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Turkish Studies
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The Mosque as a Divisive
Symbol in the Turkish Political
Landscape
Sefa imek
a
, Zerrin Polvan
a
& Tayfun Yeilerit
a
a
Yeditepe University , Istanbul, Turkey
Published online: 25 Jan 2007.
To cite this article: Sefa imek , Zerrin Polvan & Tayfun Yeilerit (2006) The Mosque
as a Divisive Symbol in the Turkish Political Landscape, Turkish Studies, 7:3, 489-508,
DOI: 10.1080/14683840600891166
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683840600891166
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Turkish Studies
Vol. 7, No. 3, 489508, September 2006

ISSN 1468-3849 Print/1743-9663 Online/06/030489-20 2006 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/14683840600891166

The Mosque as a Divisive Symbol in the
Turkish Political Landscape

SEFA

[ SCEDI L]

IM

[ SCEDI L]

EK, ZERRIN POLVAN & TAYFUN YE

[ SCEDI L]

IL

[ SCEDI L]

ERIT

Yeditepe University, Istanbul, Turkey

Taylor and Francis Ltd FTUR_A_189039.sgm 10.1080/14683840600891166 Turkish Studies 1468-3849 (print)/1743-9663 (online) Original Article 2006 Taylor & Francis 73000000September 2006 Sefa[Scedil]im[scedil]ek sesim2003@hotmail.com

A

BSTRACT

This study explores the impact of two controversial mosque projects. The first
project was intended for Gztepe Park and the second for Taksim Square in Istanbul. These
projects are considered in the broader context of a general Islamist bid over the last few
decades to re-conquer the Turkish political landscape and public opinion. These attempts on
the part of Islamist movements reflect their desire for legitimacy, power, prestige, and elite
status that were monopolized by the republican elite throughout modern Turkish history.
However, these projects elicit a very negative response among secularist circles, both at the
state and civil society levels. Both sides see themselves as in a continuous tug-of-war for
control over the public sphere. It seems that in the long run, this struggle may moderate both
political Islam and puritan secularism in Turkey, creating more spaces for their coexistence
as well as dialogue and mutual respectif not consensusbetween them. However, the
potential for further polarization between the two sides is also not completely out of the realm
of possibility.

Introduction: A Fierce Public Debate over the Construction of a Mosque in
Gztepe Park

On September 15, 2005, under the chairmanship of the proxy mayor, Idris Gllce,
the Council of the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul passed a formal decision
by a majority vote, proposing the construction of a mosque in Gztepe Park.
According to the decision, the mosque would be built on one-fourth of the parks
land, a plot with a total area of 10 acres (10.000 m

2

). A parking lot would also be
included in the project. Turkish public opinion, not unfamiliar with such projects
since the 1950s, was, as usual, divided into two opposite camps. One camp reacted
positively, while the other protested. The latter argued against the legitimacy of the
decision, for it was taken during the absence of the mayor himself, Kadir Topba

[ SCEDI L]

.
Upon returning to his office, the mayor declared that the decision was both legiti-
mate and valid, explaining that according to a legal document, Idris Gllce was
chosen to be his substitute during his absence.

1

The mayor of the Kadky District (to which Gztepe is administratively
annexed), Selami ztrk, took the case to the relevant administrative court in the

Correspondence Address:

Sefa

[ SCEDI L]

im

[ SCEDI L]

ek, Nisbetiye cad., 3 sok., no. 32/4, Rumeli Hisarustu, Bebek,
Istanbul, Turkey. Email: sesim2003@hotmail.com
S S S S
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hope that it would issue a verdict of cancellation. To the same end, the Kadky
Municipality offered advisory assistance to those who wished to bring suit against
the project as individuals.

2

The vice mayor of Kadky, Grsel Tekin, made an official statement criticizing
the project:
The mosque project in Gztepe is a political decision There are survey
results that show the AKP has lost support in metropolises. As in the case of
building a mosque in Taksim Square, they coveted religious motifs to compen-
sate for this loss. Their concern about the ballot led them to make an artificial
agenda out of the mosque issue. In fact, the residents of Gztepe do not have
such a need. Were there such a demand, we would be informed in the first place
as the local government

3

Meanwhile, on December 3, 2005, a civil platform including 171 NGOs held a
demonstration in front of the park. The platform named itself the Movement of the
Sensitive Urbanites. They used slogans including

betona hayr

! (no concrete!)
and

ye

[ S CEDI L]

ile evet

(welcome green). As the spokesperson of the platform, the head
of the Environmental Council of Istanbul ( stanbul evre Konseyi Ba

[ SCEDI L]

kan), Trk-
sen Ba

[ SCEDI L]

er Kafao

[ GBREVE]

lu, read the press release. The representatives of other NGOs also
addressed the crowd, stressing the common need to protect the green areas of the
city, on the grounds that they served as a site of refuge at times of natural disasters
such as earthquakes, and also provided the residents with clean air and mental and
physical well-being.

4

In reply to these criticisms, Kadir Topba

[ SCEDI L]

stated that the CHP (Republican
Peoples Party) members of the municipal council had not raised objections during
the talks over the project before the final decision; once the decision was taken,
however, they started to provoke people against the mosque project.

5

Rza Saka, the
representative of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) members in the Kadky
Municipal Council, put the blame on Selami ztrk:
Selami Bey [Bey being the rough equivalent of Mr. in English] has prob-
ably got different agendas. That the CHP members of Kadky Municipality,
who had not objected to the project before the final decision, added fuel to the
flames aims at dismissing the allegations of impropriety and corruption in
Kadky Municipality out of public agenda.

6

Amid this state of dust and smog, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo

[ GBREVE]

an visited
the Topba

[ SCEDI L]

administration. He dismissed Idris Gllce from his office, although he
had appointed him to that position as his right-hand man. Erdo

[ GBREVE]

ans consultants told
him that their party was losing support in Istanbul due to the impression of a double-
headed administration, one that for too long had created confusion and weakness in
urban management.
How does a local issue such as this become a full-fledged national concern? Why
does it have so much impact on the political landscape and public opinion of the
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The Mosque as a Divisive Symbol

491
country? Why does the construction of a mosque in a Muslim-majority country
(where many mosques are being built every day without any dispute or controversy)
incite so much political clash? This article aims to find proper answers to such
questions. However, in order to do so we have to walk through a long road, both
through the past and present.
To that extent, this article first considers the wider impact of the project on the
national political agenda and public opinion. Second, it gives a narrative account of
a similar but more shattering project that was levered in the last decade, the project
of Taksim Mosque. Third, the article looks at the Islamist bid to re-conquer Istanbul
as a strongly relevant and more encompassing symbol; one which possesses a kind
of ordinal continuity and inclusiveness like the Russian

matrusk

.

7

Fourth, the article
examines the radicalization of Islam and the construction of the official/secular
public sphere to shed light on the later developments. Lastly, we present the under-
pinnings of Islamist reclamation over the public sphere as the means to achieve their
desires for legitimacy, recognition, access to proportional power and elite status
through controlling space, urban design and toponymy (names given to places and
sites).
As may be seen, our methodology is somewhat entangled and spiraled rather than
simple and linear in that we move back and forth on both the diachronic and
synchronic axes. Additionally, we combine a number of different techniques, from
ethnography to historical narrative to political semiotics.

