Asia-Pacific Economic Outlook: China Embraces Risk and Japan Provides An Unexpected Boost

Economic Research:
Asia-Pacific Economic Outlook: China

Embraces Risk And Japan Provides An
Unexpected Boost
Chief Economist, Asia-Pacific:
Paul F Gruenwald, Singapore (65) 6216 1084; paul.gruenwald@standardandpoors.com
Economist, Asia-Pacific:
Vincent R Conti, Singapore (65) 6216 1188; vincent.conti@standardandpoors.com
Table Of Contents
Asia-Pacific Growth Tilts Away From Emerging Markets
Inflation Remains Mostly In Check, With Monetary Policy On Hold Until
2015
Risks Crystalize Around The Repricing Of Credit In China And Weak
Property Markets
Returning To The "Old Normal"--The Major Test
WWW.STANDARDANDPOORS.COM/RATINGSDIRECT JUNE 9, 2014 1
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Economic Research:
Asia-Pacific Economic Outlook: China Embraces
Risk And Japan Provides An Unexpected Boost
Slowing growth in China and a delayed U.S. recovery are the two main factors underpinning our latest Asia-Pacific
economic forecasts. Following the Third Plenum late in 2013, Chinese authorities have begun to move toward a larger
role for market (risk-based) pricing in the economy. This process is likely to take years, but we are already seeing
slower and arguably higher-quality growth owing to tighter lending standards, a handful of loan and bond defaults, and
a lack of significant policy stimulus. The latter suggests official tolerance (at least so far) for a necessary slowing of
growth below the official target. The U.S. recovery hit a speed bump in the first quarter, largely because of bad
weather, but we expect the effects from higher U.S. growth and global trade flows to build as the year progresses (see
"U.S. Weekly Economic Roundup: A Pause," published May 30, 2014, on RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal). At
issue is the strength of those trade flows and the extent to which higher exports to the U.S. (and, to a lesser extent,
Europe) will bolster Asia-Pacific growth and aid the digestion of past excesses in lending.
Economies elsewhere in Asia-Pacific are looking a bit better than China's. Japan had a very strong first quarter,
dampening fears of a return to deflation for now. The recent elections in India and elections in progress in Indonesia
point toward strong mandates for reform-minded governments, raising hope that the authorities can tackle thorny yet
important structural reforms to fiscal subsidies and the investment environment sooner, rather than kicking them down
the road. And last but not least, capital markets in the region seem mostly unfazed by fears of further volatility related
to the U.S. Federal Reserve's taper of its bond purchases following sharp balance-of-payment adjustments in India and
Indonesia stemming from last summer's turbulence.
Overview
We continue to forecast Asia-Pacific GDP growth at close to 5.5% over the next few years, with China leading
and with a surprising contribution from Japan this year. We believe higher U.S. growth and global trade will
also help.
The main risk to our baseline scenario relates to potential turbulence in China's nonbank financial sector as the
country moves to a more risk-based financial model, which would spill over to investment and growth. Within
this risk envelope, property sector risks are on the rise.
Some other risks appear to have faded for now, including the effects on capital flows from U.S. Fed tapering,
electoral risks in India and Indonesia, and growth and deflation risks in Japan.
A key question going forward is whether stronger demand from the advanced countries can offset slower
domestic demand if interest rates rise, as we expect, and the region digests past excesses in lending.
Asia-Pacific Growth Tilts Away From Emerging Markets
Our aggregate Asia-Pacific GDP growth forecast remains steady at close to 5.5% over the next few years. But, as
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always, there is movement among the various constituents, with new contributions from surprising sources.
Table 1
Asia-Pacific Baseline GDP Growth Forecasts
(%) 2014 2015 2016
Asia-Pacific 5.4 5.5 5.4
Japan 1.8 1.3 1.3
Emerging Asia 6.1 6.4 6.3
China 7.2 7.2 7.0
India* 6.0 6.3 6.5
Newly industrialized nations 3.7 4.1 3.8
ASEAN 4.6 5.5 5.8
Asia-Pacific excluding Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. *Fiscal year ending March 31. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan.
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam. Source: Standard & Poor's.
