Social Representations of History and the Legitimation of

Social Inequality: The Causes and Consequences of

Historical Negation
1
Cnis G. Sinirx
2
University of Auckland
Auckland, New Zealand
J:xrs H. Lii
Victoria University of Wellington
Wellington, New Zealand
The stories of history tend to favor dominant groups. Two longitudinal studies
indicated that ideologies negating historical injustice experienced by Ma

ori (the
indigenous peoples of New Zealand) predicted increased opposition toward social
policies promoting material reparation among New Zealand European undergradu-
ates. Historical negation was, in turn, predicted by right-wing authoritarianism
(Study 2). These ndings suggest that the authoritarian motivation to protect the
positive history of the in-group causes New Zealand Europeans to actively position
historical injustices performed by earlier colonial generations as irrelevant. Position-
ing history in this fashion has important consequences for the mobilization of
political attitudes and, in particular, opposition toward social and political policies
relating to the distribution of resources and status within society.jasp_799 598..623
New Zealand (NZ), like many nations discovered by European coloni-
als in the latter half of the last millennium, has a history of injustices expe-
rienced by indigenous peoples. Like minority ethnic groups in many nations,
the indigenous peoples of NZ (Ma

ori) remain disadvantaged relative to the

dominant majority group (NZ Europeans) in contemporary society. For
example, Ma

ori earn, on average, $2 less per hour than do NZ Europeans,

and their life expectancy is 8.2 years less (The Social Report, 2006).
One might reasonably argue, as many have (e.g., Belich, 1996), that
present-day inequalities between Ma

ori and NZ Europeans are at least par-

tially the product of historical injustices experienced by Ma

ori during the

colonial period (see Rata, Liu, & Hanke, 2008). Thus, it might seem uncon-
troversial to assert that features of NZ history such as the alienation of
communally owned land from Ma

ori and bans on the use of Ma

ori language
in schools should have had lasting impacts on the well-being of Ma

ori people
today. Despite this, claims for reparation on the basis of historical injustice
1
The authors contributed equally to this manuscript.
2
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Chris G. Sibley, Department
of Psychology, University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, New Zealand. E-mail:
c.sibley@auckland.ac.nz
598
Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 2012, 42, 3, pp. 598623.
2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2011.00799.x
often incite considerable controversy and opposition in mainstream (NZ
European) society (Sibley, Robertson, & Kirkwood, 2005).
In an initial examination of this issue, Sibley, Liu, Duckitt, and Khan
(2008) used cross-sectional data to show that individual differences in a new
measure of historical negation predicted policy preferences on issues impact-
ing Ma

ori. We formally dene historical negation as a prescriptive belief that

historical injustices experienced by indigenous peoples in the colonial era are
irrelevant in contemporary society, versus the belief that such injustices are of
continued relevance and that current generations of post-settler/colonial
members of the population have an obligation to address such injustices. In
the NZ context, individual differences in historical negation explained about
60% of the variance (Sibley et al., 2008) in resource-specic policy preferences
among NZ Europeans. However, the critical issue remaining to be deter-
mined is whether historical negation has a causal impact on policy prefer-
ences. We address this issue by presenting data from two independent
longitudinal studies that examined the antecedents (right-wing authoritari-
anism) and consequences (social policy opposition) of historical negation
among members of the majority/dominant ethnic group in New Zealand:
European/White New Zealanders.
The Symbolic Theory of History and Identity
The symbolic theory of history and identity (Hilton & Liu, 2008; Liu &
Hilton, 2005; Liu & Sibley, 2009) asserts that social representations of history
provide an important symbolic resource for mobilizing opinions about
resource allocations for historically disadvantaged groups in contemporary
society. Liu and Hilton, for instance, posited that history provides founda-
tional myths for nationhood, including an account of the nations historical
origins and mission. Such a charter denes rights and obligations for the
nation or group, and legitimizes its social and political arrangements by
appealing to cognitive narrative schemas (Liu & Lszl, 2007). These
schemas communicate the relevance of cultural traditions in the face of new
challenges. They are causal in their implications, not epiphenomenal prod-
ucts of post-decision dissonance. The manner in which history is constructed
and interpreted, therefore, can have enduring implications for what is con-
sidered fair in society, whether specic historical events constitute injustices,
and how resources are to be allocated in contemporary society, particularly
in view of alleged historical grievances (Sibley & Liu, 2004, 2007; Sibley et al.,
2008).
Most New Zealanders agree on a social representation of the history
of NZ as containing bicultural elements involving both Ma

ori and NZ
HISTORICAL NEGATION AND POLICY ATTITUDES 599
Europeans (Liu, Wilson, McClure, & Higgins, 1999). There is also strong
support from the dominant majority for the use of symbolic elements of
indigenous cultures/peoples as part of the representation of national culture
(Liu, 2005; Sibley & Liu, 2007). Because of this high level of recognition and
support for symbolic elements of biculturalism, the plight of indigenous
peoples cannot simply be passively ignored to the same extent as it has been
in some other postcolonial nations. It cannot be easily forgotten. Rather, we
argue that the colonial past in NZ is actively negated or is rendered politically
inert by NZ Europeans through discourses positioning historyparticularly
the role and responsibility of current generations of NZ European postcolo-
nials for historical injustices perpetrated against or at the expense of
Ma

orias irrelevant.
Based on content analysis of political speeches and qualitative work,
Sibley et al. (2008) developed a measure of historical negation to capture
key elements of the way in which history is mobilized (or demobilized) to
capture political legitimacy in NZ. They argued that this measure provided
a culturally appropriate index assessing the degree to which historical injus-
tices are actively construed by the individual as irrelevant (or relevant) to
the political arrangements and governance of contemporary intergroup
relations.
Consistent with a social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and
system justication theory perspective (Jost & Banaji, 1994), historical nega-
tion is theorized to function as a legitimizing myth (or ideology/political
discourse) in the NZ context (Sibley et al., 2008; Sibley, 2010). We argue that
historical negation summarizes a set of beliefs that are shared by large seg-
ments of society and derived from the discourse of political elites. These
beliefs, in turn, produce and maintain support for existing social inequality
and the unequal distribution of resources, status, and power between groups
by positioning the historical basis of claims for injustice as irrelevant to the
governance of contemporary society.
Moreover, in postcolonial nations (e.g., NZ) where indigenous peoples
have experienced a history of injustice and where social inequality is rela-
tively stable and enduring, Sibley et al. (2008) argued that the causal effect
of historical negation on attitudes toward resource-based social policies
should be unidirectional. The ideology determines the policy preferences,
not vice versa, because the ideology reects enduring elements of the
history of inequality endemic to NZ society, socialized during late adoles-
cence and early adulthood and produced by group-based motivational
goals (as discussed later). An alternative, perhaps more cynical position
would be to argue that historical negation is simply a post hoc justication
of policies disenfranchising Ma

