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No. 26
in this iSSue
THE GAME OF
TACTICAL LEVEL COMBAT
IN VIET NAM


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In This Issue ... page
COHESION AND DISINTEGRATION:
AMERICAN FORCES IN VIET-NAM 3
by John Kramer
THE MAGAZINE OF CONFLICT SIMULATION
GRUNT' (TACTICAL GAME 11 :
Edilor' In,Chief James F DunnIgan
Art D,rector and Co. Editor Roomol'd A. Simonsen
Research Olrector and Managing EdilOl' AlberT A Noli
Associill. EdItors John Young
AMERICAN FORCES IN VIETNAM) 33xs
Sk'Phcn P,ltnel<.
Supplement Editor Nichol(ls M"ffE!o
OfficI Manager Froo Sch.K:llwr
THE WAFFEN SS 10
Off,cI Sta ff Art L(I$Io:.V _ Joe Shean
Chri s NIelsen John Shean
Adul t -Gam ... Editor Sid SilCkson
Q,"lomKY Ed,tor Rod Walke!
Conlribul ing Artllt J ohn Kramer
Contributing Edilors Dave Wilhams
Lou ZOC(:hl,Slevc List
James FI,H1ag.ln
by Steve Patrll k
John Flanagan
Guy Ferralolo, Bob Charnper
Ray Johnson, Ed Mohrm ..... n
Fred V,cuncyer
NORTH AFRICA: The Sea-War 17
Research AsslSlant Dave
by Albert A. Noll
Orlg,nal Edi lor and Founder Ctlflslophcr A. Wagner
OUTGOING MAI L by the Editors 2
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DIPLOMACY
FEEDBACK
This issue's Outgomg Mati w,1I be somewhilt
brief. matnly becausc we haven', hdd time to
wa,t for leuers lor No, 25 to come in Wh,ch
brings us to another sublect, the frequency lor
1;lCk of II) with wh,ch 580T is pllbh$hed_ As our
veleran loyal subscribers well know. up unlil
oOOut a year S&T publ,shed at rather
infrequent intervals. An issue was "sl::oppe(I"
occ:asionally In order 10 bring things up to
date The prm\ary reason for all this skippIng
around lay in Ihe lact that S&T was, unt,t
recently. put ou t , literally. on II shoestring
When we took ovef the 18 months
ago ,t was lIal broke, and we didn't have much
by Steve Patrtck 27
by R<xJ Walker 28
Vox POPUli, Vox Del 31
and 0'P - .
IIIIQ
".r"
l'e
money to pump 1'1110 It ellher So for nearly a
ye.:or everyone worked (some lull t,me) lor
nothing When we d,d start P<ly'ng salaroes they
amounted to less lhan a dollar an hour Iwtl
now pay a lillie over a dOli", an hOllr to the
full t ime staff l AnOll1er ploblem, IUSI recen ll y
SOlved. W;:lS ,n 'mding competent stalf at ')11
We now have enough expenenced people 10
get the magaline out on Itme w'thout 100
much trouble A Imal problem was '" havmg a
olace to do lhe work Until quite recently we
"operaled" out 01 a basement 10 New York's
" fash,ollilble" Lower Easl Side district (sic),
We have s,nce mo\ll!d to lar\lllr quarters (400%
{Conrmued on p29.'
,
Cohesion and Disintegration:
Forces In
ABOUT THE AUTHOR ...
J...:k K .. mer, age 30. is II commerClalarlllt by
profeSSion. He Stlfved for 18 months liS II lSI
L'ffutfHIlJnt In Iftll lSI CaviJlry Division (AIT-
mobile), He WIIS ..."th the division when if was
orf/ilmzed in the United S,ares lind Iramed
wl l ft I I before going overseas w,th Ihtl ume
untt In 1965. AI /hough an ilrtlllery Off/Uf, he
spent mOil of hIS lime with 1111 Infantry
company liS an art illery FO (f orward observer).
For Ihfl purposes of wfiling Ihls srltel, Ihal
was probablv the besl pOSSible posmon /0 be
m. He _I wtlh the ,,, fant,y bur did nor
belong /0 It. JM:k saw considerablfl /lCIIon, liS
dId the ,.,,, of the division, durmg hll year In
Vitti Nam. 8ur. as he hilS pomted OUI to us, the
waf flllS chlll1gt1d considerably sincfl he lelf VII"
Nam. Hil conve"IJfi ohs WI th so/(I/,,, who have
bet!II in'Vif/f N;Jm afrer he lefr confIrms rh15,
by John Kramer
However, cerraln rhlngs did nor change . .. and
if IS with Ihese subiecu thar hiS ar l lcle and
gilme deal. He professes to be no "experr"" on
Vietnam. wr. at he says IS Simply his observ,,
l ions and opmlOflJ. Bur then that's apparently
all Ih"t comes out of Viet Nam , .. someone's
observa tIons imd opinIons.
THE AIRMOBILE DIVISION
The Airmobile D,y,s,on IS YeIV SIInll". 10 Ihe
Airborne DiYlslOn a '('gul,1I .nl,mllv d,y,s,on
SlflppecJ 01 liS armOured \o('llIcles. h('"vy a,III
lerv and 01 IllI! IlCavlcr .n lant,v
lm Olhm words "Iight 11I 1,ml'v"). All Ihe
Infanl rv bilttalions ilrnJ ,III the 105mm Howl!
l e r banallons muSI be 1/9111 enough to be
<.:a rrlOO bv the diVI SIon's Oflla"'C heiocop ltlfS ,11
"nv '''lit' Unli .... Ibe il"bo,np diVISions which
{j"P"'Il(j ,'', tho A"fo,te for the inmal a$$ilul1.
!Ill! ,lIfIl10hl l, d ,vlslorl ""WllaUI5 In own trans
pClrts WIl,,eds Iht! il i,boJJ1p. is SUiCIIV a onc
W,IY dcoi . the ""mobile u,"IS can be "I.
un Oul ,Hid pul back ayoIm In some other
l(I(:ollOrl. SmC(> vouf own people arc dOing the
moy.nQ. coo,dll'l<:)\,on IS Y"sllv simllhhoo and
'(l.k:!lon lim('s can be mea5<)'ed In hOu'$ and
ilS 10 ddVs .!lx! wee .. s
lhC 01 an aI/mobile VI"I,S nUl thai 01
Id"'UlI! 01 huld,n'l lI,uund from tlnenly uni ts
A{lilulSI lorm. 11 OppOSi t ion and Ofg<lJllled 005'
IheS(' <.mllS would be hard ",essed I rIC
Iyp,t:<ll r"iSSIOl1 COI1SiSIS 01 pal/ ol hng. ei ther
IIqhtlv JTl,1I1rwd lronl lone areas Of bOlders. or
enenlv or t ' le,x!lv wI"..,,' olliv I'gh l
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and token resistenoo is to be expected. Because
of their mobility the units can be sprelld OUI to
cover large areas. because of Iheir reaction
lime they can quickly mass to overcome or
shlldow whatevel resistance one of their Pi!
trois hilS come across.
This type 01 unit IS never emplOyed in the
occupyandhold operation. but instelld is used
for scout ing and screening. usually fllr from
the major field of ac\lon.
The COm!).1t portion of the d ivisIon consists of
three brigades organized for the record. but
no t nc<:essarily operationall y. into two inlan
Ify maneuver bal1alions and one art illery
battalion. The dIViSIon can field enough heir
copters 10 li l \ and support one brigade/
THE AIRMOBILE DIVISION: 1962 1971
In 1960 work WiJ$ fir$1 official/y done on
the possibile forming o f an airmObile (as
opposed to lin "airborne'" division. The
new di'dsion would use helicopters as i ts
main form of tactical trilnsportation. In
ear/v 1962 the Howze Board was con
vened at FOr! Bragg to study the airmobile
qUIIHion and to perform field teslS. In late
'62 the Howze Board submitted iu report,
suggerting thllt lin airmobile division be
cfaMed. II was decided 10 {JQ ahead with
the orgimizarion lind tesling of II "rest"
division. In January the order was issued
fOf the establishment of a len division. In
September 1963 the first battalion size
rests were conducted. These lests were II
SlICCess. In J!lnu,lfY 1965 i t was decided
that the new airmobile division would be
sent /0 Vier Nam should there be a call for
more American troops. In June 1965 the
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was of
ficially formed. In July the division was
sent to Viet Nam, completing this move in
September 1965. The t1ase for the unit
was established al Ankhe. Berween Oc
tober and November 1965 the division
pllrticipated in its first major action, the
of Pleik.... In the 37 day period
between 23 October and 28 November
1965 the division made 193 company size
moves by helicopuu. This involved over
6,000 hlll/capter sorties. In addition some
13,O()() tons of IImmunition and supplies
were moved. In 27,000 hours of flying
only four helicopters were shot down, The
barrie involved most of the 1st OJV.
although the inf"ntry brigild8$ were sent in
one lit " time, on " rotation basis. One
brigllde pf South Villtnamese forces (three
ranger lind one reconnaissance battalions}
WilS involved. In ilddition there was a US
Spec:ial Forces contingllllt al Plei Me.
which had been besieged and started off
the fight in the firS( place. North Viet
niH11ese forces Consisted of the equivalent
of one division (the 33rd. 32nd and 66th
regiments). As wi th all other field uni ts in
Viet Nam, these regimllnts were rather
small. averaging some 300500 men per
battalion. There were three battalions per
regimen!.
The 1st Cev division contained somll
16,000 men, nine i nfantry battalions and
some 400 helicopters. There were only
about 1500 mOlOr vehicles in the division.
The divisional artillery consisted of three
reinf orced (usuall y with an ex tra infamry
baltalionf with 11 few helicopters lelt over for
l imi ted use by t he remil ining bflgades Opera-
tionally tile diviSion fieldS a tasK f oroo, usually
under thl! command of an assi st ant division
commander (one swr gfln(!ral) Wi t h 11 brigade
reinforced Icol ) as liS basis l or its primary
mission. This ele,nenl has most Of the d lvi
sian's hel icorHers all<tChcd In a di rect support
role and cooducts most of Ihe ai. assaults. A
second brig1lde will be oft on a secondary
miSSion somewhere, i ts pnmary means of
transponation and supply. except for a few
helicoPwrs , beong the 2)1, Ion truck. f IS mission
is \0 guard suppl y li nes, patrol Quiet areas,
generally less in tense t han t he main acl ion.
The third brigade is Ihe base camp refitting
for the nex t campaign and defend ing the base
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{/8 gun} 105mm howitzer battalions end
one battalion of rocket-'iring helicopters.
The division reconnaissance battalion can
tained thrBf! companies of helicopter end
one of infantry. It usually opefated as
RED (rOCket firing helicopters), WHITE
(light observation helicopters) and BLUE
(helicopter borne infantry) teams. In addi -
tion the division had the usual support
elemen ts attached to an infantry division.
One exception was thll helicopter trans
port brigade, which contained most (and
serviced all/ of the division 's 400odd
helicopters. The nine infantry autalions
were distributed among the three infllntry
brigades as needed. These battalions were
rarely up to their full strength. They
normllllv operated with about 500600
men. i f they were lucky.
In early 1966 the airmobile division was
involved in another major operation, this
time around Bong Son. The result loWS the
$;Ime as at Pleiku. The most successful use
of lIirmobile troops came two years later,
whlln the 1st Cev relieved the Milrines
during the siege of Khe Sanh. Again. the
flbilily of the lIirmobile troops to move in
fast , rein force just liS fast and to get out
equelly fast was a combination the North
Vietnllmese could not stllnd up to.
The introduction of the airmobile di vision
had a profound effect on the war for
national liberation in South Viet Nam. Up
until early 1965 the South Vietnllmese
gueri//lls and their regular North Villt -
namese allies were quite close to winning a
military victory against the American sup
ported government in South Vietnam. The
communist forces had already won a
political victory in South Viet Nam. It
seemed as if only truly messive interven
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camp perimeter, Of course these assignments
are not rigid. Ihe ent ire d ,viSIon can operate in
the same or One brigade can be detadled
as an mdcpenckmt unit for a period of li me
The only li mi tIng facto! IS the of
the helicopter tor fuel, repair and mainten
anee. The dIVision can support contllluOU5
OJ>(!rat lons 20 and 40 miles from Its base camp.
more WI th forward bases, bu t It must have
those bases and they are lairly complex. In
addition to the t hree maneuver brigadilS. t he
diVISIOn has a rather large Helrcop1l!r brrgade
This b"yilde consists of a cavalry troop equip
ped wllh OH 13 and UHl b model helicopters
armccl wllh mochinegulls/rockets and used lor
alf scouting operat ions Two 11f t baualions
uSing UHld model helicopters for gener al
assaUlt , and support operations and two rne

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tion by American forces could stop them.
Such intervention would have probably
taken too long to be effectillt!. The air
mobile division changed all thet. It showed
that the communist forces could not stand
up to II direct confrontation with mobile
American forces backed up by artillery
and air power. The lesson was finallv
learned i n II series of barrles i n the la
Drllng valley (near Pleiku}. Communist
forces tried to lake on American forces
head-on and were smashed. Khll SllfIh was
IInother attempt at a "conventional" mili
tary solurion, Ihllt of siegft warfare in the
sparsely populated hi nterlands. This too
flli/eel. American air power smashed the
besiegers with over 13,000 fans of bombs
(plus some 2,000 tons of artillery shells)
before the airmobile units moved in 10
drive them out. Thll communists then fell
back on their pre 1964 tactics of infiltra
tion and political agitation. This would
not win them control. but it was their
country and they could certainly last
longer than the Americans, who were
10.000 miles 'rom home. This definitelv
became communist policy lifter the failure
of the losses suffered during the Tet
Offen$;V8 of early '68. With no more IlIrge
enemy units to go after. the airmobile
division was relegated to many far ranging.
fllst lind largftly futile sweeps through the
sparsely populated regions of Viet Nam.
Since 1968 however. thtl communists have
been content to just wait until the Ameri
cans get tired of beating the jungles for
them. Thll South Vietnamese government,
in thfl mellntime, makes little progress
towards delivering the social reforms
which the communists promise. Thll lIir
mobile division threlhes around in the
jungle. And the guerilillS loWit.

diUfll hll bJllalions ulih7lng CH47's for terry
ing lroons, lu"l and drlilk!ry ",id Iheir
.t"'munltlOIl. Additional unllS are the Aer,.11
Rocklll ArtlUery Ball"'ry wilh rocket armt'd
UHld's, tht' Mt'd EVdcuation Hehcooter Com
oany. <!lid the Heavy lltl Compilfly With their
Sky C,df1('f; lor heavy equipment and d"wr1('(1
hul/C'Jf'to'.s There IS also a support heliCOPter
co,,\pany .11l,K'h.'(l directly 10 the diviSion lor
commdnd shiPs. a,roome tactical operations
dl,d .llfborne long range comrnunlCd
lions rcl(lY
Tilt' lor mdnnlOQ .. nd
tht.' hl!licOPHlr$ IS considerable. The diVision IS
mo.e 11'.111 doubled ,n manpower a!l(j rriplt.'Clrr,
lhe area lor 1001 and 'ep"" 'dCilit,es.
01 cour'le Irrendly aor superiority IS a necesslly
10 p.ot.",1 th" vulnerable aod relal,vely
baSt! area Unlike the truck whicl! Ciln
go lor considerable periods With only ope.ator
the rOtary wing ai.cralt's lime
belween ovt'rhauls ,s measure(! In II,ght hours.
COMMUNI CATIONS
The key 10 successful operations of 5<11..l11 UiIlIS
patroH mg 1dl"1JIl arl!as 's communlcat ions. Ever y
combal untl down 10 squad IINeI is $Opplil'Cl
With 411 one rad.o. usually Ihe relativl!ly
small arid Ioght welghl. bilttery ope<atad solid
$t.tte PRC 25 The range 01 this radiO
Irom 15 to JO miles depending on the ICHain.
type of anlenna and condlt,on of the I)dllery,
the PRC operiltes on the FM bafld which
reqUires line 01 Sight lor best 'e$Otts. In heavy
mount')Ins ar,d Ih,ck Jungle. tefraln wtllCt,
e lt hllr absorbs or obstructs the rM roclro
WdveS. Ille range IS much sI'Oller. then the
operator, havmg to move Ihrough the trees.
w,11 be USIr'\y thil shorl wh,., antenM
(,nstead 01 the longer r,gid pole antennal
whICh lulllie< CUI$ down the rangE' The range
problems are owrcome for lhe most Pdft by
hiIYlng relayshlps airborne. Artillery ;Mid In
fanlly base P05ltlOflS Witt usually set up the
long range 292 anlenna 10 Increase thelf
:send receive range
The PRC radiO$ contain enough dHmnels to
han.clle li lt 01 the networks that Ihe vanous
un,IS utilize. although only one (II (I Inne.
There are about scyen radiO OIIts thai the bas'c
infantry company Will concern lise\! With. The
IlIsl ,s the bat talion command network. the
company commander Wilt h!JYf! one 01 hiS
rrKIlas on Ihis net at all wnes lor Ihrough It
Will come the orders and. mlormauon
the ballahon commander and h,s operallons
oftlcer l$Sue to Ihe manC\Jver The
company commander 1SSUi!1 h,s orden to his
tour platoons on the company commend OIIt.
The platoon leaders In turn communicate
Wllh,n Iheir own plaloon on lhe platoon
cornman(! net All helicopter act lv,tles In
volving the company's movllfTlent and supply
are handled by sWllching somebody's radiO to
the Baltalion lilt 1161 Medical evacuat ion 01
wounded 1$ handled by going to the Mad wac
net ThIS ",nstant" communication can con
sume a good porlion 01 t he company com
mander's lime, especially m p8ruxl$ 01 stress.
FtAEPOWER
Once the ,n,t,al request for artillery 15 made, it
is a mailer of mmutes belore the enemy
pasll ions begin to recl!iVl'! ti re, The mission
begins :Vllh t he Observer requesting II lire
mission Irom tim t,re dlrt!Ction cent"r of the
ballery support,ng tllat unit The observer
gives mi>P coordinates (thc baSiC method, th",re
Me others). a comPolSS direction Irom his
OOSlllon 10 Ihe laryet. Ihe ndlUre ot lhe tilr!JCt
and II request tor a parl!cul<lr type ot fuse or
shell. the coordmales 9'\11".''1 arc planed on lhe
FOC chilrt tdbt", thaI has the loclluon 01 lhe
IlImg bdltu.y alrrudy plolted. the horizontal
chart operator then m6ilSUles Ihe angle the
guns must turn 10 lOCI! on Ihe direction 01 t he
target and the r.mge. these figures
.tre given 10 Ihe t:ompu ter whiCh converts t he
ran9! to a powder ch;JIII" and tube elevation
necessary to hit Ihe t<lr!/Ut The howitzers shifl
10 this datil ilnd lhe two center lube5100d and
fIre. The FOC announces "OIl the w<V" to lhe
ollSef\ICr. who answers With "on the WiJY.
W3It .. When the rounds Impact Ihe observe.
1/11111 trv to <idlust them on target. usong
the compass angle to th(l tilfy.IJl as his basis. he
Will give a left or right correclion calJed a
defleclion correction arld a range COllection.
The observer has given f1 is correct ions from his
v.ewpomt. Ihe FOC hor I/onlal chan operalor
now converts these Cor'CCllUns 10 the view
pamt of the guns. <In(1 nev... ddta is given to tIl{!
guns. This process IS continued. usu<llly three
or four times with orlly the center sections
doing the adjusting un\oI the Fa IS satisfied
and enters "lire for elleel" whereupon the
l!ntrre billlery beg,ns flflllg d(:cordlng 10 lhe
last dilta given. for as many volleys as are
required.
Most of the tiling thaI IS done by lhe FO ,son
t,ugets within the range of the smill! arms of
thl! company. usually around <100 meters or
less. and's done ,'1 troos or foresls wherc
actual observation is flll ... t to 1I111)OSslble. The
howitzer 's an area fllo weilPon so Ihe FO
flicks an area and tlfes tit rt With all the
vari<lbles that affecl artillery (such as wind
direclion and soeecI. all temperatule and den
sity. oowder temperalure. moisturl! content
and manufacturer. tube wear. drol l due to the
spinning 01 the projectlla, 'olalion 01 lhe earlh
while the shell IS In flight to say nothing of
m"P errors up to 200 melersl the FO will
usually give It'dt are nOI 10 the
tilr!1.!t bu t are a generous distance away. As an
added precaul ion the lirst shell fired wil l be
white phosphorous. nOI so mUCh 10 be able
to see the smoke as It llseS up over the trees as
to lessen the chances o t Iriendlv casualties.
once lhe FO has established thaI he is not m
the impact area he will ask lor shell HE and
cootrnue the adJuslment A good portion of
the Illing IS done Into tree1 so the correction,
are based on sound $Cn,"ng (Ihe procedure
berng called creepu191 startrng with the rounds
at a safe distance 01.11 and then a::IJusling Ihem
closer arid cf05l9r In heavy trees or at night lhe
sound of lhe SPlInt shell IraogfTl(Jn\s on the
helmet ,ndlcates Ih"t tha I(lst correction was a
correct one. Once a concentrat,on has betln
established there is no limit 10 the amounl 01
l ire Ihilt can be placed on that targel or the
a.ea around It Once a common pomt has been
eSlablished between the FO and the FOC.
$ObsEquen t shiltS uSlf'Ig that point as a basis
take no tune al aU Since a common grid
sYstem is usod wi thin all lhe baneries. any
filing battery of any type wi thin . ange can be
brought 10 bear on thai poin t u$mg Ihe f roal
dala o f t he banery Ihat flied the ,nitial
mission. If the si t uallon warrants and It is
available an FO might find hlmsel l adJus t ong
!l!veral ban alrons 18 guns perl of 105 as
well as odd balter lllS 01 155'lowed and 175
SMALL UNIT TACT1CS
The IItrmobilll d/l'<Sion does not Illway.
operate by helicopter. ThtJ helicoPtllr1 /lfll
used onl y when they hll llt/ t o be. Slnell
1968 the a"mobi le h/lS hlld l ewer
OPPortumt olls to come chll rgmg in on a
bttsoeged Amllriclln outpost /I kll thll
01 old. Thll airmobile troops must now go
out lind fmd thll IInemy. This results in
numtlt'Ous "SW6ep missions, mall o f
which lind m no conmet wi th the enemy
li t 1111. Sweepl li re planned liS II rtlsul t of
m fOrmll tlon (hoWtllltlf sCllnty/al t o where
the IIneml' II. Usulllly II brigade li t II t ome
(WIt h most o f the di llilion's h"icop fllrsl
will bII out on t hiS type of million, or
p llrh/IPs two brigadeS each Wi th tmough
hel/coptlfrl to 11ft ten infantry eomplIrIllll
lit onclI. The sweePI /lfe CiJrritld OUt slmul
taneousll' ollt/r a Wide IIrN lind then
on a central point in lin attempt
to cllteh al manl' Imemy IrOOPI lIS pas
sob/If. This 01 extremely di ffi cult as Ihll
enem l' troops usually aVOId conlaCI Wi th
Amllflcan Uni tl . One Will' 10 10ft:1I Ihe
IInllmV to flghl OS to try to locate lind Ihlln
send m II comfJ/Iny lind try 10 prOllOke an
enemy reaction. AirmobIle Unt ts would
t hen , urround the attacking enllmV forcll.
8ack lng up IIny OIIe of the,e operil l ion, /I
the artlllllry, oftM operatmg lIS
two gun'llICt oons which Cliff bII r/IPl dl y
molltld (li nd mor ll ompor(lIntl y, suppli lld
Wit h " mmunltlonl bv helicopter. Son,.
tomel only II pliltoon IS sent m III "bait."
In el thll r C/l se ll company" usu/l/ly ' tllnd
Ing by to fly m by helicop ter at Iha leasl
hmt of contacl wolh IInemy Unt ts. But
onCII con fllCl IS made Ihe enemy ulual/ I'
doel not stand lind fight. Thll conllderablll
AmeflClln IIr t oller y fife is usuall y enough to
rrIIIke thll communtst troops lIilCllte the
arf!ll. At thlll pamt the mall (ha AmerlC8n
troops can hope 10 gel 0' iIbIIndontld food,
Wtlapons and flqUlpnlflnt CIIchtn.
THE AIRMOBILE INFANTAY COMPANY
The companl' usual/I" consISts of aboul II
hundred men, mamly because of constoml
cilsu/lil iel lind the one r ear replacllment
policy. The company conSIsts of four
platoons, onll of whoch i$ II mor tar plll-
toon. Thll infantry platoons con"'I of
four squlldl. one of which is II machfnflgUn
squlld. Full SIrenglh of thll i nfllntrv squlld
is 10 men; I t i, usual/I" l /lSs in actual
pract lCll. Thll machmegun squild has two
M6O machmeguns. A ll ot her men m thll
company 1Iff1 armed with "" / 6 IIU/amaln:
"flill. The mortllr p latoon hll$ t WO SIIC/l ons
(squads / WhiCh, el'l.'n III full I lfllnglh only
hilvil Jht; men. The mortars lire almOlt
nevllr used and the mOr//lf pla/oon 01
lither u'lld 11$ m fant ry or Molciln up 10
bri ng thll infllntrl' squllds up to Ilfllnlll h.
Thll.company /IImost alWilYs has I11111ched
to i / II forward observer team ( f WO mllnl.
thr" or four medic t ellml (two men eK h/
lind II South Vltltm'mtI$lI rf/ConnlllUlH>Cft
plat oon (20 or SO menl 10 IICI II' mtlll"
prettIfJ lind, i n IhflOrY. $Couts.
The in 'lIntry compllny II the basoc comblll
uni t In V""nllm. MOlt of t hll " lUrch "
milllonl lire performed by compllny su,
uni ts. O"r;a on II whi le IInorher compllnl'
will flown In to rein forcilII compllnl' on
trOUb/II.
5

6
CH47 Hehc:opter
WEAPONS ANO EQUIPMENT
F,,", of ther. lire helicopter .
The', 8'. two mllm type'S bv the
I",mobile troops. The UHl0 ("Iroqufm"
bur usual/II called rhe "Huey"] is the
workhorTII of Ihtl lIirmobile division. Eight
Of more companies /25 "aUCOol tlrt ench)
In the dIvisional helicopter brigade do
mOil of the movmg of men and Jupph,s.
perF/eu/arly in areas where they mirY be
"red upon. The UH l0 is 40 feet long, 8.5
(Ht Wldl1lmd 14.3 feer high. lu maN/mum
_,ght is 4.3 tons of whi<:h 0.7 tons is fUfJI
and 2 tans is car!}O. If usual/y carri., fen
troops, tWl') door gunfHIfl and pilor lIfId
copilot, II/though Only one mltn CII1I fly If.
III cruismg speed II 170 kllomertlfl per
hour. Endurance is 2 hours (plus /J 30
m;nutfl rese,".). The UH 1D reqlJir.s 1m
M-16 Rifle (5.56mml

RPD MlK:hinegun (7.62mm)
!
,
<

,
UH l0 Helicopter ("H ... ey")
area 28 by 28 meters III which to land.
The gils turbme flr>gme of the UH l0
burm 8 pounds of fuel per mlr>ute. The
UHl0 car> carry shl lir/er casualties and
Dr>e walking wounded. For heavier nans
port jobs (such IJS moving IJrtlliery pieces)
the CH47 is used. This helicopter is 51
feet long. 12 ffH/t wldlJ IJf>d 19 feet high. It
Is into companies of 16 heli
copters each. The diVision usually has
about eight of these helICopter companies.
For each hour the CH47 IS in the air, 16
hours of maintenance (thlJts manhours}
IJre needed. For the UHl0 only SIX hours
IJre neJed. Oftlln these Irandards cannor
be met. As IJ rtnult of th,s more helical"
rers are usulJlly 1011 to accidents or equip
ment failure Ihan to enemy SCfl on. The
CH47's mallimum weight Is 16.5 tonI, of
wh,ch IWO IOns are fuel and 7.9 tom cargo
(a 155mm hOWtuer we'ghl 6.3 tom, /I
105mm how,uer 1.5 tons). The CH47
carries 33 (or morel trOOPS plus IJ mmi
mum crew of two. Its crUISIng spfHId is
230 kilometers per hour with enduranCfJ
of 2.6 hours (1'11,1$ a 30 mlllute
The CH-47 requires an area 46 by 64
met"" III which to land. The CH-47 burns
22 pounds of fuel per mmut". II can clJ"y
24 "I ter casualties lind 3 WiJlklllg
wounded. Both of rhesa hel,copters re
qUITe (Ir> theory) rhree mmutes 10 load
/lnd unload troops and ten mmutes for
clJJual r,,,,. In combat the figure for troop,
is sctually reduced w less than 30 seconds.
M60 (7.62mm)
AK47 Rdle 17.62mml
M79 Grenad. L .... ncher (40mm)
The baSIC weapon of the American mfan
try Is the M 16 .ille, whiCh _'ghs 6.3
pounds, h/ll a C4liber of 5.56mm, a 20
round m8f/azllle, a length of 38 mche, /lnd
a rate of fire (full auramalie) of 1015
roundl per second. Each squad slso has an
M..&o machinegun, whICh weifJhs 23
pounds, a caliber of 7.62mm and cames
ammunit,on in linked btllts. lIS length IS
43 inches and lIS rattl of fire (lul/lJuIOma'
tic) I, 10 rounds per second. Each squad
also has ar> M79 grenade I/lunche. , which
weighs 6.5 pounds, is 28/nelles long. has a
caliber of 40mm and f irlS one shOI at a
II/TIe (no m/lf}8zmeJ. II fires a six ounce
shell up to 400 metf!lrs. (The M 16 also has
an "effective" range of 400 meters /IIId the
M60 CIll1 be effectlv"y uud at somewhat
longer ranges labour 600 mfllflfS) ./
CommUni" troops a IImilar se/ectlon
of weapons. North V,etnamese and mair>
force Viet Cong forCfls Ule rhe AK47 as
their basic infanrry _pon, It weighs 8.4
pounds, has a calibBr o f 7.62mm, a 30
round magazmtl, a/englll o f 35 mehBS MId
a r/lla of fire (full automatic/of 10 rounds
per sfICond. Also found Ir> large quamme,
(perhaps one or lWO per platoon) " Ille
RPD m.chin8(jun wh,eh _igh, 15
pounds, has a caliber of 7.62mm and ,
length 01 40 /nclll1l. la filII of fire is I I
rounds per s:ond (ful/ .... tomal'e! find ;1
Slmll/lr to th, M 60. Communist local
guenlla (mili tia) Uni ts, as well BS many
rlgular lroOPS, alto ule a large quant,ty of
caprurtJd American eqUipmMt.

,
<llld 8 Illch SP. ail shells landing 600 meters
from his pOSItion. If the day hiJS been II quiet
one w,th lew I,rll .nisslOns be,,,!! conducted
anywhere and he comes UP with oJ Iilrgel he
m,ghl lind he 15 being given all Ihose U,lIlS
anyway. It '5 a bit embarassing whe<l out 01
boredom the FO ,lOci company commander
deCide lhal iI paflicular treelill8 1$ more $U"
PICIOUS looking than the last dozen or so, and
that It might be nice 01 iI few rounds 'MIre
thrown In jusl 10 be sure. The FO calls in the
firll mlssiell Sldtlng that his !ilf\l6t is a
pt!Cloc/ enemy position on the trt.'Clirle" only to
Imd hiS is Ihe only aclion report of the ddY
throughout Ihe diVIsion. II IS very pOssible (tid!
In it short lime Ihe PreSident m'ohi become
Interested ,n the outcome of Ihill treeline.
especially ,I Ihls IS during II malOf operation
from which Ii 101 was Il)(pected and In which
noth"'g hM h;lppeoed for two Veeks, unlllihe
treeline appeared in red grease pencil on
IM!rybody's OOIIralions map. The infanlry
peeling a lew rounds going ofl III Iha woods
$Uddanly finds whole stands of trees collap:sing
in ralher lar(1l! clouds 01 smoke and duSI, It
ulso appears that the diVision OIlS had two Ulr
st(lkes on call all day and hoct not as yat been
able to fmd a targel for them, Now, II you dre
aliocCliod a certoilln number 01 air 51rikes ,lnc!
YOU don't use any of them you WI" not be
allocated as many lor the r'IIIxt day, and in
addition, lhere happen 10 be two fighter
bombers alfborne II'! a nearby sector whose
primary largel has been cancelled and who are
now headlrtg for a .5eC:oodary to use up fuel
and ordnance Now things are gelling a bll
tense. By Ihis l ime everyone knows what's
happening out it's been a quiet day wllh the
preSSlJre off and It's more lun 10 tast the
sySlem when II doosn' t really count
DISINTEGRATION: WARGAMES
Playing Wllh airolanes is another mailer Now
nobody has ItClUally mentioned air strike and
nobody really needs an air strike but there .s
an aor strike available. When people have spenl
a lot of lime transacting buslrtess by radio
(especially when these transaclions are carned
out wilhlrt a strict procedural
designod 10 elimlrtala unnecessary and dis,
tracting emotion and the need lor Irt te/preta
tionl they develop a silent lorm of communi
Ciltlon, Somehow 'air strike' has 10 be intro
duced II1to Ihl5 tittle charade without anyone
really lalong the chance of r8ceI\"ng a roouff
If someone mentions "alf stnke" at the d,ll,'
SlOO TOC and the general 5ilYS no, everyone
Will agree " was the dumbest idea 01 the day
and lour Slalf olficers WIU begirt alte!' actloo
reporlS on whal a dumb idea it was and whal II
waue of ordnance 10 sinke suspected enemy
tree lines aller Ihey h8lle been paSled wilh all
sorlS of artillery and Snlait arms fife (the mediC
had neller fired lin M16 before and while Ihey
were 51andlng around Walllrt!! for the artillery
to hit somebody gave him a chance although
the d"ecllOO he fired in is in dOubt). If
lIOmebody al DTOC menlioned aor strike and
the general 5ilid Ihal he was gOing up on Ihe
command helicooter to watCh, staff of
ficers WOuld be wrlling alter achon reparlson
wnal a great Idea .t is to follow UP an artillery
assaull by fire with an illr sl"ke' The ooly
problem IS thaI the deciSion for whal happens
as far as f,rll suppor l goes lies w.th the FO and
Ihe company commander they hall8 10 go
along wi lh Ihe idea. If someone comes on Ihe
radio anti asks the FO If he neod$ an alf stnke
00 hiS tree Ilrte he will of courw. say no, "
however, the FO is Informed that an air strike
is in Ihe area w.thOul <I tar!JC1 and has lwenty
mmutes fuel before 'I WI" go expend liS
Ofdnance on sorroe secondary target and if he
should agree could he wall five monutes until
the battalion, Ihe b"g.ada, and lhe division
TOC ships gel "HO tho dreil to walch, the FO
will turn to Iha company commander and
mform him Ihal he better hold Ihe company a
linle longer unlll the air stnka is over The
company commandar has JUSt raalized that thiS
young kid t wO grades below him In rank has
directed mora fife POWer In five minules into II
group of t rees than Ius PUny 100 or SO riHes
and machine guns could deliver In a month 01
continuous firing, all the while silting on a tree
trunk and eating II Cdn of boned Chicken, And
now they're gilling him eirplen" , Beller have a
chock wilh the battalion commander The
captllin Irtforms the battalion commander of
me .mpending alf strike Tho colonel inlorms
him that he is aWolr!! 01 it arid he is now
alfborne north of n,e comp"ny's position and
as soon as the mlln are through With their C
rations arid touch 10010,111 with the
coconut COuld they pOSSibly gat InlO some sort
of military lormatlon and run an assault on
Ihal tree line as soon as the a" stnka is over
because we're going 10 have visitors. The
company commander was nOI aware o f thll
helicoptef. the FO w'" lind milOe contact wllh
1\ to warn II to stay OUI 01 the path of Ihe
shells
At this pOint Ihe Air Force FAC establishes
radio conlact wtlh the FO on the art,llery fife
nel and announces that ha IS ,lpproaching from
tha south in an L 19 three minutes out and thaI
he has Iwo birdS whosa ETA In lha target area
is approximately one-Ilva minutes The FO
ilClr.nowled!1lS with perhaps a small word 01
greeting thera"l and g.lIes Ihe coordinates
10 Ihe largel and Ihe nalure 01 Ihe target. He
announces that fflendly troops ara dlfectly
south of the larglll area and they w.1I ffiilrk
their forward positions with 5fT1oke and panel
markers al Ihe FAC's command The FO
reQuests Ihal Ihe allack be made from east to
west across thll Ironl of Ihe trooO$, he Siaies
the wlrtd direction and aslimates Ihe speed and
Ihe visibility over II,e tarIJCt area and informs
Ihe FAC that he has experienced ". ,nega
live enemy amiaircraf t <lCtlvlty in the ,Heil,"
The F AC thanks him and leaves the nel to
make contact wllh tile f'llhter bombers on a
VHF freQuency. lhese alfcraft do nOI
carry FM r!Odio eQUipmenl By IhlS lime the
fighter bomber h85 octenlilled friendly and
enemy POSitloos and will be makll1g a dry run
10 double Check. A 1111 fighta r bomber. fully
loaded Wllh ruel . and aerodynamic.ally con
fusing, has 10 be flown wnh almOsl lolal
concentralion Picking out a particular piece 01
Jungle and k90Pll1g 1\ In View while aiming an
alfcraft and calculaling bomb angles also re
Qu'res some concentration, The larget area has
been marked by smoke With the ooded Ii lip
thaI the FAC Of FO usuilily <l5ks lor a further
correction of 5ily "'rom the smoke northwest
400 meters." Now bomb'ng lactories, rooos
and bndges ,s one thing - lhey're m lhe open
and easy to At 200 miles an hour
and 500 fOOl above the lungla. Ihe trees tend
to lose Ihalf Indllliduallty To aIm for lhe
smoke 15 hard enough - ilnythll1g else would
be a guess. What the alf stroke 10565 on plnOOll11
accuracy, however. it makes up ,n area
covered. 500 Ib and 250 Ib bombs, cluster
bombs, rockets, and 20mm cannon fi ro are
very effecllve ,n open terrain, son'1p.what leu
afleclive In heolvy jungle The problem IS ,n Ihe
close SOPPOI't aspect The arllilery aod al( .. re
the ,nfanlry company's heavy weapons. ThiS
add"l1 fire pOWf'r all0W5 the lightly arl'lll!{f
comoony to laka on much larger anemy un,ts,
Smart enemy commanders realtz'ng Ihis face
rarely li f eved engctgO American UnlU, no
matter wha' Iheir adlianlaqE!, unless they can
be absolutely sUie that Ihey can \lilt in gilt
out before the AmeficansCall bflng up this f ire
power. This t,lkes organ;latlon and plannin9
Knocking off d Special Forces Cdrn!> or de
landod hamlet IS one thing, all the f'>osltions
can be plolled and everybody's mo_ are
rehearsed beforahand and mal(imum effeclive
ness Will be gall1ed wilh ooly a lew troops
enQ<I9'ng, The cavalry. however, mOW\ dround
a lot, never comil1q from the SolrTl!! dl(ect,on,
never staYing In one POSition for any length of
lime, thretllen'ng everywhere To on a
C!Walry unit means 10 use men hastily coHeeit'd
arid or9alli/oo: a difflcull lask wllhoUI rapid
communicat ions. Tp maka UP for tho I'lf.
cillncy planning yilles. the enemy com
milndar muSI mass more men, he cannOI
on objectives being taken out. ha can
only hope they will be overwhelmed. This IS
precisely what the Amf'ricans want if Ihera "
goll1g 10 be lighting. we're not gO'"9 to mdtch
you In stroclly Inlantry verses Inlantry i)C1'on,
wc're y0ll19 to form our ""le wheel
around our forward observer and let him shoOI
at you wllh hiS MliJierv and alfplanes, The
problem !s thaI you w.1I be fighllng al small
arms ranges and lhe arlillery hlld beller be
good because Ihey will be usod <II folnflllS !IS
close as 100 meters. Artillery can be pmoloved
,1t those r(lnges. but cau tiously, Air supoort,
howtlller, cannot Artillery rounds can be Crepl
closer and closer to the POSilioos II is very
hilref 10 have a fightar bomber pilot "regl$ter"
hiS bombs. G.ve him an area and he'll saturatll
It 11151 doo'l have any friendl.es ,n that
area , or ne(lf 11
DI SINTEGRATION: "WHO' S ON FIRST?"
If two of the comP<lny's platoons become
engaged In a heJIIV flfef,ghl lind take cilSual
ties, everybody wants to know what's gOIl19
on The en[l8!ll!d plaloons report and rcquest
orders. the unengaged platoon W1lnu to know
what to do. The company commander is IrYll1g
to lind out exactlY whera the engaged ele-
menu are and what they (Ire lacing from lhe
plal00n leader who IS trying 10 keep down and
make IIO'ce or radio contact With hiselemenu
who are lhemselves Just Irying to keep down.
The battalioo commandllf, hear"'lg the dIStant
thunder. IS bugging lhe compariy commend8f'
for an Immed,ata reporl" All III Ihe 5ilme time.
When a unit goes InlO actlOfl a conSiderable
amounl o f time is spent by the officers
explaining what is going on, lime thai is mken
from dolrtg anything abOt.lI 1'- A good RTO
(Ratlio{Tale Operator) is a nece$Slty to sort
01.11 the resulting confusion. One radiO nat
whera stroct radiO dl5l:ipline '5 malrttained is
the ArtillllfY fire net, through which the
IIr\lllery forw_d obserWr conduca hIS fife
miSSions. No Infantry are allowed 10 v,., th"
net unlll$$ Ihey are aclually adjusting the
miSSion This nel contains, under normal cIr-
cumstances. lhe 8f'tiliefy lIaSlon ollicer who IS
w'th Ihe Infantry ballalioo commander, the
three forward observers With tha companies,
and eithor the " nng ballery fife dlfeeli on
centar or the IIrlllierv ballalion fife diraclion
7

