Aaron J. Walker, Esq.

[redacted]
Manassas, Virginia 20109
[redacted]
[redacted]

Tuesday, June 24, 2014

Honorable Judge George J. Hazel
6500 Cherrywood Lane
Greenbelt, Maryland 20770

Re: Brett Kimberlin v. National Bloggers Club, et al. GJH-13-3059;

Response to ECF 128 and 129

Dear Judge Hazel,

In response to the Plaintiffs two letters filed as ECF 128 and 129, I respectfully ask this court to strike
and return to the Plaintiff the two letters, and alternatively, I respond to them on the merits in opposition.

Under the Case Management Order of March 4, 2014 (ECF No. 97) and the Letter Order of February 21,
2014 (ECF No. 88), there is a specific procedure parties in this case are supposed to follow if they wish
to file a motion. The Plaintiff has disregarded these orders in the past, and has chosen to do so again.
See, e.g. Order of March 5, 2014 (ECF No. 99) (noting that the Plaintiffs filing of a motion to
disqualify counsel has been stricken and returned as improperly filed under my Letter Order of
February 21, 2014, ECF No. 88).

Here, the Plaintiff has made the same exact error that he made previously: rather than asking permission
to make filings, he simply made the filings. The Case Management Order (ECF No. 97) provides that
no other motion [besides an answer or a motion to dismiss] may be filed in this case without advance
permission of the Court. Page 2, I.A.2. In this case, rather than styling it as a motion, the Plaintiff
styled his breaches of procedure as letters, but in actuality they 1) moved (without permission) for
additional time to serve defendants that over eight months into this case, he still hasnt served (ECF No.
128), and 2) attempted to supplement (without permission) his various oppositions to Defendants
motions to dismiss with a brand new case (ECF No. 129).

Turning briefly to the merits of each, in reference to the request for sixty days additional time, I hereby
register my opposition to such an unwarranted delay. While I do not wish to rush this court into a
decision on my pending motion to dismiss (ECF No. 11) or my opposition to the motion for leave to
amend (ECF No. 115), this case should not be delayed any longer due the Plaintiffs lack of diligence.

With respect to the Plaintiffs attempt to supplement his pleadings with a new citation, United States v.
Osinger, No. 11-50338 (9
th
Cir. 2014), this case is inapposite. Osinger was convicted in essence of
spreading revenge pornsexually explicit pictures of an ex-girlfriend as revenge for perceived slights
between them. Osinger created a Facebook page with those photographs, under a false name close to
the victims, and sent invitations to her family to view that page, as part of a campaign that included
emails, text messages and phone calls to the victim and her coworkers.

The Plaintiff correctly says that the Ninth Circuit held that stalking conduct, which included the
disclosure of private and personal information, was not protected by the First Amendment but what fact
private to the Plaintiff did I (or any Defendant) disclose? That the Plaintiff is a convicted terrorist
known as The Speedway Bomber,
1
a convicted perjurer,
2
or a convicted drug kingpin?
3
The fact that
three of the Defendants (including myself) have had crimes committed against them and Mr. Kimberlin
is on the short list of suspects? These are not private facts.

Osinger does not even contradict this courts precedent in U.S. v. Cassidy, 814 F.Supp.2d 574 (2011);
the Ostinger court simply distinguished Cassidy. Like the government in Cassidy, the instant Plaintiff
asks this court to declare the mere act of peaceably speaking to the general populace about a public
figure (the Plaintiff) a criminal act, in an attempt to convert RICO into a criminal defamation statute. He
doesnt allege that any of the Defendants communicated with him directly, a consideration that was
critical in Cassidy, this court holding that statements written to the public at large were in sharp
contrast to a telephone call, letter or e-mail specifically addressed to and directed at another person and
that this difference is fundamental to the First Amendment analysis in this case. Id. at 578. Both
Osinger and another case the Plaintiff cites for the first time in this letter, United States v. Shrader, 675
F.3d 300 (4
th
Cir. 2012), involved conduct that included direct contact with the victim. Thus Osinger
and Shrader provide no aid to this court in resolving this case.

For the reasons above, the two letters should be stricken, or, alternatively, the request in ECF 128 should
be denied, while the case law in ECF 129 is of no aid to this court.

I thank you for your time and consideration.

Sincerely,



Aaron J. Walker, Esq.

1
Kimberlin v. White, 7 F.3d 527, 528-29 (6
th
Cir. 1993) (describing how he terrorized the town of
Speedway, Indiana by setting off eight bombs in six days).
2
Kimberlin v. Dewalt, 12 F.Supp.2d 487, 490 n. 6 (D. Md 1998) (describing the revocation of his
parole, and his criminal history, including perjury).
3
U.S. v. Kimberlin, 805 F.2d 210, 225, 233, 235 and 238 (7
th
Cir. 1986) (describing his convictions
related to drug dealing).