反違憲審查之研究 PDF

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MARK TUSHNET
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iv
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Alexander Bickel The Least Dangerous Branch
John H.Ely
Mark Tushnet Taking

the Constitution away from the Courts
Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A case of Unfortunate
Interdisciplinary Ignornace, 92 Nw. U.L. Rev.251, 256-59 (1997).
1
Mark Tushnet
Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue:

A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (1988); Susan J. Brison and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong eds.,
Contemporary Perspectives on Constitutional Interpretation (1988); Michael J. Gerhardt et al. eds.,
Constitutional Theory (2000).
3
Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: a Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (1988).
5
Robert H. Bork Scalia

Robert Bork
5
Robert Bork
7
Antonin Scalia
Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085,
1086-1087 (1989).
5
Robert H. Bork, The Original Understanding, in: Contemporary Perspectives on Constitutional
Interpretation 51 (Susan, J. Brison & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong eds., 1993)
6
Id, 53.
7
Id, 56-57.
6
Charles L. Black
10
Akhil Reed Amar
architexture11(intratextualism) 12Akhil Reed

Amar
13
Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 23-25, 37-47 (1997).
Scalia 28 2
83-85
9
46-47
2002 9
10
Charles L. Black, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (1969)
11
Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 76 Ind.L J. 671 (2002).
12
Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1999).
13
Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 789 (1999).
7
Lawrence Lessig Bruce Ackerman
Lawrence Lessig
14
Bruce Ackerman
15
Richard A. Epstein16
14
15
16
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165 (1993).

Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 799 (1995)
Richard A. Epstein, A Common Lawyer Looks at Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.U.L. Rev. 699
8
David A. Strauss
17
Cass Sunstein
minimalism
18
19
Ronald Dworkin
Dworkin (integrity)
20
Christopher L. Eisgruber
(1992).
17
David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 929-930
(1996).
18
2001 6 18
Sunstein
875-9172002 7
19
2002 9
20
Ronald Dworkin
12-142001
9
9

21
Philip Bobbitt
22
John Ely
Laurence Tribe
23
Richard Fallon constructivist
coherence theory
21
Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (2001).

Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate(1982); Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation (1991).
23
Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 62 (3d ed. 2000)
773-793
22
10
24
Richard Posner
Posner
Posner
25
James B. Thayer
26
Alexander Bickel
passive
virtue
24
Richard H. Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L.

Rev. 1189, 1238-1268 (1987). 71-92
1992 6
25
Richard A. Posner
221-2282001
11 Richard A. Posner
263-308
2001 11
26
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L.
Rev. 129, 140-151 (1893).
11
27
John Hart Ely Democracy and Distrust28
29
Ely
30
31
32
27
Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962).

Bickel
309-319
2002 12
28
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980).
29
16
30
Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law 71(1988)
16
31
1522001 8
32
147-1552001 8
12
33
34
35
36
37
Posner
Posner
38
33
3752002 10

132
2002 12
34
374-3792002
10
35
782-7882002
7
36
18-23
2002 12
13
37
2001 3 23 24
25-39
249-2691994 5
38
13
Sunstein
39
Bickel 40
41
42

Mark Tushnet
43
44
Owen Fiss
45
Owen Fiss
39
26 2 1262000 10
3862002 10
29-30
71 27-77
40
134
41
46-51
213-2191999 3
42
71 27-77
2002 9
1999
7
43
Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and Experience, in: Contemporary
Perspectives on Constitutional Interpretation, edited by Susan J. Brison and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong,
208, 215-216(1993); Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law
1-17(1988).
44
Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and Experience, 216, 221.
2511994 5
45
Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739 (1982).
14
46
47
Robert M. Howard Jeffrey A. Segal
48
Harold J. Spaeth Jeffrey A. Segal
8.4
13.249
Philip Bobbitt
Philip Bobbitt
46
Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739 (1982).

Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and Experience, 217-221.
48
Robert M. Howard Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at Originalism, 36 L. & Soc. Rev. 113
(2002)
49
Harold J. Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Majority Rule or Minority Will (2001).
47
15
Mark
Tushnet 50 Jeremy Waldron Robin West Michael
J. Klarman51
50
Mark Tushnet Taking the Constitution away form the Courts(1999)
Mark A. Graber, The Law Professor as Populist, 34 U. Rich. L. Rev. 373 (2000)
51
Michael J. Klarman
anticonstitutionalist
Michael J.
Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 38 (1997).
16
Gerald Rosenberg
Michael J. Klarman Gerald Rosenberg
Michael J. Klarman
Michael J. Klarman
17
Michael J. Klarman
52 53
54
55 56
57 58
59
Michael J. Klarman
60
61 62 63 64
52
Michael J. Klarman, What so Great about Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U.L. Rev. 145, 147 (1998).
54
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
55
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
56
Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (
)Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)
57
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976)
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
58
Michael J. Klarman, What so Great about Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U.L. Rev. 145, 147-8 (1998).
59
60
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
61
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
62
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
63
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
64
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
53
18
65 66
67
68 69
70
Michael J. Klarman
nondelegation doctrine
71
72Michael
J. Klarman
73
74
75
65
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).

