Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
UAN F. FAAR!O, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Higinio V. Catalan for appellee.
Prila, Pardalis and Pejo for appellants.
RE"ES, . #. L., J.$
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First nstance of Camarines !ur convictin" defendants-appellants #uan
F. Fa$ardo and Pedro Babilonia of a violation of %rdinance No. &, !eries of '()*, of the Municipalit+ of Baao,
Camarines !ur, for havin" constructed ,ithout a permit from the municipal ma+or a buildin" that destro+s the
vie, of the public pla-a.
t appears that on Au"ust '), '()*, durin" the incumbenc+ of defendant-appellant #uan F. Fa$ardo as ma+or of
the municipalit+ of Baao, Camarines !ur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in .uestion providin" as
follo,s/
!EC0%N '. An+ person or persons ,ho ,ill construct or repair a buildin" should, before constructin"
or repairin", obtain a ,ritten permit from the Municipal Ma+or.
!EC. 1. A fee of not less than P1.** should be char"ed for each buildin" permit and P'.** for each
repair permit issued.
!EC. 2. PENA304 5 An+ violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall ma6e the
violation liable to pa+ a fine of not less than P1) nor more than P)* or imprisonment of not less than
'1 da+s nor more than 17 da+s or both, at the discretion of the court. f said buildin" destro+s the vie,
of the Public Pla-a or occupies an+ public propert+, it shall be removed at the e8pense of the o,ner of
the buildin" or house.
!EC. 7. EFFEC0904 5 0his ordinance shall ta6e effect on its approval. :%ri". Recs., P. 2;
Four +ears later, after the term of appellant Fa$ardo as ma+or had e8pired, he and his son in-la,, appellant
Babilonia, filed a ,ritten re.uest ,ith the incumbent municipal ma+or for a permit to construct a buildin"
ad$acent to their "asoline station on a parcel of land re"istered in Fa$ardo<s name, located alon" the national
hi"h,a+ and separated from the public pla-a b+ a cree6 :E8h. =;. %n #anuar+ '>, '()7, the re.uest ,as
denied, for the reason amon" others that the proposed buildin" ,ould destro+ the vie, or beaut+ of the public
pla-a :E8h. E;. %n #anuar+ '?, '()7, defendants reiterated their re.uest for a buildin" permit :E8h. 2;, but
a"ain the re.uest ,as turned do,n b+ the ma+or. @hereupon, appellants proceeded ,ith the construction of
the buildin" ,ithout a permit, because the+ needed a place of residence ver+ badl+, their former house havin"
been destro+ed b+ a t+phoon and hitherto the+ had been livin" on leased propert+.
%n Februar+ 1>, '()7, appellants ,ere char"ed before and convicted b+ the $ustice of the peace court of Baao,
Camarines !ur, for violation of the ordinance in .uestion. =efendants appealed to the Court of First nstance,
,hich affirmed the conviction, and sentenced appellants to pa+ a fine of P2) each and the costs, as ,ell as to
demolish the buildin" in .uestion because it destro+s the vie, of the public pla-a of Baao, in that Ait hinders the
vie, of travelers from the National Bi"h,a+ to the said public pla-a.A From this decision, the accused appealed
to the Court of Appeals, but the latter for,arded the records to us because the appeal attac6s the
constitutionalit+ of the ordinance in .uestion.
@e find that the appealed conviction can not stand.
