Review Diplomacy in War by Gregory John Ryan/May 2014 Page 1 of 3

Review Diplomacy in War by Gregory J. Ryan

Introduction
Hans Morgenthau had once stated that the conduct of a nations foreign affairs by its diplomats
is for national power in peace what military strategy and tactics by its military leaders are for
national power in war. Yet, both may also go together, for once a nation finds herself forced to
draw and point the sword against others, diplomacy complements the main war effort as carried
out by the military machine; such is the argument as presented by Akira Iriye in The New
Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations (2014). Looking at the involvement of the
United States in the Second World War, Iriye highlights the role diplomacy played in the grand
strategy of that nation.
Indeed, for some considerable time even after finding herself caught in a deadly struggle with the
axis powers, the United States saw her primary role not as a provider of hard power, but rather,
as a strategic coordination center, dedicating herself to knit a durable wartime alliance, and to
make sure that those allies were provided with whatever was necessary so as fight of the axis
powers in all the theaters of war around the globe. In his account of that struggle, Iriye identifies
several distinct areas of American diplomatic action, some of which are: Building an alliance
with the aim of containing and countering the axis powers, bilateral relations with non
committed members of the international community, laying out of plans on how to deal with the
enemy once defeated, and the effort to device a post war order.
Forced to enter the war
When the world plunged into war towards the end of the nineteen thirties, many in the United
States had hoped that the storm would spare them. Not Japans work of slaughter in Manchuria,
nor Germanys blitzkrieg storm over Europe convinced the people of the US that their nation
should act. That dream sitting out the war in was however not to last. After Japans sudden attack
on the pacific fleet stationed in Pearl Harbor and Hitlers declaration of war which came a few
days later forced the US to overhaul her strategy.
Forging an alliance
In the early moments after entering the war, the US found herself however unable to fight the
battle hardened axis powers. The country did not possess a big and well trained standing army,
the pacific fleet was largely disabled and the country did not own large amounts of armor, planes
and other military assets. In response, and while the country was arming herself, her leaders
came to understand the importance of securing allies all around the world. Several motivating
factors played a role: Gaining time, isolating the axis powers, securing access to war relevant
raw materials, securing access to geopolitically important areas, making sure that the major
adversaries of the axis powers remained capable of fighting.
When approaching potential allies, ideology played a minor role. Roosevelt and his advisors
applied a realist approach in building a coalition against the Nazis and imperial japan. Anyone
who was of potential use was considered a potential ally. Through conferences, regular
consultations with the major war parties, frequent bilateral dealings with others, and promise of
assistance in a manifold form of ways, the United States was able to build up an impressive
network of states which came to adhere to the US led alliance.

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The most important countries destined to be courted and embraced in an alliance were China, the
Soviet Union and the UK; together they came to be known as the Big Four. The hitherto strong
anticommunist stance was put aside; Stain came to be known as Uncle Joe, indeed even the
Chinese communists, which were not part of the official government, but who had some
significant military forces, were to be incorporated into the ranks of the alliance.
The US made sure that all of its allies were supported with whatever means possible. Many
nations received land lease shipments. There was a broad process of strategic coordination,
depending on the theater of war, the US provided intelligence and made sure to coordinate its
movements with its allies in the region. The closest relationship the US maintained, however,
with the UK. The two countries had enjoyed an implicit alliance already before Pearl Harbor,
and thus once the US entered the war, the two partners moved immediately to set up facilities
and structures so as to closely coordinate the overall war strategy.
The Soviet Union was recognized as occupying a central role in the fight against the Nazis. As
German panzer divisions made crass inroads into Russia, the US stepped up massively in
delivering land and lease shipments, supplying the red army with all that that it needed. While in
China, besides massive land lease shipments for its hard pressed army, the US sent specialist
troops and military advisors, most prominently, General Stilwell was to serve as the chief of staff
of Chiang Kai-shek.
Besides its relations with the other major anti axis parties there were other diplomatic initiatives.
In Latin America, the US depended on conferences diplomacy and bilateral relations so as to
cajole the region into an alliance with itself. For those who joined the US there were explicit and
implicit promises of further intensified cooperation. In some cases the US took on the building of
infrastructure projects, such as the steel plant in Brazil, or the many air fields which were built
throughout the Americas. Those who did not enter follow the US wished soon found themselves
isolated and confronted with implicit threats. The diplomatic strategy in the Americas was soon
to be met by success, as almost all countries joined the US, some of them even contributing
troops. The only exception of significance was Argentina, which refused to follow the US lead.
The realistic character of US foreign policy was underscored through her dealings with France.
Once France was occupied and officially dropped out of the war, the US showed itself not
necessarily inclined to exclusively assist and support de Gaul and the armies raised under the
banner of Free France. Au contraire, the US was willing to work with Nazi collaborating Vichy
France. In line with this strategy, the US even induced the two French factions to work together
in several occasions, thereby lending legitimacy to the regime of the regime of Petain.
Thinking about the post war era
In the early moments of its participation in the war, the US had invested considerable efforts in
denying that it was contemplating a post war order. The idea was to focus on securing victory
first, and thus to avoid the danger of splitting the alliance. A first step towards the securing of the
cohesion of the alliance was done once all major parties agreed that there would be no separate
peace, and that they would all insist on the unconditional surrender of the axis powers.