67
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
68
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
69
70
Michael J. Klarman, What so Great about Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 145, 156, note 51-54 (1998).
71
A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388 (1935).
72
73
74
Michael J. Klarman, What so Great about Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U.L. Rev. 145, 157 (1998)
75
66
19
76
77
Dred Scott 78 Jim Crow
79
Brown Roe v. Wade 80 Romer v.

Evans 81
Brown
82
Brown
Gerald Rosenberg
Brown
Brown
76
Michael J. Klarman, What so Great about Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U.L. Rev. 145, 158-9 (1998)
78
60 U.S. 393 (1856).
79
80
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
81
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
82
Gerald RosenbergMichael KlarmanMark Tushnet Mark Tushnet,
Taking the Constitution away from the Courts 145 (1999).
77
20
83
Gerald Rosenberg
Brown
84
Michael Klarman Brown
Brown
Michael Klarman
Brown
Brown
85 Brown
86
Roe Gerald N.
Rosenberg Roe
Roe 87
Roe
Gerald N. Rosenberg
88 Roe
83
Gerald Rosenberg, Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 111-134 (1991)
2003 3 13
84
Gerald Rosenberg, Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 157-169 (1991)
48 4 25-28
85
Michael Klarman, Browrn, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 Va. L. Rev. 7, 13-71
(1994).
86
Mark Tushnet Brown
Brown Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution away from the
Courts 146 (1999).
87
Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 178-180 (1991).
88
21
89Gerald N. Rosenberg
90
Barry Friedman Roe
Roe
Roe
91
David Garrow Robert Karrer Roe
Roe
92
Romer Mark Tushnet
93
94
95
89
91
Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577, 659-668 (1993).
92
Michael J. Klarman, What so Great about Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U.L. Rev. 145,
161, n 79 (1998).
93
94
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,
originally print in 6 J. Pub. L. 279, 193-94 (1957), reprint in 50 Emory L.J. 563, 581(2001).
95
90
22
96
Mark Tushnet
1968
Mark Tushnet
97
98
interpretation thesis
99 100 Robin West

101
102
96
Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1529, 1541-2,
note54, 55 (2000).
97
Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and Experience, 221-226.
98
Michael J. Klarman, What so Great about Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U.L. Rev. 145, 159-60 (1998)
99
Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1325 (1984).
100
Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 241, 258 (1993)
101
Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 241 (1993).
102
Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 241, 261-263 (1993).Robin West
23
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
Jeremy Waldron
103
Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C.L.
Rev. 587 (1983). Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 Cornell
L. Rev. 1529, 1546-7 (2000).
104
Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1529, 1547
(2000).
105
(2000); Einer R. Elhauge, Does interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101
YALE L. J. 31 (1991).
106
(2000).
107
Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1529,
1547-48 (2000).
108
1548-49(2000).
109
Eg. Mark Tushnet, Red, White and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (1998).
24
aristocracy110
111
112
113
Stanford Levison
114
115
116
117 Michael J. Klarman
118
110
Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 264 (1999).

Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 255, 262 (1999).
112
113
Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 291-293 (1999).
114
Sanford Levison, Constitutional Faith, ch. 2 (1988) Duncan Kennedy, American
Constitutionalism as Civil Religion: Note of an Atheist, 19 Nova L. Rev. 909 (1995).
115
Mark Tushnet, Two Versions of Judicial Supremacy, 39 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 945, 949-950 (1998).
116
117
Michael J. Klarman, What so Great about Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U.L. Rev. 145, 151-2, 157-8
(1998).
118
Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 Geo. L.J. 491,
544 (1997).
111
25
119
120
121
122
123
Mark Graber Dred Scott

124
125
119
Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment

Problem, 85 Geo. L.J. 491, 545-551 (1997).
120
Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 Geo. L.J. 491,
549-550 (1997).
121
122
Mark Tushnet, Taking the constitution away from the courts 57-58 (1999); Neal Devins & Louis
Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 Va. L. Rev. 83, 98 (1998).
123
Mark Tushnet, Taking the constitution away from the courts 149 (1999).
124
Mark Tushnet, Taking the constitution away from the courts 149-50 (1999).
125
26

