1494 .

American Anthropologist [68, 19661

rights and duties (the various types of heirs, testators, etc.), as well as the rights
and duties themselves. A componential analysis is usually concluded rather
than started with a set of components that define segregates of the analyzed
matrix.
I n conclusion I would like to suggest that for the sake of accuracy, clarity,
and objectivity it is always better to quote the author that one is about to
criticize than to proceed in the loose way that is Goldbergs practice.
LEOPOLD POSPISIL
Yale University
REFERENCES CITED
HAXMEL, E. A.
1965 Introduction. American Anthropologist 67, no. 5, pt. 2: 1-8,
POSPISIL, LEOPOLD
1964 Law and societal structure among the Nunamiut Eskimo. I n Explorations in
cultural anthropology. W. H. Goodenough, ed. New York, McGraw-Hill.
196% A formal analysis of substantive law: Kapauku Papuan laws of inheritance.
American Anthropologist 67, no. 6, pt. 2: 166-185.
196513 A formal analysis of substantive law: Kapauku Papuan laws of land tenure.
American Anthropologist 67, no. 5, pt. 2: 186-214.
MAXIMIZATION, ECONOMIC THEORY, AND ANTHROPOLOGY :
A REPLY TO CANCIAN
To express my principal thesis as concisely as possible: Cancian has maxi-
mized (i,e., rationally calculated) economics out of anthropology by equating
formalist economics with the study of maximization processes. I n reducing
the formalist-substantivist split in economic anthropology to a difference in
problem-focus (i.e,, study of maximization vs. study of institutions)-an exer-
cise that no doubt reflects his sincere effort to simplify some abstruse discus-
sions-Cancian has, I believe, glossed over certain critical differences in ap-
proach among the formalists and has failed to appreciate the wider theo-
retical-philosophical implications of issues that have emerged in the recent
literature. Finally, although Cancians comments were apparently conciliatory
in aim, underlying his main argument is a variation on the substantivist theme
that the formalists are nonanthropological (i.e., subinstitutional) in their
approach to the study of economics.
Cancians use of the term formalist raises doubts in my mind as to
whether this label can have any further denotative value in economic anthro-
pological discourse. I n my article (Cook 1966:327) I employed the term in an
epistemological sense in opposition to the romanticist syndrome, and in that
context it served a useful expository purpose. However, in equating formal-
ist with maximizationalist, Cancian implies the existence of a degree of
theoretical consensus among the critics and nonpractitioners of the substan-
tivist approach that is not evident from their writings. To illustrate this point
we can consider his treatment of what he terms the two principal formalist
articles to appear in this journal (1966:467), namely, those by Burling
Brief Communications 1495
(1962) and LeClair (1962). While Cancian is correct in asserting that both of
these authors define economics in terms of economizing or Lmaximization,
he fails to note the crucial difference in their positions vis-a-vis the role of max-
imization as a general social-scientific strategy. Whereas Burling, in unequivo-
cal terms, advocates the general applicability of the economists maximization
model, LeClair is more cautious in his remarks: TO suggest that economics
may logically concern itself with all of social life does not imply that economics
can satisfactorily explain all of social life (1962: 1182). Certainly, continues
LeClair, no logical basis for such a view can be established (1962:1182).
Furthermore, whereas Burling advocates the extreme position of excluding
technology, subsistence, and ecology from the economic realm (1962 : 804-
805), LeClair carefully and, I think, more correctly incorporates these into his
abstract-analytical model of the economic system (1962: 1188-1196).
I n Cancians reduction exercise, which hinges upon his critique of Homans
work, he formulates his own version of a fundamental tenet in the substanti-
vist ideology, which can be most conveniently expressed in the following two
sets of syllogisms:
I. (a) Proposition 1:
(b) Proposition 2:
(c) Proposition 3:
11. (a) Proposition 1:
Substantivist economics = study of norms, institutions, or culture
Anthropology=study of norms, institutions, or cultwe
Substantivist economics = anthropology
Formalist economics=study of economizing or maximizing (rn-
tional calculation), without regard to particular time and place (i.e.,
norms, institutions, or culture) ; it is subinstitutional
(b) Proposition 2:
Nonanthropology = nonconsideration of norms, institutions, or
culture
( c) Proposition 3:
Formalist economics = nonanthropology
This reasoning may indeed be applicable to Homans and to other social
scientists (including most economists) who study the logic of choice and maxi-
mization in human decision-making, but it has little relevance to an evaluation
of the work of economic anthropologists like Goodfellow, Firth, Belshaw, Salis-
bury, Pospisil, etc., who are greatly concerned with culture and context
in their application of models, principles, and concepts from economic theory
to the analysis of primitive and peasant economies. Yet Cancian, referring to
the formalists, states that there is no reason to think that measures
(operationalizations) devised by non-anthropologists (economists) for a part
of our own culture (the economy) are less subject to difficulties than measures
devised by anthropologists with a cross-cultural perspective (1966: 469), and
concludes with a warning that we cannot expect to borrow procedures for
1496 American Anthropologist [68, 19661
operationalization from the economists (1966: 469). Operationalization is,
however, an ad hoc process that each anthropologist who has drawn upon the
economists theoretical tool kit has worked out in accoidance with the specific
problems and situations involved in his own particular research. Moreover,
economic anthropologists (Cancians formalists) like Firth and Salisbury
have never sought procedures for operationalization from economists but,
rather, have borrowed from them modes of conceptualization and analytical
models in the search for meaningful insights into the nature of economic
behavior.