From a Local Issue to a High-Profile National Debate

Religious symbols are generally known to be elements of unity and solidarity in
almost all societies, from primitive to advanced.

8

This is usually true in Turkey, as
long as they are kept within their traditional and vernacular bounds. However, when
these symbols are used at unusual times and places, they lose their religious denota-
tions, and gain powerful political connotations. Once their intrinsic meanings are
translated into the language of politics, they also become targets or instruments of
political game and struggle.
The Gztepe project far exceeded the normal competitive agenda of incumbent
politicians of local governments in Istanbul and of the central government in Ankara
within a few days. It became the chief concern of newspapers, columnists, television
programs, professional associations, social movements and NGOs.
Critiques and commentators who lent support to the project raised a common
argument: they stated that the nearest mosque to the Gztepe Park, Galip Pa

[ SCEDI L]

a
Mosque, was often overcrowded; and particularly during weekends, this situation
created enormous traffic jams. There was a need for a larger mosque with a parking
lot in the same neighborhood. In light of this consideration, the project should not
have been perceived as political.
On the other hand, those who opposed the decision suggested that green areas
should be sustained and that the mosque project was a political investment. The
detractors opined that the inhabitants of Gztepe were against building a mosque in
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the park area because they were happy to use the park as a place of recreation in
nature. Although they confirmed the traffic problem around the Galip Pa

[ SCEDI L]

a Mosque,
they argued that the green park was not the appropriate place to build a mosque.
They said that they would not object to the project, were it put into effect someplace
else.
Internet sites did not miss the chance to avail themselves of the popularity put
forth by the issue. They immediately conducted surveys among their visitors to
understand their attitudes concerning the project. We surveyed nine Internet ques-
tionnaires. The average consent to the mosque project was 55 percent, while the
average opposition was 45 percent.

9

Many sites also invited their visitors to submit
their opinions. Like politicians, people, too, were divided into two campseither in
favor or against the project. Those who were in favor viewed the mosque project as
a social and religious need. The dissidents, on the other hand, were further divided
into two sub-categories. One category claimed that the construction of a mosque had
not grown out of any common need, while the other opposed its construction
directly in Gztepe Park. Here are the examples of each position:
I share the belief that there is need for a mosque in Gztepe In Gztepe,
especially during religious holidays and the Friday public prayers, the existing
mosques have become insufficient.

10

The surroundings of the Gztepe Park do not have a need for a new mosque
In nearly every neighborhood there is a mosque. Do we, in fact, have enough
schools? Instead of building mosques, please open new schools.

11

Those who visited the park know very well that there are enough mosques
around. It is true that our worship sites are the mosques; of course, the mosque
should be constructed; I do not say it shouldnt be. But everywhere has already
become concrete and stone; since we have scarce green areas, please leave
them with us.

12

One of the present authors interviewed the leaders of two different civil initiative
groups that are highly active in environmental and urban issues. Ayla Aydndoyum,
the leader of the Caddebostan Environmental Volunteers Platform, told us that the
neighborhood residents do not have any need for extra sanctuaries; she noted that
there are already four mosques around the park: Ttnc Mehmet Efendi Camii,
Galip Pa

[ SCEDI L]

a Camii, Selamie

[ SCEDI L]

me Camii, and Fenerbahe Camii. Aydndoyum further
opined:
We believe that these mosques meet the needs of the neighborhood. People
here keep their prayers with themselves. They do not perform fake prayers.
Hence, there is a multitude of religions here along with Islam. Only during the
religious holidays and the month of holy Ramadan are the mosques full. At
other times they are sparsely used.

13
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The Mosque as a Divisive Symbol

493
Aydndoyum says that she observed that the usual mosque attendants are porters,
guards, and other apartment workers. She complained that there are even people
who used the mosque solely to use the toilet. The reason why the owners of trades
around the park want the mosque, Aydndoyum explained, is that there will be more
people shopping and spending money. She listed the negative aspects of the project
as follows: its potential to aggravate the traffic problem, the likelihood that the
incidents of theft will increase, and most importantly, the green will die out. In her
overall evaluation, Aydndoyum said, I do not see the mosque project as an inno-
cent act. It is an entirely political event. As social democratic voters make up an
overwhelming majority here, the mosque decision is an act to punish them.

14

Ye

[ SCEDI L]

im Menderes, the leader of the Kadky Health Solidarity Foundation
(KASDAV), also stated that the people of the neighborhood do not need new mosques.
She added that they collected signatures against the project, and that the signatures
were attached to the petition of the Kadky mayor, Selami ztrk, who brought suit
against the project in the local administrative court. Like Aydndoyum, Menderes,
too, addressed the potential traffic density, the scarcity of green areas, and so forth.
She stressed that they would object to any construction in green areas, be it a mosque,
a school, or a hospital. On the political quality of the project, she opined as follows:
Beneath the project lies the desire to take over Kadky, because the constitu-
ency here has since long been politically social democratic. The Prime Minis-
ter, especially prior to the last elections, said, I want Kadky. However, the
social democrats once again won the elections by a landslide victory.

15

The mosque project in Gztepe and the political disputes revolving around it
serve to remind us of a similar decision to build a huge mosque complex in Taksim
Square more than a decade ago, one that shook the political landscape of Turkey
more thoroughly for many years.

The Taksim Project: The Mosque Challenges Secular and Global Symbols

The Taksim project elicited more lasting and serious debates than the Gztepe issue,
based not on the loss of green, but on the allegations that the Islamist Welfare Party
(RP) was challenging the cardinal values and symbols of the Turkish Republics
secularist establishment. Taksim Square is a locus of multiple symbols, including
the Atatrk Monument, Atatrk Culture Center, Greek Orthodox Church, Marmara
Etap Hotel, McDonalds, historical water distributor (Maksem), and many more. It
is one of the favorite official public spheres of secular Turkey, like the Kzlay and
Ulus Squares in Ankara, and the Konak Square in Izmir.
However, the Taksim project had already occupied the Turkish political agenda a
number of times before the Islamists reawakened it in 1994. Thus, before being an
instrument of Islamic revivalism, it was used as a capital investment of political
populism by the center-right parties such as the Democratic Party (DP) of Adnan
Menderes and the Justice Party (AP) of Sleyman Demirel.
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The history of the mosque project in Taksim Square dates back to the early 1950s,
during the beginning of the multi-party system in Turkey. Unlike the preceding
single-party period, this new era witnessed the return of religious symbols and
discourse to public life. The Association for Monuments of Turkey (Trkiye Antlar
Derne

[ GBREVE]

i) made the first proposal for constructing a mosque in Taksim. The Istanbul
Municipality, to which the application had been submitted, rejected the proposal on
the grounds that there was no suitable place for the mosque in the Taksim area. The
municipal government was occupied by the secularist CHP at the time.

16

The
military coup of 1960 not only dethroned the Menderes government but also pushed
the mosque project off the policy agenda indefinitely.
The second attempt to build a mosque in Taksim started in 1968 when the AP was
in power, yet could only be formalized in 1977, during another reign of Demirel,
this time as the head of a coalition government. Demirels Minister of Culture
applied to the Supreme Council of Monuments (Antlar Yksek Kurulu) for the
construction of the mosque on May 13, 1977. The Council approved the project on
July 9 on the condition that it would not damage the historical Maksem. The project
included a huge mosque, a set of underground markets, a branch of Turkeys
Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankas), and a parking lot.