8
THE " ENEMV"
V,., Nam was Ii'$( QCcup'tld by tntl
F"",ch If> the late /9/11 century, They
iK/mimfte,.d I t tiS II colony. To the
V,ernl.mestl H was more I,ke f)em9 oc
cupled by ,. lortl lgn army. But III. Fumeh
"/ld Ihe modern weapons Bnd /I /IJfU- army.
Sporadic altempts III mfllonlli "'Mfa/ion
were rulhleu/y pur down. In 1940 the
Japanes. occupied Ih, country, The
French troops In Viet Nam dId nOf oppose
tM J;lp/Jnew find, in fli cl . ewm colillbor-
.t6d WIth them towards til nd of rhe
_r, Some of did
OiJpOSft the JapafHUll, although Ihey were
gillen liltle IISsistllnctl bV /11. All'.,.
Ihll _r Mded It V,.tnBnJeu (Jlllional
ifbttfll/lon molltlmenr headed by Ho all
Mmh sprtlild throughoul /"'1 country and
0Mi1 ItCtullll r funning Ihe country wh6n the
French returned, armed with Amf1,iCl;ln
_lIpans and equipment. This w"" /I dl sap
pointmfm' for Ho a.i Minh. Htl hlld
,!tempted to obtam the lIid 01 the Amerl'
cans before. during and a(ttlr the war.
Roo_'1elr had e'llln madll plans 10 prevent
tile Frencll from returnmg / 0 tllelf colon'l
.fter IIIB wilr. bul lie diad belo,. he could
cerry Ih,s out. Srill. Ho O>i Minll felt Illiit
Ille Ameucans would nor abandon 111m.
Hit B'IIIn IIad modlllad Ille Vietnamese
const, wtlon efter fhllt of 'he Umled
Slales. But dUring the polt'war wrmoil no
cenTer The other elemenlS thai enler Ihls nOl
&$ reQuired are anv aerial observers. ARA
heliCoplerS. Air Foree F AC's lind II!>V oThe.-
Ilnng baltelV No olher bUSHless IS coodUC1ed
on Ihls net excepT fire miSSions and intelll
gencedaTa gathered bV the FO's
The cavalrv units are rarelv if ever called upon
to close With an enemy once he has been
discovered. The main woopon these umts
utilize Is IIr tlllery fire and TacTical air s tnkes_
RadiOS and Ihe well-orgal1lzed tlason neTwork
olus Ihe melhods and Ihlll hllYll
beeo developed for dose fire support work
g'ye Ihe un,t II considerable Increase .n its
Combal elfactlveness AnV indiVidual With a
mao and a radio has lhe ilhihty to stop or
greallv disrupt enemy uniTS and po$ltions. a
capabililV which In Viet Nam is denied lhe
enemv_ For Ihe enemy to obtain enough fire
power 10 OVllrcoma even a minor oblective he
must rna" hiS men for Ihe ini l ial assau lt phase_
Surprise is his onlv prolecl lon. Hil mU51 car ry
his objecllves QuicklV and Ihan break off under
an e'V6f.1ncreUlng concen traTion of anlHery
and aircraft bombing.
DI SINTEGRATI ON: THE GROUP
The elleet of 1111 Ihis - the tactics. eQuipment
and procedures - on the morale of lhe
indIVidual inlantrvman is inleresting For one
Ihing, he IS nOI going 10 be asked to take pan
in IInV mass charges inlo Iha guns o f the
enemy No heroic slands in Ihe face 01
overwhelming odds eIther In fact he Is not
one PBld much et/en/lon fO what went
on in Viet Nam. ThB Frencll III first
realized Ihe/ /hB'I would h .. '111 fO O'lllr'
throw the ViernalnBw go'lllrnrnttnt WIth
military force. TItus IIIe'l stalled for t ime.
and pretended 10 negot'ale lin amiCllbie
agreement wllh Ihe ViBtnlllnBse govern
ment. As soon as the Frencll had buil, up II
large enough tJfmed force in the countr'l
thB'I sought 10 o.."rthrow the ViBtnemese
government. The war IInded in 1954 after
the French hlld committed 380.000 men
to th. war and had suffered 154.000
cMualritlS (plus 62.000 for Iocalrmops who
frwghr _Ih Ihe French}. Abour 45"
of rh/lSll _,. dtlad. The Vielnamese w f
" rtld from 450,000 to a million casualt,es
(including cI'l,/laMI. As the French had
occupied rhll countr'l for almost a hun
dred '1ears Ihey had acquired a number of
supporrers. abOUI 20" of Ihe populalion.
This included mOSI (bul nOI all) of rhe
wealthy classes (less Ihlln 5% of Ihe
popullllion l as well es much of Ihe French
crealed Civil service and man'l of Ih.
Vietnamesll Catholics. These people feared
reprisals f or ei ther their exp loilation o(
Ihtlir own PBOplB or IhBir collabora/ion
_til the French. In addition. rhB French
slill had II large 8rm'lln Nam In 1954.
For /hBM IhrH reasons V,BI Nllm was nOI
allowed to be Independent as a single
nation. Instead IhB northern parr of the
gOing InTO an area if The enemy is there in any
numbers. This soon evolved InTO Ihe "'Shool al
Them and scare lhem OUl"' procedure The
NLF troops usuallv took lhe hint
If Ihere is a fighl Ihe American soldier will
soon have the artillcry 10 hclp prevenl Ihe
enemy from shootlrlg at him with any great
accuracy. " he is wounded he will have the
QuickesT pOSSible lrip t o medical aid in the
peaceful world For the o fl ieer"s ability to
command. The tactics o f ,solalion are a great
aid In gelling reSpecl and obedience hom the
SQk:loers. In most operations Ihe infantryman
k.nows he is mil&$ inside enemy lerritory. cut
off or surrounded. Tt1ere IS no rear w relreat
10. onlv 20 01 enemy territory. The only
way out is through the roldios and the officers
who conuol lhese communicalions. He that
controls the commumcaTlons controls the
country. "'NOThing OUI there but me and my
feUow soldiers." Combat $Oldlers may talk
aboul dissent when thov are nOI in act ion or
on a mission. Once out in the boonies not too
many people want to hear how Iheir fl!lighbor
is nOI going TO fire hiS gun anvmore_ Every
body is going 10 do hIS best in a flrefight for
there IS no place to escape 10.
A major time of crISes for the soldier is his lirst
act ion. the moment when he f,.st comes under
fire and that sudden realization of acute fear .
panic and confuSion. His recovery lime de-
pends, aside from personal faclors . on hIs
training and the confidence he has in the
people around him. The Inilial wave of shock
is present in everyone no matter how many
times the Ind iVidual has come under fire.

country ."as to be under /he control o( Ihe
mll/onal,st goWlfnment led by Ho all
Minh. Tn. southern pari of Ihe countr'l
was 10 be II refuge for rholl elements of
the POpulal,on Ihlll "'lIred reprlSms lind
would be admimstered b'I II government
led b'l . whom' This IlIlt questIon
evenwall'l became II '1llal one. To prO'lldlJ
for eventulIl uni fiCat ion of the nalion
/here will/a be an elecri on held In bOlh
Vlel NIlfTJI (efler a few YBars hlHl pasStJd
for Ihe cooling off of PBSSlons lifO used
dUflng (he f ighting). MBn Ihe lime came
lor Ihe electiOns the governmIMI In Ihe
south rBfused to allow II . ThB reolSon.
which w.lS barBi'l concealed. WIIS thaI Ho
OIi Mmh would win. lind liS I( IUrnBd rwl
thaw who had the most cause 10 fea r
fBpri,.,ls for rhBir cOllllbOfa(Ion or Bxploi
lal ion werB running thB government in (htl
w u(h. This class (Itla wtllI/(h,est tam""'e,
and thtl me! avid collaborati onists) fOf
the most pafl. wal nOI even e meioril'l in
IhB soU/h. But mOne'l talkBd. as well III
Iheir cloStJ tlas with thtl French and thB
Ihen,cu"ent IInti-commumst peranola
rampanl m Iha UnilBd StatBS. The Urmed
Slates had lUst Itmmed fighting II cotrl'l
war a!Jilinll the O!inew In KQTU and had
VISIons of (hB I<ImB Ihlng haPfHlnmg In
South Vier Nam. Whll( was Ignored was
Ho O>i Mmh 's long history of pro'
Americamsm and the longltandlng d,slike
o f the OIinale emong the VielnemB$tJ. Ttltl
Ellpenence. however. allows the veteran to
overcome the eHecu QUicklV or at least to
suoress Ihem enough so Thai he can funcllon
despite the Inward feeling of panic and confu-
Sion. The veteran also has the group. his
famlliarltv and relat ionshiPS With IhI! people
around him who are ellpenencinn tOO $lime
conditions of dan!J8r as 00 IS. The feeling of
shored cllperience as well as lhe fOCI Ihllt his
reactions at the point are belflg walched and
his perfor mance IS being rated goes a lon\l wav
towardS giving him Ihat advantage In OYI!f-
Coming the disruptive fear and aOlliety reac
Tlons that lhe stress of combat IndUces. II is
the group that playS Ihe greaten part In the
sold,er's ablhlv to function while under fire A
unl\ that IS poOrly Ira/ned or lack.mg ,n
dlsclphne. a umt where lhe opinion leaders
Inol alwaVs the officers or NCO'sl haye come
to the fore wllh negative alii tudes whiCh
in!juenee Ihe $h;tpll\g o f a um!'s morale more
Ihan Ihe militarv leaders. or a unil In which
Ihoro is a loss of confidence In l he military
leadors - any of these factors can cause a
breakdown Ifl the protect ive CharacTerislu;:s
that the group prOVides an Individual In limes
of stress This severely reduces a uflll"S military
efficle<lcv
On the other hand. there IS the unil WIth no
combat e"penence but one Ihat hllll func
tlOned togeTher for a long lime. especiallv in
held e"ercises of e,, !ended duration. where
conSTant pracliee and rehearsal h_ drilled II
unll in lo acting to order, or silual ions as a
group. aUTomatically. Th is IVpe of unit and the
Individuals ,n It will find ilnle trOlible opera
l ing effoclivelV durmg their f,rst ellposure to

"
North Vietnamese .ww that Sourh Viet
Nam Will largely a puppet gov6mmenr, all
indigenoul o( the previous French
colonization. So they proceeded to renew
the poliriclll warfaro in the south thaI had
prl1llious/y pushed oul the French. The
National Liberat ion Front was formed in
lare 1960. I( w,U rIOt to be e monollrhic
organization. Even in Nonh Vifll NBm.
after hundreds of thousands of people
with di$$ident views had left, there were
too many different groups (or the forma-
tion of a righ rly-organized movement as is
often the case in EIl'ope. Compromise WilS
e frequent lind continuous poliCy. Th is
acceptance of di fferent ideas was one
reason why the North Vietnamese ""lion-
alisU trusted the French to see that the
agreed-upon elections would (<Ike place for
the undiclIllon o( 1"11 country. But the
Vietnamele were beginning to learn more
of how the inscrVl abl1l WeJterner thovght.
First, hOlNflver, the N IF wovld have to be
rUn and organized as a VletnBmese organl'
zation. II includad any group that was
w,/Iing to work together for thll unifica'
t ion of Viet Nam. Most groups in South
Viet Nam had seen that there were no
mass reprisals i n North Viet Nam after the
p;Jrt'lion. Meanwhile, the Diem govern
ment in the south had turned out to be
nothing more than an American-supported
combat. The fear will be present and no less
Intense. but the reactions will be directed. by
habi t . Ul tl"le fight d,rections ({ntol the lear
reactiom have been brought under control.
Because of the nature 01 t he Indo.china war,
and the nature of the American army. one of
the worst problems In military efficiency has
been produced Only entire units (bal1allon
size) which were trained in the United States
and then sent to Viet Nam PO$SeSS the co
hesion which lorms efficient groups (at the
plaloon and SQuad All troops Ul Viet
Nam serve for only a year Not all of tllat time
IS spent in combat units. An Infantry replace
ment Will receive. in most cases. a month or
two of duty in a quiet area 10 allow him 10
become accustomed to Viet Nam before
sending him to II unit involved in very active
OP6rallons A few months before the soldier is
dU6 to leave Viet Nam, he Will usually again be
transferred to a quiet unit. This last transfer
has two purposes. First. when a soldier be
comes "short"' (close to the time when he Will
Viet nam I he usually becomes extremely
cautious. No one wants to be hurt an his l8$t
week or day in Viet Nam. An overly cautious
in fantryman is usually dangerous to his com
panions. although they usually symphalhile
with him. The secood ,eason IS more apparent.
This soldier has picked up II considerable
amount of eXPllfience while In action. This
experience can be more easily. and safely.
transferred to the green troops under quiet
conditions
dictatorship. Just about ellery maior reo
ligious. political and ethnic group in South
Viet Nam rallied to the NLF cause. Armed
action was taken using. for the most part.
weapons captured or "donated"" (by de
fecting soldiers) from the South Viet
namese army. BV 1963 the Diem dictator
lhip had turned most of the country
lI{Jain!t government. The NLF was
relldv to walk in. Bur then the Sourh
Vietnamese armV overthrew and assassin
ated Diem. This made the government
qvite popular. the Wfant was dead. For
the f irst rime the North Vietnamese de-
cided to send regular soldiers south to
ensure that the takolf(!r w,n completed
beforo too many American soldiers could
enter the covntrv. By mid-1964 this al
most happened. 8vt then the Americans
began a mMsive build-up in South Viet
Nam as well as largescale bombing of
the North. In 1964 there were 23.000
American troops in South Villt Nam; in
1965 there were 184.000; in 1966
385.000; in 1967 485.000; in 1968
536.000 and in 1969538.000. The fight
ing died down bV 1969. but not until
38.000 American. 8 1.000 South Viet
namese. SOO.OOO NLF and North Viet -
namese soldiers had died. in addition to
over a million South Vietnamese civilians.
NearlV half of the population of South
Viet Nam became refugees in their own
Tile overall eHeet produces units at low
military efficiency. This problem is funher
by the very nature of the wilr. A
guerilla war. particularly one in which manv of
the regular troops are of a different nationality
ao%r race from the guerilla troops, makes 11
relaTIvely easy for the regular troops 10 lose
any enthusiasm they might have had for
fighting such 1.1 war The prospect of having to
shoot civilians. and In turn being shot at by
ununi formed troops. does nothing for troop
morale. The American rotation policy does nOt
leave t he troops in the country long enough to
acquire needed skills for with such a
war, in a knowled{Je of t he focal
language and Customs. With II rotation policy
the same mistakes will invariably be made over
aoo over lIglIin. But a rotati on pollcy is
difficult to The United States is not
formally at war with anyone. Nevertheless. II
large scale war is being fought Not everyone in
the United States agrees that there Should even
be a wllr Naturally, Ihose chosen /that is.
drafted) to actually fi ght. and die, in this war
can be expected to eventually show a marked
declone in morale as Ihe war grinds on with no
apparent end in sigh l . Company commanders
and other company and platoon officers find
themselves In an even more difficult si t uation.
The lack of morale and mili lary effiCiency
must be dealt with directly by the company
commander. Of course the battalion and
higher commanders eventually became aware
of the IImitalions of thelf IrOOPS and adjust
the goals and operat ing procedures of their
troops accordingly. But the goals and opera
ting procedures eventually adopted were not
country as the A merican armv fought i ts
most destructive campaign since World
War II.
In 1964 and 1965 the soldiers the US
forces faced were primarily local guerillas
reinforced with some North Vietnamese
regulars and many North Vietnamese lNfIa
pons. Soon most of the local guerillas had
been killed or otharwise taken Ollffr by the
North Vietnamese forces. The Tet offen
sive in 1968 wiped out manv of the
remaining South Vietnamese guerillas. Tha
remaining guerilla units went back into the
""bush."" bur there Ifill remained numerous
locill guerillas (militilll whose mllin func
rion _s now to survilff! until the Ameri
caM left. Mainforce guerillil units (by now
primarily North Vietnamese) operaled OUI
of sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos.
They also sought mainly to limply survive
until the Americans left. To w'pe our all
guerillas In the south would be impossible.
Emry time an American unit or lIirr:raft
fired on a South Vietnamese v,l/age more
guen11as INfInt created. The people II" the
enemy.
very Conducive 10 the efficient completion of
mili lary opera t ions. The new conditions were.
in a word, "'don', take casualties:' A mission
was considered a success If no Amerlcanswere
killed or wounded. If some enemy troops .....ere
killed or some enemy equipment so
much the bener. But th is was not cr ucial not
having any American casualties WU. The war
always was boring. If one sweep in ten
produced a live and fighting enemy it was
considered unusual The mast common action
was one in which nothing happened. There
were then a few actions in which contoct was
made WI(II the enemy. Tllis was invariably
followed by a massive application of American
firepower on the SUspl!Cled enemy positions
The enemy was usually Given a wav out. He
usually took It American troops would then
int o the area hoping to f,nd enemy
equipment or bodies. In a war like this YOU
needed something by which to keep score.
Bags of roce. a few rifles. The body of a dead
Vietnamese would do. Ifs mUCh harder 10
count the "'heans 1100 minds" 01 the people
9


\
,
I n considering the German f orces In World War
II , the Wallen-SS POSJe1, or $hould pose, a
oroblem This is due to the fact that the myth
surrounding the Wallen-55 ouu\nppec! fuli!y.
Perhaps the point can best be made by
ind'Qhng leIIer,,1 things which are nol true of
the Wallen-SS II did nOI spring fuliV armed
from the brow of HIller and Hlmmler on
September I, 1939, Its growth and develop-
men t W85 nOI the res,ult 01 an or93n1zed,
planned ellor!. Hil ler did not wanl a large
Waflen-SS until late In the war, eh er he felt
1h4! army hi!ld f ailed him, by far the majori ty of
Waf/enSS diviSIons were OO l llrmored diviSions
and, in fact, t here were no armored dlYiSlons in
the WallenSS unt,l late 1943, the Wallen55
was not composed 01 pUre nordles and, In fact,
less than hlltl of the d,Ylsions had a ma,or'ty of
Germ/ll'l members, the WaffenSS was not iI
homoger'lOU!-lhmking. super'POhlical organil-
lilian
The slow grOWl h 01 the WaffenSS is set fonh
elsewhere on thiS article and need nOI be
reho$hed here Nonelheless. il should be uoder.
$Cored thaI nO WaffenSS unlls
lought in Poland. thaI li.buand .. , . Adoll
Hill., IlAHL inlamous all er Maimed.,. in
1944. was onl.,. a reglmen( fstandanel. albell II
reinforced one, irr 1939. a brigatie In 1940, a
paru:er-grenadler division in 1942 and I paru:er
dNlsion onlv in latll 1943. t hat at the outset of
Barbarossa Ihere were onlv lour full-strength
Wallen-55 dIVisions aod the sizlI of the Wal.
fenSS .... aslt peroentege of lhe Al9llar
Armv
Of the ui l imille 41 dIVisions which. al various
times, .... erll on the Waf lenSS. lAH. Oft Aeich,
Totlnkopf , Wiking , Hitler Jugend . F,undsberg.
Hohenlleulan were called "ell te" bv lhe Waf!
enSS but some, such as K.m . were so bad as
to be disbanded .... ,(hOUI seeing a ,not hred in
combat due to unreliabilitV. Poliui . which
reach! dIViSIon level In 1939. was always a
second-class dIViSion, be.ng an inlanlry dIVISiOn
.... hen O. Reich and Totenkopl were motor
IZl onlantrv dNlsions and II panzergrenadler
dIViSion .... hen lhe resl 01 its contemporaries
_e panzer d NiSions It was t he onl.,. paru:er.
grenadier division. In lact. in Ihe lirst ten
dIViSions lormed.
The Image 01 lhe Wallen55 as lhe elite 01 the
panzer erm is simplv false. To be sure, thev
were better trll"-.oo than the average motorized
onlantry diviSion bu t when Rommel ran th,
ough France, the WllllenSS was no more than
I motorized infantrv dIVision Some Of lhe
most Important light,"g .... as done prior to
becoming armed as panzer diVisions In lact,
thera were no paru:er dNisions In the Walle .....
SS unll l the Iide be!lan 10 turn against Ihe
Germans, the ordl!f off icially coming In Octo-
ber. 1943. Of course, the American COnlaCt
.... ,th the WaHenSS .... as in France .... here .... e
faced Hill., J"".nd in Normand.,.. and Li.b-
Illndarte Adolf Hit ler . among man.,. others. in
the Bulge
While one Iokes to think of the Nazi party lIS
having IIfl id_li .. concemlng antl-semiti,",
and racIsm and also t hat t he 55. in controlling
JUch organiutlons as the Gestapo, was the
acme of this whole Herrenvolk spirit. the fact
remaons that as laSI as lhe Ge.mllfl army
overran lore",n COUnlfoeS. the WallenSS began
recruiting in those countries, in con tradict iOl"1
to preconcept ions of normal antl-nonGerman
bias. First it .... as t he Ge' manic peoples. such as
the Dar"j81. the Norwegians and Ihe Dutch. lIS
well as the Flemish. Then the French'sPeaking
parts of Belgium and the French Ihemselves
we.e accepted aod. balore long. the Italians
and even t he "untermenschen" of Croatia.
Galicia. the Baltic countries end Hungarv. In
the end, even the RUSSians were lormed into
WaflenSS dN'Slons, not to mention the Turks.
Indians and Cossacks Whether Ihls wholesale
adoption 01 non-Germanic peoples. and. In--
deed . lhe very peoples .... hom the Nazis pre
dicted they .... ould reduce to slavl!fY. into a
major elemenl of the Wehrmacht ever caused
philosoph ls confUSIon among the Nazi hil!f
erchy 1$ unclear It should have. but st ranger
things than thiS haopened on t he Third Reich
In any event. those who pUshed the policy of
making the WallenSS a European army may
h""e done Hitler a I""or II the zeal with which
they gave the .. lives as lhe war ended is anV
measure.
By way of background. 11 should be pointed
out that the or igons o f the WaffenSS have
been traced bv SOmB back 10 the progeni lor 01
the Sturmlbt.ilu"ll . the StoS$truppan . In fac t.
t he genuine origin was nO ear lier Ihan 1933
and Ihe WallenSS was a product 01 three
separat e ,rends which intertwined 10 produce.
in 1939. the core 01 the WallenSS as II was to
become known. The lirst element began in
1933 .... ith Ihe creation 01 the liebstandarte
Adolf Hitl.r [LA H). LAH 'NIlS crealed. as Ihe
name implies, to guard Hitler's life. This. 01
course. ....as the lunctlon for which the SS
itself was origlnallv created, It.s interesting to
note that Ihis inflation 01 H.tlers bod.,. guard
did not end .... "h LAH As LAH became
_involved in the war. Hitler created a new bod.,.
guard. Ihe Fuh"f Beglei' Battalion. l ormed
October I , 1939 which. in turn. became part
of the Gro$Sdlutschllndvlfbend. In 1940. and
was e)(panded to bl"igac!e and divisioo level. In
1944. the Fuh .. , Gr.nadier BrIgade was form
ed and thiS, 100. became a division in 1945.
One wonders where it would have ended since.
In \945. LAH .... as UP 10 corps level
In 1934. WIth the creat,Ol"1 of the concent ra-
lion camps and the assumptlOO 01 the .. control
bv the SS from lhe SA. the Tot.nkopl ......
bende were crealed to r un them. In 1935. two
SS-Slandarten. Germln;. and Deutschllnd.
....ere raised ond combined with LAH 10 be
called t he Vlrlugungstruppen With the An
schluss. the Ihroads began 10 be drawn toge.
lher.
On a coktly practical baSIS. however , one can
make some estimate of lhe relatNe values of
these unllS The Wallen-SS panzer diviSions
were as well-equlpped end as fully manned as
any unrts on the .... ar Accordingly. thev should
be assJgned t he strength in deter-
minrng t he relat ive values of the various
German units. On Ihe other hand. the remain
der of the German Waf/enSS diviSiOnS were
Iil\le bell er than their regular army counler
part s aod. in some cases. oecldedl y inferior_
Polilei . lor o)(ample. Wi" the onl.,. one of the
f irst divisions which was never raised to a
panzer d ivision, Whether this .... as a tribute to
the calibre of men In the
police or due 10 other lactors IS not indicaled
In any event, even from lhe date of its
formation, Polin; was not a good diviSIon
Prinz Eugen .... as not a very good dIViSIon but,
since it was light ing par t isans. II was as good iI$
It hac! to be, The quality of the men in Prinz
EUQen IS indicated by the number of men tried
for .... ar crimes in Yu!)Osl8ll ia - more t han an.,.
Ol her WaffenSS div ision Klml and 29. (rUM. )
.... ere SO poor thaI they were disbanded prior to
seeing Iny IIoCI!0n,
tn general. the nonGerman Ii.e_ Germanic&nd
non-Germanic) divisions were not as well
equipped 85 lheir German WaffenSS counter-
parts and, In many cases, as their German
regular army cour!lerparts. Y81, before wriling
off Ihese divisions as somewhat .... orthless.
t here IS a factor to consider .... hich is di ff icult
10 include In a combat factor but which.
despile Ihal . renders lhese nonGorman dlvi,..
ions 01 mlli tarv Significance. In late 1944, and
particularly in 1945. all bul the mOSI sanguine
o f the members of the Wallen-SS saw defeat in
the offing, For many, It was the ultimale
stupid ltv to die in a war t hat was soon 10 be
over and so !lUrvNal became more Important
Ihan military accomplishments. As .... as Ind,cat
ed above, this was the case With even 10 lo.,.al a
Nazi as Sepp Dietrich and hiS 6 S5-PIAr"," ,
The pr05POCt of peace mac!e the Germllfl
WaffenSS diviSions less to win the
honor of deat h in t he closing months 01 t he
w"'
This was not the case lor the non German
Wallen--SS and. in Ihal regard, the SlIme fac tors
.... h,ch diluted the Walfen--SS when dllullOn
$hould have been avoided. helped proloog the
war The reason was simple For a German.
peace meant taking off H uniform and going
back to the Stammtl$Ch at the Gasthaus For
the RU$$ian. or Pole. or Hungaflan .... ho had
10u'8d lhe WallenSS and who now found he
had backed the wrong side. il .... as another
matter Most realized Ihal the COllaborators
would be perseCUled and cerloinlv none more
than those who hoo actuall.,., pUblicly .... orn
the Hakenkreul. Therefore. lhe mot ivation 01
the nonGerman Wallen-SS increased at the
very lime .... hen Ihe motIVation 01 the German
Wallen55 declined. Indicat IVe 01 thiS is the
number 01 the nonGerman uni t s .... hich wero
destroyed. rather than surrenduring. The ef.
fect. '" the end, might not have been greet but
lor Hiller. tIIIerv soidiSllnt dNI$.lon of r'!lllm-
ental STrength thaI was selling itsell to the last
man on Ihe ()der meant that much longer
before the end came II IS thaI flctor - the
increase in hardness .... il h which lhe non-
German WaflenSS divisions staved off tho end
at the very ti me that supplies should have been
lorcing them to !Urrender wi t hOU t a f;ghl, that
makes 10' difficul t evalua\lon .... hich. at the
same time, muSI be accmmted for In order to
a$$8$$ the part whiCh the Wallen-SS played In
lhe war
The Waffe ..... SS grew $.Iowl.,. . being ontv three
regiments in strength Itt lhe time 01 the
AnschlU$$ {Liebsllnd.rte Adolf Hitler, D.UI
II:ht.nd and Gllrmlnil l. All were motOfiZed
inlantrv regiments and organized. esill:lntlall.,..
on the SlIme lines as the armv regiment s. As a
result of t he Anschluss. a four t h reglmenl. Der
Fuhflr ..... as raIsed in Aus tria aod the Lieb,
Itandartl wa5 graduallv separaled f, om Ihe SS
V.rlugungnruppen (S5-V). Therefore. prior to
the outbreak 01 war, the 55 uni ts under arms
on three groups - the Li.b5llndlrte the
three standar ten 01 the SS V, and th. Totan
kopf Slandarten.
Bv 1939, !he SS-V had been augmented by en
artiflerv regiment and, in ellecl, had the
nece$5llrv combat power to be organized 81 a
division. The army opposed t hi, and that" the
reason why the Wlffen--SS was not emploved
in any larger unit Ihan regiment duri ng
the PoUsh campaign. However, t he zeal .... ith
11

12
which they applied themselves bore fru,' after
the campaign, SS-V was formally organized as
II division during the winter 01 1939. So, 100.
were the Tot . okopf units Ofganll'OO on II
diviSion leYet Finally. the police. which had
conlribuled 1. and 2. PoI iu; regiments to the
Polish campa' gn, were organized on a diVISion
basi s. In the case of t he police, however, this
chango was less due to the manner in which
they served In Poland Ithe pOlice regiments
were not motorized and were actually used for
filar echelon pollc:e. tyPI! workl end mom 10
the desire to enSUfe thlll the police 5er'llod the
NallS before they 5eNOO the army
By the torTlll of the French campaign of 1940.
three dillisions eXisted plus the brigade-
strength Liebst.ndiorte Again the Wllffefl.SS
unin showed their eagerness for combat to the
point thot while many regular army com
manders considered lhe Waffefl.SS approach to
baule to be a butche.'s outlo..,k, t hey had to
concede Ihot the Waffell-SS had achieved
objectives which regular units were unable to
gain. Ihollgi1 the cost was terrific.
After tho campaign 10 tho west, Ihe Norweg
lans and Danes were formed IOtO an SS
regiment called Nordlllnd , raised April 30,
1940, and Ihe Belgiens and Du!Ch into S5
Regimei'll Westllnd , raised June 6, 19<10 These
tWO regimenTS were later combined with Ger .
m.";. , in 194\, into II new division, caUed.
initially. Germani. , and Ihen Wiking Dunng
thiS Silme pe1iod, the unwieldy name of SSV
was repl.xed by Das Reic:h under which it is
beuer known_ To replace the lost Germ.ni. ,
the 11 .SS infan t. y regiment, formerly 0 Toten-
kopl s\andart o. was assigned Das R.ich under
the namo L.ngem.rk At the end o f 1940. the
total strength of the Wall enSS was 100,000

In the flfst hall of 1941. several more
"Germanic" units were raised Irom the oc:eu-
pied counlries In Scaodan/lllia and lhe low
countnes Fre.wi ll igen Nordwesl. Freiwillig.en
verbande Oanemark. Frelwilhgenlegion Nieder
hInde, Frewilligenlegion Fl andern and Freiwil -
ligenlegion Norwll9lln. I n lhe same period, IWO
SS Inlantry brigades were raised. as well as a
separate infantry regiment, formerly a loten-
kopl standarte_ In addi t ion. a brigade Slreng th
kamplgruppe, cal led Nord aoo two cavalry
regimen ts, combined in a ClNalry brigade
rounded oul tho unit! which the WalfenSS
had available at the time of Barbarossa. It
should be pOinted ovt Ihat the dllli,ions were
lIS yet unnumbered and the .egiment;1 nom
ber-s in each diviSion were redesignated in the
lauer part of 1943. So, for example. Oeutllt;h.
land was SSinfant erie ,egiment 1 on 1941 but
in 1943. SS-Panz"grenadl er regiment 3 while
SS Panz"grenadier regiment 1 was now the
number of one of the regiments in LAH which
had previously been unnumbe,ed
At the t ime of Borbarossa, the 51reng ths of the
Wallen-SS units were LAH - 10.796, 0 ..
ReiCh - 19,021. TOl enkopf - 18_754 Polizei
- 17,347. Wiklng - 19,377 KG Nord -
10.573, FWstand.rte Nordoll - 904, FWuan.
darle No.dwest - 2.500; FWlegion Flandatn
875. The over all strength of the Waffefl.SS bv
lhe end 01 1941 was now UP to 222.000 men
In the tat ter part 01 1941, more .aclal German
unllS were raised Freiwllirgenvarbaooe Dane
mark 480 strong. which. to carry the story
out. was 10 become F.eikorPi Dene-
mark , with 1,164 men and, ultimately ,
regllTll!nt In the Nordland division. In lIddition,
there was Freiwill igenlegion Niaderlande , num
benng 2.559 which also became a regimenl in
DIVISIONS OF THE WAFFEN-SS NOle (" J rndlCiutn tha, the uni , woJl only nominally a division and had an ItellJal strenglh of leu than that.
1. SS-Pan,erdivlSion " LiebslancM'la Adolf Hitler "
2. " Das Raich"
Itormerly SS.Verlugungsclivision and SSDivision "Reich"l
3. SSPanzerdivision "Tolenkopf"
4. SSPoliuipanurgrenadierdivision
5. SS-Pan'erdivision "Wi k;ng" (forme,ly SSDivision "G.-mani. " )
6. SSGebi'gsdi"i-sion "Nord"
7. 5S-Fra;willigengebirgsdiv;s;on " Pf inz Eugan"
8, SS Kav.lle,iedivision " Florian Gayr"
9. SS-Panlerdi"isign " Hot.Jnstaulfan"
10. SS-Panz"division " Frundsbtt", "
II, SS Freiwitlillllnpanze'grarwodierdivi,ion " Nordland"
12, SS-Panzardivision "Hitle.jugend"
13. W.lfengebirgsdivislon dar S5 " HandfChar" I Kroat . nr , 11
14. Waffangremodierdivision der SS [G.I;z. nr. 1 J
15, Waffengrenadierdivision de. SS I Lett . n. , 1 J
16. SS,P.nze'lI'enadierdivi, ion ' Reichsfuh. e. S5"
17. SS' PanU'grenadierdivision "Gou von Be.lichingen"
18. SS.Fralwiltillllnpanzergrenadierdivision " Horst Wessel"'
19. W.ff.ngrenadierdivision der SSI Lan nr . 21
20. Wllfengrenadierdivision de. SS IEstn. n . 11
"21 . Waifengebrigsdivision d" SS "Skand"beg" IAlban. Of. 11

