G.R. No.

L-44896 July 31, 1936

RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER v.
!ANUEL ". !ORAN, Ju#$% o& F'() *+),+-% o&
!,+'l,
F,-): This petition is for a writ of prohibition
overruled with a view to preventing the Court of First
Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the
criminal action filed against him. The petitioner was
an accredited honorary consul of ruguay at Manila.
!e was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Manila of falsification of a private document. !e
ob"ected to the "urisdiction of the court on the ground
that both under the Constitution of the nited #tates
and the Constitution of the $hilippines the court
below had no "urisdiction to try him. !is ob"ection
was overruled hence this present petition.
*u%: %hether or not the Court of First Instance of
Manila has "urisdiction to try the petitioner.
H%l#: The counsel for the petitioner contend that the
CIF of Manila has no "urisdiction according to &ticle
III #ec. ' of the nited #tates Constitution which
stipulated that the #upreme Court of the nited
#tates has original "urisdiction in all cases affecting
ambassadors( public ministers( and consuls( and
such "urisdiction which e)cludes the courts of the
$hilippines and that that such "urisdiction is
conferred e)clusively upon the #upreme Court of the
$hilippines. Al).ou$. %-)'o+ 1/ o& A-) No. 136
v%) '+ ).% Su0(%1% Cou() ).% o('$'+,l
2u('#'-)'o+ )o 'u% 3(')
o& mandamus, certiorari, 0(o.'4')'o+, .,4%,
-o(0u, ,+# quo warranto, u-. 2u('#'-)'o+,
3, ,lo -o+&%((%# o+ ).% Cou() o& F'()
*+),+-% 4y ).% Co#% o& C'v'l 5(o-%#u(%. *&ct +o.
,-.( secs. ,-/( ',/( '''( ''0( and 1'1.2 It results
that the original "urisdiction possessed and e)ercised
by the #upreme Court of the $hilippine Islands was
not e)clusive of( but concurrent with( that of the
Courts of First Instance. !ence( the Court of
Instance has "urisdiction over the petitioner.
G.R. No. 167867 J,+u,(y 68, 6888
JEFFRE9 L*ANG :HUEFENG; v. 5EO5LE OF
<HE 5H*L*55*NES
F,-): $etitioner is an economist working with the
&sian 3evelopment 4ank *&342. !e was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court *MeTC2 of
Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral
defamation for uttering defamatory words against
fellow &34 worker 5oyce Cabal. $etitioner was
arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC.
6n &pril ,7( ,--8( the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City( acting pursuant to an advice from
the 3epartment of Foreign &ffairs that petitioner
en"oyed immunity from legal processes under
#ection 81 of the &greement between the &34 and
the $hilippine 9overnment regarding the
!ead:uarters of the &34 *hereinafter &greement2
dismissed the two criminal cases without notice to
the prosecution. 6n a petition for certiorari and
mandamus filed by the $eople( the ;egional Trial
Court of $asig City( 4ranch ,0.( annulled and set
aside the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court
dismissing the criminal cases. &fter the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied(
petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a
petition for review arguing that he is covered by
immunity under the &greement and that no
preliminary investigation was held before the
criminal cases were filed in court.
*u%: %hether or not the petitioner is covered by
immunity.
H%l#: The 3F&<s determination that a certain person
is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has
no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the
3F&<s advice and in motu propio dismissing the two
criminal cases without notice to the prosecution( the
latter<s right to due process was violated.
Furthermore( the immunity mentioned under #ection
81 of the &greement is not absolute( but sub"ect to
the e)ception that the act was done in =official
capacity.= It should have been determined first if the
case falls within the ambit of #ection 81*a2 thus( the
prosecutor should have been given the chance to
rebut the 3F& $rotocol. Finally( slandering a person
could not possibly be covered by the immunity
agreement because our laws do not allow the
commission of a crime( such as defamation( in the
name of official duty. !ence( the petitioner is
covered by immunity.
G.R. No. L-37131 Nov%14%( 69, 19/6
<HE =ORLD HEAL<H ORGAN*>A<*ON ,+# DR.
LEONCE "ERS<U9F< v. HON. BENJA!*N H.
A?U*NO, , 5(%'#'+$ Ju#$% o& B(,+-. "***,
Cou() o& F'() *+),+-% o& R'@,l
F,-): The present petition is an original action
for certiorari and prohibition to set aside respondent
"udge<s refusal to :uash a search warrant issued by
him at the instance of respondents Constabulary
6ffshore &ction Center *C6#&C2 officers for the
search and seizure of the personal effects of
>erstuyft of the %!6 *%orld !ealth 6rganization2
notwithstanding his being entitled to diplomatic
immunity( as duly recognized by the ?)ecutive
branch of the government and to prohibit respondent
"udge from further proceedings in the matter.
The #ecretary of Foreign &ffairs Carlos $. ;omulo
pleaded to !on. &:uino that 3r. >erstuyft is entitled
to immunity from search in respect for his personal
baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic
missions pursuant to the !ost &greement and
further re:uested for the suspension of the search
warrant. The #olicitor 9eneral accordingly "oined the
petitioner for the :uashal of the search warrant but
respondent "udge nevertheless summarily denied
the :uash hence( the petition at bar.
*u%: %hether or not personal effect of %!6
6fficer 3r. >erstuyft can be e)empted from search
and seizure under the diplomatic immunity.
H%l#: The e)ecutive branch of the $hils has
e)pressly recognized that >erstuyft is entitled to
diplomatic immunity( pursuant to the provisions of
the !ost &greement. The 3F& formally advised
respondent "udge of the $hilippine 9overnment<s
official position. The #olicitor 9eneral( as principal
law officer of the gorvernment( likewise e)pressly
affirmed said petitioner<s right to diplomatic immunity
and asked for the :uashal of the search warrant.
The unfortunate fact remains that respondent "udge
chose to rely on the suspicion of respondents
C6#&C officers =that the other remaining crates
unopened contain contraband items=
The provisions of ;epublic &ct /1 declares as null
and void writs or processes sued out or prosecuted
whereby inter alia the person of an ambassador or
public minister is arrested or imprisoned or his goods
or chattels are seized or attached and makes it a
penal offense for =every person by whom the same
is obtained or prosecuted( whether as party or as
attorney( and every officer concerned in e)ecuting it=
to obtain or enforce such writ or process.
The Court( therefore( holds the respondent "udge
acted without "urisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in not ordering the :uashal of the search
warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic
immunity of petitioner >erstuyft. The writs of
certiorari and prohibition from the petitioners were
granted.
G.R. No. 87/78 S%0)%14%( 68, 1998
*N<ERNA<*ONAL CA<HOL*C *!!*GRA<*ON
CO!!*SS*ON v. HON. 5URA CALLEJA *N HER
CA5AC*<9 AS D*REC<OR OF <HE BUREAU OF
LABOR RELA<*ONS
F,-):
&s an aftermath of the >ietnam %ar( the plight of
>ietnamese refugees fleeing from #outh >ietnam<s
communist rule confronted the international
community.
In response to this crisis( on '7 February ,-@,( an
&greement was forged between the $hilippine
9overnment and the nited +ations !igh
Commissioner for ;efugees whereby an operating
center for processing IndoAChinese refugees for
eventual resettlement to other countries was to be
established in 4ataan .
ICMC was one of those accredited by the $hilippine
9overnment to operate the refugee processing
center in Morong( 4ataan. It was incorporated in
+ew Bork( #&( at the re:uest of the !oly #ee( as a
nonAprofit agency involved in international
humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered
with the nited +ations ?conomic and #ocial
Council *?C6#6C2 and en"oys Consultative #tatus(
Category II. &s an international organization
rendering voluntary and humanitarian services in the
$hilippines( its activities are parallel to those of the
International Committee for Migration *ICM2 and the
International Committee of the ;ed Cross
6n ,8 5uly ,-@0( Trade nions of the $hilippines
and &llied #ervices *T$&#2 filed with the then
Ministry of Cabor and ?mployment a $etition for
Certification ?lection among the rank and file
members employed by ICMC The latter opposed the
petition on the ground that it is an international
organization registered with the nited +ations and(
hence( en"oys diplomatic immunity.
*u%: %hether or not the grant of diplomatic
privileges and immunites to ICMC e)tends to
immunity from the application of $hilippine labor
laws.
H%l#:
The grant of immunity from local "urisdiction to ICMC
is clearly necessitated by their international
character and respective purposes. The ob"ective is
to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by
the host country in their internal workings. The
e)ercise of "urisdiction by the 3epartment of Cabor in
these instances would defeat the very purpose of
immunity( which is to shield the affairs of
international organizations( in accordance with
international practice( from political pressure or
control by the host country to the pre"udice of
member #tates of the organization( and to ensure
the unhampered performance of their functions
ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever
there are disputes to be settled. #ection 7, of the
Convention on the $rivileges and Immunities of the
#pecialized &gencies of the nited +ations ,/
provides that =each specialized agency shall make
provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: *a2
disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of
private character to which the specialized agency is
a party.= Moreover( pursuant to &rticle I> of the
Memorandum of &greement between ICMC the the
$hilippine 9overnment( whenever there is any
abuse of privilege by ICMC( the 9overnment is free
to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded.
Clauses on "urisdictional immunity are said to be
standard provisions in the constitutions of
international 6rganizations. =The immunity covers
the organization concerned( its property and its
assets. It is e:ually applicable to proceedings in
personam and proceedings in rem.
ICMC did not invoke its immunity and( therefore(
may be deemed to have waived it( assuming that
during that period *,-@7A,-@12 it was tacitly
recognized as en"oying such immunity.
$etition is 9;&+T?3( the 6rder of the 4ureau of
Cabor ;elations for certification election is #?T
&#I3?( and the Temporary ;estraining 6rder earlier
issued is made
G.R. No. 178888, July 6, 6887
S%+,)o( AAu'l'+o 5'1%+)%l, J(., %) ,l. v O&&'-% o& ).%
EB%-u)'v% S%-(%),(y (%0(%%+)%# 4y Ho+. Al4%()o
Ro1ulo, ,+# <.% D%0,()1%+) O& Fo(%'$+ A&&,'(,
R%0(%%+)%# By Ho+. Bl, O0l%
F,-) C This is a petition for mandamus to compel the
6ffice of the ?)ecutive #ecretary and the 3epartment of
Foreign &ffairs to transmit *even without the signature of
the $resident2 the signed copy of the ;ome #tatute of the
International Criminal Court *ICC2 to the #enate of the
$hilippines for its concurrence or ratification A in
accordance with #ection ',( &rticle >II of the ,-@/
Constitution.
$etitioners contend that that ratification of a treaty( under
both domestic law and international law( is a function of
the #enate. That under the treaty law and customary
international law( $hilippines has a ministerial duty to ratify
the ;ome #tatute.
;espondents on the other hand( :uestioned the legal
standing of herein petitioners and argued that e)ecutive
department has no duty to transmit the ;ome #tatute to
the #enate for concurrence.
*u% C
%hether or not petitioners have the legal
standing to file the instant suit.
%hether or not the ?)ecutive #ecretary and the
3epartment of Foreign &ffairs have the
ministerial duty to transmit to the #enate the copy
of the ;ome #tatute signed by the $hilippine
Member to the nited +ations even without the
signature of the $resident.
H%l#C 6nly #enator $imentel has a legal standing to the
e)tent of his power as member of Congress. 6ther
petitioners have not shown that they have sustained a
direct in"ury from the nonAtransmittal and that they can
seek redress in our domestic courts.
$etitionersD interpretation of the Constitution is incorrect.
The power to ratify treaties does not belong to the #enate.
nder ?.6. 81-( the 3epartment of Foreign &ffairs *3F&2
prepares the ratification papers and forward the signed
copy to the $resident for ratification. &fter the $resident
has ratified it( 3F& shall submit the same to the #enate for
concurrence.
The $resident has the sole authority to negotiate and
enter into treaties( the Constitution provides a limitation to
his power by re:uiring the concurrence of 'E7 of all the
members of the #enate for the validity of the treaty
entered into by him. #ection ',( &rticle >II of the ,-@/
Constitution provides that Fno treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in
by at least twoAthirds of all the Members of the #enate.G
The participation of the legislative branch in the treatyA
making process was deemed essential to provide a check
on the e)ecutive in the field of foreign relations.
It should be emphasized that under the Constitution the
power to ratify is vested in the $resident sub"ect to the
concurrence of the #enate. The $resident has the
discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the
$hilippine representative whether or not to ratify a treaty.
The signature does not signify final consent( it is
ratification that binds the state to the provisions of the
treaty and renders it effective.
#enate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent(
concurrence to the ratification. It is within the $resident to
refuse to submit a treaty to the #enate or having secured
its consent for its ratification( refuse to ratify it. #uch
decision is within the competence of the $resident alone(
which cannot be encroached by this court via writ of
mandamus(
Thus( the petition is 3I#MI##?3.
G. R. No. 16/919, F%4(u,(y 14, 688/
5l,('#%l !. A4,y, v. Ho+. S%-(%),(y H%(1o$%+% E.
E4#,+%, J(.
FAC<SC
6n May /( '..8 4ids and &wards Committee *4&C2 of the
3epartment of $ublic %orks and !ighways *3$%!2
issued a ;esolution +o. $5!CA&A.8A.,'. It was approved
by 3$%! &cting #ecretary Florante #ori:uez. This
resolution recommended the award to China ;oad H
4ridge Corporation of the contract for the implementation
of civil works for Contract $ackage +o. I *C$ I2( which
consists of the improvementErehabilitation of the #an
&ndresA>iracA5ct. 4agoA>iga road( with the lengt of /-.@,@
kilometers( in the island province of Catanduanes.
This Coan &greement +o. $!A'.8 was e)ecuted by and
between the 54IC and the $hilippine 9overnment
pursuant to the e)change of +otes e)ecuted by and
between Mr. Boshihisa &ra( &mbassador ?)traordinary
and $lenipotentiary of 5apan to the $hilippines( and then
Foreign &ffairs #ecretary #iazon( in behalf of their
respective governments.
*SSUEC
%hether or not the Coan &greement +o. $!A'.8 between
the 54IC and the $hilippine 9overnment is a kind of a
treaty.
HELDC
The Coan &greement +o. $!A'.8 taken in con"unction
with the ?)change of +otes dated 3ecember '/( ,---
between the 5apanese 9overnment and the $hilippine
9overnment is an e)ecutive agreement.
&n Fe)change of notesG is a record of a routine agreement
that has many similarities with the private law contract.
The agreement consists of the e)change of two
documents( each of the parties being in the possession of
the one signed by the representative of the other.
Itreaties( agreements( conventions( charters( protocols(
declarations( memoranda of understanding( modus vivendi
and e)change of notes all are refer to international
instruments binding at international law.
&lthough these instruments differ from each other by title(
they all have common features and international law has
applied basically the same rules to all these instruments.
These rules are the result of long practice among the
#tates( which have accepted them as binding norms in
their mutual relations. Therefore( they are regarded as
international customary law.
GR No. 171447, A0('l 11, 6886
L'1 v EB%-u)'v% S%-(%),(y
F,-)C This case involves a petition for certiorari and
prohibition as well as a petitionAinAintervention( praying
that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the
soAcalled =4alikatan .'A,= and that after due notice and
hearing( that "udgment be rendered issuing a permanent
writ of in"unction andEor prohibition against the deployment
of .#. troops in 4asilan and Mindanao for being illegal
and in violation of the Constitution.
4eginning 5anuary of this year '..'( personnel from the
armed forces of the nited #tates of &merica started
arriving in Mindanao to take part( in con"unction with the
$hilippine military( in =4alikatan .'A,.= These soAcalled
=4alikatan= e)ercises are the largest combined training
operations involving Filipino and &merican troops. In
theory( they are a simulation of "oint military maneuvers
pursuant to the Mutual 3efense Treaty( a bilateral defense
agreement entered into by the $hilippines and the nited
#tates in ,-1,.
The entry of &merican troops into $hilippine soil is
pro)imately rooted in the international antiAterrorism
campaign declared by $resident 9eorge %. 4ush in
reaction to the tragic events that occurred on #eptember
,,( '..,.
6n February ,( '..'( petitioners &rthur 3. Cim and
$aulino $. ?rsando filed this petition for certiorari and
prohibition( attacking the constitutionality of the "oint
e)ercise. They were "oined subse:uently by #&+C&J&#
and $&;TI36 +9 M&+99&9&%&( both partyAIist
organizations( who filed a petitionAinAintervention on
February ,,( '..'.
*u%:
%hether F4alikatan .'A,G is covered by the
>isiting Forces &greement *>F&2.
%hether the >F& authorized &merican soldiers to
engage in combat operations in $hilippine
territory.
H%l#C
In resolving the first issue( it is necessary to refer to the
>F& itself. !owever( not much help can be had therefrom(
unfortunately( since the terminology employed is itself the
source of the problem. The >F& permits nited #tates
personnel to engage on an impermanent basis in
FactivitiesG( the e)act meaning of which was left undefined.
The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched
in the negative( in that nited #tates personnel must
Fabstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this
agreement( and in particular( from any political activity.G
The #upreme Court( after studied reflection of &rticles 7,
and 7' of #ection 7 of the >ienna Convention on the Caw
of Treaties( concluded that the ambiguity sorrounding the
meaning of the word FactivitiesG arose from accident. In
our view( it was deliberately made that way to give both
parties a certain leeway in negotiation. nder these
auspices( the >F& if given legitimacy to the current
4alikatan e)ercise. It is only logical to assume that
F4alikatan .'A,G a mutual antiAterrorism advising( assisting
and training e)ercise(G falls under the umbrella of
sanctioned or allowable activities in the conte)t of the
agreement. In connection with the second issue( both the
history and intent of the M3T and the >F& support
conclusion that combatArelated activities( as opposed to
combat itself are indeed authorized.
More so( the Terms of ;eference are e)plicit enough.
$aragraph @ of #ection I stipulates that # e)ercise
participants may not engage in combat Fe)cept in selfA
defense.G It is the opinion of the Court that neither the
M3T nor the 3F& allow foreign troops to engage in an
offensive war in $hilippine territory bearing in mind the
salutory prescription stated in the Charter of the nited
+ations.