17

The mosque was to be built
near the Maksem. This lot was owned by different institutions such as the State
Treasury, Bank of Agriculture, and the General Directorate of Pious Foundations
(Vakflar Genel Mdrl

[ GBREVE]

) with varying number of parcels. Thus, the lot first had
to be united under a single legal status, and then opened to construction. To that end,
the Ministry of Public Works passed the necessary legal amendments that would
make the construction of the mosque possible.

18

The military coup of 1980, like its forerunner in 1960, cancelled once again the
mosque project indefinitely. The General Directorate of Pious Foundations, one of
the supporters of the project, was astute in pursuing the construction of the mosque,
and brought suit against the cancellation in the Council of the State. The latter,
however, rejected the suit on December 26, 1983, on the grounds that the zone near
Maksem was not suitable for the mosque and the project was of no public benefit.

19

The mosque project, as a trump card, was reshuffled and opened anew by the
Islamist RP in 1989 during the campaigns for the upcoming local elections. The
proponents of the project established a foundation to sustain and institutionalize
their cause.

20

When the metropolitan and many district municipalities in Istanbul, as
elsewhere, were taken over by the Welfare candidates after the 1994 local elections,
Recep Tayyip Erdo

[ GBREVE]

an (the current Prime Minister) assumed the office of mayor
and put the mosque project at the top of his agenda. On June 21, 1994, Erdo

[ GBREVE]

an
submitted his project to the Municipal Council. The Beyo

[ GBREVE]

lu Municipality, taken
over also by a RP candidate, had already given its consent. In the meantime, the
protocol enabling the Chamber of Architects and Engineers to inspect the construc-
tion projects before the municipalitys final decision was rescinded. Although the
project was approved by the metropolitan municipality, the Protection Council
(Koruma Kurulu) countered it on the grounds that the zone nearby the Maksem was
a historical site including many valuable residues. The Welfare then revised the
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The Mosque as a Divisive Symbol

495
project, and chose the Gezi Park (Promenade Park) as the new zone for the mosque.
The official decision to that end was issued by Beyo

[ GBREVE]

lu Municipality on January 21,
1997.

21

In order to add further legitimacy to the project, the metropolitan municipality
opened an adjudication called the Urban Design Project for Taksim on March 11,
1997. The Consortium of Infra Gesellschaft Fur Umveltplnung Mbh-Yapi Sa

[ GBREVE]

li

[ GBREVE]

i
won the adjudication. Following the approval of the Exchequer and Audit Depart-
ment (Say

[ SCEDI L]

tay), the project was submitted to the Supreme Council of Monuments,
but was declined on March 12, 2001. The metropolitan municipality of Istanbul then
brought suit against the Ministry of Culture but lost the case immediately.

22

The Taksim project could not be realized, nor is it likely to be done so in the fore-
seeable future. However, its repercussions still remain in Turkish political memory
and gain further vividness when similar issues, such as the Gztepe project, are on
the national agenda. Still, this elicited significantly more political tension than the
Gztepe debate among the politicians of the time and public opinion.
The confrontation of the Islamist and secularist circles over the project can be
clearly observed in the mass media of the time. Radical Islamist press organs such
as daily

Akit

fervently supported the mosque project, while the mainstream secular-
ist press, such as the daily

Hrriyet

, opposed it, with each side justifying its position
on different grounds. One position in favor of the mosque project stated:
Those who counter the mosque project saw last Friday, as every Friday, that
the few mosques around Taksim could not sufficiently accommodate the pray-
ing community. Although there are many churches in the area, we have only
two small mosques along Istiklal Caddesi [main street of Beyo

[ GBREVE]

lu district].
That is why people here have to perform their public prayers especially on
Fridays in the streets.

23

Meanwhile, the secularist position against the mosque project was reflected in the
following:
Those who come to Taksim Mescid-

[ SCEDI L]

erif for public prayers on Fridays gather
in the courtyard. Choosing not to go to A

[ GBREVE]

a Camii [a mosque], which is only a
few hundred meters away, they put their prayer rugs on the tramway rails in
Taksim Caddesi. They pray under rain in the open air to give this message:
You see the Mescid [mosque] is too small for the community; a new mosque
is of urgent need. They deliberately ignore the nearby A

[ GBREVE]

a Camii.

24

Both the Taksim and Gztepe projects became important public issues, which
demonstrates both the dynamism of Turkish political culture and its perennial fault-
lines. However, they can be better understood within the broader context of Islamic
resurgence that has marked the political transformation in Turkey since the 1980s.
Since that time, the Islamist movements and political parties have demanded
increasing visibility in the official public sphere, more legitimacy and higher elite
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status in the hierarchy of Turkish democracy. Such efforts within the context of
Istanbul were viewed as an act of re-conquest. Thus, both mosque projects have
grown in importance as an integral part of this broader process.

The Aura of Islamic Re-conquest

The concept of re-conquest or second conquest has been forged relative to the
conquest of Istanbul in 1453 by Mehmet II. Islamist circles in Turkey believe that
Fatih (conqueror) turned the city into a genuine site of Ottoman and Islamic civiliza-
tion. However, in their view, the Westernization currents during the late imperial
area and the radical reforms of the early republican period disengaged the city of its
Turco-Islamic authentic identity, and made it a sham. Thus, leaders of political
Islam in Turkey made the re-conquest, or Islamization, of the city their top priority.
When after the local elections in 1994 the Welfare Party candidates became the
mayors of many metropolises and other important cities, they tried to make some
difference in the name of Islamic recuperation. One such act was adopted by the
greater municipality of Ankara to replace the city logo, an octagonal Hittite sun,
with an Islamic icon inscribed onto city buses in 1994. One author describing the
change wrote, The city buses carried a blue and white logo: a mosque cupola like a
helmet, a minaret on either side, the whole bending inwards into a sickle moon with
a Roman column and a large star in its pincers.

25

However, greater dreams of Islamizing urban topography, as a challenge to the
citys Christian past and secularist present, were had in Istanbul. Among such grand
dreams were the projects to convert the Hagia Sophia Museum into a mosque, to
clear the outer Byzantine walls surrounding the old city, and to build a huge mosque
in Taksim Square. The famous Hagia Sophia, which was originally a Byzantine
Church, was initially converted into a mosque by Fatih Sultan Mehmet as a symbol
of Ottoman hegemony and Islamic establishment. However, the secularist Atatrk
regime turned it into a museum in 1935 as a result of its exclusionary policy toward
Islamic symbols situated in the public sphere.

