ng - of the ||fe cyc|e of a nuc|ear power p|ant. lt covers ma|n|y the
construct|on phase, wh|ch |s the most comp|ex, and a|so covers the operat|ng phase, wh|ch |s somewhat
s|mp|er. These are the reactor ||fe cyc|e phases most ||ke|y to resu|t |n damages and ||ab|||ty |ssues |n the
near future that cou|d be traced back to the supp||ers of the equ|pment, mater|a|s and serv|ces. The
decomm|ss|on|ng phase and |ong-term waste d|sposa| are covered on|y br|ef|y (see Box 1} because there |s
||tt|e commerc|a| exper|ence of decomm|ss|on|ng and the f|e|d of compan|es |nvo|ved |s not we|| estab||shed.
A|so decomm|ss|on|ng and waste d|sposa| are |ess ||ke|y to resu|t |n short-term damage and ||ab|||ty |ssues,
even though waste d|sposa| |n part|cu|ar can cause damages for future generat|ons.
A nuc|ear power p|ant |s, on a number of cr|ter|a, very d|fferent to any other p|ece of |ndustr|a| equ|pment. lts
un|que features |nc|ude:
N(D0+4 30Y"&30'0<+$. A fa||ure at any stage |n the ||fe cyc|e of a nuc|ear power p|ant from start of
construct|on to comp|et|on of decomm|ss|on|ng cou|d have catastroph|c consequences far beyond the
bounds of the p|ant.
6*$+. The cost of a new nuc|ear power p|ant |s |n the order $10bn S do||ars. The cost of
decomm|ss|on|ng a p|ant |s not we|| estab||shed because there |s ||tt|e |f any representat|ve exper|ence
of fu||y decomm|ss|on|ng a fu||-s|ze commerc|a| p|ant, and many of the key operat|ons requ|red - for
examp|e, robot|c cutt|ng up of h|gh|y contam|nated mater|a|s - have not been demonstrated.
P)(<+ )&D0+&'0. The t|me from start of construct|on (typ|ca||y 5-10 years to reach commerc|a| operat|on},
through operat|on (typ|ca||y expected to be 40-60 years} to comp|et|on of decomm|ss|on|ng (expected
to be up to 100 years from end of operat|on to re|ease of s|te for unrestr|cted use} cou|d be |n excess of
150 years. ln add|t|on, the h|gh|y rad|oact|ve waste produced |n a nuc|ear power p|ant w||| need to be
safeguarded for hundreds of thousands of years.
6*'7)0/&+4. A nuc|ear power p|ant compr|ses a vast number of components and mater|a|s, many of
wh|ch are cr|t|ca| for safety and re||ab|||ty. Many parts of the p|ant are d|ff|cu|t to access once the p|ant has
been comm|ss|oned, and check|ng bu||d qua||ty or mak|ng mod|f|cat|ons may be effect|ve|y |mposs|b|e.
The nuc|ear power p|ant
supp|y cha|n
by Professor Stephen Thomas
=3
chapter +%300
5: !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
S6T +
Decomm|ss|on|ng
Decomm|ss|on|ng |s the |east proven of the three stages |n the ||fe cyc|e of a nuc|ear power p|ant. lt |s
convent|ona||y d|v|ded |nto three phases w|th per|ods of surve|||ance and storage |n between.
Phase 1 ma|n|y |nvo|ves the remova| of the spent fue|, wh|ch |s dea|t w|th under the second (O&M}
stage. Th|s |s an operat|on that has been carr|ed out throughout the ||fe of the p|ant and |s, therefore,
techno|og|ca||y we|| proven. Once the fue| has been removed, the vast major|ty of the rad|oact|v|ty has
been removed from the p|ant and the p|ant no |onger needs to be staffed as for an operat|ng reactor
because there |s no |onger any r|sk of a cr|t|ca||ty. There |s, therefore, an |ncent|ve to comp|ete th|s
operat|on qu|ck|y. Even though the vast major|ty of the rad|oact|v|ty |s |n the fue|, the rema|n|ng structure
|s very hazardous and exposure to |t wou|d be damag|ng to hea|th.
Phase 2 |nvo|ves the remova| of the uncontam|nated structures, |eav|ng ma|n|y the reactor. Th|s |s
essent|a||y a norma| demo||t|on job and |s not therefore techno|og|ca||y nove|. There |s no part|cu|ar
|ncent|ve to carry out the job qu|ck|y, a|though once |t |s done, the rema|n|ng p|ant |s much cheaper
and eas|er to mon|tor because the contam|nated components can be sea|ed off and made |arge|y
|naccess|b|e.
Phase 3 |nvo|ves the cutt|ng up and d|sposa| of the contam|nated structures. lt |s ||ke|y to requ|re robot|c
techn|ques, not yet proven, and w||| generate a s|gn|f|cant quant|ty of rad|oact|ve waste. There |s ||tt|e
representat|ve exper|ence of phase 3, |nvo|v|ng a fu||-s|ze reactor that has comp|eted a fu|| operat|ng ||fe
(those ret|red ear|y w||| be much |ess contam|nated and, therefore, eas|er to decomm|ss|on}.
The lnternat|ona| Atom|c Energy Agency |dent|f|es three strateg|es for decomm|ss|on|ng: |mmed|ate
d|smant||ng; 'safestor" (enc|osure for severa| decades pr|or to phase 3}; and entombment.
1
The th|rd,
wh|ch |nvo|ves cover|ng over the p|ant, does not appear to be an opt|on that any country has adopted.
ln Europe, France, K, lta|y and Spa|n have not started phase 3 at any of the|r ret|red p|ants. On|y
Germany has exper|ence of phase 3, ma|n|y at the f|ve reactors |n former East Germany at the
Gre|fswa|d s|te.
ln the S, 22 commerc|a| reactors have been ret|red and of these 12 are us|ng the 'safestor` approach
and, therefore, have no exper|ence of phase 3. Of the 10 go|ng for |mmed|ate d|smant||ng, on|y
seven are commerc|a|-s|ze reactors (100MW} and most of these had not operated for a fu|| ||fe, so
commerc|a| exper|ence |s m|n|ma|.
2
chapter +%300
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer 58
chapter +%300
H00B D*3 "$03 $#&))$. The re||ab|||ty and safety of a nuc|ear power p|ant depends cruc|a||y on the user
(|.e. the operator} prov|d|ng except|ona||y h|gh-qua||ty sk|||s for operat|ons and ma|ntenance, and for
manag|ng contractors |nvo|ved |n construct|on, ma|ntenance and decomm|ss|on|ng.
L(3=0 ('*"<+ *D $&+0 F*3#. Most of the cost of construct|on of a nuc|ear power p|ant |s |ncurred at the
s|te, and re|at|ve|y ||tt|e |n the more contro||ed env|ronment of a factory. Th|s prov|des a part|cu|ar cha||enge
for the management of the construct|on process.
The ut|||ty (owner/operator} bears u|t|mate respons|b|||ty for a p|ant. lnternat|ona| convent|ons (the Par|s
and v|enna Oonvent|ons and the Par|s/Brusse|s protoco|} channe| ||ab|||ty for th|rd-party damage to the
operator of a p|ant, and ||m|t the ||ab|||ty of the operator to an amount (on the order of $1bn} that |s very sma||
|n compar|son w|th the potent|a| costs of a major acc|dent.
3
ln genera|, under these convent|ons supp||ers
respons|b|e for des|gn, construct|on and ma|ntenance of a nuc|ear p|ant cannot be he|d ||ab|e for damages
ar|s|ng from the|r work.
On|y |n lnd|a has supp||er ||ab|||ty been a part|cu|ar |ssue of debate, resu|t|ng |n the O|v|| ||ab|||ty for Nuc|ear
Damage Act, 2010. The Act p|aces respons|b|||ty for any nuc|ear acc|dent w|th the operator and ||m|ts tota|
||ab|||ty to 300 m||||on Spec|a| Draw|ng R|ghts (SDR} (about t300m}. However, the Act a||ows the operator
to have |ega| recourse to the supp||er for up to 80 years after a p|ant starts up |f the 'nuc|ear |nc|dent has
resu|ted as a consequence of an act of a supp||er or h|s emp|oyee, wh|ch |nc|udes supp|y of equ|pment or
mater|a| w|th patent or |atent defects [or| sub-standard serv|ces". Th|s potent|a| supp||er ||ab|||ty may mean
orders for nuc|ear power p|ants for lnd|a from fore|gn supp||ers w||| not be commerc|a||y feas|b|e.
4

