Evelyn Chua-Qua vs. Hon. Jacobo Clave, et al., G.R. No.

49549, 8/30/90
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 49549 August 30, 1990

EVELYN CHUA-QUA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant, and
TAY TUNG HIGH SCHOOL, INC., respondents.

William C. Gunitang and Jaime Opinion for petitioner.

Laogan Law Offices for private respondent.



REGALADO, J.:

This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the
controversial and unique situation that the marriage of herein petitioner, then a
classroom teacher, to her student who was fourteen (14) years her junior, was
considered by the school authorities as sufficient basis for terminating her
services.

Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is an educational institution in
Bacolod City. Petitioner had been employed therein as a teacher since 1963 and,
in 1976 when this dispute arose, was the class adviser in the sixth grade where
one Bobby Qua was enrolled. Since it was the policy of the school to extend
remedial instructions to its students, Bobby Qua was imparted such instructions
in school by petitioner. 1 In the course thereof, the couple fell in love and on
December 24, 1975, they got married in a civil ceremony solemnized in Iloilo City
by Hon. Cornelio G. Lazaro, City Judge of Iloilo. 2 Petitioner was then thirty (30)
years of age but Bobby Qua being sixteen (16) years old, consent and advice to
the marriage was given by his mother, Mrs. Concepcion Ong. 3 Their marriage
was ratified in accordance with the rites of their religion in a church wedding
solemnized by Fr. Nick Melicor at Bacolod City on January 10, 1976. 4

On February 4, 1976, private respondent filed with the sub-regional office of the
Department of Labor at Bacolod City an application for clearance to terminate the
employment of petitioner on the following ground: "For abusive and unethical
conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher and that her continued
employment is inimical to the best interest, and would downgrade the high moral
values, of the school." 5

Petitioner was placed under suspension without pay on March 12, 1976. 6
Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr. of the National Labor Relations
Commission, Bacolod City, to whom the case was certified for resolution, required
the parties to submit their position papers and supporting evidence. Affidavits 7
were submitted by private respondent to bolster its contention that petitioner,
"defying all standards of decency, recklessly took advantage of her position as
school teacher, lured a Grade VI boy under her advisory section and 15 years her
junior into an amorous relation." 8 More specifically, private respondent raised
issues on the fact that petitioner stayed alone with Bobby Qua in the classroom
after school hours when everybody had gone home, with one door allegedly
locked and the other slightly open.

On September 17, 1976, Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr., without
conducting any formal hearing, rendered an "Award" in NLRC Case No. 956 in
favor of private respondent granting the clearance to terminate the employment
of petitioner. It was held therein that

The affidavits . . . although self-serving but were never disputed by the
respondent pointed out that before the marriage of respondent to Bobby Qua,
fourteen (14) years her junior and during her employment with petitioner, an
amorous relationship existed between them. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the undisputed written testimonies of several witnesses convincingly
picture the circumstances under which such amorous relationship was manifested
within the premises of the school, inside the classroom, and within the sight of
some employees. While no direct evidences have been introduced to show that
immoral acts were committed during these times, it is however enough for a sane
and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired and took place during
these times. . . . 9

Petitioner, however, denied having received any copy of the affidavits referred to.
10

On October 7, 1976, petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission claiming denial of due process for not having been furnished copies
of the aforesaid affidavits relied on by the labor arbiter. She further contended
that there was nothing immoral, nor was it abusive and unethical conduct
unbecoming of a dignified school teacher, for a teacher to enter into lawful
wedlock with her student. 11

On December 27, 1976, the National Labor Relations Commission unanimously
reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision and ordered petitioner's reinstatement with
backwages, with the following specific findings:

Affiant Maselliones deposed and said that he saw appellant and Qua sitting on
the student desk inside a classroom after classes. The depositions of affiants
Despi and Chin are of the same tenor. No statements whatever were sworn by
them that they were eyewitnesses to immoral or scandalous acts.

xxx xxx xxx

Even if we have to strain our sense of moral values to accommodate the
conclusion of the Arbiter, we could not deduce anything immoral or scandalous
about a girl and a boy talking inside a room after classes with lights on and with
the door open.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner-appellee naively insisted that the clearance application was
precipitated by immoral acts which did not lend dignity to the position of
appellant. Aside from such gratuitous assertions of immoral acts or conduct by
herein appellant, no evidence to support such claims was introduced by
petitioner-appellee. We reviewed the the sequence of events from the beginning
of the relationship between appellant Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua up to the date
of the filing of the present application for clearance in search of evidence that
could have proved detrimental to the image and dignity of the school but none
has come to our attention. . . . 12

The case was elevated by private respondent to the Minister of Labor who, on
March 30, 1977, reversed the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission. The petitioner was, however, awarded six (6) months salary as
financial assistance. 13

On May 20, 1977, petitioner appealed the said decision to the Office of the
President of the Philippines. 14 After the corresponding exchanges, on September
1, 1978 said office, through Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave,
rendered its decision reversing the appealed decision. Private respondent was
ordered to reinstate petitioner to her former position without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and with full back wages from the time she was not
allowed to work until the date of her actual reinstatement. 15

Having run the gamut of three prior adjudications of the case with alternating
reversals, one would think that this decision of public respondent wrote finis to
petitioner's calvary. However, in a resolution dated December 6, 1978, public
respondent, acting on a motion for reconsideration 16 of herein private
respondent and despite opposition thereto, 17 reconsidered and modified the
aforesaid decision, this time giving due course to the application of Tay Tung High
School, Inc. to terminate the services of petitioner as classroom teacher but giving
her separation pay equivalent to her six (6) months salary. 18

In thus reconsidering his earlier decision, public respondent reasoned out in his
manifestation/comment filed on August 14, 1979 in this Court in the present case:

That this Office did not limit itself to the legal issues involved in the case, but went
further to view the matter from the standpoint of policy which involves the
delicate task of rearing and educating of children whose interest must be held
paramount in the school community, and on this basis, this Office deemed it wise
to uphold the judgment and action of the school authorities in terminating the
services of a teacher whose actuations and behavior, in the belief of the school
authorities, had spawned ugly rumors that had cast serious doubts on her
integrity, a situation which was considered by them as not healthy for a school
campus, believing that a school teacher should at all times act with utmost
circumspection and conduct herself beyond reproach and above suspicion; 19

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner relies on the following grounds for the
reversal of the aforesaid resolution of public respondent, viz.:

1. The dismissal or termination of petitioner's employment, despite Tay
Tung's claim to the contrary, was actually based on her marriage with her pupil
and is, therefore, illegal.

2. Petitioner's right to due process under the Constitution was violated when
the hearsay affidavits of Laddy Maselliones, Eleuterio Despi, Pina D. Chiu, and Ong
Lee Bing, were admitted and considered in evidence without presenting the
affiants as witnesses and affording the petitioner the right to confront and cross-
examine them.

3. No sufficient proofs were adduced to show that petitioner committed
serious misconduct or breached the trust reposed on her by her employer or
committed any of the other grounds enumerated in Article 283 (Now Article 282)
of the Labor Code which will justify the termination of her employment. 20

We first dispose of petitioner's claim that her right to due process was violated.
We do not agree. There is no denial of due process where a party was afforded an
opportunity to present his side. Also, the procedure by which issues are resolved
based on position papers, affidavits and other documentary evidence is
recognized as not violative of such right. Moreover, petitioner could have insisted
on a hearing to confront and cross-examine the affiants but she did not do so,
obviously because she was convinced that the case involves a question of law.
Besides, said affidavits were also cited and discussed by her in the proceedings
before the Ministry of Labor.

Now, on the merits. Citing its upright intention to preserve the respect of the
community toward the teachers and to strengthen the educational system,
private respondent submits that petitioner's actuations as a teacher constitute
serious misconduct, if not an immoral act, a breach of trust and confidence
reposed upon her and, thus, a valid and just ground to terminate her services. It
argues that as a school teacher who exercises substitute parental authority over
her pupils inside the school campus, petitioner had moral ascendancy over Bobby
Qua and, therefore, she must not abuse such authority and respect extended to
her. Furthermore, it charged petitioner with having allegedly violated the Code of
Ethics for teachers the pertinent provision of which states that a "school official or
teacher should never take advantage of his/her position to court a pupil or
student." 21

On the other hand, petitioner maintains that there was no ground to terminate
her services as there is nothing wrong with a teacher falling in love with her pupil
and, subsequently, contracting a lawful marriage with him. She argued that she
was dismissed because of her marriage with Bobby Qua This contention was
sustained in the aforesaid decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
thus:

. . . One thing, however, has not escaped our observation: That the application for
clearance was filed only after more than one month elapsed from the date of
appellant's marriage to Bobby Qua Certainly, such belated application for
clearance weakens instead of strengthening the cause of petitioner-appellee. The
alleged immoral acts transpired before the marriage and if it is these alleged
undignified conduct that triggered the intended separation, then why was the
present application for clearance not filed at that time when the alleged
demoralizing effect was still fresh and abrasive? 22

After a painstaking perusal of the records, we are of the considered view that the
determination of the legality of the dismissal hinges on the issue of whether or
not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts which
culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her student constitute
immorality and/or grave misconduct. To constitute immorality, the circumstances
of each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in the light
of prevailing norms of conduct and the applicable law. Contrary to what
petitioner had insisted on from the very start, what is before us is a factual
question, the resolution of which is better left to the trier of facts.

Considering that there was no formal hearing conducted, we are constrained to
review the factual conclusions arrived at by public respondent, and to nullify his
decision through the extraordinary writ of certiorari if the same is tainted by
absence or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The findings of fact
must be supported by substantial evidence; otherwise, this Court is not bound
thereby. 23

We rule that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion. As vividly
and forcefully observed by him in his original decision:

Indeed, the records relied upon by the Acting Secretary of Labor (actually the
records referred to are the affidavits attached as Annexes "A" to "D" of the
position paper dated August 10, 1976 filed by appellee at the arbitration
proceedings) in arriving at his decision are unbelievable and unworthy of credit,
leaving many question unanswered by a rational mind. For one thing, the
affidavits refer to certain times of the day during off school hours when appellant
and her student were found together in one of the classrooms of the school. But
the records of the case present a ready answer: appellant was giving remedial
instruction to her student and the school was the most convenient place to serve
the purpose. What is glaring in the affidavits is the complete absence of specific
immoral acts allegedly committed by appellant and her student. For another, and
very important at that, the alleged acts complained of invariably happened from
September to December, 1975, but the disciplinenary action imposed by appellee
was sought only in February, 1976, and what is more, the affidavits were
executed only in August, 1976 and from all indications, were prepared by appellee
or its counsel. The affidavits heavily relied upon by appellee are clearly the
product of after-thought. . . . The action pursued by appellee in dismissing
appellant over one month after her marriage, allegedly based on immoral acts
committed even much earlier, is open to basis of the action sought seriously
doubted; on the question. The basis of the action sought is seriously doubted; on
the contrary, we are more inclined to believe that appellee had certain selfish,
ulterior and undisclosed motives known only to itself. 24

As earlier stated, from the outset even the labor arbiter conceded that there was
no direct evidence to show that immoral acts were committed. Nonetheless,
indulging in a patently unfair conjecture, he concluded that "it is however enough
for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired during
those times." 25 In reversing his decision, the National Labor Relations
Commission observed that the assertions of immoral acts or conducts are
gratuitous and that there is no direct evidence to support such claim, 26 a finding
which herein public respondent himself shared.

We are, therefore, at a loss as to how public respondent could adopt the volte-
face in the questioned resolution, which we hereby reject, despite his prior
trenchant observations hereinbefore quoted. What is revealing however, is that
the reversal of his original decision is inexplicably based on unsubstantiated
surmises and non sequiturs which he incorporated in his assailed resolution in this
wise:

. . . While admittedly, no one directly saw Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua doing
immoral acts inside the classroom it seems obvious and this Office is convinced
that such a happening indeed transpired within the solitude of the classrom after
regular class hours. The marriage between Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua is the best
proof which confirms the suspicion that the two indulged in amorous relations in
that place during those times of the day. . . . 27

With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral
acts, it follows that the alleged violation of the Code of Ethics governing school
teachers would have no basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that
petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. If the two
eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this
only lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which
reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal
emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the
circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be
considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.

It would seem quite obvious that the avowed policy of the school in rearing and
educating children is being unnecessarily bannered to justify the dismissal of
petitioner. This policy, however, is not at odds with and should not be capitalized
on to defeat the security of tenure granted by the Constitution to labor. In
termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing an
employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so would result in a finding
that the dismissal is unjustified.

The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we declare her
dismissal as unwarranted and illegal. It being apparent, however, that the
relationship between petitioner and private respondent has been inevitably and
severely strained, we believe that it would neither be to the interest of the parties
nor would any prudent purpose be served by ordering her reinstatement.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the resolution of public
respondent, dated December 6, 1978 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private
respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioner
backwages equivalent to three (3) years, without any deduction or qualification,
and separation pay in the amount of one (1) month for every year of service.

SO ORDERED.
2. Rene v. Puse vs. Ligaya Santos-Puse, G.R. No. 183678, 3/ 15 /10
FIRST DIVISION

RENE VENTENILLA PUSE,
Petitioner,

- versus -

LIGAYA DELOS SANTOS-PUSE,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 183678

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

March 15, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order filed by petitioner Rene V. Puse assailing the
Decision[1] dated 28 March 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
100421.
Petitioner is a registered Professional Teacher stationed at S. Aguirre Elementary
School, East District, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, while respondent is a
Barangay Rural Health Midwife assigned at the Municipal Health Office of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
It appears that on 10 January 1992, petitioner married respondent Ligaya Delos
Santos-Puse at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Daet, Camarines Norte before
the Hon. Judge Oscar T. Osorio.[2] He had two (2) children with her, and had a
church wedding before respondent found out that petitioner was already married.
Respondent discovered that petitioner had already gotten married to Cristina Pablo
Puse at the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Laoag City, Ilocos Norte on 27
December 1986. Respondent likewise learned that he has two (2) children with his
first wife.[3]
Thus, on 2 August 2005, respondent filed a letter-complaint with the Director of
the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), National Capital Region, Manila,
through the Director, PRC, Lucena City, seeking assistance regarding her husband
against whom she had filed a criminal case for Bigamy and Abandonment.
She alleged that her husband has not been giving her and their children support.[4]
In a letter dated 16 August 2005, petitioner was directed by the PRC of Lucena
City to answer the complaint for immorality and dishonorable conduct filed by
respondent.[5] Per directive, petitioner submitted his Compliance[6] dated 31
August 2005 denying the charges against him. He adopted his counter-affidavit
and the affidavits of his witnesses, Jocelyn Puse Decena and Dominador I. Blanco,
which were submitted in Criminal Case Nos. 7228 and 7229 before the MTC of
Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte. He argued that if respondents allegations
were true, she herself would be equally guilty of immorality and dishonorable
conduct, as she was fully aware that petitioner was already married when she
married him. He added he has not abandoned respondent or their children and
continually gives support for their children.
In her Reply to Answer/Compliance[7] dated 6 September 2005, respondent said
she married petitioner in good faith, unaware that he was already married to
Cristina N. Pablo. When she learned of petitioners deception regarding his
marital status, she filed a case for Bigamy before the MTC of Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, which found probable cause to hold petitioner for trial. She
found petitioners explanation Na ako ay wala ng balita o komunikasyon sa aking
unang asawa at ang paniwala ko ay siya ay patay na at ang aking kasal ay nawala
ng saysay to be lame and insufficient to justify his contracting a subsequent
bigamous marriage. She claimed that petitioner should have instituted in court a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of his first wife
before contracting a subsequent marriage. In the absence of such declaration, her
marriage to petitioner is bigamous and void ab initio. She added that the affidavits
of his sister and close friend should not be given weight.
In his Rejoinder[8] dated 11 October 2005, petitioner reiterated the arguments in
his Answer and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it was
not verified and for failure of the respondent to attach a valid certification against
forum-shopping.
After due consideration of the complaint, affidavits, supporting documents and
pleadings filed, the Board of Professional Teachers, PRC, Lucena City, found a
prima facie case for Immorality and Dishonorable Conduct against petitioner, and
directed respondent to pay docket and legal research fees.[9] The case was
docketed as Adm. Case No. LCN-0016.
On 16 February 2007, the Board of Professional Teachers (Board), PRC, Manila,
found petitioner administratively liable of the charges and revoked his license as a
Professional Teacher. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Board finds Rene Ventenilla Puse
guilty as charged and accordingly revokes his license as a Professional Teacher.
He is ordered to surrender his Certificate of Registration and his Professional
Identification Card to the Professional Regulation Commission within ten (10)
days from the time this decision becomes final and executory and to desist from
the practice of the teaching profession under the pain of criminal prosecution.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The Board ruled that contrary to petitioners contentions, it had jurisdiction over
petitioner and could validly order the revocation of his license, as petitioner was a
professional teacher. Under Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7836, otherwise
known as the Philippine Teachers Professionalization Act of 1994, the Board has
the power and authority to regulate the practice of teaching in the Philippines. The
charge of Immorality and/or Dishonorable Conduct is also one (1) of the grounds
for the revocation or suspension of a license of a professional teacher. For entering
into a second marriage without first seeking a judicial declaration of the
presumptive death of his first wife and thereafter cohabiting with his second wife
and having children with her, petitioner is liable for Immorality and Dishonorable
Conduct. The Board added that whether respondent had knowledge of the first
marriage or not is irrelevant and further found petitioners claim that his
cohabitation with respondent was under duress, force or intimidation untenable.
Citing Section 3,[11] Article III and Section 3,[12] Article XI of the Code of Ethics
of Professional Teachers, and the Oath of Professionals,[13] the Board also
explained that petitioners official life cannot be detached from his personal life,
contrary to his contention that the acts complained of were purely private. His
immorality and dishonorable conduct demonstrate his unfitness to continue
practicing his profession as he is no longer the embodiment of a role model for
young elementary school pupils, the Board ruled.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision but his motion was denied by
the Board per Resolution dated 9 July 2007.[14]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
100421, before the Court of Appeals assailing the Resolutions dated 16 February
2007 and 9 July 2007 of the Board.
On 28 March 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners appeal.[15] The
appellate court held that the applicable law was Rep. Act No. 4670 or the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers because petitioner was occupying the position of
Teacher I at the S. Aguirre Elementary School. Under Rep. Act No. 4670, the one
(1) tasked to investigate the complaint was the Board of Professional Teachers.
Thus, it was the Board of Professional Teachers that had jurisdiction over the
administrative case and not the Civil Service Commission (CSC) or the
Department of Education (DepEd) as contended by petitioner. As to the finding of
immorality and/or dishonorable conduct, the Court of Appeals agreed with the
Board in finding as untenable petitioners excuse that he believed his first wife to
be dead and that his first marriage was no longer subsisting. It said that petitioner
should have applied for a judicial order declaring his first wife presumptively dead
before marrying respondent. It further found without merit petitioners defense
that the complaint is of a private nature, explaining that his actions relate to the
very nature of his career: to teach, mold and guide the youth to moral
righteousness.
As to petitioners defense of pari delicto, the appellate court upheld the Boards
finding that respondent was in good faith when she married petitioner. The Board
also afforded petitioner due process.
On 30 June 2008, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.[16] Hence, the present recourse.
Petitioner argues that:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
VALIDATING THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE BOARD FOR PROFESSIONAL
TEACHERS OF PRC-MANILA DESPITE THE LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE SAME AND ITS PATENT NULLITY FOR
HAVING BEEN ISSUED OUTSIDE OF ITS JURISDICTION AND IN
VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF YOUR PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESS;

II. THE HONORABLE BOARD FOR PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS
OF THE PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC)-MANILA
AND LUCENA CITY, GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, WHEN IT ASSUMED PRIMARY JURISDICTION
OVER THE UNVERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THE RESPONDENT IN
CONTRAVENTION WITH EXISTING RULES AND SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER;

III. THE HONORABLE BOARD FOR PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS OF
THE PRC-MANILA GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONER
GUILTY OF IMMORALITY AND DISHONORABLE CONDUCT AND
SUBSEQUENTLY REVOKING HIS TEACHERS LICENSE AS A PENALTY
NOTWITHSTANDING THE LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
SUSTAINING THE COMPLAINT, WHICH IN EFFECT VIOLATED THE
RIGHT OF YOUR PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.[17]