In the same manner( both the M3T and the >F&( as in all
other treaties and international agreements to which the
$hilippines is a party( must be read in the conte)t of the
,-@/ Constitution. &lthough the Constitution presents a
conflict between the fundamental law and our obligations
from international agreements( it however resolves it in
section ' of &rticle >III of the Constitution. The foregoing
premises leave us no doubt that # forces are prohibited
from engaging in an offensive war on the $hilippine
territory.
G. R. No. 1387/8, O-)o4%( 18, 6888
B,y,+ v. >,1o(,
F,-)C
The nited #tates panel met with the $hilippine panel to
discussed( among others( the possible elements of the
>isiting Forces &greement *>F&2. This resulted to a series
of conferences and negotiations which culminated on
5anuary ,' and ,7( ,--@. Thereafter( $resident Fidel
;amos approved the >F&( which was respectively signed
by #ecretary #iazon and nited #tates &mbassador
Thomas !ubbard.
$res. 5oseph ?strada ratified the >F& on 6ctober 1( ,--@
and on May '/( ,---( the senate approved it by *'E72
votes.
Cause of &ction:
$etitioners( among others( assert that #ec. '1( &rt K>III of
the ,-@/ constitution is applicable and not #ection ',(
&rticle >II.
Following the argument of the petitioner( under they
provision cited( the Fforeign military bases( troops( or
facilitiesG may be allowed in the $hilippines unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met:
a2 it must be a treaty(
b2 it must be duly concurred in by the senate( ratified by a
ma"ority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for
that purpose if so re:uired by congress( and
c2 recognized as such by the other contracting state.
;espondents( on the other hand( argue that #ection ',
&rticle >II is applicable so that( what is re:uires for such
treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at
least twoAthirds of all the members of the senate.
*SSUE: %hether or not the >F& governed by the
provisions of #ection ',( &rt >II or of #ection '1( &rticle
K>III of the ConstitutionL
HELD:
#ection '1( &rticle K>III( which specifically deals with
treaties involving foreign military bases( troops or facilities
should apply in the instant case. To a certain e)tent and in
a limited sense( however( the provisions of section ',(
&rticle >II will find applicability with regard to the issue and
for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes
re:uired to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.
The Constitution( makes no distinction between FtransientG
and Fpermanent.G %e find nothing in section '1( &rticle
K>III that re:uires foreign troops or facilities to be
stationed or placed permanently in the $hilippines.
It is inconse:uential whether the nited #tates treats the
>F& only as an e)ecutive agreement because( under
international law( an e)ecutive agreement is as binding as
a treaty.
Ku(o#, v J,l,+#o+', 83 5.'l. 197, GR No. L-6666,
!,(-. 66, 1949
F,-) C #higenori Juroda( a former CieutenantA9eneral of
the 5apanese Imperial &rmy and Commanding 9eneral of
the Imperial Forces of the $hilippines was charged before
a Military Commission convened by the Chief of #taff of
the &rmed Forces of the $hilippines. !e had unlawfully
disregarded and failed to discharge his duties as a
commander to control the operations of members of his
command.
$etitioner was duly prosecuted for acts committed in
violation of the !ague Convention and the 9eneva
Convention through the issuance and enforcement of
?)ecutive 6rder +o. 0@.
?)ecutive 6rder +o. 0@ provided the organization of such
military commissions( established +ational %ar Crimes
6ffice and prescribing rules and regulations governing the
trial of accused war criminals.
&ttorneys Melville !ussey and ;obert $ort of the nited
#tates of &merica participated in the prosecution of the
case in behalf of the nited #tates of &merica.
*u% C %hether or not ?)ecutive 6rder +o. 0@ is legal
and constitutional.
H%l# C This court holds that the ?)ecutive 6rder +o. 0@ is
legal and constitutional as provided in #ec. 7( &rt. II of the
Constitution( thatA
F The $hilippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy( and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the
nation.G
The participation of the two &merican attorneys although
under our law( they are not :ualified to practice law is valid
and constitutional. Military Commission is a special military
tribunal governed by special law not by ;ules of the Court(
which govern ordinary civil courts. There is nothing in
?)ecutive 6rder +o.0@ which re:uires counsels need to
be :ualified to practice law in the $hilippines. In fact( it is
common in military tribunals that counsels for the parties
are usually military personnel.
nder the doctrine of incorporation( although the
$hilippines was not a signatory of the !ague and 9eneva
Conventions( international "urisprudence is automatically
incorporated in $hilippine law( thus making war crimes
punishable in the $hilippines.
The Military Commission having been convened by virtue
of a valid law( with "urisdiction over the crimes charged
which fall under the provisions of ?)ecutive 6rder +o 0@(
and having "urisdiction over the person of the petitioner by
having said petitioner in its custody( the court will not
interfere with the due process of such Military
Commission.
$etition is denied with costs de oficio.
G.R. No. L-/997, !,y 31, 197/
LAO H. *CHONG, '+ .' o3+ 4%.,l& ,+# '+ 4%.,l& o&
o).%( ,l'%+ (%'#%+), -o(0o(,)'o+ ,+# 0,()+%(.'0
,#v%(%ly ,&&%-)%#. 4y R%0u4l'- A-) No. 1188,
0%)')'o+%(,
v.
JA*!E HERNANDE>, S%-(%),(y o& F'+,+-%, ,+#
!ARCEL*NO SAR!*EN<O, C')y <(%,u(%( o& !,+'l,,
(%0o+#%+).
F,-)C
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon
the validity and constitutionality of a legislative enactment(
fundamental and farAreaching in significance. The
enactment poses :uestions of due process( police power
and e:ual protection of the laws. It also poses an
important issue of fact( that is whether the conditions
which the disputed law purports to remedy really or
actually e)ist. &dmittedly springing from a deep( militant(
and positive nationalistic impulse( the law purports to
protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through
it( and within the field of economy it regulates( Congress
attempts to translate national aspirations for economic
independence and national security( rooted in the drive
and urge for national survival and welfare( into a concrete
and tangible measures designed to free the national
retailer from the competing dominance of the alien( so that
the country and the nation may be free from a supposed
economic dependence and bondage. 3o the facts and
circumstances "ustify the enactmentL
The rule in general is as follows:
&liens are under no special constitutional protection which
forbids a classification otherwise "ustified simply because
the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality.
That would be re:uiring a higher degree of protection for
aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar
classes of &merican citizens. 4roadly speaking( the
difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes
a basis for reasonable classification in the e)ercise of
police power. *' &m.( 5ur. 80@A80-.2
*u%C
Is the e)clusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade
unreasonable. &rbitrary capricious( taking into account the
illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the
aliens have heretofore engaged thereinL
H%l#C
;esuming what we have set forth above we hold that the
disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat
and danger to national economy posed by alien
dominance and control of the retail business and free
citizens and country from dominance and controlM that the
enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police
power of the #tate( thru which and by which it protects its
own personality and insures its security and futureM that
the law does not violate the e:ual protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds e)ist for the
distinction between alien and citizen in the e)ercise of the
occupation regulated( nor the due process of law clause(
because the law is prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilegeM that the
wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its ob"ectives
appear to us to be plainly evident N as a matter of fact it
seems not only appropriate but actually necessary N and
that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of
the Cegislature( with whose power and discretion the
5udicial department of the 9overnment may not interfereM
that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the
title( and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled
the legislators or the segment of the population affectedM
and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict
with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been
entered into on the sub"ect and the police power may not
be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.
#ome members of the Court are of the opinion that the
radical effects of the law could have been made less harsh
in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more
time should have been given in the law for the li:uidation
of e)isting businesses when the time comes for them to
close. 6ur legal duty( however( is merely to determine if
the law falls within the scope of legislative authority and
does not transcend the limitations of due process and
e:ual protection guaranteed in the Constitution. ;emedies
against the harshness of the law should be addressed to
the CegislatureM they are beyond our power and
"urisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied( with costs against petitioner.
R,Au'@, v. B(,#&o(#, /7 5.'l. 78 :1948;
FAC<S: 4y virtue of the proclamation issued by 9eneral
of the &rmy Mac&rthur( petitioners were arrested by the
7.0 CIC and detained under security commitment order
+o 7@1. The
petitioners ;a:uiza( Tee !an Jee( and Infante were
charged with ?spionage activity with the 5apanese( active
collaboration with the enemy respectively. $ower for
Commander of the #
&rmy to proclaim by virtue of military necessity is not
:uestioned. !e based proclamation on the reasons that
the apprehended have violated due allegiance to the #
and it is a military necessity. $etitioners move for writ of
!abeas Corpus.
*SSUES:
,. %hether or not the war terminated within the
meaning of that part in the proclamation. O+ote:
The power of commander in chief of the # &rmy
to issue a proclamation providing for military
measures to be taken upon the apprehension of
Filipino citizens who voluntarily have given aid(
comfort and sustenance to the enemy( cannot be
seriously :uestioned.P
'. %hether or not this court has "urisdiction or legal
power to afford relief to the petitioners in the sad
and sorry plight to which they have been and are
being sub"ected.
H%l#:
,. +o. FThe war( in the legal sense( continues until(
and terminated at the same time of( some formal
proclamation of peace by an authority competent
to proclaim it. It is the province of the political
department( and not the "udicial department( to
determine if war has ended. The fact that delivery
of certain persons under custody of the # &rmy
has already begun does not mean that the war
has( in the legal sense( already terminated( which
clearly it has not. 3elivery within the power of
military authorities to make even before was
terminates.
'. +o. Civil Courts should not interfere. & foreign
army permitted to march through a friendly
country or to be stationed in it( is e)empt from
civil and criminal "urisdiction of the place. 9rant of
free passage implies a waiver of all "urisdiction
over troops during passage *let them e)ercise
their own discipline2. &ny attempt by our civil
Courts to e)ercise "urisdiction over # troops
would be a violation of our countryDs faith. 6n the
other hand( petitioners may have recourse to
proper military authorities.
!'Au'4, v. Co11,+#'+$ G%+%(,l, 88 5.'l. 66/ :1948;
FAC<S: Mi:uiabas is a Filipino citizen and civilian
employee of the # army in the $hilippines who had been
charged of disposing in the $ort of Manila &rea of things
belonging to the # army in violation of the -8th article of
%ar of the #. !e was arrested and a 9eneral CourtA
Martial was appointed. !e was found guilty. &s a rule( the
$hilippines being a sovereign nation has "urisdiction over
all offenses committed within its territory but it may( by
treaty or by agreement( consent that the # shall e)ercise
"urisdiction over certain offenses committed within said
portions of territory.
*SSUES:
,. %hether or not the offense has been committed
within a # base thus giving the # "urisdiction
over the case.
'. %6+ the offender is a member of the # armed
forces
H%l#:
,. +o. The $ort of Manila &rea where the offense
was committed is not within a # base for it is
not names in &nne) & or 4 of &rticle KK>I of the
Military 4ase &greement *M4&2 and is merely
part of the temporary :uarters located within
presented limits of the city of Manila. Moreover(
e)tended installations and temporary :uarters
are not considered to have the same
"urisdictional capacity as permanent bases and
are governed by &rticle KIII paragraphs ' and 8.
The offence at bar( therefore is in the beyond the
"urisdiction of military courts.
'. +o. nder the M4&( a civilian employee is not
considered as a member of the # armed forces.
?ven under the articles of war( the mere fact that
a civilian employee is in the service of the #
&rmy does not make him a member of the armed
forces.
U.S. v. A. S'+$, 36 5.'l. 9/8 :191/;
FAC<S: The defendant is a sub"ect of China employed as
a fireman on a steamship. The steamship is a foreign
steamer which arrived the port of Cebu on &pril '1( ,-,/(
after a voyage
direct from the port of #aigon. The defendant bought eight
cans of opium in #aigon( brought them on board the
steamship and had them in his possession during the trip
from #aigon to Cebu. %hen the steamer anchored in the
port of Cebu( the authorities on making the search found
the cans of opium hidden in the ashes below the boiler of
the steamer<s engine. The defendant confessed that he
was the owner of the opium and that he had purchased it
in #aigon. !e did not confess( however( as to his purpose
in buying the opium. !e did not say that it was his
intention to import the prohibited drug.
*SSUE: %hether or not the crime of illegal importation of
opium into the $hilippine Islands has been provenL
H%l#:
Bes. It is the onus of the government to prove that the
vessel from which the drug discharged came into
$hilippine waters from a foreign country with the drug on
board. In this
case( it is to be noted that #ec. 8 of &ct +o. '7@, begins(
F&ny person who shall unlawfully import or bring any
prohibited drug into the $hilippine IslandsIG Import and
bring should be
construed as synonymous terms. The mere act of going
into a port( without breaking bulk( is prima facie evidence
of importation. The importation is not the making entry of
goods at
the customhouse( but merely the bringing them into the
port( and the importation is complete before the entry to
the customhouse. Moreover( possession for personal use
is unlikely( "udging from the size of the amount brought.
L',+$ v. 5%o0l%, 363 SCRA 676 :6888;
FAC<S: $etitioner is an economist for &34 who was
charged by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong
city for allegedly uttering defamatory words against her
fellow worker with two
counts of grave oral defamation. MeTC "udge then
received an office of protocol from the 3epartment of
Foreign &ffairs( stating that petitioner is covered by
immunity from legal process under section 81 of the
agreement bet &34 and the government. MeTC "udge(
without notice( dismissed the two criminal cases.
$rosecution filed writ of mandamus and certiorari and
ordered
the MeTC to enforce the warrant of arrest.
*SSUE: %hether or not the petitioner is covered by
immunity under the agreement and that no preliminary
investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed
in court.
H%l#: !e is not covered by immunity because the
commission of a crime is part of the performance of official
duty. Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the
communication from the 3F& that a certain person is
covered by immunity. That
a person is covered by immunity is preliminary. 3ue
process is right of the accused as much as the
prosecution.
#landering a person is not covered by the agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime
such as defamation in the name of official duty. nder
>ienna
convention on 3iplomatic ;elations( commission of a
crime is not part of official duty.
6n the contention that there was no preliminary
investigation conducted( suffice it to say that preliminary
investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by
the MeTC such as the one at bar. 4eing purely a statutory
right( preliminary investigation may be invoked only when
specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure
is clear than no preliminary investigation is re:uired in
cases falling within the "urisdiction of the MeTC. 4esides(
the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect
the courtDs "urisdiction nor does it
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective.
U.S. v. S3%%), 1 5.'l. 18 :1981;
FAC<S: #weet was employed by the nited #tates
military who committed an offense against a $6%. !is
case is filed with the CFI( who is given original "urisdiction
in all criminal cases for
which a penalty of more than 0 months is imposed. !e is
now contending that the courts are without "urisdiction
because he was Facting in the line of duty.G
*SSUES:
,. %hether or not the case at bar is within the
"urisdiction of the CFI.
'. %hether or not an assault committed by a soldier
or military employee upon a prisoner of war is not
an offense under the penal codeL
7. &ssuming that it is an offence under the penal
code( whether or not the military character
sustained by the person charged with the offence
at the time of its commission e)empts him from
the ordinary "urisdiction of the civil tribunalsL
H%l#:
,. Bes. 4y &ct +o. ,70 of the #A$hil Commission(
the CFIs are given original "urisdiction in all
criminal cases in which a penalty more than 0
months imprisonment or a fine greater
than Q,.. may be imposed. Furthermore( CFIs
have "urisdiction to try offenders charged with
violation of the $enal Code within their territorial
limits( regardless of the military character of the
accused. The defendant and his acts are within
the "urisdiction of the CFI because he failed
to prove that he was indeed acting in theline of
duty.
'. Bes. Though assault by military officer against a
$6% is not in the ;$C( physical assault charges
may be pressed under the ;$C.
7. +o. The application of the general principle that
the "urisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected
by the military or other special character brought
before them for trial *;.&.
+o. /.112. &ppellant claims that the act was
servicebut this cannot affect the right of the Civil
Court to takes "urisdiction of the case.G
5udgment: 5udgment thereby affirmed F&n
offense charged against a military officer in
conse:uence of an act done in obedience to an
order is clearly shown on the face( where such
offense is against the military law( is not within
the "urisdiction of the courts of the Civil
9overnment.G RR$er Cooper( 5.( concurring
S%-(%),(y o& Ju)'-% v. L,+)'o+, 366 SCRA 168 :6888;
FAC<S: 6n 5une ,@( ,--- the 3epartment of 5ustice
received from the 3epartment of Foreign &ffairs a re:uest
for the e)tradition of private respondent Mark 5imenez to
the .#. The
9rand 5ury Indictment( the warrant for his arrest( and
other supporting documents for said e)tradition were
attached along with the re:uest. Charges include:
,. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the #
'. &ttempt to evade or defeat ta)
7. Fraud by wire( radio( or television
8. False statement or entries
1. ?lection contribution in name of another
The 3epartment of 5ustice( through a designated panel
proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment
of the e)tradition treaty which they found having matters
needed to be addressed. ;espondent( then re:uested for
copies of all the documents included in the e)tradition
re:uest and for him to be given ample time to assess it.
The #ecretary of 5ustice denied re:uest on the ff.
grounds:
,. !e found it premature to secure him copies prior to the
completion of the evaluation. &t that point in time( the 365
is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and
re:uirements under the relevant law *$3 ,.0-N$hilippine
?)tradition Caw2 and treaty *;$A# ?)tradition Treaty2
have been complied with by the ;e:uesting 9overnment.
?valuation by the 365 of the documents is not a
preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in
criminal prosecution inapplicable.
'. The .#. re:uested for the prevention of unauthorized
disclosure of the information in the documents.
7. Finally( the country is bound to the >ienna convention
on the law of treaties such that every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties.
The respondent filed for petition of mandamus( certiorari(
and prohibition. The ;TC of +C; ruled in favor of the
respondent. #ecretary of 5ustice was made to issue a
copy of the re:uested papers( as well as conducting
further proceedings.
*SSUES:
,. %hether or not private is respondent entitled to
the two basic due process rights of notice and
hearing.
'. %hether or not this entitlement constitutes a
breach of the legal commitments and obligation
of the $hilippine 9overnment under the ;$A#
Treaty.