Japan provided the biggest change to our 2014 growth forecasts. After a strong first quarter (with 1.5%
quarter-on-quarter growth, or 5.9% annualized), we have raised our 2014 GDP growth forecast by 0.5 percentage
points to 1.8%. We had expected a good start to the year in Japan as consumers were likely to have spent in
anticipation of the consumption tax hike to 8% from 5% on April 1. Consumption grew 2.1% (seasonally adjusted) in
the quarter, contributing 1.2 percentage points to growth. Nonresidential investment contributed 0.6 percentage points
to growth. We are forecasting a modest contraction in Japan's GDP in the second quarter as consumers temporarily
pare back spending before returning to trend. Importantly, the strong start to the year in Japan mitigates, for now, one
of our key risks in the region: namely, the return of deflationary pressures.
Growth in China continues to moderate on slowing investment as authorities move toward a more market-based
financial system. We have lowered our 2014 growth forecast for China by 0.2 percentage points to 7.2%, taking into
account the weak first quarter, when growth was just 1.4% (5.7% seasonally adjusted and annualized). Risk awareness
is certainly on the rise: Lenders across the financial system are tightening credit standards, weakening property prices
and sales dominates the headlines, and, perhaps most significantly, a number of select corporate defaults have
occurred, injecting a notion of credit risk in the system. In our view, moving to a more risk-based financial system is a
process, and these are early days. Chinese authorities seem comfortable with the current pace of growth and financial
sector developments, suggesting that the official annual growth target of 7.5% may not be sacrosanct. However, we do
expect a bold policy response if growth looks likely to fall below 7% for the full year.
Our forecasts for the other parts of Asia-Pacific are as follows:
We're reaffirming our 6% growth forecast for India this year, as the recent election provided a strong mandate to
Narendra Modi's BJP-led coalition. Early indications are that economic policy will focus on the supply side, with a
view to raising growth while holding inflation in check. First-round elections in Indonesia point to a likely reformist
government, but weakness in the first quarter has led us to lower our growth forecast to 5.2% this year.
Australia continues to transition to a less mining-based investment growth pattern, and we forecast growth at
2.5%-3% in the coming years. New Zealand should have a strong 2014, with growth of 3.5%.
We have raised our growth forecast for Korea by 0.5 percentage points to 3.9%, although this increase is mainly
technical and relates to revisions to the historical GDP series. Korean exports tend to be a leading indicator for
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Economic Research: Asia-Pacific Economic Outlook: China Embraces Risk And Japan Provides An Unexpected
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global trade, and recent data have been encouraging. In the other Tiger economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, and
Taiwan, external demand has not shown the same strength as in Korea, but we continue to expect a U.S. rebound to
begin to support growth in these trade-dependent economies.
Country-specific factors continue to drive economies in the rest of Southeast Asia. Malaysia's domestic demand is
easing, while the Philippines' growth remains strong despite a weaker-than-expected first quarter. Vietnam's growth
is still running below its potential growth rate of about 7%, reflecting weak bank lending, while Thailand's political
crisis is exacerbating the consumption slowdown stemming from household indebtedness.
Inflation Remains Mostly In Check, With Monetary Policy On Hold Until 2015
Given that many economies in the region are still operating below capacity (with slack in the product and labor
markets), demand-driven inflation pressures will remain muted for the most part in 2014. The exceptions are the two
economies that face imported inflation through depreciated exchange rates (India and Indonesia) and the two
economies that face demand-driven inflation from fast growth and small output gaps (New Zealand and the
Philippines). In the next two years, we expect the rate of price increases to pick up across the region as the global
recovery gains traction and economies that are more externally focused grow faster.
Correspondingly, we do not expect much need for higher policy rates in our 2014 baseline scenario. However, central
banks will have to start moving next year since policy rates have remained very accommodative following the global
financial crisis. So far, only the Reserve Bank of New Zealand has raised rates twice this year, although the Philippines'
central bank has raised reserve requirements and raised a key interbank rate. Over 2015-2016, we are forecasting
policy rate increases in Australia, New Zealand, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand.
A key risk on the inflation front in the coming year is the removal or reduction of fuel subsidies in the region,
particularly in Southeast Asia. Despite being important for fiscal and external balances, such steps effectively lower
wages and exacerbate general inflation pressure.