Deta||s of the nuc|ear ||ab|||ty convent|ons and |aws and the|r |mp||cat|ons on the nuc|ear sector are covered
|n Ohapter 2
5
. lt |s c|ear that the current nuc|ear ||ab|||ty convent|ons protect the |ndustry by exc|ud|ng
supp||er ||ab|||ty from the f|nanc|a| consequences of a nuc|ear acc|dent, and by ||m|t|ng ||ab|||ty for operators.
No other |ndustry enjoys th|s |eve| of protect|on from the consequences of |ts act|ons.
Th|s chapter exp|ores the |nvo|vement of supp||ers throughout the ||fet|me of a nuc|ear reactor, and the|r
respons|b|||t|es |n terms of nuc|ear r|sks. R|sks of nuc|ear acc|dents are not on|y caused by the reactor
operat|on, but des|gn cho|ces and construct|on qua||ty are a|so of cr|t|ca| |mportance. For examp|e, as was
c|ear|y demonstrated by the Fukush|ma d|saster, the character|st|cs of a nuc|ear s|te need to be accurate|y
assessed so the p|ant can be des|gned and bu||t to res|st any cred|b|e cond|t|ons such as earthquakes,
f|ood|ng etc.
5, !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
N*"3109 S Boyark|n 'Presentat|on to the 7th Energy Forum` Eastern lnst|tute, Sopot, Nov 29-30, 2012
>M, 6*<$+3"1+&*<
The construct|on of a nuc|ear power p|ant can be d|v|ded |nto three ma|n categor|es of act|v|ty:
des|gn, eng|neer|ng and procurement;
supp|y of equ|pment (e.g. the reactor vesse|}, raw mater|a|s (e.g. stee| and concrete} and bas|c goods (e.g.
cab||ng and p|pework}; and
management and execut|on of on-s|te construct|on (c|v|| eng|neer|ng}.
A breakdown of the construct|on cost of a nuc|ear power p|ant, a Pressur|sed Water Reactor (PWR}, |s
shown |n Tab|e 3. The PWR |s the most w|de|y used des|gn |n the wor|d. Th|s examp|e re|ates to a Russ|an
PWR reactor des|gn ca||ed vvER. D|fferent techno|og|es, such as the other ma|n des|gn, the Bo|||ng Water
Reactor (BWR}, w||| have a somewhat d|fferent breakdown of costs, as w||| other vendors` des|gns of a PWR,
but th|s breakdown w||| be reasonab|y representat|ve of other des|gns and vendors. What exact|y |s |nc|uded
|n each category |s not c|ear. For examp|e, |t |s not c|ear what category arch|tect eng|neer|ng fa||s |nto: des|gn
of the overa|| des|gn, exc|ud|ng the nuc|ear steam-supp|y system
6
(NSSS}, or the supp|y of the reactor
vesse|. However, the key po|nts are that the des|gn and supp|y of the NSSS represents on|y a sma|| fract|on,
about 15%, of the cost of a p|ant. The cost |s dom|nated by on-s|te eng|neer|ng, such as construct|on,
cab||ng, and |nsta||at|on.
Nuc|ear Eng|neer|ng lnternat|ona|`s Yearbook prov|des a somewhat d|fferent breakdown of the e|ements,
and for each reactor, names the supp||er of the serv|ce. Tab|e 4 |||ustrates the d|vers|ty of arrangements for a
range of nuc|ear power p|ants. lt shows f|ve p|ants ordered |n d|fferent eras, |n d|fferent countr|es and under
d|fferent procurement ph||osoph|es. The owner |s genera||y the operator of the p|ant. Where a p|ant |s owned
by more than one company, one |s des|gnated as the operator of the p|ant or a spec|a| company |s set up
to operate the p|ant (e.g. Borsse|e, the Nether|ands}. The ma|n contractor |s norma||y known as the vendor
and these are we||-known names w|th a |ong h|story |n the nuc|ear sector. However, somet|mes ownersh|p
R(C)0 >9
Oost breakdown
of a nuc|ear
power p|ant
chapter +%300
;1+&2&+4 Z *D 7)(<+ 1*$+ P*$$&C)0 $"77)&03
Reactor des|gn ? vendor
NSSS supp|y 15 vendor, spec|a||st supp||ers
Arch|tect eng|neer|ng ? vendor, arch|tect eng|neer, ut|||ty
O|v|| eng|neer|ng 50 O|v|| eng|neer, ut|||ty
E|ectr|ca| equ|pment 9 Spec|a||st supp||er
Turb|ne generator 6 Spec|a||st supp||er
va|ves 6 Spec|a||st supp||er
lnstrumentat|on & contro| 6 vendor, spec|a||st supp||er
Other equ|pment 5 Spec|a||st supp||ers
Ooo||ng 3 Spec|a||st supp||ers
Fue| ? vendor, spec|a||st supp||er
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer 5>
R(C)0 5:
Supp||ers of
serv|ces for
se|ected nuc|ear
power p|ants.
N*"3109 Nuc|ear Eng|neer|ng lnternat|ona| (2011}. Wor|d nuc|ear energy handbook. G|oba| Trade Med|a.
chapter +%300
!"#"$%&'( 8 6*)"'C&( N%&< [*3& 5 \('7&0330 8 V*3$$0)0 \*0) >
6*"<+34 Japan SA Korea France Nether|ands Be|g|um
]0(3 *D
*3B03
1966 1971 2007 1973 1969 1974
6*''031&()
*703(+&*<
1971 1984 2014 1980 1973 1982
SF<03 Tokyo
E|ectr|c
Energy NW KHNP EDF Essent/De|ta E|ectrabe|
S703(+*3 Tokyo
E|ectr|c
Energy NW KHNP EDF EPZ E|ectrabe|
^(&<
1*<+3(1+*3
GE GE Doosan Framatome KW Framaceco
;31%&+01+
0<=&<003
GE Burns & Roe KOPEO EDF KW Tractebe|
_0(1+*3
$4$+0'
GE Getsco GE Doosan Framatome KW Framaceco
_0(1+*3
20$$0)
lHl GE
Getsco
OB&l Doosan Framatome RDM OOP/Fram
6*30
&<+03<()$
GE GE Doosan Framatome
Oreusot
Bors|g Fram/AOE
!&3$+ D"0) GE GE KNF FBFO/Fram KW FBFO/Fram
N+0('
3(&$&<=
GE, Getsco GE Not known Framatome Ba|cke OOP
R"3C&<0
=0<03(+*3
GE West|nghouse Doosan A|sthom S|emens A|sthom/
AOEO
6&2&)
0<=&<003&<=
GE, Getsco Bechte| Not known GOMB Bredero AMGO
55 !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
!"#$%&' !"#
changes and capab|||t|es move. For examp|e, the ma|n contractor for Doe| 3 (Be|g|um} was formed by a
consort|um of Framatome (France, |ater known as Areva}, AOEO and Oocker|||. Ne|ther of the |atter two
compan|es now ex|sts |n anyth|ng ||ke the|r form when the p|ant was ordered.
A ser|es of f|ve p|ants ordered by the Wash|ngton Pub||c Power Supp|y System became so notor|ous for
cost overruns that on|y one of the f|ve p|ants - the Oo|umb|a power p|ant - was actua||y comp|eted. The
owner`s ph||osophy was dom|nated by compet|t|on cons|derat|ons and a|| act|v|t|es poss|b|e were put out
to compet|t|ve tender. By compar|son, the Korean p|ant, Sh|n Kor| 4, was supp||ed by a much t|ghter supp|y
cha|n, dom|nated by the ut|||ty, Korean Hydro & Nuc|ear Power Oompany (KHNP} and the ma|n equ|pment
supp||er and vendor, Doosan w|th other serv|ces supp||ed by Korean 'nat|ona| champ|on" compan|es such
as Korean Nuc|ear Fue| (KNF} and Korean Power Eng|neer|ng Oompany (KOPEO}. A s|m||ar|y concentrated
p|cture wou|d app|y for p|ants bu||t |n France. ln the Nether|ands, the Borsse|e p|ant was supp||ed by KW
(Germany}, a company dom|nated by S|emens, wh|ch spec|a||sed |n des|gn rather than equ|pment supp|y,
w|th the notab|e except|on of the turb|ne generator. The Doe| p|ant was ordered before the French nuc|ear
power p|ant supp|y |ndustry had been fu||y estab||shed so the equ|pment and serv|ces came from a w|de
range of supp||ers, most of wh|ch do not now ex|st |n anyth|ng ||ke the|r form then.
,I)I+ -"8/F=U "=F/=""$/=F &=0 ;$62%$"?"=:
The des|gn, procurement and eng|neer|ng act|v|t|es can be sp||t |nto three ro|es: the reactor vendor,
the arch|tect eng|neer (A-E}, and the eng|neer|ng, procurement and construct|on (EPO} contractor. The
boundar|es between these ro|es are somet|mes b|urred, and there |s over|ap between the set of compan|es
|nvo|ved. For examp|e, a reactor vendor ||ke M|tsub|sh| cou|d carry out a|| three act|v|t|es, wh||e Bechte|
cou|d be the A-E and the EPO contractor. The supp|y of the f|rst fue| charge |s convent|ona||y |nc|uded |n the
construct|on cost, but the supp||ers are the same as those |nvo|ved |n supp|y|ng new fue| dur|ng the ||fe of
the p|ant and are cons|dered |n the Operat|ons and Ma|ntenance (O&M} sect|on.
>M,M8M8 W0<B*3$
The vendor market |n |ts current form was |arge|y set by 2006 when the West|nghouse (based |n S} nuc|ear
d|v|s|on was taken over by Tosh|ba (Japan}. The wor|d market, wh|ch by then was, and rema|ns, extreme|y
sma||, was dom|nated by three estab||shed compan|es w|th markets |n the West: Tosh|ba, supp|y|ng PWR
and BWR techno|ogy; Areva (France}, supp|y|ng PWR and, potent|a||y BWR techno|ogy; and H|tach|-GE
supp|y|ng BWR techno|ogy. Three further supp||ers, Atomstroyexport (ASE, Russ|a}, supp|y|ng vvER (the
Russ|an vers|on of the PWR} techno|ogy; Oh|na, supp|y|ng PWRs; and Korea, supp|y|ng PWRs are now an
|ncreas|ng presence on the wor|d market. Atom|c Energy of Oanada |td (AEO|}, now pr|vat|sed and owned
by the Oanad|an company SNO |ava||n, and M|tsub|sh| cont|nue to offer p|ants but w|th ||m|ted chance of
success. lnd|a supp||es |ts home market w|th sca|ed-up vers|ons of the Oanad|an-des|gned OAND reactor
|t |mported |n the 1960s, but there appears no prospect of |t be|ng ab|e to export these des|gns. Oh|na |s the
most comp|ex and potent|a||y the most s|gn|f|cant of the new supp||ers, and |t |s dea|t w|th separate|y. Tab|e
5 g|ves an overv|ew of the des|gns ava||ab|e and the|r status.
7os||oa
ln 2006, Tosh|ba bought the West|nghouse reactor d|v|s|on from Br|t|sh Nuc|ear Fue|s ||m|ted, a pub||c|y
owned nuc|ear company. By then, West|nghouse |nc|uded the reactor supp|y d|v|s|ons of Oombust|on
Eng|neer|ng (S} and ABB (Sw|tzer|and/Germany/Sweden}, wh|ch was formed from the merger of the
reactor d|v|s|ons of Brown Bover| and Asea. p to that t|me Tosh|ba (and |ts Japanese compet|tor H|tach|}
had BWR techno|ogy ||cences w|th GE, and orders for Japan were sp||t between H|tach| and Tosh|ba.
Another des|gn, Advanced Bo|||ng Water Reactor (ABWR} techno|ogy, was jo|nt|y deve|oped by GE, H|tach|
and Tosh|ba. Tosh|ba ended |ts ||cence agreement w|th GE, and |s now offer|ng ABWR techno|ogy |n
compet|t|on w|th H|tach|-GE.
chapter +%300
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer 5A
Tosh|ba`s ABWR has been chosen for the S South Texas project, a|though |t |s un||ke|y that th|s project w|||
proceed. The ABWR rece|ved approva| from the S regu|ator, the Nuc|ear Regu|atory Oomm|ss|on (NRO},
|n 1997, wh|ch exp|red |n 2012. Tosh|ba app||ed for the approva| to be renewed |n 2010, and has subm|tted
proposed des|gn mod|f|cat|ons so that the des|gn meets current standards, but approva| has not been g|ven
yet. ln January 2013, there was no NRO target date for comp|et|on of th|s rev|ew.
The other ma|n des|gn Tosh|ba offers apart from the ABWR |s the AP1000, a|ready under construct|on |n
Oh|na (two each at Ha|yang and Sanmen} s|nce 2009, and f|rst concrete |s expected |n 2013 for reactors |n
the S (two each at vogt|e and Summer}.
ln December 2012, Tosh|ba announced |t was seek|ng to se|| a 36% stake |n |ts West|nghouse d|v|s|on. lt
was reported that three compan|es, |nc|ud|ng Oh|cago Br|dge and lron Oompany (OBl} - a Dutch-owned
company based |n the S - were |nterested |n purchas|ng a 20% stake, and three other compan|es were
|nterested |n a 16% stake. Tosh|ba was reported to be expect|ng u|t|mate|y to reta|n on|y a 51% stake |n
West|nghouse.
7