Yet, as Iriye argues, the question of how the world should look like once the axis powers were
defeated was early on Roosevelts mind. The policy makers in charge of the United States had
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realized that they could not retreat to isolationism, as was done after the Great War, thus leaving
the rest of the world once again to its own device.
In broad terms, there was early on a consensus in Washington that the Wisonian spirit would
play a significant role in any potential post war order. In certain ways, the 1920s were looked as
a positive model. The focus on trade and cooperation was to stand once again at the heart of
international relations; not competition and petty nationalism which had corrupted the world in
the course of the 1930. These negative values and principles were to be combated, cut out of the
equation; mistakes of that period were not to be repeated; lessons had to be applied.
A major lesson was the recognition that the world must be secured through a few committed
great powers. Believing in the just cause and the integrity of the alliance and its members,
Roosevelt contemplated that the Big Four would maintain a central role after the war, and should
constitute the informal or forma institution of a world police, making sure that no other power
would be able to subjugate the world as the axis had done.
However, as the war progressed, idealistic US policy makers came to realize that others had
different ideas for the post war world. The Soviet Union in particular was not convinced of the
order proposed by Washington. As Moscow gained strength once Leningrad was relieved and
Paulus sued for surrender, Stain became more assertive, demanding to hold on to conquered
territories and to maintain a sphere of influence. For fear of losing its empire to US idealism,
Britain came to adhere to the Soviet view; promising to recognize gains in eastern Europe and
Asia in exchange for recognition of its empire which was still standing in largely intact. The
balance of power among the big four was also weakened as it became clear that china and the
UK were not able to measure up to the Soviets and the US.
As a result, the US was forced to change many of its more idealistic plans; indeed, once it was
clear that the wartime alliance was limited to the time of the war only, the US became more
aggressive and more assertive, racing to gain control of as many lands as possible. Yet
nonetheless, through clever maneuvering, the US was able to set up the most significant
conferences in which the post war order was to be defined. In San Francisco and in Bretton
Woods the most important post war international institutions were to be born. In the case of the
former, the ground work for the institutional framework which was dedicated to the political
order of the world was laid down. The United Nation was infused with a considerable degree of
idealism, the reference to we the people, as well as a privileging of freedom and democracy
still stand today. However, the reality of the central role of great powers was also acknowledged,
and thus the real power was to be vested in the Security Council. In the case of the Bretton
woods institutions, the US was able to achieve an almost flawless victory. To institutions which
were put up were to be dominated by it for decades to come, and in turn, dominated molded the
whole world in the US image.
Conclusions
While the Second World War is usually remembered in terms of nations fighting each other with
huge armies, diplomacy had occupied a central role in the overall strategy of all parties involved
and the united states in particular. Once US diplomacy achieved a central place for herself, the
momentum was used to roll out a new world order, a world order which was underpinned by a
set of institutions which were molded in US values and which continued to exist throughout the
cold war into our own times, defining much of world history in the process.