From the foregoing, the issues may be summed up as follows: (1) Did the Board
of Professional Teachers have jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaint filed
by respondent against petitioner? (2) Was petitioner denied administrative due
process? (3) Was there substantial evidence to sustain the complaint and to hold
petitioner liable?
On the first issue, petitioner argues that the proper forum to hear and decide the
complaint was either the CSC pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 991936 (Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service) or the DepEd pursuant to Rep.
Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers). Since the charge was for
violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, the complaint should have been brought before the CSC.
We do not agree. An administrative case against a public school teacher may be
filed before the Board of Professional Teachers-PRC, the DepEd or the CSC,
which have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases such as for immoral,
unprofessional or dishonorable conduct.
Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject
matter at the same time by two or more separate tribunals.[18] When the law
bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive
unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction,
in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.[19] The
authority to hear and decide administrative cases by the Board of Professional
Teachers-PRC, DepEd and the CSC comes from Rep. Act No. 7836, Rep. Act No.
4670 and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807, respectively.
Under Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7836, the Board is given the power, after due
notice and hearing, to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration of a
professional teacher for causes enumerated therein. Among the causes is immoral,
unprofessional or dishonorable conduct. Section 23 reads:
SEC. 23. Revocation of the Certificate of Registration, Suspension from the
Practice of the Teaching Profession, and Cancellation of Temporary or Special
Permit. The Board shall have the power, after due notice and hearing, to suspend
or revoke the certificate of registration of any registrant, to reprimand or to cancel
the temporary/special permit of a holder thereof who is exempt from registration,
for any of the following causes:
(a) Conviction for any criminal offense by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(b) Immoral, unprofessional or dishonorable conduct;
(c) Declaration by a court of competent jurisdiction for being mentally unsound or
insane;
(d) Malpractice, gross incompetence, gross negligence or serious ignorance of the
practice of the teaching profession;
(e) The use of or perpetration of any fraud or deceit in obtaining a certificate of
registration, professional license or special/temporary permit;
(f) Chronic inebriety or habitual use of drugs;
(g) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the rules and regulations and
other policies of the Board and the Commission, and the code of ethical and
professional standards for professional teachers; and
(h) Unjustified or willful failure to attend seminars, workshops, conferences and
the like or the continuing education program prescribed by the Board and the
Commission. x x x[20]
Thus, if a complaint is filed under Rep. Act No. 7836, the jurisdiction to hear the
same falls with the Board of Professional Teachers-PRC.
However, if the complaint against a public school teacher is filed with the DepEd,
then under Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, the jurisdiction over administrative cases of public school teachers is
lodged with the investigating committee created pursuant to said section, now
being implemented by Section 2, Chapter VII of DECS Order No. 33, S. 1999, also
known as the DECS Rules of Procedure. Section 9 of the Magna Carta provides:
SEC. 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against a teacher shall
be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School
Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative who should at
least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as
chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or
national teachers organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be
designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee shall submit its
findings and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days
from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where the school
superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the
committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.
A complaint filed under Rep. Act No. 4670 shall be heard by the investigating
committee which is under the DepEd.
As to the CSC, under P.D. No. 807, also known as the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines, particularly Sections 9(j) and 37(a) thereof, the CSC has the power to
hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or
brought to it on appeal. These sections state:
SEC. 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission.The Commission shall
administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and functions:
x x x x
(j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in
accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal;
x x x x
SEC. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal
all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days
salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A
complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a
government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or
it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to
conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the
Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action
to be taken.
As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction to
supervise and discipline all government employees including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.[21]
Consequently, if civil service rules and regulations are violated, complaints for said
violations may be filed with the CSC.
However, where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body or
agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the others.[22] Here, it was the Board of Professional Teachers,
before which respondent filed the complaint, that acquired jurisdiction over the
case and which had the authority to proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of
the DepEd and the CSC.
Petitioners reliance on the cases of Emin v. De Leon[23] and Office of the
Ombudsman v. Estandarte[24] to support his claim that it was the DepEd
Investigating Committee created pursuant to Rep. Act No. 4670 which had
jurisdiction to try him because he is a public school teacher, is without merit as
these cases are not in point. In Emin, the issue was which between the DepEd
Investigating Committee (under Rep. Act No. 4670) and the CSC (under P.D. No.
807) had jurisdiction to try the administrative case, while in Estandarte, the issue
was which between the Office of the Ombudsman and the DepEd Investigating
Committee had jurisdiction over the administrative case filed in said case. In
contrast, the instant case involves the Board of Professional Teachers which, under
Rep. Act No. 7836, had jurisdiction over administrative cases against professional
teachers and has the power to suspend and revoke a licensed teachers certificate of
registration after due proceedings.
As to the issue of due process, was petitioner denied administrative due process?
Petitioner questions the authority of the Board of Professional Teachers-Lucena
City to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, arguing that venue was improperly
laid as he and respondent are residents of Parang, Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte; they were married in Daet, Camarines Norte where the alleged immoral and
dishonorable conduct was committed; his professional teachers license was issued
in the Central Office of the PRC in Manila and renewed in the PRC Regional
Office in Legaspi City, Albay; and he is a Teacher I of S. Aguirre Elementary
School, East District, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
Moreover, petitioner also faults the Board of Professional Teachers-Lucena City
for acting on respondents unverified letter in violation of CSC Resolution No. 94-
0521 which provides:
Section 4. Complaint in Writing and Under Oath. No complaint against a civil
servant shall be given due course, unless the same is in writing and under oath.
He also asserts that respondent purposely filed the complaint before the Board of
Professional Teachers in Lucena City because the investigating officer was her
colleague and belonged to the same religious denomination as her. This, according
to petitioner, showed the partiality of the board. The Board of Professional
Teachers also allegedly denied him due process because he was allegedly informed
of the retraction of the testimony/affidavit of his witness (Dominador Blanco) only
upon receipt of the Boards decision.
Petitioners contentions are without merit.
Petitioners allegation of improper venue and the fact that the complaint was not
under oath are not sufficient grounds for the dismissal of the complaint. Well to
remember, the case was an administrative case and as such, technical rules of
procedure are liberally applied. In administrative cases, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.[25] The
intention is to resolve disputes brought before such bodies in the most expeditious
and inexpensive manner possible.[26]
Petitioner was likewise amply afforded administrative due process the essence of
which is an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[27] The records show that
petitioner filed the following: (1) Compliance-Answer to the Complaint; (2)
Rejoinder; (3) Position paper; (4) Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of
the Board of Professional Teachers finding him guilty as charged; and (5) Motion
for Reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. He attended the
preliminary conference and hearing where he was able to adduce his evidence.
With the opportunities he had, he cannot claim he was denied due process.
As regards his claim that the Board of Professional Teachers-Lucena City was
partial because the investigating officer knew respondent personally, the same was
not substantiated. Even assuming arguendo that the investigating officer knew
respondent, convincing proof was still required to establish partiality or bias.
Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias.[28] For failure of petitioner to
adduce such evidence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty prevails.[29]
That he was allegedly informed of Dominador Blancos retraction upon receipt of
the Boards resolution is also of no moment. Even if it were true that petitioner
was only informed of the retraction when he received a copy of the Boards
resolution, there was still no denial of due process because he still had the
opportunity to question the same in his Motion for Reconsideration. This, he did
not do.
But was there substantial evidence to show that petitioner was guilty of immoral
and dishonorable conduct? On this issue, we likewise find against petitioner.
Petitioner claims good faith and maintains that he married respondent with the
erroneous belief that his first wife was already deceased. He insists that such act of
entering into the second marriage did not qualify as an immoral act, and asserts
that he committed the act even before he became a teacher. He said that for
thirteen (13) years, he was a good husband and loving father to his children with
respondent. He was even an inspiration to many as he built a second home
thinking that he had lost his first. He wanted to make things right when he learned
of the whereabouts of his first family and longed to make up for his lost years with
them. He maintains that he never violated the Code of Ethics of Professional
Teachers but embraced it like a good citizen when he opted to stop his illicit
marriage to go back to his first family. He adds that respondent knew fully well he
was married and had children when they contracted marriage. Thus, she was also
at fault. Lastly, he claims there was no substantial proof to show that his bigamous
marriage contracted before he became a teacher has brought damage to the
teaching profession.
However, the issues of whether petitioner knew his first wife to be dead and
whether respondent knew that petitioner was already married have been ruled upon
by both the Board of Professional Teachers and the Court of Appeals. The Board
and the appellate court found untenable petitioners belief that his first wife was
already dead and that his former marriage was no longer subsisting. For failing to
get a court order declaring his first wife presumptively dead, his marriage to
respondent was clearly unlawful and immoral.
It is not the Courts function to evaluate factual questions all over again. A
weighing of evidence necessarily involves the consideration of factual issues - an
exercise that is not appropriate for the Rule 45 petition filed. Under the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, the parties may raise only questions of law in
petitions filed under Rule 45, as the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. As a
rule, we are not duty-bound to again analyze and weigh the evidence introduced
and considered in the tribunals below.[30] This is particularly true where the
Board and the Court of Appeals agree on the facts. While there are recognized
exceptions to this general rule and the Court may be prevailed upon to review the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals when the same are manifestly mistaken, or
when the appealed judgment was based on a misapprehension of facts, or when the
appellate court overlooked certain undisputed facts which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion,[31] no such circumstances exist in this case.
Indeed, there is no sufficient reason to overturn the findings of the Board as
affirmed by the appellate court. It is clear from the evidence that petitioners claim
that he believed his first wife Cristina Puse to be already dead was belied by the
latters declaration. In the affidavit submitted before the CSC in A.C. No. CSC
RO5 D-06-012 entitled Cristina Puse v. Ligaya de los Santos, Cristina Puse,
petitioners first wife, declared that Sometime in 1993, complainant decided to
work in Hongkong x x x. Since then up to the present, she has regularly sent
financial support to her children and husband. From time to time, complainant
would visit her family in the Philippines at least once a year every year. From
this statement, petitioner cannot claim that he had no knowledge of the
whereabouts of his first wife or that she was already dead given that she regularly
sent her family financial support and visited them in the Philippines at least once a
year.
Petitioners contention that there was no substantial evidence to show his guilt
because respondent did not even formally offer her exhibits also does not persuade.
As we have already said, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied in administrative proceedings. The fact that respondent did not formally
offer her exhibits the way she would in the courts of justice does not prevent the
Board of Professional Teachers or Court of Appeals from admitting said exhibits
and considering them in the resolution of the case. Under Section 5 of PRC
Resolution No. 06-342 (A), Series of 2006, also known as the New Rules of
Procedure in Administrative Investigations in the Professional Regulation
Commission and the Professional Regulatory Boards, technical errors in the
admission of the evidence which do not prejudice the substantive rights of the
parties shall not vitiate the proceedings. Here, we do not find any evidence that
respondents failure to formally offer her exhibits substantially prejudiced
petitioner.
Neither is there merit to petitioners contention that because he contracted the
bigamous marriage before he even became a teacher, he is not required to observe
the ethical standards set forth in the Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers.[32]
In the practice of his profession, he, as a licensed professional teacher, is required
to strictly adhere to, observe and practice the set of ethical and moral principles,
standards and values laid down in the aforesaid code. It is of no moment that he
was not yet a teacher when he contracted his second marriage. His good moral
character is a continuing requirement which he must possess if he wants to
continue practicing his noble profession. In the instant case, he failed to abide by
the tenets of morality. Petitioner kept his first marriage secret to his second wife.
Unfortunately for him, his second wife discovered his true marital status which led
to the filing of the administrative and criminal cases against him.
In Santos, Jr. v. NLRC, a case involving a teacher dismissed from work on account
of immorality, we declared:
On the outset, it must be stressed that to constitute immorality, the circumstances
of each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in light of the
prevailing norms of conduct and applicable laws. American jurisprudence has
defined immorality as a course of conduct which offends the morals of the
community and is a bad example to the youth whose ideals a teacher is supposed to
foster and to elevate, x x x Thus, in petitioners case, the gravity and seriousness of
the charges against him stem from his being a married man and at the same time a
teacher.

x x x x

As a teacher, petitioner serves as an example to his pupils, especially during their
formative years and stands in loco parentis to them. To stress their importance in
our society, teachers are given substitute and special parental authority under our
laws.

Consequently, it is but stating the obvious to assert that teachers must adhere to the
exacting standards of morality and decency. There is no dichotomy of morality. A
teacher, both in his official and personal conduct, must display exemplary
behavior. He must freely and willingly accept restrictions on his conduct that
might be viewed irksome by ordinary citizens. In other words, the personal
behavior of teachers, in and outside the classroom, must be beyond reproach.

Accordingly, teachers must abide by a standard of personal conduct which not only
proscribes the commission of immoral acts, but also prohibits behavior creating a
suspicion of immorality because of the harmful impression it might have on the
students. Likewise, they must observe a high standard of integrity and honesty.

From the foregoing, it seems obvious that when a teacher engages in extra-marital
relationship, especially when the parties are both married, such behaviour amounts
to immorality, justifying his termination from employment.[33]
The Code of Ethics of Professional Teachers contains, among others, the
following:
PREAMBLE
Teachers are duly licensed professionals who possess dignity and reputation with
high moral values as well as technical and professional competence. In the
practice of their noble profession, they strictly adhere to, observe, and practice this
set of ethical and moral principles, standards, and values.
x x x x
ARTICLE II
THE TEACHER AND THE STATE
Section 1. The schools are the nurseries of the citizens of the state. Each teacher is
a trustee of the cultural and educational heritage of the nation and is under
obligation to transmit to learners such heritage as well as to elevate national
morality, x x x.
x x x x
Section 3. In the interest of the State of the Filipino people as much as of his own,
every teacher shall be physically, mentally and morally fit.
x x x x
ARTICLE III
THE TEACHER AND THE COMMUNITY
x x x x
Section 3. Every teacher shall merit reasonable social recognition for which
purpose he shall behave with honor and dignity at all times and refrain from such
activities as gambling, smoking, drunkenness and other excesses, much less illicit
relations.
x x x x
ARTICLE XI
THE TEACHER AS A PERSON
Section 1. A teacher shall live with dignity in all places at all times.
x x x x
Section 3. A teacher shall maintain at all times a dignified personality which could
serve as model worthy of emulation by learners, peers, and others. [Emphasis
supplied.]
The foregoing provisions show that a teacher must conform to the standards of the
Code. Any deviation from the prescribed standards, principles and values renders
a teacher unfit to continue practicing his profession. Thus, it is required that a
teacher must at all times be moral, honorable and dignified.
The discovery of petitioners bigamous marriage has definitely caused damage to
the teaching profession. How can he hold his head up high and expect his students,
his peers and the community to look up to him as a model worthy of emulation
when he failed to follow the tenets of morality?
The fact that he is now allegedly walking away from his second marriage in order
to be with his first family to make up for lost time does not wipe away the immoral
conduct he performed when he contracted his second marriage. If we are to
condone immoral acts simply because the offender says he is turning his back on
his immoral activities, such would be a convenient excuse for moral transgressors
and which would only abet the commission of similar immoral acts.
His assertion that he fulfilled his responsibilities as a father and a husband to his
second family will, even if true, not cleanse his moral transgression. In a case
involving a lawyer who raised this same defense, we held:
Before we write finis to this case, we find it necessary to stress certain points in
view of respondents additional reason why he should be exonerated that he
loves all his children and has always provided for them. He may have indeed
provided well for his children. But this accomplishment is not sufficient to show
his moral fitness to continue being a member of the noble profession of law. It
has always been the duties of parents e.g., to support, educate and instruct their
children according to right precepts and good example; and to give them love,
companionship and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance. But
what respondent forgot is that he has also duties to his wife. As a husband, he is
obliged to live with her; observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and render help
and support. And most important of all, he is obliged to remain faithful to her until
death.[34]

Petitioners claim that he is a good provider to his second family is belied by the
complaint of respondent wherein it was alleged that he failed financially to support
his second family. Moreover, he is already delinquent as to his duties to his second
wife. How can he live with her, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, render
help and support, and to remain faithful to her until death when he has another
family to whom he is returning to?
All told, petitioners act of entering into said second marriage constitutes grossly
immoral conduct. No doubt, such actuation demonstrates a lack of that degree of
morality required of him as a member of the teaching profession. When he
contracted his second marriage despite the subsistence of the first, he made a
mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
We now go to the penalty imposed on petitioner. The penalty imposed on
petitioner was the revocation of his license which penalty was upheld by the Court
of Appeals. He claims that such penalty was harsh and inappropriate. He cites
Section 22, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations which
states that disgraceful and immoral conduct is a grave offense punishable by
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense
and dismissal for the second offense. Considering that the charge was supposedly
his first offense and taking into account his years of committed service, the
commensurate penalty, according to petitioner, is only the suspension of his
professional license. He refers to the case of Vitug v. Rongcal,[35] where this
Court considered remorse and the brevity of the illicit relationship as mitigating
circumstances taken in favor of the respondent lawyer.
It must be remembered, however, that petitioner was charged before the Board of
Professional Teachers under Rep. Act No. 7836 and not under Civil Service Law,
Rules and Regulations. Under Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7836, the Board has the
power to suspend or revoke the certificate of registration[36] of any teacher for any
causes mentioned in said section, one (1) of which is immoral, unprofessional or
dishonorable conduct. The Board has the discretion, taking into account the
circumstances obtaining, to impose the penalty of suspension or revocation. In the
imposition of the penalty, the Board is not guided by Section 22 of Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations which provides for suspension for
six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal
for the second offense for disgraceful and immoral conduct. Petitioner, therefore,
cannot insist that Section 22 be applied to him in the imposition of his penalty,
because the Boards basis is Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7836 which does not
consider whether the offense was committed the first or second time.
As to the supposed mitigating circumstances of remorse and brevity of the illicit
relationship, these cannot be appreciated in petitioners favor, as these
circumstances are not present in the instant case. We do not find any expression of
remorse in petitioner. What we note, instead, is obduracy on his part. Despite the
clear evidence (first wifes statement that she regularly sends financial support to
her children and husband [referring to petitioner] and that she visits them in the
Philippines at least once a year) showing that petitioner knew that his first wife
was still alive, he remains unyielding on his stand that he thought that his wife was
already deceased. We also cannot consider the illicit and immoral relationship to
be brief because it lasted for more than twelve (12) years until respondent learned
about petitioners deception.
Under the circumstances, we find the penalty imposed by the Board proper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 28 March 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100421 is AFFIRMED.
With costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

RIGHT TO SELF ORGANIZATION
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 142332-43. January 31, 2005]
YOLANDA BRUGADA, ANGELINA CORPUZ, EVELYN ESCANO,
SHIRLEY GARMA, DEDAICA JUSAY, PARSIMA LERIA, SONIA C.
MAHINAY, ADELA SOLO, ELSIE SOMERA, VIRGINIA
TALICURAN, JOSE S. VALLO, and TEOFILA
VILLANUEVA, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J .:
The Case
This petition for review
[1]
assails the 31 July 1996 Decision
[2]
and 29
February 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 37794-
99 and SP Nos. 37800-05. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
for certiorari filed by petitioners and affirmed the Resolutions issued by the
Civil Service Commission.
The Facts
Petitioners Yolanda Brugada, Angelina Corpuz, Evelyn Escano, Shirley
Garma, Dedaica Jusay, Parsima Leria, Sonia C. Mahinay, Adela Solo, Elsie
Somera, Virginia Talicuran, Jose S. Vallo and Teofila Villanueva (petitioners)
are public school teachers from various National Capital Region schools.
In the latter part of September 1990, petitioners incurred unauthorized
absences because of the teachers strike. Their mass action called for the
payment of their 13
th
-month differentials and clothing allowances, as well as
the recall of DECS Order No. 39, series of 1990 and passage of the debt-cap
bill, among others.
Subsequently, then Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) Secretary Isidro Cario (Secretary Cario) issued a memorandum
to all striking teachers, as follows:
TO : ALL PUBLIC SCHOOL
TEACHERS AND OTHER
DECS PERSONNEL
SUBJECT : RETURN TO WORK ORDER
Under civil service law and rules, strikes, unauthorized mass leaves and other forms
of mass actions by civil servants which disrupt public services are strictly prohibited.
Those of you who are engaged in the above-mentioned prohibited acts are therefore
ordered, in the interest of public service, to return to work within 24 hours from your
walkout otherwise dismissal proceedings shall be instituted against you.
[3]

Secretary Cario likewise issued a memorandum to the DECS officials, as
follows:
TO : REGIONAL DIRECTORS
DIVISION SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENT
AND OTHER DECS OFFICIALS
CONCERNED
SUBJECT : TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES MASS
ACTION
Please inform immediately all DECS teachers and employees who have started a mass
protest action to the prejudice of the public service that they will be dismissed if they
do not return to their jobs within twenty-four (24) hours from their walkout.
Regional Directors and division superintendent are hereby directed to accordingly
initiate, in the interest of public service, dismissal proceedings against those who
continue with their action and hire their replacements.
[4]

Petitioners disregarded the directives of Secretary Cario. Consequently,
Secretary Cario filed administrative charges against petitioners for grave
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, and gross violation of Civil Service laws
and rules. Secretary Cario also charged petitioners with refusal to perform
official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and absence without leave. Secretary Cario gave petitioners five
days to answer the charges, to secure the assistance of counsel, and to elect
a formal investigation. However, petitioners failed to answer despite notice.
Thereafter, Secretary Cario created committees to investigate and hear
the cases. The investigating committees summoned the school principals
concerned to confirm reports on petitioners absences. After the investigation,
the committees submitted their reports to Secretary Cario.
Secretary Cario rendered decisions finding petitioners guilty as charged
and dismissed them from the service effective immediately. Petitioners
appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board, which dismissed the
appeals.
Petitioners appealed the decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board
to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC issued Resolutions
reducing the penalty to six months suspension without pay and ordering the
petitioners reinstatement without back wages. The CSC denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with this Court on 9 February
1995. The Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals pursuant to
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari cannot be given due course as it is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[5]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals
denied in its 29 February 2000 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals ruled that the CSC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in finding petitioners guilty of the administrative charges and
suspending them for six months without pay.
The Court of Appeals cited the following grounds for its decision:
FIRSTLY, although the constitutional right of the people to form association[s]
embraces both public and private sectors, pursuant to Article XIII, Section 3, 1987
Constitution, the right to strike is not extended to government employees under the
Civil Service Law (P.D. No. 807). Under Republic Act 875, workers, including those
from the government-owned and controlled-corporations, are allowed to organize but
they are prohibited from striking. xxx
SECONDLY, during the deliberation of the 1987 Constitutional Commission,
specifically on the Committee on Labor (Alliance of Government Workers, et al. vs.
Hon. Minister of Labor etc., 124 SCRA 1), acting Commissioner of Civil Service Eli
Rey Pangramuyen stated:
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of the
public employer and the peculiar character of the public service, it must necessarily
regard the right to strike given to unions in private industry as not applying to public
employees and civil service employees. xxx
xxx
THIRDLY, petitioners contention that respondent Commission on Civil Service
gravely erred when it affirmed the decision of the then DECS Secretary, invoking
violations of constitutional due process, is without merit.
xxx In the case at bench, it has been shown that petitioners admitted joining the mass
action and despite threats of dismissal, they disobeyed the return to work order within
24 hours from their walk-out. Petitioners were given an opportunity to present their
side. They did not only refuse to answer the charges filed against them. They also
opted to shy away from the investigation conducted. xxx
xxx
FINALLY, the facts of the case clearly demonstrate strong basis for the administrative
charge[s] and justifies the subsequent penalty imposed upon herein
petitioners. Indeed, petitioners contention that they did not strike but merely joined
the mass action exercising their constitutional right to assemble, is a question of
semantics. In the case of MPSTA vs. Hon. Perfecto Laguio, (G.R. No. 95445), and
also inACT vs. Hon. Cari[]o, et al., G.R. No. 95590, the Supreme Court held
that mass actions and peaceful assemblies amounted to a strike in every sense of the
term, constituting as they did, concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence
from work which it was said teachers sworn duty to perform. xxx
[6]

