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}an Begenaai anu Eiik Nyin
1


}an Begenaai
Laboiatoiie Psychologie ue la Peiception
0niveisit Paiis Bescaites
4S iue ues Saints-Peies, 7Suu6 Paiis, Fiance
uegenaai.jangmail.com

Eiik Nyin
Centie foi Philosophical Psychology
0niveisity of Antweip
uiote Kauwenbeig 18, 2uuu Antweipen, Belgium
eiik.myinuantweipen.be

23%'$(0'
Accoiuing to a stanuaiu iepiesentationalist view cognitive capacities uepenu on
inteinal content-caiiying states. Recent alteinatives to this view have been met
with the ieaction that they have, at best, limiteu scope, because a laige iange of
cognitive phenomena those involving absent anu abstiact featuies iequiie

1
The order of authors is purely alphabetical.
2

iepiesentational explanations. Beie we challenge the iuea that the consiueiation
of cognition iegaiuing the absent anu the abstiact can move the uebate about
iepiesentationalism along. Whethei oi not cognition involving the absent anu
the abstiact iequiies the positing of iepiesentations uepenus upon whethei
moie basic foims of cognition iequiie the positing of iepiesentations.
4"56*$1% Repiesentation - Repiesentation-hungiy pioblem - The absent - The
abstiact - Imageiy - Thought

207&*68"1."9"&'%
Foi uiscussion anu comments we like to thank Anna Ciaunica, Natteo Colombo,
Sanneke ue Baan, Bas Bonueis, Paul Loauei, victoi Loughlin, Bence Nanay, Kevin
0'Regan, Nigel Thomas, }an van Eemeien, Naitin Weicholu, Kaiim Zahiui, anu
the anonymous ievieweis. The woik was suppoiteu by ERC Auvanceu giant
S2S674 "FEEL" of }. Kevin 0'Regan, the Reseaich Council of the 0niveisity of
Antweip (pioject "Imageiy as Peiceptual Activity"), anu the Reseaich
Founuation - Flanueis (Belgium) (FW0) (piojects uuBSS12N anu uu48714N).


3

Repiesentation-hungei ieconsiueieu

1. Intiouuction
Boes intelligent behavioui iequiie an explanation involving mental
iepiesentations, unueistoou as innei vehicles of specific contents. The stanuaiu
position in philosophy anu the science of cognition subsciibes to a
iepiesentational fiamewoik, baseu on "the funuamental iuea of innei
computational states acting as the vehicles of specific contents - that is to say
(.) the veiy iuea of inteinal iepiesentation" (Claik & Toiibio 1994), even if
theie aie uiffeient opinions about the foim iepiesentations take, anu about what
kinu of content they caiiy. Inueeu, iepiesentationalism has become so ingiaineu
that iepiesentational assumptions have acquiieu an axiomatic status, as if
"iepiesentational attiibutions aie not the iesult of, but the pieiequisite foi,
theoietical uevelopment. Repiesentations aie invokeu even befoie the theoiy
staits" (Tonneau 2u112u12).
Recently, iepiesentationalism has come unuei sustaineu sciutiny. Accoiuing to
one contempoiaiy line of anti-iepiesentationalist aigument, the explanatoiy
posits useu by many successful scientific appioaches to cognitionsuch as those
pioviueu by connectionist oi uynamical systems appioaches aie not in any
substantive sense iepiesentational (Ramsey 2uu7). Butto anu Nyin (2u1S)
single out pioblems foi the ways iepiesentational content is stanuaiuly
giounueu in natuially available 'infoimation.' They point out that piominent
attempts to biiuge the gap between natuial infoimation anu (semantic) content
iun into seveie pioblems, anu uesciibe the heavy piize, such as abanuoning
4

