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Professor Binder
Advanced Criminal Law
Memo #1
Tuesday, October 5, 2004
Even though all women instinctively know when they have been
which to rely for certainty and clarity. State legislators have perennially
struggled over policy issues that come with the crime in all its attendant
forms, from forcible rape to acquaintance rape to the sex sting. A body of
law that once suffered from lack of nuance now has become more refined
and requirements. For example, New York implicitly requires the crime of
have led to different legal implications in each state, yet despite different
focal points for litigators, both states arrive at the same ideological
conclusion. It is the conduct of the defendant that must receive the judicial
rape has not led the courts to dissect the victim’s behavior in order to
130.05 2(a). Traditionally, the intent of the defendant was gleaned from
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the amount of resistance displayed by the victim in trying to dispel her
attacker. A true show of resistance affirmed both the presence of force and
against her will could not be mistaken since the defendant could in no way
drew the focus of the law to the behavior of the victim, rather than that of
many rapes involving no force escaped prosecution. New York has since
forcible compulsion required has been relaxed as well. The intent of the
defendant still remains an element of the crime, and this presents a special
The essence of the crime now revolves around two states of mind, that of
the defendant and that of the victim, but the question is whose state of
mind is the controlling one? New York has answered that it is the state of
committed a crime.
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Several cases trace this development in New York law. The first, from
elevator in front of her four-year-old son by two men. The two defendants,
Coleman and Harvey, blocked the elevator when it arrived at her floor, and
told her that she was not getting off. One of the defendants placed her son
on his shoulders and he began to cry. They ascended to the tenth floor
where they blocked the elevator doors with the woman’s shopping cart and
demanded that she remove all of her clothing. They screamed at her until
she complied. Harvey then unzipped his pants and told her to perform
fellatio. She protested that she had never done it before, and he replied,
“you are going to do it now.” Three acts of sodomy ensued, but the victim
was finally able to escape from the elevator and run down the hallway.
With the assistance of a neighbor, she retrieved her son and her clothes
after the defendants had left. Since no actual physical force was used, the
have placed the victim in fear of immediate death or serious physical injury
the presence of an implied threat with the defense asserting that any threat
posed by the defendants did not involve that of immediate death or serious
physical injury. The victim testified that she feared for her life and that of
her son, and the court found a basis for the jury to find this testimony
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entirely credible. The difference, the court noted, was “not what the
defendants would have done, but rather what the victim, observing their
conduct, feared they would or might do if she did not comply with their
demands.” Id. Therefore, the presence of a threat was gauged by the state
probability that those threats would be realized or visited upon the victim.
Threats are designed to instill fear, and the presence of fear in a victim’s
revisited this issue of threat realization and its relationship to the intent of
the defendant, and the court followed the same line of reasoning as
Coleman.
the defendant surfaced. The victim, a juvenile, was a jail inmate with the
defendant, an older prisoner who threatened the victim through the bars
between their cells. The defendant demanded oral sex, and if he did not
receive it he would ensure that the victim’s stay in jail was not pleasant.
The defense cried impossibility; there was no way those threats could have
been immediately realized and therefore, the defendant could not possibly
lack of intent to do so, but it fell back on the language of Coleman. It held
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that the proper inquiry was “what the victim, observing the [defendant’s]
mind produced in the victim,” Id. for it is there that lack of consent - the sin
qua non of the crime – is found. Apparently, once the inquiry is properly
focused the rest of the elements fall in line: if the defendant was afraid,
force must have been somehow present, and if force was present, then the
victim was obviously not consenting. One cannot mistake a lack of consent
when one has used force, and a fearful victim is a non-consenting victim.
However, this line of reasoning has become muddled and called somewhat
erroneous, as evident in another New York case raising the mistake of fact
defendants struck up a conversation on the street with the victim and they
asked her to join them at a club. She declined, but the defendants
continued to walk with her until they reached their car. There they
surrounded her, and the complainant got in because she felt she had no
other choice. She repeatedly asked to be let out, but her requests were
ignored. When they arrived at their apartment, all three defendants forced
that they mistakenly believed the woman had consented to all of the sexual
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encounters, thereby negating any culpable states of mind in accordance
with NY Penal Law § 15.20 (1)a. The court began its decision on this
argument by stating, “Though the statutes are silent on the subject, intent
instruction given at the trial level whether the defendants acted with the
necessary intent was the issue on appeal, but the court dismissed any error
as harmless. The reason the error did not amount to a reversal was
because the jury found that the defendants had used forcible compulsion, a
finding which necessitates a finding that they knew they were acting
without the consent of the victim (or else forcible compulsion would be
attorneys in rape cases to understand the law on intent and to insist that
the jury be instructed that the crimes of first degree rape and sodomy
the charged sexual act.” 6 N.Y. Prac. Crim. Law § 7:4. By contrast, the state
of Michigan has chartered a more serene and lucid course for itself in the
law of rape.
Michigan rape law foregoes any mens rea, and the battles over
However, like New York, Michigan refrains from unnecessary scrutiny of the
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victim’s behavior to determine the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.
penetration. Force or coercion includes, but is not limited to, the actual
force that the victim believes the actor has the present ability to execute,
threats of retaliation against the victim or another person and the victim
believes the actor can carry them out, overcoming the victim through
degree to the victim, an actor who in a position of authority over the victim
and that authority is used to coerce the victim to submit, and various other
MCLA § 750.520 The fact that the legislature left this category open-ended
coercion that do not fit neatly into those already annunciated. The leading
466 Mich. 130, 644 N.W.2d 704 however an examination of a case that
The case of People v. Jansson, 116 Mich. App. 674, 323 N.W.2d 508
elements. The facts show that, under the guise of wanting to hire the
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complainant, the defendant raped her at his place of employment. During
the course of the encounter, the defendant told the complainant that he
was looking “for someone to fuck,” and complainant said that she did not
do that. Nevertheless, the defendant pulled her to the floor, removed her
clothing and had sexual intercourse with her. On appeal, the defense
relinquished that force was used during the encounter, but even so, the
defendant had no idea that the victim was still not consenting to the sexual
intercourse. She had never stated to him that she did not want to engage
in sex with him. The court rejected this argument as a clever rehashing of
suggestion that we require proof that the victim resisted the actor, or at
with each other for almost two years. Two weeks before the incident, the
touching, but not penetration in the defendant’s car in a parking lot. Two
weeks later, the two were together again in the defendant’s car in a parking
lot, and the complainant allowed the defendant to digitally penetrate her.
The defendant asked her to have sex with him and she said no. He asked
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why and she replied because she did not want to. The defendant repeated
his request and met with another refusal, then asked if he could “just stick
it in once” and she again said no. The defendant again asked for sex
several more times until the complainant grew tired of answering him.
When she failed to answer, he climbed on top of her and engaged in sexual
After the supreme court established that the court below had erroneously
court held that it did not because that would require the inappropriate
introduction of an extra element into the statute. However, the court noted
that,
Id.
how the court would have determined the presence of force if the
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hand, force can be evidenced by a disregard of the victim’s wishes, and on
the other, the victim is not required to express her non-consent. Here,
Michigan case law reasoning seems to run into the same problems of
puzzle of what to prove and how has not become more clear. New York still
operates under the old male fear of the vindictive woman leveling false,
progressive statutes that do not call for proof of non-consent or mens rea.
Each state has taken admirable steps towards putting the defendant’s
conduct on trial, rather than that of the victim, and those are at least steps
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