/|e.a
Areva NP was formed |n 2002 from the nuc|ear d|v|s|ons of Framatome and S|emens. Framatome was by
then part of the Areva group, |arge|y owned (92%} by the French government. Areva (66%} and S|emens
(34%} merged the|r reactor supp|y bus|nesses to form a jo|nt venture, Areva NP. ln 2009, S|emens
announced |ts |ntent|on to w|thdraw from th|s jo|nt venture and Areva NP |s now who||y owned by Areva. lt
offers the European Pressur|sed water Reactor (EPR}, the Atmea1 des|gn (|n a jo|nt venture w|th M|tsub|sh|,
Atmea} and potent|a||y, the AOPR1000 |n jo|nt venture w|th OGNPO (Oh|na}. lt |s a|so offer|ng a BWR des|gn,
Kerena, a|though th|s |s not ava||ab|e for purchase yet.
chapter +%300
R(C)0 A9 Ourrent
Generat|on
lll/lll+ des|gns on
offer.*
W0<B*3 \0$&=< N()0$ `0<03&1 302&0F
R*$%&C(ab0$+&<=%*"$0
cX(7(<adNe
AP1000 (PWR} SA (2}, Oh|na (4} S comp|ete 12/11. K
process suspended
R*$%&C(ab0$+&<=%*"$0
cX(7(<e
ABWR (BWR} Ear||er mode| to Japan (4} S approva| exp|red 2012.
Renewa| app||ed for 10/10.
No comp|et|on date spec|f|ed
f&+(1%& `. cX(7(<adNe ESBWR (BWR} - S awa|t|ng f|na| ru|e-mak|ng
f&+(1%& `. cX(7(<adNe ABWR (BWR} Ear||er mode| to Japan (2},
Ta|wan (2}
S approva| exp|red 2012.
Renewa| app||ed for 12/10.
No comp|et|on date spec|f|ed
;302( c!3(<10e EPR (PWR} F|n|and (1}, France (1},
Oh|na (2}
K approva| 2013 S approva|
2014
;302( c!3(<10e ATMEA1 (PWR} - Not started
;302( c!3(<10e Kerena (BWR} - Not started
;N. c_"$$&(e AES-92 lnd|a (2} Not known
;N. c_"$$&(e AES-2006 Russ|a (5}, Turkey (4},
v|etnam (4}
Not known
^&+$"C&$%& cX(7(<e APWR - S approva| 2015
[*30( AP1400 Korea (3}, AE (4} Not started
;.6L Enhanced Oandu 6 - Not started
N*"310: Author`s research.
* 7|e |0c|ea| ||d0s||, |as oee| de.e|oo|| |0c|ea| |ec||o|o, /o| decades. Ge|e|a||o| ||| a|d |||+ des||s a|e a||eed|, |mo|o.eme||s o|
||e Ge|e|a||o| || de|s|, o0| ||e d|s|||c||o| /|om Ge|e|a||o| || |s a|o|||a|,. Ge|e|a||o| ||, ||e mos| commo| des||, was de.e|ooed || ||e
70s a|d c0s, Ge|e|a||o| | || ||e 50s a|d 50s.
5E !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
S6T )
The AE nuc|ear order from Korea
ln December 2009, the AE ordered from Korea four nuc|ear reactors us|ng AP1400 techno|ogy,
beat|ng oppos|t|on from consort|a |ed by EDF (|nc|ud|ng GDF Suez, Areva, Tota|} w|th the EPR and GE-
H|tach| (ABWR}.
14
The contract |s w|th the Korea E|ectr|c Power Oorp (KEPOO} to bu||d and operate the
p|ants, the f|rst com|ng on ||ne |n 2017 and the |ast by 2020. KEPOO w||| prov|de des|gn, construct|on
and ma|ntenance for the nuc|ear reactor and w||| subcontract some of the work to equ|pment supp||ers
such as Hyunda|, Doosan and Samsung. The terms of the dea| and what |s |nc|uded are not c|ear
a|though the contract |s reported to be worth $20.4bn S do||ars. The Korean b|d was reported to be
$16bn |ower than the French b|d, and the GE-H|tach| b|d was reported to be s|gn|f|cant|y h|gher than
the French b|d.
15
lt appears not to be a who|e project 'turnkey" (f|xed pr|ce} dea|. Korean compan|es w|||
ho|d an equ|ty stake |n a jo|nt venture w|th AE pub||c compan|es, wh|ch w||| operate the p|ants after
the|r comp|et|on. Oonstruct|on work on the f|rst of these at the Barakh s|te started |n Ju|y 2012.
Other export markets Korea has competed |n, so far unsuccessfu||y, |nc|ude Turkey and Jordan. The
des|gn be|ng bu||t |n Korea and AE, w|thout a 'core-catcher" and a 'doub|e conta|nment", probab|y
wou|d not be ||censab|e |n Europe. Areva was part|cu|ar|y b|tter about |os|ng the tender to a des|gn |t
c|a|med had much |ower safety standards than the|r EPR. The|r then OEO, Anne |auvergeon, ||kened
the APR1400 to 'a car w|thout seat be|ts and a|rbags".
16
Neverthe|ess, AE`s new|y formed Federa|
Author|ty for Nuc|ear Regu|at|on (FANR} has requ|red changes to the reference des|gn (the South
Korean p|ants Sh|n Kor|-3 and -4} to ref|ect the |essons from Fukush|ma. lt had not been determ|ned by
September 2012 who wou|d pay these extra costs.
17

Some of the f|nance for the AE project came from the S Exlm bank on the bas|s of the benef|ts to
the West|nghouse company (owned by Tosh|ba}, now owner of the techno|ogy ||cence fo||ow|ng the
absorpt|on of the Oombust|on Eng|neer|ng nuc|ear d|v|s|on |nto the West|nghouse reactor bus|ness,
even though th|s |s now owned by Tosh|ba. West|nghouse w||| prov|de the reactor coo|ant pumps,
reactor components, contro|s, eng|neer|ng serv|ces, and tra|n|ng.
18
The Ex|m bank prov|ded a $2bn
d|rect |oan to the Barakah One Oompany of the AE to underwr|te the export of Amer|can equ|pment
and expert|se. There |s a |ack of c|ar|ty over the ownersh|p of Barakah One.
19
The partners |n the project
are KEPOO and Em|rates Nuc|ear Energy Oorporat|on (ENEO}. KEPOO |s ent|t|ed to take a share of
ownersh|p |n the Barakah p|ant but, by September 2012, |t was not c|ear whether they had taken one.
chapter +%300
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer 5I
|||ac||-GE
After the take-over of West|nghouse by Tosh|ba and |ts emergence as a compet|ng supp||er of BWR
techno|ogy, GE and H|tach| set up jo|nt ventures |n 2007. GE-H|tach|, 60% GE, 40% H|tach|, covers |ts S
operat|ons and H|tach|-GE, 80% H|tach|, 20% GE, for the rest of the wor|d
8
. Both jo|nt ventures market the|r
BWR des|gns, the Econom|c S|mp||f|ed Bo|||ng Water Reactor (ESBWR} and the ABWR.
The ESBWR |s a pass|ve-safety des|gn that was reported|y near comp|et|on of |ts regu|atory rev|ew |n the
S |n 2012. However, there was a de|ay and |t |s not c|ear when f|na| approva| w||| be g|ven.
9
Wh||e there
was some |nterest among S ut|||t|es, none of them appear ||ke|y to proceed and one sw|tched to the o|der
ABWR des|gn supp||ed by Tosh|ba.
The ABWR rece|ved approva| |n 1997 from the S regu|ator, the NRO, wh|ch exp|red |n 2012. ||ke
Tosh|ba, H|tach|-GE app||ed for the approva| to be renewed |n 2010, and has subm|tted proposed des|gn
mod|f|cat|ons so that the des|gn meets current standards, but approva| has not been g|ven yet. ln January
2013, there was no NRO target date for comp|et|on of th|s rev|ew. H|tach|-GE was chosen as the preferred
supp||er for a reactor to be bu||t |n ||thuan|a, but an order now seems un||ke|y after a referendum on nuc|ear
power |n October 2012 came down dec|s|ve|y aga|nst |t.
10
ln 2012, H|tach|-GE bought Hor|zon, a jo|nt
venture set up by two German ut|||t|es, RWE and EON, to bu||d nuc|ear power p|ants |n the K.
11

|E|CO/Doosa|
After buy|ng p|ants from West|nghouse, Framatome and AEO|, the Korean nuc|ear |ndustry (made up of the
ut|||ty, Korean E|ectr|c Power Oompany and the equ|pment supp||er Doosan} began to take a |arger part |n
nuc|ear orders for Korea us|ng Oombust|on Eng|neer|ng techno|ogy. ln|t|a||y they used an o|d des|gn, System
80, wh|ch evo|ved |nto the|r OPR (Opt|m|sed Power Reactor} of 1,000 megawatts (MW} w|th 12 orders for
Korea. The |ater Oombust|on Eng|neer|ng System 80+ des|gn rece|ved gener|c approva| from the NRO, S
regu|atory author|ty, |n 1997 (th|s exp|red |n 2012} and the Korean nuc|ear |ndustry bought a techno|ogy
||cence for th|s des|gn from West|nghouse.
For the future, the most |mportant Korean des|gn |s the AP1400 der|ved, under ||cence from Oombust|on
Eng|neer|ng, from the System 80+ des|gn. The ||cence now res|des w|th Tosh|ba/West|nghouse, a|though
they are no |onger market|ng the des|gn. Oonstruct|on work |n Korea on the f|rst two un|ts of th|s des|gn
(Sh|n-Kor| 3 & 4} started |n 2009. Oonstruct|on on a th|rd (Sh|n-|ch|n} started |n 2012. Korea emerged as a
potent|a||y s|gn|f|cant exporter of nuc|ear techno|ogy w|th |ts w|nn|ng of a compet|t|ve tender |n AE |n 2009
(see Box 2}. ln 2010, Korea c|a|med |t wou|d subm|t the AP1400 to the S NRO for gener|c des|gn rev|ew |n
2012.
12
By November 2012, the target date for subm|ss|on was March 2013.
13
/|om5||o,Exoo|| (/5E
After near|y two decades of ||m|ted market|ng effort fo||ow|ng the Ohernoby| d|saster, the Russ|an nuc|ear
|ndustry began to compete aggress|ve|y |n export markets w|th |ts vvER techno|ogy, buoyed by the
resumpt|on of order|ng |n Russ|a. S|nce 2007, construct|on of seven new reactors has started |n Russ|a, f|ve
us|ng ASE`s |atest des|gn, AES-2006, and two us|ng an ear||er des|gn. For some markets, such as Jordan, |t
|s offer|ng the ear||er AES-92, a|ready bu||t |n lnd|a (Kudanku|am} wh|ch was awa|t|ng commerc|a| operat|on
|n January 2013.
/|om|c E|e|, o/ Ca|ada ||d (/EC|
Atom|c Energy of Oanada |td cont|nued to w|n a tr|ck|e of orders for |ts OAND reactors from 1980
onwards, for examp|e |n Oh|na and Korea, a|though both countr|es seem to have abandoned further
orders of the OAND. W|th no orders for |ts home market for 30 years and ||m|ted future prospects, AEO|,
prev|ous|y owned by the Oanad|an federa| government, was so|d to the Oanad|an eng|neer|ng company
SNO |ava||n for a m|n|ma| amount ($15m Oanad|an do||ars} |n 2011.
chapter +%300
5? !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
Wh||e |t st||| appears |n b|dd|ng ||sts, for examp|e to Jordan and Roman|a, the prospects of further orders are
||m|ted and the techno|og|es |t offers are based on des|gns f|rst offered more than 35 years ago. lt appears to
have abandoned or at |east put on |ce |ts new generat|on des|gns, the AOR700 and AOR1000.
/||s0o|s||
After the purchase of the West|nghouse reactor bus|ness by |ts Japanese compet|tor, Tosh|ba, |n 2006,
cont|nu|ng a re|at|onsh|p w|th West|nghouse was not v|ab|e for M|tsub|sh| and |t began to market reactors
|ndependent|y, |n|t|a||y |ts APWR des|gn. Th|s had been under deve|opment s|nce 1980 but prom|ses of
orders for Japan had not been fu|f|||ed. Two p|anned orders (Tsuruga} have been cont|nua||y de|ayed and may
not proceed after the Fukush|ma d|saster. Further mod|f|cat|ons were undertaken and the APWR (1,700MW}
began the process of gener|c rev|ew by the NRO |n 2007. ln 2012, the NRO was forecast|ng comp|et|on of
the rev|ew |n 2015, but the one S ut|||ty, |um|nant, |nterested |n the des|gn |s not c|ose to order|ng the two
un|ts (Oa||away} |t p|ans.
20
The jo|nt venture, Atmea, between M|tsub|sh| Heavy lndustr|es and Areva was
announced |n 2007, when they stated that a 1,000MW des|gn, to be ca||ed Atmea1, wou|d be deve|oped
us|ng techno|ogy from both compan|es. By 2012, there was some |nterest |n th|s des|gn from markets such
as Jordan, Turkey and Argent|na, but the deta||ed des|gn work had not started |n 2012 and the des|gn has not
started a gener|c rev|ew anywhere yet. nt|| such a rev|ew |s comp|ete, export|ng w||| be d|ff|cu|t.
C|||a
21
Oh|na |s potent|a||y the most |mportant new vendor to emerge on the wor|d reactor market. After near|y
two decades of amb|t|ous forecasts of nuc|ear order|ng not be|ng ach|eved, Oh|na began to order |arge
vo|umes of p|ant |n 2008. From 2008-10, construct|on was started on 25 un|ts. Of these, 19 were supp||ed
by Oh|nese vendors, 15 us|ng the OPR1000 des|gn and two us|ng the s|m||ar ONP1000 des|gn and two
us|ng the sma||er ONP600 des|gn. lt a|so |mported four reactors from Tosh|ba/West|nghouse (AP1000} and
two from Areva (EPR}, w|th strong techno|ogy-transfer prov|s|ons. lts o|der ONP300 and ONP600 des|gns
appear to st||| be ava||ab|e. Oonstruct|on was started on two export orders to Pak|stan for the ONP300
des|gn |n 2011 and construct|on on two ONP600 reactors |n Oh|na was started |n 2010.
R(C)0 E9
Oh|nese-
des|gned
reactors
N*"310: Author`s research.
chapter +%300
W0<B*3 \0$&=< @<+0))01+"() 73*703+4 N()0$ ^(3#0+$ N+(+"$
OGN OPR1000 ||censed from Areva 18 Oh|na St||| ava||ab|e
OGN AOPR1000 Jo|nt deve|opment
w|th Areva?
0 Oh|na + Not ||censed
ONNO ONP300 lnd|genous 5 Pak|stan, Oh|na St||| ava||ab|e
ONNO AOP300 lnd|genous 0 Oh|na + Not ||censed
ONNO ONP600 lnd|genous 6 Oh|na St||| ava||ab|e
ONNO AOP600 lnd|genous 0 Oh|na + Not ||censed
ONNO ONP1000 ||censed from Areva 2 Oh|na Deve|opment
stopped
ONNO AOP1000 lnd|genous 0 Oh|na + Not ||censed
SNPTO OAP1400 Jo|nt deve|opment w|th
West|nghouse
0 Oh|na + Not ||censed
The construct|on
and operat|ng
phases of a reactor
are most ||ke|y to
resu|t |n damages
that cou|d be traced
back to supp||ers.
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer 5K
chapter +%300
@'(=09 Nuc|ear
power p|ant B|b||s, |n
Germany, operated
by RWE. The power
p|ant produces
2525MW.
J