26

As one author succinctly stated,
While for most secularist Turkish visitors, Ayasofya [Hagia Sophia] represents a
museum of a time past, an Islamist visiting Ayasofya would most likely be lament-
ing its former state as a mosque.
27
Also striking was the use of toponymy (specifically name changes) as an instru-
ment of Islamic re-conquest. The attempt to change the name of Sargzel Street in
the Fatih neighborhood, one of the most conservative areas in Istanbul, to be named
after Mehmet Zahit Kotku, a popular Nakshibendi sheikh, brought out serious
controversy in the political arena. The mayor of Fatih district, Sadettin Tantan, who
was a member of the Motherland Party (ANAP), asked the court, and received, an
order of cassation.
28
The restoration of historic Islamic works of architecture was yet another policy
adopted by the Erdo[ GBREVE] an administration in metropolitan Istanbul in order to revive an
Islamic aura. This was indeed a logical result of Islamist theory that Turco-Islamic
culture and symbolism had been under incessant attacks since the establishment of
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The Mosque as a Divisive Symbol 497
the Turkish Republic. The RP-led municipality was determined to restore and
preserve those assets with great dedication.
To that end, in Eyp, another district well known for its Islamic splendors, the
Adile Sultan, Hsrev Pa[ SCEDI L] a, Baba Haydar, Pertev Pa[ SCEDI L] a, Mihri[ SCEDI L] ah Valide Sultan,
Ferhatpa[ SCEDI L] a, and Abdurrahman Pa[ SCEDI L] a tombs, as well as the Sal Abdlkadir and Zal
Mahmut Pa[ SCEDI L] a mosques, were included in a comprehensive restoration project. The
Eyp Sultan mosque was first restored and illuminated during the night, together
with the nearby historical fountain. The Kuyuba[ SCEDI L] Emin Baba dervish lodge in
Edirnekap was also added to the list for restoration. In the Yldz neighborhood, a
site belonging to the new city, a renovation project was conducted for the historical
Hamidiye Mosque. The Malta and adr villas situated within the Yldz Palace
Complex, one of the chief symbols of the Ottoman Empire, were also restored.
Likewise, the restoration of the Pink, Yellow, and White villas in Emirgan was
completed, and these sites were opened for public use.
29
However, besides these
legitimate efforts of restoration from 1994 through the present, the Islamic under-
standing of public works also constructed unlicensed sanctuaries within many of
these historical sites without the permission of the Protection Council.
30
The Welfare Party administrations, while demanding the end to the ban on wear-
ing headscarves in public institutions, granting equal access of religious high-school
graduates to universities, and other like-minded policies, moved beyond pressing for
freedoms and equality and started to impose certain interdictions in urban public
life. The mayor of Beyo[ GBREVE] lu, for instance, forced the hanging of opaque curtains on
the windows of restaurants in Beyo[ GBREVE] lu that used to serve alcohol, as if they were the
smoky bars of Amsterdam. The greater municipality stopped the sale of alcohol in
the premises under its control. Erdo[ GBREVE] an prohibited billboards from advertising
female swimsuits. He also deemed ballet to be an immoral performance and with-
held his financial and cultural support from this art. Thus, municipal guards soon
began to hunt across public places such as parks and beaches along the Bosphorus in
order to deter people from drinking alcohol in public.
31
Religious and cultural activities such as festivals, festive events, commemoration
observances, and celebrations of remarkable events constituted another vein of the
re-conquest efforts. For instance, Erdo[ GBREVE] an was sworn into office as mayor by citing
the first sura of the Koran, Fatihahone that is generally recited after a person
dies.
32
Since 1994, Islamist mayors have made the anniversary of Istanbuls
conquest an official holiday to be celebrated with an Islamic glory and magnifi-
cence. They also set up tents and pavilions (Ramazan adr) during the holy month
of Ramadan in order to provide food, drink, entertainment and other religious activ-
ities to believers every year in some of the most popular and favorite public spaces
such as the Gezi Park in Taksim and the Sultan Ahmet Square on the peninsula.
During the International Habitat II Conference, sessions were opened with a show
performed by the Ottoman team of musicians to demonstrate that Istanbul had in
fact an Ottoman-Islamic identity.
33
Other individual attempts, such as painting curb-stones in green and white (major
Islamic colors), encouraging the use of headscarf in municipal places, making work
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hours more flexible when Ramadan falls in the fall or winter months (especially in
December when the time for breaking the fast corresponds to the evening rush hour)
all completed the aura of RPs attempts to re-conquer the social landscape.
In addition, new forms of Islamic symbolism are continually being created and
inserted into the urban public sphere. One such recent project of the Topba[ SCEDI L] admin-
istration is to erect a huge Mevlevi statue performing the whirl (semazen) in the
most appropriate place of the city as a contribution to UNs declaration of the year
2007 as the World Mevlana Year.
These trajectories of Islamic re-conquest were further intensified by the overtly
political slogans of Islamist politicians such as Necmettin Erbakan (the veteran
leader of political Islam in Turkey). Many of his statements caused an unending tug-
of-war between Islamists and secularists in the national political landscape. These
statements included: University rectors will show reverence to the headscarf (as if
they were soldiers standing respectfully to receive their commanders salute on a
parade ground); Sharia will become the rule of governance in Turkey, with or
without bloodshed; and Erdo[ GBREVE] ans renditions, One cannot be a true Muslim and
secular person at the same time, and Celebrating the [calendar] New Year is a
foreign custom. Islamist attempts to re-conquer Istanbul and reclaim the public
sphere, however, can best be understood relative to the nation-building process in
the early Republican era, the formation of national identity and official ideology as
well as the constitution of secular public sphere in Turkey.
The Constitution of National Identity and Official Ideology
The roots of the unending struggle between Islam and secularism in Turkey should
be sought in the formative phases of national identity and official ideology. After
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Atatrk regime tried to establish a viable
nation-state with a unitary political and territorial system according to Western stan-
dards. However, religious, ethnic, and cultural diversity in Anatolia was not easy to
accommodate under a unitary state establishment and a societal homogeneity or
cohesion. This was, and continues to be, a nearly universal problem in the Middle
East.
34
The Ottoman Empire, as a host of numerous religious, ethnic, and cultural
communities, was more successful than the republican regime in accommodating
identity problems. First of all, religion was the major bridge between the central
government and local communities. Religious and economic bonds were the main
axes of statesociety relations. Both Muslim and non-Muslim communities, alike,
were allowed to run their intra-community affairs freely, such as civil code, justice,
education, religious leadership and political succession. The central state legiti-
mized its authority on the basis of Sunni Orthodox Islam. The local communities,
too, derived their rights and legitimate demands in the face of the central govern-
ment from religious sources. The latter, however, were diverse and heterodox in
nature. Relative compartmentalization and isolation characterizing the community
life led to tensions both amongst communities and between these communities and
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The Mosque as a Divisive Symbol 499
the imperial power. This system, widely known as the millet system, did not force
any national homogeneity or uniform identity. Millet was used within the Ottoman
nomenclature to denote ethno-religious community. However, Republican Turkey
changed this word to mean nation.
35
The modest identity and ideological compatibility between the imperial center