22. Freiwillillllnkavalleril'division de. 55 "Maril Theresia"
The ch.racterillltion o f II divilion as II d,vision or panlllrgrllna'
dier division or greniJdiftr division il the final designation that division
Thus. " Das Reich" WIll formllrly, .s Verfu!JUngsdivision. a
moto,uttd mfant ", diVISion then, as " Das Raich ," a panzergren8(/'er
d,v",on, prror to becoming II pI",ze, diVision.
In CMes where divis,on number js used tWICe, this is in ltecord with the
WaffenSS prxtia.. In .eh eM' the fint named divis,on was
dlJbilndttd prior to thll crea tion of the ucond. Thlln Will thtm a vx.nt
numbilr to be il$signed the nllw div,sion. In fact, until the end of t he
war, the t"lId to h.ving vlteant numbef$, a practice not
follo_d in the army. and, for a rel.tively brief period, there
wer, rhirryoflight consecut ively numbllfed W/lffllnSS divisions in 1945,
All tOld, 41 unirs bore thll dIIsignlltion of division in the WaffenS5,
23. Waffengebi'gsdivision der S5 ' K.ma" [Kroal . nr. 21 disb.nded.
end 1944
23. FraiwitligenpanzergrenadierdlVision der SS " Nederl.nd "
'24. Waffenllllbirp.rstjagerdivision der 55
"25. Waffllngrenadierdlvision der S5 " Huny.di" [Ungar. n . 11
'26. W.ffenogrenadierdivlsion der S5 [Ungar, IV. 21
"27. SSF.eiwinigengren.dierdivision "Langem.rck "
"28. SS Freiwilligenogrenadi erdivision ' W.ltonien"
"29. W.ffengrenadiardivision der 5S IRuss. nr . 11 disbotnded, and 1944
"29, W.ffengrenadietdivision der S5 I ltal. nr . 11
30. Waffengremodierdivision dar SS [ Russ. Of . 2[
31 . SS-F reiwilligenp.nzerg.en.dierdivision "BohmenMahr.n"
32. 55Panze.gren.dierdivision "30. Janu.,"
"33. Walfengrenadierdlvision dar SS [Ungar , n' , 31 disbanded , urly
194'
33, Wallengrenadierdi ... ision de' SS " Ch.lremagne" ( Fr.nz , n, . 11
'35, SSPotizeigrenad;erdivi'ion
36, W.ffengrenadierdiwision der SS
37, SS Freiwilligenk ..... lleriedivition " Lul'ow"
38, SSP.nze'grencodierdivi,ion " Niebetungen"
I , Kosaken Kav.lteriedivlslon der SS
2. Kosaken Kavatieriedivision der S5
though only 38 division numbers _re assigned. ActullIlV. a number of
othllr regimllnts and IImilar units also IIl1isted under ,he "runlls." et
these, t_nry-one actuallv reached div,sic'!. Sfr/lflgth lind only seVlln
_re fully by Germ.n,. To ev8luatf thll hllterogenous elements
whiCh fought in fhe Waffen'SS il diff,cul, talk. One rNlon " the
myth o( the WllffenSS. The Western .1I,es happened to face th, tfulv
"cfKk" di vilions of the Waffen 5S, though nOt 1111 of rhem, oJI
TOllnkopf and Wiking d,d not f,ght in the west in 1944-45. To the
Americans: and British, to fKe , W,ffen5S divislon w"'s fa face a fuliV
lIQuipped, hardfighting foe. 11Ie not refilled the eJltlHlt to
wh,ch the mere presence of W.ffllnSS di vilion of Wiking calibre
.ffected their condUct of the war, Certainlv there must haWl been scmll
efftICt : The Ruuians did make. point of Illooting, out of hand, most
55 trOOpl Illar werll CllptU,ed,
-
,
I
,
Nordland, Fr8twil Ugeniegion Norwegen, nllm
bering 1,218, the lhird regimen I of Nord arid II
number of interesting failures Among
these vain altempt5 10 drilYl' on foretgn nation-
for tll e Wnflf'n-SS were a Swed ish legion,
which col l"pSl..>d when lhe German off icers
wcre too harsh 10 " few of Ihe soldiers, ilr'
Amf'ric"n legion (which coll ected aboul
men). "n Eng lish legion and an Indian legion
The British and Indian units faired bener than
tile American one, both getting 10 the stage of
a d, sttnctive uniform but both fall in
manv people's minds inlO t he same category as
t he Werewoll s
Bv the end 01194 1, Niederland and Flandern
lL'l'IionS were combined into 2 SSinfanter ie
brtgade and posted to the Lerungrild front The
other Germanic uni l s were simi l""v disbursed
along Ihe easlern Iront.
From December, 19<10, 10 September, 1942,
only one division level umt was actuall y
formed i n ttl(! Waf/en-SS Pr inz Eugen The
rl'lOst brutal sector of the war was the partiSiln
war in Greece lind Yugoslavi.] I I tied down
more and more 01 the German army to the
point that. al the beginni ng of 1944, there
were 28 d ivisions and some 600,000 men in
lhe Bal kllns, 011 of whom could have been of
help on the collapsing Eastern Front In
ocIdition to Pr inz Eugen, rai sed March I, 1942,
Ihree olher Waffen-SS div isions were formed
or altempled to be formed In t!1e BalKans
Handschar (13th) (a Moslem diVISion which
wore a fez and had an off icial imanl, Skande.
beg (21st) and Kama (23rd ) All were raised
from 10cilI, nonGerman popu lattons and all
wera quile bru lal Al l in 1111, the perforrnance
of the Waflen-SS in the Balkans was the mast
brutal 01 Ihe war Interesllngly, these di Visions
in Iita Bal k ans wore all mourll ain divisions and
only two of the si x Waffen55 mountain
divisions put their major service in areas
oulslde of the Balkans. In effect, the Bal kans
lied down 1/9 01 t!le w.ffenSS divisions
raised. I n addi tion. Polilei and Reich fuh,er S5
bo th maj or tour s rn the as dld
bolh COSSilck Cavalry div isions (units under
WaHen-5S con t rol bUI not, str ict ly speak ing,
Waffen-SS untts!. The point most to be mocle
from the Balk an campaign was IhM here, more
tllan any where else and, in fact, ear li er Ihan
most other f ron ts, tile WaHen-55 banner was
not onl y not carried by Germans, bu t by
nonGermanics. The men in Skanderbeg were
Ihe wry untermenschen" which supposed Iv
were to be dominated as a result 01 t he
ultimate German viclory The praclice of usi ng
Sl av s and olher nonGer manic peoples becafTlt!
wideSpread as Ihe Waf/en-5S expandoo but no
historian commen t ing on this Cl evelOPmen t has
ever reallv resolved Ihe Quest ion 01 how,
ideologicallv, the Nal is were able to accept
lhese peooles in t he mOSI polilicall Y-Of ienled
part of t he armed f orces and, at t he S.- "l rne I, me,
oreach the annihilation 01 lhese nat ions as
nat ions Probablv a great pon ion of t he reason
is due to t he fact lhat the Nazis t hemselves did
not aHempl to the prob lem. It
remarrled one of the many cur ious conl ,adlC-
l ions which regul arl y crop up In Nazi
Germany.
1942 al so saw the beglllfl lflg of the chllflge of
the major WallenS5 dI visions from str aigh t
infantry di VISions In to ar mored uni ts. In June.
February and May , 1942, respect l velv , LAH,
Oas Reich and Tot enkopl Wfl re assigned armOf
ad OOtlal ion5, though ot herwise nol f ullV
organi zed as panzergrenadler It was
x
SOURCES OF NAMES OF WAFFENSS DIVISIONS
lIEBSTANDARTE ADOLF HITLER - The Adolf Hlt/er Bodyguard
Reglmtmt.
OAS REICH _ Former Verfugungsrruppen Division. Irs first thrtffi
reglmenu had natlOnalisllc names: Germama, DeUlschiand. Der Fuhrer.
Das Reich IS. Illerally, "Ihe nation."
TOTENKOPF - From Ihe death 's head worn bv the 5S.
POLIZEI _ This dIvision w.JS initially raIsed from l evies from the
German police. The name.li/eraIlV. means "police. "
WIKI NG - The German S{Julling of V,kmg. The mltlBl elemel!fs of the
dIvision were Danes and Norwegiant.
NORD _ Likewise drawn f rom nor/hem germanic peoples, II served
most of thu Wilr on the Finnish from. The name, literal/y, means
"North ..
PRINZ EUGEN - P"nce ugunu of SI!IOV was an Ausman military
luoder in thu uarly , 700s. Hu defeat ed the Turks al Bulgrade i/l 1777,
Prinz ugen was mostlV used in Yugoslavi8.
HOHENSTAUFEN - A familV of HoIV Homan Emperors. 1138-1268.
which produced Fr iederich Bar/)arossa.
NORD LAND - Drawn from nord,c /latIOns. Lllerallv. "NorthI8nd."
HITLERJUGENO - Raised from former Hitle, Youth members. not
from chlldre/l as Alllud propogand8 had il.
REI CHSFUHRER-SS - D-eated bV expandmg the RfSS Escort
(Beglelt) Baualion.
GOTZ VON BE R lI CHINGEN - A characted created by GOllthe whose
major feat was fO SU!J96SI fO a certain bishop whllt part of his IInafOmV
the bishop mIght kiss.
HORST WESSE L - A Berlm Nazi , apparemly 8 whoremonger by Irade.
who was killed In a b'lIwI WHh CDmmumsrs at a rime when Goebbels
needed a hero. He had wrirren somt! 'poetry " which was set to musIC In
Horst Wessel Lied and became the anthem of thll Nazi Parry.
SKANOERBEG - Albanian na/ ional hero,
MARtA THERESA - The AuslNan monarch who fought Frederick
the Great. R8islld from Ausman elemenU.
HUNYAOI - Hunyadi Janos, a Magvar who success ful/V fought thll
Turks in thllmid 14oos.
LANGEMARCK - A regional /lame applied to the Low Countries,
from whiCh the dlYisio/i was raised,
WALLCNI EN - The Frenchspeaki/lg area of Blligium.
BDHMEN-MAHREN - The protectorate of Bohemia and Moravill,
created when Hitler occupied the Czechoslovak rump $fate in 1939.
This d,VISIon was ,aised f,om schools statIoned there to train SS
members.
30. JANUAR The datfl whe/l H,t/fir cflme /0 power in 1933.
LANOSTD RM NEOEH LAND - Landsrorm was a milttlfl. The division
came from a DutCh unif.
LUTZOW - A Prussian field marshal.
FRUNOSaERG - Founder and leader of the Ge!'man l.and$knl!(:kl in
lhll 16 Century In the serviCfl of Karl V,
NtBELUNGEN - The Nibelungen guarded the treasure If! the Fhein.
Th(J Niebelungenlied Is the great German folk mvth upon which Wagner
based his Ring cycle.
36 Waffengrenadierdivis;on dflr 55 W.lS unofficillily called Oir_anger
flfler the commandflr of the penal battalion from whiCh if was created.
It h81 proyen impossible fO dale 10 ascertllin who or what were
FLORIAN GEYR, HANDSCHAR. and KAMA. AnV in formll/ion will
be appreciated.
13

14
not ",nlll 1942 that these were
re(lrg.lfllzed pa11zergrenadier di"
,SolOns. In any event, by the end of 19<12. IN!
Wallen SS now had wme 3:ll,OOO men urlder
arms. Vel. as of Docember 1942 Ihe WattenSS
w.n 51,11 of II modeSI Sllll It had tl!fl diVIS-OIlS
aocl only three Of them were panzerg,enad'ef
div'sions I t hid no armored divisions. ES!lent
lally. it WilS In the last two years 01 the Wit(
1!16 Wdffen-SS developed >010 the organil-
al10n whiCh IS incorrectly conSidered tYPical of
tile Wofhm-SS throl'ghoul the
This ,,,pid oovelopmenl In the litSt p,m of the
Wilf W,IS due in great measure to Ihe decllJle of
Gernldfl fortunes As the army failed \0 do Ihe
Job, Hiller turned more and more \0 the
Wa"enSS In 1943 illone 11!fl dIviSions we'e
ra,sed. More Impor1ilnllv, by the end of 19113.
SIX corps hild been ra,sed. Hiller had. hereto-
NOTES ON WAFFEN 55 DIVISIONS:
ThfI 1 55 division Win Oflgmallv II rt!1Jimenr
(Stllndaf/en) and onlV became a bflfillde In
the !Wmmer 01 '4a SIIII, i ls Slfength was
10,196 in June '41. It bt!cllmll a dlll/Slon
IIIll1r Ihllt !Wmmer and II tanlr
comPOnf!(lt m earl y '42, Officiall y became
II PIInZllr drlllSlon in elfrly ' 43. Conlili ned
SS PzGren regIments I IIfId 2 Iffid SS pz
I, The 2 S5 division WIll formed
In Ill te '39 wi th 55 rel1"Tlenl$ 3 (Deutsch
land}, 4 lOer Fuhrer! and 9 (Germania).
{)eyelop'TUml simila' to 1 SS. The 3 5S
division also formed in 1939. Received
tllnlr element rn mid ' 42, Conraiood SS
regunenl$ 5 (Thule}, 6 (Theodor Erelre)
and 3 SS Pl. The 4 SS division WIIllormed
from non' SS polic"men. Alway, a poor
qualltv dl VIIIon. Conrami!d SS 1
and 8 (loWll rds the lind of thll war "
rervi!d the 4 SS plf(fzer battal,on also),
Thll 5 S5 division wars formed m I,'e ' 40
f rom ScandrnllVian voluntetlrs, although
nol enough of these clime forward lind
never more thlln 2,", of the dHlllion
conSIlled 01 nonGerman,- 1/$ reglmenlal
numberl fOllowed Ihe U5U1I1 55 paUern. It
contllrned regiments 9 lind 10 (pzGren}
and 5 SS plll1zer reglfnen t. The 6 SS
d,vis,on _ $ oflginal/y II moun/llrn infantry
br,gadll in FIn/and whICh WIll ralutd ro
diVISIon ItlltUI rn early '41 I,fler about 6
monlh'll$ a brlgiKk}. II IIl1yed Iherll for
moll of Ihll war, Contal".d SS regl'menu
11 (Rernhardl Httydnch) and 12 (MIChael
GIIIS$lTl/lrrJ. The 1 SS division _ , formed
rn 'erb,a rn earlV ' 42 from local GermanIC
" vo/un/llltr,-" SlaVed there mas/ of Ihe
.. "Jr. Comarned SS rerJ'ffHln(s 13 (Aflhur
Phelpsl and 14. The 8 SS diVIsion was a
cllvllirv unll formed from two SS cavlI/rv
bfllPJdcs rn /lIle '42. Conlallled SS regi
men" 15, 16, 11 and 18. Tha 9 SS
dIVISIon was ra,sed In ellrlv '43 as a pllnzllf
dlv",on. COnlarned SS PzGren reglmenu
19 and 20 and 9 SS {)IInler reg,mlmt. Thll
10 SS d,vlslDn IIm,laf 10 thll 9rh, It
cOnlarned SS regrmenl$ {PrGrfffl/ 21 lind
22 .. s well oOS SS PII"ffH reglmenr 10
(L;mgcma,lr l The 11 SS d,VISIon "V,lIS
lotnlf!d In earlv '43 from elllmful.u 01 5 SS
d,vrsron. Conramed SS 'egllTUlIIts 23
fore, strongly reSisted Wallen SS expansion.
To a great tlU5 WdS in order to avoid
offending the stIll vlclorious olrmy. When Ihe
army began 10 lOse. Ihat need was jJOr1e. It was
Hausser's 5S.pionierkorps wh,ch retook Khar
kov '" February 1943 a!'ld the Wallen-SS unItS
in Z,taclelle werl! the ones whIch gained lhe
mOSI ground and dId t he most damage to the
Russians More and more HlttCl regarded the
WallenS5 as his "Fe\)Orwehr" or l ,re brigade.
As a result. In October, 1943. l he so-called
el , te units were created by Iransl orming LAH.
Oas Reich. Totlllnkopf. Wlking, Frurw;l$berg,
Hohenstaufen dnd Hitler JUfllllnd Into l ul l
panzer was nOI Ufll,lxj)e(;ted. LAH,
OR and T had ell been receiving first-hne tanks
ahettd of the regulM ,)fmy l or
over a year ewn before Ihe" formal des'gn
ation as pan;rergrenacl,er II the peak
for the regular army c<l'ne In mId 1942. the
(No,ge) and 24 (Danmarlr! liS well as 55
pallzer ballll/Ion "He,mann von Selza"
(which was, in late '44, joini!d bv SS heavV
lank bat/a/ion 503 10 form SS pallzer
regimenl I/). Thil 12 SS division was
formed m mId ' 43 Irom voung men who
had passed 'hrough H,tler YOUlh camps
and a c.odrf! of the 1 SS dIVision. Con
tained SS PzGrlln reglfTlf!nrs 25 and 26 as
well a, SS panzllr reg,ment 12. ThI! 13 S5
division WOOS ralwd from Croat"," vol un
lBefS and Ballrtln Moslems m ear/v '43 for
anri'partisan worlr, Mutmied durmg '1$
training and after seeing same BCtion In
1944 WII$ reduced to a regimental size unil
at IhI! end 01 the vear (compo$ed miJmlv
of the remaming German cadre}. The 14
SS division WIIS formed ill earl", '43 from
UlrralTl,alll WIth German offICers. One of
lhe bener " fOrel911 " SS Un/ts. ContalTli!d
SS regml/lnts 29, 30 and 31. The 15 SS
division w,,' formed In latll ' 43 from
La,v,.,n po/ICe lind clv,11I1TI volunreers.
Conramed SS reglmllnrs 32, 33 and 34.
The 16 SS division was formed /II Corsica
in late '43 from thll SS Sturm Brigade
" Reichsfuhrllr 55" (RFSS) which hMi
originallV been formed from Himm/er's
bodvguard. Contained SS PzGren regi'
ments 35 and 36. Tha 11 S5 division Wil l
formed in France In ''' 111 '43 from main/V
German personnel plul m;wv Belgians and
Rumanian'- Incorporated the SS brlflades
49 and 51 m fate '44. Contained SS
regiments (PzGfen) 311md 38. The 18 SS
division was formed In ear'V '44 around
lhe 1 SS molorrred brl(lMJII wi th HUr>gllr
I/IFI Germans. COn/alTli!d SS regIments
(PzGren) 39 alld 40. The 19 SS division
was formed m or/", '44 from the 2
Llllavian 55 i n(lIm,,,, brigade. Contained
SS fegimenrs 42, 43 and 44. The 20 55
division Will formlld III IlIle ' 43 from thll
EIfOlllan Vo/unleer B"gMiIl and the
Speclll/ Emplovment DIVISion 300 (EI/o,
man Pollell!. Contll,ned SS regiments 45,
46, and 41. Thll 21 S5 division WIll formed
In m,d '44 from A lbanian " volunteers"
who deSi/lrled al every OPPOffUnilV. D,v,
Slon newr re:hecJ full strength and ended
up /IS .n "ugmentallon to SS dIVision 1.
Contained SS r/l9lm6nu 50 lind 51. The 22
SS division WIIS a Cll valrv u",t lormi!d m
peal.. for the W<lflenSS fell <lround tho efld of
1943. 11 had strong Itlle brlQdde
strength sor.cfisant divisions were yel. to be
formed!. 9000 morale and. willie III retrOSPect
one could call the war IOSI by 1943. 11 Wil!>
only In 1944. when no SprIng olfenSI-..:t occur
red In lhe easl and the Bal kans /Ifld Ilaly werl!
dral",ng more and more troops Ihat all bul Ihe
moS! sanguIne could see the end at hand.
The FeuerwdH concer" should IX' kepI fll mly
in mI nd III consi ctefl ng Ihe WMfcn5S In t he
I<lst two years 0 1 the WiJr. HIller hold kepI a
', rm hand on Ihe Wdllen-SS until Z, ladp.llc for
iJ numbef 01 reasons, but the shi ft 10 an almost
lully mech,mizoo force In early 1943 rnd,caled
Ihal the WaifenSS were more and morc
tallOrOO. Bv mrd-I943. all except the mOuntaIn
d,v,s,ons were paflzcrgrenad,er dIVISIonS. On
the other hand, to underscore I he latebtoom
mid '44 from mOltlV (10"'1 Hung;man
GermanI and cMire, from Ih6 8 SS
d,v/SIon. COlltained SS reglfflents 52, 53,
54 and 55.
The folfowmg u",ts never reached full
Ilrllngth and _fll, at most, bflgadll (hiJ/f a
dl vls,on) size, The 23 SS division WIIS
lormi!d In mid ' 44 Irom CrOll/ Moslllms
but was never complated. COntl,ned SS
reg,ments 56, 51 and 58. In IIIle ' 44 a
SI1COnd 23 SS divi.lion was slarred, thIS ana
waS organized around the 4 SS bflgllde
" NfJdar' .. nd" WhICh, in tum, hlld been
formi!d in /lIle '43 from Dutch vOluntoors
and thll remllants of 2 SS motorued
brigade. The 24 55 division was e moun'
taln UTllt formed from Ila/um Germans
(tor Iha molt part). Nflller SIIw KIIOn.
Contamed SS reg,ments 59 and 6(), The 25
SS dIvision was formed in lat a ' 44 from
HU"9"flan Germans. Conta,ned SS refl'
ments 61, 62 and 63. The 26 SS dIvision
_s fo,med m Ill /e '44 (rom Hungafian
Germall' and members of the Hungarian
Mmv. Contained 55 regiments (PzGren)
64 and 65. This division number wal also
used m an unwcc/JIsful alfemp l /0 form a
26 SS pllnzar division in Seplembar 1944
from Ihe 49 and 5 I SS .motor,uJd b,,
gadel. The 27 SS division was formed m
late '44 from thll 6 SS voluntt!flr assault
bflglldll "Lllllgetnarir " (which was m turn
formed in latll '43 around lhe I"IIfTInan/S of
thll " Nederland" regiment tllal had St!flIlId
wllh SS d,vlIJon 111. Contained SS reg,.
men/s (PrGren) 61 (Limgemarlr) ,nd 68.
The 28 SS diyi$:ion was fOfmed m lal a '44
from Ihe 5 55 volunteer IISSIIult bflgada
' Wallo",en" (whICh had bellII in turn
formed In 111111 '43 from Iha 'Wal/onien
Leglon"l. Formed primarilv from 86/g,an
civilian and POW VO/UntBflfS. Conlain/Jd SS
rt!1Jiments (pzGrenl 69 (Wallonill) and 10,
The 29 SS division was fort1ll!d in m,d "44
from Russ,an personnel WIth polica ax
peflence. Poorl", trained lind equ,pped and
eventual/", u .. nslerred 10 the "VloOSSOv
Army." Cont .. med SS regirmmts 71, 12,
13 lind 74. Whfffl this UTlit was taklln off
lhe SS roll, in late ' 44 anather 29 SS
djyision was formed from I tal/an volun
toor. around Ihe cadre of the 44 SS
I
,
,
ing 01 Ihe W,lffen-SS, Iho!.C who delighl in
pOlnl"'9 oul Ihe percentage of IOtal German
armored unllS In theWaffen-SS Ignorl! the t.lel
thai I ...... regular army l)anzard,V",,,ns
...... .0 tormed before lhe IlrSI WaflenSS Pdn/el
d,v'ilon organized On the mile. hdOO.
f.om ,md 1 943. Wallen-5S panlerdlVl$l-
ons WIl,e fOll1'll.'d wIllie only eQual number
of re9ular a'nw pilnzerdlVI$IOnS Iplus n"'1l
5Ocail t'd formed In Ihe closing
monlhs) were 'a,sed
A Imef di'lrl!$sion Into the baSIS of tho Waft,,,,,
SS 1$ in o.der to und",stand why the
WaflollS5 was chosen to fIll tho vacuum
CreiltOO hy lhe Inability of The army 10 win Ihp
Wdr FilS!, lhere were Ihe IdeologIcal faclOfS
The W,lifen,SS was led by ",he people' Only
5" of 110.. oificefs were from mihTary f,mlilie$
wh.le gO'll. carne from lhe larmer and ppasant
brigade. The 30 SS was al$O
formed from Russian p ersonnel, bUI
mutlmed ralher than fight and elltlntullily
collqpsed i n chaos. Contamed SS regi-
menu 75, 76 lind 77. Origi nally formed m
mid '44, The 31 SS was fOlmed m
Nrl y '45 from the i nstructors lind treming
personnel of the SS ITChoo/, in Czechoslo-
vak,a. Contemed SS regiments (pzGren/
78, 79 end 80. The 32 SS division Woll
formed in earlv '45 flam sund"" SS
" -emlng school personnel. Contamed SS
regiments (PzGlen/ 83, 86 (Schilll and 87
(F.lke). The 33 SS division was fOlmed
from Units of the HUllgllflan Jumy.
Contai ned SS legimenu 88, 89 IJnd 90.
Unl/ formed in late '44. There W.JS e
$JBCond 33 SS divtsion formed IIftel the
f ,rst one w.u destroved defendmg
8udepest in fIil fl y ' 45. Thl$ $JBCond one
contal nf French SS Pffsonnel, The 34 SS
diviJion w.u not more than e
' 'paper'' unit suppo:sedly composed of
"loYIII " Dutch Nazi s. No SS regiments
known to have bet:n /lSsigned. The 35 SS
division was to been organized m
e;Jdy '45 flom municipill police UflllS. No
SS regiments known to been as
signed, ThIJ 36 SS division was formed in
e;Jrl V '45 f rom t he 2 SS eS$ilUlt brigade
" DlflfIWllnger. ,. OnlV on. SS rl1fJlment
known to have been auignad (92). The 37
SS division WilS e clWalry uni t fOlmed f,om
foreign voluntte'1S i n early '45. Contllmed
SS rtIfJrments 93 end 94. The 38 SS
division wal !Olmed m tNlfl V '45 f rom the
tftlrnmg ".rwnntlll of the mam SS II. /ning
et 8 11d Toll. No regiments known
to hil\l' been euigned,
SS BRI GADES AND SA TTA LIONS
The 1 SS motorized brigade was formed i n
1941 in Polllnd es IJ police Unit lind
fN,ntu.lly beceme a part of SS dlvi llon
18. The 2 SS motorized bripde was a
Sister uni t of the I mot orized brigade. The
2 SS MaIIull brigade " Oirlew.,.," (the
mfamoos ' 'Olf lewa''9flr brlgiJdeffl WB$
formed in 1944 to fight partisans. The 2
SS --..11 br igade " Flandet-n" was IIlso
known to elt ist, but no t much more ;,
known. The 2 (lalYian) volunteer inllntry
of rhe SS was formed i n 1943 end
classes. In Ihp regular IIrmy Ihe percentages ran
49% and 2% for Ihe same clilSSCS In SchleSWIg
-Holstein, Niedcriachsen. Franken ilnd lhe
SaM, the farmer peasant stronyholt;ls of Ger-
fTliIny, one Oul 01 e....,rv Ihree sons Joined tiM'
WaffenSS. Then. 100. II was a party army. nOI
truly re:;ponsible, III 10 tha army chain
0 1 command, On the questIon 0 1 who COntrol
led the Wafien,5S. however, therll ;s
seriOUS d.,bate ThoS<! S('!'klng to tie it in as
tighTly as possiblo to the Nazi Par t y wlllpO;nl
to Ihe formal t ies. PilUl Hausser. at Nurnber\!,
alleged thai lI,a Wdffon-S5 actudlly sub
to tha a.my In lhe hald and only
looked to Himmle. for personnel. replacemen t ,
military justice and fund.-.mental org<lnl7
dlional maners_ "AU d,vIsions 01 lhe Willlen-
SS were iflCoroordtild InlO lhe Army and
lought under lhe commdnd and, In lhe I,nal
anlaySls. under lhe fl'spor1SibllllV 01 the
became a parr of SS 19 m eaflv
'44. The 3 (Eston;an ) volunteer infantry
briple o f the SS WiIS fOlmed III 1943 and
incorporated in the 20 SS dlvtllon at the
end of ' 43. The 2 SS volunteer pzGren
brigiOd. " Nede.land" w.:s formed in 1944.
The 5 SS volunteer assault b.ig.(ld. ' 'WIII _
lonie" was fOlmed m 1942. The 6 SS
voluntee. _It bri!lllde " lllngemll.k ,"
was formed in 1944, The 6 SS volunleer
"'Silul! bri9lKie (SS nr. 56) "Chlll'lemenge"
was formed in 1944. The 7 Wallen
G.enadier IISS/1UII b.illflde " SS F'lInkreich"
(SS nr. 57) WilS formed in 1943. The 25
and 26 SS pzGra n brigades werB known to
hil\le elt ist ed but Imle moftl il known
about them. The same appliel fOl the 27
SS assaull brigade " l angema.k." The same
lllso IIppli tlil for the fo/lowrng SS brigades;
44 Wallen G.enadie . 49 and 51 PzG.en.
The followmg were non<ilvillonal Ufllts of
the SS of biJi ta/,on :SIze. The Esco.t
Baltalion (molorized) " Reichsluh.er SS. "
The Guard Baltalion " l eibslllndarte Adolf
Hitler" (Be.lin ), Penlll Banal ion of the
Wallan SS. SS light Infantry Units "Osl"
Im d " Nordwest." SS pzGren lehr Regi
ment (became plJfl of the 18 SS divI$ion in
JulV 1944). SS pa.achute lighl infantry
baltalions 500. 501 , 502 alld 600. SS
PzGren baltelion 506 (became part of the
6 SS division). SS Mountllinear ban. lion
(became part of SS d,vi Sion 24/. Finnish
SS volunl_ liiht infllntry battillion (1M-
came part o f 1 I SS Eston;,n SS
volunteer battalion " Naf'llll " (_nt to 20
SS divisron in 19 44J, Estonian SS volun
_. banlllion 658 (went 10 20 SS di vision
III 1944). SS legion " k,oali,n" (went to
23 SS d iY/sian). ElISl Turkesilln SS-lllgion.
Cauells'u S5-lqion, Indilln SS lQ9ion,
Norweyian SS Ski ban,lion. Eston;an
Rifle regiment (2 bettaltons) lltavian
borde. gullrds (15 bettal,ons), ESlOnian
border gullrds (15 bet tallollS}, Heavy SS
arlillery Mnelions 101, 102. 501. 502.
503, 504, SS Flak balllliion " BerchlllS-
gilden, " " kommandosllb RFSS I and fl .
550. SS hellVY tIIn" batlalions ( TIger/ 501 ,
502, 503, SS hMvy tIInk destroyer bIIt
Ialions fJagdt iger) 560, 561. SS recon
naissance bIIttalion 505, SS rock.t
Army" Thai was Hausser's tesl"mlfl\l .JI Num-
bercl Thai II may hil\le been selllI(>rving dllln
nothIng 10 ch""'1lI! Ihe f<OCl Ihdl II eS5erllldU\I
rern.Jlned unrefUTed al Ihe 111,11,
Tha twin f<t<:tars 01 Ihe Polrty IK," dnd Ih ..
source of <1$ te.xl(' rsh,p a:lowed thfl Wdllen,55
to <lvo,d sorno of the 'rOOllions which ...... lIe sa
slrong in Ihe regular Mmy, Steiner dr1d HolllSscr
were abla 10 InrrO(iuOO SOffi(' s ignlf,canl ",nov-
III IOns. no jJrelcrenoo was given for pd\lCalion,
fulure offirers st'rved Iwo years III ttll' ranks,
off Icer NCO compeTillon wa. elxmJ"1l/'1d
aod cluscn(!ss beTween 1t1t->se Iwo aroSi'
which "".IS ""heard of In lho .equldr <1"11\1. The
Illal key, however, remained the e),lIl of Ihe
Wallen SS. Thf' templdlion 10 .trwlO<jl/' WIlle
US Mdflnes 'S greal bUI whal,,""" Ihe US
Mdfinos h;we 10 seT themselVl!$ ,lP<)rl !rom the
a.my, Ihp WaffanSS dId Wllh ol
launcher "'Nebelwedel"} baltillions 101,
102, 501 , 502, 503, 504, 505, 506. SS
engi neer const ruct ion battlll ion.
The above Itst is not exhaust,ve, elthough
most Units hallf/ btten covered. Uni ts not
COVtllred art, SUPPOrt uni ts (Stgnal. supply,
traming, etc, }.
A NOTE ON TERMINOlOGV
Whether a WaffenSS UIlI t was Ger mlln.
Gel mamc or non Gl.'I'manlC COuld be deter
milled flOm , 11 full dfwgnat,on. The full
German dlll ;S;on was CII /led ' 'SSOlvil ion''
(e_fl ' SS,Pll nza.divISl on " Ou Relch"l; the
GermanIC d,vIs,om were " lIOIunteer d,vi'
Slons" or "SS Freiwilligendivision" (e.g,
11 SS Fr.iwill istenpanzeryranad.erdivilion
" Nordland"l; and the dIVisi ons raised from
non Germanic na tions were " Division d. r
SS" (e.g. 13 Waffengebirgsdivision der SS
" Hendschat " [KrOllI , Nr . 11 J. Wi th If!!JBrd
t o t he IllS\. the name in bfackeu would be
the natlonailtv from wh,ch the diVIsion
_ drawn together with thtt number o(
that dl v;SlOn wi th regard to that nallonal
l tV. Thus, H. ndscha, was Cloat.an dl 'I/s,on
, and k a mll, 2. Unt,1 1942, the WaffenSS
dlvIslom were onl v known bv the" nemes.
Thus, t o ce/l Ou R.ich " 2. SS,G'. nad'a'
or " 2nd SS Oiv; $ion" (}urlllg Ihe
1940 cempalgn in France is incOffeet.
After numb.rs were assigned. rhey were
used mterchangeably with t he names. This
use of names WBS .Imon 101a/lv II Weffen-
SS practICe. The regular 8rmV umll WI th
namt/$ _re qui t. f ew: the Slovak S<:hMII
dIVIS/CHI, rhe Spanish Azur. end the GrOSll '
deutschlllnd d,VISi ons life ont/$ which come
to mmd. The Luft waffe, o f coo'". hed
the Hermann Go.ing umu. ThIS IS. mon
then l,kelV, an emphasis on the PanV
Of/gills o f the Wo1 ffenSS as the Nui Partv
tended to heve ""/TIft, rather than num
ben, f Ol i tllll'fl/lr elements.
15