The Issue
Petitioners seek the reversal of the assailed decision on the ground that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A MOST GRIEVOUS ERROR
WHEN IT DID NOT EXPRESSLY RULE ON THE ISSUE OF THE RIGHT
OF PETITIONERS TO BACKWAGES AND IN EFFECT AFFIRMED THE
TERRIBLY WRONG RULING OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
THAT PETITIONERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO BACKWAGES.
[7]

The Courts Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners are no longer pleading for exoneration from the administrative
charges filed against them. Instead, petitioners are merely asking for the
payment of back wages computed from the time they could not teach
pursuant to Secretary Carios dismissal orders minus the six months
suspension until their actual reinstatement.
[8]

Petitioners have no right to back wages because they were neither
exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended. Petitioners admitted participating in
the teachers strike which disrupted the education of public school
students. For this offense, the CSC reduced Secretary Carios dismissal
orders to six months suspension without pay. The Court has already put to
rest the issue of the award of back wages to public school teachers whom the
CSC reinstated in the service after commuting Secretary Carios dismissal
orders to six months suspension without pay.
[9]
In Alipat v. Court of
Appeals,
[10]
the Court denied the teachers claim for back wages stating thus:
This Court has also resolved the issue of whether back wages may be awarded to the
teachers who were ordered reinstated to the service after the dismissal orders of
Secretary Cario were commuted by the Civil Service Commission to six (6) months
suspension. The issue was resolved in the negative in Bangalisan vs. Court of
Appeals on the ground that the teachers were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably
suspended. The Bangalisan case also ruled that the immediate implementation of the
dismissal orders, being clearly sanctioned by law, was not unjustified. The Court held
that as regards the payment of back salaries during the period of suspension of a
member of the civil service who is subsequently ordered reinstated, the payment of
back wages may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which caused the
suspension and when the suspension is unjustified.
Citing the Bangalisan ruling, this Court in Jacinto vs. Court of Appeals held that when
the teachers have given cause for their suspension i.e., the unjustified abandonment
of classes to the prejudice of their students they were not fully innocent of the
charges against them although they were eventually found guilty only of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and not grave misconduct or other offense
warranting their dismissal from the service; being found liable for a lesser offense is
not equivalent to exoneration.
[11]

The facts in this case are substantially the same as those in Bangalisan
v. Court of Appeals,
[12]
De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals,
[13]
Alipat v. Court of
Appeals
[14]
and Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports v. Court of
Appeals.
[15]
In these cases, the Court categorically declared that the payment
of back wages during the period of suspension of a civil servant who is
subsequently reinstated is proper if he is found innocent of the charges and
the suspension is unjustified. These two circumstances are absent in the
present case. When a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to
a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future
cases where the facts are substantially the same.
[16]

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 31
July 1996 and Resolution dated 29 February 2000 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 37794-99 and SP Nos. 37800-05. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 170132 December 6, 2006
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON
F. GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS President & General
Manager, petitioners,
vs.
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS, respondents.


D E C I S I O N


GARCIA, J .:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and its President and General
Manager Winston F. Garcia (Garcia, for short) assail and seek to nullify the
Decision
1
dated June 16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
87220, as reiterated in its Resolution
2
of October 18, 2005 denying Garcia's motion
for reconsideration.
The recourse is cast against the following setting:
A four-day October 2004 concerted demonstration, rallies and en masse walkout
waged/held in front of the GSIS main office in Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City,
started it all. Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action
participants were GSIS personnel, among them members of the herein respondent
Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS ("KMG" or the "Union"), a public
sector union of GSIS rank-and-file employees. Contingents from other government
agencies joined causes with the GSIS group. The mass action's target appeared to
have been herein petitioner Garcia and his management style. While the Mayor of
Pasay City allegedly issued a rally permit, the absence of the participating GSIS
employees was not covered by a prior approved leave.
3

On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a
memorandum directing 131 union and non-union members to show cause why they
should not be charged administratively for their participation in said rally. In
reaction, KMG's counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration of said
directive on the ground, among others, that the subject employees resumed work
on October 8, 2004 in obedience to the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea
for reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the filing, on October 25,
2004, of administrative charges against some 110 KMG members for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
4

What happened next is summarized by the CA in its challenged decision of June
16, 2005, albeit the herein petitioners would except from some of the details of the
appellate court's narration:
Ignoring said formal charges, KMG, thru its President, Albert Velasco,
commenced the instant suit on November 2, 2004, with the filing of the
Petition for Prohibition at bench. On the ground that its members should not
be made to explain why they supported their union's cause, petitioner
[KMG] faulted respondent [Garcia] with blatant disregard of Civil Service
Resolution No. 021316, otherwise known as the Guidelines for Prohibited
Mass Action, Section 10 of which exhorts government agencies to "harness
all means within their capacity to accord due regard and attention to
employees' grievances and facilitate their speedy and amicable disposition
through the use of grievance machinery or any other modes of settlement
sanctioned by law and existing civil service rules." Two supplements to the
foregoing petition were eventually filed by KMG. The first, apprised [the
CA] of the supposed fact that its Speaker, Atty. Molina, had been placed
under preventive suspension for 90 days and that the formal charges thus
filed will not only deprive its members of the privileges and benefits due
them but will also disqualify them from promotion, step increment
adjustments and receipt of monetary benefits, including their 13th month pay
and Christmas bonuses. The second, xxx manifested that, on December 17,
2004, respondent [Garcia] served a spate of additional formal charges
against 230 of KMG's members for their participation in the aforesaid
grievance demonstrations.
In his December 14, 2004 comment to the foregoing petition, respondent
[Garcia] averred that the case at bench was filed by an unauthorized
representative in view of the fact that Albert Velasco had already been
dropped from the GSIS rolls and, by said token, had ceased to be a member
much less the President of KMG. Invoking the rule against forum
shopping, respondent [Garcia] called [the CA's] attention to the supposed
fact that the allegations in the subject petition merely duplicated those
already set forth in two petitions for certiorari and prohibition earlier filed by
Albert Velasco . Because said petitions are, in point of fact, pending
before this court as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 86130 and 86365, respondent [Garcia]
prayed for the dismissal of the petition at bench .
5
(Words in bracket
added.)
It appears that pending resolution by the CA of the KMG petition for prohibition in
this case, the GSIS management proceeded with the investigation of the
administrative cases filed. As represented in a pleading before the CA, as of May
18, 2005, two hundred seven (207) out of the two hundred seventy eight (278)
cases filed had been resolved, resulting in the exoneration of twenty (20)
respondent-employees, the reprimand of one hundred eighty two (182) and the
suspension for one month of five (5).
6

On June 16, 2005, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision
7
holding that
Garcia's "filing of administrative charges against 361 of [KMG's] members is
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion which may be the proper subject of the
writ of prohibition." Dispositively, the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition [of KMG]
is GRANTED and respondent [Winston F. Garcia] is
hereby PERPETUALLY ENJOINED from implementing the issued
formal charges and from issuing other formal charges arising from the same
facts and events.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)
Unable to accept the above ruling and the purported speculative factual and
erroneous legal premises holding it together, petitioner Garcia sought
reconsideration. In its equally assailed Resolution
8
of October 18, 2005, however,
the appellate court denied reconsideration of its decision.
Hence, this recourse by the petitioners ascribing serious errors on the appellate
court in granting the petition for prohibition absent an instance of grave abuse of
authority on their part.
We resolve to GRANT the petition.
It should be stressed right off that the civil service encompasses all branches and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the GSIS,
9
or those created by
special law.
10
As such, employees of covered GOCCs are part of the civil service
system and are subject to circulars, rules and regulations issued by the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) on discipline, attendance and general terms/conditions
of employment, inclusive of matters involving self-organization, strikes,
demonstrations and like concerted actions. In fact, policies established on public
sector unionism and rules issued on mass action have been noted and cited by the
Court in at least a case.
11
Among these issuances is Executive Order (EO) No. 180,
series of 1987, providing guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of
government employees. Relevant also is CSC Resolution No. 021316 which
provides rules on prohibited concerted mass actions in the public sector.
There is hardly any dispute about the formal charges against the 278 affected GSIS
employees a mix of KMG union and non-union members - having arose from
their having gone on unauthorized leave of absence (AWOL) for at least a day or
two in the October 4 to 7, 2004 stretch to join the ranks of the demonstrators
/rallyists at that time. As stated in each of the formal charges, the employee's act of
attending, joining, participating and taking part in the strike/rally is a transgression
of the rules on strike in the public sector. The question that immediately comes to
the fore, therefore, is whether or not the mass action staged by or participated in by
said GSIS employees partook of a strike or prohibited concerted mass action. If in
the affirmative, then the denounced filing of the administrative charges would
be prima facie tenable, inasmuch as engaging in mass actions resulting in work
stoppage or service disruption constitutes, in the minimum, the punishable offense
of acting prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
12
If in the negative, then
such filing would indeed smack of arbitrariness and justify the issuance of a
corrective or preventive writ.
Petitioners assert that the filing of the formal charges are but a natural consequence
of the service-disrupting rallies and demonstrations staged during office hours by
the absenting GSIS employees, there being appropriate issuances outlawing such
kinds of mass action. On the other hand, the CA, agreeing with the respondent's
argument, assumed the view and held that the organized demonstrating employees
did nothing more than air their grievances in the exercise of their "broader rights of
free expression"
13
and are, therefore, not amenable to administrative sanctions. For
perspective, following is what the CA said:
Although the filing of administrative charges against [respondent KMG's]
members is well within [petitioner Garcia's] official [disciplinary]
prerogatives, [his] exercise of the power vested under Section 45 of
Republic Act No. 8291 was tainted with arbitrariness and vindictiveness
against which prohibition was sought by [respondent]. xxx the fact that the
subject mass demonstrations were directed against [Garcia's] supposed
mismanagement of the financial resources of the GSIS, by and of itself,
renders the filing of administrative charges against [KMG's] member
suspect. More significantly, we find the gravity of the offenses and the sheer
number of persons charged administratively to be, at the very least,
antithetical to the best interest of the service.
It matters little that, instead of the 361 alleged by petitioner, only 278
charges were actually filed [and] in the meantime, disposed of and of the
said number, 20 resulted to exoneration, 182 to reprimand and 5 to the
imposition of a penalty of one month suspension. Irrespective of their
outcome, the severe penalties prescribed for the offense with which
petitioner's members were charged, to our mind, bespeak of bellicose and
castigatory reaction . The fact that most of the employees [Garcia]
administratively charged were eventually meted with what appears to be a
virtual slap on the wrist even makes us wonder why respondent even
bothered to file said charges at all. xxx.
Alongside the consequences of the right of government employees to form,
join or assist employees organization, we have already mentioned how the
broader rights of free expression cast its long shadow over the case. xxx we
find [petitioner Garcia's] assailed acts, on the whole, anathema to said
right which has been aptly characterized as preferred, one which stands on a
higher level than substantive economic and other liberties, the matrix of
other important rights of our people. xxx.
14
(Underscoring and words in
bracket added; citations omitted.)
While its decision and resolution do not explicitly say so, the CA equated the right
to form associations with the right to engage in strike and similar activities
available to workers in the private sector. In the concrete, the appellate court
concluded that inasmuch as GSIS employees are not barred from forming, joining
or assisting employees' organization, petitioner Garcia could not validly initiate
charges against GSIS employees waging or joining rallies and demonstrations
notwithstanding the service-disruptive effect of such mass action. Citing what
Justice Isagani Cruz said in Manila Public School Teachers Association [MPSTA]
v. Laguio, Jr.,
15
the appellate court declared:
It is already evident from the aforesaid provisions of Resolution No. 021316
that employees of the GSIS are not among those specifically barred from
forming, joining or assisting employees organization such as [KMG]. If only
for this ineluctable fact, the merit of the petition at bench is readily
discernible.
16

We are unable to lend concurrence to the above CA posture. For, let alone the fact
that it ignores what the Court has uniformly held all along, the appellate court's
position is contrary to what Section 4 in relation to Section 5 of CSC Resolution
No. 021316
17
provides. Besides, the appellate court's invocation of Justice Cruz's
opinion inMPSTA is clearly off-tangent, the good Justice's opinion thereat being a
dissent. It may be, as the appellate court urged that the freedom of expression and
assembly and the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances stand
on a level higher than economic and other liberties. Any suggestion, however,
about these rights as including the right on the part of government personnel to
strike ought to be, as it has been, trashed. We have made this abundantly clear in
our past determinations. For instance, in Alliance of Government Workers v.
Minister of Labor and Employment,
18
a case decided under the aegis of the 1973
Constitution, an en banc Court declared that it would be unfair to allow employees
of government corporations to resort to concerted activity with the ever present
threat of a strike to wring benefits from Government. Then came the 1987
Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of government
personnel to self-organization
19
to complement the provision according workers
the right to engage in "peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law."
20

It was against the backdrop of the aforesaid provisions of the 1987 Constitution
that the Court resolvedBangalisan v. Court of Appeals.
21
In it, we held,
citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr.,
22
that employees in the public service may not engage
in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of
government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or
associations, without including the right to strike.
Jacinto v. Court of Appeals
23
came next and there we explained:
Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively
recognized in Association of Court of Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja.
But, as in the exercise of the rights of free expression and of assembly, there
are standards for allowable limitations such as the legitimacy of the
purpose of the association, [and] the overriding considerations of national
security . . . .
As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise
with the provision "in accordance with law." This is a clear manifestation
that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain
sectors such right. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the
exercise of the right of government workers to organize, for instance,
implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which "enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from
staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of
mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public
service" by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in government service shall be observed. (Emphasis
and words in bracket added; citations omitted)
And in the fairly recent case of Gesite v. Court of Appeals,
24
the Court defined the
limits of the right of government employees to organize in the following wise:
It is relevant to state at this point that the settled rule in this jurisdiction is
that employees in the public service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves,
walkouts, and other forms of mass action that will lead in the temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of government employees
to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations only,
without including the right to strike,
adding that public employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join
concerted mass actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
Significantly, 1986 Constitutional Commission member Eulogio Lerum, answering
in the negative the poser of whether or not the right of government employees to
self-organization also includes the right to strike, stated:
When we proposed this amendment providing for self organization of
government employees, it does not mean that because they have the right to
organize, they have also the right to strike. That is a different matter. xxx
25

With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what
respondent's members launched or participated in during that time partook of a
strike or, what contextually amounts to the same thing, a prohibited concerted
activity. The phrase "prohibited concerted activity" refers to any collective activity
undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their employees'
organization, with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in
order to realize their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it
includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature.
26
Indeed,
for four straight days, participating KMG members and other GSIS employees
staged a walk out and waged or participated in a mass protest or demonstration
right at the very doorstep of the GSIS main office building. The record of
attendance
27
for the period material shows that, on the first day of the protest, 851
employees, or forty eight per cent (48%) of the total number of employees in the
main office (1,756) took to the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2
p.m.,
28
leaving the other employees to fend for themselves in an office where a host
of transactions take place every business day. On the second day, 707 employees
left their respective work stations, while 538 participated in the mass action on the
third day. A smaller number, i.e., 306 employees, but by no means an insignificant
few, joined the fourth day activity.
To say that there was no work disruption or that the delivery of services remained
at the usual level of efficiency at the GSIS main office during those four (4) days
of massive walkouts and wholesale absences would be to understate things. And to
place the erring employees beyond the reach of administrative accountability
would be to trivialize the civil service rules, not to mention the compelling spirit of
professionalism exacted of civil servants by the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
29

The appellate court made specific reference to the "parliament of the streets,"
obviously to lend concurrence to respondent's pretension that the gathering of
GSIS employees on October 4-7, 2004 was an "assembly of citizens" out only to
air grievances, not a striking crowd. According to the respondent, a strike
presupposes a mass action undertaken to press for some economic demands or
secure additional material employment benefits.
We are not convinced.
In whatever name respondent desires to call the four-day mass action in October
2004, the stubborn fact remains that the erring employees, instead of exploring
non-crippling activities during their free time, had taken a disruptive approach to
attain whatever it was they were specifically after. As events evolved, they
assembled in front of the GSIS main office building during office hours and staged
rallies and protests, and even tried to convince others to join their cause, thus
provoking work stoppage and service-delivery disruption, the very evil sought to
be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government personnel.
30

The Court can concede hypothetically that the protest rally and gathering in
question did not involve some specific material demand. But then the absence of
such economic-related demand, even if true, did not, under the premises, make
such mass action less of a prohibited concerted activity. For, as articulated earlier,
any collective activity undertaken by government employees with the intent of
effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands or
force concessions, economic or otherwise, is a prohibited concerted mass
action
31
and doubtless actionable administratively. Bangalisan even went further to
say the following: "[i]n the absence of statute, public employees do not have the
right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose."
To petitioner Garcia, as President and General Manager of GSIS, rests the
authority and responsibility, under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291, the GSIS
Act of 1997, to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for
cause.
32
At bottom then, petitioner Garcia, by filing or causing the filing of
administrative charges against the absenting participants of the October 4-7, 2004
mass action, merely performed a duty expected of him and enjoined by law.
Regardless of the mood petitioner Garcia was in when he signed the charge sheet,
his act can easily be sustained as legally correct and doubtless within his
jurisdiction.
It bears to reiterate at this point that the GSIS employees concerned were
proceeded against - and eventually either exonerated, reprimanded or meted a one-
month suspension, as the case may be - not for the exercise of their right to
assemble peacefully and to petition for redress of grievance, but for engaging in
what appeared to be a prohibited concerted activity. Respondent no less admitted
that its members and other GSIS employees might have disrupted public service.
33

To be sure, arbitrariness and whimsical exercise of power or, in fine, grave abuse
of discretion on the part of petitioner Garcia cannot be simplistically inferred from
the sheer number of those charged as well as the gravity or the dire consequences
of the charge of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, as the appellate court made it to appear. The principle of accountability
demands that every erring government employee be made answerable for any
malfeasance or misfeasance committed. And lest it be overlooked, the mere filing
of formal administrative case, regardless of the gravity of the offense charged, does
not overcome the presumptive innocence of the persons complained of nor does it
shift the burden of evidence to prove guilt of an administrative offense from the
complainant.
Moreover, the Court invites attention to its holding in MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., a case
involving over 800 public school teachers who took part in mass actions for which
the then Secretary of Education filed administrative complaints on assorted
charges, such as gross misconduct. Of those charged, 650 were dismissed and 195
suspended for at least six (6) months The Court, however, did not consider the
element of number of respondents thereat and/or the dire consequences of the
charge/s as fatally vitiating or beclouding the bona fides of the Secretary of
Education's challenged action. Then as now, the Court finds the filing of charges
against a large number of persons and/or the likelihood that they will be suspended
or, worse, dismissed from the service for the offense as indicating a strong and
clear case of grave abuse of authority to justify the issuance of a writ of
prohibition.
The appellate court faulted petitioner Garcia for not first taping existing grievance
machinery and other modes of settlement agreed upon in the GSIS-KMG
Collective Negotiations Agreement (CAN) before going full steam ahead with his
formal charges.
34

The Court can plausibly accord cogency to the CA's angle on grievance procedure
but for the fact that it conveniently disregarded what appears to be the more
relevant provision of the CNA. We refer to Article VI which reads:
The GSIS Management and the KMG have mutually agreed to promote the
principle of shared responsibility on all matters and decisions affecting
the rights, benefits and interests of all GSIS employees . Accordingly,
the parties also mutually agree that the KMG shall not declare a strike nor
stage any concerted action which will disrupt public service and the GSIS
management shall not lockout employees who are members of the KMG
during the term of this agreement. GSIS Management shall also respect the
rights of the employees to air their sentiments through peaceful concerted
activities during allowable hours, subject to reasonable office rules
....
35
(Underscoring added)
If the finger of blame, therefore, is to be pointed at someone for non-exhaustion of
less confrontational remedies, it should be at the respondent union for
spearheading a concerted mass action without resorting to available settlement
mechanism. As it were, it was KMG, under Atty. Alberto Velasco, which opened
fire first. That none of the parties bothered to avail of the grievance procedures
under the GSIS-KMG CNA should not be taken against the GSIS. At best, both
GSIS management and the Union should be considered as in pari delicto.
With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss at length
the legal standing of Alberto Velasco to represent the herein respondent union and
to initiate the underlying petition for prohibition. Suffice it to state that Velasco,
per Joint Resolution No. 04-10-01 approved on October 5, 2004 by the KMG Joint
Executive-Legislative Assembly, had ceased to be member, let alone president, of
the KMG, having previously been dropped from the rolls of GSIS
employees.
36
While the dropping from the rolls is alleged to have been the subject
of a CA-issued temporary restraining order (TRO), the injunction came after Atty.
Velasco had in fact been separated from the service and it appears that the TRO
had already expired.
As a final consideration, the Court notes or reiterates the following relevant
incidents surrounding the disposition of the case below:
1. The CA had invoked as part of its ratio decidendi a dissenting opinion
in MPSTA, even going to the extent of describing as "instructive and timely"
a portion, when the majority opinion thereat, which the appellate court
ignored, is the controlling jurisprudence.
2. The CA gave prominence to dispositions and rattled off holdings
37
of the
Court, which appropriately apply only to strikes in the private industry labor
sector, and utilized the same as springboard to justify an inference of grave
abuse of discretion. On the other hand, it only gave perfunctory treatment if
not totally ignored jurisprudence that squarely dealt with strikes in the public
sector, as if the right to strike given to unions in private corporations/entities
is necessarily applicable to civil service employees.
3. As couched, the assailed CA decision perpetually bars respondent Garcia
and necessarily whoever succeeds him as GSIS President not only from
implementing the formal charges against GSIS employees who participated
in the October 4 - 7, 2004 mass action but also from issuing other formal
charges arising from the same events. The injunction was predicated on a
finding that grave abuse of discretion attended the exercise of petitioner
Garcia's disciplinary power vested him under Section 45 of RA 8291.
38
At
bottom then, the assailed decision struck down as a nullity, owing to the
alleged attendant arbitrariness, not only acts that have already been done, but
those yet to be done. In net effect, any formal charge arising from the
October 4-7, 2004 incident is, under any and all circumstances, prejudged as
necessarily tainted with arbitrariness to be slain at sight.
The absurdities and ironies easily deducible from the foregoing situations are not
lost on the Court.
We close with the observation that the assailed decision and resolution, if allowed
to remain undisturbed, would likely pave the way to the legitimization of mass
actions undertaken by civil servants, regardless of their deleterious effects on the
interest of the public they have sworn to serve with loyalty and efficiency. Worse
still, it would permit the emergence of a system where public sector workers are, as
the petitioners aptly put it, "immune from the minimum reckoning for acts that
[under settled jurisprudence] are concededly unlawful." This aberration would be
intolerable.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the writ of prohibition issued by that court
is NULLIFIED.
No Cost.
SO ORDERED.