and communitarian periphery reminds us of the concepts of great tradition and
little tradition, originally formulated by Robert Redfield during his fieldwork
among various ruralurban networks of communities such as the Yucatan in Mexico
and Guatemala. According to Redfield, great tradition consists of the ideology,
science, philosophy, artistic works and cultural elements produced by elite rulers
and intellectuals, while the little tradition includes the arts, emotive characteristics
and religious beliefs of ordinary people.
36
Although ordinary people never practice
great tradition in its entirety, they tend to see it as an ideal model for themselves.
The channels of communication between the two traditions that were functioning
in relative stability during the Ottoman rule broke down altogether when the Kemal-
ist regime adopted Western culture, civilization, secularism and Turkish nationalism
as the anchors of its great tradition. The traditional Muslim majority, the ethnic
Kurds, and non-Muslim minorities, who were the loci of little tradition, felt excluded,
alienated and marginalized by the new regime and its official ideology (or great tradi-
tion). Islam, which once constituted the cement of both great and little traditions, had
been pushed into the domain of little tradition by more coercive and derogatory
mechanisms. As a result, Turkey became a divided country, on the one hand possess-
ing an elitist and authoritarian center, characterized by Westernism, modernism and
secularism, and on the other hand focusing on a more traditional, rural, and religious
periphery dominated by its vernacular, local and authentic culture.
37
In the process of nation-building, the Kemalist rule established new institutions
such as the Turkish Historical Society, Turkish Language Society, Nation Schools,
Peoples Houses, Village Institutes, and new universities in order to formulate its
official identity and diffuse it all over the country. It exercised a strict surveillance
over these institutions. It either closed down or rehabilitated the pre-existing institu-
tions such as the Turkish Hearths. It made all civil society organizations, from sports
to education and from art to charity, the satellites of the ruling party (CHP).
38
The ruling elites engaged themselves in a comprehensive secularization project
through numerous reforms imposed from above. The first pillar of this project was
political secularization that replaced the Ottoman Sultanate with a modern republic
and the Caliphate with a state-sponsored office of religious affairs. The second pillar
was institutional secularization that imposed the adoption of Western patterns in a
large spectrum, from education to law and from economy to the family. The third
pillar was cultural secularization that forced the adoption of various new styles in
art, dress, leisure, and manners. The last pillar of secularization forced the transfor-
mation of public and national symbols from flag to anthem, from toponymy to
spatial symbolism.
39
The new regime placed utmost importance on the construction of its official public
spheres and on restructuring the established centers as the sites of its visibility,
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symbolism, hegemony and power. Authoritarian and totalitarian regimes have
historically used this to make their mark on the public space in more concentric
features compared to pluralistic and democratic governments. This tendency, in their
eyes, provides them with an organic bond with the society they need, and with a
feeling of popular legitimacy.
40
The Construction of the Republican Public Sphere and the Racialization of
Islam
The notion of the public sphere is perhaps one of the most sophisticated concepts
imbued with multiple and situational meanings in the social and political sciences.
Hence, it is no doubt one of the least agreed upon tests for the basic criterion used to
regulate the balance of relations between state and society, as well as religion and
politics. Still, it is a major determinant for the scope and degree of secularism in
modern political systems.
First of all, the public sphere is a terrain of visibility: Only in the light of the
public sphere did that which existed become revealed, did everything become visible
to all.
41
From ancient Greece to the present, all valuable resources such as wealth,
power, virtue, popularity, honor, prestige and valiance had to receive public consent
to gain validity. This consent was only to be obtained in the public sphere. According
to Habermas, [T]he virtues, whose catalogue was codified by Aristotle, were ones
whose test lies in the public sphere and there alone receives recognition.
42
The use of power, the exercise of sovereignty or autonomy, and the state of
legitimacy are defined through mutual relations between the holders of these quali-
ties, and those who give informed consent to them. Therefore, these relations can
only be handled in a public domain. In Habermass analysis, the concept is used in
three different but virtually related meanings. First, the public sphere is the locus of
private transactions on the market; this is called the bourgeois public sphere.
Second, the public sphere means the official domain determined, regulated, and
used by public people as attached to the state establishment. State rules are dictated
also for the actions of private people in these official sites. Such places may be
called as the official public sphere, and are most akin to strong state traditions with
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes rather than pluralist liberal democracies.
Third, the public sphere also means those elements of public opinion that encom-
passes private and public foci such as the mass media, professional associations,
civil society organizations, unions, and voluntary groups that build up and control
the public agenda.
In Turkey, there is not a strong tradition of the bourgeois public sphere due to histor-
ical reasons, such as the absence or weakness of an autonomous bourgeois class in
the Western sense. Further, the public sphere in the sense of public opinion is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon, based on important domestic and global developments
such as liberalization, privatization, and transnationalization. When we say public
sphere in Turkey, one should understand that to mean a state-attached and -dominated
public sphere that is highly formal, elitist, and restrictive, as well as staunchly secular.
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The Mosque as a Divisive Symbol 501
From the outset, the republican regime started to invest large sums in constructing
large monuments, statues, and other symbolically condensed artifacts, such as
Atatrks mausoleum in Ankara and the Atatrk Cultural Center in Istanbul. Topon-
ymy was an asset used ubiquitously to reflect and impose national identity, official
ideology as well as Western and secular culture of the new regime. In almost every
urban settlement, whether large or small, there are numerous Atatrk, Inn,
Cumhuriyet and Istiklal boulevards, streets, squares, stadiums, neighborhoods,
bridges, schools, etc. Large enterprises such as airports, dams, universities, farms,
and other big projects express through their names and symbolic designs the zeal
and irresistibility of the republican loftiness.
All public places such as parks, and squares, and all public institutions from state
offices through schools to village administration rooms are decorated with various
symbols of the republican regime such as Atatrk busts and photos. In fact, the
production of republican symbols evolved as one of the earliest and largest sectors
in Turkey. For larger projects such as monuments and big statues, foreign artists
were hired while subsequently a group of national artists such as Ibrahim all and
Mehmet Inci were encouraged to develop into figures who could fashion future
works.
43
Islamic, Kurdish, and to some extent non-Muslim identities were ousted from the
construction of national identity and official ideology. The dervish lodges, religious
seminaries and sects were all closed down and banned indefinitely. The Kurdish
toponomy was likewise replaced by Turkish translations and equivalents. The
names of few Ottoman figures were given to public institutions. The most popular
figures included Namk Kemal, [ SCEDI L] inasi, Ahmet Vefik Pa[ SCEDI L] a and Mustafa Re[ SCEDI L] it Pa[ SCEDI L] a,