More relevant (than the problem of operationalization) to the issues raised
by Cancians comments is a set of philosophical problems dealing with the
interrelationship between epistemological levels or orders. Do, for ex-
ample, labels such as maximization, economy, economic system, and
economic relations refer to similar or to distinct epistemological entities?
As I conceive it, the concepts of economic relations and economy belong
to the epistemological order of empirical things and events, or, if you will,
they are approximate representations of concrete experiences and perceived
empirical data. As an anthropological field worker, I cannot directly observe
an economy, but I can observe acts and/or activities (i.e., economic rela-
tions) that are components of an economy. In contrast, maximization
and economic system are conceptual creatures of the epistemological order
of model-building and theoretical analysis, in which the basic operations
performed tend to be more a priori than a posteriori in nature, with deductive
reasoning being relied upon to yield heuristic conceptualizations. There is a
precedent in the recent anthropological literature for the argument I am mak-
ing here since a good case can be made for a distinct parallel between LBvi-
Strauss position on social structure and the economists (and, by implication,
certain economic anthropologists) position on economic theory. The object of
studies in economic theory for economists (like that of social structure studies
for LLvi-Strauss) is to understand economic relations with the help of models.
For economists the term economic system (like the term social structure
for Lhi-Strauss) has nothing to do with empirical reality, but with models that
are built up after it. For economists, economic relations are the raw data of
social experience of which the model or models comprising the economic sys-
tem are built. The economic system, on the other hand, belongs to a different
epistemological category; it can never be reduced to the ensemble of the eco-
nomic relations to be described in a given society, That Cancian has a different
conception of the nature of economic theory is obvious from his statements
{1966:468) about LeClairs article, As I interpret it, this article is essentially
an attempt to translate economic theory into a form that has more direct rele-
vance to anthropological (i.e., cross-cultural and empirical) inquiry. LeClairs
model of the economic system, it seems to me, represents a mid-level in ab-
straction between the highly abstract models of economic theory and the min-
imally abstract descriptive models of the anthropologist.
Finally, one gets the impression from Cancians discussion that maximi-
zation is a great deal more in economic theory than simply one of the com-
Brief Commltnicadions 1497
ponent postulates in the economists model of man, which, taken by itself,
must necessarily present a distorted view of that model. If I understand it
correctly, the economists model is conceived as a heuristic device to assist in
the analysis of choice situations under scarcity conditions-choice that the
economist assumes is exercised in accordance with culturally determined pref-
erence scales. Since economic models, concepts, and principles are essentially
deductive and heuristic in character, i t follows that they can be applied to the
analysis of exchange situations regardless of whether maximization is a norm
or whether there is a prescription to maximize in terms of the very objects
being exchanged (in the empirical situation being analyzed), as Cancian sug-
gests (1966:466). Rottenberg has concisely expressed an axiom that many
economic anthropologists have long recognized and that all who wish to
appreciate the role of economic theory in anthropology must understand:
. . . the significant question is not whether real-world duplicates can be
found to the assumptions (of economic theory), but whether real-world
observed experience duplicates theoretically derived predictions (1958: 677).
I n the spirit of clarification it might be admitted that while Cancian may be
right about the shortcomings of maximization as a strategy in social-scientific
inquiry, he does not appreciate the subtleties of relationship between economic
theory and anthropology in the work of many economic anthropologists, that
is, those he labels formalists.a
SCOTT COOK
Oaxaca, Mexico4
NOTES
The above statements have been paraphrased from an expository paragraph on Levi-
Strauss thought in Nutini 1965:708.