5
C
V
R

R
C
3
Q
L
K
H
N

G

W
B
3
M
>

G

Q
L
B
B
3
5
B
C
H
B
A: !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
There |s cons|derab|e deve|opment, not covered here, of fue|-cyc|e act|v|t|es and Oh|nese compan|es
have been act|ve buy|ng uran|um resources, for examp|e, |n Kazakhstan. The programme to deve|op h|gh-
temperature reactors |n Oh|na (us|ng the German pebb|e bed des|gn} was resumed |n January 2013 after a
de|ay fo||ow|ng the Fukush|ma d|saster w|th start of construct|on of a 200MW demonstrat|on p|ant at Sh|dao
Bay but th|s des|gn |s some way from commerc|a| dep|oyment.
22
Fast-reactor des|gns are a|so be|ng deve|oped but do not appear to be c|ose to commerc|a| dep|oyment, or a
h|gh pr|or|ty, and are a|so not d|scussed further. For the future, the most re|evant des|gns are Oh|nese des|gned
PWRs, the AP1000 and the EPR. Tab|e 6 shows the status of the des|gns a|ready bu||t and proposed for Oh|na.
7|e /0|0|e wo||d ma||e| /o| .e|do|s
The so-ca||ed 'nuc|ear rena|ssance", f|rst ta|ked about more than a decade ago, was expected to see a
rev|va| of nuc|ear order|ng |n the West, based on new reactor des|gns offered by the trad|t|ona| Western
vendors, for examp|e, Areva`s EPR, West|nghouse`s AP1000 and GE`s ESBWR. Th|s surge of orders |n the
West has not happened and the reactor market, |n terms of vendors and des|gns, |s dramat|ca||y d|fferent to
that of on|y a decade ago. The ma|n changes |nc|ude:
lncreased contro| of the ma|n vendors by Japanese compan|es. West|nghouse was taken over by
Tosh|ba; Tosh|ba has sp||t from GE and |s now compet|ng aga|nst |t for BWRs; H|tach| seems to dom|nate
the jo|nt ventures w|th GE for sa|es of BWRs; M|tsub|sh| |s try|ng to estab||sh |tse|f as a front||ne vendor
through |ts APWR and through |ts Atmea jo|nt venture w|th Areva;
Before the Fukush|ma d|saster, Japan seemed po|sed to make a major effort for the f|rst t|me to enter the
|nternat|ona| market w|th much stronger coord|nat|on and support from the Japanese government, for
examp|e, w|th |oan guarantees. lf th|s support |s not ma|nta|ned, |t |s not c|ear how successfu| Japanese
compan|es w||| be |n w|nn|ng exports;
Oh|na, w|th |ts comp|ete supp|y cha|n, has emerged as a potent|a||y |mportant vendor a|though, unt||
Oh|na resumes order|ng reactors fo||ow|ng |ts ha|t on orders after the Fukush|ma nuc|ear d|saster, |t w||| not
be c|ear wh|ch techno|ogy/techno|og|es w||| be offered. The opt|ons |nc|ude: the EPR and AP1000 under
||cence, the OAP1400 jo|nt|y w|th West|nghouse; a 1,000MW des|gn, yet to be def|ned jo|nt|y deve|oped
w|th Areva
23
; or |nd|genous des|gns, the AOP1000 and AOPR1000;
Korea has emerged as a g|oba| vendor of nuc|ear power p|ants w|th the w|nn|ng of a |arge order for |ts
AP1400 for AE;
Russ|a has moved outs|de |ts trad|t|ona| markets of Eastern Europe and former Sov|et Repub||cs to
markets |n deve|op|ng countr|ess, such as v|etnam. lt wou|d a|so ||ke to get a footho|d |n the West, for
examp|e, v|a entry to the K market;
lnd|a rema|ns a potent|a||y |arge market for reactors and has a reactor supp|y |ndustry but seems a |ong
way from be|ng ab|e to compete on |nternat|ona| markets.
5||/||| o/ |o|es
A key |ssue |n reactor orders |s the ava||ab|||ty of f|nance and |t |s now c|ear that, un|ess there |s a strong and
cred|b|e guarantee that fu|| cost recovery from consumers w||| be poss|b|e, reactor orders w||| on|y be poss|b|e
w|th state, or state-backed f|nance. vendors seem, for the f|rst t|me, w||||ng to take equ|ty stakes |n reactors.
Examp|es |nc|ude Russ|an compan|es |n Turkey, H|tach|-GE |n ||thuan|a, Oh|nese compan|es |n the K, Areva
|n the K and Korean compan|es |n the AE. Th|s further b|urs the ||ne between operators and supp||ers,
ra|s|ng add|t|ona| quest|ons about who carr|es respons|b|||ty and cou|d be he|d ||ab|e |n case of acc|dents.
lt rema|ns to be seen whether vendor ownersh|p of operat|ng p|ants |s a v|ab|e bus|ness mode|. As was
demonstrated by the co||apse of Br|t|sh Energy |n 2002, when a fa|| |n the who|esa|e e|ectr|c|ty pr|ce |ed to |t
reported|y |os|ng 2m a day,
24
e|ectr|c|ty generat|on |s a huge cash f|ow bus|ness and |f a project goes bad|y,
even a |arge vendor wou|d be |n ser|ous d|ff|cu|t|es.
chapter +%300
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer A8
ln Russ|a, the Turk|sh Akkuyu project for four reactors of Russ|an des|gn w||| be a Bu||d-Own-Operate (BOO}
dea|, the f|rst t|me th|s mode| has been used for a nuc|ear p|ant. The company that w||| own the p|ant |s a
Russ|an consort|um dom|nated by the Russ|an reactor supp|y company, Rosatom (92.85%} w|th m|nor
ho|d|ngs from lnter RAO (the Russ|an ut|||ty} and AtomStroyExport.
25

The Russ|an consort|um |s arrang|ng f|nanc|ng of the project, backed by a 15-year Power Purchase
Agreement (PPA} w|th Turkey`s state e|ectr|c|ty who|esa|er Tetas, for around ha|f the tota| output - 70% of
the f|rst two Akkuyu un|ts and 30% of the second two. The power |s to be so|d at a we|ghted average pr|ce
of $123.5/MWh, w|th a ce|||ng of $153/MWh.
26
lf construct|on costs overrun or |f operat|ng costs are h|gher
than expected, the Russ|an owners cou|d |ose |arge amounts of money. Where PPAs become uneconom|c,
the p|ant owners have typ|ca||y tr|ed to renegot|ate the terms, sh|ft|ng the r|sk to consumers.
ln ||thuan|a, H|tach|-GE was expect|ng to take 20% of the v|sag|nas p|ant compr|s|ng one ABWR. ||thuan|a
was expected to take 38% and |atv|an (22%} and Eston|an (20%} were expected to take the rest of the
equ|ty.
27
However, a referendum |n October 2012 before the agreement was f|na||sed was dec|s|ve|y
aga|nst the project, and there seems ||tt|e prospect |t w||| now go ahead. lt |s therefore not c|ear whether the
proposed mode| was v|ab|e.
ln the K, H|tach|-GE bought Hor|zon, a jo|nt venture set up by two German ut|||t|es, RWE and E.ON, to
bu||d nuc|ear power p|ants |n October 2012.
28
However, before H|tach|-GE can bu||d |n the K, the ABWR
w||| have to go through the K`s Gener|c Des|gn Assessment process, ||ke|y to take about f|ve years. So
|t |s too ear|y to say what the form of H|tach|-GE`s |nvo|vement |n the K wou|d be. Russ|an and Oh|nese
compan|es and Areva were a|so reported to have b|d for Hor|zon.
29

>M,M8M, ;31%&+01+ 0<=&<003&<=
The ro|e of arch|tect eng|neer|ng (A-E} |s part|cu|ar|y prom|nent |n the S where, |n the past, ut|||t|es have
not had the s|ze and capab|||ty to des|gn power p|ants of a|| types, and used spec|a||st arch|tect eng|neers
to |ntegrate the e|ements of a nuc|ear power p|ant |nto an overa|| des|gn. Most ut|||t|es had |ong-term
re|at|onsh|ps w|th the|r favoured A-E, wh|ch |n turn m|ght tend to use the same equ|pment vendor, and
nuc|ear power p|ants were bu||t us|ng the same mode|. Some of the |arger ut|||t|es, ||ke the Tennessee va||ey
Author|ty (TvA}, d|d the|r own A-E but for those that d|d not, about a dozen A-Es were |nvo|ved |n the S
nuc|ear power programme.
30
Some of these are st||| act|ve, such as Bechte|, wh||e others have ex|ted the
bus|ness, for examp|e Stone & Webster.
The |ack of standard|sat|on among S p|ants and cost overruns are often b|amed on the A-E, wh|ch
genera||y has no |ncent|ve to use standard|sed des|gns and |n some cases, s|mp|y produced poor des|gns.
ln some cases, the vendor takes th|s ro|e, for examp|e S|emens or Areva, wh||e |n others the ut|||ty takes the
ro|e, for examp|e EDF. One of the factors beh|nd the prob|ems at the O|k||uoto p|ant |n F|n|and (see 3.2.4} |s
often sa|d to be Areva`s |nexper|ence |n th|s ro|e
31
.
>M,M8M> .<=&<003&<=J 73*1"30'0<+J 1*<$+3"1+&*< c.P6e 1*<+3(1+*3$
32
The EPO ro|e of overa|| project management has become more prom|nent as attempts are made to
|ntroduce nuc|ear power |nto markets |n sma||er or |ess deve|oped countr|es where the ut|||ty may have
||m|ted capab|||ty and the |ndustr|a| base |s not very strong. An effect|ve EPO contractor |s ||ke|y to need
strong sk|||s |n project and construct|on management |n the nuc|ear |ndustry and from other comp|ex
projects, as we|| as good sk|||s |n procurement to ensure the comp|ex supp|y cha|n |s we|| managed.
The f|e|d of compan|es |nvo|ved |n EPO |nc|ude ut|||t|es such as Korean Hydro and Nuc|ear Power Oo
(not on|y for p|ants to be owned by themse|ves}, arch|tect-eng|neers such as Bechte|, spec|a||st nuc|ear
compan|es such as AtomTechnoProm and nuc|ear vendors, a|though th|s |s not common.
chapter +%300
A, !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
,I)I) BX%/;?"=: &=0 ?&:"$/&48 8%;;4'
33
The Wor|d Nuc|ear Assoc|at|on (WNA} portrays the supp|y cha|n as a pyram|d w|th s|x t|ers and |t g|ves two
examp|es of th|s cha|n.
34
From the bottom, these t|ers are:
Raw mater|a| supp||ers and m|ners (e.g. s||ver, z|nc etc};
Processors/fabr|cators (e.g. a||oys};
Sub-component supp||ers/d|str|butors (e.g. contro| rods and heavy forg|ngs};
Or|g|na| equ|pment manufacturers (e.g. rod c|uster contro| assemb|y};
System |ntegrators (e.g. reactor pressure vesse| and steam generator};
Techno|ogy vendor, supp||er of the nuc|ear steam-supp|y system (NSSS}.