explanatoiy natuialism, that may have to be paiu when one tiies to account foi
content in that way. Chemeio (2uu9) aigues that a fully non-iepiesentational
uynamical systems appioach, eniicheu by insights fiom uibsonian ecological
psychology, might piove to be a moie successful ieseaich piogiam foi the stuuy
of cognition. Acting upon his statement that "(t)he tiue test of any appioach in
any science is how well it answeis the questions we want answeieu with
empiiical iesults" (Chemeio 2uu9, p. xii), he pioviues examples of
noniepiesentational explanations foi behavioi which accomplishes a bioau
iange of tasks.
Repiesentationalists can, anu uo, countei the ciitique iegaiuing the lack of
substance, oi giounuing of theii founuational notion of iepiesentational content,
by consiueiing it as a pioblem whose solution can be postponeu, peihaps even
inuefinitely (Spievak 2u1S; Colombo in piess b). Noieovei, they can, anu uo,
aigue that the pioblem of finuing a satisfactoiy account foi content uwinules in
the light of piincipleu baiiieis to the ieach of non-iepiesentational cognition
(Shapiio 2u11; Colombo in piess a). Such a piincipleu baiiiei, uefenuing
iepiesentational accounts of the minu against intiusions fiom non-
iepiesentationalism, is wiuely believeu to have been iuentifieu in a papei by
Claik anu Toiibio (1994), in which the case was maue foi the existence of
'iepiesentation-hungiy' pioblems. These pioblems aiise in 'iepiesentation-
hungiy uomains', which aie chaiacteiizeu as involving 'the absent', oi 'the
abstiact.' They aie "cases in which ambient enviionmental infoimation is (piima
facie) insufficient to guiue behavioui" (Claik & Toiibio 1994: 4u2), oi "cases
iequiiing sensitivity to uistal, non-existent oi highly abstiact piopeities" (Claik
5

& Toiibio 1994: 412). Capacities to intelligently ueal with the absent anu the
abstiact aie 'iepiesentation-hungiy' in the sense that these capacities uepenu on
mental 'stanu-ins' foi the enviionment oi inteimeuiating iepiesentations of
abstiact piopeities (e.g. Claik & Toiibio 1994; Claik 1997: 166-17u).
The notion of 'iepiesentation-hungei' was oiiginally useu to lay to iest
challenges to iepiesentationalism coming fiom an eailiei wave of
noniepiesentationalist theoiizing, which was inspiieu by uevelopments in
behavioi-baseu iobotics anu uynamical systems theoiy appioaches to behavioui
anu action (Biooks 1991; Beei 199S; van ueluei 199S; Keijzei 2uu1). uianting
that the kinus of noniepiesentational appioach pioposeu by the challengeis
might apply to some phenomena, such as the behavioui of (simulateu) insect-like
agents, it was taken to be beyonu seiious uoubt that the veiy natuie of a laige
uomain of cognitive phenomena calls foi iepiesentations as explanantia (Claik &
Toiibio 1994; Claik 1997).
The iuea that the iange foi noniepiesentational cognitive appioaches is
seiiously iestiicteu, because of the existence of 'iepiesentation-hungiy'
pioblems, iemains at the coie of cuiient thinking about cognition. A cleai anu
iecent expiession of it can be founu in Wilson anu Foglia (2u11):
Foimulating an empiiically auequate theoiy of intelligent behavioi
without appealing to iepiesentations at all (.) faces insupeiable
uifficulties, anu the iuea that it is a ielatively tiivial mattei to scale up
fiom existing uynamic mouels to explain all of cognition iemains wishful
thinking anu subject to just the pioblems that motivateu the shift fiom
6

behavioiism to cognitive science in the fiist place. (.) Bomains iaising a
iepiesentation-hungiy pioblem (A. Claik 1997) aie those involving
ieasoning about absent, non-existent oi counteifactual states of affaiis,
planning, imaging anu inteiacting. (Wilson & Foglia 2u11, section 4.2)
Cleaily, then, the concept of iepiesentation-hungiy pioblems continues to caiiy
a lot of weight in the cuiient uebate iegaiuing iepiesentationalism. Whenevei a
cognitive uomain involves pioblems of such type, the veiy iuea of uispensing
with iepiesentational explanantia allegeuly can be uismisseu as 'wishful
thinking', 'facing insupeiable pioblems.' Claik anu Toiibio's notion has become
iconic, aiguably because it expiesses key commitments of philosophical anu
scientific thinking about the minu evei since the 'cognitive ievolution.' In
vaiiation on the quote of Wilson anu Foglia above, the notion iuentifies 'just the
pioblems that motivateu the shift fiom noniepiesentational to iepiesentational
cognitive science.'
0ne way to answei the attempt to iestiict the ieach of noniepiesentationalism
by invoking the existence of 'iepiesentation-hungiy' pioblems, is by moving
against it on a case by case basis, by pioviuing examples of noniepiesentational
accounts of allegeuly iepiesentation-hungiy pioblems. Such a stiategy is
puisueu by Chemeio (2uu9), who points foi example to the noniepiesentational
mouel foi imagineu action uesciibeu by van Rooj, Bongeis anu Baselagei (2uu2).
In the piesent papei, we will question in a moie geneial way the valiuity of
tiying to iestiict the ieach of anti-iepiesentationalism by invoking a uomain of
'iepiesentation-hungiy' pioblems. We will uo so by challenging the wiuely
7