Risks Crystalize Around The Repricing Of Credit In China And Weak Property
Markets
The main downside risk to our baseline growth forecast remains potential fallout from the repricing of credit in the
Chinese financial sector. A key development since our last quarterly update is that China is taking steps to give the
market what the Third Plenum has called a more "decisive" (as opposed to basic) role in allocating resources. Risk
awareness has risen, as banks have tightened lending standards amid an incipient rise in nonperforming loans,
including in the weakening property sector. A few (non-systemically important) firms have been allowed to default on
their loans and bonds. And the authorities are moving the timing of deposit insurance forward, perhaps to this year (to
clarify what is government-guaranteed and what isn't).
This process of repricing credit in China is in its early stages. Although it has been orderly so far, and our baseline
scenario assumes it will remain so, the risk of a credit event in the financial sector, including stops in bank lending and
the associated curtailing of investment, cannot be ruled out (see "Asia-Pacific Economic Outlook: Risks Abound, Led
By China's Financial Sector," published April 28, 2014). In this scenario, a fast-softening property sector poses a
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growing risk, as we have recently observed an acceleration of price declines and soft sales in a number of economies,
including Hong Kong and Singapore (see sidebar).
A final risk to watch is rising geopolitical tensions. Although they are difficult to quantify, in our view, they constitute a
"tail risk" (with an extreme but unlikely negative impact). Strong trade and production linkages among the parties in
question provide a significant deterrent. Still, we believe tensions surrounding territorial borders are rising with a small
but increasing probability of an "accident" that could spill over into the economic sphere.
But not all macro downside risks are growing. Three risks we had previously identified are abating--that of capital
outflows related to U.S. Fed tapering; a reemergence of Japanese deflation pressures after the consumption tax hike on
April 1; and electoral stalemates in India and Indonesia as impediments to necessary reforms.
Capital flows have been orderly since late 2013, and we expect them to remain so, despite the onset of the U.S.
Federal Reserve's reduction in its asset purchases. A risk previously associated with tapering was a sharp outflow of
capital from emerging markets (including in Asia) to advanced markets as relative growth perceptions changed. Sharp
capital outflows were generally expected to hurt asset prices, exchange rates, confidence and investment, and growth.
Indeed, India and Indonesia were hit hard by outflows in mid-2013 after the Fed's announcement of the planned
action, but the external imbalances that triggered those flows have since been rectified as markets stabilized.
In Japan, deflation risks have abated, at least in the near term, following the country's stronger-than-expected
first-quarter GDP growth. Consumption and nonresidential investment in anticipation of the rise in the consumption
tax led annualized GDP growth of nearly 6% for the quarter. The strong economic momentum of Japan suggests that
the likelihood of reemerging deflation and a required further loosening of monetary policy by the Bank of Japan have
receded.
The risk of weakening reform efforts from divided governments in India and Indonesia has lessened as well. Many
feared both countries' mid-2014 national elections would fail to produce a clear mandate and would therefore result in
policy gridlock in the areas of fiscal subsidy reform and improving the investment climate. India's new government has
a clear mandate and has already signaled actions on both fronts. In Indonesia, the presidential elections will take place
in July, but the likelihood of a clear mandate and a post-electoral push on the necessary reforms looks promising.
Returning To The "Old Normal"--The Major Test
Can continued buoyant growth absorb past excesses in Asia-Pacific? China's slowdown reflects a much-needed move
toward market-based pricing of credit. If this move leads to moderately slower growth, but with better-quality lending
and investment, it is arguably a good thing. The questions are (1) whether this re-pricing can occur without a major
financial and investment setback; and (2) whether the need of the authorities to maintain social stability and therefore
higher credit and GDP growth will allow the necessary adjustment to take place, with the risk of creating further
impaired assets if they do not.
In a few other economies, interest-rate-sensitive sectors, most notably property, have also boomed in recent years.
This reflects in part the de facto importation of U.S. interest rates through ties of varying degrees between the local
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currency and the U.S. dollar. Since U.S. rates were not appropriate for most Asian economies in recent years, the
region will need to absorb the resulting credit and asset price boom as well. In some markets, this process has already
begun. But there are no guarantees that the ride down will be as smooth as the ride up.
A recovery in the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Europe will help. But we believe the largely homemade excesses in Asia
in recent years cannot be erased with a simple boost from foreign demand. The flipside of a normalization of the U.S.
economy and interest rates will be the return to a pricing of credit in much of Asia that's more in line with levels before
the financial crisis. This will include higher debt-servicing costs and perhaps lower asset prices. Negotiating the path
from here to that "old normal" will be the major near-term test for Asia-Pacific.
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Is Property The Big Domino In Asia?