16
Whereas the Mannes ilIrl! known for high esprd
Ind read,'M!SS 10 f,ght harsh odds, the
Wallen-55 held the icllldl 01 the mission belore
anything. Includ,ng life ilse!!. If the
WtlS ill hill, the Wallen-55 unit assigned the
ubjeclive would either ;1 '" d,e 10 a rnan
trying. The fact lhlll thUy were beno. !falfX'd
and. in most C8'1!'. better armed Ihan Ihe"
",my coumerpllrtf ,lllow.>d them 10 accomplish
missions other un,IS would have been un"ble
10 olCCOmplish. Unql.Jl!st'Ofldhly Wallen-55
losses we.e higher Ih'lII army losses, 'Illd
,lfobitbly unneoos.sdrily SQ, though the fact Ihal
they accompli,hea fcau Ihe regulM ilrmy was
unable 10 do does 8et ,IS" mitigating I"clor, By
NtM.mber of 1941, for eXdmple. Totankopl
replmed II loss of 60% of their officers lind
NCO$. In effect, the old feudal concept of
honor beocame Pdl"amounl he who was 1'101
unci", fi,e W<JS III cOW-iIrd. The IndOCtr.nalion
Ihat dOV loss nOI 100 great 10 accomplish
mission or Ihat ,InV act was justd,able il "
<lCoornpl.!.hed the mIssion, when coupled w'th
IdXf!( d,sclpllne, unQUUSI,ondbly mddtl possiblll
Ihe JlrOCltles of Le ParOOIS, in HJ40, 0011
Orddoursurill"ne lind Malrtledy ill 19114 To
9'rt. the hi! dlle. however. Though Ihll'5e
were undoubted and nol accidenu
of war. Ihere IS no re<ll ,nd,callon Ihat the ...
were commITTed ,n respen$(! 10 some dellberale
(I(letflne. On the Olher hand. IheV were lhe
logical result of the Wilffen-55 train'ng and
ilKloclrin<lTion Heinl HOlm\.' de5Cflhed Ihe
Wallen-55 best when 11C ildld "as a result 01
1111' Introduction of unsold,erlV IVpeS dr,lWn
from the CI!S5POO1 of pulillcal lanallcism
cumblned with Ihe lu .... 01 biltlle ,!fld d cefl,lIn
relllx<llion of diSCIPline, the Willien-SS be<:d,ne
dill 10 use al! t ... pes of Inh"man methods of
woldilfe "
anI! 01 Ihe worST problems With the Wallen 55
was Himmler'S inclUSion 01 genu,ne $(;um
ullder the Wallen,55 bldllt..et On April 27.
1 !}II 1. such units as Ihe concentration camp
guards were made Pdr t 01 lhe Wallen55.
Whatever was bdd aOoo.ll lhe WaffenSS, and
there were many things, Ihe addllion of the
oonoenTrallon camp and the Hohrer SS
und Poli/eiluhrers was an unfoJir smear on the
alre.ld ... tdtnished escutdlolOn of the Waffen 55.
Some 1.500 men were "I ken frum Ihe WaHan
5S fOf the Einstutlkormn,mdos ,md certalfl
reserve units. such as Keminski's brigade. were
Involved rn Ihe Irquodahon 01 the Waf"$8W
Ghello. which dod the WuHenS5 repulallon
no good, SUI in defense of the Waf/en-SS. at
leil!lt as 1M as soch units d$ Kaminskl's werll
concerned, these orgallilatlons were not of the
:lam<) chara"ter of such dlvis,ons as Wikrng dnd
In ,caching a conclusion on Ihe Wallen-55.
falmeM requIFes Ihat such umlS be d,scoufHed
The prolligacy 01 Wallen,55 commanders with
human liW5 was urdcr,,-:ored Ifl Januar .... 1942,
when Dir. Full.e, slandoJrte was usod ItS a
$l;;rl!en In _52
0
C ......eiuher iI9iI,nst the RUSSian
counleranack In Iront of M03COW while
MOOE'I. C-in-C of N,nlh Arm ... , muslered hl5
coun te,allac:l< When relieved in m,d
Feb. uar .... Dul 01 2,000 men Oe, Fuhrer could
muster 35.
In anv event. this do-of-dia coupled with
the success of HIIU5$8"S decePllvelv named
SS' Poonoerkorps In 1943 left Hiller With the
OOI",on that the$e ......ere lhe only trOO(lS which
Could Win. The iron ... was Ih31 IhI! core 01 the
WallenS5 which had ca,vad the repu talion 01
lhe Wallen5S WilS gone. For tha
WllifenSS losl t ,239 oH,ce.s (lnd 35,377 men.
13.037 of which were killed. between June 22.
1941 and NO\I9mber 19. 19111 That was
enough to man two d,visions and represented
onl ... d,vislons' losses. in OUI 01
The Cherkassv pod,et al the end 01 1943.
Wiklng 100t 1111 01 Its tanks. all of ils eqUIpment
and half ils men. The replacemenu did nOt
have the lengt h nor IntensilV 01 training 01 Ihe
losl men, nor ware Ihey lIS well indoe::t .. naled_
In lacl. lhey came 10 be drawn Irom the $dtne
replacement POOls as regular army men and
while lhey ma ... have been the crBilm of Ihe
crop, as It were. the ... were no longe. purely
Party men They tended to think of themselves
less as member' of the Party "arm ..... iIIld more
as tha fourth Dram;h of the Wehrm,lcht Mon
like Haus$Cr. 5teiner. Simich and Phelps not
onlV relused to die lor their Fuhrer as the war
......enl on il the ... could, b ... wilhd'tlWal, fight
another day. but they look to excluding the
non-military NUl observers from the" coun-
and ignored Himmler totally B,"rich was
re/,eved "om command of II 5S.Panzerkorps
b ... Himmlef when it was In Norm,mdv. and he
refused to g'vt;\ up hiS command until his
wperior In the B.mV Chain. GFM Model. told
him to Model relused to relieve him so
B.Hrich Slaved on.
II was the Julv 20. 194<1. plot which actually
put Himmler and his S5 in lhe position of
absolute power. which people claimed he had
had all along, Bv the end of June. 1911<1 Ihe
Wallen-55 had risen 10 594,443 in strong But
In the last len mOnths of Ihe war, Hitler
ordered Himmler 10 form fifteen new Wallen
SS division,_ To do so. Hlmmler l)(!{Ian 10
scrape tha bottom of the barrel. running a
second combing 01 Ihe peltee and turning out
trolining schools_ In point 01 fact. Hlmmler
oUI-did the demands 01 Hitler as he created
seventeen nominal d,v,sions loflen no larger, in
actudl strength, than regiments) 2 mountain
divisions,4 palllergrenOOler d iviSions, 2 cavalr ...
lind 9 inlantry divisions Actuall ....
fl'W 01 these rosa <lbove their initial strength.
In addition, the OSl1urkische Wilflenverbllnde
der SS. KllukilSische Waflenve.bandtt de. SS,
Serbisches F,.iwilligenkorps, WilUengreMdier
rllli"ment der SS (Rumilnische 1 and 2 and
Builla.ischll ) were rll'sed Finallv, plans were
laid for Gebirllsdivislons Andrus Hofe .
55 F.e i wiliillengrenlldie.division Feldhurrn
halle. FinnischeulbI!tllUion Kalevall , 5S.0ivis
ionl NiederMehsen, SSPanzerdivision R,iehs
mil.sc:hall , SSPlnzllfgreniidierdivision Wllilen-
nein and Germenlsche SSOivision W'f AI
the end, the Wallen 55 had some 900.000 men
doubled In strength in less Ihan a ... ear. of
which 1/3 10 112 were Reich Germans
The account of Ihe only 55 Arm ... , Oietllch's
Slxlh SS-Panzer. Is wel l told in the numerovs
(H:Counts oj the Bulge, 5imilarlv, Hlmmler's
twO comman(h. HG Obe"hein and HG W,iJh-
... . can be lound In the US Armv's lor.lline
IAmpailln and The last 100 O..,s. These were
Ihe onlv lafger thancorps units which could be
considered Waffen5S, If onlV because their
commander was of t ha Wallen-55.
The Wallen-S5 endured the war well
Except fOI the debacle o f Budapest , which
eHeclivelv knOCked out three cavalry divisions.
and several near brushes with the RUSSians. UP
10 the last few weeks, no Wallen-55 diviSion
was dcsto ... ed tn combat Those which did not
see the end 01 the war, exceptIng the cavalry
diVisions. were d ls/:laOded bv the Wallon5S or
surrendered d ur ing tho 18S1 week or so. In t he
end. Ihe free diSCipli ne and Ihe
allilude may haw proven Hiller, undotng for
Ihe German units While lhe fore'lln units had
to fighl 10 the end to keep from belnl1lr,ed as
war Criminals. the German unllS knew tha ...
oould relurn home (or oJt least the ... Ihought
Ihey couldl without being Of the
th It IV -four d iVls,ons which II15\(.'d u 1lIi1 the rnd .
Ihough onlv threo were actuallv facong wesl.
half surrendered to lhe US forces and l ive to
Ihe Blltlsh. Onlv twelve couldn't eJl;ape lha
Russiclns. An IIIterestlng SIdelight on the ,m-
pact 01 the Wallen55 on the Ott\Jr
red at Nurnberg when lhe Russians were
cleartv sceptical when Haussc. deilled Ihe
of 134 5S diVISion and 97 55 d'VISlon
(Golden l,ly ) That the Russi,ons were suff i-
ciently dece,ved to thaI IWO more
divisions e_,sted on the WallenSS rolls than
iIC1u.itlv dod IS Ind'Ci.'lIIVe of Ihe ,mpac l it made
on RUSSian mindS.
In Iht "nal ,lI1al",$15. the Walff'nSS c.tnnOI be
measured clnV olher body It was
un,q"e In world hislory rn Ihal II was a
polilical body wllich CUI across "..:Iltlonal
mil itar ... VJlufls and dnd ... el
s,de by Sid,) with one 01 the most tradillon
bound armjp, in the world, The fact thaI for
four Oul of the Veolrs 01 Ihe wolr no more
than Ihltloon were III Iha Wallen,SS
oJt IIll> wme time lhe .mv had owr 300
d,vlslons IS over looked due to lhe ImlJilCt of
the Wallen,SS. To pul the ma!\or moo-e prec
iselV in locus. the true reputallon of Ihe
W.iflenSS was founded 011 its four and later
seven elile diviSIons U./ntende"e Adolf Hit
er, DIS Re,eh, Totenkopf, Wlklng. F.undsbe'g,
Hohenstaul.., and Hitler Jugend ullits which
cl$ panzer dIviSIOns for only a ye and
a half 01 a Slxvear war In the e<'ld anal ... sis. no
mailer how one evaluates Ihe WallenS5 _
miS\)uioed ,dl'Jlrsts, base crrmrnals or !oOnle-
where Inoolween. thiS small group 01
ensurro Ihe Wa!fen-55 d posl lion in military
hlsto .... along with the PrllClorian and
Ni>POleon's Old Guard
PRINCIPAL BIBLiOGRAPHV
Bauer. Eddv Dill Pilnze.kries!
BradleV. Omar. et al - Aft .. Aelloo Repo.t.
12th A.my Group
Burkhart, H,lIebrand DIS Heer 1933, 1945
Carell. Paul Oa. Russlandkrieg
Hohne. Heln.!' - The Order of thl Oeath's
Head
Slahl, Peter - 0 .. Wllffen S5
5tcJhl. Peler - Plnze,
Slein. George Geschichle de. Weffln SS
T4VlOr, Tellofd The Ma.eh of Conquest
A word of caulion. Poss,blv the ..... orsl 00010; on
Ihe WaflenSS IS Ihe enlrv 01 Ihe B,lIldl1hne
series Whon a book contains such 9ross and
obviOUS errors as naming the Ihroo army
groups al Ihe start of Barbarossa es A, B and C
InSlead o( No.d. Mitte and Sud tor North.
Center and South). ooe cannOI but wonder
how- much 01 the iesswell mallJroal is
Slmllarlv In error A number of the item-s
included In the book are not found In any of
the books contained rn lhe bibliography which
.alses Iha double Question as to where Ihey
came from and whether Ihey are reallv accur-
ale Anothe, ......eak point is the !lIustrat ions_
The book pUrPQfIS to deal Wllh the Waffen-SS
which. as can be seen. reall ... did not as
such. until lhe star1 of lhe war More lhan 5O'JI.
01 the il lustrations In the Ballanlille W!nture
are eIther pre-war general 55 shOts or feature
Heinrrch H Immler who. though he was Reichs-
fuhrer-55 aOO nQmlllalleader of Ihe Waf/en-SS
was, nonetheless. not Ihe subJecl 01 the book,

o
J

CAMPAIGN ANAL YSIS: Part 4
by Albert A. Nofi
L.I. T, V ,Ill r c In WUfld W,tI II,
c.JmPil''.I' Afrlt.d .... lIlm,lIeIV dt.-
jud \Jp.;)r1 S8d F 0' both sid,,, every
" e_v bu I. ",>'IIfV OU'IC'_' .)1 fuel, every
veil ,1(:I'0!0$ The _ 11 e.' ..... "00 hlld
I.IOef oble It> mUSTt_f 1U1f,,-teol se.1 .nd a ..
"ftngll, 10 \liI'" of the: Mcd,terr.:me<ln
the ." lhe W.s1Crn 011_1 would ".we
bu&n 3nlid,m 11C rnent mopP'"Q up of
osolaled 10"'''1 Th I nmlhef t,<,M w In I"el
"ble 10 do to mode The duwrt Ilghllng neces
sary AI'" neithef 8"""" nt,/ It"ly Wils .. b
10 lut IIV duny Ih, Genu .. , Med,ten_iln !O
the uther FOf the "fltosn. tIllS w<Nld hallQ
10" ,ld to O(*"hl .. noor 'Wveft! hdn,J.
CdD. for Ihl! IMh ns It Wl,IUtd h"w spelled
d( lin
. LA REGIA MARINA
n n,lV.11 It hJ(,J 4tc;ttPll'(j the IhtlO(ies
01 ''<'ommand ul IhD 00."" but hd(l ill<;)
r6</listic.llly thaI Ildlv not likely
10 ONe' """III""" m"lerial 50P'-'HorIIV which
SllCh d pllIIL)soph ... nEJCeiSitaled It,ll ... had
planrwd Ic>. mdfl", ... ear! 1m Wol' wilh F.,lflCE',
"rod 11ah;J" !1'.Jlt'\ll$1$ had rec;ogI1tlud INt inher
1101, end unlikel.,. to ql,liInlt!ahvl!
,0rilY of I .... Fr.mer> the 11<'I1t4l1 Fleet
Though 1t1l118n ,h.ps wltre innova""",.n
dt$i1]<l and bV no me..J1lS leu "II CwttH th"n
Ihow "I F .ana!, th1!re _ "mplv !lotl:lnouQh
,)f IhoIm, nur .... ou1d 1'*1:1 ewf be Thu$, Iialy
sellled upon what m"Y btl 1Pnlll'd a "'_lJllIn
.tra\L'gV
. ....

-
-
. -
-

--
In efff!(;1 tho! RegIa Miull'liI en\llS!ooud ,15 role
as ltual 01 il '"Ileet In bemg" A strong, "d",d,ng
loree, able 10 1;0n\,n"otJsty d.spute cUfltrOI )f
the Cemral Mtld,terr.tne:ln, ,I unhkel.,. lu 8V"..
lie2e Ihal conlrol, Mal()l' we,a 10 be
"voided, bot _'Y effOft wO)uld be I1lada 10
_UI _.,. al France S moJtenal edgP And al 01\1
I.mes the enemy's IIghl 01 Pftlllge would b8
dl$J)uttld I ldlv WOuld ba 5dttl1ltld w'lh be,OIiI
.ble to <.15& lhe 1\ whl"f'l she w..nlt!d 1<
II unabkl 10 1I1ke Of'! France In II ""-1lmBl"-blow
fldVal war, lhen 111I1.,. \III.IS shit ii'S! ,.bI" to ck1 to
Wilh Brilaln lind Iha \IV _,11o'tId lor u.
Ihe Old eoamv, F lance. btK;aroo II OIl to
be used ag<Jinsl Ihe nt'W, B",,,1I1
IUlly enlO'tOO Wurld I( on 10 Juno 1940.
.. fu" delaYing f;Uch ",l\raue"" lor a 11ffi(' lit the
r"CIUt,,;t 01 Hltte. AI Ih"t lima i' itPPIM.OO Ihul
Ihe Anlllo,Fre/tch cO<IIi\lun would ool(apoe
w,lhln <;I lew- ""'*lk.s o. Olfido.1ll ... Ihe
W,I' Wo.1S 10 IJe e lone ilnd If' Ihlt F ,.scISt
Siale whal W0.15 offiCial WIb unquustloned Th"
IIIHlude pravenloo lb. A09Io.1 M.Jfim. hom
I"kmg a long View 01 the UTlperxJ,n\l n'ugqhl,
1"101 Ihat It was consUlled In the deCt$ion
.. n.,.way_ A malor 00'\10" at the IIc.)I w .. In
reserve Sialus. onlv Iwo 01 !i!lgI'l blllll.''\t"ps.
WI!I'I! off IhI! 510<ks at !;'005tnKto"S Of recon
stflJ(:IOf'S yards. m.Jlor nt'W construction pro
grams Sidl !lad ye.Jr1 IQ run_ and the I),lVdl a"
arm WoJ\ Y'flu<;Illy non-e_ISlenl
S1Ilce the WM W<lS to be a shorl ('I'll!, the Reg'"
Md,ina wa, given lin _ntlally delll""'w rol"
-,

I
-


..

--
-
Indtll'd, Ildly IS prob.Jblv lhe o',ly dllon HI
hlstor), to w an agg.I!$'5, .... waI' bY lmmed,
IIIIV '}Omg 10 lhe dt'iensw . NOI I!Yt:n lhe
_.v IMge 5ubmdllne 10 res were lI,ven ree
."
ThiS I'IUmpl.on In muj 1940 It t the WI was
10 be II shoft one would plague Ih", R.o ..
M,)rma's ooera!tons 101' the lItK I Ih,oo yed"
In m renet lhe Regilt M"lfll'o1 w n
190\0, tile Iltlh lafl)8Sl navy ,n lhe WOfld. alt.1t'
BrUmn ,!lit U"H..,j StiUt'S ..IiIp;)n. and Franc
M\>51 Importantly. Italv POIUII!tl Ine lef98St
suhm.tf'/lIl 'Oral In lhe wurld All 1'- tot1ipS
wer!;! eitu;mlll, well prOtected. and ...
MOil we.e rel .. " .... lv llew, ,h,p, ""PI
1;0"'in9' Ill! the slO(:ks Ihrouqh much 01 tl\
Odd ... porHon 01 Ihe W.1r The pnn(,p,,1 del,e
ant.lt!S w('fa in nayal air IXM'IIf Itfld h ... 1
'U$I!rvt'
The R!;!9"1 Ma.ona anythi"ll more than I
fudifT"'n1drv n.oyal air drm, wluClt compritit'd
s,nmt' I!)() pIlots. chiellv obslrrwr$ N, .... y Arr
Forct" cooperalu_lfl was tu sa ... th
teast. end no ImmedIate solution was to be
t,.n, 01 Ihe Itve malOf va POW!!" 11,liy alone
IlILlt'd .. "naft CMT.rs or plans 10 buIld <lnv
Ttlll Pfootl:lffl was NOT It loICIt u! .. ,r minded
nell; hUI rdlher all excess 0' III The Reg.a
Af'fonotull(;d and a signll,carl1 POrIlO" 01 Ihe
Aag . j M.lfilld betlllYed Iha1 1!.Ily, .... l1h httr
""'fly and colonl9l!i, .1n u
r""tt ca,ne. 'fom which 8lfcr,lft coo d be
Il'fll to OpItrdle ,n yirlually!Y!:!)I .r..... 1 he
17
18
FUEL CONSUMPTION: THE ITALIAN NAVY, NOTES: ThtI ,sble S6t1 (orrh rite /tiler.
monthly fuel consumption for the REGIA
MARINA :' majQr combatant and Mcon
VflSStHS during t he 28-monrh period rhst
Fuel Consumption
C'_ Sort .. To". Mil..,. M .... fSo.tia Son ies/Month M,lafTo" TonsJMonth
BB
"6
79.959 324.8
CA/Cl 96. 383,81 4 399.3
DO/ DE 31,378 7,074,348 225.4
SS 1,642 2.339,99 1 288. 7
Total s 34,227 9,878,11 2 288.6
MedIterranean This was, in tact , technical'v
true Italwn could feach most 01 the
from land b. ... ses However,llal
ian aircraft could 1'101 always be where the
actIOn was on t,me, except In 11 f!MI, well-
planned lnstancl!$, The few Imurs 11 tool<. f or
fT1.eSSiJogE!s to run between 11 beleaguered SQuad
ron and Superm,lrIna (Naval GHOl. to Super-
aerea IA'r GHOI. to an operallonal squadron.
in order 10 gel planes in the aor were usually
enough fOJ the beleaguerer 10 wrwk hiS Will
and be off.
That the lock 0 1 aircraft carners was severely
fel t is by the fact that B pair of
liners were III hand for conversion. and
one was ready for sea on B September
1943. Armistice Day
Perhaps the mOSI element milrtatmg
119<11n5t effective Italian participation in the
sTruggle was the fuel situalion. For full
operational ef f iciency the Regia Marina esti-
mated that it needed 200.000 tons 01 fuel per
month In faci. topping of! Ihe fuel of
all operational naval units required some
50.000 Ions, so II appears the estirnate was a
fairly accurale one. particularly when il is
noted thai the average monthly consumption
for the entire twenty-eight months of The war
ran to over 80.000 tons, eXClusive of convoy
and mmor unit consumpllon and including the
very curtailed operations of late 1942 and
early 1943 When Ihe war beg<ln there
suffiCIent fuel for about nme months of
operations, AI no time during the war was this
reserw maintaoned and at one poin t. April
1942. only some 14.000 tons were available,
which represenTed the residue in The fuel
storage tanks all over Italy. Throughout the
war operations had 10 be POStponed or can-
celled because of a of fuel. In June 1942.
only destroyers and smaller craf l were ,wad-
able to take on a partiCularly imponan, and
h<;avrlyprotected Brotish there being
IJlsuificient fuel for t he larger elements,
ThiS fuel shor tage was due parTially to misman
agernent on the part 01 the Ital'an governmenT
but primarily to a blatant German refus.al to
supply fuel in the needed quantity from
German.con trolled sources. Admrral Welchold,
the Kriegsrnarine liaison Officer with the
Regia Marina. repeatedly asked for fuel to be
B.O .6 4,330.4
34.3

12,450.9
1, 120.5 c. 5.0 64, 140. 2
47.5 c. 15.0 912.0
1,222.3 8 1, 833. 5
shipped from Germany and severalll9reemen ts
were out yet they were rarely kept by
the Germans_ Thus. dUring the second quaner
o f 1941 The Regia Manna received barely
38,000 tons of luel at iI time when the pre war
fuel reserve was virtually Germon
shIpments of fuel 10 the Italians never reoched
50% of Ihe agreed-upon figures, Which were
themselves based upon obsurd redUCTions in
the minimum operational reqUiremen tS, At
one point. again in Apri! 194 1. lhe limn of
30,000 Ions per month or 15% of opt imum,
was set which , n effect meant that vessels had
10 Operalll with what t hey hoc! in their till'lks
and not exp&ct more than minimal resupply
German non-cooperal ion In Ihis matter is
probably more than a hllie 'ha fault of Ihe
ob$CSSlon Ihe German High Command had
with Ihe Eastern Front also with Rom-
mel's continuous attacks upon the RIIgia
M""na for its "melficiency" in escort ,ng con
vol's 10 Africa! Though an aliI' protecting a
common interest. the Regia Marina had 10
sweat lor every ounce of fuel oll rece,ved from
Gerrnany\ A truly remarkable si tuation_
One area where the Reg, a Marina held a
significant lead Ol'Cr everyone else was in the
!ield 01 special allack !orces: frogmen,
"human torpedoes:' assault boats, and so
l orth . The Regia Marina had pioneered such
methods in World War I and was unquestion
ablv the world leader In this cheap bUT
pOlI!ntlaily highly effective approach 10 the
problems of naval warfare. These teams were
to prove the Regia Manna's secret weapon
during the war. though they were insufficient
of themselves to win the war singlehandedly,
They COUld. of course, influence -events al
criticallunCturcs.
AU in all the Regia Marina was not ideally
equipped and prepared for war with Brrtain.
Though sh,ps and crews were 01 excellent
quali ty, the general numerical ,nferiori t y, the
lock 01 an adequate naval alf arm. the fuel
situation, and the long-held feeling that Britain
was a friend and not an enemy at all militated
against an eflect iw showmg_ For al l that,
howel'C'. the performance of the Regia Marina
was not unpralseworthy. particularly in the
case of the es.cort forces and the special
assault forces.
Italy _ /I _be, of the his. Excluded
f,om thr' tllb/e If(e the OptNa,iofl$ of minor
comb,If _Is and fIOn..:ombatani mer-
chlm t tontlBfJfl. In lIdditiDII, the table dON
NOT accounr for consumption during
ptNr'ods of insct iviry in POrt. ,ang;ng from
seWl,aI tOnf of f uel 1'''' o..y for bau /f1$hips
t o _ral hUndM pounds P'" day for
light", _'f, It should be noriced thll l
rhe bulk o f t/Je oPBnrions dlncribtld here
actually took place du, ing t he firll of
the _ ' , whenllfl /ldllqUllte fuel supply wM
avai lable. Cl)nsidering Ihllt the lotel mon
thly fuel /IIItI' 1IfI8 of fuel cOfIJumfld \wf
OWl' 80.(){)() t()(lS. and TIIB' This mcllJded
long pe,iods o f i n/ICl lvity during '943, Ihe
REGIA MARINA ', claim 10 n.ding
200.000 Ions fo, minimum operational
'equirement'S "Hlml cDIISlu"'ative,
I, required some 50.000 tonI JUSt TO top
off the tanh of all llessels in mil eool/fJ
cliJSSfI5.
II. THE ROYAL NAVY
II Ihe ITalians were ill prepared for the coming
conflict then the status of the Royal Navy
mighl besT be termed "half ready_" In spirit
and aggresSiveness therll can be no Question
thai the Royal Navy was second to none.
Cen tu,,1!S o f dominance of the sea had helped
to bUild a spirit OIl which aggressiveness was
second nature. In material terms, hOWtlver, Ihe
Royal Navy was somewhat less than fully
prepared
Materially, of course, (Ile shiPS lind men were
second to none m every category
And, in the bargam, B"tam had a new weapon
which permitted the ships of the Royal
to detect the enemy long before They could do
likewise radar The loct that thereexlSllld the
Fleel Air Arm was also 01 extreme imponance,
even if the Royal Aif Force had man!l!}ed to
keep this Vital In s.ubJugat lon for long
ywrs. Though tmy and relat ively unsophiSTi-
cated when compared with the Japanese or
American ""val IIIf arms, the Fleet Air Arm
was an IICtual Iac-t which could, and did
develop mto an IIflective. a!1,lressive force
during the war.
Britain did not seek. nor desire. a Mediterran.
wn war, though Bflllsh diplomacy d,d Illtle 10
avoid it. When war did COmB. however, The
Royal Navy saw bu t one strategy to seek out
the enemy and destroy him wherever and
possible As a resull the Royal Navy
would often sortie intO the dangerous waters
01 the Central Medl\erranean for no Other
reason than to keep the Regia Marina off
balance and to remind the world thaI Brilannla
slill r ules the waves. (Curiously. thiS did not
always work out as and the expected
rWClion-forces often did nOT malenalize, muCh
to the disappOintment 01 H,s MajllSty's sea
men. Thi S situation was, of course, partiallY
due to the poOr Quality of Italian aerial
reconnissance linked with thel, lock 01 radar,
bUT also due to the increasinglv efficient Fleet
Aif Arm. In pomt of fOCI a number of majOr
SOflies went unnoticed)
This aggressive strategy, capitalizing as it did
upon the known out lines of the basic Italian
strategy. was very important in the condUCt of
the Western Desert f,ghting. Control of t he

,




GREAT BRITAIN - S CLASS. Brlliin
possessed some 230 or 50 subm'lrlnttS
du""9 World Wa, II. By and li"911 these
were ve.y MilwOrlhy bolIl$ and mo or
less equal 10 any in 1hl world ill the
t im . Nearly thirty percent becama war
losses, and .U performed ,,"h,1 servIce
on .n froon. In the MedIterranean, in
.ddltion to sniping II lIalian warships.
Ihe" ptimil'Y purpose wu to onterle
wl1h A_IS sh'PPIOlilo and hom haly and
Africa, a for which they proved well
SUIted, IICCQUnlOrIi 10' 25% of Itall."
merchant shopp,ng 10_ lind 12% 01
Ilal'ln warshIp lolH'l .
ITALY - ARCHIMEOE CLASS. lIaly
had tha Sf!<:ond la.gest submarina !leet In
the world whan Wolld ... b.oka out ,
but made Hili. ,1f&Cllva uSlt 01 thIS
potenllaLly valuilbl. lorce. A number 01
the boats we.e not 01 pllrlicularly g"111
qual.1V blll MVillUI wera WIth
lhe most up-todat. designs. Itali;",
subm;uioeli which opera led on the
Allllnlic , l oul 01 27 bo;!ts .
demonstrated consider.ble ability and
setm 10 hay. accumullll.d a higher
IVlllge KO" thlln dId the Ubo;!IS.
TheM were, 01 cou.se, t he most .mci.nt
boats ava.labl. to lIaly. but the po,n'
... mllns the ilIm, : Italy la.led 10 UI4i!
IIIff.CIIY1lly whal wu pe.haps he. grealest
navallls$C!1.
GREAT BRITAIN - KING GEORGE V
CLASS. ThIS cla$S was B.itain's mOSI
modem claSll of banleshlpS. fully the
match 01 tha lI alians' best IJtC.pl in tha
.... 11 .. of speed . Brlti,h designers had
5PlCilled I_Iv. 14" gun, .n the o.ig' OIII
plans, pflmlnly 10' political reasons, but
the un. two guns had to be dropped
lor raasons 01 weight, making Ihese
vessels som.thing of disappointment
lor the Royal Navy . One was losl in Ihe
Pacific . Al109Ilher th.r. we .. five vessels
In this ctass. and a total of tw.nty Bntl$h
guna.med capItal ships.
GREAT BRITAIN QUEEN
EUZABETH CLASS. These f.ve vessels
rep.esented t hl f,nest banlMhips In the
wo.ld fa. a gen.r.tion, being a Ii...,
ballfIC. among fi power, p.ot.ction.
and $peed . By 1940 th.ir speed h;od
dropped slight ly. but th.y wer. still the
best of th. World Wa. I hold-ov'rI.
Thre. of tha cia" becama Medile'""naan
U$uallies. though Iwo w .. a partillily
"stored to _Wlce . Th. " Royal
SoYtlt.lgn" class, IIHI of fivi vfiSels and
slightl y youngllr , was glInarally similar
bUI by no m8llns as successf ul , being
much slower and lass rellabl .
GREAT BRITAIN _ HUNT CLASS.
Evan before Iha w .. had brok.n out the
Royal Navy hMi g,van 50ma thought to
th. need lor ant i-$<.lbma"na _ Is and
hMi com. up firU w.th th. 'corvlnte,"
then with tha "fr igata' Or destroyer
escort . As il turned out , these vessel s
w 1 r.markably like tha Italian oc.an
torpedo boals and both M,tId tha ilIITM
fUflCtion: aKo' t of As the Brit
,$1"1 wassels were considerably newer .
howaYtlr, th.y weta geoerllily superior
Ion lor Ion. A total of 32 Briti$h
frigales, sloops 00 dlll$lIoye. escoru
W"'III 10$1 durifl9 the Meditl"anaan cam
plign.
Oass
T",.
Length
Dlsp
.".,d
Metal
Arm"
Arm Wt
A IC
011$$
T",.
Lengrh
DilfJ
"""" Metal
Arm"
A rm WI
A!C
ClaIS
rl'pe
Length
Drsp
"""" Metal
A="
A rm WI
A!C
a,n
Tvpe
Length
D.sp
"-d
Merltl
Afm"
Arm Wt
AlC
aon
T,,,,

D.sp
"-d

A rm $
A rm wr
A!C
Sturgeon
SS
NA
927
15 /10
Archimede
SS
NA
1.231
17/8+
King George V
SS
'" 44,500
28
14.2
33.0
12,000

Queen Eliubeth
SS
635
35,000
"
14.0
31.2
8.GOO

Hunt
DE
280
1.400
".
19
7

20
TO StNK A SHIP
n. llbifiry o( ..... to .t1JrlJ pu",."""'" /$ " qcNJIlty of ",.ny
IKrOlf, nong them til.",.:.".,.,. thickneu.nd of.rmour
prorection. Ii,. UHlrroI mIlICh/fiery Md Ihniqu COfflp.rtmlffl'
. " on, lind lh" .llfI, ."d mar"'. of th. Lucky hlh,
uri/ring 60",. I'tiClllMly ./tal .pot. ".." c.uu .",.,. f., QlWffIr
INn OM might nonnMly "lMCt undtlr OI'tIittMy ciTCUll1n_.
willI., on rile or"" luclty .,ips m.y -'I 1Ibs0ltJ IN ma,..
pUlllshmflfl, ",., wowd btl rMaDtNbI" to 111(l'r. Thus, ,,,- (igura
lPP_ilJf/ btNow .,. only.
NOTES: Figufft for BBICC bIuI on hib per f.(X)(} tom of
disp/.c(lmlfflt, "1(ctlPt (or toqJlIdfHrs. wh;ch f'8. from thlft iH'
10,000 ,on, d,rp/:tIIfIMt down to just oM/ucky hit. Othw fiJUffII
_"blo/llllI. Bombl". considered 10 be 250 - 500 pounds.
T,po
BBICC
CVfCA
CL/CE
DDfDE
Merehant
lit .. +
,.,
8-"

,.,
,.,
W(I$ the key elelTW!nt in$Of(lf as
the forces were concerned _ ilUhough
MU!050lini. Weichold. ;;lnd others wore them
out trying 10 convIIlce Hitler "nd OKW
of Ih,s - and the ROYdl N,IVY amled at nothIng
less than total mastery of that sea The
converse of this, that tho Med,\l:!rranean Win
OQually vllal 10 thO British forces operatil1ll m
Alnca was NOT Irue MosI Brl1lsh lind Alhed
supphf!$ went the long route. v,a the Cape 01
Good Hope mto the Indian Ocean. the Red
Se" and Imally to Egypt Only on rare and
perolous occasions was a convoy forced 10 run
the g ... unllet between G,brdltar and
and this was usually 10 SUlJoorl the belea
{Juereel Maltll Qilrm.on or In limes 01 great
desP8fatlOr1 In the desert. such as the TIGE R
convOy of mid 1941. to cany VI1I1I supploes
rapidly to the Eighth Army
NAVAL STRENGTH AVAILABLE:
THE MEDITERRANEAN Ju_l940
T,po
BB/CC
CV
CA
CL
ODf OE
ss
ITALIAN
,
7
"
9.
IlS

,

7
22
"
BRITISH
,


,
9


Naval Gui .fire
6-8"
-
, .. ,.
3 10
' 5
' 3
FRENCH
5
,
7
7
44
..
. .. - 5.7" TOlp d_ 80m ..
- ' 3
,.,
!SO
,.,
".
15-40
,., ,.,
.. ,. ,.,
12
_r,1
,.,
' 3
NOTE: 11M tllble _ Iorth tto.
w_.h .cruMly In th.
un .nd .WtiIIJbl. for _r.c. on
tM outbreak of Both Jidft
rfIlIlnt.ined fO:M outJidf th. th".
.t".t thu time; in "If ca. 01 tM
All;' ,h_ loIoW8' of co",i ,..
If". TIl. Brit ." could. did,
c." upon ",.,. lor /NIp if
n.ded "'- Frtmeh F"'t _ hot
to pl.y .n import.,,' roM in ,IIis
c."",.ifJfI F,.nce I.ft ,IItt -'
within '- _/1:1 01 Ita/.,. 'd
,ntrlnett. Th. Freocll IIH' _
d.rlded into E."m WeI,ern
'quWofl$ tI$ MIll,

Why. theo. in view 01 the aggressive spir it ,>nd
$CUncI stralegy possessed by the Royal Nnvy
was 11'1801 force unilble to deny the Regia
Milrlna use of the Centrel Moollerranenn -
which" did. in IlIt't. fail to do. despi te mllSllive
Allied propaganda campaigns to the comrary
ALLIED NAVAL LOSSES IN.WORLO WAR II
until the fall 01 Tunisla in May 1943'
BaSICally there are three reasons for Ihis
a) For the Royal Navy the Med,terranean
was but one theater of many. tor Ihe
Reg'a Manna 'I w ... S lhe only t hea ler.
b) The Regia Manna successfully ma,n
ta,ned a "floot In being" stalus. and
dchberaWly aVOided major IlCl ions. and
c) alrpower, oper<J\lr'Ig from bases ' n
Ilaly. Greece, Tunls'a. and L,bya, was ...ole
10 COvet' the entire region, " ,nefficiently
Undoubtedly Ihe Bntish stralegy was the
correct Allied 5Olullon 10 tna problem, much
itS the Italian st rategy was correct for them.
however , thQ IlICk of sufficient resources to
brong " 011 prevented fulf illment 0 1 Ihls
strategy Th iS. in t urn, made lhe ground
fighting on North Afnca of Vital ,mponance
Itt . THE CONVOY BATTLES
Locking the convenleoce 01 d detour SUCh ..s
lhe All ies possessed In Ihe Cape of Good Hope
roule, the forces in Afroca depended
SHIP DATA INTERPRETATION:
THE MEDITERRANEAN AND PACIFIC THEATRES COMPARED
"po
Roy .. Nhv United Slata
.-
Mod % P.:ific %
BB 3 42.8
,
1()().0
CV
,
.... 5 100.0
CAICL I .... 10 l()() .O
DO

33.3 52 73.2
DE 32 35.0 5 45.4
SS .. 55 . 5'
98.1
almost entorely upon the convoy roules be
tween Itilly alXl North Alflca fo' the" ,em
lorcements and supplies
In addlt,on 10 the different Impoftance Ihe
Cenlral Mediterranean held for each Side, there
was also a basic ph,losophical difference be
lween the AlltOCI. Chiefly British. alld the Ax '5.
chiefly Ilalian. approach to the proolem of
convoys, The II/Ilians believed Ihal a large
number of very small convoys would be mole
eff icient than a few very lar!}l.l OrlC1 II was held
L_R,ho
.",/,
rtlbl. com/Mnn AmlHicMl
loa. durin. tllfl Pxific W.r,
%
,POPd.,. thf rJIIJjor ""tIM "-". of
150.0
World W.r II, "",til #kit .. Iou.
in ,lie MediterranMn, ,uppoHdly
....
' rfitI,JwIy minor ttI.tN.
Loua .,. ,>tp.ss,I In MtHUtf
160.0
tInd tlllO in ,."", of
".,-eMt. of thft n, ,/'''' '' tohtl
92.8 ,_ of th.t ty".. 111, lou ,..r!o
'>tp,*"" in PffCMt, tit. ffII.fiOlt+
640.0
.,,/p of FIN to USN _
10.3
_n for of til. ffIItI,
! .. impon.-
01 rhf r- t""
......
that t he smaller convoys would be less likely
10 be detected and would be easier to defend
Wllh one Of two escorls. In addl l lOn. It was
well known Ihal port facililles In Libya were
limited and thaI TobflJ'ch, the pan closest 10
the "ghtong, was lroquently subjOCt to au faiets
so that It would be imprllCllcal to halle more
Ihan a minomum amount 01 sh'PPlng Ihele at
any one lime
As a result sorne 1.210 convoys were sen l to
L,bva during the Western Desert fighting.
NOTES; Oisp .. lull load drlplKernent (rNd.,. for action1: St>eed ..
normlll obtllrnllbl. Ifill (+ indicllt" hlghttr speecil Occillionllll.,.
obfll;nedl; Metal " _ if/lit i n tonI 01 one mrnute 01 mllin batter.,. l i"nf/:
.. batt/all,p: CC .. batt/reru",,; CV ... lIi rcrll 1r carri er; CA .. IIeavy
cruiler; CL .. Ugh r crurler; CE .. ,scort crurler; OD .. deftroyer: DE ..
destro.,.ff escorr: SS .. lubmllrrne. NA .. not avai/abf,. Not ll/hat not all
of rhe profiles are (0 the same ICllla. Lengtll of veJle/ i. given ro Ille
nearest loot.
Arm " .. the 01 rh. bare 'If'p wllich il armor; Arm Wt .. (Orlll
Wfif/hl of IIrmor cllrriw; AIC" aircralt carried. Tl'pe abbrevillfiOnJ: BB
r