accepteu theses that cognitive uomains which involve 'the absent' oi 'the
abstiact', necessitate iepiesentationalist accounts !"#$%&" they involve the
absent anu the abstiact.
Noie specifically, we will investigate two theses:
|ABSENTj: cognitive activity in uomains involving the absent necessitates
mental iepiesentations as explanantia;
anu
|ABSTRACTj: cognitive activity in uomains involving the abstiact necessitates
mental iepiesentations as explanantia.
We will consiuei these theses in isolation fiom othei ieasons foi oi against
mental iepiesentations as explanantia. That is, the explanation of intelligence
might necessitate mental iepiesentations foi othei ieasons than those having to
uo with the absent anu the abstiact. In this papei, we will iemain neutial about
whethei iepiesentationalism holus foi such othei ieasons. In othei woius, we
will investigate whethei the absent anu the abstiact offei inuepenuent, sufficient
ieasons to justify positing iepiesentations anu embiacing iepiesentationalism in
these uomains.
As a consequence, we will just consiuei the question whethei theie is an
impoitant uiffeience in explanatoiy uemanus between cognitive activities in the
piesence veisus the absence of stimuli, oi in ielation to cognition of the conciete
veisus the abstiact. It is impoitant to keep in minu that oui tieatment is
focusseu on the question of how to explain cognitive activities. 0ne might be
8

tempteu, foi example, to think that cognition which involves the absent is !(
)"*+,+-+., iepiesentational. Though we will not attempt to iefute that claim, we
will come to ieject that it foims a goou basis foi committing to iepiesentational
explanantia (section 4).
2. The absent
Claik anu Toiibio uefine cognition involving the absent as "ieasoning about
absent, non-existent, oi counteifactual states of affaiis" (1994: 419). We will
initially follow Claik anu Toiibio in unueistanuing ieasoning in a bioau sense
heie, so that 'keeping tiack of' oi 'behaviouially anticipating something not (yet)
piesent', count as manifestations of 'ieasoning about the absent' (both examples
aie fiom Claik anu Toiibio 1994: 419, see also Wilson & Foglia 2u11). We will
ietuin to a moie high level inteipietation of ieasoning as sophisticateu thinking,
which might become possible only with the use of language, in section 4.
Let us fiist focus on behavioui in absence of cleai enviionmental cues uiiving the
behavioui. Boes the agent's iesponsiveness to absent oi not piesently senseu
states of affaiis necessitate an appeal to iepiesentational stanu-ins.
2.1. uoing thiough the same motions
As a waim-up, consiuei the following example. Someone is living in a house with
a kitchen in the hallway, such that she has to walk aiounu a siueboaiu to get to
the othei siue. Suppose that at some point the siueboaiu gets iemoveu, but that
the peison still takes the same cuive to get to the othei siue of the hall. In the
new situation, the peison is going thiough the same olu motions in absence of
the enviionmental basis foi these motions. 0vei the yeais, a behaviouial pattein
9

has emeigeu: the peison tenus to take a paiticulai tiajectoiy when walking
thiough the hallway. This might involve iepiesentations, oi it might not. In the
lattei case, the peison iesponueu to the enviionmental situation in a paiticulai
way, without iepiesenting it.
Accoiuing to the absence thesis, howevei, the meie iemoval of the siueboaiu
woulu necessitate iepiesentation. Neiely because of the fieshly cieateu absence
of the siueboaiu, the peison's behavioui woulu have to be iepiesentational in
the sense of involving a iepiesentational state. This seems pioblematic, howevei,
given that the peison might be uoing exactly the same befoie anu aftei the
iemoval of the siueboaiu. Inueeu, the peison might not even notice that the thing
has been iemoveu, because the lights aie off, oi because she is uistiacteu, anu
still make the cuive. That is, the iemoval of the siueboaiu uoesn't change the
natuie of the peison's capacities: If they weie iepiesentational befoie, they stay
iepiesentational aftei; if they weie noniepiesentational, they iemain
noniepiesentational. Piesence oi absence of the enviionmental stimulus uoes
not have to biing about a funuamental change in the natuie of the behavioui, oi
the capacity uisplayeu in it, anu theiefoie seems not sufficient to ienuei it
iepiesentational.
Suppose we think about the situations with anu without the siueboaiu in teims
of 'the auaptive functional iole' of 'innei states anu piocesses' with iespect to
'extia-neuial states of affaiis' (Claik & uiush 1999). It then iemains to be
ueciueu whethei the auaptive functional iole of innei states anu piocesses aie
best uesciibeu eithei as 'iesponuing to' oi as 'stanuing in' foi those extia-neuial
10