126
127
Bruce Ackerman
128
Jeremy Waldron
t1 t2
t1 t2 129
t1 t2 t1
t2 130
131
132
133
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
Mark Tushnet, Taking the constitution away from the courts 60-61(1999).
Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens (1984).
Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 260-265 (1999).
Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 270 (1999)
27

Michael J. Klarman (dead hand)
Michael J.
Klarman
134
135
Robin West
normative 136
positive
137
Robin West
134
Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 381, 397-398 (1997).

136
Robin L. West, Constitutional Scepticism, 72 B.U.L. Rev. 765 (1992),
Contemporary Perspectives on Constitutional Interpretation 235 (Susan J. Brison and Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong eds., 1993).
137
Robin L. West, Constitutional Scepticism 235-237.
135
28
138
Robin West
139
Robin West
140
141
Dworkin
civil republican
participatory democracy
142Dworkin Roe v. Wade
138
Robin L. West, Constitutional Scepticism 247.

140
Robin L. West, Constitutional Scepticism 238, 247-248.
141
Mark Tushnet, Taking the constitution away from the courts, 139.
142
Ronald Dworkin
4862001
9
139
29
143
Jeremy Waldron
144
145
146
Catherine MacKinnon
147
143
Ronald Dworkin
4872001
9
144
145
Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution away from the Courts 137-138 (1999).
146
Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution away from the Courts 140, 169 (1999).
147
Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution away from the Courts 142 (1999).
30
148 Robin West

progressivism
149
150
aspiration
151
Mary Ann Glendon Robin West

152
148
149
150
151
152
Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (1991)
31
153
Robert Dahl 1957

minority rule
minorities rule154
155
Robert Dahl
156
153
Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 Va. L. Rev. 83, 95
(1998).
154
18
2002 10 20
155
Robert A. Dahl, DecisionMaking in a Democracy: the Supreme Court as a National Policy Maker,
originally print in 6 J. Pub. L. 279 (1957), reprint in 50 Emory L.J. 563, 581(2001).
156
originally print in 6 J. Pub. L. 279 (1957), reprint in 50 Emory L.J. 563, 570 (2001).
32
157
Michael J. Klarman
158
159
160
Neal Devins Louis Fisher
161
157
Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution away from the Courts 135(1999).
Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolution, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1, 16
n.72 (1996).
159
Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1529, 1555,
n.154 (2000).
160
1556-57 (2000).
161
Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 Va. L. Rev. 83, 96
(1998).
158
33
162
163
164
results-driven
165
Mark Tushnet 166
John Ely
Mark Tushnet
162
originally print in 6 J. Pub. L. 279 (1957), reprint in 50 Emory L.J. 563, 577 (2001).
163
164
Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 Yale L.
J. 31 (1991).
165
Jerey Waldron, Law and Disagreement 26 (1999).
166
34
John Ely 167
168
169 Robin West
170
John Rawls veil of ignorance
171
172
Mark Tushnet
167
1562-63 (2000).
169
Einer R. Elhauge, Does interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE
L. J. 31, 50, 59, 64-65 (1991); Michael J. Klarman, Majortarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment
Problem, 85 Geo. L.J. 491, 495-96, n.26 (1997).
170
Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 241, 249-250 (1993). Robin West
171
1564-65 (2000).
172
1564-65 (2000).
168
35
173
174
175
176
Robin West
177
178
179
Robert Dahl
173
(2000).
175
1580-1582 (2000).
176
1591-1592 (2000).
177
Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 241 (1993).
178
179
Gabriel A. Almond Sidney Verba The Civil Culture
18-191997 11
63-702002 9
174
36
180
Mark Tushnet
Jeremy Waldron
181
Mark Tushnet Jeremy Waldron
Mark Tushnet
self-enforcement
incentive-compatible182
Michael J. Klarman
183
Mark Tushnet Jeremy Waldron
180
Robert A. Dahl
146-7180-21999 10
181
Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 310-311 (1999)
182
183
Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 Geo. L.J. 491
(1997).
37