ori, in which case the causal chain should be

from policy preferences to historical negation. This argument about causal
600 SIBLEY AND LIU
direction refers to a process that should occur in the general NZ European
population, and is not necessarily the same process that might occur in
individual political elites responsible for maintaining and promoting such
ideologies.
As Liu and colleagues (Liu et al., 1999; Liu & Hilton, 2005) have argued,
history is the story of the making of an in-group. Representations of history
provide important narrative schema for maintaining a societys traditions
and values (Liu & Lszl, 2007; Wertsch, 2002). Thus, the stories of history
tend to favor the dominant groups within society. What then causes some
members of the NZ European population to endorse historical negation to a
greater or lesser extent than others?
Causes and Consequences of Historical Negation
Sibley et al. (2008) argued that historical negation, or the ideological
positioning of historical injustices as irrelevant, should be especially likely to
be employed by majority-group members who are high in right-wing authori-
tarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1996). According to Duckitts (2001) dual-
process model, high levels of RWA are an expression of the motivational goal
for social cohesion and collective security, whereas low levels reect goals of
independence and autonomy.
Research on RWA and the related construct of social dominance orien-
tation (SDO; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) has focused primarily on predicting
prejudice and discrimination. The threat-driven security-cohesion motiva-
tion indexed by RWA is theorized to predict prejudice toward groups that are
seen as threatening in-group values and norms, and likely to disrupt social
stability and cohesion. This form of prejudice is likely to emphasize the
supposed moral or value-based deviance of the out-group (Duckitt & Sibley,
2007). However, as Duckitt and Sibley (2009) argued, RWA should also
predict support for different types of societal ideologies or legitimizing myths
that stratify and position groups by emphasizing different aspects of social
relations.
According to Duckitt (2001), the threat-driven security-cohesion motiva-
tion indexed by RWA should cause the individual to endorse legitimizing
myths that emphasize the maintenance of in-group norms and values. These
ideologies or myths are likely to be anchored in notions of (in-group)
morality and values, portraying out-group threats to in-group values and
way of life, and prescriptions of the roles that specic subgroups may
perform within society. Sibley et al. (2008) argued that members of the
majority group high in RWA, therefore, should be among those most likely
to subscribe to ideologies that actively negate the legitimacy of historical
HISTORICAL NEGATION AND POLICY ATTITUDES 601
claims for injustice from minority-group members, because to recognize such
claims would represent a value-based threat to the moral integrity of the
in-group, especially ones traditions and ancestors.
Consistent with this possibility, Sibley et al. (2008) reported that RWA
predicted increased levels of historical negation among the majority NZ
European group; and that historical negation, in turn, predicted increased
opposition toward resource-specic aspects of social policy (see Figure 1).
Historical negation thus functioned as a mediator that resulted from RWA
and, in turn, predicted increased opposition toward social policies that aimed
to provide resource allocations to the indigenous group: Ma

ori. This causal

process should occur because for people high in the threat-driven security-
cohesion motivation indexed by RWA, the ability to validate the in-group
and its version of history provides an important symbolic resource for main-
taining and justifying in-group norms (e.g., adherence to and respect for
moral values and tradition; see Altemeyer, 1996).
These observations suggest that one central process underlying NZ Euro-
pean opposition toward resource allocations favoring Ma

ori is the percep-

tion that to accept such claims for reparation has important implications for
the denition of the in-group, where it has come from, the values and tradi-
tions from which it arose, and the pride and security one can take from
knowing that one is part of a time-honored group. Thus, historical negation
functions as an ideology or legitimizing myth that neutralizes a value-based
threat to the glorious history of the in-group.
In their initial assessment of the proposed causal model shown in
Figure 2, Sibley et al. (2008) tested a structural equation model (SEM)
using concurrent (cross-sectional) data in which RWA was modeled as a
predictor of historical negation, which, in turn, was modeled as a predictor
of opposition toward resource-specic social policy attitudes. Data from
both undergraduate student and general population samples provided
a good t to this proposed model, andimportantlyt the data better
than did models proposing alternative causal sequences. Moreover,
Sibley et al. also reported that participants who read extracts of political
speeches negating historical relevance expressed heightened opposition to
resource allocations favoring disadvantaged groups who had suffered from
historical injustices, although this effect was moderated by political party
preference.
Right-wing
authoritarianism
Historical
negation
Resource-specific
policy opposition
Figure 1. Theoretical model of the causal sequence.
602 SIBLEY AND LIU
Although SEM of cross-sectional data provided by Sibley et al. (2008)
yielded results consistent with the hypothesized causal model, such data
cannot test the proposed causal sequence with the same degree of validity
that longitudinal panel designs can achieve (for a discussion, see Cole &
Maxwell, 2003). This is because the inference of causality based on the
modeling of cross-sectional data assumes that the observed covariances have
been produced by a causal process occurring over some previous timeframe.
However, when dealing with cross-sectional data, the ordering of variables is
necessarily based on a priori assumptions. Cross-sectional data can be used
to evaluate whether particular patterns of inferred causal relations are con-
sistent with a causal model, but they can never explicitly test whether change
has, in fact, occurred through the hypothesized process. Thus, although the
model presented by Sibley et al. appears promising for describing the func-
tion of history-negating ideologies in intergroup contexts, the causal paths
proposed by the model require conrmation.
The analysis of longitudinal data provides important strengths for assess-
ing causal relations that are not subject to these same criticisms. The use of
longitudinal panel data, such as we present here, allows assessment of simul-
taneous change in both directions. Thus, we can readily test whether RWA
predicts historical negation and not the reverse, and whether historical nega-
tion predicts resource-specic policy opposition and not the reverse. Tests of
the directionality of these effects are extremely important, as the observation
of these two opposing cross-lagged effects would raise serious questions
about the sequence through which historical negation and policy attitudes
are produced.
The observation of signicant cross-lagged effects in longitudinal data
also strengthens claims of causality because it addresses the possibility that
associations observed in cross-sectional data may result from unidentied
third variables. Inferences of causality based on cross-sectional (correla-
tional) data rise or fall, depending on whether other variables that may
inuence the outcome but also correlate with the hypothesized predictor have
been reliably measured and their potential effects statistically controlled
(Gollob & Reichardt, 1991). In cross-lagged longitudinal designs such as
ours, examining the effect of RWA at Time 1 on latter levels of historical
negation while also controlling for the effects of historical negation at Time
1 removes much of this concern. Controlling for the Time 1 dependent
variable also represents a control for other third variables if those other
variables hypothetical effects on historical negation also remain unchanged
at both points in time. This only applies to confounding variables that exert
an equivalent or unchanging effect on the DV at both time points, but it
nevertheless represents a considerable improvement in the validity of claims
for causality than those based on cross-sectional data.
HISTORICAL NEGATION AND POLICY ATTITUDES 603
Overview and Guiding Hypotheses
In sum, we used cross-lagged panel data to examine theoretical proposi-
tions of the symbolic theory of history and identity among the dominant
group in NZ society (i.e., NZ Europeans). According to the model presented
in Figure 2, historical negation should causally inuence NZ Europeans
policy preferences over time, and not vice versa (tested in Studies 1 and 2).
Furthermore, RWA should produce increases in NZ Europeans historical
negation over time. Historical negation, in turn, should mediate the causal
effect of RWA on policy preferences, and not vice versa (tested in Study 2).
Study 1
Study 1 examined one critical effect proposed by our model, that of
historical negation on opposition toward resource-specic social policy. We
tested this path using a cross-lagged panel design over 1 year. If individual
differences in historical negation produce change in attitudes toward
resource-specic policy, as Sibley et al. (2008) asserted, then historical nega-
tion should exert a cross-lagged effect on policy attitudes, but not vice versa.
Consistent with an integrated threat theory perspective (Stephan &
Stephan, 2000), Sibley and Liu (2004, 2007) also argued that social policy
attitudes in NZ tend to be clearly differentiated into two domains: those
relating to resource- or material-based issues, and those relating to symbolic
representation in national consciousness. In the interest of completeness,
therefore, we examined the effect of historical negation on attitudes toward
resource-based policies (our critical outcome of interest), but also attitudes
toward symbolic-oriented policies. This allows us to delineate the effects of
historical negation, which we argue should predict social policy opposition
toward primarily resource-specic policy allocations relating to material
reparation for historical injustices and contemporary social inequality, rather
than the representation and promotion of Ma