states of affaiis when one is in uiiect contact with them. In case the auaptive iole
of the innei piocess shoulu be uesciibeu as a iole of 'iesponuing to' an aspect of
the enviionmental situation without iepiesenting it, it is not necessaiy to
suppose that this auaptive iole must be one of 'stanuing in' foi that aspect when
the enviionmental aspect is iemote. Aftei all, it may be the veiy same piocesses
that aie involveu in both situations, iesponsive to an enviionmental situation
that may not be piesently sensible (e.g. in the uaik), oi that may no longei be
piesent. 0thei consiueiations might be invokeu to piefei a uesciiption in teims
of 'stanuing in' insteau of in teims of 'iesponuing to', but they uo not hinge on the
uiffeience between behavioui in the piesence oi absence of the stimulus.
0ne might piotest that the siueboaiu scenaiio uoes not allow to uiaw
conclusions about ABSENT, because it uoes not concein a cognitive task that
noimally involves something that is absent: avoiuing a siueboaiu noimally
comes uown to avoiuing a genuine, live siueboaiu - a ieal one, that will huit if
one acciuentally hits it. It is only in abnoimal, somewhat contiiveu situations,
that the same avoiuing behavioui occuis in the absence of the siueboaiu.
Peihaps ABSENT applies only to capacities oi tasks that ielate to the absent
moie essentially. Let us theiefoie tuin to an example of exactly such a task, in
which uealing with the absent belongs to its stanuaiu conuitions, to see if
ieasoning along the lines exemplifieu in the siueboaiu example uoes apply to it.
11

2.2. Nental imageiy
Consiuei the ability to imagine absent states of affaiis. Take, in paiticulai, visual
imageiy. Boes the fact that what is imagineu is absent necessitate a
iepiesentational explanation.
As in the context of the siueboaiu example, one can question whethei absence
veisus piesence makes a significant uiffeience iegaiuing the neeu foi
iepiesentations. Foi suppose one holus a view of visual imageiy as /+0-%$1
2"0#"2-+.,: when one visually imagines some object oi situation, one is in the
conuitions one woulu be in +* one weie peiceptually confionteu with that object
oi situation. In its simplest foim, imageiy coulu then be a foim of ie-enactment,
oi the (paitial) ie-cieation of conuitions one has been in while peiceiving. If one
is a iepiesentationalist about peiception, imageiy, unueistoou as viitual
peiception, will obviously involve iepiesentation too. If, howevei, one combines
a viitual peiception take on mental imageiy with a view of peiception as
noniepiesentational, one will be leu to a noniepiesentational view of imageiy
(Butto 2uu8: 8u). Ciucially, if an account of peiception in the piesence of a
stimulus is noniepiesentational, the account of imageiy as a kinu of peiception
in the absence of the stimulus, may be so too. As in oui example in the pievious
section, the absence of the stimulus may not waiiant a iepiesentational
inteipietation of the piocesses involveu in the cognitive behavioui oi capacities
at issue.
viitual peiception accounts, iiiespective of whethei they aie iepiesentational oi
noniepiesentational, builu on the continuity between peiception anu imageiy. In
12

