Crisis Econmica de los Estados Unidos de 2008

I. Introduccin
II. Antecedentes de la crisis
a. Securities (ttulos de deuda)
i. Instrumentos financieros: los bancos ponen sus prstamos en
activos vendibles dando sus prstamos con lo mayor riesgo a
otros. El comprador recibe pagos regulares de los hipotecas y
los bancos se deshacen del riesgo.
ii. Los bancos pidieron ms prestados para que crearan ms
ttulos de deuda para vender.
1. Algunos como Lehman Brothers usaron hipotecas
iii. Bancos tambin compraron ttulos de deuda de unos de otros.
iv. Obligaciones de deuda colateralizada (CDOs): un forma de
ttulo de deuda compleja que a menudo oculta prstamos
malos
1. Peter Harn, uno de los innovadores de los CDOs dijo a
BBC people would likely lose their job: anyone trying
to slow down would have seen a decline in their market
share compared to others cuando le pidi que pasara
si alguien tuviera preocupaciones.
2. Collateralised debt obligations are a structured form of
asset-backed security. They are asset backed in the
sense that their worth and payments derive from a
portfolio of fixed income underlying assets. They are
structured in the sense of being divided into prioritised
tranches with each tranche being assigned a different
degree of riskiness.
b. Gestin de riesgos
c. Mercado de derivados
i. Los bancos grandes apostaron mucho en este mercado no
regalada
ii. Derivatives are financial contracts or instruments that, as their
name suggests, derive their value from that of something else.
It is not necessary to own that something else. So trading in
derivatives is a form of pure gambling.
iii. Over-the-counter nature meaning directly between 2 parties
d. Sub-prime lending
i. Cuando los bancos faltaron personas a quien pudieron prestar
ellos empezaron prestar a los pobres quien no pudieron
permitirse el lujo de los prstamos, los ms arriesgados.
1. Por el sube de precios de las casas ellos pensaron que
no habra tanto riesgo porque si los pobres no pagaran,
el banco vendra las casa por ms porque tendra un
valor mayor.
e. Bribe crdito rating agencies
i. Segn Evan Davies de BBC las agencias de calificacin fueron
sobornado a dar una puntaje a los ttulos de deuda
ii. Very often these larger rating agencies offered credit rating
advisory services that essentially advised an issuer on how to
structure its securities so as to achieve a given credit rating for a
certain debt tranche. In consequence, it seems not unlikely that if
the agency's advice was followed, the latter agency consequently
felt obligated to provide the issuer with precisely that given rating.
Not surprisingly the banks choose very often to structure in such a
manner as to achieve tranches with AAA ratings. In fact, in the last
ten years the repackaging of assets has resulted in huge quantities
of AAA-rated securities. Indeed, at one point roughly 60% of
structured products were triple-A rated according to Fitch Ratings
(2007) compared with less than 1% of corporate bond issues. And
one result of all this was the generation of a perception (as it turned
out, an illusion) that structured securities were comparable in terms
of safety or riskiness with single name corporate finance.
iii.
III. Desarrollo de la crisis
a. Housing bubble (alter the 2000 dotcom crash there needed to be
another bubble, so Money started shifting into housing mortgages)
b. Compra/venta del riesgo impossible to predict future prices
c. Consumer confidence amount of GDP based on consumption for USA
(75% in US vs other countries), inflation forces people to buy (have to
get Money out of their hands) whereas deflation forces people to save
(prices will fall in the future? Okay, Ill save my Money!)
d. Crdito (interest compounds over time, causes exponential costs)
e. Spreads of the crisis
f. Bank bailouts (infinite risk)
IV. Anlisis del impacto
a. Impacto en los Estados Unidos
b. Impacto en el resto de Amrica
c. Impacto en Europa
d. Impacto en los pases del tercer mundo
e. Impacto en toda la economa mundial
f. Mercado libre vs modelo keynesiano
V. Conclusiones
a. Personas vean una crisis de atrs
i. The greatest tragedy would be to accept the refrain that no
one could have seen this coming and thus nothing could have
been done, the panel wrote in the reports conclusions, which
were read by The New York Times. If we accept this notion, it
will happen again.
b. The majority report finds fault with two Fed chairmen: Alan Greenspan,
who led the central bank as the housing bubble expanded, and his
successor, Ben S. Bernanke, who did not foresee the crisis but played a
crucial role in the response. It criticizes Mr. Greenspan for advocating
deregulation and cites a pivotal failure to stem the flow of toxic
mortgages under his leadership as a prime example of negligence.
c. The report does knock down at least partly several early theories for
the financial crisis. It says the low interest rates brought about by the Fed
after the 2001 recession; Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the mortgage
finance giants; and the aggressive homeownership goals set by the
government as part of a philosophy of opportunity were not major
culprits.
d. It calls credit-rating agencies cogs in the wheel of financial
destruction. Paraphrasing Shakespeares Julius Caesar, it states,
The fault lies not in the stars, but in us.