___________________________________ ___________________________________

The Tension Between Gesinnungsethik and Verantwortungsethik

1
A Critical Interpretation of the Position of Max Weber in Politik als Beruf
2
Johan Verstraeten
A consensus exists in the Christian tradition
concerning the idea that a faith conviction based
on the gospel also has ethical and political impli-
cations. Much disunity remains, however, with
respect to the interpretation of the relationship
between the two. Throughout the history of theo-
logical thought we can find a variety of hypothe-
ses
3
on the question ranging from ideas of theoc-
racy
4
and status confessionis declarations
5
to
manifold interpretations of the two kingdom
theory.
6
In the political praxis of modern sec-
ularised society, the latter two kingdom theory,
even when it is not explicit, is given some prefer-
ence because it responds to our desire to guar-
antee the autonomy of politics in the face of
ecclesiastical or ideological paternalism.
7
Such a
position is theoretically rendered by the liberal
method of avoidance and those political theolo-
gies which make a clear distinction between ones
secular dealings as a citizen or politician and
ones ecclesiastical dealings as a believer.
8
An unconscious maintenance of the two king-
dom theory also bears witness to the fact that the
sense of responsibility and the realism of those
politicians who take the logic of power into con-
sideration, who are not afraid to get their hands
dirty, is often highly praised
9
while the naive
idealism of those who permit themselves to be
guided by their faithful adherence to ideological
goals are just as frequently looked down upon
and spoken of with disapprobation. In concrete
political praxis, the tendency to make a sharp
separation between an ethics of conviction and
an ethics of responsibility is further reinforced
by the increasing influence of the technocrats and
the representatives of various interest groups who
inhabit the inner circle of ministerial cabinets. In
such contexts, a realistic, no-nonsense balance
of interests is all too often considered the only
viable and desirable option at the governments
disposal.
Nevertheless, the relationship between Gesin-
nungsethik and Verantwortungsethik remains of
essential importance to the political world. With-
out directional perspectives and individuals ori-
ented towards high moral goals which derive their
significance from meta-ethical frames of meaning,
the political machine with its strategic rationality
is in danger of becoming a pointless, system-
immanent and even alienating reality for many
citizens.
Gesinnungsethik and Verantwortungsethik:
An Unbridgeable Chasm?
One of the most fascinating texts to deal with the
relationship between an ethics based on Christian
conviction and an ethics of political responsibility
is Max Webers Politik als Beruf. At first sight it
would appear that Weber is pressing for a strict
separation between both elements. Advocates of
such an interpretation
10
like to point to the well
known passage in which Weber speaks of two
fundamentally different and irreducibly con-
trastive maxims and of the yawning chasm
between the ethics of responsibility and what he
calls the absolute ethics or the a-cosmic ethics of
the Sermon on the Mount.
11
According to We-
ber, the genius or demon of politics is poised in
an interior tension with the God of love, a tension
that can collapse at any moment into unendurable
conflict.
12
A genuine politician should not al-
low his or her activities to be exclusively deter-
mined by nice ideas or by his or her concern to
maintain purity of intention. A politician needs to
dare to take up his or her responsibility and to
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Ethical Perspectives 2 (1995)3, p. 180
___________________________________ ___________________________________
seize authority and power: Wer Politik treibt
erstrebt Macht.
13
State officials exercise dominion over others
and have the monopoly of legitimate physical
violence at their disposal. On this point Weber
agrees with Trotsky: Jeder Staat wird auf Gewalt
gegrndet.
14
Such a position, however, has
important consequences: one cannot do politics
without getting ones hands dirty, in fact one
places oneself into the realm of demonic pow-
ers.
15
In this way the politician inevitably comes
into conflict with those who advocate an ethics of
conviction, who reject the use of ethically repre-
hensible means and refuse to put up with the
ethical irrationality of the world.
16
In this con-
text Weber rejects Frsters position according to
which the good can only emerge from the good,
and the bad from the bad. World history, in
Webers view, provides clear proof to the con-
trary, and whoever is unwilling to accept such a
fact is politically speaking a child.
17
The impression that in his Politik als Beruf
Weber is making a sharp separation between an
ethics of conviction and an ethics of responsibili-
ty is further underscored by the broad, ideal-typi-
cal seperation he establishes between value ra-
tionality and instrumental rationality.