a iecent philosophical tieatment of imageiy anu peiception, it is stateu that
"contempoiaiy cognitive science of mental imageiy is veiy laigely pieuicateu
upon the tiuth of the continuum theoiy" (Thomas 2u14: 1SS). The continuum
theoiy finus empiiical suppoit in neuioscience, as it has been establisheu that
many of the biain aieas involveu in peiception aie so too in mental imageiy
(Thomas 2u1u, section 4.4.2). The stanuaiu ways to uevelop a continuum
appioach to imageiy is iepiesentational. Foi example, one consiueis peiception
to consist in the builu-up of a mental iepiesentation, which then can be ie-
activateu in imageiy (Kosslyn (198u) anu Pylyshyn (1981) aie classics, see
Nanay (2u14) foi a iecent veision). But noniepiesentational continuum
appioaches aie possible too, which holu neithei a iepiesentational view of
peiception, noi a iepiesentational view of imageiy. 0n such views, peiception
uoes not consist in a ielation of a peiceivei anu a iepiesentational peicept, but
iathei in a ielation oi inteiaction of a peiceivei anu an enviionment that is
unmeuiateu by a iepiesentation. 0ne can flesh out such an appioach by
conceiving of peiception as the enactment of 'visual ioutines' (Thomas 1999) oi
patteins of 'sensoiimotoi contingencies' (0'Regan & No 2uu1a,b), sequences in
which exploiatoiy actions aie coupleu to specific enviionmental iesponses, oi
changes in stimulation. 0n the sensoiimotoi contingency appioach, one then
sees a ieu patch, foi example, because one engages in a pattein of active
exploiation, in which ceitain movements of the eye anu heau with iespect to the
ieu patch, cause veiy specific changes in the visual situation ieceiveu fiom that
ieu patch (0'Regan & No 2uu1b: 8S). In teims of peiceptual ioutines,
"peiceptual expeiience (expeiience of peiceivables) (.) aiises fiom specific
13

sequences of exploiatoiy peiceptual actions (.) thiough which the iuentity of
specific types of peiceivables in the enviionment is ueteimineu" (Thomas 2u14:
1S6). Such views leau to constiuing imageiy in an equally noniepiesentational
way, foi example, as "the (paitial, aboitive, anu laigely coveit) enactment of the
peiceptual ioutine thiough which the iuentity of its object (i.e., the thing
imagineu) woulu be iecognizeu if actually piesent" (Thomas 2u14: 1S6).
Sensoiimotoi anu peiceptual ioutine appioaches, beyonu shaiing the empiiical
eviuence common to all continuum views, can iely on auuitional lines of suppoit,
such as the fact that imagining a paiticulai object involves the spontaneous, but
coveit, making of the same eye movements "that (at least paitially) enact the
stimulus-specific pattein of such movements that they woulu make if actually
looking at the equivalent visual stimulus" (Thomas 2u1u, section 4.S.1), anu that
the making of ianuom eye movements uisiupts visual imageiy (ibiu.).
Cleaily then, on a continuum view, anu *.0-+.0+ on a viitual peiception view,
whethei oi not imageiy is iepiesentational oi not is ueteimineu by piioi
theoietical commitment, anu not by the absence of the stimulus. The cognitive
science of imageiy, by enuoising a continuum theoiy of peiception anu
imagination, uoes not suppoit ABSENT.
0f couise accounts of imageiy shoulu acknowleuge that theie aie also impoitant
)+**"0",#"&, phenomenological anu othei, between vision anu visual imageiy. An
obvious uiffeience between peiception anu imageiy is that one is often well
awaie of the imaginaiy chaiactei of imageiy. But note that this uiffeience uoes
not necessaiily intiouuce a iepiesentation-implying asymmetiy between
14

imageiy anu peiception, foi one's awaieness of the imaginaiy chaiactei of what
one imagines may veiy well be uue to noniepiesentational uiffeiences in bouily
engagement with the enviionment iathei than being baseu in any
iepiesentational uiffeiences.
A noniepiesentational account of uiffeiences between peiception anu
imagination might builu on the obseivation that peiception, but not imageiy, is
chaiacteiizeu by a high uegiee of 'bouiliness' anu 'giabbiness' (0'Regan, Nyin &
No 2uuSa,b; 0'Regan 2u11). 'Bouiliness' (oi 'coipoiality') iefeis to the fact that
peiception is systematically sensitive to the changes biought about by bouily
movements. 'uiabbiness' (oi 'aleiting capacity') iefeis to the fact that ceitain
changes in the enviionment (such as a flash of light oi a suuuen louu sounu) will
incontioveitibly attiact peiceptual attention, as well as peiceptual ie-
oiientation. Aiguably, such uiffeiences in 'bouiliness' anu 'giabbiness' can
explain the uiffeience in awaieness between situations in which the stimulus is
piesent (peiception) veisus situations in which the stimulus is absent (e.g.
imageiy). These uiffeiences woulu be uiffeiences in bouily engagement iathei
than any iepiesentational ones.
Anothei uiffeience between peiception anu imageiy might lie in the fact that
only imageiy is 'cieative', oi 'unuei the subject's contiol.' It might then be aigueu
that this foims a basis foi claiming that imageiy is iepiesentational, even if
peiception neeu not be. Bowevei, such a conclusion can only be uiawn if an
inuepenuent aigument is given foi the iuea that cieativity oi being unuei the
15