SECOND DIVISION

SCHOOL OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON CITY and/or SR.
CRISPINA A. TOLENTINO, S.Sp.S.,
Petitioners,
G.R. No. 165565

Present:

- versus -

CORAZON P. TAGUIAM,
Respondent.

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

July 14, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the Decision[1] dated June 7, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81480, which reversed the Resolution[2] dated
September 20, 2002 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in
NLRC NCR CA No. 031627-02. The NLRC had affirmed the Decision[3] dated
March 26, 2002 of the Labor Arbiter dismissing respondents complaint for illegal
dismissal. This petition likewise assails the Resolution[4] dated September 30,
2004 of the Court of Appeals denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Respondent Corazon P. Taguiam was the Class Adviser of Grade 5-
Esmeralda of the petitioner, School of the Holy Spirit of Quezon City. On March
10, 2000, the class president, wrote a letter[5] to the grade school principal
requesting permission to hold a year-end celebration at the school grounds. The
principal authorized the activity and allowed the pupils to use the swimming pool.
In this connection, respondent distributed the parents/guardians permit forms to
the pupils.
Respondent admitted that Chiara Mae Federicos permit form[6] was unsigned.
Nevertheless, she concluded that Chiara Mae was allowed by her mother to join
the activity since her mother personally brought her to the school with her packed
lunch and swimsuit.
Before the activity started, respondent warned the pupils who did not know
how to swim to avoid the deeper area. However, while the pupils were swimming,
two of them sneaked out. Respondent went after them to verify where they were
going.
Unfortunately, while respondent was away, Chiara Mae drowned. When
respondent returned, the maintenance man was already administering
cardiopulmonary resuscitation on Chiara Mae. She was still alive when respondent
rushed her to the General Malvar Hospital where she was pronounced dead on
arrival.
On May 23, 2000, petitioners issued a Notice of Administrative Charge[7] to
respondent for alleged gross negligence and required her to submit her written
explanation. Thereafter, petitioners conducted a clarificatory hearing which
respondent attended. Respondent also submitted her Affidavit of Explanation.[8]
On July 31, 2000, petitioners dismissed respondent on the ground of gross
negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence.[9] Meanwhile, Chiara Maes
parents filed a P7 Million damage suit against petitioners and respondent, among
others. They also filed against respondent a criminal complaint for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.
On July 25, 2001, respondent in turn filed a complaint[10] against the school
and/or Sr. Crispina Tolentino for illegal dismissal, with a prayer for reinstatement
with full backwages and other money claims, damages and attorneys fees.
In dismissing the complaint, the Labor Arbiter declared that respondent was
validly terminated for gross neglect of duty. He opined that Chiara Mae drowned
because respondent had left the pupils without any adult supervision. He also
noted that the absence of adequate facilities should have alerted respondent before
allowing the pupils to use the swimming pool. The Labor Arbiter further
concluded that although respondents negligence was not habitual, the same
warranted her dismissal since death resulted therefrom.
Respondent appealed to the NLRC which, however, affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, which ruled in her favor. The appellate court observed that there was
insufficient proof that respondents negligence was both gross and habitual. The
Court of Appeals disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition. The assailed
September 20, 2002 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
entitled Corazon Taguiam vs. School of the Holy Spirit and/or Sister Crispina
Tolentino[,] NLRC NCR Case No. 00-07-03877-01[,] NLRC NCR CA No.
031627-02 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby
ENTERED directing the private respondent the School of the Holy Spirit to:
(1) Pay the petitioner full backwages, plus all other benefits, bonuses and general
increases to which she would have been normally entitled, had she not been
dismissed and had she not been forced to stop working computed up to the finality
of this decision;
(2) Pay the petitioner separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of
service in addition to full backwages;
(3) Pay the petitioner an amount equivalent to 10% of the judgment award as
attorneys fees;
(4) Pay the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In this petition, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in:
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR
LACK OF MERIT.[12]
Simply stated, the sole issue presented for our resolution is whether respondents
dismissal on the ground of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and
confidence was valid.
The issue of whether a party is negligent is a question of fact. As a rule, the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and this applies with greater force in labor
cases.[13] However, where the issue is shrouded by a conflict of factual
perception, we are constrained to review the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals. In this case, the findings of facts of the appellate court contradict those of
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.[14]
Under Article 282[15] of the Labor Code, gross and habitual neglect of duties is a
valid ground for an employer to terminate an employee. Gross negligence implies
a want or absence of or a failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire
absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exerting any effort to avoid them.[16] Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to
perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances.[17]
Our perusal of the records leads us to conclude that respondent had been grossly
negligent. First, it is undisputed that Chiara Maes permit form was unsigned.
Yet, respondent allowed her to join the activity because she assumed that Chiara
Maes mother has allowed her to join it by personally bringing her to the school
with her packed lunch and swimsuit.
The purpose of a permit form is precisely to ensure that the parents have allowed
their child to join the school activity involved. Respondent cannot simply ignore
this by resorting to assumptions. Respondent admitted that she was around when
Chiara Mae and her mother arrived. She could have requested the mother to sign
the permit form before she left the school or at least called her up to obtain her
conformity.
Second, it was respondents responsibility as Class Adviser to supervise her class
in all activities sanctioned by the school.[18] Thus, she should have coordinated
with the school to ensure that proper safeguards, such as adequate first aid and
sufficient adult personnel, were present during their activity. She should have been
mindful of the fact that with the number of pupils involved, it would be impossible
for her by herself alone to keep an eye on each one of them.
As it turned out, since respondent was the only adult present, majority of the pupils
were left unsupervised when she followed the two pupils who sneaked out. In the
light of the odds involved, respondent should have considered that those who
sneaked out could not have left the school premises since there were guards
manning the gates. The guards would not have allowed them to go out in their
swimsuits and without any adult accompanying them. But those who stayed at the
pool were put at greater risk, when she left them unattended by an adult.
Notably, respondents negligence, although gross, was not habitual. In view of the
considerable resultant damage, however, we are in agreement that the cause is
sufficient to dismiss respondent. This is not the first time that we have departed
from the requirements laid down by the law that neglect of duties must be both
gross and habitual. In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC,[19] we ruled that
Philippine Airlines (PAL) cannot be legally compelled to continue with the
employment of a person admittedly guilty of gross negligence in the performance
of his duties although it was his first offense. In that case, we noted that a mere
delay on PALs flight schedule due to aircraft damage entails problems like hotel
accommodations for its passengers, re-booking, the possibility of law suits, and
payment of special landing fees not to mention the soaring costs of replacing
aircraft parts.[20] In another case, Fuentes v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[21] we held that it would be unfair to compel Philippine Banking
Corporation to continue employing its bank teller. In that case, we observed that
although the tellers infraction was not habitual, a substantial amount of money
was lost. The deposit slip had already been validated prior to its loss and the
amount reflected thereon is already considered as current liabilities in the banks
balance sheet.[22] Indeed, the sufficiency of the evidence as well as the resultant
damage to the employer should be considered in the dismissal of the employee. In
this case, the damage went as far as claiming the life of a child.
As a result of gross negligence in the present case, petitioners lost its trust and
confidence in respondent. Loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for
dismissal must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly
established facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and
purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly,
thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently.[23] Otherwise stated, it must rest on
substantial grounds and not on the employers arbitrariness, whims, caprices or
suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the
employer. It should be genuine and not simulated; nor should it appear as a mere
afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith or a subterfuge for causes
which are improper, illegal or unjustified. It has never been intended to afford an
occasion for abuse because of its subjective nature. There must, therefore, be an
actual breach of duty committed by the employee which must be established by
substantial evidence.[24]
As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, respondent should have
made sure that the children were protected from all harm while in her
company.[25] Respondent should have known that leaving the pupils in the
swimming pool area all by themselves may result in an accident. A simple
reminder not to go to the deepest part of the pool[26] was insufficient to cast
away all the serious dangers that the situation presented to the children, especially
when respondent knew that Chiara Mae cannot swim.[27] Dismally, respondent
created an unsafe situation which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to
real danger. This is a clear violation not only of the trust and confidence reposed
on her by the parents of the pupils but of the school itself.
Finally, we note that based on the criminal complaint filed by Chiara Maes
parents, the Assistant City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict respondent
for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The Assistant City
Prosecutor held that respondent should have foreseen the danger lurking in the
waters. By leaving her pupils in the swimming pool, respondent displayed an
inexcusable lack of foresight and precaution.[28] While this finding is not
controlling for purposes of the instant case, this only supports our conclusion that
respondent has indeed been grossly negligent.
All told, there being a clear showing that respondent was culpable for gross
negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence, her dismissal was valid and
legal. It was error for the Court of Appeals to reverse and set aside the resolution
of the NLRC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 7,
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81480 is SET ASIDE. The
Resolution dated September 20, 2002 of the National Labor Relations Commission
in NLRC NCR CA No. 031627-02 is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner,
vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student
into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when
such is not the case? This is the issue in the instant petition for review premised on
the following undisputed facts as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the
Court of Appeals (CA),1 to wit:

Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In
the first semester of his last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to take the
regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete
grade (Exhibits "2", also Exhibit "H"). He enrolled for the second semester as
fourth year law student (Exhibit "A") and on February 1, 1988 he filed an
application for the removal of the incomplete grade given him by Professor Carlos
Ortega (Exhibits "H-2", also Exhibit "2") which was approved by Dean Celedonio
Tiongson after payment of the required fee. He took the examination on March 28,
1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega submitted his grade. It was a
grade of five (5). (Exhibits "H-4", also Exhibits "2-L", "2-N").1wphi1.nt

In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to
deliberate on who among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate.
The plaintiff's name appeared in the Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for
the Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988) with
the following annotation:

JADER ROMEO A.

Def. Conflict of Laws x-1-87-88, Practice Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-1 to submit
transcript with S.O. (Exhibits "3", "3-C-1", "3-C-2").

The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of
Bachelor of Laws was scheduled on the 16th of April 1988 at 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, and in the invitation for that occasion the name of the plaintiff appeared
as one of the candidates. (Exhibits "B", "B-6", "B-6-A"). At the foot of the list of
the names of the candidates there appeared however the following annotation:

This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who
satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as
approved of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (Exhibit "B-7-A").

The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, U.E.,
Recto Campus, during the program of which he went up the stage when his name
was called, escorted by her (sic) mother and his eldest brother who assisted in
placing the Hood, and his Tassel was turned from left to right, and he was
thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of
the Law Diploma. His relatives took pictures of the occasion (Exhibits "C" to "C-
6", "D-3" to "D-11").

He tendered a blow-out that evening which was attended by neighbors, friends and
relatives who wished him good luck in the forthcoming bar examination. There
were pictures taken too during the blow-out (Exhibits "D" to "D-1").

He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence
without pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 (Exhibit "G")
and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern University. (Exhibits "F" to
"F-2"). Having learned of the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not
able to take the bar examination.2

Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered
moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar
examinations arising from the latter's negligence. He prayed for an award of moral
and exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.

In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it
never led respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor
of Laws degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating
students. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of
THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS
(P35,470.00) with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint until fully
paid, the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees and
the cost of suit.

Defendant's counterclaim is, for lack of merit, hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.3

which on appeal by both parties was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) with
modification. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the lower Court's Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that defendant-appellee, in addition to the
sum adjudged by the lower court in favor of plaintiff-appellant, is also ORDERED
to pay plaintiff-appellant the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS
for moral damages. Costs against defendant-appellee.

SO ORDERED.4

Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner UE elevated the case
to this Court on a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, arguing
that it has no liability to respondent Romeo A. Jader, considering that the
proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by the latter arose
out of his own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned the result
of his removal exam.

The petition lacks merit.

When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of
education is entered into between said institution and the student. The professors,
teachers or instructors hired by the school are considered merely as agents and
administrators tasked to perform the school's commitment under the contract. Since
the contracting parties are the school and the student, the latter is not duty-bound to
deal with the former's agents, such as the professors with respect to the status or
result of his grades, although nothing prevents either professors or students from
sharing with each other such information. The Court takes judicial notice of the
traditional practice in educational institutions wherein the professor directly
furnishes his/her students their grades. It is the contractual obligation of the school
to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every
student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for
the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who
will graduate. Although commencement exercises are but a formal ceremony, it
nonetheless is not an ordinary occasion, since such ceremony is the educational
institution's way of announcing to the whole world that the students included in the
list of those who will be conferred a degree during the baccalaureate ceremony
have satisfied all the requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to the
ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly inform the student of any
problem involving the latter's grades and performance and also most importantly,
of the procedures for remedying the same.

Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal
examination, particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for
the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith
must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party
in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes
an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though
the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information
or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.5 It is the school
that has access to those information and it is only the school that can compel its
professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations and policies with respect to
the computation and the prompt submission of grades. Students do not exercise
control, much less influence, over the way an educational institution should run its
affairs, particularly in disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their
compliance with the school's rules and orders. Being the party that hired them, it is
the school that exercises general supervision and exclusive control over the
professors with respect to the submission of reports involving the students'
standing. Exclusive control means that no other person or entity had any control
over the instrumentality which caused the damage or injury.6

The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of an academic
program, enforcement of rules and regulations, and the supervision of faculty and
student services.7 He must see to it that his own professors and teachers, regardless
of their status or position outside of the university, must comply with the rules set
by the latter. The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the
school, for instance by not promptly submitting a student's grade, is not only
imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer.

Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a university
which is engaged in legal education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in
its students, more specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles
19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.8 In civilized society, men must
be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury that others will
commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they act
affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and moral
sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they deal in the general
course of society will act in good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability
is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society.9 Schools and professors
cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to them, for without the
latter, the former are useless.

Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic
status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious
indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be
affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages.10 Want of care to
the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of
the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party
liable.11 Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the
performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign
ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams since that is
precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to
act seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades at any time
because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court
on the submission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner's liability arose
from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and
in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the
course. Worth quoting is the following disquisition of the respondent court:

It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that defendant-appellee
University had been informed during the deliberation that the professor in Practice
Court I gave plaintiff-appellant a failing grade. Yet, defendant-appellee still did not
inform plaintiff-appellant of his failure to complete the requirements for the degree
nor did they remove his name from the tentative list of candidates for graduation.
Worse, defendant-appellee university, despite the knowledge that plaintiff-
appellant failed in Practice Court I, again included plaintiff-appellant's name in the
"tentative list of candidates for graduation which was prepared after the
deliberation and which became the basis for the commencement rites program.
Dean Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-appellant's name was allowed to remain in
the tentative list of candidates for graduation in the hope that the latter would still
be able to remedy the situation in the remaining few days before graduation day.
Dean Tiongson, however, did not explain how plaintiff appellant Jader could have
done something to complete his deficiency if defendant-appellee university did not
exert any effort to inform plaintiff-appellant of his failing grade in Practice Court
I.12

Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence
that led to the delayed relay of information to respondent. When one of two
innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear
it.13 The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there
is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit.14 If mere fault or negligence in
one's acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more
reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be protected
only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with
prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.15

However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent
for the latter's actual damages, we hold that respondent should not have been
awarded moral damages. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' findings that
respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain when he was informed that he could
not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very
least, it behooved on respondent to verify for himself whether he has completed all
necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law
student, respondent should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his
affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order.
Given these considerations, we fail to see how respondent could have suffered
untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review
classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If respondent was indeed
humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not
verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including his school records,
before preparing himself for the bar examination. Certainly, taking the bar
examinations does not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects thereof;
there are also prerequisites of documentation and submission of requirements
which the prospective examinee must meet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-
five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of
6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid;
the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of
the suit. The award of moral damages is DELEIED.1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD dIVISION

G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988

JOSE B. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses PACIFICO DELMO and SANCHA
DELMO (as private respondents), respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Luzel D. Demasu-ay for respondent.



GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
which afirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, adjudging the
petitioner, who was then the President of the West Visayas College liable for
damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for failure to
graduate a student with honors.

The facts are not disputed.

An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some students of
the West Visayas College. They elected the late Violets Delmo as the treasurer. In
that capacity, Delmo extended loans from the funds of the club to some of the
students of the school. "the petitioner claims that the said act of extending loans
was against school rules and regulations. Thus, the petitioner, as President of the
School, sent a letter to Delmo informing her that she was being dropped from the
membership of the club and that she would not be a candidate for any award or
citation from the school.

Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the petitioner denied it.
Delmo, thus, appealed to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public
Schools.

The Director after due investigation, rendered a decison on April 13, 1966 which
provided:

Records of the preliminary investigation conducted by one of the legal officers of
this Office disclosed the following: That Violeta Delmo was the treasurer of the
Student Leadership Club, an exclusive student organization; that pursuant to
Article IX of the of the Constitution and By-Laws of the club, it passed Resolution
No. 2, authorizing the treasurer to disburse funds of the Club to student for
financial aid and other humanitarian purposes; that in compliance with said
resolution and as treasurer of the Club, Violeta Delmo extended loans to some
officers and members of the Club upon proper application duly approved by the
majority of the members of the Executive Board; and that upon receiving the report
from Mr. Jesse Dagoon, adviser of the funds of the Club, that Office conducted an
investigation on the matter and having been convinced of the guilt of Violets
Delmo and the other officers and members of the Club, that Office rendered the
order or decision in question. In justifying that Office's order or decision, it is
contended that approval by that Office of the Constitution and By-Laws of the
Club is necessary for its effectivity and validity and since it was never submitted to
that Office, the Club had no valid constitution and By-Laws and that as a
consequence, Resolution No. 2 which was passed based on the Constitution and
By-Laws- is without any force and effect and the treasurer, Violeta Delmo, who
extended loans to some officers and members of the Club pursuant thereto are
illegal (sic), hence, she and the other students involved are deemed guilty of
misappropriating the funds of the Club. On the other hand, Raclito Castaneda,
Nestor Golez and Violeta Delmo, President, Secretary and Treasurer of the Club,
respectively, testified that the Club had adopted its Constitution and By-Laws in a
meeting held last October 3, 1965, and that pursuant to Article I of said
Constitution and By-Laws, the majority of the members of the Executive Board
passed Resolution No. 2, which resolution became the basis for the extension on of
loans to some officers and members of the Club, that the Club honestly believed
that its Constitution and By-Laws has been approved by the superintendent
because the adviser of the Club, Mr. Jesse Dagoon, assured the President of the
Club that he will cause the approval of the Constitution and By-Laws by the
Superintendent; the officers of the Club have been inducted to office on October
9,1965 by the Superintendent and that the Club had been likewise allowed to
cosponsor the Education Week Celebration.