7. %6+ there is any conflict between private
respondentDs basic due process rights and the
provisions of the ;$A# ?)tradition treaty
H%l#:
,. Bes. #ection '*a2 of $3 ,.@0 defines e)tradition
as Fthe removal of an accused from the
$hilippines with the ob"ect of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable
the re:uesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation
directed against him in connection with any
criminal investigation directed against him or the
e)ecution of a penalty imposed on him under the
penal or criminal law of the re:uesting state or
government.G &lthough the in:uisitorial power
e)ercised by the 3epartment of 5ustice as an
administrative agency due to the failure of the
3F& to comply lacks any "udicial discretion( it
primarily sets the wheels for the e)tradition
process which may ultimately result in the
deprivation of the liberty of the prospective
e)tradite. This deprivation can be effected at two
stages: The provisional arrest of the prospective
e)tradite pending the submission of the re:uest
and the temporary arrest of the prospective
e)tradite during the pendency of the e)tradition
petition in court. Clearly( there is an impending
threat to a prospective e)traditeeDs liberty as
early as during the evaluation stage. 4ecause of
such conse:uences( the evaluation process is
akin to an administrative agency conducting an
investigative proceeding( the conse:uences of
which are essentially criminal since such
technical assessment sets off or commences the
procedure for and ultimately the deprivation of
liberty of a prospective e)tradite. In essence(
therefore( the evaluation process partakes of the
nature of a criminal investigation. There are
certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily
available only in criminal prosecution. 4ut the
Court has ruled in other cases that where the
investigation of an administrative proceeding may
result in forfeiture of life( liberty( or property( the
administrative proceedings are deemed criminal
or penal( and such forfeiture partakes the nature
of a penalty. In the case at bar( similar to a
preliminary investigation( the evaluation stage of
the e)tradition proceedings which may result in
the filing of an information against the
respondent( can possibly lead to his arrest( and
to the deprivation of his liberty. Thus( the
e)traditee must be accorded due process rights
of notice
and hearing according to &rt. 7 sec ,8*,2 and *'2(
as well as &rt. 7 sec /Nthe right of the people to
information on matters of public concern and the
corollary right to access to official records and
documents.
The court held that the evaluation process
partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation(
having conse:uences which will result in
deprivation of liberty of the prospective
e)tradite. & favorable action in an e)tradition
re:uest e)poses a person to eventual e)tradition
to a foreign country( thus e)hibiting the penal
aspect of the process.
The evaluation process itself is like a preliminary
investigation since both procedures may have the
same result R the arrest and imprisonment of the
respondent. The basic rights of notice and
hearing are applicable in criminal( civil and
administrative proceedings. +onobservance
of these rights will invalidate the proceedings.
Individuals are entitled to be notified of any
pending case affecting their interests( and upon
notice( may claim the right
to appear therein and present their side.
;ights to notice and hearing: 3ispensable in 7
cases:
a.%hen there is an urgent need for immediate
action *preventive suspension in administrative
charges( padlocking filthy restaurants(
cancellation of passport2.
b.%here there is tentativeness of administrative
action( and the respondent is not prevented from
en"oying the right to notice and hearing at a later
time *summary distraint and levy of the property
of a delin:uent ta)payer( replacement of an
appointee2
c.Twin rights have been offered( but the right to
e)ercise them had not been claimed.
'. +o. The .#. and the $hilippines share mutual
concern about the suppression and punishment
of crime in their respective "urisdictions. 4oth
states accord common due process protection to
their respective citizens. The administrative
investigation doesnDt fall under the three
e)ceptions to the due process of notice and
hearing in the #ection 7 ;ules ,,' of the ;ules
of Court.
7. +o. 3octrine of incorporation under international
law( as applied in most countries( decrees that
rules of international law are given e:ual standing
with( but are not superior to national legislative
acts. Treaty can repeal statute and statute can
repeal treaty. +o conflict. >eil of secrecy is lifted
during trial. ;e:uest should impose veil at any
stage.
5udgment: $etition dismissed for lack of merit.
BANCO NAC*ONAL DE CUBA v SABBA<*NO
3/6 US 398D 84 :19642
FAC<S
In 5uly ,-0.( the Cuban government retaliated against the
# for various measures imposed against the Castro
government by e)propriating property held by # citizens
in Cuba. This included the seizure of sugar owned by
C&>. & different &merican company( Farr( %hitlock H Co.
had contracted to buy this sugar from C&>( but after it was
seized( they bought it directly from the Cuban government.
&fter receiving the sugar( however( Farr( %hitlock H Co.
did not pay the Cuban governmentAAinstead( they paid
C&><s legal representative( #abbatino. 4anco +acional de
Cuba( the national bank of Cuba *acting on behalf of the
Cuban government2( filed a suit in the # 3istrict Court for
the #outhern 3istrict of +B against #abbatino( to recover
the money paid for the sugar. The 3istrict Court and the
C& ruled in favor of #abbatino( and the case was
appealed to the #C.
*SSUE
%hether the &ct of #tate 3octrine should be applied
HELD
9ES. The Court applied the &ct of #tate 3octrine and
upheld the legality of the e)propriation because it was an
official act of another country( not sub"ect to :uestion in
the # courts. The Court refused to hold that the
e)propriation violated international law( because there no
clear unity of international opinion disapproving the
seizure of land or property in a country by a government of
that country.
It noted that interposition of the ?)ecutive was
unnecessary to prevent the courts from interfering in the
affairs of state( as a single court could upset delicate
international negotiations through the assertion of # law
in another country.
Finally( the Court found no bar to application of the
doctrine should imposed by the fact that Cuba had brought
the suit( comparing this to the sovereign immunity en"oyed
by the # states which can sue( but cannot be sued.
Go <',+ C.,' v. Co11''o+%( o& *11'$(,)'o+
9; +o. CA'.081( '' #eptember ,-00
F,-)C
9o Tian Chai *9o2 is a Chinese national( admitted as a
temporary visitor into the $hilippines on &pril '7( ,-8/.
!aving failed to leave upon e)piration of his visa(
notwithstanding the granted e)tensions( he was arrested
March ,( ,-1.. 3uring the deportation proceedings( he
was temporarily released under bail.
Cater( the 4oard of Commissioners *4oC2 unanimously
declared him to have unlawfully overstayed in the
$hilippines and ordered his deportation on the first
available flight. The %arrant for deportation was issued on
March @( ,-1,( but the actual arrest and custody by the
immigration authorities was ,, years later( on 6ct @( ,-0'.
3uring his detention and pending his deportation to
Taiwan( 9o filed a petition for habeas corpus. In his
petition( he alleged *,2 the representations made by his
counsel in admission and repatriation to Taiwan were
futile( and *'2 it was unlikely that the $hil. 9ovDt would be
able to deport him in the near future. #o he prayed for
temporary liberty on bail( with the case of Borovsky v.
Commissioner as basis( which said that F& foreign
national( not an enemy and no criminal charges were filed
against or "udicially issues( was also entitled to protection
against deprivation of liberty without due process of lawG
The lower court ruled in favor of 9o. It took notice of the
fact that there were indeed negotiations between the
Chinese and the $hilippine 9overnments( and recognizes
that these take time. !owever in this case( the petition of
habeas corpus has been filed only l% ).,+ 6 1o+).
from 9oDs arrest and detention. &nd deportation can only
be effect when the matters are final. It cannot be said that
the detention was for an unreasonable length of time. 6n
the other hand( negotiations between the $hil and
Taiwanese governments may drag on for a long time( it
would be un"ust to detain the petitioner for that length of
time. The Court in the case of Borovsky v. Commissioner
said the 0 months is considered a reasonable length of
time as the limit( after which a writ of habeas may be
ordered( and release on bail in an amount the court may
deem proper. !ence the lower court ordered release
under bail( after such lapse of 0 months.
6n appeal( Commissioner contends that the lower court
erred in the provided si) month limit( applying Borovsky,
because *,2 it compels the $hil. 9ovDt to finalize
negotiations to 0 months( *'2 unlike 4orovsky( 9o is +6T
a stateless individual( but a national who can be deported
to Taiwan and *72 The court has no authority to interfere.
*u%C
,. %hether or not 9o may be released on bail
during the pendency of the negotiations
'. %hether or not the 0 month period may be
applied to this case.
7. %hether or not 9o had an inherent right to bail.
8. %hether or not the Courts can interfere with
Immigration authorityL
H%l#C
,. +o. The Court ruled in many previous cases( a
Chinese national declared to be overstaying may
be sub"ect to deportation pending negotiations. It
has been ruled that there is nothing Fun"ustG in
the detention of the overstaying Chinese
nationals( because all is in accordance of
$hilippine Caws. &lso( as in Tan Seng Pao v.
Commissioner( the petitioner is +6T a stateless
aliens hence has a J+6%+ country( to which he
may be deported to.
If there be any delay( it is not due to the fault or
negligence of the 9overnment or its officers. It
may be a result from diplomatic negotiations
which can have variable results( in any case(
cannot be taken against the 9overnment and be
a ground for declaring the order of deportation
functus oficio. 6therwise( orders of deportation
can easily be rendered ineffective by aliens
frustrating all diplomatic efforts in negotiation.
'. +o. The 0 month period may not be applied since
the case of Borovsky is separate and distinct( 9o
being an alien with a known state( therefore( the
#upreme Court ruled against the lower courtDs
ruling in 9oDs favor.
7. +o. &liens in deportation proceedings( as a rule(
have no inherent right to bail and that any release
can only be granted e)pressly by law *Bengzon
v. campo2. In #ec 7/ *-2 *e2 of the $hil Imm &ct(
it provides that F&ny alien...may be released
under bond and other such conditions as may be
imposed by the CommissionerG. +ote that it is
only the Commissioner who had the power and
discretion to grant bail. The word FmayG indicates
bail is merely permissive and discretionary upon
the Commissioner.
8. +o. The determination of the alienDs propriety( is
sub"ect to the law and procedure under the
Immigration &ct as to bail and release( and falls
e)clusively within the "urisdiction of the
Commissioner( and not the courts of "ustice.
#imply because courts do not administer
immigration laws. *The only thing the courts can
check is the proper administration and e)ecution
of $hilippine immigration laws( and ?KCC3?#
the discretion of the Commissioners.2
K.o(o3 !'+u-.%( v CA ,+# S-,l@o GR No. 9//67
:1996;
F,-):
Jhosrow Minucher is the Cabor &ttachS of the ?mbassy of
Iran in the $hil. &rthur #calzo( then connected with the
&merican ?mbassy in Manila( was introduced to him by
5ose Inigo *an informer belonging to the military
intelligence community2.
&ccording to Inigo( #calzo was interested in buying Iranian
products like caviar and carpets. Minucher complained to
#calzo about his problems with the &merican ?mbassy
regarding the e)pired visas of his wife( &bbas Torabian.
6ffering help( #calzo gave Minucher a calling card
showing that the former is an agent of the 3rug
?nforcement &dministration *3?&2 assigned to the
&merican ?mbassy in Manila. &s a result( #calzo
e)pressed his intent to buy caviar and further promised to
arrange the renewal of the visas.
#calzo went to Minucher<s residence and asked to be
entrusted with $ersian silk carpets( for which he had a
buyer. The ne)t day( #calzo returned and claimed that he
had already made arrangements with his contacts
concerning the visas and asked for Q'(....
It turned out that #calzo prepared a plan to frameAup a
Minucher and wife for alleged heroin trafficking. 4oth were
falsely arrested and charged with violations of the
3angerous 3rugs &ct.
Minucher prays for actual and compensatory damages.
!owever( counsel for #calzo filed a motion to :uash
summons alleging that the defendant is beyond the
processes of the $hilippine court for the action for
damages is a personal action and that #calzo is outside
the $hilippines.
TC denied the motion. C& dismissed the motion for lack of
merit on the basis of the erroneous assumption that
because of the 3iplomatic +ote *advising the 3F& that
#calzo is a member of the # diplomatic mission
investigating Minucher for drug trafficking2( #calzo is
clothed with diplomatic immunity.
*u%:
,. %hether or not a complaint for damages be
dismissed in the sole basis of a statement
complained in a 3iplomatic +ote.
'. %hether or not private respondent &rthur #calzo
can be sued provided his alleged diplomatic
immunity conformably with the >ienna
Convention on 3iplomatic ;elations
H%l#:
,. +o. 5urisdiction over the person of the defendant
is ac:uired by either voluntary appearance or by
the service of summons. In the case( #calzo<s
counsel filed a motion to :uash( which( in effect
already waived any defect in the service of
summons by earlier asking an e)tension to file
time to file an &nswer and filing an &nswer with
Counterclaim.
The complaint for damages cannot be dismissed.
#aid complaint contains sufficient allegations
which indicate that #calzo committed imputed
acts in his personal capacity and outside the
scope of his official duties and functions. The TC
gave credit to Minucher<s theory that he was a
victim of frameAup hence( there is a prima facie
showing that #calzo could be held personally
liable for his acts. Further( #calzo did not come
forward with evidence to( prove that he acted in
his official capacity.
'. The #C 3?+I?3 the petition.
Conformably with the >ienna Convention( the
functions of the diplomatic mission involve( the
representation of the interests of the sending
state and promoting friendly relations with the
receiving state. 6nly Fdiplomatic agents(G are
vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil
and criminal suits. Indeed( the main yardstick in
ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat
entitled to immunity is the determination of
whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic
nature. 4eing an &ttache( #calzoDs main function
is to observe( analyze and interpret trends and
developments in their respective fields in the host
country and submit reports to their own ministries
or departments in the home government. !e is
not generally regarded as a member of the
diplomatic mission. 6n the basis of an erroneous
assumption that simply because of the diplomatic
note( divesting the trial court of "urisdiction over
his person( his diplomatic immunity is
contentious.
nder the related doctrine of #tate Immunity from
#uit( the precept that a #tate cannot be sued in
the courts of a foreign state is a longAstanding
rule of customary international law. If the acts
giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign
government done by its foreign agent( although
not necessarily a diplomatic personage( but
acting in his official capacity( the complaint could
be barred by the immunity of the foreign
sovereign from suit without its consent. #uing a
representative of a state is believed to be( in
effect( suing the state itself. The proscription is
not accorded for the benefit of an individual but
for the #tate( in whose service he is( under the
ma)im R par in parem( non habet imperium R that
all states are sovereign e:uals and cannot assert
"urisdiction over one another. The implication is
that if the "udgment against an official would
re:uire the state itself to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the award( such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages decreed against him( the suit must be
regarded as being against the state itself(
although it has not been formally impleaded
& foreign agent( operating within a territory( can
be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as
long as it can be established that he is acting
within the directives of the sending state. The
consent of the host state is an indispensable
re:uirement of basic courtesy between the two
sovereigns.
The FbuyAbust operationG and other such acts are
indication that the $hilippine government has
given its imprimatur( if not consent( to the
activities within $hilippine territory of agent
#calzo of the nited #tates 3rug ?nforcement
&gency. In conducting surveillance activities on
Minucher( later acting as the poseurAbuyer during
the buyAbust operation( and then becoming a
principal witness in the criminal case against
Minucher( #calzo hardly can be said to have
acted beyond the scope of his official function or
duties.
<AEADA "S. ANGARA 6/6 SCRA 18
F,-)
6n &pril ,1( ,--8( the $hilippine 9overnment represented
by its #ecretary of the 3epartment of Trade and Industry
signed the Final &ct binding the $hilippine 9overnment to
submit to its respective competent authorities the %T6
*%orld Trade 6rganization2 &greements to seek approval
for such. 6n 3ecember ,8( ,--8( ;esolution +o. -/ was
adopted by the $hilippine #enate to ratify the %T6
&greement.
This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the %T6
agreement as it violates #ec ,-( &rticle II( providing for the
development of a self reliant and independent national
economy( and #ections ,. and ,'( &rticle KII( providing
for the FFilipino firstG policy.
*u%
%hether or not the ;esolution +o. -/ ratifying the %T6
&greement is unconstitutional.
H%l#C
The #upreme Court ruled the ;esolution +o. -/ is not
unconstitutional. %hile the constitution mandates a bias in
favor of Filipino goods( services( labor and enterprises( at
the same time( it recognizes the need for business
e)change with the rest of the world on the bases of
e:uality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
interests only against foreign competition and trade
practices that are unfair. In other words( the Constitution
did not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy.
Furthermore( the constitutional policy of a FselfAreliant and
independent national economyG does not necessarily rule
out the entry of foreign investments( goods and services. It
contemplates neither Feconomic seclusionG nor
Fmendicancy in the international community.G
The #enate( after deliberation and voting( gave its consent
to the %T6 &greement thereby making it Fa part of the law
of the landG. The #upreme Court gave due respect to an
e:ual department in government. It presumes its actions
as regular and done in good faith unless there is
convincing proof and persuasive agreements to the
contrary. &s a result( the ratification of the %T6
&greement limits or restricts the absoluteness of
sovereignty. & treaty engagement is not a mere obligation
but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. &
state which has contracted valid international obligations is
bound to make its legislations such modifications as may
be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations
undertaken.
BOR*S !EJOFF "S. D*REC<OR OF 5R*SONS
98 5.'l. /8 :19/9; Cou() o& ).% 5.'l'00'+%
F,-)C
The case is a second petition for habeas corpus filed by
petitioner 4oris Me"off( the first having been denied in a
decision of this Court of 5uly 7.( ,-8-.
!erein petitioner is an alien of ;ussian decent who was
brought from #hanghai by the 5apanese forces. pon
liberation( he was arrested as 5apanese spy by .#. &rmy
Counter Intelligence Corps and was handed to the
Commonwealth 9overnment for disposition in accordance
with Commonwealth &ct +o. 0@'. Thereafter( the $eople
Court ordered his release but the 3eportation 4oard taking
his case up declared the petitioner as an illegal alien for
lack of necessary documents presented upon entering the
$hilippines. The immigration officials then ordered that the
petitioner be deported on the first available transportation
to ;ussia but failed to do so in several times. %hile the
arrangements for his departure are being made and for
the best interest of the country( petitioner Me"off was
detained at the 4ilibid $rison in Muntinlupa. 6ver two
years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was
promulgated( the 9overnment has not found ways and
means of removing the petitioner out of the country.