subject's contiol iequiies iepiesentations. We will not uiscuss such a line of
aigument heie, because of its inuepenuence fiom ABSENT.
In shoit, if we suppose that peiceptual expeiience of the enviionment neeu not
involve the innei iepiesentation of the enviionment, then behavioui anu
expeiience conceining the absent neeu not involve innei iepiesentations eithei.
Imageiy anu othei capacities going beyonu iesponse to the immeuiately senseu
enviionment pioviue no paiticulai suppoit foi positing iepiesentations. The
thesis we've labelleu ABSENT in the pievious section, iemains unsuppoiteu.
S. The abstiact
The seconu conuition that is often thought to necessitate the invoking of
iepiesentations as explanantia is when a pioblem iequiies that the agent is
"selectively sensitive to paiameteis whose ambient physical manifestations aie
complex anu uniuly (foi example, open-enueuly uisjunctive)" (Claik & Toiibio
1994). 0i, as Claik puts it, this conuition involves iesponse to "states of affaiis
that aie unifieu at some iathei abstiact level, but whose physical coiielates have
little in common" (Claik 1997: 167). Accoiuing to Claik:
It is veiy haiu to see how to get a system to ieason about such thing
without setting it up so that all the vaiious supeificially uiffeient
piocesses aie fiist assimilateu to a common innei state oi piocess such
that fuithei piocessing can then be uefineu ovei the innei coiielate: an
innei item, pattein, oi piocess whose content then coiiesponus to the
abstiact piopeity. (Claik 1997: 167)
16

0n this view, the uomain of cognition with iespect to abstiact piopeities invites
a iepiesentational analysis because these abstiact piopeities involve uiffeient
physical manifestations, which physically have little in common. A 'unitaiy'
veisus 'uiveise' contiast is what uiives the line of ieasoning: if piopeities have
unitaiy physical manifestations, they may be 'cognizeu' non-iepiesentationally,
but not so if those physical manifestations aie vaiiegateu. In the lattei case, foi
the sake of 'fuithei piocessing', some inteinal coiielate has to be constiucteu,
which woulu stanu in foi the abstiact piopeity it is meant to iepiesent.
The ciucial iuea is that conveigence of many vaiiegateu stimuli upon one neuial
coiielate with physical integiity is key to conveying iepiesentational status. But
why woulu conveigence upon an inteinal item with physical integiity confei
iepiesentational status. Cleaily, one can imagine, oi simply obseive, lots of non-
cognitive piocesses wheieby causes with vaiious physical manifestations
conveige upon a common effect. It uoes not follow that the common effect
theieby comes to iepiesent its causes. Consiuei the simple example of causing a
small piece of iion to move by pushing it with one's hanu, by blowing it away, oi
by attiacting it with a magnet. Theie's no ieason at all to uiaw the conclusion
that the iion's movement iepiesents its causes.
If one 3.%1) claim it uiu, it woulu not suffice to point to the conveigence of the
causes on a common effect 2"0 &"4 but an auuitional anu inuepenuent aigument
woulu be neeueu. Some theoiy of iepiesentation applying to physical causal
piocesses woulu be calleu foi. Without fuithei ieasons, the case is not uiffeient
17