ori cultural icons and symbols

in mainstream national identity.
We argue that ideologies of historical negation operate in response to
value-based threats in order to negate the perceived obligations of the
in-group to right past wrongs for the in-groups historical transgressions.
Historical negation resolves what Sibley and Liu (2007) referred to as the
New Zealand dilemma: As a former loyal colony of Great Britain that was left
to its own devices by the mother country in the 1970s (see Liu, 2005), NZ
Europeans must acknowledge and include aspects of Ma

ori culture in order

to achieve positive distinctiveness in the international arena. The only other
things for which it is famous internationally are its environmental beauty, its
604 SIBLEY AND LIU
agribusiness, and its prowess in rugby. Hence, symbolic elements of Ma

ori
culture are actively incorporated into the national identity and national
symbols by members of the dominant group (Sibley & Liu, 2004, 2007), and
historical negation is not employed against this because it adds to positive
distinctiveness for all New Zealanders in the international context.
Ma

ori symbols benet NZ Europeans on the international scene.

However, few majority-group members want to pay the price this entails in
terms of material reparations for past injustices committed during the colo-
nial era against indigenous peoples. Historical negation justies this policy
position, and protects the value basis of NZ tradition, while simultaneously
allowing for change in its current representation.
Study 1
Method
Participants and Procedure
Participants were NZ-born undergraduate students who self-identied as
NZ European/Pakeha. Data were collected from 108 participants (35 male,
73 female; M
age
= 20.0 years, SD = 3.9) during the rst testing phase. During
the following wave conducted 1 year later, 51 people (15 male, 36 female)
participated. This sample was collected in 2006. Data from this sample have
not been reported previously.
Study participants received partial course credit for participation during
the rst phase. Participants listed their e-mail addresses on the survey, which
were used to contact people 1 year later, at which point they were e-mailed an
electronic version of the same questionnaire. The participants were entered
into two separate prize drawings, each for $100 NZ (approx. $70 US), as an
incentive for participation during the second phase. There were 18 invalid
e-mail addresses during Time 2 assessment, yielding a valid response rate of
57% for contactable participants. Importantly, the sample who completed
the Time 2 survey were comparable to those who participated during only
Time 1 with regard to both gender, c
2
(1, N = 108) = 0.40, p = .53; and age,
F(1, 104) = 2.65, p = .11, partial h
2
= .03.
Materials
Historical negation was assessed during both phases using the eight-item
scale shown in Appendix A. The Historical Negation scale assesses the degree
to which people endorse discourses that negate the relevance and legitimacy
HISTORICAL NEGATION AND POLICY ATTITUDES 605
of historical injustices and construe such injustices as irrelevant in present-
day New Zealand society (high scores) versus the degree to which people
construe the history of intergroup relations as highly relevant and of lasting
importance for understanding contemporary relations between Ma

ori and
NZ Europeans (low scores). The items contained in the scale were adapted
from a variety of sources, primarily recent NZ political speeches; qualitative
responses and summaries of responses described in earlier work on race
talk in NZ; and research on perceptions of history (for further details, see
Sibley et al., 2008).
We assessed opposition toward the resource-specic and symbolic aspects
of bicultural policy by using items referring to actual or recently proposed
social policy (Liu & Sibley, 2006; see Appendix B). Previous research has
shown that this scale provides a valid, reliable measure that clearly differen-
tiates between these two clusters of policy attitudes (Liu & Sibley, 2006).
Higher scores indicate increased opposition toward the redistribution of
resources to Ma

ori on the basis of ethnic group membership (in the case of

resource-specic social policy), and increased opposition toward the incor-
poration of symbolic aspects of Ma

ori culture into majority (NZ European)

culture national identity (in the case of symbolic social policy).
Items assessing historical negation were rated on a 9-point scale ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Items assessing attitudes
toward social policy were rated on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly
support) to 9 (strongly oppose). The order of the items was randomized during
both phases.
Results
Descriptive statistics, internal reliabilities, and correlations between
historical negation and opposition toward the symbolic and resource-
specic aspects of social policy are presented in Table 1. As shown, all
constructs were highly internally reliable and relatively normally distributed
at both times. Historical negation (r = .84), attitudes toward resource-
specic social policy (r = .85), and attitudes toward the symbolic aspects of
social policy (r = .80) all displayed moderate to high testretest correlations
over a year.
The cross-lagged effect of historical negation at Time 1 on attitudes
toward resource-specic and symbolic aspects of social policy measured
1 year later was examined using path analysis. Cross-lagged effects are rep-
resented by the diagonal paths in Figure 2. These cross-lagged effects were
calculated simultaneously while controlling for (a) the concurrent associa-
tions between historical negation, opposition toward resource-specic policy,
606 SIBLEY AND LIU
and opposition toward symbolic policy at Time 1; (b) the direct within-
measure longitudinal association between repeated measures of each con-
struct (represented by the horizontal paths); and (c) the residual associations
between historical negation, opposition toward resource-specic policy, and
opposition toward symbolic policy at Time 2. By including these residual
associations, we controlled for the possibility that there might be unexplained
covariation between Time 2 measures not predicted by Time 1 measures,
which might bias the observed cross-lagged effects. Including these residual
associations, therefore, provides a more stringent test of the hypothesized
cross-lagged effects.
Signicant cross-lagged paths found that using this analytic strategy
would provide good evidence for the causal effect of variables measured at
Time 1 on variables measured at Time 2. Importantly, this model also
included cross-lagged paths from Time 1 social policy attitudes to historical
negation at Time 2, and thus also tested for these causal effects in the
alternative direction to Figure 2. To reiterate, this approach represents a
stronger test of the cross-lagged effects than simply testing a model in which
only the predicted paths are modeled, because including all other (nonpre-
dicted) cross-lagged paths as well as residual associations between Time 2
measures controlled for these alternative possible effects when assessing the
hypothesized paths. Note that t indexes are irrelevant in this context, as the
model was saturated (i.e., the model controlled forand testedall possible
paths).
As shown in Figure 2, historical negation exerted a signicant cross-
lagged effect on opposition toward resource-specic social policy over the
1-year testing period (b = .20, z = 2.21, p = .03). People high in historical
negation at Time 1 tended to become more opposed to social policies that
Symbolic
policy opposition
Symbolic
policy opposition
Historical negation
Resource-specific
policy opposition
Historical negation
Resource-specific
policy opposition
One year
.73*
.20*
.74*
.72*
.12
.21
-.02
-.12
.09
Figure 2. Study 1: Path analysis with standardized coefcients testing the cross-lagged effects of
historical negation on opposition toward resource-specic and symbolic aspects of social policy
over 1 year (* p < .05). Dashed lines indicate nonsignicant paths.
HISTORICAL NEGATION AND POLICY ATTITUDES 607
T
a
b
l
e
1
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
v
e
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
a
n
d
C
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
B
e
t
w
e
e
n
H
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
a
l
N
e
g
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
O
p
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
T
o
w
a
r
d
R
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
-
S
p
e
c
i