After a careful study of the records, this Office sustains the action taken by the
Superintendent in penalizing the adviser of the Club as well as the officers and
members thereof by dropping them from membership therein. However, this
Office is convinced that Violets M. Delmo had acted in good faith, in her capacity
as Club Treasurer, in extending loans to the officers and members of the Student
partnership Club. Resolution No. 2 authorizing the Club treasurer to discharge
finds to students in need of financial assistance and other humanitarian purposes
had been approved by the Club adviser, Mr. Jesse Dagoon, with the notation that
approval was given in his capacity as adviser of the Club and extension of the
Superintendent's personality. Aside from misleading the officers and members of
the Club, Mr. Dagoon, had unsatisfactorily explained why he failed to give the
Constitution and By-Laws of the Club to the Superintendent for approval despite
his assurance to the Club president that he would do so. With this finding of
negligence on the part of the Club adviser, not to mention laxity in the performance
of his duties as such, this Office considers as too severe and unwarranted that
portion of the questioned order stating that Violeta Delmo "shall not be a candidate
for any award or citation from this school or any organization in this school."
Violeta Delmo, it is noted, has been a consistent full scholar of the school and she
alone has maintained her scholarship. The decision in question would, therefore,
set at naught all her sacrifice and frustrate her dreams of graduating with honors in
this year's commencement exercises.

In view of all the foregoing, this Office believes and so holds and hereby directs
that appellant Violeta. M. Delmo, and for that matter all other Club members or
officers involved in this case, be not deprived of any award, citation or honor from
the school, if they are otherwise entitled thereto. (Rollo, pp. 28-30)

On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by mail the decision of the Director and
all the records of the case. On the same day, petitioner received a telegram stating
the following:

"AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT THAT OFFICE"

The Director asked for the return only of the records but the petitioner allegedly
mistook the telegram as ordering him to also send the decision back. On the same
day, he returned by mail all the records plus the decision of the Director to the
Bureau of Public Schools.

The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director order him
to furnish Delmo with a copy of the decision. The petitioner, in turn, sent a night
letter to the Director informing the latter that he had sent the decision back and that
he had not retained a copy thereof..

On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the petitioner received another
telegram from the Director ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any honors due
her. As it was impossible by this time to include Delmo's name in the program as
one of the honor students, the petitioner let her graduate as a plain student instead
of being awarded the Latin honor of Magna Cum Laude.

To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5, 1966, wrote the Director for a
reconsideration of the latters" decision because he believed that Delmo should not
be allowed to graduate with honors. The Director denied the petitioner's request.

On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of the school to
enter into the scholastic records of Delmo the honor, "Magna Cum Laude."

On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her parents in flag action for
damages against the petitioner. During the pendency of the action, however,
Delmo passed away, and thus, an Amended and Supplemental Complaint was filed
by her parents as her sole and only heirs.

The trial court after hearing rendered judgment against the petitioner and in favor
of the spouses Delmo. The court said:

Let us go to specific badges of the defendants (now petitioners) bad faith. Per
investigation of Violeta Delmo's appeal to Director Vitaliano Bernardino of the
Bureau of Public Schools (Exhibit L it was the defendant who inducted the officers
of the Student Leadership Club on October 9, 1965. In fact the Club was allowed
to cosponsor the Education Week Celebration. (Exh. "L"). If the defendant he not
approve of the constitution and by-laws of the Club, why did he induct the officers
into office and allow the Club to sponsor the Education Week Celebration"? It was
through his own act that the students were misled to do as they did. Coupled with
the defendants tacit recognition of the Club was the assurance of Mr. Jemm
Dagoon, Club Adviser, who made the students believe that he was acting as an
extension of Mr. Ledesma's personality. (Exhibit "L").

Another badge of the defendan'ts want of good faith is the fact that, although, he
kaew as early as April 27,1966 that per on of r Bernardino, Exhibit "L," he was
directed to give honors to Miss Delmo, he kept Id information to . He told the
Court that he knew that the letter of Director Bernardino directed him not to
deprive Miss Delmo the honors due her, but she (sic) says that he has not finished
reading the letter-decision, Exhibit "L," of Director Bernardino 0, him to give
honors to Miss Delmo. (Tsn, Feb. 5, 1974, testimony of Mr. Ledesma, pp. .33-35).
It could not be true that he has not finished reading the letter-decision, Exh. "L,"
because said letter consisted of only three pages, and the portion which directed
that Miss Delmo "be not deprived of any award, citation or honor from the school,
if otherwise entitled thereto is found at the last paragraph of the same. How did he
know the last paragraph if he did not read the letter.

Defendants actuations regarding Miss Delmo's cam had been one of bias and
prejudice. When his action would favor him, he was deliberate and aspect to the
utter prejudice and detriment of Miss Delmo. Thus, although, as early as April 27,
1966, he knew of the exoneration of Miss Delino by Director Bernardino, he
withheld the information from Miss Delmo. This is eloquently dramatized by Exh.
"11" and Exh. "13" On April 29,1966, Director Bernardino cabled him to furnish
Violeta Delmo copy of the Decision, Exh. "L," but instead of informing Miss
Delmo about the decision, since he said he mailed back the decision on April
28,1966, he sent a night letter on April 29,1966, to Director Bernardino, informing
the latter that he had returned the decision (Exh. "l3"), together with the record.
Why a night letter when the matter was of utmost urgency to the parties in the case,
because graduation day was only four days ahead? An examination of the
telegrams sent by the defendant shows that he had been sending ordinary telegram
and not night letters. (Exh. "5", Exhibit "7"). At least, if the defendant could not
furnish a copy of the decision, (Exh. "L"), to Miss Delmo, he should have told her
about it or that Miss Delmo's honors and citation in the commencement be
announced or indicated. But Mr. Ledesma is one who cannot admit a mistake.
Very ungentlemanly this is home out by his own testimony despite his knowledge
that his decision to deprive Miss Delmo of honors due to her was overturned by
Director Bernardino, he on his wrong belief. To quote the defendant,1 believed that
she did not deserve those honors(Tsn Feb. 5, 1974, p. 43,Empasized supplied).
Despite the telegram of Director Bernardino which the defendant received hours
before the commencement executory on May 3-4,1966, he did not obey Director
Bernardino because he said in his testimony that he would be embarrassment . Tan
Feb 5,1974, P. 46). Evidently, he knew only his embarrassment and not that of r
Bernardino whose order was being flagrantly and wantonly disregarded by bim
And certainly, not the least of Miss Delmo's embarrassment. His acts speak
eloquently of ho bad faith and unjust of mindwarped by his delicate sensitivity for
having been challenged by Miss Delmo, a mere student.

xxx xxx xxx

Finally the defendant's behaviour relative to Miss s case smacks of contemptuous
arrogance, oppression and abuse of power. Come to think of it. He refused to obey
the directive of Be o and instead, chose to feign ignorance of it." (Reward on
Appeal, p. 72-76).

The trial court awarded P20,000.00 to the estate of Violeta Delmo and P10,000.00
to her parents for moral damages; P5,000.00 for nominal damages to Violeta's
estate; exemplary damages of P10,000.00 and P2,000.00 attorney's fees.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.

The issues raised in this petition can be reduced to the sole question of whether or
not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that
petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the New Civil Code.

We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should be
reversed. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal
which was brought about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus,
moral damages are but proper. As we have affirmed in the case of (Prudenciado v.
Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448):

There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of
defendant's wrongly act or omission." (People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62 (1984).

The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to
inform Miss Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish
her a copy of the Director's decision. Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless
the petitioner's duty to enforce the said decision. He could have done so
considering that he received the decision on April 27, 1966 and even though he
sent it back with the records of the case, he undoubtedly read the whole of it which
consisted of only three pages. Moreover, the petitioner should have had the
decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, and inform the latter, at the very
least of the decision. This, the petitioner likewise failed to do, and not without the
attendant bad faith which the appellate court correctly pointed out in its decision,
to wit:

Third, assuming that defendant could not furnish Miss Delmo of a copy of the
decision, he could have used his discretion and plain common sense by informing
her about it or he could have directed the inclusion of Miss Delmo's honor in the
printed commencement program or announced it during the commencement
exercises.

Fourth, defendant despite receipt of the telegram of Director Benardino hours
before the commencement exercises on May 3-4, 1966, disobeyed his superior by
refusing to give the honors due Miss Delmo with a lame excuse that he would be
embarrassed if he did so, to the prejudice of and in complete disregard of Miss
Delmo's rights.

Fifth, defendant did not even extend the courtesy of meeting Mr. Pacifico Delmo,
father of Miss Delmo, who tried several times to see defendant in his office thus
Mr. Delmo suffered extreme disappointment and humiliation.

xxx xxx xxx

Defendant, being a public officer should have acted with circumspection and due
regard to the rights of Miss Delmo. Inasmuch as he exceeded the scope of his
authority by defiantly disobeying the lawful directive of his superior, Director
Bernardino, defendant is liable for damages in his personal capacity. . . . (Rollo,
pp- 57-58)

Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary damages are also in order. In the same
case of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra., at p. 450, we ruled:

The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to
provide an example or correction for the public good (Lopez, et al. v. Pan
American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431).

However, we do not deem it appropriate to award the spouses Delmo damages in
the amount of P10,000.00 in their individual capacity, separately from and in
addition to what they are already entitled to as sole heirs of the deceased Violeta
Delmo. Thus, the decision is modified insofar as moral damages are awarded to the
spouses in their own behalf.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the slight modification as stated in the
preceding paragraph. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988

FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA DORONIO petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO AQUINO, MAURO SORIANO and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.

Buenaventura C. Evangelista for petitioners.

Modesto V. Cabanela for respondent Edgardo Aquino.

Manuel P. Pastor for respondent Mauro Soriano.



GANCAYCO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 36390-R entitled "Federico Ylarde, et al. vs.
Edgardo Aquino, et al.," a case which originated from the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, We are again caned upon determine the responsibility of the principals
and teachers towards their students or pupils.

In 1963, private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon
Primary School, a public educational institution located in Tayug, Pangasinan-
Private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. At that time, the school
was fittered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school
shop that was destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge stones were
serious hazards to the schoolchildren, another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez
started burying them one by one as early as 1962. In fact, he was able to bury ten
of these blocks all by himself.

Deciding to help his colleague, private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered
eighteen of his male pupils, aged ten to eleven, after class dismissal on October 7,
1963. Being their teacher-in-charge, he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton
concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. The work
was left unfinished. The following day, also after classes, private respondent
Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging. These
four pupils Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito
Ylarde, dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep. At this
point, private respondent Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils
remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the
digging.

When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, private
respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. Then, said private
respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he
went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away. Private respondent wanted to
borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope.
Before leaving. , private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children "not to
touch the stone."

A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left, three of the four kids, Alonso,
Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without any warning at
all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide
down towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the
excavation on time but unfortunately fo Ylarde, the concrete block caught him
before he could get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing position. As a result
thereof, Ylarde sustained the following injuries:

1. Contusion with hematoma, left inguinal region and suprapubic region.

2. Contusion with ecchymosis entire scrotal region.

3. Lacerated wound, left lateral aspect of penile skin with phimosis

4. Abrasion, gluteal region, bilateral.

5. Intraperitoneal and extrapertitoneal extravasation of blood and urine about 2
liters.

6. Fracture, simple, symphesis pubis

7. Ruptured (macerated) urinary bladder with body of bladder almost entirely
separated from its neck.

REMARKS:

1. Above were incurred by crushing injury.

2. Prognosis very poor.

(Sgd.) MELQUIADES A. BRAVO

Physician on Duty. 1

Three days later, Novelito Ylarde died.

Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damages against both
private respondents Aquino and Soriano. The lower court dismissed the complaint
on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with
their course called Work Education; (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence
of a very cautious person; and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own
reckless imprudence. 2

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the lower court.

Petitioners base their action against private respondent Aquino on Article 2176 of
the Civil Code for his alleged negligence that caused their son's death while the
complaint against respondent Soriano as the head of school is founded on Article
2180 of the same Code.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

On the other hand, the applicable provision of Article 2180 states:

Art. 2180. x x x

xxx xxx xxx

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain
in their custody. 3

The issue to be resolved is whether or not under the cited provisions, both private
respondents can be held liable for damages.

As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death
of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a school of
arts and trades. This is in line with Our ruling in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, 4
wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who
should be answerable for torts committed by their students. This Court went on to
say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be
held liable. In the same case, We explained:

After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the
conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as
well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or
vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach
to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision.
This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the
head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general
rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students
except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof
who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula sinquilis
'teachers' should apply to the words "pupils and students' and 'heads of
establishments of arts and trades to the word "apprentices."

Hence, applying the said doctrine to this case, We rule that private respondent
Soriano, as principal, cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads
is an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Besides, as clearly
admitted by private respondent Aquino, private respondent Soriano did not give
any instruction regarding the digging.

From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that private respondent Aquino can be
held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the
children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the
necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. However, as earlier
pointed out, petitioners base the alleged liability of private respondent Aquino on
Article 2176 which is separate and distinct from that provided for in Article 2180.

With this in mind, the question We need to answer is this: Were there acts and
omissions on the part of private respondent Aquino amounting to fault or
negligence which have direct causal relation to the death of his pupil Ylarde? Our
answer is in the affirmative. He is liable for damages.

From a review of the record of this case, it is very clear that private respondent
Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when he: (1) failed to avail himself
of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to
eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be
a very hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after
they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could
be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the
perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was
so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place
where he would not be able to check on the children's safety; and (5) left the
children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.

The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a
dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left
by themselves, it was but natural for the children to play around. Tired from the
strenuous digging, they just had to amuse themselves with whatever they found.
Driven by their playful and adventurous instincts and not knowing the risk they
were facing three of them jumped into the hole while the other one jumped on the
stone. Since the stone was so heavy and the soil was loose from the digging, it was
also a natural consequence that the stone would fall into the hole beside it, causing
injury on the unfortunate child caught by its heavy weight. Everything that
occurred was the natural and probable effect of the negligent acts of private
respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the child Ylarde would not have died were it
not for the unsafe situation created by private respondent Aquino which exposed
the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger.

We cannot agree with the finding of the lower court that the injuries which resulted
in the death of the child Ylarde were caused by his own reckless imprudence, It
should be remembered that he was only ten years old at the time of the incident, As
such, he is expected to be playful and daring. His actuations were natural to a boy
his age. Going back to the facts, it was not only him but the three of them who
jumped into the hole while the remaining boy jumped on the block. From this, it is
clear that he only did what any other ten-year old child would do in the same
situation.

In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent, it is evident that the lower court did
not consider his age and maturity. This should not be the case. The degree of care
required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to
care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult,
but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of
his age and experience. 5 The standard of conduct to which a child must conform
for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the
same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or
similar circumstances. 6 Bearing this in mind, We cannot charge the child Ylarde
with reckless imprudence.

The court is not persuaded that the digging done by the pupils can pass as part of
their Work Education. A single glance at the picture showing the excavation and
the huge concrete block 7 would reveal a dangerous site requiring the attendance of
strong, mature laborers and not ten-year old grade-four pupils. We cannot
comprehend why the lower court saw it otherwise when private respondent Aquino
himself admitted that there were no instructions from the principal requiring what
the pupils were told to do. Nor was there any showing that it was included in the
lesson plan for their Work Education. Even the Court of Appeals made mention of
the fact that respondent Aquino decided all by himself to help his co-teacher Banez
bury the concrete remnants of the old school shop. 8 Furthermore, the excavation
should not be placed in the category of school gardening, planting trees, and the
like as these undertakings do not expose the children to any risk that could result in
death or physical injuries.

The contention that private respondent Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a
very cautious person is certainly without cogent basis. A reasonably prudent
person would have foreseen that bringing children to an excavation site, and more
so, leaving them there all by themselves, may result in an accident. An ordinarily
careful human being would not assume that a simple warning "not to touch the
stone" is sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that a huge concrete block
adjacent to an excavation would present to the children. Moreover, a teacher who
stands in loco parentis to his pupils would have made sure that the children are
protected from all harm in his company.

We close by categorically stating that a truly careful and cautious person would
have acted in all contrast to the way private respondent Aquino did. Were it not for
his gross negligence, the unfortunate incident would not have occurred and the
child Ylarde would probably be alive today, a grown- man of thirty-five. Due to
his failure to take the necessary precautions to avoid the hazard, Ylarde's parents
suffered great anguish all these years.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the
questioned judgment of the respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
another judgment is hereby rendered ordering private respondent Edagardo Aquino
to pay petitioners the following:

(1) Indemnity for the death of Child Ylarde P30,000.00

(2) Exemplary damages 10,000.00

(3) Moral damages 20,000.00

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION



G.R. No. 82465 February 25, 1991

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS. FERNANDO NANTES
AND ROSARIO LACANDULA, BENJAMIN ILUMIN, TIRSO DE CHAVEZ,
LUISITO VINAS, CONNIE ARQUIO AND PATRIA CADIZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION and DR.
ROMULO CASTILLO and LILIA CADIZ, respondents.

Jose C. Flores, Jr. for petitioners.

Jovito E. Talabong for private respondents.



PARAS, J.:p

This is a petition for review of the decision * of the Court of Appeals, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby affirmed, with the following
modifications: (1) Exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 are hereby
awarded to plaintiffs, in addition to the actual damages of P30,000.00, moral
damages of P20,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00 awarded to
plaintiffs in the decision under appeal; (2) St. Francis High School, represented by
the Spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, and Benjamin Illumin, are
hereby held jointly and severally liable with defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso de
Chaves, Luisito Vinas and Patria Cadis for the payment to plaintiffs of the
abovementioned actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees, and for costs; and (3) Defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones are
hereby absolved from liability, and the case against them, together with their
respective counterclaims, is hereby ordered dismissed.

SO ORDERED. (p. 60, Rollo)

The complaint alleged that Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section
1-C at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school picnic undertaken by
Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's parents,
respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short
notice, did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the
teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after doing
so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them
to the beach.

During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in the water,
one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students,
including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand
himself who drowned. His body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore
failed. He was brought to a certain Dr. Luna in Sariaya, Quezon and later to the
Mt. Cannel General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 8834,
in the Regional Trial Court, Branch LVIII of Lucena City, against the St. Francis
High School, represented by the spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula,
Benjamin Illumin (its principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas,
Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for Damages which
respondents allegedly incurred from the death of their 13-year old son, Ferdinand
Castillo. Contending that the death of their son was due to the failure of the
petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the family in
preventing their son's drowning, respondents prayed of actual, moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses for litigation.

The trial court found in favor of the respondents and against petitioners-teachers
Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas, Aragones, Jaro and Cadiz, ordering all of them jointly
and severally to pay respondents the sum of P30,000.00 as actual damages,
P20,000.00 as moral damages, P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs.
The court a quo reasoned:

Taking into consideration the evidence presented, this Court believes that the
defendant teachers namely: Connie Arquio, Luisito Vinas, Tirso de Chaves, Yoly
Jaro, Nida Aragones and Patria Cadiz had failed to exercise the diligence required
of them by law under the circumstances to guard against the harm they had
foreseen. (pp. 2930, Rollo)

xxx xxx xxx

While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at
the picnic site, the drowning incident had already occurred, such fact does not and
cannot excuse them from their liability. In fact, it could be said that by coming late,
they were remiss in their duty to safeguard the students. (p. 30, Rollo)

The students, young as they were then (12 to 13 years old), were easily attracted to
the sea without aforethought of the dangers it offers. Yet, the precautions and
reminders allegedly performed by the defendants-teachers definitely fell short of
the standard required by law under the circumstances. While the defendants-
teachers admitted that some parts of the sea where the picnic was held are deep, the
supposed lifeguards of the children did not even actually go to the water to test the
depth of the particular area where the children would swim. And indeed the fears
of the plaintiffs that the picnic area was dangerous was confirmed by the fact that
three persons during the picnic got drowned at the same time. Had the defendant
teachers made an actual and physical observation of the water before they allowed
the students to swim, they could have found out that the area where the children
were swimming was indeed dangerous. And not only that, the male teachers who
according to the female teachers were there to supervise the children to ensure their
safety were not even at the area where the children were swimming. They were
somewhere and as testified to by plaintiffs' witness they were having a drinking
spree. (pp. 55-56, Rollo)

On the other hand, the trial court dismissed the case against the St. Francis High
School, Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna. Said the court a quo:

As shown and adverted to above, this Court cannot find sufficient evidence
showing that the picnic was a school sanctioned one. Similarly no evidence has
been shown to hold defendants Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna responsible
for the death of Ferdinand Castillo together with the other defendant teachers. It
has been sufficiently shown that Benjamin Illumin had himself not consented to
the picnic and in fact he did not join it. On the other hand, defendant Aurora
Cadorna had then her own class to supervise and in fact she was not amongst those
allegedly invited by defendant Connie Arquio to supervise class I-C to which
Ferdinand Castillo belongs. (p. 30, Rollo)

Both petitioners and respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. Respondents-
spouses assigned the following errors committed by the trial court:

1. The lower court erred in not declaring the defendant St. Francis High School
and its administrator/principal Benjamin Illumin as equally liable not only for its
approved co-curricular activities but also for those which they unreasonably failed
to exercise control and supervision like the holding of picnic in the dangerous
water of Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon.

2. The lower court erred in not declaring the St. Francis High School and
principal Benjamin Illumin as jointly and solidarily liable with their co-defendants-
teachers Rosario Lacandula, et als., for the tragic death of Ferdinand Castillo in a
picnic at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon, last March 20, 1982.

3. The lower court erred in not declaring higher amount for actual and moral
damages for the untimely and tragic death of Ferdinand Castillo in favor of
plaintiffs-appellants against all the defendants. (pp. 56-57, Rollo)

The Court of Appeals ruled:

We find plaintiffs-appellants' submission well-taken.