Dick Morris
184185
184
Dick Morris (Vote.com)2000 6

Cass Sunstein
Republic.com
2002
185
38
186 Richard
Posner What Do Judge and Justice Maximize?
187
Posner
186
Frederick Schauer, Incentive, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of judicial Behavior , 68
U. Cin. L. Rev. 615, 619-621 (2000).
187
Richard Posner, What Do Judge and Justice Maximize?The Same Tthing Everybody Else Does, 3
Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1(1994).
39

ideology
good
Patricia M. Wald
188 Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross
189
Jeffrey Segal Harold Spaeth
188
Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 235, 239-41 (1999)
Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Reply to Judge Wald, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 262, 264
(1999)
189
40
190
191
192
193
194
Mancur Olson
195
190
Jeffrey Segal Harold Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model 225-229, 256-57
(1993)
191
Lawrence S. Wrightman, Judicial Decision Making: Is Psychology Relevant? 58-62 (Kluwer
Academic/ Plenum Publishers, 1999)
192
Einer R. Elhauge, Does interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE
L. J. 31 (1991); Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 Hastings L.J. 355 (1999).
193
194
Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE
L. J. 31, 35-36 (1991).
195
L. J. 31, 36-39 (1991).
41
Erwin ChemerinskyRichard
EpsteinJerry MashawMartin ShapiroBernard SieganCass Sunstein 196
197
Bruce Ackerman
198
Daniel Farber Philip Frickey
Daniel Farber Philip Frickey

199
196
L. J. 31, 44, n. 59-65 (1991).
197
L. J. 31, 50-51 (1991).
198
Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (1985).
199
Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflection on Affirmative
Action and Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 Calif. L. Rev. 686, 702(1991).
42
200
Einer R.
Elhauge
201
202
203
204
200
L. J. 31, 52 (1991).
201
Einer R. Elhauge, DoesInterest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE
L. J. 31, 55-57 (1991).
202
Erwin ChemerinskyRichard EpsteinJerry MashawMartin ShapiroBernard Siegan
Cass Sunstein
203
L. J. 31, 60-62 (1991).
204
Einer R. Elhauge, DoesI nterest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE
L. J. 31, 63-64 (1991).
43
205
206
207
208
209
210
205
L. J. 31, 64-65 (1991).
206
L. J. 31, 67-87 (1991); Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 Hastings L.J. 355,
360-368 (1999).
207
L. J. 31, 67, n.135 (1991).
208
Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 Hastings L.J. 355, 361-62 (1999).
209
L. J. 31, 77 (1991).
210
44
211
212
Einer Elhauge
Frank B. Cross
213
214
215
Einer Elhauge
L. J. 31, 77-78 (1991).

211
Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 Yale
L.J. 31 (1991).Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process, 20-21 (1988).
212
Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 Hastings L.J. 355, 362, n.33 (1999).
213
Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 Hastings L.J. 355, 364 (1999).
214
L.J. 31, 77-78 (1991).
215
L.J. 31, 80 (1991).
45
216
Thomas Merrill
217
Frank Cross
218
219
Schlozman Tierney
220
221
216
L.J. 31, 78-79 (1991); Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 Hastings L.J. 355, 366-368
(1999).
217
Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism After All?, 21 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol'y 219, 222-225 (1997).
218
219
Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law 187
(1997).
220
K. Schlozman & J. Tierney, Organized Interests and American Democracy 395-97 (1986)
Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 Hastings L.J. 355, 373, n.85, 96 (1999).
221
46
222
Frank Cross
223
224
John Ely
225
222
224
225
Lee
Epstein and Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The Informational Role of Amici Curiae,
in Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches 215-235 (Cornell W. Clayton &
Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
223
47
New Institutionalist226
behavioralist
attitudinal model
227
228
226
2002 12 13
Forrest Maltzman, James F F. Spriggs II, and Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Judicial Choice:
New Institutionalist Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in Supreme Court
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227
Harold J. Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Majority Rule or Minority Will 18-19 (2001)
228
Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches (Cornell W. Clayton &
Howard Gillman eds., 1999)
48
229
Maxwell L. Stearns
230
Paul H. Edelman Jim Chen
231 Forrest
MaltzmanJames F. Spriggs II Paul J. Wahlbeck
tit-for-tat232
Scalia
233
229
Forrest Maltzman, James F F. Spriggs II, and Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Judicial Choice: New
Institutionalist Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in Supreme Court Decision-Making:
New Institutionalist Approaches 51-57 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999);.David M.
OBrien, Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Opinions: On Reconsidering the Rise of Individual
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230
Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 Yale L. J. 1219 (1994).
231
Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Mathematics, 70 South. Cal. L. R. 63 (1996); Ly nn A. Baker, Interdisciplinary Due Diligence: The
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232
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New Institutionalist Approaches 57 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999)
233
Scalia David M. OBrien, Institutional Norms and Supreme Court
Opinions: On Reconsidering the Rise of Individual Opinions, in Supreme Court Decision-Making: New
Institutionalist Approaches 112 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
49
234
J2
c
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d
J2
(0,0)
d
c
(-2,1)
(1,-2)
(-1,-1)
Harold J. Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Majority Rule or Minority Will,