18
In a
secularised or entzauberte world, in which the
diverse domains of reality politics included
are functionally differentiated, instrumental ratio-
nality (Zweckrationalitt) tends to dominate to
the unavoidable detriment of a more absolute
rationality of values (Wertrationalitt) which is
ultimately banished into the specific domain of
religion.
19
The rationality of values, to which
one can ascribe the Gesinnungsethik, presup-
poses a completely different world view from that
of instrumental rationality. Value rationality is
typical of a (now lost) harmonious and ethical
universe in which a fundamental goal or an inter-
related cluster of goals is striven after by way of
an appropriate cluster of means. Instrumental
rationality, in contrast, belongs to a relativistic
universe. In our disenchanted world, there exists
a diversity of conflicting goals about which, from
the perspective of such a relativistic universe, one
cannot pass a final judgement. In the same dis-
enchanted world, means are chosen in function
of their effectiveness with respect to the achieve-
ment of the goal or end in question.
20
Webers position with respect to the back-
ground appearance of religious value rationality
under the influence of the secularisation process
is certainly not contradicted by his religious-so-
ciological analysis of the religious convictions
which are characterised by inner-worldly as-
cesis. In his work on Protestant ethics and the
spirit of capitalism he shows that it is primarily
the Calvinist tradition that has had a significant
influence on the development of modern society
and its ethos of work. The influence of Protestant
inner-worldly ascesis was such that it occa-
sioned the general rationalisation process out of
which the secularisation process, with its predom-
inantly instrumental rationality and its suppres-
sion of value rationality, ultimately emerged. The
separation between instrumental rationality and
value rationality is, however, not the final word
on Webers political ethics. Indeed, a thorough
reading of his Politik als Beruf reveals a number
of indications to the contrary.
Unity Between Gesinnungsethik and
Verantwortungsethik Nonetheless?
It would be difficult to understand Politik als
Beruf if one were to reduce it to a few out-of-
context quotations. At the same time, an adequate
interpretation of this work would be impossible if
one were not to take its Sitz im Leben into
account, namely a profoundly shattered post
World War I Germany. In this specific context
Weber wanted to warn young and well-inten-
tioned pacifists against the dangers of idealistic
dazzlement and against the irretrievable conse-
quences of the refusal to use power (including
legitimate violence) in order to realise a noble
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Ethical Perspectives 2 (1995)3, p. 181
___________________________________ ___________________________________
end. History, in the meantime, has taught us that
such a warning was justified: those who, to put it
mildly, had less than noble goals, took the power
unto themselves and silenced well-intentioned
citizens in the thousand year Reich.
In spite of the fact that Weber attaches so
much importance to the acquisition of political
power, he does not in fact reject absolute ethics
or a-cosmic human love per se. His intention is
simply to emphasise the fact that the great virtu-
osos of a-cosmic human love and goodness
whether they came from Nazareth or Assisi or the
royal palaces of India did not establish their
kingdom by means of power or force. Their
kingdom was not of this world.
Weber is not reacting against the proponents
of a radical religious-ethical way of life, but
rather against those who involved themselves
directly with politics on the basis of religious and
absolute ethical principles. In this sense he is
referring to the landlocked steersmen who, with-
out taking up their own responsibility, pointed the
finger at the politicians as well as to the wind-
bags who let themselves be carried away in a
whirl of romantic emotions into dangerous revo-
lutionary adventures. In this way Weber wants to
avoid a situation wherein people who strove for
high-minded ethical or religious ideals would do
so in an unthinking way via politics, i.e. without
taking the specific, indeed dangerous, logic of
power into account. At the same time, he reacts
against those who have failed to appreciate the
specific ethical task of the politicians because of
their conviction that no viable society was realis-
able without political power. In this context he
points to the fact that the major religious tradi-
tions have correctly understood this paradox and
have sought ways to use power and even to legit-
imise the use of arms without deviating from
their radical ethical point of departure. Among
other examples, he cites the distinction between
the consilia evangelica followed by the clergy
and religious and the specific responsibilities of
the laity together with the fraternal side-by-side
existence of the Protestant church tradition, which
the state legitimised, and radical, anti-violence
sects. Once the significance of participation in
political power is sufficiently addressed, the ques-
tion remains as to how one could make room for
the contribution of ethical or religious convictions
in actual political praxis.