all of whom pioneered the Westernization movement during the late Ottoman
period. Ottoman sultans such as Faith Sultan Mehmet, Yavuz Sultan Selim, and
Kanuni Sultan Sleyman were accorded some place within the official ideology and
public sphere while Abdlhamid II, Said Nursi, Fethullah Glen, and Mehmet Zahit
Kotkuwho were associated with Islamwere kept out of the public domain. Only
some well-known representatives of heterodox Islam such as Yunus Emre, Mevlana
and Ahi Evran were given some place within the official public sphere.
Indeed, the more radical Islamic forces went underground, while the moderates
were pushed into the margins of public life. During the single-party period, even the
villagers visiting Ankara were directed to use side and back streets instead of boule-
vards and central public places due to their traditional appearance, one that was not
seen as compatible with modern secular tenets of the ruling elitie.
44
Ever since,
traditional people were asked to undress their vernacular local headgears and
scarves in state institutions such as courts, police departments and military premises.
Even today, people are asked to bring photos of themselves with their heads
uncovered when they apply for official documents, such as university entrance
exams and passports.
The secularist establishment has thus not only kept the lid closed on Islam, but
has racialized it in the same way the Germans and the British racialized the Jews and
the Irish, respectively.
45
Islam, which had been perceived and presented as a threat,
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now was viewed to be inferior by the ruling elite. However, the Kemalist elite
guarded its official ideology and the secular public sphere through the force of the
bayonet and unalterable constitutional legislation,
46
rather than via a cultural or
ideological hegemony implanted in, and internalized by, the broader sectors of civil
society, such as in the conceptualization of Antonio Gramsci.
47
On the other hand, Islamist politicians such as the current Prime Minister,
Erdo[ GBREVE] an, and Islamist intellectuals, such as Ali Bula, as well as an important
number of other secularist and liberal scholars, have shown that they are well aware
of this alienation and othering of Islam. They have frequently spoken of a meta-
phoric racial division in Turkey with the people divided into white and black
Turks. They suggest that the white Turks include the ruling elite (both civilian
and military), urban middle classes and the upper echelon bourgeoisie, while the
black Turks consist of rural periphery, the suburban poor who make up the majority
in cities, some sectors of the middle classes with Islamist orientations, and small and
medium-sized enterprise holders.
48
Discussion and Conclusion: Islamists Reclaim the Secular Public Sphere
The suppression of Islam by the Kemalist elite as a threat and backward force for
decades led to its evolution as an anti-elitist movement.
49
Since the beginning of the
multi-party system, Islam has gradually started to gain some ground in Turkish poli-
tics and public life as a result of populist responsiveness, which characterizes
competitive politics in Turkey, toward peripheral and grassroots demands.
However, the real resurgence of Islam as a social and political movement was
witnessed after the 1980 military coup. Islam, which had been perceived and
suppressed as a threat until then, was now operationalized as a savior by the military
rule against the perils of severe political polarization and violent clashes that marked
the last two decades. Islam and Turkish nationalism were coined into a composite
official ideology referred to as the Turco-Islamic Synthesis.
50
To back this new
official ideology, officials opened numerous religious schools, and constructed
countless mosques everywhere, even in purely Alevi villages where people perform
their religious activities in cemevis instead of in mosques. Thus puritan secularism
began to lose ground against Islam.
Political Islam, however, was able to gain entirely new ground with zals liberal
economic policies, which introduced market mechanisms, new communications
technologies, and privatization, as well as the emergence of private media organs in
public life. Private radio stations and TV channels began to mushroom all over the
country, both at local and national levels. Identities that were strictly suppressed in
the past, such as Islamic, Kurdish, and Alevi, found new life in the political, social,
cultural and public landscape.
Islamic identities gained visibility in the official public sphere, and moreover,
created their alternative public spheres wherever the traditional public spheres did
not satisfy or welcome their desires. Islamist radio and TV channels, bookstores,
music markets, restaurants, hotels, and beaches, which are referred to as the new
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The Mosque as a Divisive Symbol 503
opportunity spaces by a student of Turkish politics,
51
concurrently formed an
alternative public sphere, one that is similar to the critical bourgeois public sphere in
Europe demanding authoritative regulations on its behalf.
52
The Kemalist elite tend to perceive Islamic resurgence as a direct attempt to
abolish the republican democracy and replace it with an Islamic regime. This fear
may seem to be partially justified in appearance, but in reality we also come across a
number of different motivating factors on the part of Islamic movements.
First, the Islamists try to redefine the codes of Turkish modernity that until recently
had excluded them. To that end, they refashioned traditional symbols, such as the
headscarf, to show their being more modern, cultured, educated and conscious.
Islamist woman university students, for example, stripped the headscarf of its tradi-
tional style. Traditionally, it was used to cover a womans head, but loosely allowed
the visibility of the forehead and some parts of the hair on the front and back sides of
the head. The founder and first chair of the YK (Board of Higher Education), Prof.
Ihsan Do[ GBREVE] ramac, misnamed it as a Trban (a type of headgear used by men in old
times), and completely banned it. The new fashion, however, is to cover students
heads so tightly as that it prevents any visibility of the hair, and even the entire
circumference of the neckonly a limited part of the face was left open. Some called
this new style of head-covering skmaba[ S CEDI L] (tight-covered head). The skmaba[ S CEDI L] had
a pendulum of meanings swinging between participation and revolt.
53
While Islam-
ists are claiming that it is a way of participating in modern public life, the secularists
perceive it as a direct challenge to, and revolt against, the republican establishment.
Likewise, sex segregation, tesettr (Islamic veiling for women), and other features
were re-codified as modern, and inserted into the public sphere.
54
In all these attempts, Islamists envied, rather than condemned altogether, the
Kemalist codes of modernism, urbanity, universalism, and civilization. In other
words, they wished to enjoy these qualities, together with their own religious and
conservative features, instead of simply setting up an entirely new form of state
ruled according to Sharia (Islamic law). In fact some Islamists even claim that they
are also secularist. This is done to redefine secularism, like other principles of
Turkish official ideology, in order to legitimize their own religious qualities and
manners as the integral parts of national identity. In a way, they wish to fulfill their
vision of restoring the great traditions of Turkey once again. Their stance seems to
be compromising, at least for the present, in that they do not claim an Islamic
monopoly over Turkeys great traditions but seek to join its constitution as an equal
partner.
Second, although Islamists have attempted to set up a broad societal sector with a
full-fledged hierarchical structure including elite, medium and grassroots positions
based on mainstream socioeconomic status criteria such as wealth, education, occu-
pation, housing qualities and leisure activities, they try in earnest to integrate them-
selves into the established echelons of official hierarchy. In other words, they wish
to be recognized as the members of high society by using Islamic commodities such
as haute couture clothing, spending time in luxury places, shopping at prestigious
markets, attending universities, and working at qualified and professional jobs. For