Even were We to find that the picnic in question was not a school-sponsored
activity, nonetheless it cannot be gainsaid that the same was held under the
supervision of the teachers employed by the said school, particularly the teacher in
charge of Class I-C to whom the victim belonged, and those whom she invited to
help her in supervising the class during the picnic. Considering that the court a quo
found negligence on the part of the six defendants-teachers who, as such, were
charged with the supervision of the children during the picnic, the St. Francis High
School and the school principal, Benjamin Illumin, are liable under Article 2176
taken together with the 1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. They cannot escape liability on the mere excuse that the picnic was not an
"extra-curricular activity of the St. Francis High School." We find from the
evidence that, as claimed by plaintiffs-appellants, the school principal had
knowledge of the picnic even from its planning stage and had even been invited to
attend the affair; and yet he did not express any prohibition against undertaking the
picnic, nor did he prescribe any precautionary measures to be adopted during the
picnic. At the least, We must find that the school and the responsible school
officials, particularly the principal, Benjamin Illumin, had acquiesced to the
holding of the picnic.

Under Article 2180, supra, the defendant school and defendant school principal
must be found jointly and severally liable with the defendants-teachers for the
damages incurred by the plaintiffs as a result of the death of their son. It is the rule
that in cases where the above-cited provisions find application, the negligence of
the employees in causing the injury or damage gives rise to a presumption of
negligence on the part of the owner and/or manager of the establishment (in the
present case, St. Francis High School and its principal); and while this presumption
is not conclusive, it may be overthrown only by clear and convincing proof that the
owner and/or manager exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and/or supervision of the employee or employees causing the
injury or damage (in this case, the defendants-teachers). The record does not
disclose such evidence as would serve to overcome the aforesaid presumption and
absolve the St. Francis High School and its principal from liability under the
above-cited provisions.

As to the third assigned error interposed by plaintiffs-appellants, while We cannot
but commiserate with the plaintiffs for the tragedy that befell them in the untimely
death of their son Ferdinand Castillo and understand their suffering as parents,
especially the victim's mother who, according to appellants, suffered a nervous
breakdown as a result of the tragedy, We find that the amounts fixed by the court a
quo as actual damages and moral damages (P30,000.00 and P20,000.00,
respectively) are reasonable and are those which are sustained by the evidence and
the law.

However, We believe that exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of
P20,000.00 may and should be, as it is hereby, imposed in the present case by way
of example of correction for the public good, pursuant to Article 2229 of the Civil
Code. (pp. 57-59, Rollo)

On the other hand, petitioners-teachers assigned the following errors committed by
the trial court:

1. ". . . in finding the defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso de Chavez, Luisito
Vinas, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro and Patria Cadiz guilty of negligence and jointly
and severally liable for damages such finding not being supported by facts and
evidence.

2. ". . . in dismissing the counterclaim interposed by the defendants. (p. 59,
Rollo)

On this score, respondent Court ruled:

The main thrust of defendants-appellants appeal is that plaintiffs, the parents of the
victim Ferdinand Castillo, were not able to prove by their evidence that they did
not give their son consent to join the picnic in question. However, We agree with
the trial court in its finding that whether or not the victim's parents had given such
permission to their son was immaterial to the determination of the existence of
liability on the part of the defendants for the damage incurred by the plaintiffs-
appellants as a result of the death of their son. What is material to such a
determination is whether or not there was negligence on the part of defendants vis-
a-vis the supervision of the victim's group during the picnic; and, as correctly
found by the trial court, an affirmative reply to this question has been satisfactorily
established by the evidence, as already pointed out.

However, We sustain defendants-appellants insofar as two of the defendants-
teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, are concerned. As to them, the trial court
found:

While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at
the picnic site, the drowning incident had already occurred, such fact does not and
cannot excuse them from their liability. In fact, it could be said that by coming late,
they were remiss in their duty to safeguard the students.

The evidence shows that these two defendants had satisfactorily explained why
they were late in going to the picnic site, namely, that they had to attend to the
entrance examination being conducted by the school which is part of their duty as
teachers thereof. Since they were not at the picnic site during the occurrence in
question, it cannot be said that they had any participation in the negligence
attributable to the other defendants-teachers who failed to exercise diligence in the
supervision of the children during the picnic and which failure resulted in the
drowning of plaintiffs' son. Thus, We may not attribute any act or omission to the
two teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, as to make them liable for the injury
caused to the plaintiffs because of the death of their son resulting from his
drowning at the picnic. Accordingly, they must be absolved from any liability.

As to the second assigned error raised by defendants-appellants, We agree with the
court a quo that the counterclaim must be dismissed for lack of merit. (pp. 59-60,
Rollo)

Hence, this petition.

The issues presented by petitioners are:

A) Whether or not there was negligence attributable to the defendants which
will warrant the award of damages to the plaintiffs;

B) Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is
applicable to the case at bar;

C) Whether or not the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper under
the circumstances surrounding the case at bar. (pp. 81-82, Rollo)

In the resolution of January 16, 1989, We gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

The petition is impressed with merit.

If at all petitioners are liable for negligence, this is because of their own negligence
or the negligence of people under them. In the instant case however, as will be
shown hereunder, petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or guilty of
the negligence of those under them.

Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all of any negligence. Consequently
they cannot be held liable for damages of any kind.

At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of the victim
Ferdinand, allowed their son to join the excursion.

Testimony of Dr. Castillo on cross exam. by Atty. Flores

Q Now, when your son asked you for money to buy food, did you not ask him
where he will bring this?

A I asked him where he was going, he answered, I am going to the picnic, and
when I asked him where, he did not answer, sir.

Q And after giving the money, you did not tell him anything more?

A No more, sir.

Q And after that you just learned that your son join the picnic?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you came to know of it after the news that your son was drowned in the
picnic came to you, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q From 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to 12:00 o'clock noon of March 20,
1982, you did not know that your son join the picnic?

A No, sir, I did not know.

Q Did you not look for your son during that time?

A I am too busy with my profession, that is why I was not able, sir.

Q You did not ask your wife?

A I did not, sir.

Q And neither did your wife tell you that your son join the picnic?

A Later on after 12:00, sir.

Q And during that time you were too busy that you did not inquire whether
your son have joined that picnic?

A Yes, sir.

(TSN, pp. 16-17, hearing of April 2, 1984 witness Romulo Castillo)

The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic even without
knowing where it will be held, is a sign of consent for his son to join the same.
Furthermore.

Testimony of Dr. Lazaro on cross examination:

Q How did you conduct this mental and physical examination?

A I have interviewed several persons and the patient herself She even felt
guilty about the death of her son because she cooked adobo for him so he could
join the excursion where her son died of drowning.

Q Why were you able to say she was feeling guilty because she was the one
who personally cooked the adobo for her son?

A It was during the interview that I had gathered it from the patient herself.
She was very sorry had she not allowed her son to join the excursion her son would
have not drowned. I don't know if she actually permitted her son although she said
she cooked adobo so he could join. (Emphasis Supplied) (TSN, p. 19, hearing of
April 30, 1984, Dr. Lazaro witness).

Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying Article 2180 of the
Civil Code in rendering petitioner school liable for the death of respondent's son.

Article 2180, par. 4 states that:

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.

Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the
negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice
must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned
tasks.

In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of
their assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the school premises, not on
a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a
purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the incident
happened while some members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School were
having a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the school head or
its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned
activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity.

As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by petitioner/principal
Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in
any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the
same. The application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it
supported by any jurisprudence. If we were to affirm the findings of respondent
Court on this score, employers wig forever be exposed to the risk and danger of
being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions of the employees
even if such act or omission he committed while they are not in the performance of
their duties.

Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant
the award of damages to the respondents-spouses.

Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand
belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the
picnic.

In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are
both P.E. instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid
application and swimming. Moreover, even respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas,
testified that "the defendants (petitioners herein) had life savers especially brought
by the defendants in case of emergency." (p. 85, Rollo) The records also show that
both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the
child.

Testimony of Luisito Vinas on cross examination,

Q And when you saw the boy, Ferdinand Castillo, you approached the boy and
claim also having applied first aid on him?

A Yes, sir.

Q And while you were applying the so called first aid, the children were
covering you up or were surrounding you?

A Yes, sir.

Q You were rattled at that time, is it not?

A No, sir.

Q You mean you were in calm and peaceful condition?

A Yes, sir.

Q Despite the fact that the boy was no longer responding to your application of
first aid?

A Yes, sir.

Q You have never been disturbed, "nababahala" in the process of your
application of the first aid on the body of Ferdinand Castillo?

A No, sir, because we were attending to the application of first aid that we
were doing, sir.

Q After you have applied back to back pressure and which you claimed the boy
did not respond, were you not disturb anyway?

A I was disturbed during that time, sir.

Q For how many minutes have you applied the back to back pressure?

A From 9 to 11 times, sir.

Q You mean 9 to 11 times of having applied the pressure of your body on the
body of Ferdinand Castillo?

A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please describe how you applied a single act of back to back
pressure?

A This has been done by placing the boy lay first downwards, then the face
was a little bit facing right and doing it by massaging the back of the child, sir."
(TSN, pp. 32-35, hearing of July 30, 1984)

Testimony of Tirso de Chavez on direct examination

ATTY. FLORES:

Q Who actually applied the first aid or artificial respiration to the child?

A Myself, sir.

Q How did you apply the first aid to the guy?

A The first step that I took, with the help of Mr. Luisito Vinas, was I applied
back to back pressure and took notice of the condition of the child. We placed the
feet in a higher position, that of the head of the child, sir.

Q After you have placed the boy in that particular position, where the feet were
on a higher level than that of the head, what did you do next?

A The first thing that we did, particularly myself, was that after putting the
child in that position, I applied the back to back pressure and started to massage
from the waistline up, but I noticed that the boy was not responding, sir.

Q For how long did you apply this back to back pressure on the boy?

A About 10 seconds, sir.

Q What about Mr. Vinas?

A Almost the same a little longer, for 15 seconds, sir.

Q After you noticed that the boy was not responding, what did you do?

A When we noticed that the boy was not responding, we changed the position
of the boy by placing the child facing upwards laying on the sand then we applied
the mouth to mouth resuscitation, sir. (pp. 92-93, Rollo)

With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded in
favor of respondents-spouses. The case at bar does not fall under any of the
grounds to grant moral damages.

Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's
wrongful act or omission.

Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, petitioners are not guilty of any
fault or negligence, hence, no moral damages can be assessed against them.

While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent to their son to join
the picnic, this does not mean that the petitioners were already relieved of their
duty to observe the required diligence of a good father of a family in ensuring the
safety of the children. But in the case at bar, petitioners were able to prove that
they had exercised the required diligence. Hence, the claim for moral or exemplary
damages becomes baseless.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision dated November 19, 1987,
finding petitioners herein guilty of negligence and liable for the death of Ferdinand
Castillo and awarding the respondents damages, is hereby SET ASIDE insofar as
the petitioners herein are concerned, but the portion of the said decision dismissing
their counterclaim, there being no merit, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC



G.R. No. L-24101 September 30, 1970

MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father ULISES P.
CUADRA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ALFONSO MONFORT, defendant-appellant.

Rodolfo J. Herman for plaintiffs-appellees.

Luis G. Torres and Abraham E. Tionko for defendant-appellant.



MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict, decided by the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental favorably to the plaintiffs and appealed by the
defendant to the Court of Appeals, which certified the same to us since the facts
are not in issue.

Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade
Six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962 their
teacher assigned them, together with three other classmates, to weed the grass in
the school premises. While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic
headband, an ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their hair.
Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten
the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that precise moment the latter turned
around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain,
she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, July 10,
the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to her
parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She underwent surgical
operation twice, first on July 20 and again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the
hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all of which the parents spent the sum
of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra
completely lost the sight of her right eye.

In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor
daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father, the defendant
was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages;
and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.

The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an act of his
minor child which causes damage to another under the specific facts related above
and the applicable provisions of the Civil Code, particularly Articles 2176 and
2180 thereof, which read:

ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by provisions of this Chapter.

ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.

The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or
negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there being no willfulness or
intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is that of one person for
whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article
2180, in the different cases enumerated therein, such as that of the father or the
mother under the circumstances above quoted. The basis of this vicarious, although
primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or negligence, which is presumed
from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is
merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical
inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which states
"that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage."

Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the burden of proof
necessarily rests on the defendant. But what is the exact degree of diligence
contemplated, and how does a parent prove it in connection with a particular act or
omission of a minor child, especially when it takes place in his absence or outside
his immediate company? Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated
measure applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a good
father of the family to prevent damage," it implies a consideration of the attendant
circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise
of such diligence the damage could have been prevented.

In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the
defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that
he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to
foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at
school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to
expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act
which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual
among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any
special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any
mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would
reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed
to her parents.

The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the
tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to compensate her
suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in court, but only the
moral compulsion of good conscience.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29352 July 22, 1985

EMERITO M. RAMOS, et al., petitioners,
vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents; COMMERCIAL
BANK OF MANILA, intervenor.

R E S O L U T I O N



TEEHANKEE, J.:

Pending final determination is respondent Central Bank's motion for
reconsideration dated December 28, 1982 of the Court's Resolution of October 19,
1982 which ruled "applying the Tapia ruling as reaffirmed by the Court in the
subsequent cases cited above OBM vs. Vicente Cordero, 113 SCRA 303 (March
30, 1982), per Escolin, J.; OBM vs. Julian Cordero, 113 SCRA 778 (April 27,
1982), per Barredo, J.) that the bank is not liable for interest on the Central Bank
loans and advances during the period of its closure from August 21 1968 to
January 8, 1981."

In the Tapia ruling (105 SCRA 49, June 11, 1981), the Court held that "the
obligation to pay interest on the deposit ceases the moment the operation of the
bank is completely suspended by the duly constituted authority, the Central Bank,"
and that "for the guidance of those who might be concerned, and so that
unnecessary litigations may be avoided from further clogging the dockets of the
courts, that in the light of the considerations expounded in the above opinion, the
same formula that exempts petitioner from the payment of interest to its depositors
during the whole period of factual stoppage of its operations by orders of the
Central Bank, modified in effect by the decision as well as the approval of a
formula of rehabilitation by this Court, should be, as a matter of consistency,
applicable or followed in respect to all other obligations of petitioner which could
not be paid during the period of its actual complete closure."

The parties have been extensively heard on the pending incident through their
various pleadings and in oral argument on October 23, 1984 as well as in their
memoranda in amplification of oral argument.

Respondents have failed to adduce any cogent argument to persuade the Court to
reconsider its Resolution at bar that the Tapia ruling as reaffirmed by the aforecited
cases is fully applicable to the non-payment of interest, during the period of the
bank's forcible closure, on loans and advances made by respondent Central Bank.
Respondent Central Bank itself when it was then managing the Overseas Bank of
Manila (now Commercial Bank of Manila) under a holding trust agreement, held
the same position in Idelfonso D. Yap vs. OBM and CB (CA-G.R. No. 48887-R)
wherein it argued in its brief that "(I)n a suit against the receiver of a national bank
for money loaned to the Bank while it was a going concern, it was error to permit
plaintiff to recover interest on the loan after the bank's suspension" (citing Zollman
Banks and Banking). In Pablo R. Roman et al vs. Central Bank (CA-G.R. No.
49144-R, October 18, 1973, per then Court of Appeals Justice Hermogenes
Concepcion, Jr.), the appellate court by final judgment affirmed the trial court's
judgment ordering appellant Central Bank to condone all interests on Central Bank
loans to the Republic Bank, as well as penalties imposed on it which would be
tantamount "to force the Republic Bank to liquidate as an insolvent." It should be
further noted that the respondent Central Bank when called upon to deal with
commercial banks and extend to them emergency loans and advances, deals with
them not as an ordinary creditor engaged in business, but as the ultimate monetary
authority of government charged with the supervision and preservation of the
banking system.

A significant development of the case also is set forth in the manifestation dated
October 19, 1984 of Government Corporate Counsel and general counsel of the
COMBANK Manuel M. Lazaro confirming inter alia that "(T)he Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) has acquired ownership of 99.93% of the
outstanding capital stock of COMBANK," and urging resolution at the earliest
time possible of the sole issue raised in respondent Central Bank's motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution of October 19, 1982 that "applying the Tapia
ruling as reaffirmed by the Court in subsequent cases, COMBANK is not liable for
interest on CB loans and advances during the period of its closure from August 2,
1968 to January 8, 1981 " (Record, Vol. V, p. 2261). In his earlier petition for early
resolution, Government Corporate Counsel Manuel M. Lazaro had likewise urged
that "(T)he raison d' etre of the Honorable Court's Resolution of October 19, 1982
is but a re- affirmation of the ruling laid down and firmly established in previous
decisions that have long become final, notably OBM vs. Tapia, 105 SCRA 49
(June 11, 1981), OBM vs. Vicente Cordero and Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 303
(Mar. 30, 1982), and OBM vs. Court of Appeals and Julian R. Cordero, 113 SCRA
778 (April 27, 1982)" (idem, p. 2242). Government Corporate Counsel Lazaro in
his aforecited manifestation removes any and all doubts as to the propriety of the
Court having rendered its Resolution of October 19, 1982 pursuant to the bank's
motion for a clarificatory ruling in the present case made pursuant to the express
agreement between the bank and the respondent Central Bank then under Governor
Jaime Laya. As stated in the Resolution itself, "the bank's letter of July 1, 1981
invoking the Tapia ruling was precisely the subject of the Central Bank's reply of
November 12, 1981 above quoted, agreeing anew that the Central Bank and the
Combank seek a clarificatory ruling from the Supreme Court on the applicability
of the Tapia ruling to the case at bar with both parties ultimately agreeing to 'abide
by any clarificatory ruling which the Supreme Court may render on the matter"
(Record, Vol. IV, pp. 1993-1994). The COMBANK in its said manifestation
makes of record that it has likewise entered into an agreement with its sister
government banking institution, the Philippine National Bank, that "both banks
have agreed to abide by the final resolution of this Honorable Court on the CB's
pending Motion for Reconsideration," and that "COMBANK is represented in the
above-captioned case by its General Counsel, the Government Corporate Counsel
who is also the legal counsel for the PNB and whose services were recently
retained by CB in connection with the controversy involving Banco Filipino and
Governor Jose B. Fernandez, Jr." This certainly makes moot any previous doubts
raised during the oral argument that then Central Bank Governor Jaime Laya may
not have had the authority to enter into such agreement.

The Court's Resolution of October 19, 1982 manifestly redounds to the benefit of
another government institution, the GSIS, which has acquired 99.93% of the
outstanding capital stock of the COMBANK and to the preservation of the banking
system. It is time to write finis to this case which had its beginnings long ago when
the original judgment of October 4, 1971 was rendered against the Central Bank, as
succinctly stated by the now Chief Justice in his "[concurrence] in the result
primarily on the ground that respondent's arbitrary and improvident exercise of its
asserted power in the premises is violative of due process" (Ramos vs. Central
Bank, 41 SCRA 565).

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY with finality respondent Central
Bank's motion for reconsideration, for lack of necessary votes.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 127930 December 15, 2000

MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JASPER BRIONES, JEROME GOMEZ,
RELLY CARPIO, ELIZABETH VALDEZCO, JOSE MARI RAMOS,
CAMILLE PORTUGAL, JOEL TAN and GERALD GARY RENACIDO,
respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

"Obscene," "vulgar," "indecent," "gross," "sexually explicit," "injurious to young
readers," and devoid of all moral values."1 This was now some members of the
Miriam College community allegedly described the contents of the September-
October 1994 issue (Vol. 41, No. 14) of Miriam College's school paper (Chi-Rho),
and magazine (Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho). The articles in the Chi-
Rho included:

. . . a story, clearly fiction, entitled 'Kaskas' written by one Gerald Garry Renacido .
. . Kaskas, written in Tagalog, treats of the experience of a group of young, male,
combo players who, one evening, after their performance went to see a bold show
in a place called "Flirtation". This was the way the author described the group's
exposure during that stage show:

"Sige, sa Flirtation tayo. Happy hour na halos . . . he! he! he! sambit ng kanilang
bokalistang kanina pa di maitago ang pagkahayok sa karneng babae na kanyang
pinananabikan nuong makalawa pa, susog naman ang tropa.

". . . Pumasok ang unang mananayaw. Si 'Red Raven' ayon sa emcee. Nakasuot
lamang ng bikining pula na may palamuting dilaw sa gilid-gilid at sa bandang
utong. Nagsimula siya sa kanyang pag-giling nang tumugtog na ang unang tono ng
"Goodbye" ng Air Supply. Dahan-dahan ang kanyang mga malalantik at mapang-
akit na galaw sa una. Mistulang sawa na nililingkis ang hangin, paru-parong
padapo-dapo sa mga bulaklak na lamesa, di-upang umamoy o kumuha ng nektar,
ngunit para ipaglantaran ang sariling bulaklak at ang angkin nitong malansang
nektar.

"Kaskas mo babe, sige . . . kaskas."

Napahaling ang tingin ng balerinang huwad kay Mike. Mistulang natipuhan, dahil
sa harap niya'y nagtagal. Nag-akmang mag-aalis ng pangitaas na kapirasong tela.
Hindi nakahinga si Mike, nanigas sa kanyang kinauupuan, nanigas pati ang nasa
gitna ng kanyang hita. Ang mga mata niya'y namagnet sa kayamanang ngayo'y
halos isang pulgada lamang mula sa kanyang naglalaway na bunganga. Naputol-
putol ang kanyang hininga nang kandungan ni 'Red Raven' ang kanyang kanang
hita. Lalo naghingalo siya nang kabayuhin ito ng dahan dahan . . . Pabilis ng
pabilis.'