14(2001)
J1 J2
c
0
d
1-2
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d
c
235
(Folk Theory)
236
234
235
236
Harold J. Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Majority Rule or Minority Will 14 (2001)
156-1671999 1
50
237
William N. Eskridge
238 William N. Eskridge
X*
SQ
G(L)
Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-0f-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of

Congress and Courts, 91 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 31 (1997)239
237
David M. OBrien, Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Opinions: On

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11
238
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51
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L G(L)
L L G(L) G
SQ
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240
Robert D. Cooter Tom Ginsburg

241
240
Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Deference to Congress: An Examination of the Marksist Model, in
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241
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Economic Models, 16 International Review of Law and Economics 295 (1996).
52
242
Jeffery A. Segal Brian A. Marks
IH
IS
SC
X
HC
Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Deference to Congress: An Examination of

the Marksist Model, in Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist
Approaches, The University of Chicago Press, 237, 241 (Cornell W. Clayton &
S H C
H S
242
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53
H IH C IS
C C
H
C X243
1
-20 1
E1992010.79
0
Marbury v.
Madison1803Marshall
244
243
Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Deference to Congress: An Examination of the Marksist Model, in
Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches 237, 241(Cornell W. Clayton &
244
54

Jeffrey A. Segal
245
246
247248
31 2 66-802002 3
245
Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Power Games in the Positive Theory of Law and Courts, 91 Am.
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(Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999). Segal
2002 12 13
246
Frank B. Cross, Blake J. Nelson, Strategy Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking,
95 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1437, 1483-1491 (2001).
247
11 101-102
248
58 5 61999
11
55
Scalia Romer v. Evans

249
Frederick Schauer Posner
250
251
249
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
250
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68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 615, 629 (2000).
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56
Lawrence S. Wrightsman
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Frederick Schauer
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Michael J. Klarman
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255
Michael J. Klarman
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255
256
57
257
258
OECD
259
Freedom House
260
Jan-Erik Lane Svante Ersson
257
17-222001 11
259
Jan-Erik Lane Svante Ersson 248
2002 9
260
23-241999 12
258
58
261 0.73T 2.17
1.52T 6.31
262
Freedom House 263
Jan-Erik Lane Svante

Ersson FreedomHouse
264
Gerald N. Rosenberg
265
261
Jan-Erik Lane Svante Ersson 255

2002 9
262
263
http://www.freedomhouse.org/
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Jan-Erik Lane Svante Ersson
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5.22002 9
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Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope (1991).
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266
266
30 2 2852001 3
60
267
Mark Tushnet
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268
Barry Friedman
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267
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90-106 (1998).
268
25 3 45-93
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269
61
62
Mark Tushnet
Gerald N.
Rosenberg
270
Mark Tushnet
270
Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Changes? 15-21, 30-36
(1991)
63

271
Mark Tushent
Mark Tushnet
271
64
65
272
Freedom House
272
66
67
68
273
273
631999 1
69
274
275
276
277
278
274
63-64
64-65
276
65
277
138
2000 12
278
10 1999 12
275
70
279 342
280 281
279

291-295
1994
280
294
281
294
71

282
283
384 392
284
285
1988 1993
286
17 16
15
1995 12 1996 7
282
27 6 607-6081999 6
551-5821996
283
294
284
384

1-242002
285
187-2181998 9
286
1447-14521997 3
72
50
16 13 287
288
due process of law
289
290
291
287
25 5 286-2871997 5
289
28 2 25-27
290
2961999 3
91-941995
3971998
291
524
74 179-1842001 7
2002 10 19
288
73
292
293
294
295
296
297
292
81 52-532002 2

773-793
2002 7
293
28 1-142001 11
294
171-202
2000
295
4-81999 3
296
40 1 220-2312002 3
297
174-2052002
74
298
299
300
301
302
155 157 10 5
298
741-747
2002 7
33-41
2001 3 23 24
28 2 99-119
299
33-41
2001 3 23 24
300
744
301
745-747
302
472 473 550
75
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
303
472
305
747
306
217-222
307
212-216
308
744-746
309
14 1 1332002 3
310
223-226
Siva Vaidhyanathan
304
76
311
312
313
314
Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs 11-15 (2001).