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example, Erbakan held his daughters wedding ceremony at the Istanbul Sheraton
Hotel in 1994. Although received with criticism and anger by the poor Islamists, this
was an attempt to enjoy the prestige and distinction sought after by the urban well-
to-do.
55
Third, with their aura of re-conquest, Islamists seek the approval of both the
Kemalists and global spectators, comprised mainly of foreign missionaries and tour-
ists. By resurfacing and inscribing local, traditional and Islamic symbols (both past
and present) in the most central and favorite urban places, they demand recognition
and legitimacy for their identity as a valuable global asset.
56
Here, the local
elements, history, culture and symbols are translated into global values via the
opportunities provided by a global city, Istanbul. Istanbuls Islamic (Ottoman)
pasttailored as tolerant, pluralistic, and with just governanceis articulated into
the trajectories of globalism. Here, Kemalism and globalism are the core reference
points for Islamic identity formation, rather than the inimical others.
57
Fourth and finally, spatial organization and symbolism express the dominant
identity, culture, and form of governance in a society. For example, Islamabad
signifies that we are in a Muslim city, while Leningrad tells us that we are in a
communist state.
58
Moreover, they serve as the direct expression of the dominant
power and of its degree and scope of influence over society. Thus, access to space
means access to power.
59
This is especially true of central places, in which most
monumental features are organized to testify to the existence and legitimacy of the
dominant power. However, these places also attract the greatest challenges and
opposition to domination. Any social or political movement that can mobilize the
minimum level of resources (money, members, outside support) rushes into monu-
mental official sites to protest the dominant power on issues that disturb them.
Thus, like the ballot, recruitment of public institutions and other forms of repre-
sentation in monumental spaces is a crucial means for Islamists to prove that they
are organized, important, and powerful. The mosque projects in Taksim and
Gztepe are thus concerted attempts at taking over some of the dominant power
through symbolic inscription.
The roots of Islamic understanding of politics can also shed some light on the moti-
vations behind such projects. Rainer Hermann draws an interesting distinction
between politics in the West and politics in Islam. He writes, In Western Languages
politics stand for more than just political parties and parliamentarian debates. Polis
is the antique city, in which free citizens interact. Polis is space; politics is public
space.
60
Although in limited terms, politics here imply a process of negotiation,
public debate as well as compromise and conflict resolution, which of course exclude
the slaves who made up the overwhelming majority of the population. This exclusion
was imposed on the plebeians, peasants, and other disadvantaged groups during the
Middle Ages. Even today, racial and ethnic minorities, the homeless, immigrants,
and other underclass sectors cannot be sufficiently accommodated into the political
process in the West.
According to Hermann, Siyasa is an Arabic noun originally meaning horse, the
ultimate symbol of power Medina, the Arabic word for polis, one derivation from
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The Mosque as a Divisive Symbol 505
the same root as din, religion, Medina does not imply the public sphere where free
citizens operate; it stands for the court district of a judge, and he judges according to
Islamic law.
61
At least there is partial truth in this conceptualization. Having grown
extremely thirsty of power, prestige, recognition, legitimacy and elite status, Islamist
groups both in central government and local administrations not only try to grasp
official establishment but also take over the voluntary organizations, professional
associations, unions and autonomous institutions either by hook or by crook. Their
styles and manners to that end often exhibit certain deficits of political courtesy.
To these un-institutionalized and intricate steps of take-over, secularist circles
both within the establishment and civil society respond actively. Secularist sectors
of civil society were dormant and even indifferent to the cool and boring state cere-
monies in the past when official ideology, particularly its principle of secularism,
remained unchallenged. However, with the rise of political Islam, they started to
offset the anti-secularist challenge by organizing themselves in conscious and
immanent activities. In other words, the cultural and ideological hegemony that the
Kemalist elite failed to create in several decades has been engraved in Turkish civil
society by the potential of Islamic domination.
The struggle between secularists and Islamists over the public sphere is likely to
continue for the foreseeable future. During this period, one can expect that each side
will try to domesticate the other while moderating itself. These hitherto unmixed
rival circles will develop more horizontal interactions that might bring negotiation,
peaceful debate and compromise. We observe some hints to that end in the present
events. For example, a socialist monthly, Birikim, has been publishing the works of
Islamist scholars such as Ali Bula and Abdurrahman Dilipak along with those of
socialist intellectuals for about 15 years. Likewise, in a recent TV program hosted
by Nazl Ilcak on Channel 7 (an Islamist channel), one of the participants was Vural
Sava[ SCEDI L] , the former Chief Prosecutor of the State, an irrevocable representative of
puritan secularism, who featured the closure of Islamist Welfare and Virtue parties
one after the other. However, such examples are too few to establish a regular
dialogue between the two sides; they still make up the exception rather than the rule.
However, further polarization of the struggle between Islamists and secularists is
not entirely out of the realm of possibility. Even worse is that some forces, both
domestic and international, may attempt to scratch this wound for political rent
whenever it begins to heal over. The recent attacks on the offices of daily Cumhu-
riyet in Istanbul and the Council of State in Ankara are just two such provocative
examples. These attempts may have been designed to create mass mobilization and
consciousness against the Islamist policies of the Erdo[ GBREVE] an government as well as to
weaken its chance of victory in the upcoming national elections. While the secular-
ist public opinion leaders try to show the attackers to be in cohorts with Islamist
fanatics who are suspected of being supported by the incumbent government, the
latter tries to put the blame on some illegal organizations or gangs that are nested
within the secularist state establishment.
The characteristics of Islamist and secularist youth in Turkey fortunately tend to
keep themselves away from violence. The secularist sector, being Westernized,
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506 S. im ek et al. S s
well-educated and highly cultured, does not engage itself easily and readily in
violence. Islamist youth, on the other hand, with middle class ideals and tactics that
are supported by the peaceful doctrine of their religion, are likewise reluctant to
attach priority to violence, with the exception of some fanatic elements such as the
Turkish Hizbullah. In other words, compared to the ultra-nationalist Turkish
Kurdish or even AleviSunni divide, where there are many more uneducated and
underclass people, the Islamistsecularist clash is fortunately far more difficult to
exacerbate.
Despite all of this, the Islamistsecularist controversy seems to have existed for a
long time as a means of informal political contest among opponent forces, along with
formal instruments such as elections. The present government seems neither to be
fully competent nor too willing to solve the issues leading to this controversy. If it
solves them with great determination, this may elicit a strong reaction from secular-
ists as well as its own non-religious and even mildly religious supporters. The body
politic of the AKP, which is blatantly a coalition of various groups with different
interests and tendencies, may not sustain the heavy cost of this policy. On the other