A nuc|ear power p|ant conta|ns m||||ons of |tems, each w|th |ts own supp|y cha|n.
The major d|screte |tems of equ|pment |n a nuc|ear power p|ant are: the turb|ne generator; the reactor
pressure vesse|; the conta|nment structure; the reactor |nterna|s and reactor pumps; and va|ves. A|| these
|tems must be spec|f|ca||y des|gned for nuc|ear power p|ants.
35
The d|screte |tems of equ|pment can be
d|v|ded |nto three categor|es accord|ng to how safety-re|evant they are, and to how spec|f|c they are to a
part|cu|ar reactor des|gn:
Nuc|ear |ndustry-grade components spec|f|c to the reactor des|gn (e.g. the reactor pressure vesse|};
Nuc|ear |ndustry-grade components not spec|f|c to the des|gn (some va|ves and pumps}; and
Oommerc|a|-grade components (e.g. the turb|ne generator}.

The nuc|ear |ndustry-grade components spec|f|c to the reactor des|gn are near|y a|| |n the nuc|ear |s|and
- the reactor area where systems produc|ng heat, through nuc|ear react|on, de||ver heated water to the
convent|ona| |s|and, where e|ectr|c|ty |s produced. The nuc|ear |ndustry-grade components not spec|f|c
to the des|gn are found |n the nuc|ear |s|and, the convent|ona| |s|and and |n the ba|ance of the p|ant. The
commerc|a|-grade components are most|y |n the convent|ona| |s|and and the ba|ance of the p|ant, a|though
there are |mportant |tems, such as cranes and e|ectr|ca| power systems, |n the nuc|ear |s|and. Th|s means
that major systems compr|se |tems of d|ffer|ng grade, supp||ed by many d|fferent supp||ers.
ltems of safety s|gn|f|cance genera||y have to be produced |n a fac|||ty that has been cert|f|ed as meet|ng the
requ|red standards by a cred|b|e author|ty. For examp|e, |n the S, fac|||t|es have to be g|ven approva| by the
Amer|can Soc|ety of Mechan|ca| Eng|neers (ASME}. Sett|ng up product|on fac|||t|es was, therefore, a major
comm|tment for a component supp||er.
ln the ma|n per|od of nuc|ear order|ng |n the 1970s |n the S and from 1975-85 |n France, vendors and
supp||ers had a suff|c|ent vo|ume of orders to set up product|on-||ne fac|||t|es, but as order|ng rates have
fa||en, components have to |ncreas|ng|y be fabr|cated on a one-off bas|s, |ncreas|ng the|r cost. Regu|at|on
and cert|f|cat|on by, for examp|e ASME, shou|d ensure the qua||ty |s equ|va|ent.
Des|gn-spec|f|c nuc|ear |ndustry-grade components w||| genera||y have to be produced |n product|on
fac|||t|es des|gned to produce that spec|f|c |tem. When des|gns change, the fac|||t|es supp|y|ng the
equ|pment ||ke|y w||| a|so change. Th|s means that even when there |s a |arge and reasonab|y assured des|gn
for nuc|ear power p|ants, as for examp|e |n Oh|na, the supp|y cha|n may st||| not be adequate |f the des|gn to
be used has not been dec|ded. lf the des|gn changes, the supp||er w||| have to make major |nvestments |n
product|on fac|||t|es.
36
For S, European and Japanese vendors, where |t |s not c|ear there |s a substant|a|
market for any of the|r des|gns, |t w||| be a major r|sk for equ|pment supp||ers to |nvest |n product|on fac|||t|es.
chapter +%300
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer A>
chapter +%300
>M,M,M8 R%0 <"1)0(3 30(1+*3
The reactor |tse|f |s a huge|y comp||cated p|ece of equ|pment whose supp|y |s the so|e respons|b|||ty of the
vendor, who w||| sub-contract |nd|v|dua| parts to spec|a||st contractors. lt compr|ses a reactor pressure
vesse|, |ts |nterna| structures (such as the reactor core sh|e|d} and |mmed|ate aux|||ary hardware (such as the
dr|v|ng mechan|sm for contro| rods}. The reactor |s surrounded by other v|ta| dev|ces and components, such
as pr|mary coo||ng p|pes, coo|ant pumps, pressur|ser, |njector of boron, and |n most des|gns a|so steam
generators that separate the pr|mary c|rcu|t from a secondary one.
>M,M,M, R%0 30(1+*3 20$$0)
The reactor vesse| |s perhaps the most extreme examp|e of a nuc|ear-spec|f|c component (see Box 3}.
Product|on requ|res h|gh|y spec|a||sed sk|||s and fac|||t|es, |n part|cu|ar u|tra-heavy forg|ng presses. ln 2012,
there was reported to be on|y one supp||er, Japan Stee| Works, wh|ch had a capac|ty of three vesse|s a
year (see Box 3}, to supp|y the pressure vesse| for an EPR. The Wor|d Nuc|ear Assoc|at|on
43
reported there
were n|ne spec|a||st stee|-supp||er compan|es w|th fac|||t|es ab|e to produce |arge forg|ngs, |n Japan, Oh|na,
Russ|a, Korea, France, Germany, lnd|a, Ozech Repub||c and the K.
There |s then a second f|e|d of about 20 |arge|y d|fferent compan|es that use these forg|ngs to produce the
pressure vesse|s. Some of these are d|fferent d|v|s|ons of a reactor vendor (e.g. Areva and M|tsub|sh| Heavy
lndustr|es}, wh||e some are spec|a||st compan|es, such as Babcock & W||cox (S}.
>M,M,M> R%0 1*<+(&<'0<+
The secondary conta|nment |s a re|nforced structure that enve|ops the reactor and other parts of the NSSS,
|n order to protect them from externa| events but a|so to conta|n any rad|at|on |eaks that may occur from
the pr|mary c|rcu|t. lt |s an a|rt|ght chamber, often composed of s|ng|e or doub|e pre-pressed (or re|nforced}
th|ck concrete wa||s and ce|||ng, |ntegra||y attached to the reactor`s basemat. For better a|r t|ghtness, the
secondary conta|nment often has a stee| ||ner on |ts |nterna| surface. lt |s supp||ed and bu||t as a part of the
c|v|| eng|neer|ng work at the nuc|ear power p|ant, though |t has to meet very h|gh |ndustr|a| standards.
The conta|nment usua||y a|so has accompany|ng dev|ces, such as spray|ng systems to suppress the
|nterna| pressure, and hydrogen re-comb|ners to prevent accumu|at|on and exp|os|on of hydrogen, |n
the case of a major acc|dent. The conta|nment a|so needs to have a number of penetrat|ons to a||ow the
p|p|ng carry|ng steam to reach the convent|ona| parts of the power p|ant, as we|| as enab||ng access for
staff, mach|nery (exchange of fue| or components} and e|ectr|c cab|es. Add|t|ona| p|eces of equ|pment are
supp||ed to keep those penetrat|ons a|rt|ght.
Each reactor des|gn has a separate supp|y cha|n compr|s|ng a |arge number of compan|es of var|ous
types. The WNA g|ves examp|es of s|x of the compan|es |nvo|ved |n the supp|y of the conta|nment structure
for Areva. These |nc|ude three French compan|es (e.g. Bouygues Oonstruct|on}, a Sw|ss company (vS|
lnternat|ona|}, a German company (Babcock Noe|| Nuc|ear Gmbh} and a Oh|nese company (SEPOO}.
>M,M,M5 N+0(' =0<03(+*3$
Steam generators are requ|red |n PWRs |n wh|ch the reactor coo|ant water goes through a secondary c|rcu|t
(the steam generators} |n wh|ch the steam to dr|ve the turb|nes |s produced. ln BWRs, the reactor coo|ant
water dr|ves the turb|nes d|rect|y. Steam generators a|so requ|re |arge forg|ngs, for examp|e, the four steam
generators |n an EPR we|gh about 500 tonnes each. The WNA ||sts about 16 supp||ers, w|th cons|derab|e
over|ap between supp||ers of steam generators and the supp||ers of conta|nment vesse|s.
n||ke the reactor vesse|, wh|ch |s a ||fe-||m|t|ng component - |n other words, |f the vesse| |s not serv|ceab|e,
rep|ac|ng |t |s not an opt|on - steam generators can be rep|aced and because these have not proved as
durab|e as expected, there |s a substant|a| market |n rep|acement steam generators. These can be supp||ed
by the or|g|na| equ|pment supp||er or by a compet|ng company. Supp||ers ||sted by WNA |nc|ude:
44

A5 !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
chapter +%300
S6T ,
The reactor pressure vesse|
6*'7)0/&+4 *D '(<"D(1+"30
The reactor pressure vesse| |s one of the most safety-sens|t|ve components |n a PWR. lf the |ntegr|ty of the
reactor vesse| cannot be guaranteed, the safety of the p|ant |s |n ser|ous doubt because the assumpt|on |s
that |f there |s a f|aw |n the vesse| |t w||| rupture before |t |eaks, so there w||| be no advance warn|ng.
The |ssues |n 2012 surround|ng the pressure vesse|s supp||ed by Rotterdamse Droogdok Maatschapp|j
(RDM} |||ustrate the comp|ex|ty of the |ssues. ln 2012, |nspect|ons at the Doe| 3 p|ant revea|ed
thousands of cracks |n the pressure vesse|. The reactor was c|osed pend|ng |nvest|gat|ons |nto the
extent and sever|ty of the cracks and the future of the 21 reactors wor|dw|de w|th reactor vesse|s
supp||ed by RDM.
37
S|m||ar f|aws were found |n T|hange-2 whose pressure vesse| was a|so supp||ed
by RDM.
38
These were a very d|verse set of reactors rang|ng |n s|ze from about 50MW to 1,300MW,
us|ng three d|fferent techno|og|es and from about 6 d|fferent vendors. By December 2012, |t was st|||
not dec|ded whether Doe| 3 and T|hange-2 wou|d be a||owed to go back |nto serv|ce. The vesse| was
supp||ed by RDM wh|ch had met the ASME (Amer|can Soc|ety of Mechan|ca| Eng|neers} requ|rements
of the day.
39
However, the manufacture of the vesse| was more comp||cated than that. lt was reported
that
40
: 'ln the case of Doe| 3, the raw mater|a|s for the reactor she||s was supp||ed by Krupp, the forg|ng
by RDM, the c|add|ng and assemb||ng by Oocker||| for the |ower part (two core she||s, trans|t|on r|ng and
bottom p|ate} and by Framatome (now Areva NP} for the upper part compr|s|ng the RPv head, nozz|e
she||, and the f|na| assemb|y."
lt |s be||eved the cracks were created dur|ng the manufactur|ng process, but |t |s far from c|ear at t|me
of wr|t|ng who was respons|b|e for the errors that caused them. They were on|y revea|ed because of the
use of a new u|trason|c sensor so |t may not be poss|b|e to determ|ne when these f|aws occurred.
N701&()&$0B D(1&)&+&0$
ln recent years, there has been cons|derab|e pub||c|ty about bott|enecks |n the supp|y cha|n because
the dearth of orders has |ed to c|osure of many of the cert|f|ed manufactur|ng fac|||t|es. Of part|cu|ar
concern |s the manufacture of the pressure vesse|, for wh|ch on|y one supp||er, Japan Stee| Works
(JSW} has the fac|||t|es to produce the u|tra |arge forg|ngs needed to produce a reactor vesse| |n one
p|ece for the very |argest reactors, such as the Areva EPR. The a|ternat|ve of we|d|ng together a vesse|
made up of severa| parts |s usua||y seen as |ess des|rab|e.
41
The capac|ty of JSW was on|y three vesse|s
per year. Desp|te the obv|ous r|sk of a bott|eneck, no other company was w||||ng to make the |nvestment
of $900m S do||ars |n a 14,000 tonne stee| press. JSW bu||t another one that came on-||ne |n 2010.
42