c
a
n
d
S
y
m
b
o
l
i
c
A
s
p
e
c
t
s
o
f
S
o
c
i
a
l
P
o
l
i
c
y
a
t
T
i
m
e
1
a
n
d
T
i
m
e
2
:
S
t
u
d
y
1
S
c
a
l
e
M
S
D
S
k
e
w
n
e
s
s
K
u
r
t
o
s
i
s
a
1
2
3
4
5
1
.
H
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
a
l
n
e
g
a
t
i
o
n
:
T
i
m
e
1
5
.
6
0
1
.
8
7
-
.
0
3
-
0
.
4
0
.
9
3

2
.
R
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
-
s
p
e
c
i

c
s
o
c
i
a
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
:
T
i
m
e
1
5
.
5
2
1
.
4
2
.
4
4
-
0
.
4
3
.
8
0
.
6
0
*

3
.
S
y
m
b
o
l
i
c
s
o
c
i
a
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
:
T
i
m
e
1
3
.
2
2
1
.
3
3
.
7
7
1
.
1
5
.
8
1
.
4
1
*
.
6
1
*

4
.
H
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
a
l
n
e
g
a
t
i
o
n
:
T
i
m
e
2
5
.
7
5
1
.
9
6
.
1
7
-
0
.
8
2
.
9
3
.
8
4
*
.
6
2
*
.
4
6
*

5
.
R
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
-
s
p
e
c
i

c
s
o
c
i
a
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
:
T
i
m
e
2
5
.
9
7
1
.
5
9
-
.
3
1
0
.
0
4
.
8
0
.
6
4
*
.
8
5
*
.
5
1
*
.
6
8
*

6
.
S
y
m
b
o
l
i
c
s
o
c
i
a
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
:
T
i
m
e
2
3
.
1
3
1
.
5
0
.
7
3
-
0
.
3
5
.
8
3
.
3
1
*
.
5
8
*
.
8
0
*
.
3
9
*
.
5
4
*
N
o
t
e
.
S
c
a
l
e
s
c
o
r
e
s
f
o
r
a
l
l
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
s
r
a
n
g
e
f
r
o
m
1
t
o
9
.
*
p
<
.
0
5
.
608 SIBLEY AND LIU
aimed to redistribute resources to Ma

ori over time; and, conversely, people

low in historical negation displayed the opposite trend and tended to become
more supportive of such policies over this same time period. As predicted,
this effect was unidirectional, as attitudes toward resource-specic social
policy at Time 1 did not predict change in historical negation measured 1 year
later (b = .12, z = 1.10, p = .37).
As can also be seen in Figure 2, attitudes toward the resource-specic and
symbolic aspects of social policy display similar levels of stability over the
1-year testing period (b = .74, z = 7.05, p < .01; and b = .72, z = 6.81, p < .01,
respectively). Despite these similar levels of stability, however, historical
negation did not signicantly predict change in attitudes toward the symbolic
aspects of social policy (b = -.12, z = -1.12, p = .26).
Discussion
Using a cross-lagged panel design, Study 1 indicates that historical nega-
tion produced changes in attitudes toward resource-specic social policy
measures 1 year later (but not vice versa). People high in historical negation
at Time 1 tended to become more opposed to social policies that aimed to
redistribute resources to Ma

ori over time. Conversely, people low in histori-

cal negation displayed the opposite trend and tended to become more sup-
portive of such policies over this same time period. Moreover, beliefs about
the relevance of historical injustices for contemporary society were related
primarily to resource-specic policy attitudes, and had minimal impact on
levels of support/opposition toward the symbolic integration of Ma

ori
culture into mainstream national identity and culture. Discourses of histori-
cal relevance it seems, relate primarily to the issue of who gets what in society,
rather than the issue of who belongs in the national imagination.
Study 2
Our second study aimed to replicate and extend the cross-lagged effect of
historical negation on resource-specic policy opposition by including RWA.
This study reports results from an independent longitudinal study that was
conducted over a 9-month period in which RWA, historical negation, and
opposition toward both the symbolic and resource-specic aspects of social
policy were measured at both times. Thus, this study tested the full model
proposed in Figure 2.
We propose that (a) RWA will predict cross-lagged change in historical
negation; and (b) historical negation will, in turn, predict cross-lagged change
HISTORICAL NEGATION AND POLICY ATTITUDES 609
in NZ Europeans levels of opposition toward resource-specic aspects of
social policy. Evidence of these two cross-lagged paths would thus support a
causal mediation model in which RWA indirectly predicts opposition toward
resource-specic social policy via its effects on historical negation. We tested
for this mediated effect using procedures outlined by MacKinnon (2008)
applied to two-wave longitudinal mediation models (described in detail in the
Results).
Method
Participants and Procedure
Study 2 participants were NZ-born undergraduate students who self-
identied as NZ European/Pakeha. Data were collected from 183 partici-
pants (39 male, 144 female; M
age
= 19.6 years, SD = 4.0) during the rst
testing phase. In the following wave, which was conducted 9 months later, 86
people (14 male, 72 female) participated (M
age
= 19.5 years, SD = 3.5). This
sample was collected in 2007. Data from the sample have not been reported
previously.
Participants received partial course credit for participation during the rst
phase. The participants listed their e-mail addresses on the survey, which
were used to contact people 9 months later, at which point they were e-mailed
an electronic version of the same questionnaire. The participants were
entered into a prize drawing for $250 NZ (approx. $175 US) worth of grocery
vouchers as an incentive for participation during the second phase. There
were 11 invalid e-mail addresses during Time 2 assessment, yielding a valid
response rate of 50% for contactable participants. Importantly, the sample
who completed the Time 2 survey were comparable to those who participated
during only Time 1 with regard to both gender, c
2
(1, N = 183) = 2.45, p = .12;
and age, F(1, 181) = 0.05, p = .82, partial h
2
< .01.
Materials
Right-wing authoritarianism was assessed using six randomly selected
balanced items (3 pro-trait and 3 con-trait) from Altemeyers (1998) full
30-item scale. The shortened RWA scale includes Items 5, 6, 10, 15, 17, and
24 from the original 30-item measure (Altemeyer, 1998). Sample RWA items
from the scale include It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper
authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-
rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in peoples minds
610 SIBLEY AND LIU
(pro-trait), and Some of the best people in our country are those who are
challenging our government, criticizing religion, and ignoring the normal
way things are supposed to be done (con-trait). Analyses of an independent
undergraduate sample
3
(116 men, 216 women) indicate that the shortened
RWA measure was strongly positively correlated with the full RWA scale,
r(330) = .93, p < .01.
Historical negation was assessed during both phases using four randomly
selected balanced items from the full eight-item scale that we used in Study 1.
The items included in this shortened version are marked by an asterisk in
Table 1. As shown in Table 2, this shortened scale displayed acceptable
internal reliability at both time points, and reanalysis of Study 1 data indi-
cates that the four-item version was strongly positively correlated with the
full eight-item scale, r(106) = .96, p < .01.
Opposition toward the resource-specic and symbolic aspects of bicul-
tural policy were each assessed using ve randomly selected items from the
scales described in Study 1. The items included in these shortened versions are
marked by an asterisk in Table 2. As shown in Table 2, this shortened scale
displayed acceptable internal reliability at both time points, and reanalysis of
Study 1 data indicates that the shortened scales assessing resource-specic
and symbolic social policy attitudes were strongly positively correlated with
the full versions: r(106) = .94, p < .01; and r(106) = .98, p < .01, respectively.
Items assessing RWA and historical negation were rated on a 7-point
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Items assessing
attitudes toward social policy were rated on a 7-point scale ranging from
1 (strongly support) to 7 (strongly oppose). Item order was randomized during
both phases.
Results
Descriptive statistics, internal reliabilities, and correlations between
RWA, historical negation, and opposition toward the symbolic and resource-
specic aspects of social policy are presented in Table 2. RWA (r = .83),
historical negation (r = .79), attitudes toward resource-specic social policy
(r = .78), and attitudes toward the symbolic aspects of social policy (r = .65)
all display moderate to high testretest correlations over 9 months.
We examined the cross-lagged effects of RWA, historical negation, and
opposition toward the resource-specic and symbolic aspects of social policy
using the analytic strategy described in Study 1. This model is presented in
Figure 3.
3
These statistics were from an unpublished sample.
HISTORICAL NEGATION AND POLICY ATTITUDES 611
T
a
b
l
e
2
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
v
e
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
a
n
d
C
o
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
B
e
t
w
e
e
n
R
W
A
,
H
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
a
l
N
e
g
a
t
i
o
n
,
a
n
d
O
p
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
T
o
w
a
r
d
R
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
-
S
p
e
c
i