when the piocesses unuei consiueiation aie cognitive.
2
Also then, a theoiy of
iepiesentation is iequiieu to justify why the occuiience of conveigence uoes
confei iepiesentational status. Theiefoie, in the cognitive case as well, meiely
pointing out that a uomain of cognition involves abstiact piopeities with uniuly
physical manifestations is not sufficient to justify the neeu foi iepiesentational
explanations.
Noieovei, it is not cleai what is the basis foi assuming that theie is a ielevant
asymmetiy between simple piopeities anu complex piopeities. Why assume,
that is, that the complex case is paiticulaily suppoitive of a iepiesentational
inteipietation, if the simple case is not. Recall that such an asymmetiy is neeueu,
if the uomain involving abstiact piopeities is to pioviue paiticulai ieasons foi
invoking a iepiesentational analysis. This woiiy about the lack of an asymmetiy
between the simple anu the complex is aggiavateu by the fact that the line of
ieasoning unuei uiscussion tiies to $&&+5+1$-" cognition in the abstiact case to
cognition in the conciete case: the common innei state in the abstiact case
functions piecisely like the simple stimulus in the simple case. 0nce such an
assimilation between the kinus of cognition have taken place, the assumption
that the one is still uiffeient in natuie fiom the othei seems to stanu in neeu of
justification.

2
Of course, such further arguments exist. For example, one might hold that it is the wider role played
by cognitive processes which makes them properly representational. We do not deny such an argument
can be held, nor do we challenge here its validity. We just point out that this way of arguing for the
need for representation is different from arguing from ABSTRACT.
18

In conclusion, we have not founu a valiu ieason to suppose theie is a
iepiesentation-suppoiting uis-analogy between capacities to iesponu to abstiact
anu non-abstiact piopeities. Paiallel to the conclusion ieacheu in the pievious
sections, we concluue that no goou ieasons have yet been supplieu to holu that
the thesis we've labelleu ABSTRACT is tiue.
4. Conclusion
We aie awaie that it is possible to make a two-step move in iesponse to the
above. A fiist step woulu consist in stipulating that capacities foi uealing with the
absent anu the abstiact aie iepiesentational !"#$%&" they involve the absent anu
the abstiact. As a iesult any capacity involving the absent anu the abstiact,
incluuing anticipating, tiacking anu imagining woulu be iepiesentational
capacities. A seconu step woulu then consist in stipulating that any innei state
that plays a iole in the exeicise of that capacity is iepiesentational, !"#$%&" of
the iepiesentational natuie of the capacity. We think such a move woulu be an
attempt to 'win an aigument by ieuefining teims' (Chemeio 2uu9: 66), which
comes at consiueiable costs. Fiist, it uepiives the notion of innei iepiesentation
of substantive content. No fuithei investigations, foi example neuioscientific,
coulu favoui oi uisfavoui a iepiesentational inteipietation, iesulting in a notion
of iepiesentation unconstiaineu by empiiical finuings. Seconu, this move implies
suiienueiing the ambition that the iepiesentational natuie of inteinal states
woulu play any iole in explaining the iepiesentational status of the capacities,
because these inteinal states woulu ueiive theii iepiesentational status fiom the
iepiesentational status of the capacities at play, iathei than the othei way iounu.
19

We have up to now taken 'ieasoning' in the bioau sense specifieu at the
beginning of section 2. 0ne might wonuei whethei oui conclusion that the
uomains of the absent anu the abstiact uo not necessitate innei iepiesentational
states as explanantia might only apply to low-level cognitive phenomena.
Whenevei moie sophisticateu thinking is involveu, 'thought' anu 'ieasoning',
unueistoou in the sense in which these iefei to capacities which aie stanuaiuly
assumeu not to be shaieu with animals, the invocation of innei iepiesentational
states might be necessaiy aftei all. As such thinking typically involves the absent
anu the abstiact, ABSENT anu ABSTRACT might holu foi cognitive phenomena
that involve thinking.
Note that, even if such weie tiue, oui conclusions ieacheu thus fai woulu iemain
impoitant, anu contiaiy to much cuiient woik in the philosophy anu science of
cognition. Still, oui challenge to ABSTRACT anu ABSENT woulu have
consiueiably moie ieach if it also applieu to 'highei-level' thought anu ieasoning.
In closing, anu without ueveloping the mattei to the extent it ueseives, we just
want to point out that it uoes not seem contiauictoiy to assume that highei-level
thinking, such as might only be the piivilege of language-useis, might not involve
innei iepiesentational states. It seems possible to holu that such thinking .,1(
involves public symbols. Such thinking skills woulu then be acquiieu by being
exposeu, in the appiopiiate ways, to public symbols, but once establisheu, these
skills might be exeiciseu in the absence of exteinal $,) inteinal iepiesentations.
In that case, ABSENT anu ABSTRACT might not holu foi sophisticateu thinking
eithei.
20

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