,
ITALY - lITTORRIO CLASS. Th,N of
the four s.hips of this class were com
ple tt<! dUring the WiiI' , on. bt'lni Ion
1111. the ArmIstIce; one ship wli .... Vllr
completed. Though well design&d end
5Om_hal speedy thei, general perfor-
mane. was hindered by low 'I,.-off,.,
end thei. prot'ction was
poor due to overly heavy, single-purpose
$Konde,y b;olleries.
ITALY _ DUILIQ CLASS. There
leluBII.,. Iwo lIe.y simila. classes grouped
IOU.the. , dill,ring lightly in ge ne.al
appeMIr>C., HCondary " m, ment , e nd
inlt.",1 p.olection. Origni.lly bUIlt be
101" end dUri ng World War I , ,heV w.,.
o;ompl. telV r.built during the 1930's e nd
prowi'd to be highly successful v_Is,
though by no means t:omlMrI.ble to
youn.g.er for eign mips.
ITAL V _ AQUILA. It was pt;"lned to
conwer' two line.s to aircraft carriers,
l/8fle.aUy along these linn. One ""Mil ,
Aquila. was r>l1I"'y ready for sa when
the Arm.stice Pon-war eotamlRa-
tion by Allied il uthoritiU$ concluded tha.
Ih" _ I WillS one 01 tile most wccnsful
merclwlnt ship/aircraft carri.r COn"""
sians to btl carried OUI . A special vaBion
of th' Fi" G, 50 _ , 10 1M embarked.
ITALY - lARA CLASS. haly' s seven
h$llvV (ruiser' generally followed Ih.
pUtt.n of the fourship " Zlra"
class, being re lltivelv 'au, well protected
v8$$els; of cou.se, not sufficientlv w. n.
p.otected to 'Hist baltlHhip gunfir . All
Ih. _Is of thit elMS. orlginallv built
to complement the French "Suffr. n"
clns, bee8me wlr losses, as did the three
oth.r . uch cruisers.
GREAT BRITAIN - LONDON CLASS.
Britein did not favour the concept of the
heavy cruiser. but built a h .. ge number of
them to mlintain hi. t.aditionll stock of
70 v", .. ls. It is 10 be quastioned If to
whether IhIM were fuliV com
parBble to heavy cruise.s in other IlIvi'"
or. indeed . to the genel'llllV successful
Brit ish light cruise. designs .
GREAT BRITAIN - COLONY CLASS.
Bntlin f, voured the light cruiser Ind
built In e normoUI number. most to Ihis
design Or 10 sl ightlv modified .... "Ionl of
it . The basic pattern wu highlV IUCcess
'ul Ind repeated many times. though
thIM yessell were probablv I bit too
heayilv Irmed and toph"vy. Altogether,
counting light Ind heavy cruiserl, Britlin
Ind her Commonwealth lost 16 cruisers
in the Medite .. anean. 50% 01 their 10"'"
Imong luch vessell .
GREAT BRITAIN - TRIBAL CLASS.
Brlti$h destroVe" were designed to go
Invwhtfe Ind fight under any condi
t ions. As e .esult thev Wlr. Ilrlll, we"
.rmed. speedy yessels Ikin 10 Amtfieen
or types rlthlflr thIn to the
Mediter'lneenoriented 1IIliin lIhipt.
Ship 'or ship they were undoubtedlv
superior to their Italian counterpa.n.
Britain 10l t lOme 48 destroyers In the
Medlterrlnean.
Oan
Type
Lengrh
Disp
,.,...,
",et.,1

Arm Wr
A/C
Class
T",.
Length
D,sp

MtJtill
Arm"
Arm WI
A/C
Oau
Type
Length
Olsp
,.,...,
Me tal
Arm"
A rm WI
A/C
a'A
Type
Length
Disp
_d
Metal
Arm"
Arm WI
A /C
Oass
TYPIJ
Ltmgth
Oisp
_d
Melal
Arm"
A rm WI
Ale
am
T,,,.
Length
O'SP
Sp-
Me tal
Arm"
Arm Wr
Ale
a.u
T,,,.
LBngth
D""
_d
Metal
Arm"
Arm WI
Ale
Li !tOrtO
BB
776
45,000
".
12.1
36.0
13,400
3
Ouilio
BB
."
29.000
28
11.6
39.6
9 ,349
Aquila
CV
232.5
27.800
30
50
Zan'
CA
600
14,500
".
4.8
14.3
2.600
2
London
CA
620
13,500
32
5.'
NA
NA
2
Fij i
CL
550
11 ,000
30
NA
NA
3
Tribal
DO
355
2.800
".
21

22
GREAT BRITAIN - ILLUSTRIOUS
CLASS. This represented Britain's meta.
aircraft carrier class of Ita war and had
been evolved from HMS Ark Royal , .
pr.-wa. vessel 105t in the Medile.ranean .
Among its other featurBS, this class was
one of the fint to hl!ve heavily
ilrmored de<:k 10 resill .ircraft bombs.
As . result, these ships were able to lake
an enormous emollnt of punishment lind
served lonll and well On the convoy rUnS
to Malte.
ITAlV - MONTfCUCCOLI CLASS.
Italy built twelve (.uille" along theM
general lines, comprising the five groups
of the "Condol1i.ri" class. Some othen
Were projltCled bUI neve. completed. The
basic differenc" among th_ groups,
Montecuccol; being an "ave " group,
was an increase in displa<;emtlnt due to
improved protection of from about
7.000 10 oearly 12.000 IonS. wilh a
slighl decrease in speed but . in the lasl
grouP. a half ton more firepower per
minute. Allogether 8 very successful
design. Six were 1051 during the war.
ITALY _ CAPITAN I ROMAN CLASS.
The "Roman Captains" class represented
8 departure from the traditional cruiser
design. being planned primarily as very
lighl . high-speed 5Couts and convoy 15
corts, As such they were precursors of
the destroyer laadf.!r/frigale' e5Cort cruis'
ers of currenl nanl thinking, Only four
were completed of II cia" of Iwelve. one
afler hostilities had cea$ld.
ITALY - AVIERE CLASS, 11011'1' had a
relatively large and modern destroyer
fllHlt on the outbreak of war. However.
the Italian v_Is had been designed
pr imarily for Medilerranean conditions.
while comparable Royal Navy ships had
been put togett>er with en eye to operat -
irlQ anywhere In the world. Thus, Brit ish
v_Iii usually outclassed Ihair Italian
counterparts. Over 24% of Italian major
combatanl $hip losses wen destroyers.
amount irlQ 1044 vessels.
ITALY _ PARTENOPE CLASS. The
Regia Marina was one of the few navies
building ocean-goirlQ torpedo boats be
tween the World Wars Ind profited
tt>ereby. for these vessels made uC1IlIent
destroyer substitutes for convoys Ind
such . Though lightly ermad and not
overly speedy, they could provide some
anti submiinre protection. They we'e
virtually certain of defeat . however . if
confronted with anything large. than
themselves. About 20% of Italian major
combatant losses, 41 vessels, were in this
eatflgOry.
GREAT BRITAIN - FURIOUS. Britain
possesed Sill aircraft carriers from the
period up to 1930, thrlHl of them,
including Furious. being con .... rted baHle
cruisers, one an ellbattleship, ONI 11
converted mlrchant hull, and the last a
very light \/ISSei built as a carrier. They
ware In odd lot but genlrally perfo.med
to the Dest of their abilities. The Ill"
battlecruisers werl very fast vessels; Ihe
others r8thlr slow. All but Furious and
one other became battle casualties. ooe
Ihe result of an attempt to resupply
Malta.
Oel$
r,,,.
Lengt h
Disp
_d
MtHal
Arm"
Arm Wr
Ale
C I ~
Type
Length
Disp
Sp-
Mera/
Arm ~
Ar m wr
Ale
Class
Typa
Length
Disp
Speed
Metal
Arm ~
Arm Wr
Ale
Oass
"".
Length
Disp
SpHd
Meral
A rm ~
Arm Wr
Ale
Class
r,,,.
Lffngth
Disp
SpH d
Metal
A rm ~
A rm wr
Ale
Cless
Type
Length
Disp
S p ~ d
Merlll
A rm ~
Arm wr
A /C
Illustrious
ev
'" 31,000
32
NA
NA
72
Monlecuccoli
CL
598
8,990
37
2 .0
19.8
1,370
2
AtiHo RegOlo
C'
465
Aviere
DD
350
2.400
,..
.5
Partenope
D'
267
1.200
".
.13
Furious
ev
782
26.000
30
NA
NA
33

These COmpfl!oCd 2,249 cargo $/'lips of m Ions
or more and 1,913 escOrtS, Thus, Ihe
comlllfl8ci 1.7 cargo shIPS carrYIng
170 5 men and 1,855 7 toos of ,upplles,
escorted by 1 5 wars/liDS, usually cle$troyers,
destroyer escorts, or ocean torpedo boats. Of
course, in reallly, a number of cargoes
wenl Ihrough escorled, while lhere
were tllTll!$ when vessels could 90 In small
gFOUpS WIthOUt escOrt SIII1, the bMIC POrnl is
clear Ihe Ii/lilans emphasrzed Ihe small con
In the evenl, /IS expeflenc1l rn lhe Bailie
ollhe AtlanllC proved. lhey were wrong
The COSt 01 thIS enor was enormous Roughly
44"4 01 Italy's merchan t lonna!!" was los'
through December 01 1942, mdudrng all ves
sels 01 500 Ions and above avall/lble to Itaty
dUflng Ihtl waf, roughly 01 Ibe tonnag.e
available on 10 June 19110 Most of the losses
occured on the Llbvan ,oute, IIllhough exact
flgums are not obtarnable The losS In Ihe ChIef
escorl types, destroyers, destroyer escorts, ilnd
OOI!afl torpedo boats, comprIsed lul'y 67.8% of
lhe lotal surfilCll comoot vessels los' to AllIed
mIli tary 3t.: tiofl In addItIon II IlIr\lO number 01
motor lorpedo boalS and aUXIliary types were
lost on th,s dUly, Fortunately tor Ihe Axis,
staggering losses were rel/ltlvely Inellec

Some 2,345,381 Ions of CilrgO were 10000ed rn
Italian s/lIPS for sh,pment 10 LIbya dUring the
wa. 01 thIS tOtal, and m spIte of often hedVy
losses In escorts, onty 14'110 or 3 15,426 tons
were actually lost Some 206,402 men were
embarked rn Italian ve$$els, ohen warsh,PS, lor
transport to Atflca. 01 whom 17,204 or 85%
Illlleel to affi"" lit their point 01 destInatIon
Ithough /I large PorllOO of these men were, rn
lact, rescueg ind fMlnlUaliV fHatheQ the lronts
ilnywayL It is, of cou.se, imponilm 10 nOle
tMt these fIgures do not Include men and
millenal Iraf1SPQr led In German controlled ves
sels, nor do Ihey refloct Ihe limited, but useful,
German aldlft capability
The ratIO of escort losses 10 cilri10 $/'lIP 100000s,
1 45, IS enlightenIng and an Impondnt
dat um towards an un-derslilndlng of why,
Ihough the Central Mediterranean was often
very "hOI" for Axis wssels, such a hIgh
proportIon of malenoland men reilChed Alflca
ull$Cathed The answer 11&$ in the psychologIcal
milke up of Ihe Italian se<iman ,md the 8ritlsh
seaman and o"man Usually. when a 8.,11$/'1
war$/'llp or arrplane encountered a convoy il
Invariably went for the escort. ThIS Wd) prob
ably the resull of the Royal Ndvy's illlllrsssiw
theones 01 naval wilrlil,e and 01 the Royal An
Force's deSIre to win the war slnglehanQedly
KIIlIOO escorts was an ImpOrtanl COOtflbulion
10 the w.or eHore but Impedrng the Ilow 01
wp-phes to Rommel was mOle SQ,
As iI resull 01 thIS aliI tude whill usuany
happened was that, as SOOfI as IlItacklng Bflll$/'I
a .. crall or warstflps were SIghted, the Iialian
convoy commanders would order up Ihelr
escorts and scatte. the cargo $/'l IPS. The escorts
would put up a Irghl <lnd the BfllIsh would
Invariably take the baIt and go afler lhem,
These _II almost alwilYs sunk altel a l&roc,
IOUS runnrng light, whIch usulilly pe<mrned
moSI of the cargo vessels, though not all, 10
makll their escape ThIS tenacIty otten sur
prised the 8rl l ish commanders, who had boon
noo"shed on II conslderllble IImoun\ of prop;!
ganda IlQout t he Ilghlrng quali t Ies of the RegIa
Mannll
The net resull was that the bulk of the
mateflals and manpower consIgned to North
Africa was, In lact, reachIng lhe.e AXIS sea
men, both Ilalian and German, could not be
responSIble for whal happened to the material
;tIler It reached the thealer 01 war.
To look brielly at the other srdo, the AllIed
convoy problem was essentially one of gilllmg
milleflal 10 Malta whenllYer necessary The
so-called "LIfeline 01 Ihtl 8"11$/'1 Emolre" r;tn,
during World Wit, tI. not through the Med,ter,
ranean bul around Afflca As alre3cly noteO,
only rarely w;)s there need to run a convoy
from Glbralta. 10 Alexandria, MalIa, however,
was a dIfferent story
IV, MALTA
Perhaps the srngle m05\ Important stf<ltegic
pOSlllon in the entlfe Hllienan WII' was the
tiny Island 01 Malta, Certa,nly It was so for thll
Nonh Afflcan Campallin
ContrOl 01 MalIa does nOl RUlOmot lcally Imply
control ot the Centr<il MedIterranean, but 11
helps. Mal ta's locallon ,semmmontly SUI ted to
hrndenng tralllc by seil and air belween Italy
and LIbya or belween Ille Ellstern and Western
basins of the Mediterr anean By Ihe S<lme
token, 01 course , that locatioo makes Malti! a
templ ing and easilyattalnable targel Thus lhe
s.mall Island unoorwerll heavy $illgtt during
1940 1943, until LIbya had fatlen Into Alhed
hiKlds and the embattlttd gafflson could be
readIly resupplied again. ThroughOUt the
North Alflcan Compalgn thIS srage exerCIsed a
SllI"lllci!nt and conllnulng influence
The defense of the Island proved an
propositIon for 8 .. ta,n, but one whICh w,
InevItable ilnd freely uncll!ftaken. A "",IOf
,
".
'.
,
.'

'.
,
'.
,
,
,

ponion of 8ritaln's sh IPping losses In lhe
Med,lerrantlan was directly linked to lhe prob
lem of supplYIng Mal Ia, Thtl island suffered
somethrnll on the orOOf of 2,000 eir raIds
du"ng the siege, or about two per day fo,
three Veilrs, Some 30,000 8ritlsh mllilary
pe<soonel held the Islancland nearby Gozo Of
lhe$!! about half wert! oraamred InlO combat
for millions. totalling four In!cmtry brigades by
mId 19<12, lhe most critical peflod
A IxIsic problem 10 lhe defense 01 the island
alf powef .. nd the IImlied air
the,e had peflodically to be rl!$Upplred trom
Glbralt.-af The standard method was 10 load
on a Cilrner and sortie towards Ihe
Island When Ihe pressure trom lhe Ax IS alf
and italian n.-aval unIts became tOO gredl, the
carrier would lilunch the Ilghlers and head l or
salety Alone poInt the SltUi!IIOO was so
desperate thaI uSS Wasp was borrowed lor
thIS purpose, at anOther a fast, light mrnelayer
WilS 10<Ided with VItal suppll1!s ""d made t he
trip alone Ihrough t o VallettJ Harbor
rhe potanllally major problems in the duilm5lll
of the ISIDrtd were the anllCIPJted AXIS rnva
5101'1 and the fact Ihal rmny MallttSe, thoullh
by no moans a majo .. ly 0 1 them, were not
overly ert thusiasllc about the 8 .. tl$/'l pre:;ence
on the island InOeecI, a number 01 Mdite5lll
were eng;;lged In espIonage and Sdbowye for the
AXIS,
All thIS, of course, brings us to Ih.! b .. "c and
element.-ar'f Question of why the dod not
,><:tually Inv,yje MalHI CertaInly Ihe caPture ot
the plaLe WOuld haw gfuatly eased the supply
run 10 Alrica dOd, at ,he s.ame lime, would
h.we been tI tellIng morale blow 10 the AllIes.
Plans to< the invasion of Malta were well In
hand dUfinll .he early part of 19112 Two
".
."\
-,' -',
,
'.

.. '.
'. .
.'

'. .
' ..
.:. ..
,
'"




.'
.'
,
.'
,
,"
,. ' -
\ '" ....
'. v .
.... .: c.....
\. ."
, .
:.{

,


.. .... .
,.. .
.

-....:v. """
.......
Convoy Interdiction (Jun-Dec 1942)
,
,
.... '
23

parachute one German and one
Germantrained IIali1lfl unll. were 10 drop on
the islllnd in conjunction wllh an It alian
amph,b,ous assault ,n Ihe southern porl,on 01
the iSlllnd, aimed ut caph.mng an airbilse
Attooether hallado/en were 10 lake
parI, Ihough the inilial aSS<tult was to be made
by 32.0CI0 men suppor ted by about 1,300
ltalo.(;erman alrc.aft. Local Ilir and "" ... al
SUPIIIIOf"ily was 8$SU.ed clnd the Island was
eXp&Cled 10 lull ralher Quickly.
In preparation for the Ol\ack Ihe Luflwalte
transferred the X Fleigerkorps to Sicily 10
begin the systemat iC reduction 01 Ihe islun(l"s
defenses Irom t he air Then, as one Itillian
oltice. PUI it. lhe "llIlill error" occurred
EI/IIIfl 115 lhe plans lor the in ... asion of Malul
were gOll1g fOl'WlJrd Rommel was prepallng to
break 01.11 of the Gazala pos.t,on. He requested
lhe use of the x Flelgerkorps for fifteen days
10 support him until he reached his obJect.ye,
Ihe LlbyanEgyptiun fr onl ior. Altogether three
weeks would ha\16 been lost and the Flelger
korps was expected to be back on the 100 0\16.
Malta by mld.July 1942 Hitler agreed to
Rommers request over the protests of moSt
ndVallld ... ,sors, though not of the army.
Rommel, 01 course, did nOI stop upon reach.
1111/ his OOJect l\16 but. lured by the pyramids
and the apparent rout 01 Ihe Ei ghl y Army,
pressed on to t he 'Alamuyn line, where he was
hahed 'n hard hgillinll III AuguSI The X
Flelglllkorps was by this lime 100 heavi ly
engaged and tOO necessary to the suPl)On of
the ground operallons to be returned to the
MalIa operation. The troops earmarked for the
land 11111 , both Italian and G8l'man. turned up a l
t he 'Alamay n hne replacemen ts and rein
lorcements. And Malta remaumd Srotlsh
Thus WitS A)(IS' only chance tQ gain Malta,
and With , t control of the Central Med,teffan
ean, frittered away, 10 unquesliQr"Mld greal
er benefit 01 us "II
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v. CONCLUSIONS:
This discuSSion deliberately leaves out Ihe
record of battle, 10" and won, and of Ihe
qUiet heroism In submari nes and alfcral t and
surl ace ve:;sels on both Sides. I t is meant 10 be
a straleglC analys.s of 1he infl uence 01 sea
pOWer on one 01 Ihe mOS1 y'tal campaIgns of
t he Second World War.
Fundamentally, we muSl recognize the fact
that It was a lack of the deciSlye applic,ltlon of
sea poyver, though lack of means, which
necessitated a campaign on 1he ground in
North Africa. Complete AXIS domination of
the Central Med,lerranean would have permit
ted a free and unhindered Ilow of supplies to
AKis foroos, which would have sealed lhe fOlIe
01 the British in Ellypl in short order Com
plete Sfllish control 01 this same sea would
have precluded the necessity lor anylhonll but
a brIef mopping up operalion of isola led AXIS
lorces in Libya The laclthal ne.ther situation
occurred was whllt made the North Afflcan
Cdmpaign neoossary Thus the Influence of sea
power was nOI, in lact. along traditionally
accepted li nes bul was, nevert heless. Significant
and ultima1ely decisive.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The naval """r in ,he Mediterrafltlan If one of
/htl more interesting aspects of World Wllf If
lind a considerablll tlmounr of mll/llrilll /ltiS
appeared In print bt/a,;ng on rhe subjtlct. Much
of rhis matIKial is, of countl, worrhless, bUI a
significant porlion is in ... aluable,
The varioul mOfti or less official accounts ertl
"II very good for fhls fea fheater and rem"rk
ably frt!6 from the plopoganda which taints
much of Ihe olher malerial bearing on Ihlll
topic. In thiJ caflllgOry we may placa ROJlrill 's
White En$iilfl. Momon's Operalioos in Nonh
African Waters and Si ci ly-SalernoAnl;o,
Cocchia's Th, Hunl ... S and Ihe Hunted. S,.
dms The Italian' Navy in World Wa. II, and, a
panicu/arly i nterestmg source, Auphan and
STRATEGY AND TACTICS
HAS MOVED (AGAIN!)
S& T has moved uP. up 10 23rd Street, Ihal
is. All editorial and gene.al mall, all
$Ubscfl pll ons and orders sllould hence
forth be StUll 10 lhe l oll owing addrB$1
Simulations Publications Inc.
34 East 23rd Street
New York, N.Y.
10010
/lJlail SIInt to the old address Will be
forwarded to Our new address, so don't
break 01.11 In a cold sweat over the ordor
you sent .n JU51 before gelling thi S ISSue
Mprrla!', Th, French Navy in World War Il
IM:hmo , Tramonla de Un.a Grande Marona t$
mterestlng and ,trong on Ofgani zlltlon and
plans.
OtufChil/', Tha Second Wo.ld W.r contains
consioorsble mattlrial of mferesl concerning
the Med'''"antNm but the work is neother
objectIve nor nllCflSSaflly accUr.I", Cunning
ham', A SIII Ior's Odyssey i, rhe only work by a
hlgh rankmg naval off,c", m Eng/"h and is
decldedl.,. maccurate. A ctu.lly, 01 course, like
.11 memOlrl fltIllher of these owrh ma.,. be
relIed upon haavlly,
Thill veswl$ may be found covered eJl ren"vely
in Brey",'s Schlachlschlfia und Schlachl'
krluz ... , fha offiCial 1Ia1,an , ... ,es Le Navi
D' lt . lia. and 10 Parkes Bril l$h Ba"IHhipos.. A
YOlum. On SrI/Ish crll,sers IS 10 preparatIon and
WIll unqueSlronabl.,. lilla dal,fllt, need.
Tha Malta m ... /Ulon IS cOWlrtld but poorly in
Engli$h, w,lh Galvin's rlllher inaccurate Air
Assault bamg fhe only aJlremive - " fhat IS
the rerm - account, In Itallim one ma.,. lind
the 25 JaflU,ry 1970 iUlla of Epoca ver.,.
useful and Loreole/Ii 's Le Diwi$ion, Supa. ga"
Nella TOO"menta 01 special mltuesl m terms 01
IhtI advanced trammg and JP8Cialrzed equip
ment needed lor rhe operatIon.
The r.ther IPlICtacu/ar accomplishmants of rhe
'fBl,an, IPlICi" naval anaulf forces .re eJlren'
sively COlltlred in Borghe,. ', Sea Devils. which
is occasionally leen in cinema form on late
nighl relevlslon. Neifher fh. book nor Ihe
mo ... ,e, parrlcullVl.,. the/atter, Bra wI/hour error
but the psir represent an InttHeJlmg vet'Slon of
some remsrk.ble /ldvefJ/ur81,
As always var;ous periodicals _te of some
use, parriculluly odd number, of Ihe Un ited
States Na ... allnslitute Proceedings.
S80T SUPPLEMENT
S&T recei .... muctr mor, .... 1 ... iIIl than
_ can po.ibly publish. Much of il is
excallent. bul Ihere lun lsn'l enough
spac., We think _ have a solution, WI
call il Iha S&T SUPPLEMENT and it
contains 24 0' mo.a pllgel eac:h issue 01
rYIlIler lal we couldn' t gil into Ih' 'Silular
issues of s&T. II cost, 75 cents. copy
for $3.00 fOO' a one year subtocroplionl. It
is publithed bi monthly on the months
Ih" Sa. T donn't co .... out, How do ....
do it 10 cheaply? After all, il is of he I
p.inted. Qullilimple: Wa UM unlul lified
Iype and rl1lullT lell MU piper. We
allo h .... a large proportion of S& T'I
reuul subtoc.ibt/rt soblCribiOi 10 lhe
SUPPLEMENT. In fact , ONLY regular
S&T IUbtoctiberi may subtoctibe to the
S&T SUPPLEMENT. Bad! lew. a.e
a .... ilable al 75 c,ntl a copy, The
SUPPLEMENT contains much Ihe $lime
type of .rticl" as you lind in Ihe '&gular
iuuet 01 S&T. It is.1I new malerial . Give
the S&T SUPPLEMENT. Iry, At !ha
pr ic. you can t gO _ onll,
\
,
,
Interested In filing a lawsuit for that dented
fender? Would you like to be the SUU)t1Ct of an
(>pln.on poll' Or you mther Std,t d riot
and lear up the campus? Here are Three new
games that oller these VicariOuS pleasures.
,

LAWSUIT (by Lester J. Gendron) is a legal
oct ion condensed into 138 c3fds, From two to
four can play but the best game results wi th
two, or with four plaYing as pan ners
Each player is dea lt a hand of seven cards, then
draws one aoo plays one In eoch turn. The
action is started by the play of 11 Lawsuit card
and until a player can place one, he is limi ted
to ,nterlenng With the OpPOSltmn or to dls-
ciI,dlng Once the Lawsu.t 's down 11 player can
start adding General Damage cards, which
bring him awards of from $250 for "fut ure
doctor bills" to $5000 for "pain and su f.
fering ,.
To slow UP an opponent you can play a
Demurrer, Object ion, Motion to Strike, or
COfl!lnuance on top of his Lawsuit. Whil<l he is
blocked he cannot add any cards to his case,
but he can keep trYing to louse up yours, An
Over ruled rid of II Demurrer or an
Objecti on. Denied takes Cllre 01 a Motion to
Strike and Memorandum to Set does the same
for a Continuance (These terms, inciden tally,
are all explained .1
Pl ayers can improw their cases by the use of
Medical and Property Damage cards, both of
which can lead to furt her monetary awards
Alter bot h of these have been placed a player
can <Idd a Negl igence card, worth $250, and
finally, a Verd ict card, wort h $500. Play of a
Verdict ends the hand , and knOWing just when
to use ,t is an impor tant face: of t he strategy.
Each player scores the total vallJl! of his cards
and new hands are played until a player
reaches '$1 00,000.
Other can be conducted by the U5<l
01 cards such as Sympathetic Judge, Secret
Witness, Master Pleader, D,serepancy in Testi
monY,etc.
There are similaritills In play between Lawsuit
and the clutomobile racing games Touri ng tlnd
Mill es Borna-s Bul the novel I"'gal frnmework
lawsuit a game well worth to
your collection.
Law5uit IS published by the Laugh and Play
Co. P.o. 689, Madera, Cal 93637
and lists tor $3.75
CONFRONTATION (by Gmi ScOI1) is a sim
ulat,on pilling students and protesters against
the Establ ishmellt (and, obviously, is a differ.
"'Ill game than Gamescience's "Confronta-
tion") In each game four groups are repre
sented are always one of
the groups and Ihe other th ' ee are chosen al
random from the foll owing
roles Wash ington, State Governmen t. City
Hall, The Mili tary, Universi ty Administration,
Fac t ories/Corporations, Banks/FinanCial Com-
munity, Merchants, Landlords, Home Owners
Four is the minimum numoor of part icipants,
but il greater number can be handled by
assigning more than one player to a role
SlUdents/Protesters start with 18 red
representing their ranks. Each ES111blishment
group starts wllh ch ips represent ing 36 Re
source units. Within il specif ied time limit the
Students/Protesters attemp t to win enough
Resource units to overthrow the Establish
ment Each Establishment group attempts to
hol d on to what they have, to send the
SlUdentslProtesters to Jail, and at the same
time to gain advantage over the other members
of the Establishment
A round IS started by t he Students/Protesters
making any demands they wish 01 one, two, or
ilil of the Establ ishment groups. The Establish.
men t cil n meet the demands by paying Re-
source uni ts to the St uden lsfProtesters but.
even ,I they intend to eventually pay up, it is
to their advantage to s tall as long as possible
by keeping the discussion going.
If the StudentslProtesters feel that thev are
gell ing nowhere in t he negotiations' they can
call lor a Confrontation lind the Estdblishment
has d final opportunity to ilCcept tho Studentsl
Protesters last oller. If not tile Confrontation
takes place
The Students/Protesters have a chOice of throo
act,ons do nothing. prowst peJcP.fully. or riO!
ilnd may, If they Wish. take d,fferent aC\ion
ag<IinST Establishment group. A,t the same
t ime each Establishment group chooses to
either do nOlhing, cil ll police for st,mdby, or
call police l or riot control As a res"ll 01 PilCh
combinat,on or actions an
group can lose ilS many twelvtl Resource
units whi le Students/Protesters can have up to
IWO of their ranks sen l to jail,
If all Establishment groups lose thelf Re
sources, the Studenlsll' ro\('sters win, If al l the
Students/Protesters are sent 10 lail, the Estab-
lishment group With Ihe most Resources IS the
winner If neither of these occur and the game
is endea by the time lim,t, the group With the
most Resources, or Resources plus red tokens
In the case of Ihe Swdenl'l/P/oteslOrs, is the
Winner,
Confrontat ion IS published Ily Cre,ltivo Com
I!lunications and Rese'lfch. <160 35th Avenue,
San FranCiSCO, Calif 9<1121 and l,sl5 lor
25
OPINION is iI party game for from four to
eigh t opiniollilted contestants To stan the
game each player is given an IdentI fication
number wh ich .s placed in fronl of him. Then
the poll taker, who can be of the players,
shut/ les a deck of "Feawres" cMds and draws
one. Four attnbutes are lisled on the card and
the 0011 taker deCIOOS on the one that interests
him the most For eKample, from the card
con taining 11 sentimental, 2) lazy, 3) blushing,
and 4) pilSsionate, the poll taker might choose
to Iflvesligate who the group picks as the
laZiest.
A point value for the round is set by throwong
a pair of dice and then, using a special vOlong
dial, eileh player registers his secret opinioo as
to who is the Iilziest member of t he group. An
ident,f icat,on number is randomly selected and
thll t plilyer can II l lempt to guess the one voted
as laziest, or he may pass, If he guesses and his
choice turns out to hilVl! the most yotes, or is
toed for mOSl, the guesser scores t he poin ts for
that round If not, all the other pl ayers score
the points Fifty or more POlfltS are game.
A second deck, called "Ratings" can be used
Instead of or In addition to the "Features"
deck These cards cal l for a graduated (>pinion
on subjecls such as "our president" or "low
without marriage." Rat ings can vary from 8-
"t he grElalest" to 1 _ "hate It. " The player
doing the guessing chooses a number Ihat
represents the tOlal of all the ratings. II his
number IS no fur t her from the total than t he
number of contestants, he is conSidered cor-
rect and $Cores.
Opi nion is published by Selchow & Righter
Co, 2215 Union Blvd., Bay Shore, N, V ! 1706
and lists for $4.00. _ Si d Silck son

26
GAGE ESSAY :
AVALON HI LL lUFTWAFFE
James M. Flanagan
John M. Flanagan
This review was originally done
usinG a combm<ll,on of Luf twaff e
coroponenls (board ilnd counttlfSl
and 12 O' Clock High components
(rules, elc.). We were assured by
Avalon Hill thai the lWO games
v.cre identical, AI the last minute,
we re<:BIVOO Iha rust of Ihe l uf t
waffe components (rules, etc.1 and
discovered that the two {I<Imes weft!
NOT Identical. The differences, we
found, WIlrll Inleresllll\J. The rules,
i1 seems, hOO to be enlirely re-
wnn"n. The origll131 TSG 12
O'CIC)<;k High rules were under_
standable, for a Test Series Game.
But for a mass market Qilme they
were, so to speak, , ather hard to
fathom. Omilr DeWitt (Avalon
Hi ll's "answar" man! did an excel-
lent Job on the few"\(!, The rules
arll sllil a bit On Ihe "w"ndcnr,g"
side, but (.'Vcrythmg is there. And
yOlJ don't hd"'i! 10 look all that fur
10 find everything. The CRT, which
did not change, IS still not fully
explailloo on the rules. Its use ,s
rather compli cated ilnd more clari
[icallon would have helped.
other components afe fairly
good. al though not quite as "poi
ist\ed" as in Pann rblitz. Tom Shaw
did much of the layoul wor k on
LuftwaHe , and not Redmond
Simonsen, as yOlJ wOIJld think from
comparing Luftw8ff e's "'look"' to
tl11l1 of Panzerbl itz. Upon seeing
how hiS "style"' W1I5 90 blatan t ly
COPied In Luf twaffe Simonsen
muttered abou t . "'taklOg a good
idea and beating il !O death."
Neverthe less, the Luf twaffe gaine
components are II notch or two
above Avaloo Hill's prePanzerblitz
games. Had more t ime been spent
In phrasing the fUlal rules the game
would have pl<lyed much more
smoothly.
In the ij' lla of play !l1e<:hanics we
come UP wi th one 01 the millor
faults of the game. The b<lsic game
can be played in a couple of hours.
Fine. But we aU know that when iI
game comes Oul That has several
versions. game fanalics (thal'S you)
want to on !O the mOST
version as fast es they can.
Playing the basic game seems 10
SI11.1ck of being lowerdass. don't
you know. In Luftwaffe the ad
vilnced and tournament versions are
really fen bolsic gamm on H string.
sa now you ;!fe de31ing w ith' 'SOm&
Ihlng th3t runs 30 hours or' more
(wi t h /III the extras t hrown In).
Most 01 the people who broke in
with AH iI decade ago are now
chilnglng diilp(!rs and lind 20 or 30
hours for a game hard to come by.
Now we come !O our summary The
phYSical Quality IS wry nice No
argument The accu,acy IS OK In
the that a great many factors
G.A .G. E. IG,,,,,,,,,, AMlv .. ,/ Eo.I""',,,"1
, hit_fl.
l"." Z_, 0...,_ Ood,,,
Slmul. , _ 01 , ho A"" b<>m"" ol l_. _ In .. G .. ",..,. h om 1M3 to IM5.
Lo"" s...1 'P"'''o<aIl'E>n(ImOc

TOUI Woo-d Coun, 10950
Nun'CI"oI OPl_ Ruin 20
au .... ____ . ________
N....-oI O"tl""' Ga!r.V ........ G_" 8
COMPONENTS PI.y E ..... ,tO" ....... ,
M .. imum
0.0. Fot> t81 I
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ct. " . ", Symboh ..... "" _ Io!, UUl op(l)liID 1>U1 ..... '
s. .. _ .825" I\m To,,", N._ of o.od Modu"" 1. 2IM
T.""OI T ... _ 123 .... ' ''''u"d . 1 Compl n 16 on RoIl_,n.lI) R .. I COnt ..... 3 "'""ol , F .. ",,_.y .......
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PLAYING PI ECES Shopo eir<"I ..
Nu_ P .. So<II G ......... _ 122
5,.. .625
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110", 110.. _ f"" .... ' '''ap.Jo1 Roell .. l
cell ... ,
ANC'llARY EQUIPMENT liST Na .... "" 1:AmPA9> 1ll1ot11"" 8o<>Io.1. t . n .... R_d
,0,;,." P,a"'" _ dill 80., P1l11otlc Tr ... D . T_I SMon.
PLAY MECHANICS Ta'" Nun'CI .. a H ... n.
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OECISION"PfR SlOE PE R TURN

,
,
,


,
"
"
_______ TOtoiSuPI>lood 262
37 h ..