LeClairs intentions are expressed quite clearly in his section on The Structure of an
Economic System, in which he distinguishes between descriptive and abstract-analytical
models (1962: 1193). Given the obviously theoretical nature of LeClairs discussion in the latter
half of his paper, in which he posits the fundamental properties of the economic system, I am
at a loss to understand Cancians assertion that LeClair does not refer to theory at all in the
positive part of his paper (1966:468).
8 A major obstacle that I encountered in attempting to understand Cancians comments is
his ambiguous use of the term norm and his failure to clarify the level (or order) to which hi
statements about maximization are being directed (i.e., the level of observable behavioral acts
or the level of nonobservable and inputed motives underlying behavioral acts). With regard to
his use of the term norm, I found four apparently distinct meanings in the space of five pan-
graphs: (1) as part of an institution (1966:466); (2) normative 8s synonymous with
institutional- . . , does not obviate the normative or institutional dierences (1966:467);
(3) as an ideal guide to behavior (Le., as values or prescriptions) -Ii . . . maximizing adherence
to some norm or set of norms, but none of these norms is itself a prescription to maximize
(1966:466); (4) as synonymous with motive-- . . . seeking out the norms or motives (or what-
ever the investigator sees as the impetus of behavior) (1966:466). With regard to the question
of levels, the following unqualified assertion by Cancian can be cited: I n the exchange of
Christmas gifts (in my American culture) it is appropriate to maximize equality of exchange
(1966:467). I n the first place, I dont think that maximize is the proper word in the context
of the sentence; it would be better replaced by a word like seek. But be that as it may, the
assertion, in my opinion, confounds two discrete levels of analysis: the institutional (or socio-
logical) and the motivational (or psychological). One could rephrase the statement 80 as to
1498 American A nlhropologisl [68, 19661
eliminate this confusion as follows: In American society there exists the custom of exchanging
gifts at Christmas. I n considering thi s phenomenon in the light of anthropological knowledge
concerning types of exchange in various cultures, indications are that it represents a balanced
exchange (that is, a direct exchange in which reciprocation is the customary equivalent of the
good or service received and is without delay [Sahlins 1963: 145-1491). I n this form the statement
is strictly sociological and makes no assumptions as to the motivational structure underlying the
exchanges. Alm, at the riek of making too much of Cancians example, I would hypothesize that
in American society the motivations underlying gift exchanges at Christmas vary in terms of
certain attributes of the exchanging parties (e.g., social status, kinship, etc.). One would expect
to find, for example, a different set of motives in an exchange between a broker and a customer
than between, say, two school boys or a brother and a sister.
4 The writer is a PHS Predoctoral Fellow with the Department of Anthropology at the Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh and is currently conducting field work under a NIMH grant among Zapotec-
speaking peasant-artisan groups in the valley of Oaxaca, Mexico.
REFERENCES CITED
BURLINO, ROBBINS
1962 Maximization theories and the study of economic anthropology. American Anthro-
CANCIAN, FRANK
1966 Maximization as norm, strategy, and theory: a comment on programmatic state-
ments in economic anthropology. American Anthropologist 68:465-470.
1966 The obsolete anti-market mentality: a critique of the substantive approach to
economic anthropology. American Anthropologist 68: 323-345.
1962 Economic theory and economic anthropology. American Anthropologist 64: 1179-
1203.
N m , HUGO G.
1965 Some considerations on the nature of social structure and model building: a critique
of Claude LCvi-Strauss and Edmund Leach. American Anthropologist 67: 707-731.
1958 Review of trade and market in the early empires. American Economic Review
48:675-678.
1963 On the sociology of primitive exchange. Working draft for the ASA conference,
London, J une 25-30.
pologist 64: 802-821.
COOK, SCOTT
LECLUR, EDWARD E,, JR.
ROTTENBEPQ, SIMON
S A H ~ S , MARSHALL D.
ON PATRILOCAL BANDS
The propositions advanced by Roger Owen in his recent paper, The Patri-
local Band: A Linguistically and Culturally Hybrid Social Unit (1965), are
not without interest. But generalizations of this kind are only as good as the
ethnography upon which they are based, and in this case the ethnography is
quite bad. The local organization of food-gatherers has, by and large, been so
little studied that i t is doubtful whether there is sufficient evidence to accept
(or reject) Owens formulations or even the classic typology of Steward (1936;
1955 : 101-150). Owen compounds this difficulty by considering food-gathering
societies at much too general a level, by very incompletely covering the lit-
erature on some of the societies he considers, and by what may be loosely
termed misinterpreting the data in some cases.
Since at least the timeof Stewardsfirst study (1936), it has been custom-