c
a
n
d
S
y
m
b
o
l
i
c
A
s
p
e
c
t
s
o
f
S
o
c
i
a
l
P
o
l
i
c
y
a
t
T
i
m
e
1
a
n
d
T
i
m
e
2
:
S
t
u
d
y
2
S
c
a
l
e
M
S
D
S
k
e
w
n
e
s
s
K
u
r
t
o
s
i
s
a
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
.
R
W
A
:
T
i
m
e
1
3
.
1
4
1
.
1
3
.
5
5
0
.
2
7
.
7
3

2
.
H
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
a
l
n
e
g
a
t
i
o
n
:
T
i
m
e
1
4
.
8
6
1
.
2
7
-
.
4
8
0
.
3
1
.
8
1
.
1
6

3
.
R
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
-
s
p
e
c
i

c
s
o
c
i
a
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
:
T
i
m
e
1
5
.
1
4
0
.
9
9
.
1
6
-
0
.
0
6
.
6
5
.
0
5
.
6
4
*

4
.
S
y
m
b
o
l
i
c
s
o
c
i
a
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
:
T
i
m
e
1
2
.
2
7
0
.
8
8
.
6
0
0
.
4
9
.
7
0
.
0
9
.
1
6
.
2
5
*

5
.
R
i
g
h
t
-
w
i
n
g
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
a
r
i
a
n
i
s
m
:
T
i
m
e
2
3
.
0
2
1
.
1
0
.
5
9
0
.
2
1
.
7
8
.
8
3
*
.
1
8
.
1
1
.
0
9

6
.
H
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
a
l
n
e
g
a
t
i
o
n
:
T
i
m
e
2
4
.
8
3
1
.
2
6
-
.
3
9
0
.
2
4
.
8
5
.
3
2
*
.
7
9
*
.
5
8
*
.
2
9
*
.
2
5
*

7
.
R
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
-
s
p
e
c
i

c
s
o
c
i
a
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
:
T
i
m
e
2
5
.
2
6
1
.
0
6
-
.
2
7
-
0
.
5
7
.
7
8
.
1
0
.
6
4
*
.
7
8
*
.
2
7
*
.
0
9
.
6
7
*

8
.
S
y
m
b
o
l
i
c
s
o
c
i
a
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
:
T
i
m
e
2
2
.
6
5
0
.
8
8
.
2
0
-
0
.
4
0
.
6
9
-
.
0
7
.
1
5
.
2
2
*
.
6
5
*
-
.
0
5
.
2
0
.
1
9
N
o
t
e
.
R
W
A
=
r
i
g
h
t
-
w
i
n
g
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
a
r
i
a
n
i
s
m
.
S
c
a
l
e
s
c
o
r
e
s
f
o
r
a
l
l
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
s
r
a
n
g
e
f
r
o
m
1
t
o
7
.
*
p
<
.
0
5
.
612 SIBLEY AND LIU
As shown in Figure 3, RWA exerted a signicant cross-lagged effect on
historical negation (b = .19, z = 3.01, p < .01). Importantly, this effect was
unidirectional, as historical negation did not exert a reciprocal cross-lagged
effect on RWA over time (b = .00, z = 0.04, p = .97). This, therefore, suggests
that RWA predicted change in historical negation over time. Replicating
Study 1, historical negation, in turn, exerted a signicant cross-lagged effect
on opposition toward resource-specic social policy (b = .24, z = 2.71,
p < .01). This effect was also unidirectional, as attitudes toward resource-
specic social policy at Time 1 did not predict change in historical negation
measured 9 months later (b = .10, z = 1.19, p = .23).
Consistent with the causal model proposed in Figure 2, longitudinal
mediation analyses indicate that historical negation mediated the effect of
RWA on opposition toward resource-specic social policy over time (Sobels
z = 2.01, p = .04). Following the procedures outlined by MacKinnon (2008),
we tested this longitudinal mediation model by calculating a Sobels z score
for the product of the cross-lagged path of RWA on historical negation over
time (Path A) and the cross-lagged path of historical negation on opposition
toward resource-specic policy over the same period (Path B). When esti-
mating both paths, we also controlled for all other paths and residual asso-
ciations between Time 2 variables. Therefore, this analysis tested whether the
product of these two paths (or the indirect effect of Path A Path B) was
signicant. When assessed longitudinally, this provides good evidence for the
proposed causal sequence.
Symbolic
policy opposition
Symbolic
policy opposition
Historical negation
Right-wing
authoritarianism
Resource-specific
policy opposition
Historical negation
Right-wing
authoritarianism
Resource-specific
policy opposition
Nine months
.83*
.19*
.67*
.24*
.61*
.64*
.07
.00
.00
.10
.03
.04
.04
.07
-.03
.14*
Figure 3. Study 2: Path analysis with standardized coefcients testing the cross-lagged relations
between right-wing authoritarianism, historical negation, and opposition toward resource-
specic and symbolic aspects of social policy over 9 months (*p < .05). Dashed lines indicate
nonsignicant paths.
HISTORICAL NEGATION AND POLICY ATTITUDES 613
As can also be seen in Figure 3, the effect of historical negation was
limited to resource-specic policy attitudes. Consistent with Study 1, histori-
cal negation did not exert a signicant cross-lagged effect on attitudes toward
the symbolic aspects of social policy (b = .05, z = 0.43, p = .67). However, we
did observe a relatively weak, but signicant cross-lagged effect in the oppos-
ing direction, with opposition toward the symbolic aspects of bicultural
policy predicting a slight change in historical negation over time (b = .14,
z = 0.43, p = .67). This unpredicted cross-lagged effect was not observed in
Study 1, however.
Discussion
Study 2 provides good support for the causal model that is proposed in
Figure 2. As predicted, RWA predicted longitudinal change in historical
negation. Historical negation, in turn, predicted change over time in
resource-based policy opposition. This indicates that historical negation lon-
gitudinally mediated the effect of RWA on resource-based policy opposition.
There was also one anomaly: Opposition to symbolic policy at Time 1
predicted historical negation at Time 2. Thus, although the predicted effect of
historical negation on resource-based policy attitudes was unidirectional in
both Studies 1 and 2, we did nd some tentative evidence for the possibility
that symbolic policy attitudes might produce change in the ideological posi-
tioning of history. We return to this unexpected nding in the General
Discussion.
General Discussion
Two studies examined whether a legitimizing myth or ideology derived
from social representations of history would causally inuence NZ Europe-
ans beliefs about how resources should be distributed in contemporary New
Zealand society. NZ Europeans are the dominant majority group in NZ, and
represent roughly 64% to 65% of the population at the time our data were
collected in 2006 and 2007. Extending Sibley et al.s (2008) research, longi-
tudinal data from two independent studies indicate that historical negation
produced change in support for resource-specic aspects of social policy
aimed at attenuating existing social inequalities between NZ Europeans
and Ma