,
..... .. t _ HI ... ", I SOI9l"".S._i",,-Odch.eombo' RoI"""", IT 0"' ... ..-1) R.;.,I"'< ..-. .. R. plKO,.,....' ''''''' IAd._1 ,Lo, "' tMI"",_.
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CONfliCT MECHANICS UM .. ".
..
tt'Od<;h T_ tl 01 ....
CO"'F llCl RESOl UTION ,I To,., f lo"" .... " "" (F" .. , ,,,,,,, lOl ... I .... u"" "
that were Imponant,lind their place
or! the game. e.g refueling, extra
tank.s. close suppor t OPTions Play
ability is pOOr m opinion The move
itself is no! so long. but you have to
Juggle so many Items each tirne that
It takes away the whole feeling of
air combolt you become a book
keepel instead of a fighter
The nex t few paragraphs will try to
why we feel we 10 give
this effort such a low recom
menOatlon fating Before you go
on. cancel the idea that we are
"'playabilitv"' fanatics and hate any
thing more involved than Afr ikil
Korps
,I Po,,,,, Ao::u""" ,,0<1
It seems !O us tha t alilhe a" games
publ,shed so lar that we have
mined (six, plus JUll and and 1914
arK! some Olher games like III
are at lault III their baSIC premise.
The Idea Ihat has to be
complex may nOI be valid All these
games set out to be "realistic."' The
hard-workmg designers did mount-
ains of research and fed il mta the
mechanics by the carload.
The result in eVflry case was a game
everyone s toocl in awe of - bul not
many bought 0, played Some, feel
Ing tha t t he W3Y to be loyal to
game evolution. his tory ilnd "real
Ism" W<lS to l ollow thIS trend.
boughl and played anyway
"
0...01'
10( 1 (, 10 (' l m l,I
Don" Buy It BoSut. ' a Bu. I
Here is the key Question. Can we
develop games that Include a host
o f realistic elemenlS organired In
such a way that they resull in
reasonable eilse of play? So far it
hoIs not been done - al least not
well PanzerBliu was a SPeCial (tac
llcal) case Even lhere. playabili ty
suffers as the number of playing
pieces increases How can we CreaTe
a commercial. strateg.c. complex
game that is a kick to play? The
answer lies in organization of the
game mechanics and the wr iting of
rules. Luft waff e doesn ' t make il on
the consideratioo5, hence the
low ratmg m
For arlY student of history. 110\ only is iI
Iil<;\ual knowledgo importilrlt, but alsa some
01 the principal characters who
created thaI history. In 1t,,, Second World War,
this IS parlicularly iI problem due to the
number 0 1 men who hild such lmpOrlilln
influence. 1\ is mitigated, 10 some extent, by
the number of works iIV;;Iilable dcalirog with the
imPOnal'l1 mf'n ;rlVolvnd. For the sake 01 space,
if nothing else. this d,scussion is limite<.! 10
ilutobioljraphkal works by Iho-se WilD could be
consrdert>d the lOp f''lures ", the German
gOllcrnrmml. For thJI IJUfIlOS<l, the tOp figures
have been consiul'rt!d those who wen' tried ,11
the prlflc,pa l war crilnes mal ,n Nurnberg 01
who wOIJld thwIil bei.ln so Irioo hild they been
captured alive. This is 1101 so strict a limitation
as can be irnagmod. Cilnainly thpI" alP Jrly
nUf11ber 01 charactl'rs in the Nazi [/Ov;.,rnrnonl
who hII'Ve wrilllm bool<s. The old joke is to
refer 10 them as Ihe "1 Was Hil ler's Mustache"
school 01 writi",]. So some limitation neccs-
$ilrv. To limit it 10 autobiogr.lphical w<)rks IS
equallv v<lluJble because nOI on IV does this
allow on;> to see a more closelV what
W!!nt 011 In thu higll "Inking conferences, but
also 10 (jain ins'qlll into the personalities of the
wriH'rs. ObviouslV, what II 1)Crson includes in
his book. orexdudes for that mattN. isa 0000
guide to the person
Hitler. unfor tunately, lefl no really autobio-
graphical material alter Main Kampf and TIlIl
Second Book , Wlh ot whiCh were bOth poli-
tical and bIIXJ,,,phi<:J I 01 cours.a, Ilis public
speeches are a matter of record. Some Inslghl
into Hi t ler has been providl'd by
Borm,lnn who wok no\l'S on Hi tler's alter
dinner conversatoons. which are now pubhshed
in a book called Hitl er 's Secret Conversati Ons
available in paperback, They are twicevaluable
in thaI they ruveal what Hithlr considered
important when hI' w,lsn't ing DUbHc
5I)OOch and t lley also reflect what Bormann
thought as important Speer records (hat
Bormann carried lillie white cards in his
pocket on which he would. from time to t ime.
write down 01 Hitler's better mots. The
book, t hough not truely wfltten by Hit ler, Is a
good insight into Hit ler's thinld!l(J, muddy as it
was, beC1IU$I! It Is what Hitler discussed among
his intimates and has the virtue of candor due
to the lack of any net..'CI. except psVchologlcal,
to impress the fisteners with the Iru t h of what
was expressed Again, Ihough, it also ref lects
on Bormann's attitudes since he was selective
in copying dOwn Hit ler's thougl1ts and one can
only wonder (and patctl t09llther from other
sourcesl at what was lef t out,
Or. Goebbels was Ilnother lap Nazi who
cenainly would h ..... e boon tried had he SUI
vived the war. Goobbels was an organized
person who apparently had the habil 01
dictating daily. Port ions of what was dictated
were saved Irom bur ning when t he Russi ans
were cleaning up trash flhe boOks were tal< en
for their binders and their contents. ilj)Darenlly
unrecogniled , scattered around !. Major par
lions 01 whal has been saved have been
translated in The Goebbili. Diar iu (what 9Jr
Vives 01 the original is 111 WashingTOnl. The
published. version covers 191\ 2.42, tho turning
poinl In the war The d ia ries are rea llv
I
confirmation 01 everyth ing that has been salO
about Goo!Jbels. In places they are strikingly
candid, lack in!! any sign of sel f-deception. In
otl"" places they are total ly obsequious, hrw",
inl) on the broln"nce 01 the r-uhrer. Stili ollll!(
Sf'CTjonS ilre b'tingly sarcdstic. As light reading,
the book Ilas no merit I t was not designed lor
that purpose. though probablY Goebbels did
intend to usc the as a Ilasis for some
biOgraphy later on. Bu t there is a wealth 01
information thme about the innl;r work in'lS at
th.' Third Reich and wllat wt'nt on at the t;mp
that th(' was lost. That Goobbels was
on" of Itle key in \lle machinery mill<es its
v"lue d(}uhled,
rwo of those who were tried at Nurnber!J and
sentenced to dealh I11':Waged 10 wrllE' bio
'l'aph)es Rlbben trop and Keitel. Both can be
dismissed, lust as their authors, as being
of no consequence. No genuinely original
thoughts have C\ier ,,"ribu ted to Ribben-
trOP and his main virtue was I,is i1Pparanl
conviction thaI Hitler walked on water This
character shows through in this apolOgia qullC
c learly. KeiICl.l<nown to his tellow soldiers at
or the little lackey, devotes most 01
his tim" to flxplaining why he was only
obeying orders. His record durlng (he war 01
invariablV sidinq with Hiller and Hgainst any
prelense o f sound mi litary thinking makes the
contents Of his biOgraphy both and
easlly prOOiclable.
Both of the admirals, Raeder and DOfletz. wt're
S(Jntenced to a wrm of years. Raeder tor lite
and Donetz to 10 years. though Raeder was
released lirst l or ill Both wrole
ilUlobioqraphles. Racdel'S, c"lIed MV Lif e. is.
like Keitel's. a justi f icalion. Raed"r W.:IS an
important figure in tho 1l:IV'v from the time of
Hil l"r's rise and any failings on the par t of the
navy to develDp soundlv can be attributed to
him in the same manner as the Luftwaffe's
failings were Gorings. Germany nev.'r did h""e
aircraft carriers. All three of the uod .."t battle-
ships were. Weimar, not Na7i creations Only
the U-boats were given anything Ill .. !] the
development needed to influence the wal. The
lact thaI Raeder was cashiered in midwar
furthm diminishes the value of his book In thJt
he was not around when the fa tal decisions
\NIlfe made which ended the surl llC!! navy us 8
viab le force. Donetz, on Ihe o t her h{lnd, wrote
a fasc inating boOk In Ten Years and Twent y
Day. because of his unique posit ion. The ten
'leafS refers to his term a s head of till! U-boats
and Ihe twenty days to the tilCt that he was.
for twenty days. the successor to Hi t l",. Ttll!
first sect ion, as Uboat c hief, is in teresting in
the same way Gudmian's book is interesting-
II technician telling about II forte which he was
inst rumental in and seeing into baltle
As he moved UP to beool'ne Raeder's successor.
however, Oonel2 became embroiled in the
high-policy decisions of the Reich and,
ieularl y , In the wonder weapons syndrome. In
his case, howl!\ler, he J lmost dellvered. The
finij l duveloprnent On would have
created U boals capable of vi r tual ly Ihe same
speed under water as on the surlace - around
25 knots. The effect that would h ..... e had on
the waf is easy 10 see. h;1d t hey been available
in t ime. As it wa s, they were CaptUH'Cl, in large
port. by the Russians and contrlbutlld to !lwir
eilrly lead ii, submarines in the POSI-war O!ra.
Most interesting. however, is Donut?' Il lt ort , 35
head 01 the Reich, to preserve It under ol1e
ijovernmCnt. 11 is his con tention. right Of
wrong. that one 01 th .. big.r.St mls tal<es n>.!de
by the western .;tllies was 1101 maintalnlfl!!
either his grnwrnmenl or " valid
which could speal l or all of Germ'lnY. Nf'n
thougll only in <I (Japer manner, rath!]r thd"
abolish self-governmpnt ill I""or of OCcur")1ion
zones. This book is appar"ntly 0111'1 ""ailab".,
In hard bOLlnd but is In I1IOS1 coli,!!!"
There wcre dlso some 5mal l fries 1It Nurnlwrq.
one o f wllOlll. Von Pap;>n. wrole MemOirS
Vor was <111 old-lin.., diplom.lt who was
involved army aHache in Washington al the
tim(' of tile Zimr11erman Telegram, a eh,meal-
lor under Wl.'ilnar Republi.:, <:unlidolnl 01
von Hindenburg ,md, in thai capacity, one of
the rT\illn peoplp vrying von Hind,'nburg to
"draw Hiller's W<l\h" by ."ppOllllnlq h"n CI1.Jn-
cellar Von P<lpen was VlCe-Chmlcelior under
H,tler, Initially, almost kl ll'ld in tilt' Ruo:'t.m
plot. and llfl<lL'IJ up Gerrndn tu
Turl<ey and involved in the "Cicero" a ffair. As
a book. MemOir. Is of soml' inwresl but vnl1
Papcn is 11 pompous I11JI1 who "Iways It'lt hi
could do better than the other '1"'1_
The lilSI book, in ali likelihood. bV d rn,llO'
figure in the N1l<'1 (jovernll'lomt. is SP(",,'S book.
InSI d e t he Third Re.eh Imore "'odest ly call,-d.
by SPCl'I, Me moi .. ). Speer W.IS in ,1 uniqu!>
position in th!> German qovernnmnt In Th,n I".
did not rise by Vlftlll' of bt>il"] ooliti<:l"". He
was an architect by tr,l(fe dlUJ '.1m.' il1>
Hitler's c"du not long <liter theassumPiion of
t he CIlan<:eIlOlshiP. In the 1Jrt' war 'r,'. 111'
inVOlved 111 the <:redtion of the Nurnburg P,lrly
Rally stiJdlurn the Z"ppellllweise and in the
tantastlc plan to lemal..u Berlin, floe <.h'script-
ion Of that falltasy, alullI!, 's WOIUl the prio, of
tho book, Impor tallt, Spoor's position itS
a 110n-p<.1Iitici,," t,,>d to Hitler by Hitler's
pprsoll,,1 dspj!iIllon$ drchit,'ctull! and
the fllelong of SOi"t allowed h"" to
be tn the Innel clfclu f'om the P-Iiest
lI1d to torm hiS "pinions bas..'d {)n ,I dolfer"nt
pefSl>I"'CtlW Ulal1 a Pollllclan would use Tllll
InSights boo!.. on Hit ler. part,,:;ularly, "'t'
It anything IlI1dt'rst.lt .. d In reviews of
SI)CU"s book.. Speer unnbashedly admits 1I1<1t
he was under H, tter's 'PIlII flghl to tll<' ve,y
,'nd and he allumpts to CX.lmlne why thtswas
He no bon;>s about reSlJOnSlb,llty as
a German 11I1111ster for "rmarnents for not only
Iho"",, III which might have betln
personally Involved, but also tllow things
whICh he deliber.l tely He
m<)n t lons a warning flom tim Gdul(, lt"r of
Silesia not to V'Slt any concemratlOl'l Cillnps 111
thaT ar"a He d idnt. The camp In QueSI'O" W,IS
Aus.chw.tz and Speer 1$ calldld III dt-clalil1y
tl",t he conSiders that faolure to "\Qulle onto
tile s.tualion and do wllat he could TO corre..:t
It 111,-.-.1" him just as wrong as those who
11 III the Ilrst place
An Il1Ierestll1'1 tlOint m.xl{' by Spe;!r was
Hiller's personal conviction th,1\ he would not
love unti l 1950 (he would only h1JJ O been 61
then! and that who E!\Ier Cilme a fter him would
not 0111'1 lad IllS, Hitler's. ability to lead the
IJIIOLlie, but per haps also Hitier 's personal
Ihlve. Asa result, .. :r lI"'t Hit ler took
precautions to ensure that his plans lor Ber lin
were oomIYlllnC(.'(!, at least beyond the planning
stage, uven before the w;w MOfl)ovm, It be
(Cont rnllCd on p30.J
27

28
by R.C. Welker
D,plom. ey Is II thfett t o s"ven p layer fJ8me tllUed on thtl mlfi rllry!pQliric.1 " w alion in Europe p rior
/0 World War I. The game irwol v., secrel ollgO/ilIfIO"S and troop mOllflmentr (fimed II I controlling
the maj ori ty of the provinces o( p ,,,.World Waf I Europe. It is availabl. for $8.00 from Simulations
PublicatIons, l"c./ 34 E. 23rd SI.I New York 10010
THE " BIG BAD COUNTRY MYTH"
or, How I L ... ned to love PI ' VlnS F'8flCl ,
G .. m. nv. AUllr i and Ilaly
or, I PI. V Engllnd , Turkey . .., d Au.,. JUlt
. 1 Badlv
People llten <1110:. me, 'What is the best country
\0 play"- 0' "Who has Ihe best chance to
w,n '" My Ilandilid ilnswer ,5 Ihal !:!\Ie,y coun
If.,. on the board has an equal chance. I haYe
been lor th,s To PUIII bluntly.
howOVf.lr, It IS my consldereU opinion lhal
people who clai m In,]! some coun tries haYe II
bener ch,mce 10 win tharl others are perpet ua,
ting myth which has no basiS in solid lacl, I I
IS II VICIOUS, perniCIOus mylh which even now
blighls the reputatIons of Austria and Itdly as
v,,,ble l)()8rd posillOflS land Germany and
Fran<,;e. 1001. I,,;od,ng players who the.
counlries to deleat land lherefore to
play awall,ng the 'Inevilable!. The
idea Ihal I taly and Aus tri a have clny poorer
chance than England 15 purest rubbish.
How did th is Ire Oll glnalo] There is no ques'
t;on thaI II hilS some sort of baSIS rn stat isllcs.
Game results thus far compi led ha\18 tcndod to
IndiCate thaI England Turkev, and RUSSia do
e-.:tremely well, France am:! Germany lust
SO-50, and Austria and Italy do quile pOOrly, A
monor'ty report from Seat t leptaces Italy III at
lhe lop of Ihe heap. Somev,heIB. somehow.
5OmEtbodv got lhe Idea that th,s "prolled" that
England, Turkey, and RUSSIa ale the strongest
powers. Even Itl(' Inventor 01 postal Diplomacy
has referred to England and Tur key as "the
Wicked Witch of Ihe Non h and the WICked
WIlCh of the South." HIS reasons for dOIng 50
were in lellectual ly sou nd , unlike the argu
ments of Ihose who decry the "weakn",ss" 01
Austria and I laly, but the impression II s1l11
given Ihal England and Tur key posse'lS some
unparalleled nat lYC advantage, which ,$ un true.
They hayc unrqu. advantilCj'C$. but every coun
tryon the board does,
The answer 10 Ihis proelem IS reallv qUIte
Simple, Eng1il.l(!, Tur key and RUSSIa are "nov
Ittl" coun t"eS That is. Ihe str(l legles whICh
WIn for these countfles are more obvious and
drrecl NOVIceS, and people Wllh nOvice men,
lalil les preler 10 plaV Ihese coun t ries. Analo
gously. beg inning players 01 chess prefor white,
In tho bahel Iha t some special advantage
rePOSIIS on moving first. It does, if that is [he
only side of the fence YOU're lamltrar wl lh, Bul
no Maste. wort h his sal t will seriously claim
Ihat wh,te IS rnherentl y superior to blllCk lhe
may SPEiC.atrLe In 0fl8 or the otller , but Ihal',
hlsp'oOllImf
The sarna IS true on DIplomacy. There may be
one or mole wh ich YOU preftr t o
play, because lhey are more Intere$t lng or you
know how to do well when plaYing Ihem.
HQWil\l8r, you should be aware thaI no country
IS hope less, Ihllt vou can do equall y wel l Wlttl
any coun tl y But you must work at it, YOU
cannot resign yourself 10 " fate'
so NOW WE ARE GOING TO REDRESS
THE BALANCE. franoo! Germanv' Italyl
Austrial I am il'-',ng 10 lei' you how 10 wIn.
England. RUSSIa, doIld Turkl.'V Cdn lust go to
blazes bllCaUliEl I'm g<)lnq to te+l them how to
beat you. Bear In mind. howtlvel. Ihal I WOld
cover all the angles I'm lUst go,nglO give you
Ihe general Idea,
FRANCEI fr,, '1Q!"S leo;;ord hils been beller of
late, but t here was a Illne whell her fourth
place was prelly pOOl. The ploblem w, th
France is that Engl'lIld reallv il the Wicked
Witch 01 Ihe North for her, Forsi. a Franco
German alliance agalilsl England IS ha,d 10
work out. and England normally has her
choice 01 allYIng wnh France or Wllh Germany
each therefore her lhe moon and she's
on hel wav Second. II Isea$Oer for England to
Slab France [han for France to s l"b England.
Third, an AngloFrench altrance often does not
do well - 1\ IS dlllic:ult to destrov Gelmany
and RU5$I&, and by Iho tIme you've done Ihal
t here is usua lly a POwerlul Tur key who has
assumed tile stalemale pOSillon
Ausl r lanorlh 1llIly<Clllral Med,l, Ihreatening
to won If eI t her attacks Ihe other. France's
great advanlage 15 thai she the only country
10 border on Iho Allan l lC lind the Medl ter
ranean - and once she IS UP 10617 unll$, she IS
very strong defensively (and shll very compact
England at IhlS lewl IS spread out, a
dangerous wc"kne'lS)
So wpat can yOU dO? Here IS one idea, The
FrancoGer man alliance is a real sleeper,
II can be lucce$slully played wll h good
frequency Here 's how, v ou can'l allack Eng
land because you don ' t have t he naval power
and it will lake too long lor too few goodies
land you will probab ly fall out In ill quarrel
over lhe dIVISion of lhe SPOill./ The triCK IS (a)
Ignore England, pick up cen lers elsewhere, and
then allack Ihe Limeys. or (b f gel England to
allv wi t n both of YOU and fallen up t he bird
before you kill it
Rtm.mber thaI In el thel case, you must
capltalrze on England's grealest weaknesses
first . thai she can do nOt hing on t he COfltinent
wl1hou l help, second , any e xpanSion at all
means t ha t the bul k o f nar uni ts are lar l rom
horne
Strategy lal England. She can tr v
10 cooperate wllh Russia against Ger many . bul
th,s assumes Ihal Russra 1$ Interested In t hat
sort of thing and usually depends on French
neu lf alrty (not the case here I. Of course,
Germany WIll probabl v WIsh to pI ck up some
Ih1l'lg f rom RUSSI a, $0 you Will have to count
on an AngloRussl an allI ance of convenience -
t neref ore , be sure Ihal you maneuve-r lor a
drawn Scandinavian campai gn (yOU can't WI n
there). France tiles for Ih,s gai", In lhe Med,
in cooperat ion WIt h AU1\rl U alld lor Turkey ,
then neutrali zat ion o f Ihe Irea because Auslrra
and Tur key now begrn 10 worry about each
ot her . and transfer of fleel s nor thward , Th is
breaks lhe deadlOCK In Ihe soulh and
Austrra must 1'101 be allowed to 081 100 slrongl
By lhe by - In 1901, make sure Germanv gelS
I3ejg'um and bUIlds F Kie, F Bar, A Mun HIS
SOllfOl moves should be A MutI , Ruh, F
K,t -D.n, A Be, -Kie/ A Ruh-Bel , A Kit-Hoi , F
D.nSw. You wanl a weak Russl8. Germany
should t,y 10 prtllend an all"ltlCC w, th Engl dnd
agalnSI Russia. so that England PUll A NwV In
FO I. The Ang lo-RUSSians are therr faked corn
plea'ly 0\11 01 pOSItion.
SIrate9Y Ibl IS more sub lie arl<l morc ell ect lw
In this Ilipartite agreement. Frilnce Is to move
Into Ihe Mt'd, and Germany/Engidnd hll Rus
In 23 game years. England holds NwV,
Swe, and StP and live 01 her SIX unl1S are rIl
Scandinav,a AI th,s POrlll. prob..rblv rIl F03 or
FD4 Germanv sneak aHacks Sweden and
moves II lleet to lhe North Sea. FliIO'lcc moves
to Ihe MId and hopefully has a bu,ld coming
which is F Bre England has a removal
Germany buil ds an army At thrs pOinl. II'S all
owr but Ihe sho,'t ing FIance gt'ts England and
Germar1y gEl" Scandrnavla - plenty of pickings
on that chicken l or everybody, A!I<llll. 01
course, Ihe success of t11,S oper<l l ion depends
on Ihl' !oOutheast deadlocked through
dlplomal". pull
Perfect R.Vfl1ve ' 1/ you are. however. snacked
by E ngland/Ge.many, and lhere IS nolh"'g vou
can do to SlOp ' I. al1a<: k England only and gl\18
everVlhrng to Germany. Remernbe< Irs all
England's faul t
GERMANY; First, read Fune. , Every l hrng I
sJ id there appl ies to you. Kal serbabv. In
<;pados. FlrSl, if you and England
France, or RUSSia. or both, England Is gorng 10
get the br edSl and d rumSll cks and YOU are
going to 001 the wings, necK ClOd fibs. And Ihen
you w,11 gel 11 In the back , because In
AngloGerman alliances, PerlldlOus Al bion
StWI tile Reich In Ihree out of every lour
cases And wllh hiS fleelS, tie can get YOu -
and YOU can't get him. Eyen France has a
bal1er chance. because he has $Orne .xcuse lor
flee ls, but England will demand thaI you build
none and you, t rustIng ninny that you are, will
accePI th iS invitat,on to $uicrcle On the olher
halld , what are you gOing 10 do wl l h fl een
once you burld t hem . Ihat 's lIght! So why
not do unto England in the li rst place, before
ile does untO you? Your big advan lagE! IS that
vou can . xpand rapidly on all Ironts to the
$OU th, sou lhwest, and east , Once your nor lh
west and norlh are cleared 01 Competl l lon, YOU
can really move. So long as England 1;\185. you
WIll never be $!lIe.
Perftct R.v.nge : If Engl and succeeds rn $C.
dueing France, and If an alliance wi t h RUSilla
and Italy doe$fl'l help, attack RU'lSia. This WIll
helO mil ke Tur key 8 ni ce b,g power and
England/F rance will get Ihei rs in lhe end .
all ack England and help France
get all Ihe good ies. Hopefully. they WIll gel
each ot her rn l he mid game
ITALY; I" YC already covered you in a prfl\l ,OUS
column. An alliance w, t h Ausllla (i f you Clln
trust him I is groovy. Don' t , DON' T, DON' T
all y wi t n (11 England/GermanV aga'nsl France
or (2f RUSSlafTu rkey again51 Aust"a. In each
CiII$C , you will be ne"l on the menu. Good
Ideas allv WIth Austria against Turkey or all y
with GermanyfRussia against England/ France
In Ihe case of the l a rmer, YOU can use youl
alliance 10 th reaten with stale
male and hope yOU can force Ihem 10 split up ,
OO(i of them loinrng vou Iwo againSI t he other

Wit h Ihe lanm, YOU really have 10 help
Gmmarly a Imle (bul rlot 100 much, because
you warll 11 stalemate irl The rlorlh arxi weST
urlTi l you are ready 10 pIck UP cerltersl,
Remember, Italy i s esserlliall y arl i $larlO (wilh
1",11100 l"rlU acCllssl. Wi Th similar oiferlslve
capabili!les as those at Erlgland, bUT wi l h
added defensi ve probl ems. Yours 's a bal anCll_
of -power, slow-accreTlon game
TrUSI Austria I f at all possIble You can
ooaut l fu l music togel her And il Austria 00
trays YOU, it will cost h" l1 more 10 detend
Venice Than 1\ WI ll pay hIm to it Destroy
Turkey and the two 01 you lassuming a
northwestern deadl ock I carl dommal e the
game
ParieCI Revenge ; Unfor tunatel y, often you r
most ellect ive ploy i s to send hale le11ers Try
to determi ne who your anacker's greatest
enemy is or will be, and help hi m while you
can Ihe nast i est thing you can do IS
help the Turks
Caulion: Don't ever ta ke Trieste, no mailer
how tempt"'g It might \)e, You are beller off
fflends wi th Auslria_ On t he olher hand, If
tak i ng Marseil les offers rapi d expansion west
and northweSI, do i t onl y if England and
Germany are not allied and you are certain 01
"
AUSTRIA: Read whaT I have IOld Italy. Then
be nice to Italy YOI..I ciOn' l possib ly get very
much from him and Ihere are so many nice
supply Cllrlle's in the Balkans and In Turkey.
(contonued Irom page 21
larger! on East 23rd Sireel This i s somet imes
k nown as the Mad ISOn Square area Much
niCllr, excepl t hai l ile edItor has 10 wal \: a lI t t l e
tart ile' to work BUI more Important ly, It
allows uS to operate much more etf icienlly,
What does all This me,l n, the I,,'ger quarters
and stall? II means that we will now com
menCll what we call t he "40 day pl an" Put
Simply, It means tha t we w ill try to get 5&T
ou t every 40 days i nstead of every two months
(61 daysl umi l we are gel1lng The magazIne out
abou l a month bef om liS cover d'l te. If ThI S
"plan" works we will , hopefull y , be pUllong
issue 3 1 (Jan-Feb '72) in Ihe m"il s on Novem
ber 24, 197 1 I f the "plan" doesn't work
maybe we can jU$1 come close
Th i s conversat ion, at course_ bfl ngs us 10 The
sub jec:1 01 Just what 5&T i s. Obvi ously , i t's a
bUSiness enterprise We are sei ling a magazme,
pl us god k nows whal else. HCJWever _ Our's isn't
a tradIti onal buSiness approach We are not
mot i vated by prot Its but rather by t he aCT
itsel l . The act of pul1i ng out the magazi ne and
lhe !,Jll mes Anyone who works here i s f lrsl of
all a game "freak" (as the tllf m is currenll y
being used!. We have no axes 10 grind WI th
anyone_ we have no wish to deceive anyone or,
I ",all y , to try and presen1 our5el ves as some
th ing we aren' L Th erefore, if you see some-
t hing in _5&T that you haven" seen in any
ot her magazine. don' l be surprised. It's whal
Try t o wor k on helping a sta lemale develop In
the weS1 II Germany like II comer, an
Army In BoI,emia (possibly w,lh an
I lali lln Army In Tyrolial IS a most el l ectlVil
ant i dote Use spilflng ly.
It IS Important to seek a RU5so-Turl:lsll war
T h,s WIll gIve you an opportunity to make
ShOrt wor l-. 01 Turkey and, wi lh an I talian
alliance , be 5Ccure in n followup atlack on
RUSSIa If RUSSIa and Turkey all y, 1fy to l i nd
some way 10 gel Russia d ,stracted m Ih e north
Ipromotmg IIrl Angl o-Ger man al liarlce IS al ways
a good ploy - even il t l.ey SI", l ln on France.
they will al ways have Russi a f or dessert, Ihe
problem here beIng that t hey may Top I t all al l
WI th I talyl , Regardless of what el se happens ,
insure your possession of Serbia al.d Greece In
1901 And Then gel inlo T urkey as fast as you
C<lP , Remember This' It,s possible l or Turkey
to expand by going around Austria rather than
through AUSTria I I i s al so pOSSIbl e fo, Ger
marly "nd Russia 10 get .. t each Olher Wllhout
gOIng t hrough Pol and Hal
You r' We.,t strength is that you can hold 6/7
centers in II very compact mass. You can
expand i n all dI rections. You lire weak navally ,
but that is wlllJre I tal y i s st rong , and ThaT IS
why you should cul t ivale I ialian I ri endshl p.
Converse l y, Italy IS weak in the l and forces
department , which IS WilY he should cultivate
you. FUf\her, I laly w il l do bet l er in atlacking
YOU than you will do In attack mg hIm.
Perfect Revenge: If Italy betrays you, gIve
everything to Ihe Turks (he w ill eventually
'!!gret It, believe me). I f Russi a betrays you.
happens when some people get toget her and
do whaT t hey wan t 10 do inslead 01 whal they
have 10 do We l eel Ihe same way towards our
subSCribers .. nd anyone else who gets Ifl con
tacl W<Th us. Tllere is no "us" and "them"
between the regula, S& T people. the pa r t
T,mers, Ih" conlrlbUTers. t he people who d rop
by now and Ihen and Ihe folks who on l y "see'
when they pIck up a copy 01 S& T oc
casionally Some f ol ks asked uS aboul how 111Is
operat i on was rUIl Now you know
As you al so k now, lhere were d lecut cou nters
In t hiS Issue 01 SST Fmally we are able to gIve
yoo a compl etely comp lel e g<lme In every
Issue. T his wasn 't done bofo' e because 01 the
cost conSI derations. We' ll have a Ilit ie more
money I rom now on, so we're SPending I!
where I t WIll do the most good. An addltlo,,,,1
spi n-off IS the use of d,e--cu t cOunlers in many
of the TeMing Series Games , as wel l as much
betl er quali ty mapboards (new artwork I tor
these games As soon as we gel new rules for
them we wi l l Them in t he mag,lline
as " second ed ,tions:' whI ch is exactl y what
I hey WIll be. We expect 10 expand t he TSG
IlTle considerllbly th i s year.
FEEDBACK : We l earned a l ew new lessons
WI t h The f eedback In issue 24 , whIch is w hy
t he feedback IS so val uab le to us. The game,
naturall y , came out on to p We e)lpect be tt er
Ihings at the 911me5 f rom now on, what WI th
basic games and t he "solita"e" versions we are
t ry ing to prepare for each game. The di e cut
counters d on't hurl either We gOI our nose
bloodIed a!,JIIl n ITl this i ssue. Thi s lIme iT was
the ar tIcles Whenever OUlgoing Mail comes in
second we know we' ve do ne somethlTlg wrong
Not I hal Outgoing Mail shoul dn'l be popular,
gi ve everythmg 10 the Turks. If RUSSIa and
Iialy ootrllY YOU, gIve ever ything to The
I I Russ'J, I taly, and Turkey ail betray you,
9' W everythmg to t he Church.
GENERAL CAUTION: Ewrylhmg I have said
depends, of cou, se, on lot of Inlerrelated
facto's. I hllve onl y tfled t o Sl Jg!}6St courses of
acl lOn whi ch ougl1l TO prove frui tful. You may
thin!.. of olhers, One alternative IS for
AUSTrIa , I tal y. and Turkey to al ly, Turkey
expand ,ng througll Sav-Mos-Wa. SiI / Pur -Ber ,
plus ge t llflg a bit of It.:l ly , I m I ry ing Ihat in
one g<lme, as 1urkey Pillyers should experi
merlt wllh these and other strategies i n order
10 find ways of playing These count ries which
oK:hieve satlsl actory results YOu shou ld try 10
ptay France, Gennany, Austria, and Iialy
wheneVilr yOIJ can. You should piny them WIth
ImaginaTIon and aggressive determinatIon I I
you do, you wil l Win as often as you do w i th
01 Ihe "Big Th'e(] .,
And, a. lor y ou England/TUfkey/Russl a l ovc! s,
may yOU al l drown In your Own aiel
ilyran!kv<lSS
NOTICE : Do you I"tve any quest ions about
Ihe Rules? Are you "' 101reSled In play"l g
Dipl omacy by mail? WritE' me at 5058 Hawley
Blvd., S.lr1 Diego CA 92116 Al l quer ies wIl l be
answerOO.
NEXT TIME THOSE PESKY NEUTRALS_
II'S JUST that i t shouldn t be more pOpu lM thiln
the feature artIcles. We thin!.. we know why
both t he Flying Tigers arid tl.e WIN I Arlillery
arllcles bombed For one thlTlg, we al ready
know lhat a .. artIcles just aren'T al l that
popular, t he same applies tor art Illery pnd
Worl d War I Secondly, we used somewhat
dllierent approach ITl these two ar ticles. Pll r
tlcul arly th" Flying Tigers artIcle ThIS was the
"narrallve" as opposed 10 tile "analySis" ap
proach We've always felt that the anal y t IC
approach would be besl bu t we telt
we oughl 10 t ry Ihe narral lve approach ag<l ln
JUSI 10 be sure Aside f rom that l esson, the
fea t ures more or less went accor(i lTlg
to t he scnpt
Aga in, we had Confirmed The point that games
are what many people!}6t 5&T for. 97% said'
the 911me5 are worth the space they consume
Iso much lor our semi annual egoboostl Our
"regular" ' features tared less well _ Number one
ITl The ' drop thiS column" category was
Diplomacy (26%1 follOWed by GAMES (25%1.
Pass in Raview 115%1, Incoming M;JiI 113%1.
and Outgoing Mail 12%1 On the second ques
lion, whelher Of not saId col umns shoul d be
restricted 10 one page per issue, the li neup was
somewhat differenl Pass in RBI/jew was lirst
167%1 loll owed by Incoming Mail (65%1,
GAMES 159%1. Dipl omacy (56%) and Outgo
ing Mail 130%). Incoming Mail was dropped
l ast Issue. whi ch l eaves DiplomltCy and GAMES
as lOp candldales f or Ihe <IX
The GAMES column has shown II steady in-
crease in readers since i ssue 17 whi l e the
Diplomacy column has, if anythIng, declined
ITl readership ThIS can be allributed 10 the
"wieleni ng" of our readership 10 include more
people with WI der gaming inl erests We w ill
29