311
28 2 27-322002
10
312
1998
10
329333-334
2002 10
313
747-772
314
1949 1998 28
2 1-63
77
315
316
1987
317
315
457-473
316
463
317
305
1949
78

318
319
320
321
322
323
1998 28 2 10
318
467-468
319
161
320
1949 1998 28
2 24
321
2 172001 6
322
35
2002 12 13
323

1382001 11 Jan-Erik Lane, Constitutions and Political
Theory 205 (1996).
79
324
325
1986
1987 1988 1988 1989
1988 1991 1991
1994 1996 1999
326
327
324
14 1
123-1632002 3
325
1949 1998 28
2 15-17
467
326
1949 1998
28 2 20
327
171999 12
80

328
329
330
328
28 2 27-322002 10
329
229-2321999 1
330
149-150
2000 12
81
331
332
333
1995
334 1992
1996
335
331
304-305
Tsung-Fu Chen (), Judicial Review and Social Change in Post-War Taiwan 265-311(1996)
333
204-2261999
1999 3 8
334
Tsung-Fu Chen (), Judicial Review and Social Change in Post-War Taiwan 277 (1996)
335
4 41999 3 8
332
82
336
337
1994
336
28 1 56-582002 7
337
83
338
339
340
341
338
Ailsa W. Chang,
Resuscitating the Constitutional Theory of Academic Freedom: A Search for a Standand Beyond
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339
3
340
Tsung-Fu Chen (), Judicial Review and Social Change in Post-War Taiwan 288-289 (1996)
341
Tsung-Fu Chen (), Judicial Review and Social Change in Post-War Taiwan 292 (1996)
84
342
343
342
343
179
305
85
344
344
28 2 27-322002
10
86
345
346
2003
347348
345
307 314
313
2922000 2
347
312
346
87
349
350
348
2932000 2
350
6-13
349
88
1960 8
1980 7
1980
1990
351
351
6 1 121996 1
89
352
353
352
353
65
62
90
354
2003
355
354
355
12
91
356
357
358
356
Gal Dor, Constitutional Dialogue in Action: Canadian and Israeli Experience in Comparative
Perspective, 11 Ind Intl & Comp. L. Rev. 1 , 32-33 (2000)
357
320-321
1994 10
84-87101-103184-188
2000 7
358
17
92
359
359
1292002
12
93
94
Frank
B. Cross
360
Mark Tushnet
360
Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of the Rights, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1529
(2000)
95
361
362
363
364
361
35 287-302
1977 5
289-298
1993 9
206 59-761996 11 Arthur S. Miller and Jeffrey
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362
28 1 972002
7
363
297
364
292-293
96
365
366
23
365
18 3
59-751993 1 59 12 1993
2 116-30 89-109
366
222
97
23
23
367
368
369
370
367
Brown v. Board o f Education

Arthur S. Miller and
Jeffrey H. Bowman, Break the Monopoly on the Supreme Court, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 305, 310 (1986).
368
Roe v. Wade
Arthur S. Miller and Jeffrey H. Bowman, Break the
Monopoly on the Supreme Court, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 305, 311 (1986).
369
753-768
370
769
98
371
371
2000
99
John H. Ely
Dworkin
407
372
Sunstein
Mark Tushnet
373
11 17
372
264-2651994 5
373
100
374
Posner
Posner
375Posner
Posner
369-4002002 10
26 2 3 2000 10 2001 12
374
Neal Devins and Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 Virg. L. Rev. 83,
105 (1999).
375
Richard A. Posner
221-2282001
11 Richard A. Posner
263-308
2001 11
101
376
376
Arthur S. Miller and Jeffrey H. Bowman, Break the Monopoly on the Supreme Court, 39 Vand. L.
Rev. 305, 307 (1986).
102

377
378
379
380
377
299-3162002 10
28 1-142001 11
2002 10 19
378
391-3982002
10
379
28 112001 11
380
21-22
103
381
382
381
382
17-191999 3
Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitutions away from the Courts 155-1571999.
104
383
383
Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitutions away from the Courts 59 (1999).
105
constitutional dialogue
384
385
386
387
deliberative democracy
384
35-402000 12
385
31 2 63-802002 3
386
71 27-77
2002 9
387
2002 10
20
106

388
389
Constitutional Dialogues Louis Fisher
390
391
392
388
20 3 80-971995 1
38 97-1091998 7
389
Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues 231-274 (1988)
390
Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues 273-274 (1988)
391
Neal Devins and Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 Virg. L. Rev. 83,
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Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial
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107