Webers response in Politik als Beruf is far
from an abstract, scientific exposition on the
ideal-typical contra-distinction between Ge-
sinnungsethik and Verantwortungsethik. It is
true that he repeatedly emphasises the fact that
the politician with a genuine vocation must al-
ways take the probable and real consequences of
the use or non-use of certain means of power into
consideration. An ethics of responsibility con-
ceived in this way, however, does not stand on its
own, rather it forms a triad together with clarity
of insight and political passion.
21
The politician
must also develop the capacity to precisely and
correctly gain sight of (Augenmasz) the situation
with which he or she is confronted by means of
an appropriate critical distance. At the same time,
he or she must possess a healthy dose of political
passion in the sense of dedication to an ideal.
Politics is not only done with the head but also
the heart. For the true politician, power is not an
end in itself, nor is political engagement an infor-
mal or even frivolous intellectual game. On the
contrary, it is a serious matter which demands
loyalty, commitment and an element of faith.
Depending on the individual concerned, the polit-
ical goal can take a variety of different forms and
be given a national, generically human, social,
ethical, cultural, inner-worldly or religious charac-
ter.
Genuine politics, therefore, demands a com-
plex yet subtle combination of clear insight, pas-
sionate dedication to the job and a sense of re-
sponsibility with respect to the consequences of
what one does. These elements are not contradic-
tory but rather complementary. They achieve
unity in the mature individual, the true politi-
cian who courageously dares to stick his hands
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Ethical Perspectives 2 (1995)3, p. 182
___________________________________ ___________________________________
into the spokes of the wheel of history.
22
Weber explains this as follows: This [the
genuine politician] is something truly human and
stirring. Undoubtedly such a situation can arise in
anyones life if we are not spiritually dead. When
it does happen, the ethics of conviction and the
ethics of responsibility cease to be absolutely
opposed to one another and begin to complement
one another. Only when they are combined can
they characterise the authentic human person,
namely the person who has a genuine vocation to
politics.
23
In spite of everything that would lead us to-
wards a thesis of separation, and without underes-
timating the tense relationship between conviction
and responsibility, it becomes immediately appar-
ent just how much Weber considers such a syn-
thesis to be possible, and this precisely in the
extremely personal decisions of conscience con-
fronted by the politician who has the courage to
act. It is also clear that the political task of the
true politician is not limited to purely instrumen-
tal or consequentialistic acts of power. Weber
goes a step beyond the Machiavellian approach
which would accept a calculated and limited use
of violence in function of the creation of a dura-
ble state.
24
The true politician, according to We-
ber, should not only get results (and therefore
embrace consequentialism), he or she needs to
account for his or her fidelity to the high-minded
goals he or she wishes to realise by means of
power.
The person who accepts his or her responsibil-
ity in the fullest sense of the word, who leaves
behind every form of irresponsible intoxication
with power or romantic sensation, who hazards
the almost impossible task of changing history for
the better by way of ambivalent means, is risking
so much that he or she has to be a truly coura-
geous individual, a hero who can say as did
Luther at the Diet of Worms: here I stand, I can
do no other.
25
Few are called to such heroism.
Those who do not have such a vocation should
keep out of politics: he or she would do the
world a bigger favour by cultivating good inter-
personal relations and continuing with his or her
own career as he or she should.
Critical Remarks
The way in which Weber attempts to dissolve the
complex tension between an ethics of conviction
and an ethics of responsibility, namely in the
courageous but lonely decision of the true politi-
cian who is not afraid to get his or her hands
dirty, is indeed interesting, but it nonetheless
remains open to question. Together with Michael
Walzer, one might ask oneself whether the Web-
erian politician might not end up being a very
tragic hero.
26
Walzer points to the profound
loneliness in which political heroes tend find
themselves when trying to achieve the good by
demonic means, while at the same time endeav-
ouring to save their own souls. Walzer is of the
opinion that this is an impossible task, certainly
in as far as the tragic hero must complete his or
her task in the loneliness of his or her own con-
science. The person who has used violence, ac-
cording to Walzer, can free his or her tormented
conscience in one way only, i.e. by way of the
solution of Dostoevski and Camus: by accepting
a punishment imposed by the community.