30
def inltelv keep the GAMES column while
keeping eye on tile Di pl omacy column
Me(inwhde, we ",.II carry the gilme DIPLO-
MACY tor those whO are CuriOus. As for th..,
Dipl o macy ' fmc;,,1 Issue mentioned ,1 few
months wd, we rtlCelV(.'(l nothmy defin-
ile as vet from ow D,pl omacy 00110' It's
UP 10 hIm Pass i n ReVIew w,lI Stily. 01 course.
All o f thl!se f",Hures will be resi"clt'd 10 one
page. wilh lheexception 01 Out going Mail (l or
reasons) and. more 01 less, Pass in
Review's Books Received section We are
handling the Books Received se<:l ion it bit
differenTl y Ifom now on We will do il "moni-
revIew" 01 the more worthy books In thet
section. The more we think 01 Ihe book, tOO
more we will say 11 In Ihe BookS
Recei ved sect,on This is \)!ling done mdHl l y
because so IT",ny otherwise ex<;ellerll books
woll hal/I! to wa,t m.my before we con
get 3roUnd to rev,ew,ng ttlem
wI! 45% 01 you felt !nat the
yJmes dnd m.\lcr idl found in the m<l9""ine
were too c(mlplex for the unirlltlatOO F<.lr this
r,"'SOI1 we beg ..", to develoP "[liISI"" verSions of
1111' S& T gJmes 5t_"ting with the I<lst issue,
We' ll cantin"" w,-"kong on thiS It"m. 01 our
two new publl1.;<lt<ons, only one made it 39%
s.ild they wou ld to GAME DESIGN,
42'l1 "maybe" imd 18% "no" For th" Diplo'
macy )uuol.l1 <.lnly 14% Siiid th"v would
subscrilw, 36% :\<lid "maybe" whi le 49% Silid
"no Ou, Inl,oductory Ga1Tll' Kit lor new
subscribers rflceiveQ an 88% "ves" vote. It Wil l
inc-Iud" . .lsid.:' from a letter explilinong to the
new subscriber Whdt he's gotten himself
invQlw-d in, dn "irnroductor(' (,arne called
NAPOLEON AT WATER LOO. It's an Interest
ing g3me, "rid we wil l off"r it (,md Ihe rest 01
Itlt! k'il to reg'JI", subsc.rrbers tor throo Qr four
dQl ldrs, The one we seU wrl l include a new set
of counters lind ru les (in to Ihe
original "nes) 10 provide for a more rea liST IC
dnd compltlx g,m1E 57% Thollghl issue 24 WilS
OOticr Ihil" rssue 23. which is Ilncouraging
24% thought OU' edrtorlal style 100 partrsan
and hiP Jnd should be Toned duwn, 4()"4,
tnoughl II rather "ICy but otherwrse OK while
34% didn't U,ink our wnl ing SIYle unusual.
Different strokes.
On the T 34 game, we found that 30'% uf our
needed no infroduUIUIl 10 minia
jures. The gdme increased the interesl in
miniaturm lor ,1 rurlhllf 27% Out nOI enOUGh
to get Ihen1 irtvolvtld In 2% we,e
whi le The game had no etfect on
39')<. tllerllfore shot Ou, wad on mini,,
Fur the, !1l1nidlures artictps will be fuund
rn the SUPPLEMENT and GAME DES IGN
In our g.:lme poll Ihe t itles we pru-;ented
Wf're choscn in the follOWIng order of preler
ence, Bar barossa, BaUl!! of Moscow, Kot!!a,
Nor mandy , Flying Fort ress, Ce nturion (a/k/a
Legi on . 'JA/a Tac 13 ). 1918, The Flying
Circus, The Rena issa nce of Iniallt ry flighl
of th!! Goeben . Wilen, and rf, we gel around 10
publl shrnq a line of rel"il theV wr ll
probably be rn Ihe "bove order. Barbarossa
(ou r hIlst seller, rnciden"ll(yi has been con
wr ted imo a game covering bOlh Russia and
western Europe cal led WW II No one knows
when il woll be finished and Published JUSI
thought you'd like to know
63')1) interest in a stralegy game
covering The period 19051928 {plus a J ut land
tYPIl game) Again, we don'j know when this
wrll be frnished We lust wanted 10 know il it
would be worth f inishing, Perhaps, The hassle
on the plethora of o rganiLatlon charts!n Ihe
Soviet arilly dflicla in issue 23 was. more or
less. solved. 29% Ihought Ihere \Nefe too many
ehans in thaI article 64% wanted to SOO iI
01 the wide U5l! of ofgJni7allOn
chans. In addlt;on, 7 1% Wil"TOO to sw more
dnta pre5l!nted w,lh J cross between The
ofgani7alion chart and The tabut"r Ch<lft, as
was done in last .lrticlc un the German
army. The drlicle on tt' e Soviel army in issue
23 had a number 01 bad tvpos in iT IvllS,
did roll lor Ihat bOTched job). The worst was
the mangled copy under org.JnildtiOll chart 31
on jhe Sovi et Infant r y Army Here il is as it
was supposed to be
1942-45 SOVIET INFANTRY ARMY - In
1941 the SoViet armies were organin'd much
like their western counterparts. BUI tl1f! shock
of the milial German IIIvaSlon forced them to
throw maS! of their imported wt'stem org,mi'
zarional rheories ou t . The nNe corps waS
abolished IJnd the divisions were conrrolled
directly by the army commander. ThesuPPorl
units allached fa tbe army wt're cut consider
ably Dlso. Up untillare '42 the Soviet "army"
often had less combat power than a German
mfanrry corps. Bvt durmg 1943 Ihey bad. on
tbe Dverage, Ihe strength shawn abOve. BUI thiS
strength could vary considerably. In very qvier
sectors of the front the armv would not only
be stripped of moft of iu support uniu, its
rdle d,viSlons would alSO be put on /I "reduced
strengtb" fOOllllg (therr strenglh would be Cut
30-50'J6/. On the otber band, an army takmg
pari in Iba malll effort of a major offenSIve
wovld have len or more rdle divISIOns (all at
full 51rengrh! plvs an exrrD allOl menl of
artillery and engmf!ers. The really large concen
trations of artrllery (such as the artillery corps,
each containing 1000+ guns! would only be
used m the openmg phares of the at/iJCk. As
tbe ottack moved forward Ihe artillery corps
would remain in place (otherWise they would
JUSt clog the roads) while the army witll lIS
aI/ached arrillery diViSions and bngades moved
vp, DUring 1944 the engmeer strength of Ihe
army grew. More construction baTtalions were
aI/ached permanently. as we'll os a flame
thrower bartaliOn. Combat engmeers were as
signed to the army by the front commander in
a proportiOn of one battalion per rdle diVISiOn.
This, of course. depellded on the situatiOn. As
more and more Amt'fican lend-lease mo/Or
transport became ava,lable more truck bar
tallons were added. FOVf truck ballalions
(1200 trucks! wovld fully motorize a rifle
d,v,swn, only 900 WQuld be needed rf the
diVision's horses were left behind (1700
horses). One truck COmpany (100 "vcks)
could fully motorrze a rrfle barrallon. Durrng
late '43 the ri fle corps waS gradvally reintro
dvced, along wl l h a share of the
support VIIIlS (as shown m rbe cbart above/.
By the end of the wilr the Soviet Infantry
Army was no longer merely the of a
wes tern corps, it was abOUT equal /0 two
western corps. Bm then. b y lata '44, Ibe
RussJaIJS had 48 infan/ry armies in actiOn on
the eastern front.
Only 28% 01 you plaved T34 TI,is compares
to 59% who playoo Tae 14 65% who play"d
Panzer bli!l Pleview , 42% plaVed o,icago
Chicago! , 112% plav(.-oQ Flight of the Goeben
[str ategic) , 32% pldyed Flight of Ihe Goeben
[tact ical) and 11% even played Invasion W,Th
die cut coun lers and better ru)e$ the perce n
Tage should gO e\l!!n tT igher The Vielnam
c.1lllPi'lign analvsis rece,ved a 76% " yes vole
We'll see where ,I is alter f inished
see'"g tillS ,ssue.
37"< wJnted 10 see af1 S UF III S&T
47% rn GAME DESIGN and 12% nOt at all It
woll go into GAME DESIGN Only of you
thuuqht There wme too many un the
feedbiick r
FEEDBACK 24
Rank Artr cle Ral , ng
,
Batt le of Moscow Iga me) 1,55
2 Ou tgoing Ma ll 1.93
3 11 Could Kill 2.14
,
The Flyi ng Tigers 2.16
5 Pass In Review 2.55
G Sackson: On Games 2.57
7 Ar t dle ry on the West FrOnl 2. 59
8 Diplo macy 2.67
9 Warga mer'S No te book 2.74
"
Incom.ng Maol 2.78
Overall 2.14
INoTe laS! 15s"e's owrilll r,1\II'1i w,15 In
!!rtor It sl'ould hilV been 2 31 mSTedO 01
1,96.1
NEXT ISSUE
No. 27 IMay June 19711 Art'Lles on Strategic
Bo mbing Off ensi ve in World War II O\ll!r
GermilTlY, 1066 INornWf1 '[\VilSIQr1 of Erlgldndl
<lnd the Fall of Fr a nce ,940 Gamf' w,1I bt-
1940: Th!! Battle f or France our fIlguldr
leillures
BOOKS (Contuwed from p27.1
comes dear this "',IS ,1)-;0 Ihtl drivinq
which kept Hitler lrom until his armed
forces 1I.xJ comp leted their rebuildin'l Itl",
rlJVV, for p l,,,,,,,.d lu lit! ,ed(IV 1o, wJr
in 194::.)
MO$1 IrllporfilllTly, StJ<'<'r's rlOn origins
and the Idet Th'lI I,is partle" lil r IOU rn Ihe
yoverr1rl1enl was a tedmical, rattler Than pol
ilical one, h"",e l1im to kcL'(>1l ,11J<:!rSVt-'<>
trv!! ur! all of tho characters orl the Third Reich
which no one e lSf' cOl li r! IMd, Of .III me
hooks Wll tlen by thoS!" who (ould hi' callP(l
kev fig"",s i1l tho Gcrrmll1 qovernrnerlt. Speer's
IS recommtmded withOUT
Steve Pat"c k
STRATEGY AND TACTICS
HAS MOVED (AGAIN' )
S& T has moved uP, UP to 23rd SHeel. tllat
" All edltoroal and milrl, " II
SUbSCr iptiOnS and a rdors should hence
fortll be $Cnl to the follOWing i.lddress
Simulati ons Publi cati ons Inc.
34 East 23rd Street
New York , N.Y.
10010
FEEDBACK AND THE FEEDBACK
RESPONSE CARD
Rpad('rs notll tile clla"rw in th.,
rE(OBACK responSE' system which is beinQ
inst l t\ltl'd in U1is issue 01 S80T w" will nu
lon'ler be IIsinil the 8Y, by II Feedback
Ouestionnaire found in previous In.
sWacl, the quest i ons will lX'
nrinh'Ci I!l Ih!! m'l<j,-uin., Jnd till! ,mswms
(jiven 0" the Feedback Response Card ,n-
SE'rtP(t SI'parately in this is>ut'. Incident;llly,
the RflsponS/.l Card is pre-oodrfl!>$ed ilnd
postdCj<l tr(!f! for yoU( convenienoo.
bI'r with til!' corwsoohdiny
whtl'l circling th" answers. Please Circle on l y
one number per ilPlswer lim . Jnd plelilSil be
sure to ,I1lSWl'r al l questions. even il your
answer is "'no o(ljniorl."' This i s Velry impor
tan!. c<>ros wi th incomplete Uf IncorrectlY
circled ,l'\Swms CilTlnot be counted. Wtl'rC
;o"Y about this, but them's JUSt no way
"round lhtl pro<;>lss ir'lg problem. Cards which
are not 111100 out correctly must be tossed
out (which is "sl1iIm .. 1 we want to hllar
from YOU and we want vour opinion 10 be
counted. bUl we only <1Ccompl ish this
with your aSSistance.
m"ans an AVERAGE dnrl <III num-
bers in-between express v"rlous shildes 01
approval or disapproval. "0'" Indicates NO
OPINION Of NO" APPLICABLE.
Yesl No Quest ions: Wh"n the queslions is iI
"yes or no" questlon" 'I" means YES. "2"
mNns NO '"0" meJns NO OP INION ur
NOT APPLICABLE I.
How to U5e the Feedback Response Card:
After you've finished reildioq this issue of
S&T ple"!ie the Fl'f1dlli. ck questions
and give us your opi nions on the ir.sul' and
tim QUllstions 01 ooltorial policv and di rec-
Tiol1 ,lskcd il1 the Fe<'dback sect i OI1. T he
most convenient wav to use th!! card is to
110Id 01 d irect ly alongside th" list of ques-
tions t ilen circle YOl" answernumbers
011 it as vOu roild throu'lh the questiol1s.
Please be sure to match the question nurn-
What the Numbers Mean: GUnIlrally speak
ing. thtlre Me twO types of quest i ons
in lhe Feedback sec t ion III ques-
tions and (21 "yes/no/no opinion"
questions.
Other Quest ions: WIlen dsked
whiCh do not fi t On<' of th .. above C.)tc-
(joril's, the meani"ll 01 tile ,eSPQrl,;e.numt""rs
will be gi ven p"rt 01 that
quesTion. I n sam" ISlUes. less th,1ll BO
qLlestions will be asked in SUcil cascs do nOi
circle numbors 01 un-used answer linf's.
Thanks.
We hope YOU wil l use your Feedback Re-
sponse Card as YOlJr dlrect!irw to Ih"
edilOrs 01 S80T The F("(>dback rt)9:Jlts ,lr.
tively influence tht' content lind direction of
the mag,vine. Evely (minion if yOU
don't voice your feelinQs wfl WOn'l be able
to steer S80T in your d ir{!ctio!l.
FEEDBACK QUESTIONS
DO NOT USE RESPONSE
2 LI NES ONE ,TWO
3 AND THREE
4 rhrough '2 1151< you
tD rare rhe arr,cles on th'i Issue (0
- No Opinion. , - Bad ... 9 -
E1rcellenr!
4 - Wallen 55
5 - Coheslun ,md Disi rl1cgr,1I10rt
6 - Grunt fg..lme)
1 Nort h Africa The N,lVal War
8 GAGE ReView (Luftwaffel
10 - Sachon on Games
11 Outgoing Marl
12 Pass on Review
13 No questiOrl
14 _ No QuestIOn
15 - No Quesl.on
16 - Th,s issue loverall on a scale
01 I 9 )
11 - Was Ihis issu!! better than
the last one}
18 On The
would you
nowl
baSis 01 thi s
re-subscr ibe
,ssue.
right
Rat in.!! Quest i ons: When answerinq a ratin<]
question lsuch <IS whal you thoWght 01 a
part irular article in this iSlUe) circle one
number lrom '"0" throul)h "'9" " 1'" is the
WORST ratmg. "9" is tile BEST rat ing. "'5'"
24 Your age 1-13yedrSoldor
less. 2-14 17. 3=IH-21.
5-28-35; 6-361
25 Your sex
26 EducaTion 1711 yt'laf5 or
less. yea" .
4- 13-15 and slill Ir1 school.
years. 6-1 7+ Y""'5. yeMS
d,ld st1l1 ill ,;chool
27 - How long have you t'en
playmg Game Simulations (}=Ies:s
1h"n 1 Yeilr. 1 1 y{!,jr; years,
. years_
28 What is the number
of YOU 'PI'nd Il l .. y ing G.lme-
edch month O=less
th,1O I. I - I hour. 2-2 hou rs.
9=9+ hours
29 How mallY Game-Si mul
alions do you own (il you hilve
thi s issue. you have at leasl unci
2=2,
30 - Was thiS your f irst 5&1)
31 00 you own a cony of
Oilliomacy?
32 - 00 you play OipJomocy
mqularly)
33 How long do you feel a
"good" !lame $houl d last I
hour or less. 2- 1 hour. 3=12
hours. hours. 5-3-4 hour"5.
6 45 hour"5, hours,
l ong as il lakes.
34 Howald were you when
you fi rst became interested in
GilmeSirnulations) 1- 13 years
old or tess; 2 14 17, 3=18-2 1.
5:28-35. 6,361.
35 - Are you married?
36 I I so, how many children do
you have 2- 2.
. .. 9=9+.
39 - Polit ically, would you con-
sider yourself 1 -radicJI ,
iSI; 4-middle 01 the-
rOdd. fi=very con-
conSllrvati ve.
(O=" None 01 your ddmned bus
iness!"1
40 - TOTal income ul imn"ll'(jiate
f ami l y' I $0 to $3000.
to $5000. 10 $7000.
4-$7001 10 $9000, 5-$9001 10
$11 ,000, 6=$ 11 .001 to S 13:000:
7-$13.001 to $15,000,
8 $15.001 to $20,CXX1 ,
$20.000 10 decline to af'SlWl'r).
4 1 - In what yeal were you
int roduced to Games-Simulations
1 1971. 7=1962 or
1\ -1964.
6- 1966, 7-1967. 8=1968.
9-1900,01970.
42 - How many magazinus (ulher
t l1"n 51!. II do you subscribe to
0- nDr\!. 1, 1. 2=2. ..
43 How were you lirsT intro
dLJ<.:>'<I 10 Silo T 1- Just the
maga7i nll . 2- by a friend, 3- read
'Ibout il i n anol her publicat ion.
4- broch ura. fl .
Rate the followi ng games on a
scale of , (l owest! fO 9 (highesr!
in terms o f ho w good a game
(overall! you thought i t was: put
o next ro the game if you have
not played i t:
44 Korps(AHJ
45 Blitzkr ieg fAH I
46 - Battle 01 the Bulge iAHI
47 OOay (AH)
53 Crete (Sa,.TI
54 B<lfbarossa I rSG)
55 Llllluig iTSGl
56 Waterloo (AH)
51 OeploymenT 11 SGl
58 1 ,,,-,Tie.ll GiIPTh) 3 (TSGJ
59 - l.mnenbllr!l (T$G)
60 I lilly (TSG)
61 Normandy ITSG)
62 19 18 IfSG)
63 (lSGl
64 Fly i ng FortrL'SS 11 SG)
65 12 O'Clod Hig!1 (TSGI
66 Flyin!l Togers (TSGI
67 IS/H)
68 (5& T)
69 Ull the W"II
70 Flight 01 the Gooben
(str<itegid (5& TI
11 rligh t of t he Gooben
Itact ic.<lll (S&TI
72 _ Anlio Beachhead (S& Tl
73 - IAHl
14 - K';{)9Slliel (AHI
75 Stalingra(! 3 nSGI
76 - 1914 ReVision (TSG)
31
19 - 23 In the lollow,ng hilt!
response l ines 119 - 23) ind,cale
III or der 01 prei(!fence the r,ve
areas In which you have the mOSI
Interest l-M,il l afY Hi stor y;
2-General H'S1Ory. Game
Simul at ions (I,ke those III S&Tl.
4-Abst ract Games lIi ke thOse
covered in the Sackson on Games
column!.
wit h minialUfeS." EFOesign
Game Si mulations. Inon
fictionl.
37 _ I n which season 01 the year
do you lind you have the most
time 10 Game Simul at ions
2=Summer, 3=Fall.
4-Winter , part icul ar season_
48 19 14 1AHl 71 - of Br itain Revisi on (TSG)
3B - How many peopl e ind uding
yoursel f will probably read thi s
COllY 01 S& T 1'" 1, 9""'9+.
49 Jutl and IAHI
50 - Anlio IAHl
5 1 - Stali ngrad IAH)
52 - Batt l e of Bri tain (GSI
18 - Tactic,,1 Game 14 (5& T)
19 Bani!! 01 Moscow fS& T)
80 - Cent urion (S&T)


..
STRATEGY I
IS NOW AVAILABLE fOR SHIPMENTI
After !!ltlf'\y months 01 des;,]" and dpveIOJ)-
menl, Strategy I is finally ready. Strategy I
is very Ihe biggest. moSl
encompassing conflict-simulat ion ever 01-
fered to Ihe public. The rules 01 thp game
are wrillen and orqanilOO in a modular
form(lt which enables players \0 recreate
the strale<Jic military and political situiI-
t ions 01 virlually !NcrI,' major conflict
from the lime of Alexander the Greal
righl up 10 tile present day, Tile game is
divided inl0 four hislOricalefas Ancipnt.
Medieval Early Modern, and LilHl Modern.
Each fl,a is fel)resentcd by ill least three
scenarios, Each scenario is il separate and
distinct game which can be played by as
,nany ilS eil/hl or as few as twO pldyers.
A PARTIAL DESCRIPTION OF SOME
OF THE eaUIPMENT IN STRATEGY I :
Tho Map; TWO 29 22 inch mnn
lwhich form a single ginnt playing surface
mea9Jring 44 x 291. The map is primed in
NEW
NOW AVAILABLEI

twO colors on colored stock thereby gi'/in,!
the SiJme d fect as Ih'"," colors. The pa!)e'
u<j(.'(1 is higll quality cardstock. TIm map is
geomorphlc' it may be bUlled 10-
gether and folded in many different ways
in order to farm rnany d ifferent
con figurations.
The Playing PieCH' You get FOUR com-
plete coumersl1eel s giving you a grand
IOt<llof 1020 countersl Of course. not al l
those counters need be used at The same
time some :;cenarios call for on ly a
fraction nf the number ""aitable. The
counters are professionally mounted
die-cu t
The Rules: The rufe s are printed on three
l<irge shet'ts org,mi7{f for ready
reference and easy comprehension.
THE DESIGNERS : Strategy I was de-
signed by John Young, James
Redmond Simonsen and Steve Patrick.
The oqlJipment was deSlgood bv Redmornl
Simonsen.
On Julv 4th, 1943 the Germans launched
tN!!' last Sumrn<;J offensive in Russia.
Seventy-three divisIOns 122 armored or
motorized) atta<;ked the Russian salien t
around Kursk ill cent'al Russia. The Rus-
sians. with over 200 divISlO'lS 1250fthem
nrmoredl, stopped the Germans cold and
then begall the which ended
In Berlin 21 rnomhs later. KURSK is "
d,vision lwei garrn) which realistically re-
all the elements and "What
of th.., Olllllfliji campaIgn. S'x dil/cwnt
game scenarios includ.xf. The historical
one lshowing or igi nal placement of units),
the h,storIcal SItuation allowin'l variable
oot UP. a German attack In M"y Iwhen
,

Strategy I is the filst in the coming
"second-neneration" of Test Series Games
its Qu,lli ty alld (/egroe of "finiSh" Is of
tru ly professional caliber. The enormous
scope a,Xl flexibility of the game will
provide players with an almost endless
number 01 enloyable and highlv var ied
game-situatIOns Strategy I IS completely
new ami game. totally desi'lned
from the bonom up. We fc<!1 players will
gM mNe "game hours" of S<ltislying play
from the games in St rategy I than any
other 'lame currently dVailable.
Strategy I is now avai lable at $10.00 per
copy from:
Simulations PUblicat ions, Inc.
34 East 23rd St reet
New York 10010
Pl ease make checks payable to Simulations
Publicat ions. N. Y. City resident s please
add 6% sale$ ta>< : N.Y. State resident s
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both SlOeS were much but the
RUSSIans had only one defense !i ne), a
German attack on June (when t he Germans
hitd their bf>:;t chance). the SOVICt Summer
OffenSIve (with a map showing exact
Illaccment 01 unIt s) and a scenariO allo'N-
ing thfl Ge. rnans to as.'\urne the strategIC
defenSIve In July. Game includes illr POwel
(tactical!. heavy tank and units
as well as explOItatIon or a.mor penelra
tions. KURSK is one of tht' gP.nc,a-
lion of Test ScrlflS Games. with a high
quality playing board, du, cut covnters
and" comprehensive rules folder. Avail-
able now from Simulations. 34 E 23rd St..
NY 10010 .... $5.00.

33xs
Copyri ght 1971 I SPI I Pri nted in U.S.A.
Company Commander In Viet-Nam
by John Kramer
with John Young lind Redmond A, S,monsen
GENERAL COURSE Of PLAY
The nl,lpbQ.lrd II typical lasta! afIN ot
C8fllral South Vietnam severill small village.
inUlfmixed W,lh forests, streams and ric!! pad
dies A !lrid system has been suoer
ifT\pOS/.'(! O\Ier th" map to the plJyers to
detl'ffl1l!M' mO'lli!mE!nt. positioning, and firing
ra"lIes of thei. units Each Plal/er moneul/llrs
his unrts and fires their weapons at the units of
the Em'my Plijve, The Player controlling Ihe
drsposrlion and movement of Ihe Viet Cung_
the PeaSdnIS, the Caches ano the Dummy
counters is call! Ihe NLf Play.r (Nationdl
Liberation front!. The Plaver controlling the
dispoSition ann m<Nt':me<l1 01 the United StiJtes
inlantr.,. umlS, ARVN Intf!lIig1!nce and Rang.'r
Teams is CJI\ed the U.S. Playet . AI the start of
lhe q..r1l('.[he NLF unin are lurned face down
on thl> IIlo1P. The U.S. Player must eXlJlore this
arroy of fJc;e..down counters in oWer 10 eng.ltIC
tile NLf , Tho NlF must skiUl ully doploy lind
rnanipul.I1. his combat units and dlllnrny
countl'rs in orcler 10 avoid being caugh t In
situ,lIi"n wh"rt! the U,S. Player ean loring to
bear hb sup"rk'r fire,PO'.'\/('(_ The game 15 won
by d<:CUluldtill9 more Gama POinli IhiM1 one's
oppollf'nt Game PoinlS are gained bv lirlnq
upon [r1f'lIly and d!'!stroying enemy
lIQuiprnt!l1t hee Combilt RIKUIIS Tlbl .. ). All
1Jdme5 are I!'n Gam. Turns in durdtion 1$00
SeQuence of PloIY), Players r.hould keep in
mind Ihilt the type of conftict being simulilttJd
In the {lolfN' Is not successfully by
'lmploy ir19 frontalasSdUh IdC-
tic$. Due 10 Ihe way the poinl SVSlcm is
weigh lf'd, tile U,S, Player mus t be especiJ liy
judicious In his inilial placement (i.o, IIrriv,ll by
hf>licoptl!r) and in the tvoe o l operalion he
conduct$. Tho NlF Player is advised to use
hit and run t<Ktio and !rickery in OfcM>r to
extr&<:1 01 high cost lrom the U.S. PlayElf'.
ThIl Gd!! Is sulxlivided into Ihree seu ot
IlJles the Glml lhe Slimdard Glme and
the Standard Game wilh Optional Rul"
aodlld should experience Ihe B.l5k
Game frrSI "nd tllen escalate Ihrouqh IIll!
asctlndi ng .IllYllts of compll>x ily lill t it tl,.,y t iOld
8 with which tl1t.'y IIrl' must
comlOftllble
TERRAIN
There are seven dillerent 01 hexes
repre-senlmq terrain found on the mapboord
that, !O degrtle$ .. llle<;t Ihe play 01 Ihe
\lame
1 Forast - thiCk ue"", SIJrlCh of trees wltll
heavy undergrowl h,
2 T,eeline - lorl'st bordering on clear 01
covered terrain.
3, Broken vatu"s f,om rouqh 'Jround over
lI'ow-n with brush to 9rassldpd,
4 Open - OJh.valod (tlW ,ldddles both
/loaded and drained!.
5, Buildings - grouPS 01 h "ches.
6 Rive.s -" streams,
7, Road"be,m",O,ke. IIle
III Ol)('n terram aloog wh eh the roads are
'00..0
THE PLAYING PIECES
Tile pl"Ylng piecE'S llsed in !hu 9amll SImulate
the vilrious unlls, civilian groups.
oOjPcts and 'Tl(Irler$ tiM! ellt,ct a typical
m,lltar.,. aperatlon, (',II an Irm$ cacha counter
represents erate$ 01 .... ".IJ)Ons. A qood po/lion
01 Ihe counters 'enre!ll!nt noth,ng and are used
by the Nlf Play!'r tu c:unfuSt! tlW U.s Playl"_
The combat units .lntl clV,lial' counters h<IVI!
mo.e than one characteristiC and II"t most 01
! h'" dlten t '01'. A mure co"llJle!e descr IIJ! ion 01
each ;oun te. lollo ....
Amerl<;an Infantry
Americiln Mortar
Pe,sonnlll
Vi., COny Lllader
Viet Corog Milot ..
II
V,et Cnng Hard-core
Guerrilla
Components bv John Kramer
South Vietnamese
Rangers (ARVNI

South Vietnamese
lntelligunce Platoon
American Forward
Db_rver
Medical Aid Tum
Artillery Center
of Impact
U.S. Ammo Supply
EJ
Improved Position
a _
Pinned Malker
[2]
Cuualty
Sniper
Porters
Pea$lnts
Ambush
Anns Cache
Ammunition ClIChe
AdminIstrative Records
Radio Equipment
IJ
RIce Cache
D
Anllpersonnei Traps
Dummy Counter
Attack Strengt h
Anack Strength: this numOOr represents tho
basic offensive strength of the unit. All Sniper
units have an All ack $Iren!}lh of "1 ". Cenain
units h.IVe no Attock Strength, and may nOl
attock.

All other numbers on the units are
superfluous. and for hi:>lorical flallQr only.
34xs
SeQUENCE OF PLAY
Grunt is played in complete turns called Game
Turnl . Each Game Turn is composed of two
Player Turns (U.S. and NLFL Each Player
Turn is composed of two PhilSU a Movement
PhilSe and a C,mbilt Phase. Each Player ex
ecutes his turn in st rict order according 10 the
following outline'
U.s. PLAYER TURN
1. Movement Phase : U.S. Pl ayer moves his
units.
2. Combat Phase: U.s. Player fi res his weapons
and del!!rmincs reSUlts.
NLF PLAYER TURN
1. Movement Phase: NLF Player moves his
un liS
2. Combat Phase: NLF Player fires his wea-
pons and determines resu Its.
COMPLETION OF GAME TURN: Players
record the passage of one complete Game
Turn There are ten Game Turns in a COM
PLETE GAME.
MOVEMENT OF UNITS
Each uni t has a Movement Allowance of
Movement Points. Units are mO\led from
gon to expending one movement
point from their allowance for /lOCh
they are mOIled inlO (regardless of the type of
uni t may be moved or the of terrainL No
uni t may its Allowance in a
single Movement Phase. In any given Move-
ment Phase a player may move many or as
few of Ilis units, in anv direction or combina-
tion of directIons, expending as much 01 as
little of a given unit's Movement All owance
as he desires. The NLF Player may mO\le his
dummy as if they were regular units.
AmmO'. Arms. Rice. Radio. Records. Booby
Trap and Pedsant counters have NO MOVE
MENT ALLOWANCE. Units may move
through Friendly units but they may not SlOp
on top of Friend lv units. Units may not move
througll enemy units. Units may move adJa-
cent 10 enemy units wit hout ooing requ ired 10
SlOp or fight In certain Ci rcumstances (see
Combat 3.5) units may move on to enemy
C3Che units. Onee unit has been moved (and
tile player's hand withdrawn from the cou nter)
II may . not be any fun her in 1I1al
Movement Phase. Movement points may not
bl, ilCCrUL>d from Phase to Phase to Phase or
transferred from unit to unit. No more than
Onf> unit may be placed on a given at t he
same lime
COMBAT
During the Combat Phase of the Plaver Turn.
Players may fire t heir weapons at enemv units.
The firepower of a given combat uni t is
represented by Its Attack Strength. T he unilS
being fi red upon are protected Irom the effects
of fife, according to the type of terrain they
ar" in. The defending units, themselves. do not
possess Iny intrinsic defensive value . t ha pro-
tecti on afforded by the terrain in the
being fired into is called the Oef8nse St rength
Combat is" re50lved by comparing tlte IOtal
Attack Strength of the firing units against the
Dllfense Strength of the hex into which they
are firing. The comparison is staled as a
prohability r<lt lo (oddsl Attacking St rength 10
Defense Stnmgth. These odds are simplified
and rounded off to conform to those fOllnd on
t he Combat Rewlts Table Odds which sim.
pllfy unevenly are rounded off in favor of the
defending units For example, odds of "I I to
3" are rOllnded off to "3 to I." Odds are
calculated In this manner for each separate
attack being made. For each at tack, a d ie is
roUed by the Attacking Player and t he result
line Indicated by thll die-number is read from
the Combat Results Tabte under the appropri-
ate odds heading The resu!t is applied im
mediately , before going on to resolve any
other combat
Ground combat units hiNe a f ire range of eight
hexes That is, they may use their A nilck
Strength iI!Iainst any target which is within an
eight hex radius of their position,
Terrain has t he Defense St rength listed below
Opan hili : one point
Building haK: two points
Brokan tetrain hex : two points
Treel ine or Forest hex : three points
Units IllIIY not fire through wIl ich
contain (e) other units, enemy or friendly; (b)
buildings; (e) forests; (d) road-berm. Units may
ALWAYS fire into en immediately adjacent
heK regardless of what tvpe of tarrain it
contains, Units on roads delend BS if on bro-
terrain.
Notice that the Points Combllt Results Tabla
(which is the table used in the Basic and
Standard games) aside from indicating what
effect enemy lire has upon a target, Indica tes
the numher of game pOints scored by the
attacking playe, for obtaining that result.
Players shoul d keep a running record of the
poin ts they obtain since this is the method by
whiCh the "victor' is de!l!rmined.
Only units which are faceup may be fired
upon. A given unit may not be subjected 10
more lhan one per Attacking Player
Turn. No attacking unit may fire more than
once per Combat Pha!ie. NlF units which are
face-down may fire, but in doing so afe turned
faceup.
More than one unit direct lis fire upon
the same hex the Attack StrengthS of all the
fi ring units are totaled into one combined
Attack point.value a,xI the Combat Results
Table is used once to determine the eliect of
that combined attack,
Uni ts are never fo.ced to fire, attacking is a
volun tary act. Defending uni ts. however, hiNe
no choice liS to whether or nOI they will
receive f ire.
If the defendirlg unit is a Snipilr and t he
Combat Results Table calls for points to be
scored by the al1acker, then the Sniper unit is
destroyed in addi t ion to t hat result.
"Caches" do not obstruct fire. A cache may be
destroyed in t he following manner- move the
al1acking unit OntO the cache and stoP. Do IlOt
move or fire the attacking unit in the next f ull
Playe. Turn. At the end of that full Player
Turn of sitting on the cache, the cache is
automatically destroyed (or captured. if the
Player so wishes). The un il may move and fire
normally in the Player Turn after the cache .s
destroyed (or captured) If the Player decides
to capture Ihe cache, the capturing unit
'c<ttries" !,he cache along with It. II fired upon,
the unit must drop the cache (and subse-
quently go Ihrough the capluring process again
if it wishes 10 it up iI!Iain). Uni ts carrying
caches may not fi re_ The cache may on ly be
dropped as response 10 enemy fire
SETTING UP THE GAME
The NlF Player places and positions all his
counters (Including Peas,lnts) FACE DOWN on
the playing map. The U.S, Player may not
examine any of these face-down counters
wi t hOllt first going thrOllgh a discovery pro-
cedure (" Probing' in the Basic Game; "Search-
ing' in the Standard Gamel. The NlF Player
may rll-exami ne facedown units at any time.
The U,S. Player's units are used FACE UP on
the map. After the NLF Player has placed all
his uni ts and dummy counters on the map, lhe
game commences wi t h the US. units arrfving
on the map by helicopter, The quantities and
types of units in play in II given game are lisled
in Ihe Order-ofBattle char ts. Players should
use the Basic Game Order of Bail ie and rules
for lhe first few games, Note: No units (of
either side) may be initially placed (or landed
by 'copter) WITHIN FOUR HEXES OF THE
MAP EDGES.
ARRI VING BY HELI COPTER ;
The helicopters in the game are no t repre-
sented by actual helicopter counters. They are
represen ted by the ability to place-on and
lilt-off units from the map. Each helicopter
may carry ei t her one combaT uni T
or twO Headquarters, Forward ObreNer, or
Medical units. Helicopters land and unload and
li ftoff again, all In the s.ame Movemen t Phase,
Halicoptefs do not trace their path o f ap-
proach to the landing zone simply place the
units they are de livering directly on the he. in
which they are landing. In two-Player games,
VC Guarrill;o units may fire at l he
helicoPtefs as they are landing Helicopters
(and the units in theml defend with a strength
01 Y.r point regardless of the terrain in which
they are landing. The NlF Player fires at the
helicopters during the U.S. Player's Movement
Phase. Helicopters must land the initiaiunits in
a continuous chain of hexes. No more than
one helicopter-load of units may land or
take-off in a given hex in a given Player Turn.
Units may not move or fire in the Player Turn
in which they arrive by helicopter (exception
in the Solilaire Game they MAY move in the
,lfrival turnl. Helicopters may only land/liftoH
from optln or hfokt!lntur".in hexes. t n the
Basic and Standnrd Games, the U.S. Player has
enough helicopter capaci ty to land or lift a
single Company.
THE SO LITAIRE GAME
Place all N IF, Peasant, and Dummy counters
face-down on the map, Shuffle them around
unlll Ihey are thoroughly intermixed, Ihen
p lace one cOllnter per hexiI!Ion in any son of
pallern, scattering them over the map. Ploce
one counter in each building hex. Do not
examine any of t he cOllnters. land the Ameri-
can torces and move them in the Ittrn of
landing as much as desired within the si x- heX
per Movement Phase limitation, stopping each
American unit as It comes adjacent to an
uDside-down counter, After moving all the
American units, turn over any a!xI all upside-
down cOlln ters to which they are adjacent.
American units may not fire at NLF units
during the U.S. Combat Phase immediately
following Ihe Movement Phase in which they
were turned face-up. The American unitls)
whiCh discovers an NLF uni t may not moye
away until the NLF uni t is destroyed. NlF
35)(5
uni lS which are t urned face-up MUST fi re !It
Ihe moSI American unh lor the
closest if Iwo or mora targets are equally
NLF units may not be moved even
after being turned f<lce up.
BASIC TWOPLAVER GAME
The Two-Player Game proceeds exactly as the
Solit<me Game with Ihe followong modifica-
lions'
a. The NLF Player may set up and move as he
so desires.
b. Peasants may not be moved and may nOI be
placed in foresl Up to twO peasant
COlJnters may be placed in treeline
c. The NlF may fire his units as desired. Firing
unils mus t be face up or be turned face-up as
they are fired
d. Amer ican units may not move in the Player
Turn In which they land.
e. NLF Hardcore units mav lire at helicoPlers
as they land. This fire takes place during the
U.S. Player's Movement Phase. Such NLF units
are nOI lurned loceup clue to being lired .
1. The Americans d iscover NLF unils using t he
Probe tet:hnique (see below!. Soth the
taire and the Basic Two Player Game afll ten
Game Turns long.
PROBE
In the Two-Player Sasic Game . the U.S. Player
discovers N IF units by announcing a Probe of
any lor i111) SUSP6Cled Enemy occupied
to whiCh the U.S. player has units .tdJacenl.
Probing takes place after the U.S. M(Nement
Phase and before the Combat Phase. U.S. uni ts
MA V NOT fi re inlO a which was probed in
the Movement Phase of that Ptayer Turn. Once
turned faceup, a unit may not be lurned
'acedown again. Only one U.S. unit is neces..
sary to probe a given and only one
per Player Tu rn may be probed by a given
uni t. Should Iha U.S. Player unc(Ner an
Anti-Personnel Trap in a Probe. t he units
irrvolved immediately undergo an anack at "3
to I" odds (rll<jardless of Terrain). Anli
Personnel Traps are also referred to as "Sooby
Traps."'
PINNING
Units which are fired upon are of ten pinned as
II re!lJ1t of that fire. When g,Jch a resull is
cal led for by Ihe Combat Resulls Table. ploce
a Pinned Marker on the unil(s) in question.
EJ
Units which have been pinned may not move
or fire in their ensuing Player Turn. Remove
the Pinned Marker at the end of the pinned
units' Player Turn. HelicopTerS are nOI pinned
bul uni ts being landed by t hem are.
"VICTORY" CONDITIONS:
The game is won on poims. Players are
wvarded points when CIlrtain resul ts occur on
the Combat Results Table and (in the case of
the U.SJ by destroyirog or capturing enemy
supply and materiel caches. Players Should
keep a running total of Ihe points t hey reCll;"'e.
At The end 01 ten complete Game-Turns tile
Player wi th the most poinlS may decl are
himself .the winner. I f both Players hiNe an
equal number 01 points. then bot h may declare
"victory."
If the U.S. Headquarters li.e. Ihe Company
Commanded unit isdeslroyed. the U.S. Player
may not declare himself the victor since
Isymbolically at least ) he is no longer capable
of cI!!Claring anything. In this eventuality. the
NLF Player may declare himse lf the "victor"
no matter how many or how few poin ts he has
accrued.
THE STANDARD GAME
The Slandard Game is an of the
B,lSic Game which incorporates additional
ru les at tempting greater realism. but without
hindering the easy flow of ' playabilitv." The
rules of the Basic Game should be carried
forward incorporating t he changes.
and addi t ions as noted in Ihe following set of
rules.
CHANGES AND MOOIFICATIONS TO THE
BASIC RULES:
1. Range and LineofSight: The
range of f ire is still eighl hexes. Plavers must,
however. more carefully calculate tha line-of
sight Ihrough which their fl rc courses. Fi rst.
determine whether a target hex is within The
range; then (except in the most
obivous cases) use a straight edge (such as a
ruler) to cle1i!rmine through which hexes the
line-ofsight passes: place the ruler along Ihe
li ne described bv the center points of the firing
hex and the target hex if at any point along
the way. the straightedge ()Jts Ihrough a
containing buildings. fores ts. treeli ne or berm
or unilS. then the path of patl.!Jltial fire is
SloOped i1t that hex (i.e. t he lineolsighl is
obstructed!. A broken obstructs
fire if il is four or more hexes from Ihe firing
unit and in the Tine of sight_ Broken Terrain
closer four to thE! firing unit
limil Ihe maximum range of Iha t unit's fire to
four hex es.. If al l Ihe intervening hexes are
open. terrain then the lineof sight is nOI 0b-
structed. For exampl e. a unit in a treeline
could nre at a unit in broken terrain il all the
in between were open terrain. Rivers
hiNe no eilect on t he line-olsight. Units
capable of fire may always fire into adjacent
hexfls.
The Defense Strength of terrain is not al tered
from that 01 Ihe Basic Game.
2. Stacking (mar, than Onfl Friflndly unit per
hex) : Uni ts may be stacked as many to a
as thE! Player wishes.. The number of units in a
does nOI increase or diminish the Defense
Strenglh of that Units landing or lifting
off in helicoplers are slill subjet:t to the
stocking limits of the Basic Game. Combal
reSlJits apply to al! unilS in a
3. Hiding, The NLF Player may lurn face
down iagainiany of his combat units whicl1 do
not fire in that Player Turn which arB nOI
in open or broken terrain hexes inlo which Ihe
U,S, units have a line-ofsight.
4. Landing Tactics: The U.S. Player need nOI
land all his units in one cont inuous line.
Landings may be divided Into separate groups
of cont iguous units as long as no 9rouP is less
than a platoon (four SQuads)
Search
The Probe rule is no longer used 10 locate
hklden unlts. rather the American player mav
move on top of over turned uni ts; after tile
American player has finished m(Ning. the NLF
player informs Ihe American if he hils moved
on top of any combat uni ts. If the American
has, he moves back to the hex from which he
entered the occupied he)(, In those Mexes not
ocwpied by combat un its, the American may
uncover the un its by expending three Move-
me"'t Points from that Plaver Turn's Allow
anoo, if they wish to destroy or captu re 11
CltChl , they must s.pend another Pl ayer Turn in
the he)( in a pinned position,
Booby' Trap,
If the U.S, Player moves on top of a boobv
trap, the units involved undergo a "3-t0.1"
allack immediately, The NLF Player must tel l
the US, player thaI his units have landed in a
Booby Trap IMMEDIATELY. The U,S. unit
does not e)(pend the three movement point
cost in order to uncover a Booby Trap in his
next Movement Phase. Uni ts may not f ire
while on Booby Traps. Units receive cag;alt ies
lor lose pointsl from Booby Traps as called for
by the Combat Resul ts Table, but they do not
suffer the pinning eff ect If, for some odd
reason. the US player should leave units on a
booby trap, thev suffer the effe<;;ts again (and
the NlF Player remarks upon the apt ness of
the name of the tranl. NlF units never suffer
the eff ects of their own Booby TrilPs, Caches
stacked wllh Booby Traps are destroyed and
the POints lor them awarded upon the Irap
being sprur19 for ttle fir st time. The Booby
Tran IS never "used up" and affects any U.S.
unit that dares to enter it again. Face d own
peasants or NlF units may not be placed in
Booby Traps, although the NLF may move
through them. Faceup NLF units may Slack
on a Booby Trap.
When using ihe Optional CaSlJalty Combat
Results system, U,S, units whid1 incur cag;a l
ties on Boobv Traps may move off !he Booby
Trap but may not lUke the casualties with
them. Only Modical units may remove casual.
lies (and su ff er the effects of the Booby Trap
in order to do so)
ADDITIONS
In addI t ion to the above modI fi cations, these
new rules are introduced
Fire Rettfl clion
Units may on ly fire or move in the same turn,
never both.
Terrai n Restric:t ions
Movement into forest or tree-line he)(es COSIS
three Movement Points: movement into bro
ki n terrain costs two Movement Points: move-
ment across a river hex side costs one addition-
al Movement Point (in addIt ion to any other
costs) Movement into open terrain, buildings,
or along roads costs one MOvement Point per
hex.
Port ers
Some NLF OrdersofBattie make provision for
porlars These units mav move onto caches,
radio and records in one turn move olf
with anI! of t!lese otller units in t heir
turn. I t costs three Movement Points for a
porter to load and to unload his burden.
Porters are removed from the board (de-
stroyool as soon as the AmerIcans fi re at them;
they may be captured by the Americans
simply by moving a uni t on top 01 IIlem.
36)(5
Interrogation
When ARVN units come across peasants they
may stop to inter rogate them. Peasan ts under
interrogation may nOI be moved. At t he end of
t he next complete turn after the c",il ians have
been under interrogation by the ARVN coun-
ters, a die is rol led and the results determined
and acted upon. (See Interrogation Rewlts
Tabl e)
Only one " interrogation-roll" is permitted per
Game Turn. Only one NLF uni t of a given
type may be "exposed" po.- game. The ARVN
counter must be stacked wit h an American
unit of any type for the interrogation to be
effective.
If you interrogate 11 porter, you may roll the
die twice and use both resu lts. Units uncovered
by interrogal ion may not be moved by the
NlF Player.
Command ContrOl
INLF on ly) NLF units have to depend on
voice signals and whistles or horns lor what-
ever). NLF units may only move if They are
within five hexes in open or broken terrain lor
wi thi n three in forest terrainl of a leader
c:ounter The leader counters must be used to
move troops. Snipers need no leader units.
Uni tsdO not need leaders to fire.
Civilians
US. units may not cause the NLF Player 10
turn 11 Vietnamese counter over lexcePt
through "Search"l unless it is within the U.S.
unit's line.ofsight In open terrain. If the
counter IS a dummy counter turn it over and
remOve it from the game. II the counter
con tains people leither civilians or NlF), t he
NLF Player tells the U.S Player this fact, but
does not further identify tile counter as to
whether it con tains civilians of NLF, The U.S.
unit can fire on the unidenti fied uni t, and try
to pin it, but if they hit c;ivilians they give
points to the NLF. If the NLF hit civilians in
the course of fighllng, they give points to the
U.S. Player. In general, NLF Plaver may move
all upside-down counters civilians) all
over the p lace.
Var iabl e Ordersof -Baule
VariOUS scenarios are provided on the ini t ial
OrderofBattl e CharI" they vary in ini t ial
strength for the NlF, and in ini t ial deploy-
ment for the Americans. Since various mi xes
of strengths and t ime-ofcommilmen t will
Quite naturally yiek:! different results in terms
of points, Game Points are given 10 the other
p layer, when YOl.J d100se your Orderof-Battle
or planofcommi t ment, to serve as a balancing
weight. If the American wishes to commit
more t roops, he must wri te down the com-
mitment order. and place it in a visible place,
although the contents may be hidden, To
cover his act ivities, he may pretend to write
down orders every turn, and place them in a
pile. If the order iswriuen on Game Turn One,
t he troops I;md on Game Turn Four, with a
simi lar delay occurring for orders written in
later Game Turns.
39xs
NLF Play.!r reullves 15 pOin ts for U.S WIA
and 30 poillls for KIA.
US Playf'r reC('ivf!S 100 pamts tor evacuating
N LF rucords
SITUATlON TWO
SECURE LANDING ZONE
The mission 01 the company is to air assault
into The arBa 01 the map and secure tile
zone pruscr<bed by banallon. This area IS to be
clf'ared of all e ... emy units that could interdlct
the establis.hment of this a"heacl for fu turll
operations. This is it kev part of a larger
operation. its successlul completion is to be
achilNed at all casu .
One ARVN Aanger company will be attactled.
The ARVN Rangers may land directly on
forest hexes.
The company will have on call ilnillery fire
suPPOrt nnd will h<llJ() attlldmd two FO partic-s
to coordinate
Thf're w!l l he In on the landing zone
to be coordinatf'd by the company commander
before the assault
Ttw company has !wen erlOugh SOl
ties to lifl one ha lf of the dssigncd troops. the
remarnd", will land during the movement
panion ollhe Fourth Player Turn. The second
lill wi ll carry enough extra for 4B
lire turns, (ie .. 118 units of fire In two Ammo
Supply units).
Th .. mission mUSI be compt<!too in one hour
ORDER OF BATTLE CHART
(i.e . the game ends alter te ... turnsl
Award Ihe NLF 70 Game Points lor this
situation.
NLF Player receives 10 points for each
WIA and 20 lor each KIA. U.S Plaver receives
only half Ihe pain ts for enemy caches
SITUATION THREE
EAGLE FLIGHT
Tn.. company is on ramp along side Ihe
eagle flight lift ships, on call 10 support ARVN
Ranger units operating in tn.. brigade area of
ooeratlOns.
The ARVN Ranger is landed anywn..re on The
playing map lin forest hexes they can use the
"rappel" technique to exit l ile helicopterl.
whe ... this unit becomes engaged or uncovers
either or through int!lr rO!)Btion any
enemy material caches mller than rice. lhe
company m,)y be committed imd will arrive on
tim movement portion of the Second Plaver
Turn af ler they are callfld.
The cornoany has attached two FO partiflS 10
coordinate artil lery fire support
nl<!re ",e enough lilt shios 10 transport the
entire cornp any
misslofl will be ev"lu one hour aflllr
r he mission will be evaluated one hour af ter
the company has b",>n committed. Ii.t! . Ihe
game <!nds <llI!!r ten lurnsl.
Award lhe NLF 90 Game Pornts for this
situation
Basic
Game
Mobile