ori over a 1-year period in Study 1, and over a 9-month period in

Study 2.
The effect was unidirectional, as resource-specic policy attitudes did not
predict change in historical negation. This indicates that the reverse causal
614 SIBLEY AND LIU
path, wherein ideologies about history are employed by individuals, post hoc,
to justify pre-existing social and political attitudes, is less plausible than is the
path proposed by our theory.
The symbolic theory of history and identity (Liu & Sibley, 2009) asserts
that historically derived ideologies or legitimizing myths drive policy prefer-
ences in the main and not vice versaat least with regard to resource-based
policies regarding the group-based distribution of material resources, status,
and power. As Sibley et al. (2008) and Liu and Hilton (2005) have argued, in
nations with a history of intergroup conict and injustices experienced by one
group at the hands of another group, social representations of history
provide a symbolic reserve from which important ideologies or legitimizing
myths can be derived to justify the unequal distribution of resources within
society. These results are consistent with social dominance theory (Sida-
nius & Pratto, 1999), which posits that dominant majority group members
should espouse the ideologies and stereotyped beliefs (i.e., legitimizing
myths) that justify and, therefore, maintain their privileged social position.
Sidanius and Pratto (1999) identied a number of constructs that serve
this function, including ideologies of Protestant work ethnic, modern or
symbolic forms of racism, and stereotypes of disadvantaged groups as
weaker or less competent. The current research provides clear, consistent
evidence for the general tenets of this causal model, but also provides culture-
specic evidence of a particular form of legitimizing myth adapted for a
society that acknowledges the symbolic contribution of indigenous peoples to
the national identity, but is reluctant to admit that material reparation may
be warranted (Sibley & Liu, 2004, 2007; Liu, 2005; Liu & Sibley, 2006).
We argue that the ideological positioning of history is produced at least
partially by the motivation to protect the glorious history of the in-group
(and the related perception of the ancestors of ones group as decent, hard-
working people who earned what they achieved). Discourses positioning the
in-group as being accountable or as having responsibility for the actions of
previous generations of their groupor even as being directly linked and,
therefore, like the perpetrators of previous historical injustices and
crimesconstitute a dramatic threat to positive representations of the
in-group. As Liu et al. (1999) observed, history constitutes an important and
irreplaceable element in the story of the making of the in-group. Given this
premise, we hypothesized and observed that historical negation is predicted
by a threat-driven motivation for social cohesion (as indexed by RWA) for
NZ Europeans.
RWA represents one of two proximal individual constructs that predict
prejudice and support for social inequality and group-based stratication
across numerous domains, with the other being social dominance orientation
(SDO; Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001; for a recent review, see Sibley &
HISTORICAL NEGATION AND POLICY ATTITUDES 615
Duckitt, 2008). In our earlier work on the antecedents underlying historical
negation, we included both SDO and RWA, but consistently observed that
only RWA predicted historical negation. SDO instead directly predicted
increased opposition toward both symbolic and resource-specic aspects of
social policy relating to Ma

oriNZ European relations, independent from

both historical negation and RWA (Sibley et al., 2008). This is consistent
with both a social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and dual-
process model perspective (Duckitt, 2001), where opposition toward social
policies relating to the group-based allocation of status and resources in NZ
is predicted by both competitive-driven motivations for group dominance
(SDO) and threat-driven motivations to protect the in-group and maintain
collective security (RWA). Key to our symbolic theory of history and iden-
tity, however, this earlier work emphasized that only RWAs effect was
mediated by historical negation. Therefore, we opted to focus on more spe-
cic, detailed tests of the predicted effects of RWA, and did not include SDO
in the current studies.
A central prediction arising from the symbolic theory of history and
identity is that people high in RWA should display a more rose-tinted view
of the history of their in-group. People high in RWA should more strongly
identify with and admire gures from their in-groups history, and should be
more likely to perceive such gures in a positive light. This view, therefore,
implies that ethnic in-group identication may act, at least partially, as a
mediator of the relationship between RWA and historical negation.
Interestingly, Sibley et al. (2008) reported that RWA was negatively cor-
related with objective knowledge (assessed using a series of multiple-choice
questions) about both World War II (generally perceived as the most impor-
tant event in modern world history; Liu et al., 2005) and the Treaty of
Waitangi (deemed by both Ma

ori and NZ Europeans as the most important

event in NZ history; Liu et al., 1999). This raises the possibility that although
people high in RWA may strongly identify with the history of the in-group,
they do so selectively by avoiding an evidence-based approach where nega-
tive historical events are concerned. This would presumably lead, in turn, to
limited or biased knowledge of historical facts when these facts reect badly
on the in-group.
This seems to be the case for NZ Europeans in the colonization of New
Zealand, with its stories of land alienation, cultural suppression, and political
injustice experienced by indigenous peoples. This possibility would certainly
seem to be consistent with the data reported here, in which NZ Europeans
high in RWA de-emphasize the accountability of the in-group for injustices
experienced by out-group members (Ma

ori) in the past.

Our research tested a model of historical negation applied specically to
NZ Europeans in the context of Ma

oriNZ European intergroup relations.