P|ans by Doosan (Korea} and Sheff|e|d Stee|masters (K}, wh|ch has a 30-year-o|d press of 13,000
tonnes, to bu||d s|m||ar presses d|d not mater|a||se. However, the g|oba| re-eva|uat|on of nuc|ear power
fo||ow|ng on from Fukush|ma has meant that orders have dr|ed up and the second JSW press m|ght not
have been just|f|ed.
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer AA
Oh|na: Oh|na F|rst Heavy lndustr|es, Dongfang E|ectr|c Oorporat|on, Dongfang Heavy Equ|pment ||m|ted,
Harb|n Bo||er Oompany;
Korea: Hyunda| Heavy lndustr|es, Doosan;
Areva (France};
Babcock-H|tach| KK (Japan};
AtomEnergoMash (Russ|a};
DOD Dobry| (South Afr|ca}; and
ENSA (Spa|n}.
Tub|ng for steam generators |s supp||ed by another set of compan|es |nc|ud|ng: va||ourec and vanatome (France};
A|fa |ava| (Sweden}; Armatury (Russ|a}; |arsen & Toubro (lnd|a}; Sandv|k (Sweden}; and Sum|tomo (Japan}.
>M,M,MA P"'7$ (<B 2()20$
Pumps and va|ves are found |n many systems of a nuc|ear power p|ant, |n some cases |n safety-re|ated
areas. A typ|ca| PWR or BWR has about 5,000 va|ves and 200 pumps. The WNA ||sts more than a dozen
supp||ers of the more spec|a||sed types of pumps. Some are spec|a||st pump compan|es (e.g. Ourt|ss-
Wr|ght}, wh||e others are d|v|s|ons of d|vers|f|ed compan|es that |nc|ude reactor vendor d|v|s|ons, e.g. Areva
and M|tsub|sh|. The ma|n pump supp||ers |nc|ude: AtomEnergoMash, HMS Pumps (Russ|a}; Areva (France};
Dongfang E|ectr|c Oorporat|on and Shangha| E|ectr|c Heavy lndustry Group (Oh|na}; and M|tsub|sh| and
EBARA (Japan}.
Spec|a||st va|ves and actuators (motors that dr|ve va|ves} are supp||ed by spec|a||st compan|es |nc|ud|ng
some that a|so supp|y pumps (e.g. F|owserve}. The WNA ||sts 16 supp||ers of va|ves and actuators |nc|ud|ng:
Arako spo| s.r.o. (Russ|a}, AMA (Germany}, Armatury (Russ|a}, |arsen & Toubro (lnd|a} and Samsh|n |td
(Korea}.
>M,M,ME R"3C&<0 =0<03(+*3$
The turb|ne generators, that convert energy |nto e|ectr|c|ty, have trad|t|ona||y been the major |tem |n a
therma| power stat|on, and they rema|n a major |tem of expend|ture for a nuc|ear power p|ant. Many of the
or|g|na| nuc|ear vendors were supp||ers of turb|ne generators for foss||-f|red p|ants, e.g. S|emens, GE and
West|nghouse.
There about a dozen supp||ers of turb|nes for |arge reactors and severa| of these a|so supp|y the reactor.
These |nc|ude: Dongfang E|ectr|c Oorporat|on, Harb|n E|ectr|c and Shangha| E|ectr|ca| (Oh|na}; Bharat Heavy
E|ectr|ca|s, and |arsen & Toubro (lnd|a}; OMZ and AtomEnergoMash (Russ|a}; A|stom (France}; Doosan
(Korea}; M|tsub|sh| (Japan}; S|emens (Germany}.
>M,M,MI _(F '(+03&()$ (<B $'()) 1*'7*<0<+$
|arge amounts of raw mater|a|s such as stee| and concrete, w|th str|ngent spec|f|cat|ons, are requ|red |n the
construct|on of a nuc|ear power p|ant. ln recent years, there have been ser|ous prob|ems at the construct|on
s|tes of the O|k||uoto (F|n|and} and F|amanv|||e (France} EPR p|ants because of poor qua||ty contro| |n the
pour|ng of the concrete base-mat.
45

A typ|ca| PWR or BWR |nc|udes 210km of p|p|ng and 2,000km of cab||ng w|th vary|ng funct|ons and
spec|f|cat|ons. Th|s |s most|y nuc|ear |ndustry-grade non-spec|f|c or commerc|a|-grade and |s, therefore,
open to a |arge number of potent|a| supp||ers. Respons|b|||ty for ensur|ng the qua||ty of the mater|a|s and
components var|es accord|ng to how the project |s carr|ed out, but ||es broad|y w|th the company carry|ng
out the EPO (eng|neer|ng, procurement and construct|on} funct|ons.
chapter +%300
AE !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
,I)I, H/./4 "=F/=""$/=F
As Tab|e 3 |||ustrates, the on-s|te |nsta||at|on and construct|on represents by far the |argest e|ement of
the cost of a nuc|ear power p|ant, and |s notor|ous|y the most d|ff|cu|t cost e|ement to contro| because
of the |arge number of sub-contracts |nvo|ved, and because a construct|on s|te |s much more d|ff|cu|t to
manage than the more contro||ab|e env|ronment of a factory. The compan|es |nvo|ved are |arge eng|neer|ng
compan|es, not part|cu|ar|y dependent on the nuc|ear |ndustry, w|th exper|ence |n |arge projects, such as
ra|| ||nks and other types of power p|ants. ln recent years, compan|es such as Kaj|ma (Japan}, Daewoo
and Samsung (Korea} and Bouygues (France} have taken th|s ro|e. The|r contr|but|on and |n part|cu|ar the|r
qua||ty contro| |s cruc|a| to the overa|| qua||ty of the p|ant.
,I)IY 5$6#4"?8 /= :<" 26=8:$%2:/6= ;<&8"
Few nuc|ear projects are bu||t to t|me and cost, and many substant|a||y overrun the|r forecast construct|on
t|me and cost. These prob|ems were we|| |||ustrated by the severe prob|ems w|th the construct|on of an
Areva-supp||ed EPR at the O|k||uoto s|te |n F|n|and.
Prob|ems at O|k||uoto have occurred s|nce the project began |n 2004. The ma|n concerns are about the
strength of concrete, we|d|ng qua||ty, de|ays |n eng|neer|ng des|gn, supp||er |nexper|ence and poor contro|
over subcontractors
46
. The prob|ems cont|nue, push|ng the expected comp|et|on date to 2014 from the
or|g|na| 2009.
47
The costs have more than doub|ed to about t8.5bn from the or|g|na| est|mate of t3.2bn.
48
ln Korea |n 2012, |t was d|scovered that more than 5,000 sma|| components |nsta||ed at un|ts 5 and 6 of the
Yeonggwang p|ant were cert|f|ed w|th forged safety documents. The p|ants had a|ready entered serv|ce
and were shut down for near|y two months wh||e |nvest|gat|ons took p|ace and these parts were rep|aced.
49

Korea`s h|gh |eve| of dependence on nuc|ear power meant the c|osure of these p|ants jeopard|sed the
secur|ty of e|ectr|c|ty supp|y |n Korea.
>M> S703(+&*<$ (<B '(&<+0<(<10 cSU^e
The supp|y cha|n for the O&M phase |s somewhat s|mp|er than for the construct|on phase but more d|ff|cu|t
to def|ne. lt |nvo|ves: the day-to-day operat|on; rout|ne ma|ntenance, usua||y on an annua| bas|s; repa|r and
rep|acement of fa||ed equ|pment, somet|mes dur|ng rout|ne ma|ntenance and somet|mes, |f the fa||ure |s
safety re|ated or ser|ous, |n an unp|anned outage; supp|y of new fue|; and dea||ng w|th spent fue|.
n||ke construct|on where the act|v|t|es and equ|pment needed are |arge|y pred|ctab|e and predeterm|ned,
not a|| the act|v|t|es and purchases for the O&M phase are pred|ctab|e. Refue|||ng and some rout|ne
ma|ntenance are re|at|ve|y pred|ctab|e but some operat|ons such as a non-rout|ne repa|r or rep|acement
w||| be determ|ned by the p|ant`s operat|ng h|story, and repa|rs may have to be p|anned and carr|ed out by
methods des|gned spec|f|ca||y for the p|ant. Th|s makes the f|e|d of compan|es |nvo|ved |n the O&M phase
more d|ff|cu|t to def|ne.
,I,I+ K;"$&:/6=
Th|s |s |nvar|ab|y the respons|b|||ty of the owner/operator (ut|||ty}, wh|ch must sat|sfy the nat|ona| regu|ator
that the operators are su|tab|y qua||f|ed and competent. For the future, |f the arrangements proposed for
Turkey, the AE and perhaps v|etnam are fo||owed e|sewhere, the operator may be a fore|gn company, and
supp||ers themse|ves may have a share and thus be co-owners of the operator.
chapter +%300
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer AI
ln most countr|es, reactors are owned and operated by a s|ng|e |arge ut|||ty (e.g. France, Ozech Repub||c,
Hungary, Korea, Braz||, Mex|co and Be|g|um} or a sma|| number of |arge ut|||t|es (for examp|e, Japan,
Germany, Spa|n and Sweden}. ln the S, there are a |arge number of ut|||t|es own|ng nuc|ear power p|ants
rang|ng from very |arge ut|||t|es, for examp|e the Tennessee va||ey Author|ty (TvA}, to very sma|| ut|||t|es for
wh|ch a s|ng|e reactor represents a |arge proport|on of the|r tota| assets. There has been some conso||dat|on
of ownersh|p. For examp|e, PEOO (Ph||ade|ph|a}, wh|ch owned (or owned major|ty shares |n} s|x nuc|ear
reactors merged |n 2002 w|th n|com, wh|ch owned 10 nuc|ear power p|ants to form Exe|on. Exe|on took
over a number of other nuc|ear p|ants |n the S and merged w|th another ut|||ty, Oonste||at|on, |n 2012,
mak|ng |t the |argest nuc|ear power p|ant owner |n the S w|th about 19GW of |nsta||ed nuc|ear capac|ty.
50