A first ob$ection to the validit+ of the ordinance in .uestion is that under it the ma+or has absolute discretion to
issue or den+ a permit. 0he ordinance fails to state an+ polic+, or to set up an+ standard to "uide or limit the
ma+or<s action. No purpose to be attained b+ re.uirin" the permit is e8pressedC no conditions for its "rant or
refusal are enumerated. t is not merel+ a case of deficient standardsC standards are entirel+ lac6in". 0he
ordinance thus confers upon the ma+or arbitrar+ and unrestricted po,er to "rant or den+ the issuance of
buildin" permits, and it is a settled rule that such an undefined and unlimited dele"ation of po,er to allo, or
prevent an activit+, per se la,ful, is invalid :People vs. 9era, >) Phil., )>C Primicias vs. Fu"oso, ?* Phil., &'C
!chloss Poster Adv. Co. vs. Roc6 Bill, 1 !E :1d; 2(1;
0he ordinance in .uestion in no ,a+ controls or "uides the discretion vested thereb+ in the
respondents. t prescribes no uniform rule upon ,hich the special permission of the cit+ is to be
"ranted. 0hus the cit+ is clothed ,ith the uncontrolled po,er to capriciousl+ "rant the privile"e to some
and den+ it othersC to refuse the application of one lando,ner or lessee and to "rant that of another,
,hen for all material purposes, the t,o appl+in" for precisel+ the same privile"es under the same
circumstances. 0he dan"er of such an ordinance is that it ma6es possible arbitrar+ discriminations and
abuses in its e8ecution, dependin" upon no conditions or .ualifications ,hatever, other than the
unre"ulated arbitrar+ ,ill of the cit+ authorities as the touchstone b+ ,hich its validit+ is to be tested.
Fundamental ri"hts under our "overnment do not depend for their e8istence upon such a slender and
uncertain thread. %rdinances ,hich thus invest a cit+ council ,ith a discretion ,hich is purel+ arbitrar+,
and ,hich ma+ be e8ercised in the interest of a favored fe,, are unreasonable and invalid. 0he
ordinance should have established a rule b+ ,hich its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of
the authorities cited above sustain this conclusion.
As ,as said in City of Ricmond vs. !"dley, '1( nd. ''1,1? N. E. 2'1, 2'7 '2 3. R. A. )?&, 1? Am.
!t. Rep. '?*/ At seems from the fore"oin" authorities to be ,ell established that municipal ordinances
placin" restrictions upon la,ful conduct or the la,ful use of propert+ must, in order to be valid, specif+
the rules and conditions to be observed in such conduct or businessC and must admit of the e8ercise of
the privile"e of all citi-ens ali6e ,ho ,ill compl+ ,ith such rules and conditionsC and must not admit of
the e8ercise, or of an opportunit+ for the e8ercise, of an+ arbitrar+ discrimination b+ the municipal
authorities bet,een citi-ens ,ho ,ill so compl+. :!chloss Poster Adv. Co., nc. vs. Cit+ of Roc6 Bill, et
al., 1 !E :1d;, pp. 2(7-2();.
t is contended, on the other hand, that the ma+or can refuse a permit solel+ in case that the proposed buildin"
Adestro+s the vie, of the public pla-a or occupies an+ public propert+A :as stated in its section 2;C and in fact,
the refusal of the Ma+or of Baao to issue a buildin" permit to the appellant ,as predicated on the "round that
the proposed buildin" ,ould Adestro+ the vie, of the public pla-aA b+ preventin" its bein" seen from the public
hi"h,a+. Even thus interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to
permanentl+ deprive appellants of the ri"ht to use their o,n propert+C hence, it oversteps the bounds of police
po,er, and amounts to a ta6in" of appellants propert+ ,ithout $ust compensation. @e do not overloo6 that the
modern tendenc+ is to re"ard the beautification of nei"hborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of
residents. But ,hile propert+ ma+ be re"ulated in the interest of the "eneral ,elfare, and in its pursuit, the !tate
ma+ prohibit structures offensive to the si"ht :Churchill and 0ait vs. Raffert+, 21 Phil. )?*;, the !tate ma+ not,
under the "uise of police po,er, permanentl+ divest o,ners of the beneficial use of their propert+ and
practicall+ confiscate them solel+ to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the communit+. As the
case no, stands, ever+ structure that ma+ be erected on appellants< land, re"ardless of its o,n beaut+, stands
condemned under the ordinance in .uestion, because it ,ould interfere ,ith the vie, of the public pla-a from
the hi"h,a+. 0he appellants ,ould, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the
obvious purpose for ,hich it is best suited, bein" urban in character. 0o le"all+ achieve that result, the
municipalit+ must "ive appellants $ust compensation and an opportunit+ to be heard.