The author further described Mike's responses to the dancer as follows (quoted in
part):

. . . Nagsimulang lumaban na ng sabayan si Mike sa dancer. Hindi nagpatalo ang
ibong walang pakpak, inipit ng husto ang hita ni Mike at pinag-udyukan ang
kanyang dibdib sa mukha nito.

"Kaskas mo pa, kaskas mo pa!"

Palpakan at halagpakan na tawanan ang tumambad sa kanya ng biglang halikan
siya nito sa labi at iniwang bigla, upang kanyang muniin ang naudlot niyang
pagtikim ng karnal na nektar. Hindi niya maanto kung siya ay nanalo o natalo sa
nangyaring sagupaan ng libog. Ang alam lang niya ay nanlata na siya."

After the show the group went home in a car with the bokalista driving. A
pedestrian happened to cross the street and the driver deliberately hit him with
these words:

"Pare tingnan natin kung immortal itong baboy na ito. He! He! He! He! Sabad ng
sabog nilang drayber/bokalista."

The story ends (with their car about to hit a truck) in these words: . . . "Pare . . .
trak!!! Put . . .!!!!

Ang Magasing Pampanitikan, October, 1994 issue, was in turn, given the cover
title of "Libog at iba pang tula."

In his foreword which Jerome Gomez entitled "Foreplay", Jerome wrote: "Alam
ko, nakakagulat ang aming pamagat." Jerome then proceeded to write about
previous reactions of readers to women-writers writing about matters erotic and to
gay literature. He justified the Magazine's erotic theme on the ground that many of
the poems passed on to the editors were about "sekswalidad at iba't ibang
karanasan nito." Nakakagulat ang tapang ng mga manunulat . . . tungkol sa
maselang usaping ito . . . at sa isang institusyon pang katulad ng Miriam!"

Mr. Gomez quoted from a poem entitled "Linggo" written by himself:

may mga palangganang nakatiwangwang -

mga putang biyak na sa gitna,

'di na puwedeng paglabhan,

'di na maaaring pagbabaran . . ."

Gomez stated that the poems in the magazine are not "garapal" and "sa mga tulang
ito namin maipagtatanggol ang katapangan (o pagka-sensasyonal) ng pamagat na
"Libog at iba pang Tula." He finished "Foreplay" with these words: "Dahil para
saan pa ang libog kung hindi ilalabas?"

The cover title in question appears to have been taken from a poem written by
Relly Carpio of the same title. The poem dealt on a woman and a man who met
each other, gazed at each other, went up close and "Naghalikan, Shockproof." The
poem contained a background drawing of a woman with her two mammary and
nipples exposed and with a man behind embracing her with the woman in a pose of
passion-filled mien.

Another poem entitled 'Virgin Writes Erotic' was about a man having fantasies in
his sleep. The last verse said: "At zenith I pull it out and find myself alone in this
fantasy." Opposite the page where this poem appeared was a drawing of a man
asleep and dreaming of a naked woman (apparently of his dreams) lying in bed on
her buttocks with her head up (as in a hospital bed with one end rolled up). The
woman's right nipple can be seen clearly. Her thighs were stretched up with her
knees akimbo on the bed.

In the next page (page 29) one finds a poem entitled "Naisip ko Lang" by Belle
Campanario. It was about a young student who has a love-selection problem: ". . .
Kung sinong pipiliin: ang teacher kong praning, o ang boyfriend kong bading."
The word "praning" as the court understands it, refers to a paranoid person; while
the word "bading" refers to a sward or "bakla" or "badidang". This poem also had
an illustration behind it: of a young girl with large eyes and sloping hair cascading
down her curves and holding a peeled banana whose top the illustrator shaded up
with downward-slanting strokes. In the poem, the girl wanted to eat banana topped
by peanut butter. In line with Jerome's "Foreplay" and by the way it was drawn that
banana with peanut butter top was meant more likely than not, to evoke a spiritedly
mundane, mental reaction from a young audience.

Another poem entitled "Malas ang Tatlo" by an unknown author went like this:

'Na picture mo na ba

no'ng magkatabi tayong dalawa

sa pantatluhang sofa -

ikaw, the legitimate asawa

at ako, biro mo, ang kerida?

tapos, tumabi siya, shit!

kumpleto na:

ikaw, ako at siya

kulang na lang, kamera."

A poem "Sa Gilid ng Itim" by Gerald Renacido in the Chi-Rho broadsheet spoke of
a fox (lobo) yearning for "karneng sariwa, karneng bata, karneng may kalambutan .
. . isang bahid ng dugong dalaga, maamo't malasa, ipahid sa mga labing sakim sa
romansa' and ended with 'hinog na para himukin bungang bibiyakin."2

Following the publication of the paper and the magazine, the members of the
editorial board,3 and Relly Carpio, author of Libog, all students of Miriam
College, received a letter signed by Dr. Aleli Sevilla, Chair of the Miriam College
Discipline Committee. The Letter dated 4 November 1994 stated:

This is to inform you that the letters of complain filed against you by members of
the Miriam Community and a concerned Ateneo grade five student have been
forwarded to the Discipline Committee for inquiry and investigation. Please find
enclosed complaints.

As expressed in their complaints you have violated regulations in the student
handbook specifically Section 2 letters B and R, pages 30 and 32, Section 4 (Major
offenses) letter j, page 36 letters m, n, and p, page 37 and no. 2 (minor offenses)
letter a, page 37.

You are required to submit a written statement in answer to the charge/s on or
before the initial date of hearing to be held on November 15, 1994, Tuesday, 1:00
in the afternoon at the DSA Conference Room.4

None of the students submitted their respective answers. They instead requested
Dr. Sevilla to transfer the case to the Regional Office of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) which under Rule XII of DECS Order No.
94, Series of 1992, supposedly had jurisdiction over the case.5

In a Letter dated 21 November 1994, Dr. Sevilla again required the students to file
their written answers.

In response, Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, lawyer for the students, submitted a letter6 to
the Discipline Committee reiterating his clients' position that said Committee had
no jurisdiction over them. According to Atty. Valmonte, the Committee was
"trying to impose discipline on his clients on account of their having written
articles and poems in their capacity as campus journalists." Hence, he argued that
"what applies is Republic Act No. 7079 The Campus Journalism Act and its
implementing rules and regulations." He also questioned the partiality of the
members of said Committee who allegedly "had already articulated their position"
against his clients.

The Discipline Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte. Thereafter,
the Discipline Board, after a review of the Discipline Committee's report, imposed
disciplinary sanctions upon the students, thus:

1. Jasper Briones Expulsion. Briones is the Editor-in-Chief of Chi-Rho and
a 4th year student;
2. Daphne Cowper suspension up to (summer) March, 1995;
3. Imelda Hilario suspension for two (2) weeks to expire on February 2,
1995;
4. Deborah Ligon suspension up to May, 1995. Miss Ligon is a 4th year
student and could graduate as summa cum laude;
5. Elizabeth Valdezco suspension up to (summer) March, 1995;
6. Camille Portugal graduation privileges withheld, including diploma. She is
an Octoberian;
7. Joel Tan suspension for two (2) weeks to expire on February 2, 1995;
8. Gerald Gary Renacido Expelled and given transfer credentials. He is a
2nd year student. He wrote the fiction story "Kaskas";
9. Relly CarpioDismissed and given transfer credentials. He is in 3rd year and
wrote the poem "Libog";
10. Jerome Gomez Dismissed and given transfer credentials. He is in 3rd
year. He wrote the foreword "Foreplay" to the questioned Anthology of Poems;
and
11. Jose Mari Ramos Expelled and given transfer papers. He is a 2nd year
student and art editor of Chi-Rho.7
The above students thus filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with
preliminary injunction/restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City questioning the jurisdiction of the Discipline Board of Miriam College over
them.

On 17 January 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII, presided by Judge
Jaime N. Salazar, Jr., issued an order denying the plaintiffs' prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order. It held:

There is nothing in the DECS Order No. 94, S. 1992 dated August 19, 1992 that
excludes school Administrators from exercising jurisdiction over cases of the
nature involved in the instant petition. R.A. 7079 also does not state anything on
the matter of jurisdiction. The DECS undoubtedly cannot determine the extent of
the nature of jurisdiction of schools over disciplinary cases. Moreover, as this
Court reads that DECS Order No. 94, S. of 1992, it merely prescribes for purposes
of internal administration which DECS officer or body shall hear cases arising
from R A. 7079 if and when brought to it for resolution. The said order never
mentioned that it has exclusive jurisdiction over cases falling under R.A. 707.8

The students thereafter filed a "Supplemental Petition and Motion for
Reconsideration." The College followed with its Answer.

Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order dated 10 February 1995 granting the writ
of preliminary injunction.

ACCORDINGLY, so as not to render the issues raised moot and academic, let a
writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining the defendants, including the officers
and members of the Disciplinary Committee, the Disciplinary Board, or any
similar body and their agents, and the officers and members of the Security
Department, Division, or Security Agency securing the premises and campus of
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. from:

1. Enforcing and/or implementing the expulsion or dismissal resolutions or
orders complained of against herein plaintiffs (a) Jasper Briones; (b) Gerald Gary
Renacido; (c) Relly Carpio; (d) Jerome Gomez; and (e) Jose Mari Ramos, but
otherwise allowing the defendants to impose lesser sanctions on aforementioned
plaintiffs; and

2. Disallowing, refusing, barring or in any way preventing the herein plaintiffs
(all eleven of them) from taking tests or exams and entering the Miriam campus for
such purpose as extended to all students of Miriam College Foundation, Inc.;
neither should their respective course or subject teachers or professors withhold
their grades, including final grades, if and when they meet the requirements
similarly prescribed for all other students, this current 2nd Semester of 1994-95.

The sanctions imposed on the other plaintiffs, namely, Deborah Ligon, Imelda
Hilario, Elizabeth Valdezco, Camille Portugal and Daphne Cowper, shall remain in
force and shall not be covered by this Injunction: Provided, that Camille Portugal
now a graduate, shall have the right to receive her diploma, but defendants are not
hereby prevented from refusing her the privilege of walking on the graduation
stage so as to prevent any likely public tumults.

The plaintiffs are required to post an injunction bond in the sum of Four Thousand
Pesos (P4,000.00) each.

SO ORDERED.9

Both parties moved for a reconsideration of the above order. In an Order dated 22
February 1995, the RTC dismissed the petition, thus:

4. On the matter raised by both parties that it is the DECS which has
jurisdiction, inasmuch as both parties do not want this court to assume jurisdiction
here then this court will not be more popish than the Pope and in fact is glad that it
will have one more case out of its docket.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the
parties going to another forum.

All orders heretofore issued here are hereby recalled and set aside.

SO ORDERED.10

The students, excluding Deborah Ligon, Imelda Hilario and Daphne Cowper,
sought relief in this Court through a petition for certiorari and prohibition of
preliminary injunction/restraining order11 questioning the Orders of the RTC dated
10 and 24 February 1995.

On 15 March 1995, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals
(CA) for disposition.12 On 19 May 1995, the CA issued a resolution stating:

The respondents are hereby required to file comment on the instant petition and to
show cause why no writ of preliminary injunction should be issued, within ten (10)
days from notice hereof, and the petitioners may file reply thereto within five (5)
days from receipt of former's comment.

In order not to render ineffectual the instant petition, let a Temporary Restraining
Order be issued enjoining the public respondents from enforcing letters of
dismissal/suspension dated January 19, 1995.

SO ORDERED.13

In its Decision dated 26 September 1996, respondent court granted the students'
petition. The CA declared the RTC Order dated 22 February 1995, as well as the
students' suspension and dismissal, void.

Hence, this petition by Miriam College.

We limit our decision to the resolution of the following issues:

(1) The alleged moot character of the case.

(2) The jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain the petition for certiorari filed
by the students.

(3) The power of petitioner to suspend or dismiss respondent students.

(4) The jurisdiction of petitioner over the complaints against the students.

We do not tackle the alleged obscenity of the publication, the propriety of the
penalty imposed or the manner of the imposition thereof. These issues, though
touched upon by the parties in the proceedings below, were not fully ventilated
therein.

I

Petitioner asserts the Court of Appeals found the case moot thus:

While this petition may be considered moot and academic since more than one
year have passed since May 19, 1995 when this court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents from enforcing the dismissal and
suspension on petitioners . . .14

Since courts do not adjudicate moot cases, petitioner argues that the CA should not
have proceeded with the adjudication of the merits of the case.

We find that the case is not moot.

It may be noted that what the court issued in 19 May 1995 was a temporary
restraining order, not a preliminary injunction. The records do not show that the
CA ever issued a preliminary injunction.

Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding
prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person
to perform to refrain from performing a particular act or acts.15 As an
extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the status
quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until
the merits of the case can be heard.16 A preliminary injunction persists until it is
dissolved or until the termination of the action without the court issuing a final
injunction.

The basic purpose of restraining order, on the other hand, is to preserve the status
quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction.17 Under the
former 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as amended by 5, Batas Pambansa Blg.
224, a judge (or justice) may issue a temporary restraining order with a limited life
of twenty days from date of issue.18 If before the expiration of the 20-day period
the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary order would
thereby be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the
application for preliminary injunction within the said 20 days, the temporary
restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of
law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.19 In the instant case, no
such preliminary injunction was issued; hence, the TRO earlier issued
automatically expired under the aforesaid provision of the Rules of Court.20

This limitation as to the duration of the temporary restraining order was the rule
prevailing when the CA issued its TRO dated 19 May 1995.21 By that time
respondents Elizabeth Valdezco and Joel Tan had already served their respective
suspensions. The TRO was applicable only to respondents Jasper Briones, Jerome
Gomez, Relly Carpio, Jose Mari Ramos and Gerald Gary Renacido all of whom
were dismissed, and respondent Camille Portugal whose graduation privileges
were withheld. The TRO, however, lost its effectivity upon the lapse of the twenty
days. It can hardly be said that in that short span of time, these students had already
graduated as to render the case moot.

Either the CA was of the notion that its TRO was effective throughout the
pendency of the case or that what is issued was a preliminary injunction. In either
case, it was error on the part of the CA to assume that its order supposedly
enjoining Miriam from enforcing the dismissal and suspension was complied with.
A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy
between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the
merits.22 To determine the moot character of a question before it, the appellate
court may receive proof or take notice of facts appearing outside the record.23 In
the absence of such proof or notice of facts, the Court of Appeals should not have
assumed that its TRO was enforced, and that the case was rendered moot by the
mere lapse of time.

Indeed, private respondents in their Comment herein24 deny that the case has
become moot since Miriam refused them readmission in violation of the TRO. This
fact is unwittingly conceded by Miriam itself when, to counter this allegation by
the students, it says that private respondents never sought readmission after the
restraining order was issued.25 In truth, Miriam relied on legal technicalities to
subvert the clear intent of said order, which states:

In order not to render ineffectual the instant petition, let a Temporary Restraining
Order be issued enjoining the public respondents from enforcing letters of
dismissal/suspension dated January 19, 1995.

Petitioner says that the above order is "absurd" since the order "incorrectly directs
public respondent, the Hon. Jaime Salazar, presiding judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City not to dismiss or suspend the students."26

We do not agree. Padua vs. Robles27 lays down the rules in construing judgments.
We find these rules to be applicable to court orders as well:

The sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested by its substance rather
than its form. In construing a judgment, its legal effects including such effects that
necessarily follow because of legal implications, rather than the language used,
govern. Also, its meaning, operation, and consequences must be ascertained like
any other written instrument. Thus, a judgment rests on the intent of the court as
gathered from every part thereof, including the situation to which it applies and
attendant circumstances. (Emphasis supplied.)

Tested by such standards, we find that the order was indeed intended for private
respondents (in the appellate court) Miriam College, et al., and not public
respondent Judge. In dismissing the case, the trial judge recalled and set aside all
orders it had previously issued, including the writ of preliminary injunction. In
doing so, the trial court allowed the dismissal and suspension of the students to
remain in force. Thus, it would indeed be absurd to construe the order as being
directed to the RTC. Obviously, the TRO was intended for Miriam College.

True, respondent-students should have asked for a clarification of the above order.
They did not. Nevertheless, if Miriam College found the order "absurd," then it
should have sought a clarification itself so the Court of Appeals could have cleared
up any confusion. It chose not to. Instead, it took advantage of the supposed
vagueness of the order and used the same to justify its refusal to readmit the
students.

As Miriam never readmitted the students, the CA's ruling that the case is moot has
no basis. How then can Miriam argue in good faith that the case had become moot
when it knew all along that the facts on which the purported moot character of the
case were based did not exist? Obviously, Miriam is clutching to the CA's
wrongful assumption that the TRO it issued was enforced to justify the reversal of
the CA's decision.

Accordingly, we hold that the case is not moot, Miriam's pretensions to the
contrary notwithstanding.

II

"To uphold and protect the freedom of the press even at the campus level and to
promote the development and growth of campus journalism as a means of
strengthening ethical values, encouraging critical and creative thinking, and
developing moral character and personal discipline of the Filipino youth,"28
Congress enacted in 1991 Republic Act No. 7079. Entitled "AN ACT
PROVIDING FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND PROMOTION OF CAMPUS
JOURNALISM AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,"29 the law contains provisions
for the selection of the editorial board30 and publication adviser,31 the funding of
the school publication,32 and the grant of exemption to donations used actually,
directly and exclusively for the promotion of campus journalism from donor's or
gift tax.33

Noteworthy are provisions clearly intended to provide autonomy to the editorial
board and its members. Thus, the second paragraph of Section 4 states that "(o)nce
the publication is established, its editorial board shall freely determine its editorial
policies and-manage the publication's funds."

Section 7, in particular, provides:

A member of the publication staff must maintain his or her status as student in
order to retain membership in the publication staff. A student shall not be expelled
or suspended solely on the basis of articles he or she has written, or on the basis of
the performance of his or her duties in the student publication.

Section 9 of the law mandates the DECS to "promulgate the rules and regulations
necessary for the effective implementation of this Act."34 Pursuant to said
authority, then DECS Secretary Armand Fabella, issued DECS Order No. 94,
Series of 1992, providing under Rule XII that:

GENERAL PROVISIONS

SECTION 1. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) shall
help ensure and facilitate the proper carrying out of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 7079. It shall also act on cases on appeal brought
before it.

The DECS regional office shall have the original jurisdiction over cases as a result
of the decisions, actions and policies of the editorial board of a school within its
area of administrative responsibility. It shall conduct investigations and hearings
on the these cases within fifteen (15) days after the completion of the resolution of
each case. (Emphasis supplied.)

The latter two provisions of law appear to be decisive of the present case.

It may be recalled that after the Miriam Disciplinary Board imposed disciplinary
sanctions upon the students, the latter filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
in the Regional Trial Court raising, as grounds therefor, that:

I

DEFENDANT'S DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE AND DISCIPLINARY
BOARD OF DEFENDANT SCHOOL HAVE NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
CASE.35

II

DEFENDANT SCHOOL'S DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE AND THE
DISCIPLINARY BOARD DO NOT HAVE THE QUALIFICATION OF AN
IMPARTIAL AND NEUTRAL ARBITER AND, THEREFORE THEIR TAKING
COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE AGAINST PLAINTIFFS WILL DENY THE
LATTER OF THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.36

Anent the first ground, the students theorized that under Rule XII of the Rules and
Regulations for the Implementation of R.A. No. 7079, the DECS Regional Office,
and not the school, had jurisdiction over them. The second ground, on the other
hand, alleged lack of impartiality of the Miriam Disciplinary Board, which would
thereby deprive them of due process. This contention, if true, would constitute
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the trial court. These were the same grounds invoked by the students in their
refusal to answer the charges against them. The issues were thus limited to the
question of jurisdiction - a question purely legal in nature and well within the
competence and the jurisdiction of the trial court, not the DECS Regional Office.
This is an exception to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. As the Court held in
Phil. Global Communications, Inc. vs. Relova.37

Absent such clarity as to the scope and coverage of its franchise, a legal question
arises which is more appropriate for the judiciary than for an administrative agency
to resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction calls for application when there is
such competence to act on the part of an administrative body. Petitioner assumes
that such is the case. That is to beg the question. There is merit, therefore, to the
approach taken by private respondents to seek judicial remedy as to whether or not
the legislative franchise could be so interpreted as to enable the National
Telecommunications Commission to act on the matter. A jurisdictional question
thus arises and calls for an answer.

However, when Miriam College in its motion for reconsideration contended that
the DECS Regional Office, not the RTC, had jurisdiction, the trial court, refusing
to "be more popish than the Pope," dismissed the case. Indeed, the trial court could
hardly contain its glee over the fact that "it will have one more case out of its
docket." We remind the trial court that a court having jurisdiction of a case has not
only the right and the power or authority, but also the duty, to exercise that
jurisdiction and to render a decision in a case properly submitted to it.38
Accordingly, the trial court should not have dismissed the petition without settling
the issues presented before it.

III

Before we address the question of which between the DECS Regional Office and
Miriam College has jurisdiction over the complaints against the students, we first
delve into the power of either to impose disciplinary sanctions upon the students.
Indeed, the resolution of the issue of jurisdiction would be reduced to an academic
exercise if neither the DECS Regional Office nor Miriam College had the power to
impose sanctions upon the students.

Recall, for purposes of this discussion, that Section 7 of the Campus Journalism
Act prohibits the expulsion or suspension of a student solely on the basis of articles
he or she has written.