Larry Alexander Frederick Schauer
393
Neal Devins
Louis Fisher
394
395
393
Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply (2000);
Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 Va. L. Rev. 83,
90-106 (1998).
395
2002 10
19-20
394
108
396
397
398
399
396
6 1 4-51996 1
397
35-39 2001 12
398
358-362
399
134
109
400
Robert BorkGuido
CalabresiCaroline S. Earle
400
28-35 2001 12
110

Guido Calabresi
haste or thoughtlessnesshiding
401
402
1982
Charter
of Rights and Freedoms
401
Guido Calabresi, Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 80, 104
(1991)
402
Guido Calabresi, Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 80,
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403
Notwithstanding Clause
404
2000
405
406
407
403
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406
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407
1357, 1368-1369 (1993).
112

408 409
410
411
408
1357, 1370-1372 (1993).
409
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410
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Jeremy Waldron
114
412
1949
1946
1947
95413
414
415
416
412
Jeremy Waldron, Eisbrugers House of Lords, 37 U.S.F.L. Rev. 89, 94-98 (2002).
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414
171998 7
415
851968 4
181998 7
416
181998 7
413
115
417
418
419
420
417
149-151 2001 11
Jan-Erik Lane Svante Ersson 236-237
2002 9
419
148-149 2001 11
420
143-145 2001 11
418
116
421
422
423
1991
424
425 1990
421
Jan-Erik Lane Svante Ersson 229-232

2002 9
422
224
2001 10
423
1482001 11
424
232-233
2001 10
425
117
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
426
1998
The Human
Rights Act 2000 10
incompatible
remedial order
427
428 Julie
Debeljak
429
426
Ran Hirschl, Looking Sideways, Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards: Judicial Review vs.
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427
Julie Debeljak, Rights Protection without Judicial Supremacy: A Review of the Canadian and
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428
Douglas W. Vick, The Human Rights Act and the British Constitution, 37 Tex. Intl L. R. 329,
362-365 (2002).
429
Julie Debeljak, Rights Protection without Judicial Supremacy: A Review of the Canadian and
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118
430
431
430
http://www.tahr.org.tw/committee/index3-2-0.htm
431

2002 6 4
http://www.tahr.org.tw/committee/2002.06.14.htm
119
432

Mark Tushnet
Mark Tushnet 1999 Taking the Constitution away from the Courts
433
434
2000 2 19 http://www.tahr.org.tw/committee/2000.02.19.ford.htm
432
2000 1 10
http://www.tahr.org.tw/committee/2000.01.10.huang.htm
433
Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution away from the Courts (1999)
434
2000
Mark Tushnet
120

Mark Tushnet
Mark Tushnet
noise around zero
MarkTushnet
435
Mark Tushnet Neal

Devins
436
Neal Devins Mark Tushnet
Neal Devins
437
435
Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution away from the Courts 66, 113-120 (1999).
Neal Devins, Reanimator: Mark Tushnet and the Second Coming of the Imperial Presidency, 34 U.
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437
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121
Neal Devins
438
Matthew S. Shugart
John M. Carey
Matthew S. Shugart John M. Carey
439
440
Robert A. Dahl
441
MarkTushnet
438
Rich. L. Rev. 359, 368-371 (2000).
439
46-52
2002
440
61-67
2002
441
Robert A. Dahl
146-7180-21999 10
122
442
MarkTushnet
Mark
Tushnet
Freedom House
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443
Freedom House
442
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443
25 3 375-4061997 9
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16-30
1-15
444
445
TVBS TVBS
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Freedom House
444
445
http://www.freedomhouse.org/pfs2000/reports.html#taiw
2003/2/11
124
446
447
448
Cass Sustein
449
ECRC-FIND 2002 9
37%450
446
2002 5 23 http://www.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/IA/091/IA-R-091-060.htm
447
3 85-111
448

2003 3 6
449
Cass Sunstein
450
http://www.find.org.tw/0105/howmany/howmany_disp.asp?id=45
125

MarkTushnet
451
452
453
454
451
Mark Tushnet
452
http://twstudy.ios.sinica.edu.tw/sc1/1.htm
1997 11
1996
453
49-53
2002 9
454
126
455456
Freedom House
457
455
9-102000 8
457
http://www.tahr.org.tw/data/index.htm
456
127
Mark Tushnet
458
Richard Posner
458
Robert Dahl
128
Mark Tushnet
129
Sanford Levison
459
Mark Tushnet
459
Sanford Levison, Constitutional Faith 157-165 (1988).