hand, the existence of such a controversy may enable it to keep its cause vibrant and
its supporters engaged. Thus, we should not be surprised if Islamists forge new
controversial projects as in the case of Taksim Square and Gztepe Park, and the
secularist repeatedly counterattack them.
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Ayla Aydndoyum and Ye[ SCEDI L] im Menderes, leaders of two
prominent civil initiative groups working on environmental and urban issues, for
helping with this research project as interviewees.
Notes
1. M. Duvakl, Topba[ SCEDI L] : Belediye Meclisinin Gztepe Parkna Cami Yaplmas Karar Geerli
[Topba[ SCEDI L] : The Decision of the Municipal Council to Build a Mosque in Gztepe Park Valid], daily
Zaman, October 1, 2005.
2. www.kanald.com.tr.
3. N. Alkan, Gztepeye Cami Projesi Tabana Oksijen mi? [Is the Mosque Project in Gztepe an
Attempt to Give Oxygen to the Base?], daily Birgn, November 6, 2005.
4. This observation is based on our ethnographic field notes. One of the authors joined the meeting as
an ethnographer, and took research notes for our study.
5. Kadir Topba[ SCEDI L] , Birileri Gztepede Halk Camiye Kar[ SCEDI L] K[ SCEDI L] krtyor [Some Provoke People in
Gztepe Against the Mosque], daily Zaman, October 26, 2005.
6. M. Duvakl, Cami Tart[ SCEDI L] mas Yolsuzluk [ I DOT ] ddialarn rtmek [ I DOT ] in kartld [The Mosque Debate
Brought Out to Conceal the Allegations of Corruption], daily Zaman, September 25, 2005.
7. Matrusk is a Russian toy and souvenir. It includes a number of identical items different only in their
size so that they can be placed in one another in a larger set, one that seems to be a single item.
8. T.C. Lewellen, Political Anthropology (South Hadley, MA: Bergin and Garvey, 1983).
9. Among many such Internet sites, see, for example, www.cnnturk.net and www.sabah.com.tr. We had
better remind the readers that participants of Internet surveys do not amount to a nation-wide repre-
sentative sample because, first of all, they are Internet users: not all Turkish people are Internet users;
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The Mosque as a Divisive Symbol 507
second, they are sensitive to the issue, positively or negatively: not all Turkish people may make the
mosque issue their primary concern. Thus, the results of these surveys should be received with reser-
vation and within their limitations. Still, they give some indication about the pulse of public opinion.
10. www.istanbul.com, October 31, 2005.
11. www.istanbul.com, September 23, 2005.
12. www.e-kolay.net, December 21, 2005.
13. Interview with Ayla Aydondoyum, the leader of the Caddebostan Environmental Volunteers
Platform, February 5, 2006.
14. Ibid.
15. Interview with Ye[ SCEDI L] im Menderes, leader of the KASDAV, February 5, 2006, Istanbul.
16. G. Baykal, The Iconography of Taksim Square, unpublished masters thesis (Istanbul: Bosphorus
University, 2000), pp.635.
17. Ibid., p.66; K. Diyerbekir, Bitmeyen yk [Unending Story], daily Hrriyet, April 5, 1999.
18. Baykal (2000), p.66; Diyerbekir (1999).
19. Baykal (2000), p.67.
20. Ibid., p.69.
21. O. Ekinci, Istanbulun Islambol On Yl [Istanbuls Islam-Abundant Decade] (Istanbul: Anahtar
Kitaplar, 2004), pp.1742.
22. O. Ekinci, Taksime Cami Yaplamaz [The Mosque Cannot Be Built in Taksim], daily Cumhu-
riyet, May 14, 2002.
23. Istanbul Moskova m? [Is Istanbul Moscow?], daily Akit, February 2, 1997.
24. Taksime Korsan Cami [Pirate Mosque in Taksim], daily Hrriyet, January 11, 2000.
25. J.B. White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press,
2002), p.53.
26. T. Bora, Istanbul of the Conqueror: The Alternative Global City Dreams of Political Islam, in .
Keyder (ed.), Istanbul Between the Global and the Local (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999),
pp.4950; A. Yldz, Politico-Religious Discourse of Political Islam in Turkey, Muslim World,
Vol.93, No.2 (April 2003) pp. 187209.
27. Y. Navaro-Yashin, The Historical Construction of Local Culture: Gender and Identity in the Politics
of Secularism versus Islam, in . Keyder (ed.), Istanbul Between the Global and the Local
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), p.59.
28. Ekinci (2004).
29. Istanbul Byk[ SCEDI L] ehir Belediyesi [Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul], Istanbul Yeniden
Yaplanyor [Istanbul in Reconstruction] (Istanbul: Istanbul Byk[ SCEDI L] ehir Belediyesi, 1997).
30. Ekinci (2004), pp.1942.
31. Navaro-Yashin (1999), p.72; T. Lashnits, Recep Tayyip Erdo[ GBREVE] an (Philadelphia, PA: Chelsea House
Publishers, 2005), p.76; Bora (1999), p.53.
32. M. Heper and [ SCEDI L] . Tokta[ SCEDI L] , Islam, Modernity, and Democracy in Contemporary Turkey: The Case of
Recep Tayyip Erdo[ GBREVE] an, Muslim World, Vol.93, No.2 (April 2003) pp. 157185.
33. Ekinci (2004).
34. P.R. Kumaraswamy, Who Am I?: The Identity Crisis in the Middle East, Middle East Review of
International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol.10, No.1 (March 2006) pp. 6373.
35. A. Bartu, Who Owns the Old Quarters? Rewriting History in a Global Era, in . Keyder (ed.),
Istanbul Between the Global and the Local (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), pp.3145; .
Keyder, Introduction, in . Keyder (ed.), Istanbul Between the Global and the Local (Lanham:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1999); . Ta[ SCEDI L] pnar, Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey
(New York: Routledge, 2005), pp.1119.
36. S. [ SCEDI L] im[ SCEDI L] ek, Yeni Trkiyede Byk Gelenek-Kk Gelenek Etkile[ SCEDI L] imi [The Interaction Between
Great Tradition and Little Tradition in Republican Turkey], Trkiye Gnl[ GBREVE] , No.59 (JanuaryFebruary
2000), p.26.
37. M.H. Yavuz, Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.54,
No.1 (Fall 2000), p.22.
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508 S. im ek et al. S s
38. S. [ SCEDI L] im[ SCEDI L] ek, Halkevleri: Bir Ideolojik Seferberlik Deneyimi, 19321951 [Peoples Houses: An
Experiment in Ideological Mobilization, 19321951] (Istanbul: Bosphorus University Press, 2002).
39. B. Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey (Leiden: Brill, 1981).
40. S. [ SCEDI L] im[ SCEDI L] ek, Peoples Houses as a Nationwide Project for Ideological Mobilization in Early
Republican Turkey, Turkish Studies, Vol.6, No.1 (March 2005), pp.757.
41. J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992),
p.4.
42. Ibid., p.4.
43. Y. Navaro-Yashin, The Market for Identities: Secularism, Islamism, Commodities, in D. Kandiyoti
and A. Saktanber (eds.), Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey (New Brunswick,
NJ: Rutger University Press, 2002), p.230.
44. Yavuz (2000), p.24.
45. R. Miles and S. Small, Racism and Ethnicity, in S. Taylor (ed.), Sociology: Issues and Debates
(Hampshire: Palgrave, 2000).
46. The preamble of the Turkish constitution, which defines and guarantees the unitary, secularist, legal,
and political qualities of the state, can never be amended even with parliamentary unanimity.
47. A. Swingewood, Sociological Theory, in S. Taylor (ed.), Sociology: Issues and Debates (Hampshire:
Palgrave, 2000).
48. R. Hermann, Political Islam in Secular Turkey, Islam and ChristianMuslim Relations, Vol.14,
No.3 (July 2003), p.267; Yavuz (2000), p.22.
49. Ta[ SCEDI L] pnar (2005), p.123.
50. P. Tank, Political Islam in Turkey: A State of Controlled Secularity, Turkish Studies, Vol.6, No.1
(March 2005), p.15.
51. M.H. Yavuz, Opportunity Spaces, Identity, and Islamic Meaning in Turkey, in Q. Wictorowicz
(ed.), Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN:
Indiana University Press, 2004), pp.27885.
52. Habermas (1992), p.27.
53. E. Kalayco[ GBREVE] lu, The Mystery of the Trban: Participation or Revolt? Turkish Studies, Vol.6,
No.2 (June 2005), pp.23351.
54. Hermann (2003), p.266; J.B. White, The Islamist Paradox, in D. Kandiyoti and A. Saktanber
(eds.), Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutger Univer-
sity Press, 2002), p.194.
55. White (2002), p.197.
56. A. Inan-nar, Refah Party and the City Administration of Istanbul: Liberal Islam, Localism and
Hybridity, New Perspectives on Turkey, No.16 (Spring 1997), pp.246.
57. Bartu (1999), pp.3940; Bora (1999), pp.4950.
58. E.F. Bergman, Human Geography: Cultures, Connections and Landscapes (Eaglewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1995).
59. Baykal (2000), pp.6, 156.
60. Hermann (2003), p.266.
61. Ibid.
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