27
On-
ly a punishing community can make a politicians
dirty hands pure once again.
With the exception of his reference to the
need for punishment, Walzers emphasis on the
tragedy of the guilty conscience has much in
common with the way Bonhoeffer treated the
problem in the context of accounting for his co-
operation in the resistance against Hitler.
Bonhoeffer had originally opted for non-violent
resistance but, taking the political reality into
account, he finally concluded that his participa-
tion in an attempt to get rid of Hitler was a duty.
For him, this form of co-operation in the killing
of a tyrant was a substitute act (Stellvertretung)
which, nevertheless, could not be seen as morally
good since violence was and remained an evil.
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Ethical Perspectives 2 (1995)3, p. 183
___________________________________ ___________________________________
For the sake of others, however, one had to take
such guilt upon oneself (Schuldbernahme).
28
In Bonhoeffers scheme of things, however, belief
in Gods mercy is of greater significance than
Walzers punishment by the community.
No matter how attractive the idea of guilt and
punishment is, it would be difficult to claim that
it stands at the core of Webers understanding of
the tragedy of the politician. A more likely reason
why the politician leads such a tragic existence is
to be found in Webers one-sided understanding
of political activity. He unnecessarily complicates
the life of the politician by focusing political
praxis entirely on the use of demonic means
such as violence. This is a consequence of his
reduction of power to Herrschaft. Both Arendt
and Ricoeur have pointed to the fact that Weber
takes insufficient account of the difference be-
tween the purely instrumental use of violence and
the more general significance of power as the
possibility to act in a concentrated way. The
exercise of political power is not only a question
of submission and obedience. It also demands a
relationship of authority, a relationship which
presumes genuine legitimacy and the free assent
of the citizens.
29
Any meaningful debate on the
tragic use of armed forces in exceptional situa-
tions must always be situated within this broader
understanding of power as such.
30
In the politi-
cal praxis of a democratic society politicians
normally have other means at their disposal, such
as the use of democratic procedures, communica-
tive searching for consensus (on the basis the
politically essential supposition of what Ricoeur
has called consentement permanent du vivre
ensemble) or the rhetoric which one might em-
ploy in an effort to convince ones opponent that
one is right.
31
Another reason why Webers political hero
comes across as such a tragic figure is due to the
fact that he does not take into account this indi-
viduals relationship to a supportive political and
ideological community.
Politicians, even the so-called realists, do not
act in a moral vacuum. They are influenced by
the ethos of the political community which they
represent. Even Hans Morgenthau, the inspiration
behind the American realists, defends the idea
that politicians have to constantly account for
moral inhibitions. Politicians and diplomats
sometimes refuse to propose certain goals or use
certain means not because they would be useless
or ineffective, but because certain moral barriers
get in the way: there are things one does not do
(...) even if it would be appropriate to do
them.
32
Communities are characterised by an
agglomeration of cultural, psychological and
moral value structures which delimit the possibili-
ties open to the political decision-makers.
33
One
must immediately add, however, that the assimila-
tion of the value structures of a political commu-
nity or nation might perhaps be necessary, but it
does not therefore constitute a sufficient condition
of ethically responsible behaviour. The value
framework of the polis to which one belongs
might also include dis-values and even inhuman
goals (e.g. in a militaristic culture). For this rea-
son a critical attitude remains necessary in which
engagement in a discernment process in the con-
text of the ideological and practical communities
to which politicians belong (such as political
parties, social movements and church communi-
ties) will have priority.
34
In as far as we are dealing here with questions
of Christian conviction, such elements take on a
particular significance in the life of the politician
with a genuine vocation to his or her job. Mem-
bership of a political party, social movement or
Church breaks through the heros loneliness, not
only because such groups can offer guidance in
the discernment process between what can be
done and what has to be done, but also because
they constitute the pedagogical space in which
politicians with a true vocation are formed and
offered lasting support.