The new company |s a|so ca||ed Exe|on.
Genera||y, the |argest ut|||t|es, espec|a||y those w|th strong government back|ng, are more heav||y |nvo|ved |n
the supp|y cha|n. For examp|e, the French ut|||ty EDF carr|es out |ts own arch|tect eng|neer|ng and |s heav||y
|nvo|ved |n the des|gn process for the nuc|ear steam-supp|y system (NSSS}. Sma||er ut|||t|es are more ||ke|y
to sub-contract act|v|t|es |n the O&M phase.
,I,I) L6%:/=" ?&/=:"=&=2"
Th|s |s usua||y carr|ed out dur|ng a refue|||ng outage wh|ch takes p|ace at 1-2 year |nterva|s. lt |s often carr|ed
out by the ut|||ty but can be carr|ed out by spec|a||st contractors, |nc|ud|ng the vendor and equ|pment
supp||ers.
,I,I, BX%/;?"=: $";&/$ &=0 $";4&2"?"=:
Depend|ng on the comp|ex|ty of the operat|on, th|s may be carr|ed out by the ut|||ty, for s|mp|er repa|rs, or
for comp|ex operat|ons (e.g. rep|acement of the steam generators} by spec|a||st compan|es, |nc|ud|ng the
or|g|na| equ|pment supp||er. The contractor may be se|ected by compet|t|ve tender.
,I,IY 5$6#4"?8 /= :<" 6;"$&:/=F ;<&8"
lf O&M |s not carr|ed out to the h|ghest standards, there can be severe or potent|a||y severe consequences.
The Browns Ferry (S} f|re of 1975, when an e|ectr|c|an`s cand|e d|sab|ed the safety systems for the three
reactors on s|te, was c|ose to caus|ng a major acc|dent.
51
The |nvest|gat|on by the Pres|dent`s lnqu|ry |nto
the Three M||e ls|and (S} acc|dent (the Kemeny Oomm|ss|on}
52
, wh|ch resu|ted |n a me|tdown of much of
the fue|, found the acc|dent was the resu|t of a comp|ex comb|nat|on of equ|pment fa||ure and human |ssues.
The Dav|s Besse (S} p|ant came c|ose to a ser|ous acc|dent because ma|ntenance procedures had not
|dent|f|ed crack|ng and th|nn|ng of the reactor vesse| head.
53
Had the vesse| head fa||ed, there wou|d have
been a ser|ous |oss-of-coo|ant acc|dent.
,I,IZ 9%;;4' 67 7%"4
Supp|y of fue| |s |tse|f at the end of a supp|y cha|n. Th|s |nc|udes: m|n|ng and process|ng of uran|um;
convert|ng the uran|um to uran|um hexaf|uor|de; enr|chment to |ncrease the percentage of the 'fert||e
uran|um |sotope from 0.7% to about 3.5%"; reconvers|on, and mechan|ca| process|ng to manufacture the
fue| rods. Th|s supp|y cha|n |s not e|aborated |n deta|| here but most of the e|ements have the|r own |ssues.
A|| w||| |eave fac|||t|es that at the end of the|r ||fe w||| need carefu| decomm|ss|on|ng.
chapter +%300
A? !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
chapter +%300
@'(=09 ln F|n|and, the
construct|on of the
O|k||uoto 3 reactor |s
we|| over budget and
years past |ts or|g|na|
comp|et|on date.
The cause of a
s|gn|f|cant acc|dent
at a nuc|ear p|ant
may |nvo|ve a
comb|nat|on of
des|gn, construct|on,
and operator or
ma|ntenance errors.
chapter +%300
J


Q
L
B
B
3
5
B
C
H
B

G

3
M
H
N

H
K
S
S
M
3
Q
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer AK
M|n|ng |s a mass|ve|y d|srupt|ve process |nvo|v|ng the remova| of |arge quant|t|es of rock and so|| and |eaves a
waste stream, ta|||ngs, wh|ch |f not hand|ed carefu||y can po||ute ground water.
54
The ma|n uran|um-produc|ng
countr|es are Oanada, Russ|a, Nam|b|a, Austra||a, Kazakhstan and |t |s produced by m|n|ng compan|es such
as RTZ (mu|t|nat|ona|}, Oameco (Oanada}, Areva (France}, ARMZ (Russ|a}, Kazatomprom (Kazakhstan} and
BHP (Austra||a}. Oonvers|on to uran|um hexaf|uor|de |s carr|ed out by a |arge number of compan|es, |nc|ud|ng
m|n|ng compan|es (Oameco}, d|vers|f|ed nuc|ear compan|es (Areva} and spec|a||st compan|es.
Enr|chment |nvo|ves extreme|y expens|ve fac|||t|es and uses huge quant|t|es of energy. lt |s a|so a m|||tar||y
sens|t|ve techno|ogy as |t can produce weapons grade mater|a|s. The ma|n g|oba| supp||ers are Eurod|f
(France}, renco (K, Nether|ands, Germany}, M|natom (Russ|a}, JNF| (Japan} and SEO (S}.
Fue| fabr|cat|on and supp|y |s somet|mes carr|ed out by a d|v|s|on of the reactor vendor, e.g. West|nghouse,
or by a spec|a||st company, e.g. TvE| (Russ|a}. On|y a handfu| of the countr|es w|th nuc|ear power p|ants
have domest|c fue|-fabr|cat|on p|ants. The ma|n ones are: Oanada (GE}; France (Areva}; Germany (S|emens};
Japan (MNF - M|tsub|sh| and NFl - Tosh|ba}; Korea (KNFO}; Russ|a (Mash|nostro|te|ny}; K (NDA}; and the
S (GE, S|emens, West|nghouse, Areva}.
Wh||e |n pr|nc|p|e the de||very of nuc|ear fue| |s a serv|ce that can be sw|tched to a|ternat|ve supp||ers, |n
pract|ce th|s |s h|gh|y |mpract|ca| and comp||cated. Fue| rods and the|r assemb||es are h|gh|y spec|f|c for
each of the reactor des|gns, and |t may take a number of years before an a|ternat|ve supp||er deve|ops and
f|ne-tunes fue| rods su|tab|e to a g|ven reactor. ln rea||ty, operators are therefore stuck w|th one fue| supp||er
over the ||fet|me of the|r reactor.
There have been a number of scanda|s on the supp|y of nuc|ear fue|. ln 1999, |t was d|scovered that Br|t|sh
Nuc|ear Fue|s (BNF|} had fa|s|f|ed qua||ty-assurance data for fue| conta|n|ng p|uton|um (so-ca||ed M|xed
Ox|de or MO fue|} sh|pped to Japan.
55
BNF| was forced to take back th|s fue|.
The Ozech Teme||n nuc|ear p|ant prov|des a good examp|e of the d|ff|cu|t|es of sw|tch|ng fue| supp||er. ln
2006, the Ozech ut|||ty was forced to turn back to |ts or|g|na| Russ|an fue| supp||er for |ts Russ|an-des|gned
reactor because of concerns about the r|g|d|ty of the West|nghouse-supp||ed fue|, wh|ch was deform|ng and
prevent|ng correct |nsert|on of the contro| rods.
56
,I,I[ 9;"=: 7%"4
Spent fue| removed from a reactor generates |arge amounts of decay/res|dua| heat and, therefore, needs
to be act|ve|y coo|ed for severa| years unt|| th|s heat generat|on has decayed suff|c|ent|y so that the r|sk of a
me|tdown (|n case of coo||ng fa||ure} no |onger ex|sts.
After the |n|t|a| coo|-down per|od (typ|ca||y 3-5 years}, spent fue| |s stored ons|te at |nter|m storage,
transported to a centra| |nter|m storage e|sewhere, or sent to reprocess|ng fac|||t|es. There are three ma|n
ways |n wh|ch spent-fue| storage can be carr|ed out:
ln|t|a| storage |n wet spent-fue| poo|s that are bu||t ons|te, |n the v|c|n|ty of the reactors. Most western
reactor des|gns s|tuate the poo|s outs|de of the conta|nment, |n an aux|||ary bu||d|ng, wh||e Russ|an
des|gns |ocate the poo|s |ns|de the conta|nment. The poo|s and the|r coo||ng systems are an |ntegra| part
of the reactor des|gn, construct|on and supp|y; they often share the same power backup systems, water
supp|y systems, and u|t|mate heat s|nks w|th nuc|ear reactor |s|ands. Hence, supp||ers of reactors are a|so
|nvo|ved |n spent-fue| storage.
chapter +%300
E: !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
After the |n|t|a| coo|-down per|od, the |nter|m storage of spent fue| can cont|nue to be based on poo|s
f|||ed w|th water - |.e. wet storage. Th|s pract|ce |s ||nked to most of the Russ|an-des|gned nuc|ear power
p|ants. One of the supp||ers of those |nter|m wet storage systems (poo|s} |s Skoda JS.
57