One of the main risks for Asia-Pacific is the adjustment to more normal interest rates. One key
interest-rate-sensitive sector is property. Over the past five years, this sector has benefited both from low interest
rates globally and from stronger growth within the region compared with the rest of the world. For example,
overall residential price indices indicate that house prices have risen 20%-80% in Emerging Asian economies
since end-2009, with significantly higher increases in some cities.
However, property prices in many Asia-Pacific economies have recently begun to peak (see charts 1 and 2). This
development is the result of a combination of a few factors. First, central banks and regulators concerned about
the rapid growth in property prices over the past few years have increasingly tightened macroprudential
measures. Lower loan-to-value ratios, higher turnover taxes, and restrictions on lending to highly indebted
households are just a few examples. Second, rising levels of debt and potential impaired assets, along with
growing expectations of higher interest rates, have also decreased the flow of credit for both developers and
buyers. Third, a construction binge over the past five years, along with tighter credit, has resulted in oversupply.
At this point, it's unclear how much the property market will cool. Will prices fall sharply, and if they do, how long
will they remain subdued? Will sales revive, or will developers be stuck with unwanted units? From a
macroeconomic perspective, we try to identify possible pressure points in a scenario where home prices or sales
are depressed for a protracted period. And who would be most at risk: developers, households, or banks?
The prognosis for developers is the least favorable. Many large developers have deep enough pockets and strong
relationships with banks to be able to ride out a prolonged lull in the market and higher levels of inventory.
However, smaller developers may not have that luxury. With lower cash flows, larger inventories, and higher debt
levels and interest rates, we may see more financial stress, including defaults and industry consolidation. If the
property sector does come under stress, then we would expect spillovers into related industries, such as
construction materials and furniture.
We view households as being able to weather a downside scenario better. Although we've noted increasingly
indebted household sectors in Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, homeowners haven't been borrowing
against the equity gains of their homes. As such, a situation where households are left with negative equity on
their homes (like that in the U.S. five years ago) is less likely. However, if the spillovers from the housing
construction glut become large, lower income and higher unemployment rates could start to cut into household
income significantly and thus the hurt borrowers' ability to service debt, including mortgages.
Banks in Asia-Pacific have tended to be relatively prudent in extending mortgages. Moreover, banks in some of
the hottest property markets (including Australia, Hong Kong, and Singapore) also tend to have the best overall
credit standards. Nonetheless, defaults by households and developers could still cause some stress, resulting in
tighter credit for the rest of the economy. More importantly, the involvement of the much more opaque nonbank
financial sector, especially in China, could pose significantly higher risks to the system. In those cases, weaker
developers may have been tapping these relatively less regulated shadow banks, and there is little clarity on the
banks' exposure to these activities. Thus, a large number of defaults arising from a slowing property market could
usher in our downside scenario for the region, with financial market stress resulting in an investment-led
slowdown around Asia-Pacific, particularly in China.
If such a property-led downside scenario comes to pass, what options will policymakers have? Reversing some of
the binding macroprudential measures may be the obvious choice. These were quite successful in cooling the
market in a few countries. The question is, would their reversal be as effective in preventing a sharp price
decline? Amid expectations for rising interest rates and global interest rate normalization, the reversal of
measures may not be as effective, especially if buyers expect prices to fall further and stay on the sidelines. But if
a sharp property slowdown does start to significantly spill over into the rest of the economy, central banks could
buy time by keeping policy rates lower for longer and injecting liquidity into the system to prevent a more
generalized credit crunch.
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Chart 1
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Chart 2
Appendix
Table 2
GDP Proposed Scenarios, June 2014
Baseline Downside Upside
(%) 2014f 2015f 2016f 2014f 2015f 2016f 2014f 2015f 2016f
Australia 2.7 2.8 3.1 1.8 1.7 2.6 3.1 3.4 3.4
China 7.2 7.2 7.0 6.0 6.0 6.6 7.8 7.6 7.2
India* 6.0 6.3 6.5 4.7 5.0 5.2 6.2 6.7 7.0
Japan 1.8 1.3 1.3 0.8 0.4 1.0 2.1 1.7 1.8
South Korea 3.9 4.1 3.8 2.5 1.7 3.6 4.8 5.1 4.1
Hong Kong 3.4 4.1 3.6 0.3 0.4 3.5 5.5 5.5 4.9
Indonesia 5.2 5.8 6.0 4.6 4.7 5.8 5.8 6.2 6.0
Malaysia 5.2 5.4 5.6 3.7 3.2 5.0 6.1 5.7 5.6
Philippines 6.6 6.0 6.1 5.3 4.8 5.7 7.0 6.7 6.6
Singapore 3.9 4.2 3.8 1.3 0.6 3.1 4.9 5.2 4.5
Taiwan 3.5 3.9 3.8 0.7 0.7 3.3 4.7 5.3 4.0
Thailand 1.1 4.3 5.0 0.1 3.4 4.9 1.8 5.6 5.4
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Table 2
GDP Proposed Scenarios, June 2014 (cont.)