An ordinance ,hich permanently so restricts the use of propert+ that it can not be used for an+
reasonable purpose "oes, it is plain, be+ond re"ulation and must be reco"ni-ed as a ta6in" of the
propert+. 0he onl+ substantial difference, in such case, bet,een restriction and actual ta6in", is that
the restriction leaves the o,ner sub$ect to the burden of pa+ment of ta8ation, ,hile outri"ht
confiscation ,ould relieve him of that burden. :Arverne Ba+ Constr. Co. vs. 0hatcher :N.4.; ''& A3R.
'''*, '''>;.
A re"ulation ,hich substantiall+ deprives an o,ner of all beneficial use of his propert+ is confiscation
and is a deprivation ,ithin the meanin" of the '7th Amendment. :!undlum vs. Donin" Bd., '7) Atl.
7)'C also Eatonvs. !,een+, '&& NE 7'1C 0a+lor vs. #ac6sonville, '22 !o. ''7;.
Donin" ,hich admittedl+ limits propert+ to a use ,hich can not reasonabl+ be made of it cannot be said
to set aside such propert+ to a use but constitutes the ta6in" of such propert+ ,ithout $ust
compensation. Ese of propert+ is an element of o,nership therein. Re"ardless of the opinion of
-ealots that propert+ ma+ properl+, b+ -onin", be utterl+ destro+ed ,ithout compensation, such
principle finds no support in the "enius of our "overnment nor in the principles of $ustice as ,e 6no,n
them. !uch a doctrine shoc6s the sense of $ustice. #f it $e of p"$lic $enefit tat property remain open
and "n"sed, ten certainly te p"$lic, and not te private individ"als, so"ld $ear te cost of
reasona$le compensation for s"c property "nder te r"les of la% governing te condemnation of
private property for p"$lic "se. :0e,s vs. @oolhiser :'(22; 2)1 ''. 1'1, '?) N.E. ?1&; :Emphasis
supplied.;
0he validit+ of the ordinance in .uestion ,as $ustified b+ the court belo, under section 1172, par. :c;, of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended. 0his section provides/
!EC. 1172. Certain legislative po%ers of discretionary caracter. 5 0he municipal council shall have
authorit+ to e8ercise the follo,in" discretionar+ po,ers/
8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
:c; 0o establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the 6inds of buildin"s that ma+ be constructed
or repaired ,ithin them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, char"in" a fee ,hich shall
be determined b+ the municipal council and ,hich shall not be less than t,o pesos for each buildin"
permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. 0he fees collected under the provisions of this
subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund.
Ender the provisions of the section above .uoted, ho,ever, the po,er of the municipal council to re.uire the
issuance of buildin" permits rests upon its first establishin" fire limits in populous parts of the to,n and
prescribin" the 6inds of buildin"s that ma+ be constructed or repaired ,ithin them. As there is absolutel+ no
sho,in" in this case that the municipal council had either established fire limits ,ithin the municipalit+ or set
standards for the 6ind or 6inds of buildin"s to be constructed or repaired ,ithin them before it passed the
ordinance in .uestion, it is clear that said ordinance ,as not conceived and promul"ated under the e8press
authorit+ of sec. 1172 :c; afore.uoted.
@e rule that the re"ulation in .uestion, Municipal %rdinance No. &, !eries of '()*, of the Municipalit+ of Baao,
Camarines !ur, ,as be+ond the authorit+ of said municipalit+ to enact, and is therefore null and void. Bence,
the conviction of herein appellants is reversed, and said accused are ac.uitted, ,ith costs de oficio. !o
ordered.