Moreover, the politicians ability to embrace
responsibility disinterestedly does not arise out of
thin air. It is the result of the narrative configu-
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Ethical Perspectives 2 (1995)3, p. 184
___________________________________ ___________________________________
ration of the person on the basis of his or her
broadening familiarity with the narrative tradition
and social values of the community to which he
or she belongs. Contact with texts which are
constitutive for a narrative community creates
room for a poetics of existence, both for the
community and politicians alike. By way of fun-
damental metaphors and texts, which stimulate
the imagination, the politicians horizon is wid-
ened to include a perspective that gives meaning
to prospective activity.
35
Far from thereby al-
lowing the politicians to backslide or become
isolated, the narrative imagination places them, in
spite of their involvement with the power game,
in a relationship which sharpens their awareness
of responsibility and broadens their horizon be-
yond the boundaries of role-responsibility towards
a horizon of expectation which in turn will orient
them in hope towards a new future.
36
The maintenance of a vital contact with a
community which constantly allows for revitalisa-
tion and inspiration through a narrative tradition
and for Christians this means primarily but not
exclusively the biblical narrative tradition does
not only widen the politicians meta-ethical hori-
zon of understanding, it also grants him or her
the strength to undertake his or her responsibility
in practice. It is true that the biblical texts by
which the politician is inspired, via his or her
community of interpretation, do not have a direct
influence of his or her decision-making, but they
do nevertheless constitute a world in which the
politician can understand and be understood.
Even though the decisions he or she makes do
not immediately depend on his or her contact
with the constitutive narrative texts of his or her
community, it can still be said that whoever reads
and interprets such texts is no longer the same
person. And a new way of being leads unavoid-
ably to a new way of deciding.
37
The Christian politicians familiarity with the
specific (and at the same time a-specific since it
is human and reasonable) ideological-ethical
conviction of the Christian community(ies), how-
ever, can lead him or her into the tragic field of
tension in a new way. Indeed history teaches us
that politicians who accept their full responsibility
in the power game, yet remain faithful to their
fundamental convictions, are eventually confront-
ed with the problem that compromise is no longer
tenable, or even responsible. Of course in most
cases compromises are necessary and often ethi-
cally responsible in spite of their ambiguity. They
are the royal path of a democratic regime (J.
Habermas).
There comes a time, however, when these can
no longer be kept in agreement with the convic-
tions which brought one to be a politician in the
first place. The tragic and paradoxical aspect of
such a situation lies primarily in the fact that
refusal to compromise as a form of ultimate
political responsibility finally places one outside
the logic of power. An absolute no can lead to
loss of power (e.g. the collapse of a government)
and in extreme cases can even lead to the politi-
cian being dragged down into the diabolical circle
of violence which he or she had rejected. This
has been the tragic case with historical figures
like Thomas More. The person who finds him or
herself in such a situation, where responsibility
and conviction become united in this way, cannot
escape the fact that his or her decisions will no
longer be understood in terms of political effi-
ciency (in other words they are no longer Wir-
kungshandlungen) but will only continue to
speak from the perspective of their witness val-
ue.
38
In a situation where political Wirkungshand-
lungen is no longer possible, one can only con-
tinue to insist through ones courageous witness
that prospective political behaviour becomes
inhuman and meaningless when it is totally disso-
ciated from the perspective of a humanisation
which is never humanising enough. At such mo-
ments the poetic eloquence and sense of respon-
sibility which the Christian politician has received
from his or her narrative community can become
the matrix of a courageous prophetic deed. The
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Ethical Perspectives 2 (1995)3, p. 185
___________________________________ ___________________________________
history of the humanisation of the world is just as
powerfully written by such deeds as by the for-
tunes of power. In this perspective Weber certain-
ly does not have the last word.