*u%C %hether or not prolonged detention of the
petitioner is warranted by law and the Constitution.
H%l#C
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner and commanded
the respondents to release the former from custody
sub"ect to terms and conditions. The petitionerDs unduly
prolonged detention would be unwarranted by law and the
Constitution( if the only purpose of the detention be to
eliminate a danger that is by no means actual( present( or
uncontrollable. The possibility that he might "oin or aid
disloyal elements if turned out at large does not "ustify
prolonged detention( the remedy in that case being to
impose conditions in the order of release and e)act bail in
a reasonable amount with sufficient sureties. !ence( a
foreign national( not enemy( against whom no criminal
charges have been formally made or "udicial order issued(
may not be indefinitely be kept in detention. !e has the
right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as
applied to human beings( as proclaimed in the niversal
3eclaration of !uman ;ights approved by the 9eneral
&ssembly of the nited +ations( of which the $hilippines is
a member.
A$u)'+ v E#u 88 SCRA 197
F,-)C
This case is a petition assailing the validity or the
constitutionality of a Cetter of Instruction +o. ''-( issued
by $resident Ferdinand ?. Marcos( re:uiring all vehicle
owners( users or drivers to procure early warning devices
to be installed a distance away from such vehicle when it
stalls or is disabled. In compliance with such letter of
instruction( the Commissioner of the Cand Transportation
6ffice issued &dministrative 6rder +o. , directing the
compliance thereof.
This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and
subse:uent administrative order are unlawful and
unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due
process( e:ual protection of the law and undue delegation
of police power.
*u%C
%hether or not the Cetter of Instruction +o. ''- and the
subse:uent &dministrative 6rder issued is unconstitutional
.%l#C
The #upreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition.
The statutes in :uestion are deemed not unconstitutional.
These were definitely in the e)ercise of police power as
such was established to promote public welfare and public
safety. In fact( the letter of instruction is based on the
constitutional provision of adopting to the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land. The letter of instruction mentions( as its
premise and basis( the resolutions of the ,-0@ >ienna
Convention on ;oad #igns and #ignals and the
discussions on traffic safety by the nited +ations A that
such letter was issued in consideration of a growing
number of road accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles
on the streets and highways.
J.B.L. R%y% v. B,$,)'+$, GR No. 67366 O-)o4%( 67,
1983
F,-) C $etitioner( retired 5ustice 54 .C ;eyes filed a
petition to respondent( Mayor ;amon 4agatsing( the city
mayor of manila that on behalf of antiAbases coalition
sought a permit from the city of manila to hold a peaceful
march and rally on october '0( ,-@7 from '... to 1... in
the afternoon( starting from the luneta( a public park( to the
gates of united states embassy( hardly two blocks away.
6nce there( and in an open space of the public property( a
short program would be held.
6n october '.( ,-@7 the petitioner filed a suit for
mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of preliminary
mandatory in"unction because due to the fact that as of
that date( petitioner had not been informed of any action
taken on his re:uest on behalf of the organization to hold
a rally. 6n october '1( ,-@7( the answer of respondent
mayor was filed on his behalf by assistant solicitor general
eduardo g. montenegro. It turned out that on october ,-(
suc permit was denied.
*u% C
,. %hether or not holding a rally in front of the #
embassy would be applicable or a violation of 6rdinance
no./'-1 of the city of manila.
'. %hether or not the denial of the e)ercise of the
constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably
assembly was "ustified by clear and present danger.
Rul'+$ : The petition was granted. The #upreme Court
granted the mandatory in"unction allowing the proposed
march and rally. The court found that there was no clear
and present danger of a substantive evil to a legitimate
public interest that would "ustify the denial of the e)ercise
of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceably
assembly.
6ur country is signatory of the >ienna Convention. It is
binding in our laws. The second paragraph of its &rticle ''
that the receiving state is under a special duty to take
appropriate steps tp protect the premise of the mission
against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any
disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of
its dignity. The constitution adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
That being the case( if there were clear and present
danger of any intrusion or damage( or disturbance of the
of the peace of the mission( or impairment of its dignity(
there would be a "ustification for the denial of the permit
insofar as the terminal point would be the embassy.
U+')%# S),)% o& A1%('-, v. Gu'+)o
186 SCRA 644
FAC<SC These cases have been consolidated because
they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. In 9; +o.
/00./( the private respondents are suing several officers
of the # &ir Force stationed in Clark &ir 4ase in
connection with the bidding conducted by them for
contracts for barbering services in the said base.
In 9; +o. /-8/.( Fabian 9enove filed a complaint for
damages against petitioners Camachia( 4elsa( Cartalla
and 6rascion for his dismissal as cook in the # &ir Force
;ecreation Center at Camp 5ohn !ay &ir #tation in
4aguio City. It had been ascertained after investigation(
from the testimony of 4elsa( Cartalla and 6rascion( that
9enove had poured urine into the soup stock used in
cooking the vegetables served to the club customers.
Camachia( as club manager( suspended him and
thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators
conformably to the collective bargaining agreement
between the center and its employees. The board
unanimously found him guilty and recommended his
dismissal. 9enoveDs reaction was to file his complaint
against the individual petitioners.
In 9; +o. @..,@( Cuis 4autista( who was employed as a
barracks boy in Cano 6D 3onnell( an e)tension of Clark &ir
4as( was arrested following a buyAbust operation
conducted by the individual petitioners who are officers of
the # &ir Force and special agents of the &ir Force
6ffice of #pecial Investigators. 6n the basis of the sworn
statements made by them( an information for violation of
;.&. 08'1( otherwise known as the 3angerous 3rugs &ct(
was filed against 4autista in the ;TC of Tarlac. #aid
officers testified against him at his trial. 4autista was
dismissed from his employment. !e then filed a complaint
against the individual petitioners claiming that it was
because of their acts that he was removed.
In 9; +o. @.'1@( a complaint for damages was filed by
the private respondents against the herein petitioners
*e)cept the #2( for in"uries sustained by the plaintiffs as a
result of the acts of the defendants. There is a conflict of
factual allegations here. &ccording to the plaintiffs( the
defendants beat them up( handcuffed them and unleashed
dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their
bodies and caused e)tensive in"uries to them. The
defendants deny this and claim that plaintiffs were
arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because
they were struggling and resisting arrest. In a motion to
dismiss the complaint( the # and the individually named
defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against
the #( which had not given its consent to be sued.
*SSUEC %hether the defendants were also immune from
suit under the ;$A# 4ases Treaty for acts done by them
in the performance of their official duties.
HELDC The rule that a #tate may not be sued without its
consent is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law that were have adopted as part of the law
of our land. ?ven without such affirmation( we would still
be bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law under the doctrine of incorporation.
nder this doctrine( as accepted by the ma"ority of the
states( such principles are deemed incorporated in the law
of every civilized state as a condition and conse:uence of
its membership in the society of nations. &ll states are
sovereign e:uals and cannot assert "urisdiction over one
another.
%hile the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against
the state without its consent( it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the states for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. The rule is that if the "udgment against such
officials will re:uire the state itself to perform an affirmative
act to satisfy the same( the suit must be regarded as
against the state although it has not been formally
impleaded.
%hen the government enters into a contract( it is deemed
to have descended to the level of the other contracting
party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with
its implied consent. In the case o #( the customary law of
international law on state immunity is e)pressed with more
specificity in the ;$A# 4ases Treaty. There is no
:uestion that the #( like any other state( will be deemed
to have impliedly waived its nonAsuability if it has entered
into a contract in its proprietory or private capacity. It is
only when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity that no such waiver may be
implied.
It is clear from a study of the records of 9; +o. @..,@ that
the petitioners therein were acting in the e)ercise of their
official functions when they conducted the buyAbust
operations against the complainant and thereafter testified
against him at his trial. It follows that for discharging their
duties as agents of the #( they cannot be directly
impleaded for acts imputable to their principal( which has
not given its consent to be sued.
&s for 9; +o. @..,@( the record is too meager to indicate
what really happened. The needed in:uiry first be made
by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the
conflicting claims of the parties on the basis of evidence
that has yet to be presented at the trial.
Holy S%% v. Ro,('o J(.
!"# SC$% &!'
FAC<SC & piece of real property was ac:uired by the !oly
#ee by way of donation from the &rchdiocese of Manila.
The purpose was to construct the official place of
residence of the $apal +uncio. Cater( the !oly #ee sold
the property on condition that it will evict the s:uatters
therein. For failure to comply with the condition( the !oly
#ee was sued. It moved to dismiss on the ground of state
immunity.
*SSUEC %hether respondent trial court has "urisdiction
over petitioner being a foreign state en"oying sovereign
immunity.
HELDC The ;epublic of the $hilippines has accorded the
!oly #ee the status if a foreign sovereign( the !oly #ee(
through its &mbassador( the $apal +uncio( has had
diplomatic representations with the $hilippine 9overnment
since ,-1/.
The privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was
sufficiently established by the memorandum and
certification of the 3epartment of Foreign &ffairs. The 3F&
has formally intervened in this case and officially certified
that the ?mbassy of the !oly #ee is a duly accredited
diplomatic mission to the ;epublic of the $hilippines
e)empt from local "urisdiction and entitled to all the rights(
privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or
embassy in this country. The determination of the
e)ecutive arm of government that a state or
instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic
immunity is a political :uestion that is conclusive upon the
courts.
%here the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by
the e)ecutive branch( it is the duty of the courts to accept
this claim so as not to embarrass the e)ecutive arm of the
government in conducting the countryDs foreign relations.
9,1,.'), v. S)y%(
9.;. CA,'- 3ecember ,-( ,-81
F,-):
Bamashita was the Commanding 9eneral of the
5apanese army in the $hilippines during %orld %ar '. !e
was charged before the &merican military commission for
war crimes.
!e filed a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition
against 9en. #tyer to reinstate his status as prisoner of
war from being accused as a war criminal. $etitioner also
:uestioned the "urisdiction of the military tribunal.
*u%C %hether or not the military tribunal has "urisdiction.
H%l#:
B?#. The military commission was lawfully created in
conformity with an act of Congress sanctioning the
creation of such tribunals.
The laws of war imposes upon a commander the duty to
take any appropriate measures within his powers to
control the troops under his command to prevent acts
which constitute violation of the laws of war. !ence(
petitioner could be legitimately charged with personal
responsibility arising from his failure to take such measure.
In this regard the #C invoked &rt. , of the !ague
Convention +o. I> of ,-./( as well as &rt. ,- of !ague
Convention +o. K( &rt. '0 of ,-'- 9eneva Convention
among others.
(abeas corpus is untenable since the petitioner merely
sought for restoration to his former status as prisoner of
war and not a discharge from confinement. This is a
matter of military measure and not within the "urisdiction of
the courts.
The petition for prohibition against the respondent will also
not life since the military commission is not made a party
respondent in the case. &s such( no order may be issued
re:uiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.

HERBER< BRO=NELL, JR. v SUN L*FE ASSURANCE
CO!5AN9 OF CANADA
G.R. No. L-7/31, Ju+% 66, 1974
F,-):
This is a petition instituted in the CFI under the provisions
of $hilippines $roperty &ct of the # against the #un Cife
&ssurance company of Canada to compel the latter to
comply with the demand of the former to pay him the
money which T of the proceeds of an endowment policy
payable to &ihara( 5apanese national. The defenses of
#un Cife &ssurance are that immunities in Trading with the
?nemy &ct of # is doubtful application in the $hilippines
and defendant is a trustee of the fund and under legal
obligation to see to it that it is paid to the person
entitled.CFI granted the petition. !ence( appeal was filed
with the #C contending that CFI erred in holding that the
law is binding upon the inhabitants of the $hilippines.
*u%: %6+ the Trading with the ?nemy &ct apply to
$hilippines 9ovt.
H%l#:
Bes( & foreign law may have e)traterritorial effect in a
country other than the country of origin providedthe former
in which it sought to be made operative gives its consent.
The consent need not be e)press it is enough to be
implied from its conduct or from that of its authorized
officers. In this case( the said act was conformed by
$resident ;o)as in a "oint statement signed by him and by
Commissioner Mc+utt. &mbassador ;omulo also formally
e)pressed the conformity of the 9overnment of the
$hilippines to the approval of said act to the &merican
#enate. It is well settled in the # that its laws have
no e)traterritorial effect. The application of said law in
the $hilippines is based concurrently on $hilippines
$roperty &ct of ,-80 and on the tacit consent and
conduct of the 9overnment of the $hilippines in receiving
the benefits of its provisions.
HA= 5*A v CH*NA BANK*NG COR5ORA<*ON
FAC<S
!aw $ia had previously contracted a loan from China
4anking Corporation in the amount of $1(,.7.71( which(
according to !aw $ia( had been completely paid( on
different occasions from ,-8' to ,-88 through 4ank of
Taiwan( Ctd.( which was appointed by the 5apanese
Military authorities as li:uidator of China 4anking Corp.
%ith this( !aw $ia instituted an action against China
4anking Corp. to compel the bank to e)ecute a deed of
cancellation of mortgage on the property used as security
for the loan and to deliver its title.
!owever( upon service of summons( China 4anking Corp.
demanded from !aw $ia for the payment of the sum of its
indebtedness with interests( which also constituted its
counter claim in its answer.
;TC rendered a decision in favor of China 4anking Corp.
on the basis that there was no evidence to show that 4ank
of Taiwan was authorized by China 4anking Corp. to
accept !aw $ia<s payment and that 4ank of Taiwan( as an
agency of the 5apanese invading army( was not
authorized under the international law to li:uidate the
business of China 4anking Corp. &s such( !aw $ia<s
payment to 4ank of Taiwan has not e)tinguished his
indebtedness to China 4anking Corp.
*SSUE
%hether the 5apanese Military &dministration had
authority to order the li:uidation of the business of China
4anking Corp. and to appoint 4ank of
Taiwan as li:uidator authorized as such to accept
payment
HELD
9ES. nder international law( the 5apanese Military
authorities had power to order the li:uidation of China
4anking Corp. and to appoint and authorize 4ank of
Taiwan as li:uidator to accept the payment in :uestion(
because such li:uidation is not confiscation of the
properties of China 4anking Corp.( but a mere
se:uestration of its assets which re:uired its li:uidation.
The se:uestration or li:uidation of enemy banks in
occupied territories is authorized e)pressly( not only by the
# &rmy and +aval Manual of Military 9overnment and
Civil &ffairs( but also similar manuals of other countries(
without violating &rt. 80 or other articles of the !ague
;egulations. They do not amount to an outright
confiscation of private property.
The purpose of such se:uestration( as e)pounded in the
&nnual ;eport of the 6ffice of the &lien Custodian( is that
enemyAowned property can be used to further the interest
of the enemy and to impede their war efforts. &ll enemyA
controlled assets can be used to finance propaganda(
espionage( and sabotage in these countries or in countries
friendly to their cause.
It is presumed that 5apan( in se:uestering and li:uidating
China 4anking Corp.( must have acted in accordance(
either with her own Manual of the &rmy and +avy and Civil
&ffairs 6; with her Trading with the ?nemy &ct( and even
if not( it being permitted to the &llied +ations( specially the
# and ?ngland( to se:uestrate( impound( and block
enemy properties found within their own domain or in
enemy territories occupied during the war by their armed
forces( and it not being contrary to !ague ;egulations or
international law( 5apan had also the right to do the same
in the $hilippines by virtue of the international law principle
that =what is permitted to one belligerent is also allowed to
the other.=
Taking these into consideration( it appears that 5apan did
not intend to confiscate or appropriate the assets of said
banks or the debts due them from their debtors. The fact
that the 5apanese Military authorities failed to pay the
enemy banks the balance of the money collected by the
4ank of Taiwan from the debtors of the said banks( did not
and could not change the se:uestration by them of the
bank<s assets during the war( into an outright confiscation
thereof. It was physically impossible for the 5apanese
Military authorities to do so because they were forcibly
driven out of the $hilippines( following the read"ustment of
rights of private property on land seized by the enemy
provided by the Treaty of >ersailles and other peace
treaties entered into at the close of %%I. The general
principles underlying such arrangements are that the
owners of properties seized are entitled to receive
compensation for the loss or damage inflicted on their
property by the emergency war measures taken by the
enemy.
#ince 5apan war notes were issued as legal tender( 5apan
was bound to indemnify the aggrieved banks for the loss
or damage on their property( in terms of $hil. $esos of #
Q. #ince the 5apanese Military Forces had power to
se:uestrate and impound the assets of China 4anking
Corp. and to appoint 4ank of Taiwan as li:uidator( it
follows that payments of !aw $ia to 4ank of Taiwan
e)tinguished his obligations to China 4anking Corp.
<HE *N<ERHANDEL CASE :*CJ JUDG!EN<, !ARCH
61, 1979;
FAC<S
The 9eneral &niline and Film Company *9&F2 is a
corporation incorporated in the nited #tates. nder the
FTrading with the ?nemy &ctG the government of the
nited #tates took almost all of the shares of said
company reasoning that such shares were controlled by
I.9. Farben( a 9erman and therefore enemy company.
I.9. Farben controlled the shares of 9&F through a #wiss
company called I.9. Chemie of 4asle. !owever by ,-8.(
I.9. Chemie had changed its name to Interhandel and was
found by #wiss authorities to no longer be controlled by
any 9erman or other enemy company. #witzerland
therefore seeks the restoration of the shares of 9&F that
is owned by Interhandel. #uch restoration is however
being opposed by the nited #tates who still maintains its
stance that Interhandle is being controlled by I.9. Farben.
#witzerland would like to submit the dispute to the
International Court of 5ustice however the nited #tates
believes that the IC5 has no "urisdiction over the matter.
#witzerland bases its claim that the IC5 has "urisdiction on
&rt. 70( $ar. ' of the statute of the Court.
*SSUE
%hether the IC5 has "urisdiction to decide the case
between #witzerland and the nited #tates of &merica
HELD
NO. The #wiss &pplication is inadmissible. The nited
#tates presented four ob"ections to #witzerlandDs
&pplication. 6ne of which was sustained therefore making
the #wiss &pplication inadmissible. The ob"ection
sustained held that the #wiss &pplication could not be
entertained because not all local remedies have been
e)hausted by Interhandel. The local remedy referred to is
a case still pending in the # courts.