616 SIBLEY AND LIU
However, New Zealand is only one of a number of nations with an unfortu-
nate history in which certain groups of people have experienced negative
outcomes at the hands of another group. The antecedents and consequences
of history-negating ideologies should be relevant to any society in which the
weight of a negative past is too important to forget, yet too heavy a burden
to bear easily (e.g., Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). In this
respect, we suspect that the function of historical negation may depend on
cross-national differences in the continued salience of negative historical
actions (for German evidence, see Dresler-Hawke & Liu, 2006; for Japanese
evidence, see Liu & Atsumi, 2008). This should, in turn, depend on the extent
to which groups that have experienced historical injustice are able to call
perpetrator groups to account in contemporary society. This also relies on
their having access to collective voice with which to do so. If there is no one
there to remind a people of their checkered past, then it seems likely that they
will forget it.
This perspective provides insight into a potentially important difference
between a high level of historical negation, which we view as participation in
an ideological system that actively de-emphasizes voices arguing for the
continued relevance of group-based historical injustices, versus other pos-
sible strategies that in-group members may employ to deal with a negative
past, such as collective forgetting (see Sahdra & Ross, 2007). Historical
negation recognizes that the negative events occurred. What is up for debate
in this context, or what agreement with a history-negating ideology seeks to
position as being up for debate, is the continued relevance of claims for
reparation based on historical injustices. Collective forgetting, in contrast,
seems far more passive in that it simply sweeps a negative historical act under
the carpet. Future research could examine this theoretical distinction between
the active versus more passive nature of different strategies that are used to
maintain existing social arrangements in the context of group-based histori-
cal injustices.
Another key direction for future research is to examine the distinction
between historical negation (Sibley et al., 2008) and collective guilt
(Branscombe, Slugoski, & Kappen, 2004; Doosje et al., 1998; Steele, 1990).
As stated earlier, we view historical negation as ideological in nature; that is,
as a measure of the extent to which the individual adheres to societally
promoted ideologies positioning the history of intergroup conict and injus-
tice as irrelevant today. Collective guilt, in contrast, is viewed as the emo-
tional experience of guilt for the recognized negative actions of the members
of the in-group. Historical negation, therefore, seems most appropriately
viewed as a hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myth, whereas collective guilt
predicts social policy support in the opposing direction, of hierarchy attenu-
ation (Doosje et al., 1998), not because of its ideological function (cf. Sibley
HISTORICAL NEGATION AND POLICY ATTITUDES 617
et al., 2005), but rather because support for reparation is presumably moti-
vated by the alleviation of negative emotion (i.e., guilt) experienced by indi-
viduals because of their group membership.
We look forward to seeing future research examining the effects of his-
torical negation across different nations with qualitatively different histories
of injustice, and also research directly comparing the antecedents and effects
of group-based emotions (collective guilt) and ideologies (historical nega-
tion). Currently, we are exploring data suggesting that whereas historical
negation predicts increased opposition for resource-based policies in NZ,
collective guilt predicts increased support for the symbolic aspects of social
policies among NZ Europeans.
These differential effects identify two important psychological mecha-
nisms underlying individual differences in reparation-oriented policies. One
arises from social identication and group-based emotion (which tends to
predict support for symbolic policies relating to the projection and incorpo-
ration of minority-group symbols and culture into the mainstream,
dominant-group culture and identity, perhaps serving a guilt-alleviation
function); whereas the other relates to the ideological positioning of historical
events more directly relevant to resource-based policy allocations.
To this end, a comment on the unexpected effect of symbolic policy
attitudes on historical negation is warranted. This effect was observed only in
Study 2. Although tentative, this reverse effect does raise the interesting
possibility that opposition toward symbolic aspects of social policy might
have a weak causal effect and produce slightly increased levels of historical
negation. Conversely, this would suggest that increases in support for the
symbolic aspects of social policy might actually decrease support for histori-
cal negation; and thus, in turn, increase support for resource allocations for
Ma

ori in response to historical injustices. Although this effect would need to

be replicated, it does offer an optimistic glimmer of possibility for applica-
tions promoting social change. It is possible that increasing support for
symbolic aspects of social policy (to which NZ Europeans seem to be more
amenable; see Liu & Sibley, 2006; Sibley & Liu, 2004) might provide an
avenue for also indirectly increasing support for resource allocations for
Ma

ori over time (see Sibley, Liu, & Kirkwood, 2006).

To conclude, we maintain that social representations of history play a
central role in alleviating or making okay some practices and conventions
over others (Liu & Sibley, 2009). Moreover, like other widespread ideologies,
historyor at least consensually shared representations of historytend to
favor majority or dominant groups (Liu & Hilton, 2005; see also Jost &
Banaji, 1994). This has important social implications because it suggests that
representations of history are an important resource for maintaining and
legitimizing social systems that suit some groups more than others. This
618 SIBLEY AND LIU
should be particularly important when the contested issue refers to injustices
or violations of rights experienced by one group at the hands of another
group, as is the case in many postcolonial nations, including NZ.
The current study explored one specic aspect of this general thesis: that of
the proposed causal effect of RWAon the tendency to endorse ideologies that
negate the relevance of historical injustices and, in turn, the causal effects of
historical negation on opposition toward social policies that promote material
reparation. The two longitudinal studies we reported here were both based on
samples of NZ European undergraduates, and thus cannot be considered
representative of the dominant/majority NZEuropean population. Neverthe-
less, they do provide novel longitudinal evidence for the predicted causal
effects of RWA on historical negation and historical negation, in turn, on
policy attitudes. The twostudies presentedhere indicate that the ways inwhich
history is (re)presented serves an important ideologicaljusticatory function
in creating and maintaining the unequal distribution of resources in society.
References
Altemeyer, B. (1996). The authoritarian spectre. London: Harvard University
Press.
Altemeyer, B. (1998). The other authoritarian personality. In M. P. Zanna
(Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 30. pp. 4792).
New York: Academic Press.
Belich, J. (1996). Making peoples: A history of the New Zealanders, from
Polynesian settlement to the end of the nineteenth century. Auckland, NZ:
Allen Lane/Penguin.
Branscombe, N. R., Slugoski, B., & Kappen, D. M. (2004). The measurement
of collective guilt: What it is and what it is not. In N. R. Branscombe &
B. Doosje (Eds.), Collective guilt: International perspectives (pp. 1634).
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cole, D. A., & Maxwell, S. E. (2003). Testing mediational models with
longitudinal data: Questions and tips in the use of structural equation
modeling. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 112, 558577.
Doosje, B., Branscombe, N. R., Spears, R., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1998).
Guilty by association: When ones group has a negative history. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 872886.
Dresler-Hawke, E., & Liu, J. H. (2006). Collective shame and the positioning
of German national identity. Psicologia Politica, 32, 131153.
Duckitt, J. (2001). A dual-process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology
and prejudice. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social
psychology (Vol. 33, pp. 41113). New York: Academic Press.
HISTORICAL NEGATION AND POLICY ATTITUDES 619
Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2007). Right-wing authoritarianism, social domi-
nance orientation, and the dimensions of generalized prejudice. European
Journal of Personality, 21, 113130.
Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2009). A dual process model of ideological
attitudes and system justication. In J. T. Jost, A. C. Kay, & H. Thoris-
dottir (Eds.), Social and psychological bases of ideology and system justi-
cation (pp. 292313). New York: Oxford University Press.
Gollob, H. F., & Reichardt, C. S. (1991). Interpreting and estimating indirect
effects assuming time lags really matter. In L. M. Collins & J. L. Horn
(Eds.), Best methods for the analysis of change: Recent advances,
unanswered questions, future directions (pp. 243259). Washington DC:
American Psychological Association.
Hilton, D. J., & Liu, J. H. (2008). Culture and inter-group relations: The role
of social representations of history. In R. Sorrentino & S. Yamaguchi
(Eds.), The handbook of motivation and cognition: The cultural context
(pp. 343368). New York: Guilford.
Jost, J. T., & Banaji, M. (1994). The role of stereotyping in system justica-
tion and the production of false consciousness. British Journal of Social
Psychology, 22, 127.
Liu, J. H. (2005). History and identity: A systems of checks and balances for
Aotearoa/New Zealand. In J. H. Liu, T. McCreanor, T. McIntosh, &
T. Teaiwa (Eds.), New Zealand identities: Departures and destinations
(pp. 6987). Wellington, NZ: Victoria University Press.
Liu, J. H., & Atsumi, T. (2008). Historical conict and resolution between
Japan and China: Developing and applying a narrative theory of history
and identity. In T. Sugiman, K. J. Gergen, W. Wagner, & Y. Yamada
(Eds.), Meaning in action: Constructions, narratives, and representations
(pp. 327344). Tokyo: Springer-Verlag.
Liu, J. H., Goldstein-Hawes, R., Hilton, D. J., Huang, L. L., Gastardo-
Conaco, C., Dresler-Hawke, E., et al. (2005). Social representations of
events and people in world history across twelve cultures. Journal of
Cross-Cultural Psychology, 36, 171191.
Liu, J. H., & Hilton, D. (2005). How the past weighs on the present: Social
representations of history and their role in identity politics. British Journal
of Social Psychology, 44, 537556.
Liu, J. H., & Lszl, J. (2007). A narrative theory of history and identity:
Social identity, social representations, society, and the individual. In
G. Moloney & I. Walker (Eds.), Social representations and identity:
Content, process, and power (pp. 85107). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Liu, J. H., &Sibley, C. G. (2006). Differential effects of societal anchoring and
personal importance in determining support or opposition to (bi)cultural
diversity in New Zealand. Papers on Social Representations, 15, 115.
620 SIBLEY AND LIU
Liu, J. H., & Sibley, C. G. (2009). Culture, social representations, and peace-
making: A symbolic theory of history and identity. In C. Montiel &
N. Noor (Eds.), Peace psychology in Asia (pp. 2139). London: Springer.
Liu, J. H., Wilson, M. W., McClure, J., & Higgins, T. R. (1999). Social
identity and the perception of history: Cultural representations of
Aotearoa/New Zealand. European Journal of Social Psychology, 29,
10211047.
MacKinnon, D. P. (2008). Introduction to statistical mediation analysis. New
York: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Rata, A., Liu, J. H., & Hanke, K. (2008). Te ara hohou rongo (the path to
peace): Ma