A.

Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher
learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right
of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to
attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the
overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.39 The essential freedoms
subsumed in the term "academic freedom" encompasses the freedom to determine
for itself on academic grounds:

(1) Who may teach,

(2) What may be taught,

(3) How it shall be taught, and

(4) Who may be admitted to study.40

The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third
freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot function in an
atmosphere of anarchy.

Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution
requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly
educational program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to
learning. Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the
students, faculty, and property.41

Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary,
if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the
school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise
finds basis in the freedom "what to teach."

Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in
its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.

All educational institutions shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love
of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in
the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship,
strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal
discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and
technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency.42

In Angeles vs. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the school to
carry out its responsibility to help its students "grow and develop into mature,
responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community."43

Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline more evident
than in "who may be admitted to study." If a school has the freedom to determine
whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine whom to
exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as
suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges.

Thus, in Ateneo de Manila vs. Capulong,44 the Court upheld the expulsion of
students found guilty of hazing by petitioner therein, holding that:

No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of
respondent students who have been investigated and found guilty by the
Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and
standards will certainly undermine the authority of the administration of the
school. This we would be most loathe to do.

More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom
which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitution.45

Tracing the development of academic freedom, the Court continued:

Since Garcia vs. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the
salutary proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is
discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student
rather than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right
"to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue
their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the
established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic
institution.

"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for
the admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right . . . extends as well
to parents . . . as parents under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation,
individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools."

Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the
successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing
student discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of the rules governing
university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may
be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the
institution, but to its very survival.

Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the
academic groves as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for
themselves from the panoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized
under the rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, In Hohfeldian terms, they
have the concomitant duty, and that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid down
by the school.

. . . It must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop
the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and
attitudes; may, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.

In essence, education must ultimately be religious - not in the sense that the
founders or charter members of the institution are sectarian or profess a religious
ideology. Rather, a religious education, as the renowned philosopher Alfred North
Whitehead said, is 'an education which inculcates duty and reverence.' It appears
that the particular brand of religious education offered by the Ateneo de Manila
University has been lost on the respondent students.

Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as the Ateneo
de Manila University as their own a minute longer, for they may foreseeably cast a
malevolent influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those who come
after them.1avvphi1

Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah v. Court of
Appeals that: "The maintenance of a morally conducive and orderly educational
environment will be seriously imperilled, if, under the circumstances of this case,
Grace Christian is forced to admit petitioner's children and to reintegrate them to
the student body." Thus, the decision of petitioner university to expel them is but
congruent with the gravity of their misdeeds.46

B.

Section 4 (1), Article XIV of the Constitution recognizes the State's power to
regulate educational institution:

The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in
the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of
all educational institutions.

As may be gleaned from the above provision, such power to regulate is subject to
the requirement of reasonableness. Moreover, the Constitution allows merely the
regulation and supervision of educational institutions, not the deprivation of their
rights.

C.

In several cases, this Court has upheld the right of the students to free speech in
school premises. In the landmark case of Malabanan vs. Ramento,47 students of
the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, believing that the merger of the
Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture would result in the
increase in their tuition, held a demonstration to protest the proposed merger. The
rally however was held at a place other than that specified in the school permit and
continued longer than the time allowed. The protest, moreover, disturbed the
classes and caused the stoppage of the work of non-academic personnel. For the
illegal assembly, the university suspended the students for one year. In affirming
the students' rights to peaceable assembly and free speech, the Court through Mr.
Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, echoed the ruling of the US Supreme Court in
Tinker v. Des Moines School District.48

Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. They are
entitled to do so. They enjoy like the rest of the citizens the freedom to express
their views and communicate their thoughts to those disposed to listen in
gatherings such as was held in this case. They do not, to borrow from the opinion
of Justice Fortas in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 'shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.'
While, therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of
students must be recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional
safeguards. On a more specific level there is persuasive force to this Fortas
opinion. "The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate
students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities.
Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the students. This is
not only inevitable part of the educational process. A student's rights, therefore, do
not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the
playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his
opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so
without 'materially and substantially interfering with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and without colliding with the
rights of others. . . . But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason - whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of
course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.49

The Malabanan ruling was followed in Villar vs. Technological Institute of the
Philippines,50 Arreza vs. Gregorio Araneta University Foundation,51 and Non vs.
Dames II.52

The right of the students to free speech in school premises, however, is not
absolute. The right to free speech must always be applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment.53 Thus, while we upheld the right of the
students to free expression in these cases, we did not rule out disciplinary action by
the school for "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason -
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - which materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."54
Thus, in Malabanan, we held:

6. Objection is made by private respondents to the tenor of the speeches by the
student leaders. That there would be a vigorous presentation of view opposed to
the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of
Agriculture was to be expected. There was no concealment of the fact that they
were against such a move as it confronted them with a serious problem ("isang
malaking suliranin.") They believed that such a merger would result in the increase
in tuition fees, an additional headache for their parents ("isa na naman sakit sa ulo
ng ating mga magulang.") If in the course of such demonstration, with an
enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances extremely critical at times, even
vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite understandable. Student leaders are hardly the
timid, different types. They are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be
ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the
academe. At any rate, even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full
credence to their fiery exhortations. They take into account the excitement of the
occasion, the propensity of speakers to exaggerate, the exuberance of youth. They
may give the speakers the benefit of their applause, but with the activity taking
place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of
public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the taking of disciplinary
action for conduct, which, to borrow from Tinker, "materially disrupts classwork
or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."55

It is in the light of this standard that we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism
Act. Provisions of law should be construed in harmony with those of the
Constitution; acts of the legislature should be construed, wherever possible, in a
manner that would avoid their conflicting with the fundamental law.56 A statute
should not be given a broad construction if its validity can be saved by a narrower
one.57 Thus, Section 7 should be read in a manner as not to infringe upon the
school's right to discipline its students. At the same time, however, we should not
construe said provision as to unduly restrict the right of the students to free speech.
Consistent with jurisprudence, we read Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act to
mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the
articles he or she has written, except when such article materially disrupt class
work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.

IV.

From the foregoing, the answer to the question of who has jurisdiction over the
cases filed against respondent students becomes self-evident. The power of the
school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary
corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe
and orderly educational environment conducive to learning.58 That power, like the
power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. We therefore rule
that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against
respondent students.1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner Miriam College is ordered to READMIT private respondent
Joel Tan whose suspension has long lapsed.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140604. March 6, 2002]
DR. RICO S. JACUTIN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J .:
In an accusatory Information, dated 22 July 1996, petitioner, City Health Officer
Rico Jacutin of Cagayan de Oro City, was charged before the Sandiganbayan, Fourth
Division, with the crime of Sexual Harassment, thusly:
That sometime on or about 01 December 1995, in Cagayan de Oro City, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court pursuant to the provisions of RA 7975, the
accused, a public officer, being then the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City
with salary grade 26 but a high ranking official by express provision of RA 7975,
committing the offense in relation to his official functions and taking advantage of his
position, did there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, demand, solicit,
request sexual favors from Ms. Juliet Q. Yee, a young 22 year-old woman, single and
fresh graduate in Bachelor of Science in Nursing who was seeking employment in the
office of the accused, namely: by demanding from Ms. Yee that she should, expose
her body and allow her private parts to be mashed and stimulated by the accused,
which sexual favor was made as a condition for the employment of Ms. Yee in the
Family Program of the Office of the accused, thus constituting sexual harassment.
[1]

Upon his arraignment, petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged; hence,
trial proceeded.
Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing, averred that on 28
November 1995 her father accompanied her to the office of petitioner at the City
Health Office to seek employment. Juliets father and petitioner were childhood
friends. Juliet was informed by the doctor that the City Health Office had just then
filled up the vacant positions for nurses but that he would still see if he might be able
to help her.
The following day, 29 November 1995, Juliet and her father returned to the City
Health Office, and they were informed by petitioner that a medical group from Texas,
U.S.A., was coming to town in December to look into putting up a clinic in Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro, where she might be considered. On 01 December 1995, around nine
oclock in the morning, she and her father went back to the office of petitioner. The
latter informed her that there was a vacancy in a family planning project for the city
and that, if she were interested, he could interview her for the job. Petitioner then
started putting up to her a number of questions. When asked at one point whether or
not she already had a boyfriend, she said no. Petitioner suggested that perhaps if her
father were not around, she could afford to be honest in her answers to the
doctor. The father, taking the cue, decided to leave. Petitioner then inquired whether
she was still a virgin, explaining to her his theory on the various aspects of
virginity. He hypothetically asked whether she would tell her family or friends if a
male friend happened to intimately touch her. Petitioner later offered her the job
where she would be the subject of a research program. She was requested to be
back after lunch.
Before proceeding to petitioners office that afternoon, Juliet dropped by at the
nearby church to seek divine guidance as she felt so confused. When she got to the
office, petitioner made several telephone calls to some hospitals to inquire whether
there was any available opening for her. Not finding any, petitioner again offered her
a job in the family planning research undertaking. She expressed hesitation if a
physical examination would include hugging her but petitioner assured her that he
was only kidding about it. Petitioner then invited her to go bowling. Petitioner told
her to meet him at Borja Street so that people would not see them on board the same
car together. Soon, at the designated place, a white car driven by petitioner
stopped. She got in. Petitioner held her pulse and told her not to be scared. After
dropping by at his house to put on his bowling attire, petitioner got back to the car.
While driving, petitioner casually asked her if she already took her bath, and she
said she was so in a hurry that she did not find time for it. Petitioner then inquired
whether she had varicose veins, and she said no. Petitioner told her to raise her foot
and lower her pants so that he might confirm it. She felt assured that it was all part of
the research. Petitioner still pushed her pants down to her knees and held her
thigh. He put his hands inside her panty until he reached her pubic hair. Surprised,
she exclaimed hala ka! and instinctively pulled her pants up. Petitioner then
touched her abdomen with his right hand saying words of endearment and letting the
back of his palm touch her forehead. He told her to raise her shirt to check whether
she had nodes or lumps. She hesitated for a while but, eventually, raised it up to her
navel. Petitioner then fondled her breast. Shocked at what petitioner did, she lowered
her shirt and embraced her bag to cover herself, telling him angrily that she was
through with the research. He begged her not to tell anybody about what had just
happened. Before she alighted from the car, petitioner urged her to reconsider her
decision to quit. He then handed over to her P300.00 for her expenses.
Arriving home, she told her mother about her meeting with Dr. Jacutin and the
money he gave her but she did not give the rest of the story. Her mother scolded her
for accepting the money and instructed her to return it. In the morning of 04
December 1994, Juliet repaired to the clinic to return the money to petitioner but she
was not able to see him until about one oclock in the afternoon. She tried to give
back the money but petitioner refused to accept it.
A week later, Juliet told her sister about the incident. On 16 December 1995, she
attempted to slash her wrist with a fastener right after relating the incident to her
mother. Noticing that Juliet was suffering from some psychological problem, the
family referred her to Dr. Merlita Adaza for counseling. Dr. Adaza would later testify
that Juliet, together with her sister, came to see her on 21 December 1995, and that
Juliet appeared to be emotionally disturbed, blaming herself for being so stupid as to
allow Dr. Jacutin to molest her. Dr. Adaza concluded that Juliets frustration was due
to post trauma stress.
Petitioner contradicted the testimony of Juliet Yee. He claimed that on 28
November 1995 he had a couple of people who went to see him in his office, among
them, Juliet and her father, Pat. Justin Yee, who was a boyhood friend. When it was
their turn to talk to petitioner, Pat. Yee introduced his daughter Juliet who expressed
her wish to join the City Health Office. Petitioner replied that there was no vacancy
in his office, adding that only the City Mayor really had the power to appoint city
personnel. On 01 December 1995, the afternoon when the alleged incident happened,
he was in a meeting with the Committee on Awards in the Office of the City
Mayor. On 04 December 1995, when Juliet said she went to his office to return the
P300.00, he did not report to the office for he was scheduled to leave for Davao at
2:35 p.m. to attend a hearing before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. He
submitted in evidence a photocopy of his plane ticket. He asserted that the complaint
for sexual harassment, as well as all the other cases filed against him by Vivian Yu,
Iryn Salcedo, Mellie Villanueva and Pamela Rodis, were but forms of political
harassment directed at him.
The Sandiganbayan, through its Fourth Division, rendered its decision, dated 05
November 1999, penned by Mr. Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao, finding the accused, Dr.
Rico Jacutin, guilty of the crime of Sexual Harassment under Republic Act No.
7877. The Sandiganbayan concluded:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, convicting the accused RICO
JACUTIN Y SALCEDO of the crime of Sexual Harassment, defined and punished
under R.A. No. 7877, particularly Secs. 3 and 7 of the same Act, properly known as
the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Accused is
further ordered to indemnify the offended party in the amount of Three Hundred
Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos, by way of moral damages; Two Hundred Thousand
(P200,000.00) Pesos, by way of Exemplary damages and to pay the cost of suit.
[2]

In the instant recourse, it is contended that -
I. Petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of sexual harassment in view of the
inapplicability of Republic Act No. 7877 to the case at bar.
II. Petitioner [has been] denied x x x his constitutional right to due process of law
and presumption of innocence on account of the insufficiency of the prosecution
evidence to sustain his conviction.
[3]

The above contentions of petitioner are not meritorious. Section 3 of Republic
Act 7877 provides:
SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. Work,
education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer,
employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor,
coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral
ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands,
requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether
the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said
Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed
when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-
employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said
individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or
the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the
employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee.
Petitioner was the City Health Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, a position he held
when complainant, a newly graduated nurse, saw him to enlist his help in her desire to
gain employment. He did try to show an interest in her plight, her father being a
boyhood friend, but finding no opening suitable for her in his office, he asked her
about accepting a job in a family planning research project. It all started from there;
the Sandiganbayan recited the rest of the story:
x x x. Succeeding in convincing the complainant that her physical examination
would be a part of a research, accused asked complainant if she would agree that her
private parts (bolts) would be seen. Accused assured her that with her cooperation in
the research, she would gain knowledge from it. As complainant looked upon the
accused with utmost reverence, respect, and paternal guidance, she agreed to undergo
the physical examination. At this juncture, accused abruptly stopped the interview
and told the complainant to go home and be back at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of
the same day, December 1, 1995. Complainant returned at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon, but did not proceed immediately to the office of the accused, as she
dropped by a nearby church to ask divine guidance, as she was confused and at a loss
on how to resolve her present predicament. At 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, she went
back to the office of the accused. And once inside, accused called up a certain
Madonna, inquiring if there was a vacancy, but he was told that she would only accept
a registered nurse. Complainant was about to leave the office of the accused when the
latter prevailed upon her to stay because he would call one more hospital. In her
presence, a call was made. But again accused told her that there was no vacancy. As
all efforts to look for a job in other hospitals failed, accused renewed the offer to the
complainant to be a part of the research in the Family Planning Program where there
would be physical examination. Thereafter, accused motioned his two (2) secretaries
to go out of the room. Upon moving closer to the complainant, accused asked her if
she would agree to the offer. Complainant told him she would not agree because the
research included hugging. He then assured her that he was just kidding and that a
pre-schooler and high schooler have already been subjected to such
examination. With assurance given, complainant changed her mind and agreed to the
research, for she is now convinced that she would be of help to the research and
would gain knowledge from it. At this point, accused asked her if she was a
tomboy, she answered in the negative. He then instructed her to go with him but he
would first play bowling, and later proceed with the research (physical
examination). On the understanding of the complainant that they will proceed to the
clinic where the research will be conducted, she agreed to go with the accused. But
accused instructed her to proceed to Borja St. where she will just wait for him, as it
was not good for people to see them riding in a car together. She walked from the
office of the accused and proceeded to Borja St. as instructed. And after a while, a
white car arrived. The door was opened to her and she was instructed by the accused
to come inside. Inside the car, he called her attention why she was in a pensive
mood. She retorted she was not. As they were seated side by side, the accused held
her pulse and told her not to be scared. He informed her that he would go home for a
while to put on his bowling attire. After a short while, he came back inside the car
and asked her if she has taken a bath. She explained that she was not able to do so
because she left the house hurriedly. Still while inside the car, accused directed her to
raise her foot so he could see whether she has varicose veins on her legs. Thinking
that it was part of the research, she did as instructed. He told her to raise it higher, but
she protested. He then instructed her to lower her pants instead. She did lower her
pants, exposing half of her legs. But then the accused pushed it forward down to her
knees and grabbed her legs. He told her to raise her shirt. Feeling as if she had lost
control of the situation, she raised her shirt as instructed. Shocked, she exclaimed,
hala ka! because he tried to insert his hand into her panty. Accused then held her
abdomen, saying, you are like my daughter, Day! (Visayan word of endearment),
and let the back of his palm touch her forehead, indicating the traditional way of
making the young respect their elders. He again told her to raise her shirt. Feeling
embarrassed and uncomfortable, yet unsure whether she was entertaining malice, she
raised her shirt up to her breast. He then fondled her breast. Reacting, she impulsively
lower her shirt and embraced her bar while silently asking God what was happening to
her and asking the courage to resist accuseds physical advances. After a short while,
she asked him if there could be a right place for physical examination where there
would be many doctors. He just exclaimed, so you like that there are many doctors!
Then he asked her if she has tooth decay. Thinking that he was planning to kiss her,
she answered that she has lots of decayed teeth. He advised her then to have them
treated. Finally, she informed him that she would not continue with the research. The
accused retorted that complainant was entertaining malice and reminded her of what
she earlier agreed; that she would not tell anybody about what happened. He then
promised to give her P15,000.00 so that she could take the examination. She was
about to open the door of the car when he suddenly grabbed her thigh, but this time,
complainant instantly parried his hand with her bag.
[4]

While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel,
it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a recommendation from petitioner in the
appointment of personnel in the municipal health office could carry good
weight. Indeed, petitioner himself would appear to have conveyed, by his words and
actions, an impression that he could facilitate Juliets employment. Indeed, petitioner
would not have been able to take undue liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not
been for his high position in the City Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City. The
findings of the Sandiganbayan were bolstered by the testimony of Vivian Yu,
petitioners secretary between 1979 to 1994, of Iryn Lago Salcedo, Public Health
Nurse II, and of Farah Dongallo y Alkuino, a city health nurse, all of whom were said
to have likewise been victims of perverse behavior by petitioner.
The Sandiganbayan rightly rejected the defense of alibi proffered by petitioner,
i.e., that he was at a meeting of the Committee on Awards; the court a quo said:
There are some observations which the Court would like to point out on the evidence
adduced by the defense, particularly in the Minutes of the meeting of the Awards
Committee, as testified to by witness Myrna Maagad on September 8, 1998.
First, admitted, Teresita I. Rozabal was the immediate supervisor of witness Myrna
Maagad. The Notices to hold the meeting (Exh. 3-A and 3-B) were signed by
Teresita Rozabal. But the Minutes of the meeting, Exh. 5, was signed by Myrna
Maagad and not by Teresita Rozabal. The documents, Exhs. 3-A and 3-B certify
that the officially designated secretary of the Awards Committee was Teresita
Rozabal.
Second, why was Myrna Maagad in possession of the attendance logbook and how
was she able to personally bring the same in court when she testified on September 8,
1998, when in fact, she admitted during her testimony that she retired from the
government service on December 1, 1997? Surely, Myrna Maagad could not still be
the custodian of the logbook when she testified.
And finally, in the logbook, under the sub-heading, Others Present, the attendance
of those who attended was individually handwritten by the persons concerned who
wrote and signed their names. But in the case of Dr. Tiro and Dr. Rico Jacutin, their
names were handwritten by clerk Sylvia Tan-Nerry, not by Dr. Tiro and Dr.
Jacutin. However, Myrna Maagad testified that the logbook was passed around to
attending individuals inside the conference room.
[5]

Most importantly, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the factual
findings of the Sandiganbayan must be respected by, if not indeed conclusive upon,
the tribunal,
[6]
no cogent reasons having been sufficiently shown to now hold
otherwise. The assessment on the credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the
trial court because of its unique position of being able to observe that elusive and
incommunicable evidence on the deportment of witnesses at the stand, an opportunity
that is denied the appellate court.
[7]

Conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the grant of moral and exemplary
damages by the Sandiganbayan must be tempered to reasonable levels. Moral
damages are not intended to enrich a complainant but are awarded only to enable an
injured party obtain some means that would help obviate the sufferings sustained on
account of the culpable action of an offender. Its award must not appear to be the
result of passion or undue prejudice,
[8]
and it must always reasonably approximate the
extent of injury and be proportional to the wrong committed. Indeed, Juliet should be
recompensed for her mental anguish. Dr. Merlita F. Adaza, a psychological
counseling expert, has found Juliet to be emotionally and psychologically disturbed
and suffering from post trauma stress following her unpleasant experience with
petitioner. The Court finds it fitting to award in favor of Juliet Yee P30,000.00 moral
damages. In addition, she should be entitled to P20,000.00 exemplary damages to
serve as a deterrent against, or as a negative incentive to curb, socially deleterious
actions.
[9]

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 23799, finding Dr. Rico Jacutin y Salcedo GUILTY of the crime of Sexual
Harassment defined and punished under Republic Act No. 7877, particularly Sections
3 and 7 thereof, and penalizing him with imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a
fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, is AFFIRMED. The Sandiganbayans award of moral and exemplary
damages are MODIFIED; instead, petitioner is ordered to indemnify the offended
party, Juliet Yee, in the amount of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00 by way of,
respectively, moral damages and exemplary damages. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.