3octrine of the case *according to the book2: FD;eciprocity
in the case of 3eclarations accepting compulsory
"urisdiction of the Court enables a $arty to invoke a
reservation to that acceptance which it has not e)pressed
in its own 3eclaration but which the other $arty has
e)pressed in its 3eclaration.D Thus( if a party that has
made a 3eclaration unconditionally is brought to the court
by another that has made a 3eclaration with conditions(
the former can invoke the conditions in the latterDs
3eclaration.
The situation in this case was that the nited #tates was
invoking the reservation that it made when it accepted the
statute of the Court on the countryDs acceptance of the
CourtDs compulsory "urisdiction. #uch reservation sought
to limit the courtDs "urisdiction to cases Fhereinafter arisingG
5uly '@( ,-8@. Following the doctrine stated in the bookM
this means that #witzerland may therefore invoke such
reservation if in their own declaration does not contain
such. This is the effect of reciprocity. !owever( it cannot
"ustify a #tate( in this instance the nited #tates( in relying
upon a restriction which the other $arty( #witzerland has
not included in its own 3eclaration.
<HE 5A?UE<E HABANA CASE
FAC<S
The Pa)uete (abana was a sloop and the *ola was a
schooner both were flying under the #panish flag and both
were owned and manned by #panish sub"ects residing in
Cuba which was then a colony of #pain. 4oth left !avana
on a fishing e)pedition and upon making their way back to
the capital encountered the naval blockade of the nited
#tates of &merica who had recently declared war on
#pain. The crews of both ships were unaware of the state
of war between the two nations and were also unaware of
the blockade of the navy. They nevertheless did not try to
escape or resist. pon searching the vessels no weapons
or ammunition was found and it appears that the crew
members had no intention of aiding the cause of the
#panish forces. Their ships were commandeered and
brought to Fort Jeys in Florida wherein they were declared
as prizes of war and auctioned off for Q8-. and Q@..
respectively.
*SSUE
%hether the fishing smacks were rightfully captured by
armed vessels of the nited #tates during the recent war
with #pain.
HELD
NO. The fishing vessels were captured illegally. 4y an
ancient usage among civilized nations( beginning
centuries ago and gradually ripening into a rule of
international law( coast fishing vessels pursuing their
vocation of catching and bringing in fresh fish have been
recognized as e)empt( with their cargoes and crews( from
capture as prize of war. The nited #tates had no
authority to commandeer the fishing smacks in :uestion.
#ources from as far back as ,8.7 were cited by the court
to prove the ancient tradition. Cetters between kings of
?uropean powers were :uoted as well as treaties between
?uropean nations. &ll emphasized the need to spare
fishermen and their vessels from the effects of war. #ome
:uotes: FIn time of war( the freedom of fishing is respected
by belligerentsM fishing boats are considered as neutralM in
law( as in principle( they are not sub"ect either to capture
or to confiscation.G
=&n e)ception to the usage of capturing enemy<s private
vessels at sea is the coast fishery. . . . This principle of
immunity from capture of fishing boats is generally
adopted by all maritime powers( and in actual warfare they
are universally spared so long as they remain harmlessG
=;egarding the capture of enemy property( an e)ception
must be mentioned( which is a universal custom. Fishing
vessels which belong to the ad"acent coast( and whose
business yields only a necessary livelihood( are( from
considerations of humanity( universally e)cluded from
capture.=
The capture was unlawful and the proceeds gained
through the sale of the ships and their cargo should be
restored to the claimant.
<HE COUN< BERNADO<<E CASE :AD"*SOR9
O5*N*ON OF <HE *CJ ON RE5ARA<*ON FOR *NJUR*ES
SUFFERED *N <HE SER"*CE OF <HE UN;
FAC<S
Folke 4ernadotte( Count of %isborg( was a #wedish
diplomat and nobleman noted for his negotiation of the
release of about 7,(... prisoners from the
9erman concentration camps during %%II. &fter the war(
he was chosen by the victorious powers to be the +
#ecurity Council mediator in the &rabAIsraeli conflict. !e
was assassinated in 5erusalem by the militant Uionist
group( Cehi( while pursuing his official duties.
The + #ecurity Council condemned the killing of
4ernadotte as Fa cowardly act( which appears to have
been committed by a criminal group of terrorists in
5erusalem while the + representative was fulfilling his
peaceAseeking mission in the !oly Cand.G
*SSUE
In the event of an agent of the + in the performance of
his duties suffering in"ury in circumstances involving the
responsibility of a #tate( has the + the capacity to bring
an international claim against the responsible government
with a view of obtaining the reparation due in respect of
the damage cause *,2 to the +( *'2 to the victim or to
persons entitled through himL 3oes the + have
international personalityL
HELD
9ES. The Court states that the Charter conferred upon the
+ rights and obligations( which are different from those
of its members. The Court stresses further the important
political tasks of the +AAthe maintenance of international
peace and security. &ccordingly( the Court concludes that
the +( possessing as it does rights and obligations( has
at the same time a large measure of international
personality and the capacity to operate upon an
international plane( although it is certainly not a superA
#tate.
The Court reaches a conclusion that the + has the
capacity to bring an international claim against a #tate
*whether member or not2 for damage resulting from a
breach by that #tate of its obligations towards the +.
The Court points out that it is not called upon to determine
the precise e)tent of the reparation( which the + would
be entitled to recoverM the measure of the reparation
should depend upon a number of factors.
The Court points out in this connection that really only the
6rganization has the capacity to present a claim in the
circumstances referred to( inasmuch as at the basis of an
international claim there must be a breach by the
defendant #tate of an obligation towards the 6rganization.
In the present case the #tate of which the victim is a
national could not complain of a breach of an obligation
towards itself. !ere the obligation is assumed in favor of
the 6rganization. !owever( the Court admits that the
analogy of the traditional rule of diplomatic protection of
nationals abroad does not in itself "ustify an affirmative
reply. In fact( there e)ists no link of nationality between the
+ and its agents. This is a new situation and it must be
analyzed. 3o the provisions of the Charter relating to the
functions of the + imply that the latter is empowered to
assure its agents limited protectionL These powers( which
are essential to the performance of the functions of the
+( must be regarded as a necessary implication arising
from the Charter. In discharging its functions( the + may
find it necessary to entrust its agents with important
missions to be performed in disturbed parts of the world.
These agents must be ensured of effective protection. It is
only in this way that the agent will be able to carry out his
duties satisfactorily.
The Court therefore reaches the conclusion that the +
has the capacity to e)ercise functional protection in
respect of its agents. The situation is comparative simple:
in the case of Member #tates( for these have assumed
various obligations towards the 6rganization.
4ut what is the situation when a claim is brought against a
#tate( which is not a Member of the 6rganizationL The
Court is of opinion that the Members of the nited +ations
created an entity possessing ob"ective international
personality and not merely personality recognized by them
alone.
Vuestion +o. I, of the 9eneral &ssembly refers to the
reconciliation of action by the nited +ations with such
rights as may be possessed by the #tate of which the
victim is a national. In other words( what is involved is
possible competition between the rights of diplomatic
protection( on the one hand( and functional protection on
the other. The Court does not state here which of these
two categories of protection should have priority and in the
case of Member #tates it stresses their duty to render
every assistance provided by &rticle ' of the Charter. It
adds that the risk of competition between the 6rganization
and the national #tate can be reduced or eliminated either
by a general convention or by agreements entered into in
each particular case( and it refers further to cases that
have already arisen in which a practical solution has
already been found.
Finally( the Court e)amines the case in which the agent
bears the nationality of the defendantA#tate. #ince the
claim brought by the + is not based upon the nationality
of the victim but rather upon his status as an agent of the
+( it does not matter whether or not the #tate to which
the claim is addressed regards him as its own national.
The legal situation is not modified thereby.
UNDERH*LL v HERNANDE>
168 U.S. 678 :189/;
FAC<S
In an ,@-' revolution( 9eneral !ernandez deposed the
e)isting >enezuelan government and took control of
Ciudad 4olivar( where $l nderhill( an &merican citizen(
lived and ran a waterworks system for the city. nderhill
applied to !ernandez( re:uesting a passport to leave the
city. !ernandez initially refused( but ultimately granted it.
%hen nderhill finally got back to the #( he brought an
action to recover damages caused by the refusal to grant
the passport( by his detention in >enezuela( for alleged
confinement to his own house( and for certain alleged
assaults and affronts by the soldiers of !ernandez<s army.
*SSUE
%hether the action instituted by nderhill will prosper
HELD
NO. The Court determined that !ernandez had acted in
his official capacity as a military commander so his actions
were those of the >enezuelan government.
The Court therefore refused to hear the claim against
!ernandez based on the A-) o& S),)% Do-)('+%. The
Court reasoned( =?very sovereign state is bound to
respect the independence of every other sovereign state(
and the courts of one country will not sit in "udgment on
the acts of the government of another( done within its own
territory.= &lso( it did not matter that it was a revolution(
and that the commander may not have had recognition at
the time as the leader from outside the territory. %hat
matters is that he succeeded and is now recognized as
such.
<HE NO<<EBOH! CASEC L*ECH<ENS<E*N v
GUA<E!ALA :*CJ JUDG!EN<, NO"E!BER 18, 1973,
A5R*L 6, 1977;
FAC<S
+ottebohm( born in 9ermany( possessed 9erman
citizenship. &lthough he lived in 9uatemala from ,-.1
until ,-87( he never became a citizen of 9uatemala. In
,-7-( +ottebohm applied to become a naturalized citizen
of Ciechtenstein. The application was approved under
e)ceptional circumstances and he became a citizen of
Ciechtenstein. !e then returned to 9uatemala on his
Ciechtenstein passport and informed the local government
of his change of nationality. %hen he tried to return to
9uatemala once again in ,-87( he was refused entry as
an enemy alien since the 9uatemalan authorities did not
recognize his naturalization and regarded him as still
9erman. It has been suggested that the timing of the
event was due to the recent entry of the # and
9uatemala into the %%II.
!e was later e)tradited to the # where he was held at an
internment camp until the end of the war. &ll his
possessions in 9uatemala were confiscated. &fter his
release( he lived out the rest of his life in Ciechtenstein.
The 9overnment of Ciechtenstein granted +ottebohm
protection against un"ust treatment by the government of
9uatemala and petitioned the IC5. !owever( the
government of 9uatemala argued that +ottebohm did not
gain Ciechtenstein citizenship for the purposes of
international law.
*SSUE
%hether the conferment of the Ciechtenstein citizenship is
not contrary to international law and if Ciechtenstein<s
claim on behalf of +ottebohm is admissible in court
HELD
NO. The Court agreed with 9uatemala and held that the
claims by Ciechtenstein were inadmissible. &lthough the
Court stated that it is the sovereign right of all states to
determine its own citizens and criteria for becoming one in
municipal law( such a process would have to be
scrutinized on the international plain in :uestions of
diplomatic protection. The Court upheld the principle of
effective nationality( where the national must prove a
meaningful connection to the state in :uestion. This
principle was previously applied only in cases of dual
nationality to determine which nationality should be used
in a given case.
!owever +ottebohm had forfeited his 9erman nationality
and thus only had the nationality of Ciechtenstein.
&ccording to the practice of #tates( nationality constitutes
the "uridical e)pression of the fact that an individual is
more closely connected with the population of a particular
#tate. Conferred by a #tate( it only entitles that #tate to
e)ercise protection if it constitutes a translation into
"uridical terms of the individual<s connection with that
#tate.
%ith regard to +ottebohm( the Court pointed out that he
always retained his family and business connections with
9ermany and that there is nothing to indicate that his
application for naturalization in Ciechtenstein was
motivated by any desire to disassociate himself from
9ermany.
There is thus the absence of any bond of attachment with
Ciechtenstein( but there is a longAstanding and close
connection between him and 9uatemala( a link( which his
naturalization in no way weakened. That naturalization
was not based on any real prior connection with
Ciechtenstein( nor did it in any way alter the manner <of life
of the person upon whom it was conferred in e)ceptional
circumstances of speed and accommodation. In both
respects( it was lacking in the genuineness re:uisite to an
act of such importance( if it is to be entitled to be
respected by a #tate in the position of 9uatemala. It was
granted without regard to the concept of nationality
adopted in international relations.
+aturalization was asked for not so much for the purpose
of obtaining a legal recognition of +ottebohm<s
membership in fact in the population of
Ciechtenstein( as it was to enable him to substitute for his
status as a national of a belligerent #tate that of the
sub"ect of a neutral #tate( with the sole aim of thus coming
within the protection of Ciechtenstein but not of becoming
wedded to its traditions( its interests( its way of life or of
assuming the obligations other than fiscal obligations and
e)ercising the rights pertaining to the status thus ac:uired.
Ju1,$ v NLRC
GR 189913, D%- 17, 1994
F,-):
Florencio #acramento was a support personnel of the
5oint nited #tates Military &ssistance 9roup to the
$hilippines. %hen he was dismissed( he held a position as
Illustrator ' was the president of a labor organization
registered with 36C?. !owever( he was terminated due to
the abolition of his position. !e filed a complaint with
36C? on the ground that he was illegally terminated.
;espondent asked for reinstatement. $etitioner filed for
motion to dismiss as he invoked his immunity from suit.
Cabor arbiter dismissed his suit and has petitioned in the
+ational Cabor ;elations Commission and the latter
reversed the ruling of the labor arbiter for the reason that
the petitioner lost his right not to be suid because the
petitioner failed to refute the e)istence of the employerA
employee relationship and when he hired the services of
the private respondent.
*u%:
%hether or not the petitioner has immunity from suit
Rul'+$:
The petitioner has immunity from suit. ?ven if he hired the
services of the private respondent( it has still been acting
on behalf of the governmental function of the nited
#tates pursuant to the Military &ssistance &greement
between the $hilippines and &merica. #ince #& has not
consented for the waiver of its immunity from suit( the
complaint shouldnDt have prospered. The immunity is one
of the recognized principles of International law that the
$hilippine adopts. !ence( the petition has been granted.
UN*<ED S<A<ES OF A!ER*CA v. RE9ES
619 SCRA 196 :1993;
FAC<S:
;espondent +elia Montoya( an &merican Citizen( worked
as an I3 checker at the # +avy ?)change *+?K2 at the
# Military &ssistance 9roup *5#M&92 head:uarters in
Vuezon City. #heDs married to ?dgardo Montoya( a
FilipinoA&merican serviceman employed by the # +avy H
stationed in #an Francisco.
$etitioner Ma)ine is an &merican Citizen employed at the
5#M&9 head:uarters as the activity e)change
manager.
6n 5an. ''( ,-@/ Montoya bought some items from the
retail store 4radford managed( where she had purchasing
privileges. &fter shopping H while she was already at the
parking lot( Mrs. Bong Jennedy( a fellow I3 checker
approached her H told her that she needed to search her
bags upon 4radfordDs instruction. Montoya approached
4radford to protest the search but she was told that it was
to be made on all 5#M&9 employees on that day. Mrs.
Jennedy then performed the search on her person( bags
H car in front of 4radford H other curious onlookers.
+othing irregular was found thus she was allowed to leave
afterwards.
Montoya learned that she was the only person sub"ected
to such search that day H she was informed by +?K
#ecurity Manager ;oynon that +?K 5#M&9 employees
are not searched outside the store unless there is a strong
evidence of a wrongAdoing. Montoya canDt recall any
circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a wrongA
doing on her part. #he is aware of 4radfordDs propensity to
suspect Filipinos for theft andEor shoplifting.
Montoya filed a formal protest wEMr. ;oynon but no action
was taken. Montoya filed a suit against 4radford for
damages due to the oppressive H discriminatory acts
committed by petitioner in e)cess of her authority as store
manager. #he claims that she has been e)posed to
contempt H ridicule causing her undue embarrassment H
indignity. #he further claims that the act was not motivated
by any other reason aside from racial discrimination in our
own land wEc are a blow to our national pride H dignity.
#he seeks for moral damages of $1..k and e)emplary
damages of $,..k.
6n May ,7( ,-@/( #ummons H complaint were served on
4radford but instead of filing an answer( she along with
#& government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds
that: *,2 this is a suit against # wEc is a foreign sovereign
immune from suit wEo its consent and *'2 4radford is
immune from suit for acts done in the performance of her
official functions under $hilA# Military &ssistance
&greement of ,-8/ H Military 4ases &greement of ,-8/.
They claim that # has rights( power H authority wEin the
bases( necessary for the establishment( use H operation H
defense thereof. It will also use facilities H areas wEin
bases H will have effective command over the facilities(
# personnel( employees( e:uipment H material. They
further claim that checking of purchases at +?K is a
routine procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect
H safeguard merchandise( cash H e:uipment pursuant to
par. ' H 8*b2 of +&>;?#&C?&CT #4IC I+#T. 11...,.
6n 5uly 0( ,-@/ ( Montoya filed a motion for preliminary
attachment claiming that 4radford was about to leave the
country H was removing H disposing her properties
wEintent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by ;TC.
6n 5uly ,8( ,-@/( Montoya opposed 4radfordDs motion to
dismiss. #he claims that: *,2 search was outside +?K
5#M&9 store thus itDs improper( unlawful H highlyA
discriminatory and beyond 4radfordDs authorityM *'2 due to
e)cess in authority and since her liability is personal(
4radford canDt rely on sovereign immunityM *72 4radfordDs
act was committed outside the military base thus under
the "urisdiction of $hilippine courtsM *82 the Court can
in:uire into the factual circumstances of case to determine
%6+ 4radford acted wEin or outside her authority.
;TC granted MontoyaDs motion for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment and later on issued writ of
attachment opposed by 4radford. Montoya allowed to
present evidence H 4radford declared in default for failure
to file an answer. ;TC ruled in favor of Montoya claiming
that search was unreasonable( reckless( oppressive H
against MontoyaDs liberty guaranteed by Consti. #he was
awarded $7..k for moral damages( $,..k for e)emplary
damages H $1.k for actual e)penses. 4radford filed a
$etition for ;estraining 6rder. #C granted T;6 en"oining
;TC from enforcing decision.
Montoya claims that 4radford was acting as a civilian
employee thus not performing governmental functions.