Notes
1. The concept of Gesinnungsethik is not easy to translate. In one sense it refers to an ethics which is defined by
radical, religious foundational principles (in particular the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount) while in another sense
it pertains to a persons faithfulness to such principles from the perspective of intention. Depending on the context
we translate Gesinnungsethik as absolute ethics, ethics of conviction and ethics of good inclination. For
Weber, Verantwortungsethik refers to a type of ethics which takes the political consequences of (armed) force into
account. We translate the term with the phrase ethics of responsibility, well aware that in a personalistic ethics
there can only be talk of an ethics of responsibility when the elements Gesinnung and Verantwortung are
considered together, in which event the important point then becomes the appropriateness of an activity, i.e. the
extent to which a certain activity is objectively suitable (taking consequences and circumstances into account) for
embodying a good intention or inclination (such as the desire to establish peace and justice). Cf. L. JANSSENS, De
zedelijke normen in Ethische vragen voor onze tijd. Huldeboek Mgr. Van Heylen. Antwerp, De Nederlandse
Boekhandel, 1977, p. 39.
2. M. WEBER, Politik als Beruf. Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1964, henceforth abbreviated as PB.
3. Cf. Publieke gerechtigheid. Een christen-democratische visie op de rol van de overheid in de samenleving.
Rapport van het Wetenschappelijk Instituut van het CDA. Houten, 1990, p. 41-48.
4. B.J. DE CLERCQ, Macht en principe. Over rechtvaardiging van politieke macht. Tielt, Lannoo, 1986, p. 17-45.
5. On this question see: U. MLLER, Zum Problem des Status Confessionis in R. WISCHNATH (Hrsg.) Frieden als
Bekenntnisfrage. Zur Auseinandersetzung um die Erklrung des Moderamens des Reformierten Bundes Das Be-
kenntnis zu Jesus Christus und die Friedensverantwortung der Kirche. Gtersloh, Mohn, 1982, p. 236-271 and H.J.
REESE, Bekenntnis und Bekennen, Vom 19. Jahrhundert zum Kirchenkampfs der Nationalsozialistischen Zeit (Arbei-
ten zur Geschichte des Kirchenkampfs, 28). Gttingen, Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1974.
6. For this model see, among others, M. RUPPERT, Het Rijk Gods en de wereld. Over verhouding tussen het Rijk
Gods en de wereld naar aanleiding van Luthers onderscheiding van het eeuwige Rijk van God en Gods tijdelijke
wereldlijke regiment. Kampen, Kok, 1987, H.W. SCHTTE, Zwei-Reichen-Lehre und Kningsherrschaft Christi in
Handbuch der christlichen Ethik, Vol. I. p. 339-353 and U. DUCHROW, Christenheit und Weltverantwortung.
Traditionsgeschichte und systematische Struktur der Zweireichenlehre. Stuttgart, E. Klett, 1970.
In mentioning theocracy and two kingdom theory we are referring to two extreme positions. A variety of different
models are maintained in the field of tension between both positions. Cf., for example, F. HENGSBACH (Hrsg.),
Jenseits Katholischer Soziallehre. Neue Entwrfe christlicher Gesellschaftsethik. Dsseldorf, Patmos, 1993.
7. One might say that even political liberalisms method of avoidance, in which metaphysical or universal ethical
notions on the goal of society are carefully kept out of reflection on the rules of the political game, is an implicit
two kingdoms theory.
8. Cf. H.M. KUITERT, Alles is politiek, maar politiek is niet alles. Een theologisch perspectief op geloof en politiek.
Baarn, Ten Have, 1985.
9. On this question see M. WALZER, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands in M. COHEN, Th. NAGEL &
Th. SCANLON (eds.), War and Moral Responsibility. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974, p. 62-82 and D.F.
THOMPSON, Political Ethics and Public Office. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1987, p. 11-39.
10. Thus M. WALZER, art. cit.
11. PB, p. 57-58.
12. PB, p. 64.
13. PB, p. 9.
14. PB, p. 8-9.
15. PB, p. 69.
16. PB, p. 58-59.
17. PB, p. 60.
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Ethical Perspectives 2 (1995)3, p. 186
___________________________________ ___________________________________
18. We translate the concept Zweckrationalitt thus because it points primarily to a secularised ethics in which the
emphasis is placed on the choice of the most efficient means to obtain a particular goal.
19. On this question see, for example, J. LAUWERS, Secularisatietheorien. Een studie over de toekomstkansen van
godsdienstsociologie. Leuven, Acco, 1974, p. 80-81. and D. LITTLE, Max Weber and the Comparative Study of
Religious Ethics in Journal of Religious Ethics, 2(1974) p. 5-40.