ori conceptualisations of inter-group forgiveness. New Zealand

Journal of Psychology, 37, 1830.
Sahdra, B., & Ross, M. (2007). Group identication and historical memory.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 384395.
Sibley, C. G. (2010). The dark duo of post-colonial ideology: A model of
symbolic exclusion and historical negation. International Journal of Con-
ict and Violence, 4, 106123.
Sibley, C. G., & Duckitt, J. (2008). Personality and prejudice: A meta-
analysis and theoretical review. Personality and Social Psychology Review,
12, 248279.
Sibley, C. G., & Liu, J. H. (2004). Attitudes towards biculturalism in New
Zealand: Social dominance and Pakeha attitudes towards the general
principles and resource-specic aspects of bicultural policy. New Zealand
Journal of Psychology, 33, 8899.
Sibley, C. G., & Liu, J. H. (2007). New Zealand = bicultural? Implicit and
explicit associations between ethnicity and nationhood in the New
Zealand context. European Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 12221243.
Sibley, C. G., Liu, J. H., Duckitt, J., & Khan, S. S. (2008). Social represen-
tations of history and the legitimation of social inequality: The form and
function of historical negation. European Journal of Social Psychology,
38, 542565.
Sibley, C. G., Liu, J. H., & Kirkwood, S. (2006). Toward a social represen-
tations theory of attitude change: The effect of message framing on
general and specic attitudes toward equality and entitlement. New
Zealand Journal of Psychology, 35, 313.
Sibley, C. G., Robertson, A., & Kirkwood, S. (2005). Pakeha attitudes
toward the symbolic and resource-specic aspects of bicultural policy in
New Zealand: The legitimizing role of collective guilt for historical injus-
tices. New Zealand Journal of Psychology, 34, 171180.
Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social dominance: An intergroup theory of
social hierarchy and oppression. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
HISTORICAL NEGATION AND POLICY ATTITUDES 621
The Social Report. (2006). Wellington, NZ: Ministry of Social Development.
Steele, S. (1990). White guilt. American Scholar, 59, 497506.
Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2000). An integrated threat theory
of prejudice. In S. Oskamp (Ed.), Reducing prejudice and discrimination
(pp. 2346). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Wertsch, J. V. (2002). Voices of collective remembering. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Appendix A
Historical Negation Scale
1. We should not have to pay for the mistakes of our ancestors.
2. We should all move on as one nation and forget about past differ-
ences and conicts between ethnic groups.
3. It is true that many things happened to Ma

ori people in the past

that should not have happened, but it is unfair to hold current
generations of Pakeha/NZ Europeans accountable for things that
happened so long ago.*
4. People who werent around in previous centuries should not feel
accountable for the actions of their ancestors.*
5. Grievances for past injustices should be recognized and due com-
pensation offered to the descendants of those who suffered from
such injustices.* (R)
6. New Zealand law needs to recognize that certain ethnic minorities
have been treated unfairly in the past. People belonging to those
groups should be entitled to certain benets and compensation. (R)
7. I believe that I should take part in the efforts to help repair the
damage to others caused by earlier generations of people from my
ethnic group. (R)
8. We as a nation have a responsibility that see that due settlement is
offered to Ma

ori in compensation for past injustices.* (R)

Note. Reprinted with permission from Sibley et al. (2008). *Item was
included in the shortened version of the scale that we used in Study 2.
(R) = reverse-scored item. Item 7 was adapted from Doosje et al.s (1998)
measure of collective guilt.
622 SIBLEY AND LIU
Appendix B
Symbolic and Resource-Specic Social Policy Attitudes Scale
Attitudes Toward Resource-Specic Aspects of Bicultural Policy
1. Ma

ori ownership of the seabed and foreshore.*

2. Crown ownership of the seabed and foreshore.* (R)
3. Rates exemptions on Ma

ori land.*
4. Treaty claims for rights to the radio spectrum.*
5. Requiring all treaty claims to be lodged by the end of next year. (R)
6. Reserving places for Ma

ori students studying medicine.*

7. Scholarships reserved for Ma

ori students studying at University.

Attitudes Toward Symbolic Aspects of Bicultural Policy
1. Performance of the Haka at international sports events.*
2. The use of Ma

ori cultural icons to promote New Zealand tourism.*

3. Ma

ori greeting ceremonies (Powhiri) at formal events.

4. Teaching Ma

ori language in all New Zealand primary schools.*

5. Singing the national anthem in Ma

ori and English.*

6. Waitangi Day as a national celebration of biculturalism.*
Note. Adapted with permission from Liu and Sibley (2006). *Item was
included in the shortened version of the scale that we used in Study 2.
(R) = reverse-scored item.
HISTORICAL NEGATION AND POLICY ATTITUDES 623