?ven if she were performing governmental acts( she would
still not be covered by the immunity since she was acting
outside the scope of her authority. #he claims that criminal
acts of a public officerEemployee are his private acts H he
alone is liable for such acts. #he believes that this case is
under ;$ courtsD "urisdiction because act was done
outside the territorial control of the # Military 4ases( it
does not fall under offenses where # has been given
right to e)ercise its "urisdiction and 4radford does not
possess diplomatic immunity. #he further claims that ;$
courts can in:uire into the factual circumstances H
determine %6+ 4radford is immune.
*SSUESC
,. %6+ the case is under the ;TCDs "urisdiction.
'. %6+ ;TC committed a grave abuse of discretion
in denying 4radfordDs motion to dismiss.
7. %6+ case at bar is a suit against the #tate.
8. %6+ 4radford en"oys diplomatic immunity.
HELD:
,. Bes. Intervention of a third party is discretionary
upon the Court. # did not obtain leave of court
*something like asking for CourtDs permission2 to
intervene in the present case. Technically( it
should not be allowed to intervene but since ;TC
entertained its motion to dismiss( it is deemed to
have allowed # to intervene. 4y voluntarily
appearing( # must be deemed to have
sub"ected itself to ;TCDs "urisdiction.
'. +o. $etitioners failed to specify any grounds for a
motion to dismiss enumerated in #ec. ,( ;ule ,0(
;ules of Court. Thus( it actually lacks cause of
action. & cause of action is necessary so that
Court would be able to render a valid "udgment in
accordance with the prayer in the complaint. &
motion to dismiss wEc fails to state a cause of
action hypothetically admits the truth of the
allegations in the complaint. ;TC should have
deferred the resolution instead of denying it for
lack of merit. 4ut this is immaterial at this time
since petitioners have already brought this
petition to the #C.
7. +o. 3octrine of state immunity is e)pressed in
&rt. K>I( #ec. 7 of the ,-@/ Constitustion. This
immunity also applies to complaints filed against
officials of the state for acts allegedly performed
by them in discharge of their duties since it will
re:uire the state to perform an affirmative act
such as appropriation of amount to pay damages.
This will be regarded as a case against the state
even if it has not be formally impleaded. 4ut this
is not all encompassing. ItDs a different matter
where the public official is made to account in his
capacity as such for acts contrary to law H
in"urious to rights of plaintiff. #tate authorizes
only legal acts by its officers. &ction against
officials by one whose rights have been violated
by such acts is not a suit against the #tate wEin
the rule of immunity of the #tate from suit. The
doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an in"ustice. It will not
apply H may not be invoked where the public
official is being sued in his private H personal
capacity as an ordinary citizen. This usually
arises where the public official acts wEo authority
or in e)cess of the powers vested in him. & public
official is liable if he acted wEmalice H in bad faith
or beyond the scope of his authority or
"urisdiction. *#hauf vs. C&2 &lso( #& vs. 9uinto
declared that #& is not conferred with blanket
immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the
$hilippines merely because they have acted as
agents of the # in the discharge of their official
functions. In this case( 4radford was sued in her
privateEpersonal capacity for acts done beyond
the scope H place of her official function( thus( it
falls wEin the e)ception to the doctrine of state
immunity.
8. +o. First of all( she is not among those granted
diplomatic immunity under &rt. ,0*b2 of the ,-17
Military &ssistance &greement creating the
5#M&9. #econd( even diplomatic agents who
en"oy immunity are liable if they perform acts
outside their official functions *&rt. 7,( >ienna
Convention on 3iplomatic ;elations2.
$etition denied. T;6 lifted.
E(%1% KooFoo(')-.F'+ v. Sol'-')o( G%+%(,l G.R. No.
L-1816, Au$u) 6/, 1948
FAC<S:
In &ugust ,-8,( appelleeApetitioner Jookooritchkin filed
with the CFI of Camarines #ur a petition for naturalization(
supported by *a2 the affidavits of e)A5udge 5aime M.
;eyes and 3r. #alvador Mariano( residents of Camarines
#ur( *b2 his declaration of intention which was sworn in
5uly ,-8.( and *c2 notice of hearing. The petition was filed
in &ugust ,-8, but was not heard until &ugust '@ and
#ept. 7.( ,-8/ when appelleeApetitioner presented his
evidence( since the province was invaded by the
5apanese forces during %%I and the case records had to
be reconstituted after being destroyed during the war.
&ppellant #ol9en crossAe)amined appelleeApetitionerDs
witnesses but did not file any opposition and did not
present any evidence to controvert the petition. The CFI
granted the petition for naturalization( finding that
appelleeApetitioner was a nativeAborn ;ussian who grew
up as a citizen of and was part of the military of the
defunct Imperial ;ussian 9overnment under the Czars.
!e had several stints while in military service before he
"oined the %hite ;ussian &rmy at >ladivostok and fought
against the 4olsheviks until ,-'' when the latter force
defeated the former. ;efusing to "oin the 4olshevik
regime( he fled by sea to #hanghai( and eventually went to
Manila as part of the group of %hite ;ussians under
&dmiral #tark in March ,-'7. !e finally permanently
resided in Iriga( Camarines #ur e)cept during his stint in
the guerrilla force in Caramoan from ,-8' to 5uly ,-81.
The lower court also made findings of the establishment of
his family( employment( social life( his ability to speak and
write ?nglish and 4icol( his good moral character(
adherence to the underlying principles of the $hilippine
Constitution( and being a stateless refugee belonging to
no #tate.
I##?#:

,. %E+ appelleeApetitionerDs declaration of intention
to become a Filipino citizen was valid and
sufficient basis for his petition for naturalization.
'. %E+ appelleeApetitioner sufficiently established
legal residence in the $hilippines and could
speak and write any of the principal $hilippine
languages.
7. %E+ appelleeApetitioner was stateless refugee.
!?C3:
,. #ection 1 of the ;evised +aturalization Caw
applies and provides that FOnPo declaration shall
be valid until entry for permanent residence has
been established and a certificate showing the
date( place and manner of his arrival has been
issued.G %hile appelleepetitionerDs declaration
was reconstituted( the attached certificate
referred to in the declaration was not
reconstituted. The #C ruled that the law does not
state that the certificate is essential to the validity
of the declaration as the only re:uirement is for
the said certificate to be issued. There is the
uncontroverted fact of appelleeApetitionerDs
peaceful and continuous residence in the
$hilippines for '1 years and statement in his
declaration that a certificate had been attached to
the said declaration. !ence( appellee petitionerDs
declaration was valid under law in view of other
competent evidence showing the facts sought to
be established under the certificate that was not
reconstituted.
'. &ppelleeApetitioner has sufficiently shown legal
residence in the $hilippines for a continuous
period of not less than ,. years as re:uired by
#ection ' of the ;evised +aturalization Caw. In
addition( appelleeApetitioner had good command
of both ?nglish and 4icol. %hile there may be
many standards out there( none was set in the
law on the re:uired ability to speak and write any
of the principal $hilippine languages. &ppellee
petitioner got along well with his comrades during
his hazardous days in the guerrilla movement
thus showing that he satisfied the re:uirement of
the law. There was also circumstantial evidence
that appelleeApetitioner also ought to know how
to write 4icol( which uses the same alphabet
used in ?nglish and so widely used in the
$hilippines. 9iven his good command of ?nglish
as shown in his testimony( appelleeApetitioner
could easily make use of the same alphabet in
the place where he had been residing for '1
years.
3. &ppellant #ol9en asserted that appelleeA
petitioner failed to show that he lost his
citizenship under the laws of ;ussia and that
;ussia granted to Filipinos the same right to be
naturalized citizens. !owever( the #C still found
that lower court did not err in finding appelleeA
petitioner as a stateless refugee. &ppelleeA
petitionerDs testimony that he is not a ;ussian
citizen and that he has no citizenship is
uncontroverted. There is also the wellAknown
ruthlessness of modern dictatorships giving rise
to a great number of stateless refugees or
displaced persons( without country or flag. The
tyrannical intolerance of dictatorships to
opposition translates into beastly oppression(
concentration camps and bloody purges( such
that it is only natural that those who flee to other
countries to escape such a situation( such as
appelleeApetitioner( lose all bonds of
attachments to their former
fatherlands.
=9L*E "S. RARANG
G.R. No. /4137, !,y 68 1996, 689 SCRA 37/
FAC<S:
$etitioner M. !. %ylie was the assistant
administrative officer while petitioner Capt.
5ames %illiams was the commanding officer of the . #.
+aval 4ase in #ubic 4ay( 6longapo City. $rivate
respondent &urora I. ;arang was an employee in the
office of the $rovost Marshal assigned
as merchandise control guard.
M. !. %ylie( in his capacity as assistant
administrative officer of the .#. +aval #tation supervised
the publication of the =$lan of the 3ay= *$632 which was
published daily by the # +aval 4ase station. The $63
featured important announcements( necessary
precautions( and general matters of interest to military
personnel. 6ne of the regularfeatures of the $63 was the
=action line in:uiry.= 6n February 7( ,-/@( the $63 made
a publication( under the =+&>#T& &CTI6+ CI+?
I+VI;B= which mentioned a certain person named
F&uringG who is described as a disgrace to her division and
to the 6ffice of the $rovost Marshal.
The private respondent was the only one who was named
=&uring= in the 6ffice of the $rovost Marshal and was
subse:uently proven that it was her being referred to
when petitioner M. !. %ylie wrote her a letter of apology
for the =inadvertent= publication. The private respondent
the filed an action for damages alleging that the article
constituted false( in"urious( and malicious defamation and
libel tending to impeach her honesty( virtue and reputation
e)posing her to public hatred( contempt and ridiculeM and
that the libel was published and circulated in the ?nglish
language and read by almost all the . #. +aval 4ase
personnel.
The defendants however contended by filing a motion to
dismiss based on the grounds that the defendants M. !.
%ylie and Capt. 5ames %illiams acted in the performance
of their official functions as officers of the nited #tates
+avy and are( therefore( immune from suitM and the nited
#tates +aval 4ase is an instrumentality of the #
government which cannot be sued without its consent.
*SSUE:
%hether or not the officials of the nited #tates +aval
4ase are immune from suit.
HELD:
The sub"ect article in the # +ewsletter $63 dated
February 7( ,-/@ mentions a certain =&uring= as =. . a
disgrace to her division and to the 6ffice of the $rovost
Marshal.= The same article e)plicitly implies that &uring
was consuming and appropriating for herself confiscated
items like cigarettes and foodstuffs. There is no :uestion
that the &uring alluded to in the &rticle was the private
respondent as she was the only &uring in the 6ffice of the
$rovost Marshal. Moreover( as a result of this article( the
private respondent was investigated by her supervisor.
4efore the article came out( the private respondent had
been the recipient of commendations by her superiors for
honesty in the performance of her duties.
It may be argued that Captain 5ames %illiams as
commandingofficer of the naval base is far removed in the
chain of command from the offensive publication and it
would be asking too much to hold him responsible for
everything which goes wrong on the base. This may be
true as a general rule. In this particular case( however( the
records show that the offensive publication was sent to the
commanding officer for approval and he approved it. The
factual findings of the two courts below are based on the
records. The petitioners have shown no convincing
reasons why our usual respect for the findings of the trial
court and the respondent court should be withheld in this
particular case and why their decisions should be
reversed.
&rticle ',/0 of the Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for
damages caused by a person<s act or omission
constituting fault or negligence( to wit:
&rt. ',/0. %hoever by act or omission( causes damage to
another( there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay
for the damage done. #uch fault or negligence( if there is
no preAe)isting contractual relation between the parties( is
called a :uasiAdelict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
=Fault= or =negligence= in this &rticle covers not only acts
=not punishable by law= but also acts criminal in character(
whether intentional or voluntary or negligent.=
Moreover( &rticle '',-*/2 of the Civil Code provides that
moral damages may be recovered in case of libel( slander
or any other form of defamation. In effect( the offended
party in these cases is given the right to receive from the
guilty party moral damages for in"ury to his feelings and
reputation in addition to punitive or e)emplary damages.
Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the $63 dated
February 7( ,-/@ is a defamation against the character
and reputation of the private respondent. $etitioner %ylie
himself admitted that the 6ffice of the $rovost Marshal
e)plicitly recommended the deletion of the name &uring if
the article were published. The petitioners( however( were
negligent because under their direction they issued the
publication without deleting the name =&uring.= #uch act or
omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It
was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent.
&s a result of the petitioners< act( the private
respondent( according to the record( suffered besmirched
reputation( serious an)iety( wounded feelings and social
humiliation( specially so( since the article was baseless
and false. The petitioners( alone( in
their personal capacities are liable for the damages they
caused the private respondent.
ABA9A v. EBDANE
G.R. No. 16/919 F%4. 14, 688/
F,-):
The 9overnment of 5apan and the 9overnment of the
$hilippines( through their respective representatives(
namely( Mr. Boshihisa &ra( &mbassador ?)traordinary
and $lenipotentiary of 5apan to the ;epublic of the
$hilippines( and then #ecretary of Foreign &ffairs
3omingo C. #iazon( have reached an understanding
concerning 5apanese loans to be e)tended to the
$hilippines. These loans were aimed at promoting our
countryDs economic stabilization and development efforts.
The assailed resolution recommended the award to
private respondent China ;oad H 4ridge Corporation of
the contract for the implementation of civil works for
Contract $ackage +o. I *C$ I2( which consists of the
improvementErehabilitation of the #an &ndres *Codon2A
>iracA5ct. 4agoA>iga road( with the length of /-.@,@
kilometers( in the island province of Catanduanes.The
3$%! caused the publication of the FInvitation to
$re:ualify and to 4idG for the implementation of the C$ I
pro"ect( in two leading national newspapers( namely( the
Manila Times and Manila #tandard on +ovember '' and
'-( and 3ecember 1( '..'.
& total of twentyAthree *'72 foreign and local contractors
responded to the invitation by submitting their
accomplished pre:ualification documents on 5anuary '7(
'..7. In accordance with the established pre:ualification
criteria( eight contractors were evaluated or considered
eligible to bid as concurred by the 54IC. $rior to the
opening of the respective bid proposals( it was announced
that the &pproved 4udget for the Contract *&4C2 was in
the amount of $/7@(/,.(107.0/.
The bid goes to private respondent China ;oad H 4ridge
Corporation was corrected from the original
$--7(,@7(-.8.-@ *with variance of 78.81W from the &4C2
to $-1'(108(@',./, *with variance of '@.-1W from the
&4C2 based on their letter clarification dated &pril ',(
'..8.
The petitioners anchor the instant petition on the
contention that the award of the contract to private
respondent China ;oad H 4ridge Corporation violates ;&
-,@8( particularly #ection 7, thereof which reads:
#?C. 7,. Ceiling for 4id $rices. R The &4C shall be the
upper limit or ceiling for the 4id prices. 4id prices that
e)ceed this ceiling shall be dis:ualified outright from
further participating in the bidding. There shall be no lower
limit to the amount of the award.
The petitioners insist that Coan &greement is neither an
international nor an e)ecutive agreement that would bar
the application of ;& -,@8. They point out that to be
considered a treaty( an international or an e)ecutive
agreement( the parties must be two sovereigns or #tates
whereas in the case of Coan &greement +o. $!A$'.8( the
parties are the $hilippine 9overnment and the 54IC( a
banking agency of 5apan( which has a separate "uridical
personality from the 5apanese 9overnment.
The respondents however contend that foreign loan
agreements( including Coan &greement +o. $!A$'.8( as
e)ecutive agreements and( as such( should be observed
pursuant to the fundamental principle in international law
of pacta sunt servanda. The Constitution( the public
respondents emphasize( recognizes the enforceability of
e)ecutive agreements in the same way that it recognizes
generally accepted principles of international law as
forming part of the law of the land.78 This recognition
allegedly buttresses the binding effect of e)ecutive
agreements to which the $hilippine 9overnment is a
signatory. It is pointed out by the public respondents that
e)ecutive agreements are essentially contracts governing
the rights and obligations of the parties. & contract( being
the law between the parties( must be faithfully adhered to
by them. 9uided by the fundamental rule of pacta sunt
servanda( the $hilippine 9overnment bound itself to
perform in good faith its duties and obligations under Coan
&greement.
*u%: %hether or not the the loan agreement violates ;&
-,@8.
H%l#:
The court ruled in favor of the respondents.
#ignificantly( an e)change of notes is considered a form of
an e)ecutive agreement( which becomes binding through
e)ecutive action without the need of a vote by the #enate
or Congress. e)ecutive agreements( They sometimes take
the form of e)change of notes and at other times that of
more formal documents denominated FagreementsG or
FprotocolsG.
The fundamental principle of international law of pacta
sunt servanda( which is( in fact( embodied in #ection 8 of
;& -,@8 as it provides that FOaPny treaty or international or
e)ecutive agreement affecting the sub"ect matter of this
&ct to which the $hilippine government is a signatory shall
be observed(G the 3$%!( as the e)ecuting agency of the
pro"ects financed by Coan &greement +o. $!A$'.8(
rightfully awarded the contract for the implementation of
civil works for the C$ I pro"ect to private respondent China
;oad H 4ridge Corporation.
='ll'% 9u v !'(',1 D%&%+o(-S,+)',$o GR No. 83886+
:1989;
F,-)C
%illie Bu *$etitioner2 is a naturalized Filipino citizen.
$etitioner was holder of a $ortuguese passport and
despite his naturalization on February ,.( ,-/@ applied for
a renewal of his travel document with the $ortuguese
?mbassy in Tokyo and was issued same on 5uly ',( ,-@,.
&lbeit( petitioner has renounced his former allegiance( he
continues to revert to the former whenever convenient i.e.
in business dealings and transactions local and overseas.
!erein respondent has detained petitioner for eventual
deportation alleging that the latter is not a citizen by virtue
of his acts H evidences adduced. $etitioner filed a petition
for habeas corpus seeking his release from detention.
*u%C
%hether the 4ureau of Immigration H 3eportation *4I32
was "ustified in detaining petitioner and processing him for
deportation.
H%l#:
The court a :uo( In 4oard of Immigration Commissioners
vs. 9o 9allano( enunciated that e)press renunciation was
held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly
and e)plicitly and not left to inference or implication.