130
460
Mark Tushnet
Mark Tushnet
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460
Erwin Chemerinsky MarkTushnet

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2002 10 19
(2001)
(2002)
14 1 111-173
5
(2000)
_____. (2002)
46-47
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206 59-76
_____. (2001)
2001 3 23 24
_____. (2002)Scalia 28 2
79-98
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_____. (1996)
6 1 35-50
_____. (1997)
1447-1452
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_____. (2002)
() 773-793
(1998)
(2000)
1-22
(1968)
(1999)
1-52
_____. (1999)
179-219
(1999)
1999 3 8
(2002)
40 1 220-231
(1993) 59 12 116-130
(1993) 18 3 59-75
(1997) 48 4 18-31
(1995)
_____. (2002)

2002
10 20
(2000)
(1999)
(1992)
_____. (2001)

2001 3 23 24
(2002)
2002 5 23 http://www.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/IA/091/IA-R-091-060.htm
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()
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2002 10 20
(2002)
3
85-111
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(1998)
8 4 677-698
(2002)
(2000) 2000 1 10
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(2002)
2002 12 13
(2001)
2 1-27
(1997)
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6 1 1-23
_____. (1999)1949 1998 28
2 1-63
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3 106-111
_____. (1999) 27 6 607-613
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_____. (2001)

_____. (2001)
(1998) 38 97-109
_____. (2001)
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(2001)
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_____. (2002)
28 1 45-65
_____. (2002) 28 2 19-37
(2002)
2002
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(2001) 74 179-184
(1995) 20 3
80-97
_____. (2002) 71
27-77
_____. (2002) 28
2 99-119
(1999)
_____. (2002)
1-24
_____. (2002)
2002 12
13
(2000)2000 2 19
http://www.tahr.org.tw/committee/2000.02.19.ford.htm
(1977) 35 287-302
(2002) 28 1 89-109
(2000)
11 57-118
_____. (2002)
2002 12 13
(1994)
311-331
(1994)
_____. (1994)
8
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_____. (1996)
551-582
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207-240
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_____. (2000)2000 11 17
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_____. (2002)
457-473

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(91 5 )

Mark Tushnet Taking

Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue:

Robert H. Bork Scalia

architexture11(intratextualism) 12Akhil Reed

Lawrence Lessig Bruce Ackerman

Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165 (1993).

Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (2001).

Richard H. Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L.

John Hart Ely Democracy and Distrust28

Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962).

Robert M. Howard Jeffrey A. Segal

Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739 (1982).

Mark Tushnet Taking the Constitution away form the Courts(1999)

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).

Dred Scott 78 Jim Crow

Brown Roe v. Wade 80 Romer v.

99 100 Robin West

Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement 264 (1999).

Mark Graber Dred Scott

Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment

Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 381, 397-398 (1997).

142Dworkin Roe v. Wade

Robin L. West, Constitutional Scepticism 247.

148 Robin West

Mary Ann Glendon Robin West

Robert Dahl 1957

Neal Devins Louis Fisher

Mark Tushnet 166

John Ely 167

169 Robin West

Dick Morris (Vote.com)2000 6

Jeffrey Segal Harold Spaeth

Daniel Farber Philip Frickey

L. J. 31, 77-78 (1991).

Harold J. Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Majority Rule or Minority Will,

Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-0f-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of

David M. OBrien, Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Opinions: On

Robert D. Cooter Tom Ginsburg

Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Deference to Congress: An Examination of

Scalia Romer v. Evans

261 0.73T 2.17

Freedom House 263

Jan-Erik Lane Svante

Jan-Erik Lane Svante Ersson 255

due process of law

Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs 11-15 (2001).

Brown v. Board o f Education

Neal Devins Louis Fisher

Jan-Erik Lane Svante Ersson 229-232

New Zealand Bill of Rights Act

noise around zero

Mark Tushnet Neal

Matthew S. Shugart John M. Carey

Matthew S. Shugart John M. Carey

Frank I. Michelman, Populist Natural Law (Reflections on Tushnets Thin Constitution), 34 U.

Sanford Levison, Constitutional Faith 157-165 (1988).

Erwin Chemerinsky MarkTushnet

Alexander, Larry, and Schauer, Frederick(1997), On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110

Lessig, Lawrence(1993), Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165.

_____. (2001), Republic.com, Princeton University Press.(2002)

Law and Disagreement, Oxford University Press.

_____.(2002), Eisbrugers House of Lords, 37 U.S.F.L. Rev. 89.