Vietnam 5.5 6.0 6.3 4.5 4.5 4.7 6.3 6.5 6.9
New Zealand 3.5 2.6 2.5 1.9 2.0 2.1 3.8 3.3 3.0
Asia Pac 5.4 5.5 5.4 4.1 4.1 4.9 5.9 6.0 5.7
EM Asia 6.1 6.4 6.3 4.8 4.9 5.7 6.7 6.9 6.6
NIE 3.7 4.1 3.8 1.6 1.2 3.5 4.9 5.2 4.2
ASEAN 4.6 5.5 5.8 3.6 4.2 5.4 5.2 6.1 6.0
*Fiscal year ending March 31. RBI exploring a new monetary policy framework. Regional aggregates are calculated as a weighted average using
2012 GDP measured in PPP terms. f--forecasts. Source: Standard & Poor's.
Table 3
CPI Proposed Scenarios
Base Downside Upside
(%) 2014f 2015f 2016f 2014f 2015f 2016f 2014f 2015f 2016f
Australia 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.9 3.0 3.2
China 2.5 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.7 3.2 2.7
India* 8.0 7.5 7.0 7.5 7.0 6.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Japan 2.3 1.7 1.9 2.0 0.9 1.4 2.6 2.5 2.6
South Korea 1.8 2.8 2.8 1.4 1.9 2.2 1.8 3.2 3.1
Hong Kong 3.9 4.1 4.1 3.5 2.9 3.4 4.1 4.7 4.7
Indonesia 6.0 5.2 5.5 5.7 4.5 5.3 6.2 5.6 5.8
Malaysia 3.3 3.6 3.1 3.1 2.6 2.4 3.4 4.0 3.2
Philippines 3.9 3.5 3.7 3.8 2.9 3.3 4.1 3.9 3.9
Singapore 2.3 3.0 2.8 2.0 2.4 2.5 2.5 3.4 3.1
Taiwan 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.2 0.7 1.2 2.0 2.3 1.7
Thailand 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.3 2.0 2.3 2.7 3.0 3.0
Vietnam 6.9 6.5 6.1 6.6 5.8 5.4 7.0 6.9 6.5
New Zealand 2.0 2.1 2.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 2.7 2.5 2.2
*Fiscal year ending March 31, uses WPI. f--forecasts. Source: Standard & Poor's.
Table 4
Policy Rates
(%)
Base Downside Upside
2014f 2015f 2016f 2014f 2015f 2016f 2014f 2015f 2016f
Australia 2.50 3.50 4.00 1.50 1.50 1.75 2.75 3.75 4.00
China 6.00 6.00 6.00 5.50 5.00 5.00 6.25 6.50 6.50
India* 8.00 8.00 8.00 7.75 7.50 7.00 8.00 8.50 9.00
Japan 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
South Korea 2.50 2.50 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.25 2.75 3.25 3.50
Indonesia 7.75 7.50 7.50 7.00 7.00 7.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
Malaysia 3.50 4.00 4.00 2.50 2.50 2.75 3.75 4.25 4.25
Philippines 3.75 4.25 4.25 3.00 3.00 3.25 4.00 4.50 4.50
Taiwan 2.000 2.500 2.500 1.500 1.500 1.875 2.125 2.625 2.625
Thailand 1.75 2.25 2.25 1.50 1.50 1.75 2.00 3.00 3.25
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Table 4
Policy Rates (cont.)
Vietnam 6.50 6.50 6.50 6.50 5.00 5.00 6.50 7.00 7.00
New Zealand 3.75 4.75 5.00 2.50 2.75 2.75 4.00 4.25 4.25
*Fiscal year ended March 31. Source: Standard & Poor's.
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