$etitioner after having renounced $ortuguese citizenship
upon naturalization( resumed or reac:uired his prior status
as a $ortuguese citizen by applying for a renewal of his
$ortuguese passport and represented himself as such in
official documents even after becoming a naturalized
Filipino citizen. #uch acts is grossly inconsistent with his
maintenance of $hilippine Citizenship.
$hilippine Citizenship( it must be stressed( is not a
commodity or ware to be displayed when re:uired and
suppressed when convenient.
%herefore( premises considered( petitioner<s motion for
release from detention is denied. The decision is
immediately e)ecutory.
G G.R. NO. 186/81, JUL9 63, 6888 H
Eu%4'o Eu$%+'o K. Lo0%@ v. Co11''o+ o+
El%-)'o+ ,+# <%'% 5. "'ll,+u%v,
F,-)C
?usebio ?ugenio J. Copez herein petitioner was a
candidate for the 4arangay ?lection held last 6ctober '-(
'../. $etitioner won but was nonetheless dis:ualified by
C6M?C?C. &llegedly( he is a FilipinoA&merican.
$etitioner avers that he is indeed a dual citizen pursuant to
his compliance with the Citizenship ;etention H ;eA
ac:uisition &ct of '..7 and that he returned to the
$hilippines and possesses all the :ualifications to run for
4arangay Chairman( hence this petition.
*u%C %hether herein petitioner( as a FilipinoA&merican
or with dual citizenship( is eligible to run for the office of
4arangay Chairman.
H%l#:
The petition was dismissed and the order of the
C6M?C?C dis:ualifying petitioner was upheld.
The court stated that the petitioner cannot rely on >alles
vs. C6M?C?C because his case does not sit four s:uares
with the facts of the same and that the doctrine in >alles
has been superseded by the enactment of ;.&. +o. -''1
in '..7 which e)pressly provides the conditions before
those who reAac:uired Filipino citizenship may run for
public office to wit:
#ection 1. Civil an+ Political $ights an+ *iabilities. - Those
who retain or reAac:uire $hilippine citizenship under this
&ct shall en"oy full civil and political rights and be sub"ect
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under e)isting
laws of the $hilippines and the following conditions:
))))))
*'2 Those seeking elective public office in the $hilippines
shall meet the :ualification for holding such public office
as re:uired by the Constitution and e)isting laws and( at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy( make ,
0%(o+,l ,+# 3o(+ (%+u+-',)'o+ o& ,+y ,+# ,ll
&o(%'$+ -')'@%+.'0 4%&o(% ,+y 0u4l'- o&&'-%(
,u).o('@%# )o ,#1'+')%( ,+ o,)..
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CHAN
FOOK, G.R. No. L-16968 O-)o4%( 6, 1961
FAC<SC The accused( a Chinese sub"ect( was a
passenger of the nited #tates Military Transport #outh
4end. !aving been allowed by the immigration authorities
to land( he left the boat on the same day. The following
day( he went to pier no. , to get his baggage. &fter the
search of the baggage in which postcards of an indecent
character were found( a customs agent attempted to
search the body of the accused( to which the latter
apparently ob"ected. & dispute took place between the
two( which terminated in the secret agent seizing the
Chinaman by the arm with intent to search his body( after
showing him his police badge. The accused resisted and
struck the secret agent on the stomach. The latter in turn
struck him on the neck. The customs inspector intervened
and e)plained to the accused that Cruz was a customs
secret service agent and had the right to search him in
order to find whether he had on his person any
contraband. Then the appellant made no further
resistance and allowed himself to be searched.
Chan Fook was prosecuted for the crime of resistance and
disobedience to the public authority by the CFI of Manila.
*SSUEC
%hether or not accused is guilty of the crime of resistance
and disobedience.
H%l#: +o. The prosecution alleges that under section ,77@
of the &dministrative Code all persons coming into the
$hilippine Islands from Foreign countries shall be liable to
detention and search by the customs authorities under
such regulations as may be prescribed relative thereto.
The defense( however( contends that once the accused
has arrived at the point of his destination by being allowed
to leave the boat and to land he was beyond the
"urisdiction of the customs authorities( and( therefore( not
liable to search without "udicial warrant.
!aving in mind the aim of the law in authorizing
the search of persons coming from foreign countries(
which is to avoid the clandestine introduction into the
$hilippine Islands of goods sub"ect to the payment of
customs duties( or the importation of the articles prohibited
by law( or the entrance of persons who have no right to
reside in these Islands( after the customs authorities have
permitted the accused to land in Manila( the terminus of
his voyage( he ceased to be a passenger within the
meaning of said section ,77@ of the &dministrative Code.
The scope of the respective powers of public
officers and their agents is fi)ed. If they go beyond it and
they violate any recognized rights of the citizens( then the
latter may resist the invasion.
In the case at bar the action of the accused in laying
his hands on the agent Cruz is an ade:uate defense to
repel the aggression of the latter( who had seized him by
the arm for the purpose of searching him. In accordance
with the repeated decisions of the supreme court of #pain(
the gravity of a disobedience to an order of a person in
public authority is measured and graded by the
circumstances surrounding the act( the motives prompting
it( and the real importance of the transgression rather than
by the source of the order disobeyed. &nd( taking into
consideration the circumstances of the present case(
wherein the agent Cruz had e)ceeded his functions( and
wherein the accused acted in defense of the most highly
esteemed of individual rights N the constitutional right to
be secured against unreasonable searches N we are of
the opinion that there is no ground for finding the accused
guilty of the crime defined in article '1' of the $enal Code.
The supreme court of #pain held that the act of
obstinately disregarding an order of an agent of the
authority does not constitute the crime of grave resistance
and disobedience to an agent of the public authority where
it appears that upon being directed for the third time( the
accused obeyed( though uttering unpleasant words( for
although the accused did not leave the premises on the
first and second re:uests( he( however( obeyed on the
third( and did not render it necessary for the public officer
to make use of the means authorized by law to make
himself respected. That the accused had no intention to
resist and disobey the agents of the authority( in the legal
sense of the word( is shows by the fact that by the mere
e)planation of the customs inspector( he finally allowed
himself to be searched.
That foreigners in the $hilippines are entitled to
the benefits of the individual rights secured by the
$hilippine 4ill is undeniable. %hen Congress came to
pass the &ct of 5uly ,( ,-.'( it enacted( almost in the
language of the $resident<s instructions( the 4ill of ;ights
of our Constitution. In view of the e)pressed declarations
of the $resident( followed by the action of Congress( both
adopting( with little alternation( the provisions of the 4ill of
;ights( there would seem to be no room for argument that
in this form it was intended to carry to the $hilippine
Islands those principles of our government which the
$resident declared to be established as rules of law for the
maintenance of individual freedom( at the same time
e)pressing regret that the inhabitants of the Islands had
not therefore en"oyed their benefit.
&nd according to the principles underlying the
Constitution( as e)tended to the $hilippine Islands by the
$resident<s instructions to the Commission and by the
$hilippine 4ill( foreigners are entitled to the protection of
their life( liberty( and property.
5H*L*55*NE !ANUFAC<UR*NG COR5ORA<*ON v.
UN*ON *NSURANCE SOC*E<9 OF CAN<ON, L<D
G.R. No. L-164/3 Nov%14%( 11, 1961
FAC<SC The plaintiff was the owner of the steel tank
lighter named $hilmaco. The defendant is an insurance
company organized under the laws of !ong Jong and duly
authorized to transact business here.
The defendant insured the plaintiff<s lighter and
issued its policy for such insurance. 3uring the life of the
policy and as a result of a typhoon( the lighter was sunk in
the Manila 4ay( of which the plaintiff notified the defendant
and demanded payment of the full amount of its policy(
which the defendant refused( and denied its liability.
$laintiff commenced an action and alleged in the
complaint that the loss of the said steel tank lighter was
total and the full amount for which it was insured upon
such loss immediately became due and payable. For
answer the defendant admits the issuance and delivery of
the policy( and( as a further and separate defense( alleges
that( under its terms( the defendant was only liable for an
absolute total loss( and that there was not a total
destruction of the lighter.
The lower court rendered "udgment for the
defendant. !ence( an appeal was taken.
*SSUEC
%hether or not defendant is liable.
!eld: Bes. Counsel for the defendant points out that the
policy provides that it =shall be of as much force and effect
as the surest writing or policy of insurance made in
Condon(= and contend that the policy should be construed
under the Marine Caw of 9reat 4ritain( but as to what may
be the law there is not alleged or proven.
The law of 9reat 4ritain since the 3eclaration of
Independence is the law of a foreign country( and( like any
other foreign law( is matter of fact( which the courts of this
country cannot be presumed to be ac:uainted with( or to
have "udicial knowledge of( unless it is pleaded and
proved.
The rule that the courts of one country cannot
take cognizance of the law of another without plea and
proof has been constantly maintained at law and in e:uity(
in ?ngland and &merica.
%hen in a litigation the application of a foreign
law( for e)ample the law of China( is sought( it is
necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands( in a
satisfactory manner( the e)istence of such law as a
:uestion of factM and when proof of such a law is lacking( it
is improper to apply unknown laws to suits pending before
the courts of the Islands.
In the ?nglish practice( a ship is a total loss when
she has sustain such e)tensive damage that it would not
be reasonably practical to repair her. The ordinary
measure of prudence which the courts have adopted is
this: If the ship( when repaired( will not be worth the sum
which it would be necessary to e)pend upon her( the
repairs are( practically speaking( impossible( and it is a
case of total loss. *Citing a number of ?nglish authorities.2
&fter a careful consideration of the important
case( the decision of the trial court should be reversed(
and that a "udgment should be entered here in favor of the
plaintiff against the defendant.
5EO5LE OF <HE 5H*L*55*NES v. LOL-LO ,+#
SARA=, G.R. No. 1/978 F%4(u,(y 6/, 1966
FAC<SC 6n or about 5une 7.( ,-'.( two boats left matuta(
a 3utch possession( for $eta( another 3utch possession.
There the boat was surrounded by si) vintas manned by
twentyAfour Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for
food( but once on the 3utch boat( too for themselves all of
the cargo( attacked some of the men( and brutally violated
two of the women by methods too horrible to the
described. Two of the Moro marauders were ColAlo( who
also raped one of the women( and #araw.
ColAlo and #araw later returned to their home in
#outh bian( TawiATawi( #ulu( $hilippine Islands. There
they were arrested and were charged in the CFI of #ulu
with the crime of piracy. & demurrer was interposed by
counsel de officio for the Moros( based on the grounds
that the offense charged was not within the "urisdiction of
the CFI( nor of any court of the $hilippine Islands( and that
the facts did not constitute a public offense( under the laws
in force in the $hilippine Islands. The demurrer was
overruled by the trial "udge.
5udgment was rendered finding the two
defendants guilty.
*SSUEC
%hether or not the offense committed is penalized by
$hilippine laws.
H%l#: Bes. It is evident that the provisions of the $enal
Code now in force in the $hilippines relating to piracy are
not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force
in the nited #tates.
4y the Treaty of $aris( #pain ceded the
$hilippine Islands to the nited #tates. & logical
construction of articles of the $enal Code( like the articles
dealing with the crime of piracy( would be that wherever
=#pain= is mentioned( it should be substituted by the words
=nited #tates= and wherever =#paniards= are mentioned(
the word should be substituted by the e)pression =citizens
of the nited #tates and citizens of the $hilippine Islands.=
#omewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of
nited #tates vs. #mith to give to the word =authority= as
found in the $enal Code a limited meaning( which would
no longer comprehend all religious( military( and civil
officers( but only public officers in the 9overnment of the
$hilippine Islands.
5EO5LE OF <HE 5H*L*55*NES v. =ONG CHENG, G.R.
No. L-18964 O-)o4%( 19, 1966
FAC<SC %ong Cheng is accused of having illegally
smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa(
which is of ?nglish nationality( while anchored in Manila
4ay and two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
%ong Cheng presented a demurrer to the criminal
information( alleging lack of "urisdiction of the lower court.
Cower court ruled in favor of the accused and thus
dismissed the case.
*SSUEC
%hether or not $hilippines courts have "urisdiction over
the crime committed on board a foreign merchant vessel
anchored in our "urisdiction waters.
H%l#: Bes. There are two fundamental rules on this
particular matter in connection with International CawM to
wit( the French rule( according to which crimes committed
aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be
prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose
territorial "urisdiction they were committed( unless their
commission affects the peace and security of the territoryM
and the ?nglish rule( based on the territorial principle and
followed in the nited #tates( according to which( crimes
perpetrated under such circumstances are in general
triable in the courts of the country within territory they were
committed. 6f this two rules( it is the last one that obtains
in this "urisdiction( because at present the theories and
"urisprudence prevailing in the nited #tates on this matter
are authority in the $hilippines which is now a territory of
the nited #tates.
%e have seen that the mere possession of opium
aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court
not triable by or courts( because it being the primary ob"ect
of our 6pium Caw to protect the inhabitants of the
$hilippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the
use of this drug( its mere possession in such a ship(
without being used in our territory( does not being about in
the said territory those effects that our statute
contemplates avoiding. !ence such a mere possession is
not considered a disturbance of the public order.
4ut to smoke opium within our territorial limits( even
though aboard a foreign merchant ship( is certainly a
breach of the public order here established( because it
causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within
our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our
Cegislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid
repressive statute.
GO JUL*AN v. GO"ERN!EN<
G.R. No. L-68889 O-)o4%( 66, 1963
FAC<SC 6n #ept. /( ,@--( 9o 5ulian( a Chinese
merchant( was born in the $hilippines of Chinese parents.
#ince then( he has been residing in Iloilo. In ,-''( he filed
a petition in the CFI of Iloilo for naturalization as a citizen
of the $hilippines under &ct +o. '-/'. !e admits that he
was currently a citizen of the Chinese ;epublic and that
he holds a certificate of residence issued under the &ct of
Congress of &pr. '-( ,-.'. +othing in the records shows
that his Chinese parents were considered as #panish
sub"ects before the ratification of the Treaty of $aris.
The &ttorneyA9eneral opposed his petition on the
grounds that: *a2 the petitioner( being Chinese( was not
entitled to the benefits granted by said law since it can
only be availed of by Fcitizens of the nited #tates or
foreigners who under the laws of the nited #tates may be
become citizens of said country if residing thereinMG and *b2
under the laws of the nited #tates( 5ulian could not be
naturalized as a citizen of the .#. even if he were
residing therein.
Lo3%( Cou() Rul'+$C The trial court sustained the
opposition of the &ttorneyA9eneral and denied 5ulianDs
petition.
*SSUEC
%hether or not petitioner may recover his $hilippine
citizenship.
H%l#: B?#. &ssuming that 5ulian( by reason of having
been born in the $hilippines( had at least a latent right to
$hilippine citizenshipM and assuming that during his
minority( his father chose the nationality of his country in
applying for a certificate of residence( in ,-.7( and that
5ulian( upon attaining the age of ma"ority( chose the
nationality of his fatherM the :uestion that presents itself
now for our consideration is whether or not the petition
may recover the $hilippine citizenship under &ct +o. '-'/.
In the case of ,nite+ States v. -ong .im %rk
*,0- . #.( 08-2( the Court stated that the ,8
th
&mendment
affirmed the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by
birth within the territory. The &mendment includes the
children born within the territory of the nited #tates( of all
other persons( of whatever race or color( domiciled within
the nited #tates.
#ection ' of the &ct of Congress of &ugust '-(
,-,0 provides:
/S0C. !. That all inhabitants of the Philippine
1slan+s 2ho 2ere Spanish sub3ects on the
eleventh +ay of %pril, eighteen hun+re+ an+
ninety-nine, an+ then resi+e+ in sai+ 1slan+s, an+
their chil+ren born subse)uent thereto, shall be
+eeme+ an+ hel+ to be citizens of the Philippine
1slan+s, except such as shall have electe+ to
preserve their allegiance to the Cro2n of Spain in
accor+ance 2ith the provisions of the treaty of
peace bet2een the ,nite+ States an+ Spain,
signe+ at Paris 4ecember tenth, eighteen
hun+re+ an+ ninety-eight, an+ except such
others as have since become citizens of some
other country5 Provi+e+, That the Philippine
*egislature, herein provi+e+ for, is hereby
authorize+ to provi+e by la2 for the ac)uisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine 1slan+s 2ho +o not come 2ithin the
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular
possessions of the ,nite+ States, an+ such other
persons resi+ing in the Philippine 1slan+s 2ho
are citizens of the ,nite+ States, or 2ho coul+
become citizens of the ,nite+ States un+er the
la2s of the ,nite+ States if resi+ing therein.6
4y virtue of the authority granted by said &ct( the
$hilippine Cegislature enacted on March '0( ,-'.( &ct +o.
'-'/ known as +aturalization Caw. #ection , of this &ct
provides:
/S0C. 7. -ho may become Philippine citizens.
8 Philippine citizenship may be ac)uire+ by5 9a:
;atives of the Philippines 2ho are not citizens
thereof un+er the <ones *a2= 9b: natives of the
other 1nsular possessions of the ,nite+ States=
9c: citizens of the ,nite+ States, or foreigners
2ho un+er the la2s of the ,nite+ States may
become citizens of sai+ country if resi+ing
therein.6
The Court is of the opinion that 5ulian is a native
of the $hilippines within the meaning of the word =natives=
used in the &ct and the &ct of Congress of &ugust '-(
,-,0. Therefore( since he is a native of the $hilippine
Islands( but is not( however( within the provisions of
#ection ' of the &ct of Congress of &ugust '-( ,-,0( for
having chosen the nationality of his father( he may now
recover his $hilippine citizenship( under section , of &ct
+o. '-'/. &s Mr. 5ustice Malcolm( speaking of &ct +o.
'-'/( says:
/The only )ualification for a native of the
Philippines to be able to ac)uire Philippine
citizenship is that he must not be less than
t2enty-one years of age.6
?ven in viewing the :uestion from the standpoint
that 5ulian is a Chinese on account of the fact that he
chose the nationality of his father after attaining the age of
ma"ority( the fact of his having born in the $hilippine still
stands( and under the doctrine laid down in the %ong Jim
&rk case( and followed by this court in various decisions(
he may now recover his $hilippine citizenship under the
provisions of the +aturalization &ct.