lnter|m storage can a|so be |n dry casks. The fue| |s stored |n heavy, se|f-suff|c|ent conta|ners that need
no add|t|ona|, act|ve coo||ng, or the presence of water. Thus they can be stored under open a|r, or at
sha||ow underground fac|||t|es. There are severa| compan|es produc|ng the casks, such as Gese||schaft
fur Nuk|ear-Serv|ce (Germany}, Ho|tec lnt|, NAO lnt|. and Areva-Transnuc|ear NHOMS. Skoda JS a|so
obta|ned a ||cence to fabr|cate the German-des|gned dry storage casks.
Spent fue| |s expected to e|ther be reprocessed or d|sposed of d|rect|y (see Box 4}. Reprocess|ng |s
part|cu|ar|y content|ous because |t |s a hazardous process, and because |t produces separated p|uton|um,
wh|ch represents a major weapons-pro||ferat|on r|sk. D|rect d|sposa| ra|ses fewer pro||ferat|on concerns but
the requ|rement to |dent|fy s|tes and package the waste, wh|ch a|so app||es to waste from reprocess|ng, so
that there can be near certa|nty that the mater|a| w||| rema|n |so|ated from the env|ronment for the severa|
hundred thousand years |t w||| take for the mater|a| to cease to be hazardous.
S6T Y
F|na| d|sposa| of spent fue|
There are two ma|n opt|ons for dea||ng w|th spent fue|: d|rect d|sposa|, or reprocess|ng. D|rect d|sposa|
|n a h|gh-|eve| waste repos|tory |s the preferred opt|on for most reactor owners. No h|gh-|eve| waste
- a category that |nc|udes spent nuc|ear fue| - f|na| repos|tory, where the waste must be |so|ated from
the env|ronment for about 250,000 years, has been constructed yet and |t may be decades before
any such fac|||ty ex|sts. nt|| then, the costs and the techno|ogy w||| rema|n unproven. The f|e|d of
compan|es offer|ng th|s serv|ce |s undeve|oped but g|ven the extraord|nary safety requ|rements, such
compan|es w||| |nev|tab|y be c|ose|y assoc|ated and often fu||y owned by government.
Spent-fue| d|rect d|sposa| has not been demonstrated anywhere yet and most countr|es that are
expect|ng to fo||ow th|s route are many years away from even se|ect|ng a s|te.
Reprocess|ng on a commerc|a| bas|s |s on|y carr|ed out |n three countr|es: France (|a Hague}, K
(Se||af|e|d} and Russ|a (Ohe|yab|nsk and Krasnoyarsk}. These fac|||t|es are owned by the nat|ona|
governments. Japan has a|most comp|eted a |arge reprocess|ng p|ant, Rokkasho. The p|ant |s reported
to have been 99% comp|ete s|nce 2007, but |ts start-up has cont|nua||y been de|ayed (19 t|mes by
October 2012} and, by then, |ts projected start date was October 2013.
61
lts owner, Japan Nuc|ear Fue|
||m|ted, |s ma|n|y owned by the 10 pr|vate|y owned, major Japanese e|ectr|c ut|||t|es. Other countr|es,
such as lnd|a, have sma||er fac|||t|es but these are not open to |nternat|ona| customers, and they may
have dua| m|||tary/c|v|| purposes.
chapter +%300
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer E8
Spent or part|a||y used fue| that |s not |n the reactor may represent a s|gn|f|cant hazard as was demonstrated
at the Fukush|ma d|saster.
58
A |ess w|de|y pub||c|sed acc|dent occurred at the Paks p|ant (Hungary} |n 2003.
Here, fue| assemb||es were removed from the reactor for c|ean|ng |n a c|ean|ng tank.
59
The coo||ng system
proved |nadequate and the 30 fue| assemb||es |n the tank were a|| damaged, some severe|y, |ead|ng to the
re|ease of some rad|oact|ve mater|a|. The acc|dent was b|amed on the supp||er of the tank, Areva (France},
who pa|d compensat|on reported to be $4.5m. The p|ant (n|t 2 of the four-un|t s|te} was off-||ne for more
than three years.
60
The |oss of |ncome from the |ost output for those three years w||| have far exceeded the
compensat|on pa|d.
>M5 6*<1)"$&*<$
A nuc|ear power p|ant has severa| un|que features: comp|ex|ty; extent of and potent|a| cost of acc|dents;
|mportance of user sk|||s; ||fet|me; cost; and the |mportance of s|te construct|on work. Th|s means that the
cause of a s|gn|f|cant acc|dent at a nuc|ear power p|ant |s se|dom c|ear-cut and may |nvo|ve a comb|nat|on
of des|gn, construct|on, operat|on and ma|ntenance errors.
By compar|son, |t |s usua||y re|at|ve|y easy to apport|on pr|mary respons|b|||ty for, say a car acc|dent to
des|gn, construct|on, operator or ma|ntenance error.
ln add|t|on, |nternat|ona| convent|ons and nat|ona| |aws ||m|t (|n the case of operators} or abso|ve (|n the case
of supp||ers} from the f|nanc|a| consequences of acc|dents caused by the|r errors |n a way that app||es to no
other |ndustr|a| act|v|ty. W|thout th|s |eve| of |nsu|at|on from the consequences of any acc|dents, |t |s c|ear no
commerc|a| company cou|d just|fy own|ng or supp|y|ng a nuc|ear power p|ant.
The supp|y cha|n for a nuc|ear power p|ant |s very comp|ex and |n many cases non-transparent. The owner/
operator of a p|ant carr|es f|na| respons|b|||ty, but des|gn, construct|on and ma|ntenance |nc|ude many
d|fferent part|es through many |ayers of contract|ng and subcontract|ng. D|fferent supp||ers are respons|b|e
for |mp|ement|ng e|ements cr|t|ca| for the p|ant`s safety, but these supp||ers u|t|mate|y cannot be he|d
accountab|e |n case of an acc|dent.
Th|s |ack of accountab|||ty |s further enab|ed by |ack of transparency regard|ng contracts and company
re|at|onsh|ps. Th|s s|tuat|on creates major cha||enges |n ensur|ng suff|c|ent qua||ty contro| on cr|t|ca| safety
features. lt |s often unc|ear (at |east to the outs|de wor|d} who carr|es the f|na| respons|b|||ty |n case prob|ems
were to occur w|th certa|n equ|pment or des|gns.
Many of those further down the supp|y cha|n w||| ex|t the bus|ness |ong before the end of the ||fe of the p|ant,
as was the case w|th RDM, the supp||er of the f|awed pressure vesse|s for the Be|g|an T|hange 2 and Doe|
3 p|ants. ln the case of the Fukush|ma d|saster, even though |t |s known that certa|n des|gn features caused
ser|ous prob|ems dur|ng the course of the acc|dent
62
, those respons|b|e for the des|gn and eng|neer|ng are
not be|ng he|d accountab|e.
chapter +%300
E, !"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer
8 http://www.wor|d-nuc|ear.org/|nfo/|nf19.htm|
, For further deta||s, see http://www.wor|d-nuc|ear.org/|nfo/|nf19.htm|
> For a rev|ew of |nternat|ona| convent|ons, see Anthony Thomas and Raphae|
J. Heffron (2012} 'Th|rd Party Nuc|ear ||ab|||ty: The Oase of a Supp||er |n the
n|ted K|ngdom` EPRG Work|ng Paper 1205, Oambr|dge Work|ng Paper |n
Econom|cs 1207, EPRG, Oambr|dge.
http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/up|oads/2012/02/EPRG1205_
comp|ete_rev|sed.pdf
See a|so Ohapter 2 of th|s report.
5 Nuc|ear Eng|neer|ng lnternat|ona| 'Focus on lnd|a - New-bu||d - Two paths.`
August 2012, p 26
A Antony Froggatt, see Ohapter 2 of th|s report.
E The NSSS |s extreme|y comp|ex compr|s|ng many parts. The ma|n ones are
the conta|nment, the reactor, the |nstrumentat|on & contro| system. W|th|n the
reactor, |s the pressure vesse|, the reactor |nterna|s and the pr|mary coo|ant
|oop.
I P|ttsburgh Tr|bune Rev|ew 'H|gh stakes power p|ays` 6 January 2013
? ln th|s report we refer to these two compan|es as H|tach|-GE s|nce the
des|gns they offer are the same.
K http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/des|gn-cert/esbwr/rev|ew-
schedu|e.htm|
+* Nuc|eon|cs Week 'v|sag|nas project not favored by ||ke|y ||thuan|an pr|me
m|n|ster` 8 November 2012.
88 Nuc|ear lnte|||gence Week|y 'H|tach|`s vote of conf|dence` 2 November
2012, p 5-6.
8, lns|de NRO 'Kepco to subm|t APR1400 des|gn for NRO rev|ew |n 2012` 26
Apr|| 2010.
8> lns|de NRO 'Kepco to subm|t APR1400 des|gn for NRO rev|ew |n 2012` 26
Apr|| 2010.
85 Korea Hera|d 'Korea w|ns |andmark nuc|ear dea|` 28 December 2009.
8A R|ght v|s|on News 'AE: M|dd|e East |eads ra||y |n nuc|ear p|ant orders` 12
January 2010.
8E Nuc|eon|cs Week 'No core catcher, doub|e conta|nment for AE reactors,
South Koreans say` 22 Apr|| 2010, p 1.
8I Nuc|ear lnte|||gence Week|y 'Oonfus|on Pers|sts over AE P|ant Ownersh|p`
14 September 2012, p 4.
8? Modern Power Systems 'Nuc|ear power - Barakah beg|ns` October 2012,
p 11.
8K Nuc|ear lnte|||gence Week|y 'Oonfus|on Pers|sts over AE P|ant Ownersh|p`
14 September 2012, p 4.
,: Wor|d Nuc|ear News 'APWR des|gn cert|f|cat|on reschedu|ed` 13 June
2012. http://www.wor|d-nuc|ear-news.org/RS-APWR_des|gn_cert|f|cat|on_
reschedu|ed-1306124.htm|
,8 See http://www.wor|d-nuc|ear.org/|nfo/|nf63.htm| for further deta||s.
,, Oh|na Bus|ness News 'Oh|na beg|ns work on 200 MW nuc|ear power p|ant
w|th 4th generat|on features` 7 January 2013
,> Nuc|ear lnte|||gence Week|y 'OGN, Areva and EDF to Oooperate on 1,000
MW Des|gn`, 16 November 2012, p 3
,5 Da||y Post 'Nuc|ear power group |os|ng 2m per day` 13 December 2002.
,A http://www.akkunpp.com/|ndex.php?|ang=en
,E Nuc|eon|cs Week 'Akkuyu OEO sees comm|ss|on|ng of f|rst Turk|sh vvER
|n 2020` 26 Ju|y 2012.
,I Nuc|eon|cs Week 'v|sag|nas agreement w||| be f|na||zed by year-end:
||thuan|a m|n|ster` 20 September 2012.
,? Nuc|eon|cs Week 'H|tach| to buy Hor|zon, br|ng ABWRs to the K ' 1
November 2012
,K Agence France Presse 'France`s Areva to b|d for Br|t|sh nuc|ear p|ant
venture` 7 Ju|y 2012
>: These |nc|uded Bechte|, Brown & Root, Burns & Roe, Dan|e|, Ebasco, F|uor,
G|bbs & H|||, G||bert, Sargent & |undy, Stone & Webster and n|ted Eng|neer|ng
& Oonstruct|on.
chapter +%300
>8 'The EPR |n Or|s|s`, S. Thomas, November 2010. www.n|rs.org/
reactorwatch/newreactors/eprcr|s|s31110.pdf
>, For a deta||ed rev|ew of the ro|e of the EPO contractor, see Wor|d Nuc|ear
Assoc|at|on (2012} 'The Wor|d Nuc|ear Supp|y Oha|n Out|ook 2030` Wor|d
Nuc|ear Assoc|at|on.
>> For more deta||s, see Wor|d Nuc|ear Assoc|at|on (2012} 'The Wor|d Nuc|ear
Supp|y Oha|n Out|ook 2030` Wor|d Nuc|ear Assoc|at|on.
>5 Wor|d Nuc|ear Assoc|at|on (2012} 'The Wor|d Nuc|ear Supp|y Oha|n
Out|ook 2030` Wor|d Nuc|ear Assoc|at|on.
>A Even the turb|ne generator |s rather d|fferent to a norma| steam p|ant
because the temperature and pressure of the steam |s much |ower caus|ng
part|cu|ar des|gn |ssues.
>E Nuc|ear lnte|||gence Week|y 'Move To Gen lll ||ke|y to S|ow Newbu||d |n
Near Term` 16 November 2012, p 3-4
>I http://www.|-nuc|ear.com/2012/09/04/new-|nspect|ons-conf|rm-crack|ng-
|n-be|g|ums-doe|-3-reactor-pressure-vesse|/
>? Nuc|eon|cs Week 'E|ectrabe| expects Doe|-3, T|hange-2 restart` 8
November 2012
>K http://www.fanc.fgov.be/GED/00000000/3300/3323.pdf
5: http://www.|-nuc|ear.com/2012/09/04/new-|nspect|ons-conf|rm-crack|ng-
|n-be|g|ums-doe|-3-reactor-pressure-vesse|/
58 Nuc|ear lnte|||gence Week|y '|tra-Heavy Forg|ngs: Safer Reactors` 30
November 2012, p 5.
5, Nuc|ear lnte|||gence Week|y 'S|ump h|ts forgers` 30 November 2012, p 4.
5> Wor|d Nuc|ear Assoc|at|on (2012} 'The Wor|d Nuc|ear Supp|y Oha|n
Out|ook 2030` Wor|d Nuc|ear Assoc|at|on.
55 lb|d..
5A S Thomas (2010} 'The EPR |n cr|s|s` Pub||c Serv|ces lnternat|ona| Research
n|t (PSlR}, n|vers|ty of Greenw|ch.
5E lb|d.
5I Nuc|eon|cs Week 'TvO, Areva seek l&O c|ose-out as arb|trat|on c|a|ms r|se`
4 October 2012
5? 'O|k||uoto-3 cost 'c|ose` to Eur8.5 b||||on: Areva OEO`, Nuc|ear News
F|ashes, P|atts, 14 December 2012.
5K Nuc|ear lnte|||gence Week|y 'Another scanda| rocks KEPOO` 9 November
2012, p 5-6
A: http://www.wor|d-nuc|ear-news.org/O-Oonste||at|on-Exe|on_merger_
comp|ete-1203127.htm|
A8 http://www.nrc.gov/read|ng-rm/doc-co||ect|ons/nuregs/brochures/br0361/
br/br0361.pdf
A, http://www.pddoc.com/tm|2/kemeny/att|tudes_and_pract|ces.htm
A> http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operat|ng/ops-exper|ence/vesse|-head-
degradat|on.htm|
A5 P D|eh| (2009} 'ran|um M|n|ng and M||||ng Wastes: An lntroduct|on` WlSE,
Par|s.http://www.w|se-uran|um.org/uwa|.htm|=TAl|HAZ
AA http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuc|ear/mox/mox1.htm
AE Nuc|eon|cs Week 'West|nghouse`s |mproved fue| a|med at f|x|ng Teme||n
bow|ng prob|em`, 18 December 2006.
AI http://www.skoda-js.cz/en/products-and-serv|ces/spent-nuc|ear-fue|-
storage/|ndex.shtm|
A? http://warp.da.nd|.go.jp/|nfo:nd|jp/p|d/3856371/na||c.go.jp/en/|ndex.htm|
AK Nuc|ear Fue|, 'Recovery of damaged Paks fue| now s|ated to beg|n |ate th|s
year` 19 June 2006
E: MTl Econews, 'Paks b|ock starts up more than three years after |nc|dent`
28 December 2006.
E8 Nuc|ear Fue| 'JNF| postpones Rokkasho operat|on unt|| October 2013` 1
October 2012
E, http://warp.da.nd|.go.jp/|nfo:nd|jp/p|d/3856371/na||c.go.jp/en/|ndex.htm|
!"#"$%&'( !())*"+ Nuc|ear bus|ness makes peop|e pay and suffer E>
@'(=09 A Greenpeace
rad|at|on expert checks
contam|nat|on |eve|s
at a house |n Watar|,
approx|mate|y 60km
from the Fukush|ma
Da||ch| nuc|ear p|ant.
Peop|e must be
the f|rst pr|or|ty,
not the benef|ts
of the nuc|ear
|ndustry.
J


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pressdesk.|nt@greenpeace.org
JN 444
Pub||shed |n February 2013 by

`300<70(10 @<+03<(+&*<()
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The Nether|ands