20. D. LITTLE, art.cit., p. 20.
21. PB, p. 51.
22. Ibid.
23. PB, p. 661.
24. Cf. P. RICOEUR, Le paradoxe politique in ID., Histoire et Verit, Paris, Ed. du Seuil, 1955, ...Machiavel posait
le vrai problme de la violence politique, qui nest pas celui de la vaine violence, de larbitraire et de la frnsie,
mais celui de la violence calcule et limite, mesure par le dessein mme dinstaurer un tat durable. p. 271.
[English translation: The Political Paradox in History and Truth. trans. Ch. Kelbley, Evanston, Northwestern
University Press, 1965, ...Machiavelli raised the true problem of political violence, not that of ineffectual violence,
of arbitrary or frenetic violence, but that of calculated and limited violence designed to establish a stable state. p.
257-58.]
25. PB, p. 67.
26. M. WALZER , art. cit., p. 78-80.
27. For the sake of clarity it should be noted that Walzer does not refer to Dostoevski but only to Camus.
28. Cf. D. BONHOEFFER as presented in R. PAYER, Friede durch Gewalt? Zur Frage des politischen Widerstands-
rechts. Stuttgart, Calwer, 1973. It should be noted here that this presents a very Protestant view of things. In the
Catholic tradition, barring John Paul IIs reaction in Veritatis Splendor to what he calls intrinsically evil behaviour,
the occasioning of an evil as the proportional and immediate side effect of an act performed with a good intention
and for a good end is not necessarily a morally wrong deed (cf. an act with double-effect as applied, for example,
to legal self-defence). Thomas Aquinas even accepts the killing of opponents by legal authority if this is done for
the common good and with a good intention. The acceptance thereby of serious guilt is not mentioned (cf. Summa
Theologiae, IIa IIae q. 64, art. 7).
29. P. RICOEUR, Pouvoir et violence in ID., Lectures I. Autour du politique. Paris, Ed. du Seuil, 1991, p. 22-23.
30. Cf. my articles on the topic of the bellum iustum tradition:From Just War to Proportionate Defense: A Critical
Reassessment of a Significant Tradition in Personalist Morals (ed. J. SELLING) Leuven, Peeters, 1988, p. 301-318
and Christian Priorities in the Politics of Peace in Swords into Plowshares: Theological Reflections on Peace (ed.
R. BURGGRAEVE and M. VERVENNE) Leuven, Peeters, 1991, p. 167-196.
31. For an interesting ethical evaluation of such rhetoric cf. P. RICOEUR, Langage politique et rhtorique in Phno-
menologie et politique. Mlanges offerts J. Taminiaux. Paris, Ousia, 1989, p. 161-175.
32. H. MORGENTHAU, Politics among Nations. New York, A. Knopf, 1967, p. 224-225.
33. Cf. K.J. HOLSTI, International Politics. Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1972, p. 427-428.
34. We will leave aside the question as to whether the Christian politicians source of nourishment needs to be the
Church or the social or political movement to which he or she belongs (insofar as he or she has not abandoned its
identity in the ethical and ideological sense of the word). For a good initial attempt at presenting the problems
surrounding this topic see V. DRAULANS doctoral dissertation, Christelijk genspireerd sociaal engagement tussen
werkelijkheid en wenselijkheid. Theologisch-ethisch reflectie, documentenanalyse en empirisch onderzoek over de
Christelijke Arbeidersbeweging. Leuven, Faculty of Theology, XCI-640p.
35. One should not only mention the vision of Paul Ricoeur here, but also, among others, that of M. JOHNSON,
Moral Imagination. Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics. Chicago/London, The University of Chicago Press,
1993.
36. Cf. J. VERSTRAETEN, Narrativiteit en hermeneutiek in de toegepaste ethiek in Ethische perspectieven 4(1994)2,
p. 59-65.
37. Cf. P. BEAUCHAMP, Parler dEcritures Saintes. Paris, Seuil, 1987, p. 63.
38. For the distinction between Wirkungshandlung and Ausdruckshandlung cf. R. GINTERS, Die Ausdrucks-
handlung. Eine Untersuchung ihrer sittlichen Bedeutsamkeit. Dsseldorf, Patmos, 1976.
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