BEHN, !E9ER I CO. v. S<ANLE9
G.R. No. L-6673/ D%-%14%( 8, 1964
FAC<SC In February ,-,@( during the war with 9ermany(
all the business( property( and assets if every nature of a
4ehn( Meyer H Co. *4MC2( a foreign corporation with a
branch in the $hilippines( were taken over by the &lien
$roperty Custodian under the provisions of the Trading
with the ?nemy &ct and a receiver appointed and placed
in full charge of the business and assets of the firm.
In February ,-,-( the &lien $roperty Custodian
declared 4MC to be an enemy not holding a license
granted by the $resident of the nited #tates and at the
same time made demand upon the receiver to convey(
transfer( assign( deliver and pay over to the Custodian all
the property and assets of the firm( as well as the net
proceeds of the sale and li:uidation of its business.
In ,-''( in a civil case against 4MC( the CFI of
Manila rendered a "udgment in favor of 5ureidini H 4ros.
by declaring it to be the rightful owner of certain
merchandise by virtue of a sale ordered by the 4ritish
&dmiralty Court of &le)andria( ?gypt in a prize court
proceedings. pon petition of 5ureidini H 4ros. as
"udgment creditor of 4MC( the CFI ordered the
appointment of a receiver of 4MCDs property( assets and
estate.
*SSUEC
%hether or not $hilippine courts have "urisdiction to
appoint a receiver of the property( assets and estate of a
corporation which was declared by the &lien $roperty
Custodian as an enemy.
H%l#: +o. &ccording to #ection - of the Trading with
?nemy &ct( F?)cept as herein provided( the money or
other property conveyed( transferred( assigned( delivered(
or paid to the &lien $roperty Custodian shall not be liable
to lien( attachment( garnishment( trustee( process( or
e)ecution( or sub3ect to any or+er to +ecree of any court.
#ince the firm was declared an enemy not
holding license( it became the duty of the &lien $roperty
Custodian to take possession of its business and all its
assets within nited #tates territory. It must be presumed
that this duty was fully performed and that the assets are
now either actually or constructively in the possession of
the &lien $roperty Custodian and under his control and
thus( beyond the "urisdiction and control of the $hilippine
courts. The only "urisdiction given to the courts of the
$hilippines is in regard to criminal offenses under the &ct(
as provided in #ection ,@ thereof. !aving said that( the
appointment of the receiver was in e)cess of the
"urisdiction of the $hilippine courts.
*NGENOHL v. =AL<ER E. OLSEN AND CO., *NC., G.R.
No. L-66688 J,+u,(y 16, 1967
FAC<SC Ingenohl filed a suit against the defendant( a
corporation duly organized( e)isting and doing business
under the laws of the $hilippines( before the #upreme
Court of !ongkong for infringement of trademark. #ince
Ingenohl and his company are alien enemies as declared
by the &lien $roperty Custodian( its properties and other
assets( including the trademarks( were seized and sold to
6lsen and Co. The #upreme Court of !ong Jong( which
was then a colony of 9reat 4ritain( an ally of the nited
#tates( of being a court of competent "urisdiction and
having "urisdiction over both parties( rendered a final
"udgment in favor of Ingenohl and refused to recognize the
sale of said trademarks done by the &lien $roperty
Custodian to 6lsen and Co. 3efendant corporation
refused to pay Ingenhol !J3'0('88.'7( the amount
awarded to the latter in the !ong Jong "udgment.
Therefore( Ingenohl filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Manila( seeking to recover the costs ad"udged
against the corporation by the !ongkong court.
The lower court rendered "udgment in favor of Ingenohl for
the amount of his claim( with interest of 0W p.a.
*SSUEC
%hether or not the "udgment of the !ongkong #upreme
Court( being a foreign "udgment( may be enforced in the
$hilippines.
H%l#: +o. It is well settled( upon the ground of comity and
the law of nations( that in the absence of treaty or statute(
a "udgment rendered by a court of competent "urisdiction
of one foreign country in which the parties appeared and
contested the case on its merits( will be recognized and
enforced in any other foreign country. 4ut here we have a
statute which clearly defines the specific conditions upon
which a foreign "udgment can be enforced in the $hilippine
Islands( and we have a decision of the nited #tates
#upreme Court which holds that =where there is no written
law upon the sub"ect( such as treaty or statute( :uestions
of international law must be determined by "udicial
decisions( the works of "urists( and the acts and usages of
civilized nations.= The converse of that proposition is also
true that where you do have a treaty or statute( to enforce
a foreign "udgment( it must come under and within the
specific provisions of the treaty or statute.
#ection 7,, of the Code of Civil $rocedure
provides: F ) ) ) but the "udgment may be repelled by
evidence of a want of "urisdiction( want of notice to the
party( collusion( fraud( or clear mistake of law or factG.
nder such a statute( where a party seeks to enforce a
foreign "udgment( the defendant has a legal right to make
any of such defenses( and if any of them is shown to
properly e)ist( it will defeat the "udgment.
RA<AN S*NGH v. GO"ERN!EN<
G.R. No. L-38687 July 69, 1969
FAC<SC ;atan #ingh( filed an application for citizenship in
the Court of First Instance in the $rovince of Uambales(
praying that he be neutralized as a citizen of the $hilippine
Islands. !e alleged that he was born at #angtipur(
5ullunder( $un"ab( India and was a sub"ect of 9reat
4ritainM and he had all the :ualifications re:uired by the
+atralization Caw *&ct +o. '-'/2 as to age( residence(
education( conduct( and he did not have any of the
dis:ualifications of the said &ct. $etitioner alleges that he
falls in the class of persons mentioned in paragraph *c2 in
#ection , of =The +aturalization CawG. The provision of
said law enumerates the classes of persons who may
ac:uire $hilippine citizenship. They are:
*a2 +atives of the $hilippines who are
not citizens thereof under the 5ones
CawM
*b2 +atives of the other Insular
possessions of the nited #tatesM
*c2 Citizens of the nited #tates( or
foreigners who under the laws of the
nited #tates may become citizens of
said country if residing therein.
The law of the nited #tates regulating the
immigration of alien to the nited #tates and their
residence therein( is found in the &ct of Congress of ,-,/(
which was e)pressly made applicable to the $hilippine
Islands. #ection 7 of said &ct e)cludes from admission
into the nited #tates various classes of persons( among
which are the following:
. . . natives of any country(
province or dependency
situate on the Continent of
&sia west of one hundred
and tenth *,,.th2 meridian
of longitude east from
9reenwich and east of the
fiftieth *1.th2 meridian of
longitude east from
9reenwich and south of
the fiftieth *1.th2 parallel of
the latitude north( . . .
#aid section 7 however( establishes an e)ception in favor
of the persons who are natives of N
That portion of said territory
*Continent of &sia2 situate
between the fiftieth *1.th2 and
the si)tyAfourth *08th2
meridians of longitude east
from 9reenwich and the
twentyAfourth *'8th2 and the
thirtyAeight *7@th2 parallels of
latitude north( . . .
From the aboveA:uoted provisions of the &cts of
Congress of ,-,/( it clearly appears that natives of the
Continent of &sia within specified limits are e)cluded from
the admission into the nited #tates( with the e)ception of
natives in the portion of the said continent =situate
between the fiftieth *1th2 and the si)tyAfourth *08th2
meridians of longitude east from 9reenwich and the
twentyAfourth *'8th2 and the thirtyAeight *7@th2 parallels of
latitude north.=
$etitioner contends he is a native of Johek(
$rovince of 4aluchistan( India( because his parents were
natives of the placeM that the $rovince of 4aluchistan is
found between the 1.th and 08th meridians of longitude
east from 9reenwich and the '8th and 7@th parallels of
latitude northM that( therefore the appellant is a native of a
territory whose residents are not e)cluded from admission
into the nited #tates under the provisions of the saving
clause of section 7 of the &ct of Congress of ,-,/( above
:uoted( and that( conse:uently( the appellant is :ualified
to become a citizen of the nited #tates under said &ct of
Congress and also of the $hilippine Islands under the
provisions of the +aturalization Caw of the $hilippine
Cegislature in relation to said &ct of Congress.
The "udge arrived at a conclusion that the
petitioner was not :ualified to become a naturalized citizen
of the $hilippine Islands(
The lower court "udgment is affirmed.
*SSUEC Is the petitioner a foreigner who( under the laws
of the nited #tates( may become a citizen of that country
residing thereinL
H%l#C There is absolutely no proof in the record to show
that the town of Johek( $rovince of 4aluchistan( is found
in the portion of the &siatic Continent( whose natives are
not e)cluded from admission into the nited #tates. %e
have consulted the map of India ( particularly the $rovince
of 4aluchistan for purpose of verifying the assertion of the
appellant<s counsel. %e found( however( that the $rovince
of 4aluchistan is inside the specified limits of &sia( whose
natives are e)cluded from admission to the nited #tates(
and is outside of the =territory situate between the 1.th
and the 08th meridians of the longitude east from
9reenwich and the '8th and 7@th parallels of latitude
north(< whose natives are not e)cluded from admission into
the nited #tates( with the e)ception of a very small
portion thereof of the northwest. 4ut neither in this portion
nor in any other place of the $rovince of 4aluchistan did
we find a place called Johek. The appellant has thus
utterly failed to show that he is native of a place whose
residents may be admitted into the nited #tates and may
become citizens thereof.
&nd moreover( the petitioner being a 4ritish
sub"ect( we are of opinion that the principle 3us soli( and
not that of 3us sanguinis( should be applied in this case. In
?ngland :uestions of citizenship are governed by the
principle 3us soli. Therefore( in view of the fact that the
appellant was born in the $rovince of $un"ab( India( he is
dis:ualified from becoming a citizen of the nited #tates
and conse:uently of the $hil. Islands.
Su@%))% N'-ol, y So14'lo+ ". Al4%()o Ro1ulo, G.R.
No. 1/7888, F%4(u,(y 11, 6889
F&CT#:
;espondent Cance Corporal *CEC$C2 3aniel
#mith is a member of the # &rmed Forces. !e was
charged with the crime of rape committed against a
Filipina( petitioner herein( sometime on +ovember ,( '..1.
$ursuant to the >isiting Forces &greement *>F&2 between
the ;epublic of the $hilippines and the # entered into(
the #( at its re:uest( was granted custody of #mith. The
;TC of Makati rendered a decision finding defendant
#mith guilty due to sufficient evidence.
3efendant #mith was taken out of the Makati "ail
by a contingent of $hilippine law enforcement agents(
purportedly acting under orders of the 3IC9 and brought
to a facility for detention under the control of the #
government under the new agreements between the
$hilippines and the #( referred to as the ;omuloAJenney
&greement.
$etitioners contend that the $hilippines should
have custody of defendant CEC$C #mith because( first of
all( the >F& is void and unconstitutional.
I##?: %6+ the >F& is void and unconstitutional.
!?C3: +6.
&rt. K>III( #ec. '1 states:
#ec. '1. &fter the e)piration in ,--, of the
&greement between the $hilippines and the
nited #tates of &merica concerning Military
4ases( foreign military bases( troops( or facilities
shall not be allowed in the $hilippines e)cept
under a treaty duly concurred in by the #enate
and( when the Congress so re:uires( ratified by a
ma"ority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum held for that purpose( and
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
#tate.
The provision of &rt. K>III( #ec. '1 of the Constitution(
is complied with by virtue of the fact that the presence of
the # &rmed Forces through the >F& is a presence
Fallowed underG the ;$A# Mutual 3efense Treaty. #ince
the ;$A# Mutual 3efense Treaty itself has been ratified
and concurred in by both the $hilippine #enate and the
# #enate( there is no violation of the Constitutional
provision resulting from such presence.
The >F& being a valid and binding agreement(
the parties are re:uired as a matter of international law to
abide by its terms and provisions.
&pplying( however( the provisions of >F&( the
Court finds that there is a different treatment when it
comes to detention as against custody. /%rt. >, Sec.
7?. The confinement or +etention by Philippine
authorities of ,nite+ States personnel shall be carrie+ out
in facilities agree+ on by
appropriate Philippines an+ ,S authorities.6
Therefore( the ;omuloAJenney &greements of
3ecember ,- and ''( '..0( which are agreements on the
detention of the accused '+ ).% U+')%# S),)% E14,y(
are not in accord with the >F& itself because such
detention is not Fby $hilippine authorities.G ;espondents
should therefore comply with the >F& and negotiate with
representatives of the nited #tates towards an
agreement on detention facilities under $hilippine
authorities as mandated by &rt. >( #ec. ,. of the >F&.
G.R. No. L-663/9 D%-%14%( 6/, 1969
=*LL*A! C. REAGAN, E<. AL v. CO!!*SS*ONER OF
*N<ERNAL RE"ENUE
FAC<S:
$etitioner ;eagan( a civilian employee of an &merican
corporation providing technical assistance to the # &ir
Force in the $hilippines( :uestioned the payment of the
income ta) assessed on him by respondent CI; on an
amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a
member of the # Marine Corps( the transaction having
taken place at the Clark Field &ir 4ase at $ampanga. It is
his contention( that in legal contemplation the sale was
made outside $hilippine territory and therefore beyond our
"urisdictional power to ta). !e seeks that an amount of
$'(-/-... as the income ta) paid by him be refunded.
*SSUE: %6+ the Clark Field &ir 4ase is a foreign property
therefore e)cluded from the power of $hilippine ta)ation.
HELD: +6.
4y the OMilitary 4asesP &greement( it should be
noted( the $hilippine 9overnment merely consents that
the nited #tates e)ercise "urisdiction in certain cases.
The consent was given purely as a matter of comity(
courtesy( or e)pediency over the bases as part of the
$hilippine territory or divested itself completely of
"urisdiction over offenses committed therein. This provision
is not and can not on principle or authority be construed as
a limitation upon the rights of the $hilippine 9overnment.
The #tate is not precluded from allowing another
power to participate in the e)ercise of "urisdictional right
over certain portions of its territory. If it does so( it by no
means follows that such areas become impressed with an
alien character. They retain their status as native soil.
They are still sub"ect to its authority. Its "urisdiction may be
diminished( but it does not disappear. #o it is with the
bases under lease to the &merican armed forces by virtue
of the military bases agreement of ,-8/. They are not and
cannot be foreign territory.
G.R. No. L-11174 !,(-. 61, 1916
E. !ERR*<< v. GO"ERN!EN< OF <HE 5H*L*55*NE
*SLANDS
F&CT#:
Counsel for the plaintiff insists that the trial court erred *,2
=in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff
suffered to $1(...( instead of $'1(... as claimed in the
complaint(= and *'2 =in limiting the time when plaintiff was
entirely disabled to two months and twentyAone days and
fi)ing the damage accordingly in the sum of $'(000(
instead of $0(... as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint.=
The &ttorneyA9eneral on behalf of the defendant urges
that the trial court erred: *a2 in finding that the collision
between the plaintiff<s motorcycle and the ambulance of
the 9eneral !ospital was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur( who is an alleged agent or employee of the
9overnmentM *b2 in holding that the 9overnment of the
$hilippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by
the plaintiff as a result of the collision( even if it be true that
the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeurM
and *c2 in rendering "udgment against the defendant for
the sum of $,8(/8,.
Conse:uently( the 9overnment issued an act allowing the
plaintiff to commence a lawsuit against it.
I##?:
1) %6+ the 9overnment conceded its liability to the
plaintiff by allowing a lawsuit to commence
against it.
2) %6+ the chauffeur is a government employee or
agent.
!?C3:
,2 +6.
4y consenting to be sued a state simply waives its
immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability
to plaintiff( or create any cause of action in his favor( or
e)tend its liability to any cause not previously recognized.
It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pree)isting liability
and submits itself to the "urisdiction of the court( sub"ect to
its right to interpose any lawful defense.
'2 +6.
%e will now e)amine the substantive law touching the
defendant<s liability for the negligent acts of its officers(
agents( and employees. $aragraph 1 of article ,-.7 of the
Civil Code reads: The state is liable in this sense 2hen it
acts through a special agent, but not 2hen the +amage
shoul+ have been cause+ by the official to 2hom properly
it pertaine+ to +o the act performe+, in 2hich case the
provisions of the prece+ing article shall be applicable. The
responsibility of the state is limited to that which it
contracts through a special agent( duly empowered by
a +efinite or+er or commission to perform some act or
charge+ 2ith some +efinite purpose 2hich gives rise to
the claim.
The chauffeur of the ambulance of the 9eneral !ospital
was not such an agent.
GRN L-37647 !,y 66, 1987.
UN*<ED S<A<ES OF A!ER*CA, CA5<. JA!ES B.
GALLO=A9, =*LL*A! *. COLL*NS ,+# ROBER<
GOH*ER v. HON. v. !. RU*>, 5(%'#'+$ Ju#$% o&
B(,+-. J", Cou() o& F'() *+),+-% o& R'@,l ,+# EL*G*O
DE GU>!AN I CO., *NC.
F&CT#:
The nited #tates of &merica had a naval base
in #ubic( Uambales. The base was one of those provided
in the Military 4ases &greement between the $hilippines
and the nited #tates.
#ometime in May( ,-/'( the nited #tates invited the
submission of bids for a couple of repair pro"ects. ?ligio de
9uzman land Co.( Inc. responded to the invitation and
submitted bids. #ubse:uent thereto( the company
received from the # two telegrams re:uesting it to
confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding
company. The company construed this as an acceptance
of its offer so they complied with the re:uests. The
company received a letter which was signed by %illiam I.
Collins of 3epartment of the +avy of the nited #tates(
also one of the petitioners herein informing that the
company did not :ualify to receive an award for the
pro"ects because of its previous unsatisfactory
performance rating in repairs( and that the pro"ects were
awarded to third parties. The company filed a complaint
against the defendants herein demanding specific
performance that the company be allowed to perform the
work on the pro"ects and( in the event that specific
performance was no longer possible( to order the
defendants to pay damages.
I##?: %6+ the # is immune from suit having dealt
with a private corporation.
!?C3: B?#.
& #tate may be said to have descended the the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its
consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to
the e)ercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the
pro"ects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the nited #tates and the
$hilippines( indisputably a function of the government of
the highest order( they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.