Camp
Mobi le
Training
Camp
Day.
'"
0.,
Supply
Depot
NL'
Inf . Held
Company Area
Peasants
10 12
3 4
Records
1 1
Ritdio
1 1
Ammunitron
2 2
Arms
1 1
Sniper
2
VC Militia
6
HardCore VC
3 3
Porter
6
Commander
2
Dummy
7 26
Points to US
60
UNITS
Infanlry Squild
Mortar Sauad
ARVN Intelligence Team
Mftdical Team

Forward Observer
Company Comffiilnder
12

1
1
4
4
2
6
6
6
3
2
12
60
BASIC GAME
12
1
12

6
42
12
8
1
1
4
3
3
3
3
1
4
23
12
6
4
3
9
4
3
20
50
STANDARD GAME:
Company Platoon
12 4
2
1
3 1
2
1
12
6
1
4
6
9
2
3
4
14
100
Deployment OptiOns :
1 AS'l3ullt : Land entire company On Game
Turn DOll. Award NLF 75 points.
2, eait: Land one platoon In first Game Turn,
remainder of company on call. NLF receive TO
Game Points for ini t inl platoon, 40 additional
Game Points if remainder of company IS
committed
3. Ground Drive : All U.S. units enter on roads
U!le same erllry options as described in Assau It
and Bait If entire company is committed in a
Ground Assault on Game Turn One, award
NLF 50 Game Poin ts. If platoon is used as
Bait, award NLF 10 points for platoon and 30
additional Game Points if remainder is com
mitted.
<1 Reinforcemant Option: In all of the l irst
three options, an addit ional company may 00
c<llied in. Award NLF 100 Gamtl Points if this
option IS exercised. Reinforcing company may
not arrive in lirst Game Turn
5, Ai. Strika Option: In al l of the above, Air
lTl3y 00 called in as per thE' Air Strike
rules, Each str ike used aw,'rds the NLF 15
Game Points
USING THE DEPLOYMENT OPTIONS
The U S Player does not hilve to IInnounce hi!
intentions in ildvance Once he c:;alls in rein
forC1lments leithar t he remainder of the f irst
company or by the ent ire second company)
tlley must appear Reonforcernents arriving by
helicopter appear three U,S. Movemf>nt Phases
alter the Movement PhaSll in which Ihey are
called, The U,S. Player must !lecretiy write
down the ca ll for reinlorwments and show the
order to the NLF Player when the reinforce,
ments arrive. Such orders shou ld be kept in
plain (fare-down) unti l such time as they
are shown to the NLF The U.S, Player
wri te lake orders each lurn to prevent Ihe NLF
lrom knOllVing exact ly what is happen ing,
Dummy orders should 00 plainly marked as
such in order 10 avoid confusion and recrimi
nations. Reinforcements arrivin<] by ground
travel appear on the third U.S. Movement
Phase after the Movemel'l\ PI')i\SC in which they
are cal led Tim US, Player must indicate on
the orderslip which road Ihe ground reinlorce
mf>nlS will enter on ,lnd from which direction.
CHAIN OF COMMAND: ORDERS FROM
HIGHER HEADOUARTERS
The four sets 01 "orders" and mission outlines
which foliOllV, are to be employed in pl"ce of
the Standard Deployment Oplions. Each of
the games under Ihese orders is len Game
Turns in duration. Notice that in some of the
orders changes h""e been made 10 the Order
of-Banle. The U,S. may decide to usc a
random method of selecting his orders or he
may choose a sct. In any the orders he is
operat ing under should not be revealed to the
NLF Player unlll the end of Ihe game. To
select orders at random (which is more redliS-
tiC) the US, Player should write the names 0'
Ihe orders on four separate slips 01 paper and
select ooa, il lace down but in view
of the NlF Player aller it has been read by t he
US This rule should 00 used with Ihe Cas-
ualty CRT
SITUATION ONE
SEARCH AND DESTROY NO. One
The mi9Sion of the compilrly Is to patrol the
area of the Game Map in search of enemy
personnel, equ ipment and supplies. This mis-
sion is 10 gal her intelligence and to disrupt the
enemy lines of communicat ions, and supply. If
more than light enemy act ,vity isencounlered,
the comrr,ander is only to engage the enemy to
insure the safety of his men.
All enemy suspects, prisoners and intelligence
materiel to 00 collected and prepared for
evacuation That which cannot be co llected is
10 be destroyed.
The company will have allached one ARVN
recon platoon, this unit is 10 be utlliled to the
fullest for gather ing information on tile
enemy's activ ities,
The commarlder is 10 press vigorously toward
the completion of his mission, however
ties are to be avoided with equal concern
The company wol l have fire gJpporl from one
artillery two artill"ry Forward Ob-
seNer panoes will 00 attached to Ihe company
to coordinate these fires
There w,1I be no support.
The mission will be evdhjllted at !I'e end of one
hour; i.e. game ends OIlier len turns
The company has been assignP.d enough "sor
tics" to lift half the company plus .1113ChOO
elements III the inl t'd l lift; the lilt ships will
retllrn to tile BattalIon up lOne and lif t
the remainder of the by the Fourth
Game Turn's movement portion.
Award NLF 80 Game Points to, this silualiorl,
NLF Player receives 30 polms for each U.S,
WIA and 60 points for each U.S KIA,
SITUATION ONE (Altarnate)
SEARCH AND DESTROY NO. Two
I nlelligence has determined Ihat the has
collected records of critical importance to his
war effort in tile by the milp
The comnany is to air assau lt into this area and
uncover and ca"'ture thesc records caches, Due
to the importance put onto these records by
Division. every elfort must 00 made to $CCI.HE'
them. The commander is to avoOd unnecessary
risks; however. he s1lOUid engage the
enemy If he feels it wi ll lead to the
completion of his mission
The company will have attoched one ARVN
reCOil IJlatooll.
The company wi ll have artillery l ire SU\JpOrt
and wil l have IWO artille'y Forward DbWrvef
parties attached to coordinnle these f ires.
The company has heen al locatoo two air
strikes "On clIl l" to be used by the commander
as ri"quired
The company has been assigned enOUgll sorties
to lift ha lf the company plus attached ele-
mf>nts in lhe mitial lift, the lilt ships will
relurn to lhe Battalion pick up zone and lift
the remainder of Ihe company by the move-
mf>nt porllon of the Fourth Game Turn. The
mission will 00 evaluated at the end of one
hour (j,e, the game erids after ten turns).
Award Ihe NLF 65 Game Points lor this
Situat ion.
OnCall Air Strike
When the U,S. Player is not ilied th<:ot he has an
;lir strike he makes a die roll, the
number indicates the number of Gaf'rl<l Turns
he must wait until the sl rike will place.
The strike must take place on that turn or be
cancelled.
Air Suike Procedure :
In the turn tllat the air strike takes place, tht>
U.S Player points out eight !Iexes to be
attacked. These hexes must be in contact with
each other on al least two sides, (i.e, eadl hex
must be adjacent to at leasl two OTher STrike
hexes) The U.S then rolls tho die l our
times (once for each bomb run). Each hex in
the impacT area attacked with a strength of
"9" for e<lch die-roll. If a hex is occupied. the
terrain datermines thaT unit's defense. All
material in a hex under air attack is considered
destroyed if 11 "KIA" is rolloo, if the material
is ammunition, It Is exploooo and is scored
imml'd iately Idue to se<:ondary explosions). all
ot her materia l is scored only il US uniTS pass
through the hex on a follow up swoop.
No part of the impact area may be within four
hexes 01 a friendly unit if the unil is in open,
broken, building or Treelina hexes and six
flexes in a fares\. If a stream passes between all
the frierdly units and the impact area. the
strike may be milde within three hexes 01 a
friendly unit no matter !!lrrain the
unit IS 111,
SuppreSSIve Fire from Lift Helicopters and
Escort Gunships
When tim fift heficopters are mnbng l heir final
approach to the aSS3l.llt landing lOne, the dOOf
gunners and The gunships begin liring into
SUspected enemy firing pOirllS. During lhe
land ing move 01 the U,S Player's turn, he may
fire on any open, building or treeline
wi thin lineolsight an(! eight hexes of The
landing units. The helicopters f ire on the target
with a l ire strength 01 three points each,
This is fairlv "pinpoint' fire and onlv The
target hexes are aHected. HQlicopters may not
fire through other landing helicopters nor in to
10resT
When a helicopter lands to pick up woun(!ed
or land addITiona l U S, ammunition, it receives
The fire of TWO "Huey Cobra' gun-
ships, each wilh an Atl<lck Strength of fiva.
They are considered subject to the same f ire
considerations given in 10.1. When landing
ammunition or picking up wounded with This
rule, the helicopter spends one turn on t he
ground. It lands on ona turn and Ta kes olf on
the thus permitting the NLf to fi re at It
thrill! times once during londing, onoo during
the NLF PloyerTurn in which the 'copter is
"on the ground:' and once as It lif ts all
Body Count
When using the Artillery andlor the Air Strike
rule, the U.S. player does not
receive Ihe points for casualties against the
NLF or destroying caches (by Air Strike only)
however, the NLF automatically receiYes the
poirns if peasaflts casualties.
In Cil9.lal!ies inflicted trom aU forms of action
by The U,S" Including ground fire, Ihe U.S.
must pass a unit over the destroyed cache
(destroyed caches may not be mOIled by
ponersl or the NLF casualties in Qfder to
re<:eive the poin ts tor the damage inf licted, this
is not the :I(Ime as getting points lor abandoned
ca9.lalties, whlclt muST be picked up by meai
38xs
cal units to gain these points. As any NLF
units may carry CdSuoltie-s (though t hey may
not fi re while so burdened). it can be seen t hat
t he U.S. Player wi ll al times have di ff icu lty
proying losses inl licted.
Victory Conditions: Variable
As we all know, yictory is no t as straightfor-
ward and clear ly def ined a5 some would like it
Winning by five points is obviously not as
satisfactory as winning by 255 points. Here is
how to distinguish the levels of "victory"
"Reported Victory"
One Plaver scores between 100% am 150% of
the enemy's points. Rellii t - yictory is re-
pOrted in press, Company Commander.
whether American or NLF, improves his image
slightlV.
'Notable Succus'
One Player scores betwoon 150% and 2OQ% of
the enemy's points. Result - enemy withdraws
orderly, Company Commander is comrnended.
may receive citation
"Torning Point"
One Player scores Oller 200% 01 the enemy's
points. Result - turning point 11"1 war is
announcOO to press; Company Commander
receives medal, may be promoted.
Order-ofBattle
Various Orders-olBattle are provided for [he
Player's greater edification. Each Player in
effect can chOO'le [heir own 'game plan' ,
however, Players are warned doIJa inst following
Iheir natural inst incts and choosing the
strongest Order-ai-Battle, as this may give
enough points to the enemy 10 lo:! you the
game. Moraover, Ihe more you h;Ne on the
board the more poinTS you are capable of
losing
Following the Orders-of Baule four experi.
mental situations, the U,S. may take any of
these and attempt to follow the orders to the
best of his abi lity. the games are scored in Ihe
u9.lal l ashion, but the U.S. Plaver has the
additional satisfaction of completing his
orders. In any event. [he Players should not
reveal each other's setup unt il the end of the
game, when ttle points for These things are
added in to the points received lor casualty.
causaTion. If players wish, the game m be
extended, but th is must be agrt'ed upon before
plav starts, No game may be longer 80
turns
NLF Order of Battle Chart
Each OrderolBatt le represents The type and
quantity of NLF units in the area being
aSSilu lted by t he U.S. troops, in a given game
SIlt-UP. The heildings at tlte laps of Ihe
OrderofBatt le co lumns, identify what sort of
general setting or situaTion the NLF units are
in. The numbers in the to!umns give the exact
quantities of speci fi c types of units or counters
10 be deployed by the NLF Player. In ad
di t ion, t lte choice of a given
requires that the US. Pillyer tJc awarded a
certa in number of Game Points above and
beyond any that he may "earn' In the tourse
of the game. Note : If the NLF Plaver uses t he
"Day tn-Day" set up and tho U.S. Player does
not discover and declare this filc t by the end 01
t he fourth U.S. Player Turn, Then the U.S.
Plaver loses The game. If he wrong ly declares
some other set up to be "'Daytn-DoV" then he
also lose!.
37)( s
N
h
)
+
>---<
\
Each of the six guns In
the battery allack II
each gun has an allack
strengtn of pOin ts,
Combat is re-
solved in the uSlml manner The line,ol-sight 01
an F,D, extends i"definitely through open
terrllin, The line,of sigh t of an F,D is re-
stricted to normal firing ranges arId Ilmit,lIians
it at any point it passes through broken, forest,
building, berm, or treeline hexes
The artillery rounds 1105mml <lIlack all per
sonnel in the enemy, friondly, civdian,
how""er, they do not attack materiel 11.0.,
COIJn1f'rs which do not r<,present people)
The F .D, may call down lore even if the F .D, is
pinned
Lofting and Shilt ing 01 Fires
The U,S, Player may change his Centerof
Impact up to four hexes in anv dJfE!Ction
during the wrne Combat Phase 01 his Player
Turn this, in effect gives tile U_S. Player TWD
Centers-of Impact during thaT Phasc over
which to distribute the I,re of his quns_
Subsequent Fire Minion$
Once the Allied Player has execut ed a fire
mission, he may change his Center-ol-Impact
in subsequent Plaver Turns. up to 20 hexes in
any direction without the Adlustment Phasc
penalty In tim Combat Phase of his turn, he
simply moves his Center-of Impact marker
However, the new Centl!r-ol-Impact must be in
the F ,O.'s line-of sigtl1, If tho shih is more
than 20 hexes, he must consult AdjUST
rnefll Phase Table again.
The American may never place his Centerol
Impact within of friend ly troops
which are in clear or broken terrain or withm
four hexes of friendlv !roops in lorest5.
If the F.O. is With the forward most unit or
ahead of the forward-most unit, the U.S.
Player may move his Center-ai-Impact 10
within four oi friendly units in open or
broken terrain and within twO Mxes of any
frKlndly troops in forest terrain
Unobserved Fire
If the F.D. or other U.S. unit cannot observe
the spot wherc the Center-of-Impact marker is
placed, he must mil the d ie twice to determine
rnl Celller,ollmp.Jct_
TllC first tlie-roll indicates range error il the
number on the die is "even" move the Center-
oflmpact marker nOrlh of the intended target
by that many hoxes The second tlie-rol l
determines deflection ermr, Move the Center-
of I mpact counter east Iii the number Is evenl
by that many hlllleS. weSI ilthe number is odd_
This linal posi t ion 01 Ihe marker is vour real
Center,ol..tmpact. If doubt arises as to which
of two possible hexes is true-eas\. west, north

or south, roll the die to sett lo the argument
The impact pallern is the same as in Observed
Fire. If yOU shih fire, and the Center-of
Impact counter is still unobserved. you must
repeat1l1e Unobserved Fire Procedure_
If shifting observed iire in the same Combat
Phase and the seCOnd plarement 01 the Center
of ImpilCt counter cannot be observed, you
muSI use the Unobserved Fire Procedure. IYou
might end up where vou started!)
Fieldsof Fire
When an inlantry unit lires its weapons it
creates a lield at lire or "kill lOne" that
ell tends out 10 the maximum range of the
weapons. In the game, if a unit is firing at
another Un it, the in line with the
firing unit and the target and up 10 t hQ
maximum effective range lor the terrain in
valved must be considered under fire as well.
MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE RANGE IN HEXES
PER TERRAIN a/clear, 4/broken, 1/lorest
EXAMPLE,
A U_S. SQuad Ilfes from a treelinll hex at a VC
SQuad thaI is four hexes away. There is also 8
VC uni t six hexes away and in line w,th both
the U_S. unit and the lirst VC unit the second
VC unit is in the "kill zone" of Ihe firing unit
and must undergo anack, If the second unit
had been a U.S. unit It would have to undergo
anack as well.
When a unit has fired on another unit and
established a field of lire. the "kill zone"
persists onto the Enemy Player's Movement
Pha'".!!_ Any Unil thaI wishes to move through a
unit's field of lire mUSt stop and undergo
attack, If the Combat Resu Its T able shows "no
effect," it may continue on its way This
applies for friendly a5 well as enemy fieldS of
fire. A player may establish 11 field 01 fire in his
/ire turn in order to denv the enemy free
passage through that par licular area during the
enemy's Movement Phase of his turn, (suppres-
sive fore )
For maximum rea li sm Ihere should be i!
further 70ne that beyond the max,-
mum eftective range at weapons by one half
thA distanC('_ In other words, weapons-li,e can
be considered to 00 able 10 cause casualties up
to twelve hexes in open terrain, six in
broken terrain and two hexes in fores t terrain.
The effeet on any unit caught in thege extra
zones IS ';' of the IlIiflg unit's Attack Strength.
This gelling in each o t her's line of fire IS a
major concern 01 tile COf1lp.Jnys leaders.
AIR STRIKES
Air strikes are a!tacks on kflOwn or SU5jJected
enemy positions by U.s Air ForC(' lighter-
bombers. These at tacks Me coord inated by tha
C.O, and the F.D. on the ground and an Air
Force FAC airborne in the area. There are two
types of air supporl
Pre Planned Ait Strike
The US. Player marks down on a piece 01
paper on what Game Turn he wants an air
strike \0 take place, it must then take place On
Ihat or be cancelle<.l. If he wants to use
the preplanned air str ike during his first Player
Turn as a preparation on the landing lane he
must mark down the impact-area. The strike
takes place before he Innds his troops.
Optional Rules
These rules a.e additions Which lend a st il l
more rea listic tenor to the game, bu t which, to
some degree, roouce plilyabllity,
St rengthened Defense
All uni ts which remain stat.onary for one
Player Turn h""e thei r defense strength
doubled , e_g if an Amer1ciln unit in forest
terrain does not moye on Game Turn Four,
and is al1ackoo by the NLF in their Player
Turn, it defends with a strength of 'nl rather
than three This rule applies to pinned units, as
V>1:!1I as unpinned units,
Mow. and Fir.
a) Uni ts with three movement points or more
remaining in their Allowance may Slap and fire
in the same Player Turn.
b) Units may expend UP to two units-of-fire
per Combat Phase (see Ammunition Supplyl:
they may e)(pend these units-of-lire into a
single he)( , tituS elfoctively doubling their
strength, or they m<!y apply each of the
twO unilS of flre to two targets (wltich ta.gets
may be separated from each other by no more
than one intervening hexl
B
Ammunition Ind Supply
al Each U_S unil has uni!ioffira (this
requires reco.d-keeping), eilch NLF unil has
four Uni ls-ol'llre, A I,mil may lire one or two
Idoubling their anack strength) units-ofjire
per Combat Phase. Once you are "out of
ammo" you can no longer fire, although NLF
uni ts reaching an IImmo cache may resupply (it
tllkes Ihree Movemenl Points to do this upon
reaching a cache Caches h;rve an "unlimited"
ammo supply. The U.S, may drop a supply
counter which carrys 24 units of fire, Each
unit must move to it to be supplied, alterna-
tively, a combat unit mllY Cllffy it. as they
carry enemy caches. in eit her case it costs the
combat unil three Movement Points to reo
supplv. The 'oopter carrying Ihe ammo may be
shot down as it flys in.
bl Raconnai158nc. byfi ra may be done by
t he American Player. In IhTs technique. the
player may choose any hex he wishes and fire
into It The NLF Player Ihen noti fies the
American if there are any people (NLF,
porters, civi!illnsl In the hex. If there are not,
the American simply looses the unil(s) of fire_
If Ihere are people, Ihey are revealed and lhe
ellect 01 Ihe fire is resolved.
Combat Ra$ulu Table
al When using the Casualty Combat Re""lu
Tabla 1115 opposed to Ihe Points Combal
Rawhs Table) counters appear on Ihe
t>oaJd whenever ca9.lalties are inflicted. When a
U.S. unit Incurs Cil9.lalties, lhe unit muSI nOI
mDIIe until a mafIO. unit arrives and removes
ALL of the caSUlllt le$. NLF uni ts muSt carry
their dead and wounded with them, or else
lose addit ional points (litis also applies to U.S.
casualties who fell into Enemy hands!. (See
Ihe poin ts schedule,l
Units Ihat> incur casualties are pinned for two
Player Turns lollowing the incurrence of the
casualty, unless the uni t was within three
of the compnny commander or a medic
unit, in which case the unit is pinned for only
one Player Turn.
bl When units are Slacked, each unit in the
Slack receives the casual ties called for on the
lable.
e) No un it may lake more than casualties,
after six. remove unit from board. (This
requires record keeping)
d) Abandoned Cilsulaties cause an additional
point loss. Americlln units are consKjered losl
if t hey are left on a booby Irap counter, if not
airlifted out, or i! not accompanied by a
medical un it at the end of the game. NLF units
are consideroo abandoned il. Ihey h;rve been
picked up by an American medical unit, and
not recovered by an NLF unil before the end
of the game

Ambu,h
The NLF may place an ambush counter
upside down anywhere in the line-of-sight of
lin NLF fire-unit which has remained station
ery (but not pinned) lor one Player Turn. If
Ihe American Player moves onto t his ambush
counter, Ihe NLF player adds "twO" to hisdie
ro ll number, Iit ough only one unit of fire IS
expended.
Landings
al Americans landing may split up into groups.
although no leS5 than one platoon (8 leader
and four SQuadsl may land in one contiguous
group
b) Uni ts may only be picked up or deposited
bV helicopter in open or broken terrain.
c) NLF unils mily fire over inleryening units or
bui ldings when firing at helicopters which are
landing/taking-ofT. however, they may only
fire at the landing hex, and not the "ap-
proach" of tlte 'helicopter' as it comes onto
the map.
Artillery
The Fa/ward Observer (F .0.1 allach!.!d
to the company has, on call. fire support of
one artillery battery 8,000 meters from the
company area of operations Artillery may
not perform two missions at the S3me time,
50ch as "registering-fire' and "indirect-fire."
Adjustment Phase
The American Player rolls the die to determine
on what turn the F.O. may enter the game and
"fire for ell ect"
Oi. Roll
1 - 2
3-'
5-6
Fire Effect
Combat Phase
next Ga''''' Turn
two Game Turns away
Ihree Game Turns AWlY
In Ihe combal portion of Ihe turn indicated on
ttte Adjuslment Phase Table. the AltTed Pillyer
places his Center-.oflmpact coun ter on ',he
m<!P in line-ofsight of t he F .0.
IONAL COMBAT RESOLUTION SYSTEM)
Mength)
3 to 1 4 to 1
P
P P
p P (WIA)
P (WIA) h-P(WIA)
IA) h P (WIA) h P (2WIA)
IA) h- P (KIA) h P (WI A/KIA)
IA) h P (KIA) h- P (KIA/2WIA)
h- P (KIA) h P (2KIA/2WIA)
which sustain are pinned lor TWO
PlaYef Turns (total) the units are within
three hexes of II commander or a
Friendly medical unIt, in which they are
pinned lor only one PlayefT urn.
When a unit sustains casualties, the Enemy
Playef receives points for inflicting those
casualtIes, the numbPr of pOints awarded to a
casualty-inflicting Player vanes with the type
of casualty aM thE identity of the Player. SHe
the Casualty Pomu Schedule. When a unIt
sustains casualt;es, place a Casualty counter 011
the unit. NLf units (after bei ng pinned for
two turns) mlly move (but may '101 fire) while
carrying casualtiHs. U.S. unllS may not move
with casualtllJS; they rnay fire altef lWO
Player Turns of being pinned. Th.,y may only
move afl.,r II Medical unit arriws 10 relieve
them of caS-. III tie$,. Medical units may carry
.'1ny number of casualti,'s. NLF units which are
carrying casualti"s do not have their Movement
Allowance reduced,

Roll
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
INTERROGATION RESULTS TABLE
Interrogation Resulu: Ttl< U.S, "'ldY'" rolls the
diu once al th. "nd of p..,;h run")I,,le U.S.
Playpr Turn ill which the P"Js.lJ(1 COlm"'r i,
lJcing mlcrroyated, Only one Pl"'<.;Int countl!r
may be interrogaled per PlayerTurn. A glvcn
Peasant count"r may only be ullerrogated for
tWO U,S, Player-Turns, af\l'f which
.1 may not be intNroyatL>d ;'!lain. When
interrogation daM (L'veal tho location of an
NLF cache. Ihl' U.s, Player chooses which
type of cacho (of the OlieS inti;';.!I...:!) 5hall bl'
turned face-up, the NLF Player chooses which
cache 01 Ihat type he will turn up, C<lChes
revealed by interrQ(JilliOI1 may not be mOVL>d
by the NLF PI<tyer. I f the U,S, PlayerchooS03s
a cache-type which is not available to be
revealed, the N LF Player may choose the type
to be reV1',I)ed. If, in Ihe second turn 01
inleffogat ion, the U.S, Player injures the
peasants being question...:! ( ' ), the NLF Player
is awarded 15 G"nlC Points, When NLF Porters
are under i ntL'rrog.Hion, th., die is rolled
CASUALTY POINT SCHEDULE
Die Roll
1
2
3
First turn of
Interrogation
No Intelligence
Locate one R ice Cache
No Intelligence
Second turn of
Interrog<ltion
No Intelligence
Locate one Ammo or Records Cache
Peasant Wounded*
4 Locate one R ice or Arms Cache Locate one Ammo or Radio Cache
5 No Intelligence
6 Locate one Ammo Cache
TWI CE in th<' ""me U.S. PlaYfJfTurn: the first
resul t is read Irom the "First Torn" column
and Ihe second msult from Ihe "Secooo Torn"
column, Both rL'sults <1ft! eifoclHj ImlTlf!dialely.
If the second result is "Peasant WounUt.'tf'
then the Porter can be considered as killed
Peasant Wounded*
Locate one Ammo, Radio, or Records Cache
under intf'rr(J!.l"lion, U,S, PI"y"f , . f, v '
points from h,s scoro
In all inl",rogalioJl, Ih" U,S. Play!.'r hoI,
optIon of "f",r Ih" 1,,,,1 d",roll.
MATERIAL POINTS SCHEDULE
(use with Casualty Combat Results Table)
The US Player gains the points indicated for disposing of
each NLF cache in the following manner:
Type of Casualty
Each WIA
Each KIA
points awarded
toNLF for US
casualties
20
40
Each KIA or WIA abandoned 60
Each helicopter destroyed 20
Each peasant wounded
or killed by Enemy Player 15
& . ..6,;.
points awarded
to US for NLF
casualties
10
15
25
10
,
Type of Cache Destroyed Captured
RICE 5 o
AMMUNITION 20 30
ARMS 20 30
RADIO EQUIPMENT 30 40
RECORDS 10 50
'! ".'
,.:
,


M



N



d
"
,
POINTS COMBAT RESULTS TABLE
Odds (Attacker's Strength to Defender's Terram Strength)
Roll 1 to 3 1 to 2 1 to 1 2 to 1 3 to 1
4 to 1
Roll
1 P
2 P P
3 P P 20- P 10
4 P P 20- P ,1O h20 P 10
5 P P 20 P 10 20 P 10 h40- D 20
6
p
P 20 P 10 h20, P -10 h40 0 15 h60- 0 25
7 P P 20 P 10 h20, P 10 h40- 0 1! hBO- 0 '15
8
p
P 20- P 10 h20- P 1O h40- 0 15 h120- 0 50
Odds lowef than t to 3"' Me treated as t \(
3 .. Odds greater than "4 to t ,. ara treated as
4 to L The primary effect of the fire upon
the target is shown in Boldfac.: P - Pinned
unit may not move or fire in its ensuing
Player Tum, 0 - Dwroyed all the units in
that hex are destroyed IremO'R(j from th<
map). The number to th.' LEFT ,j the primary
re.ult thE' number ,I awarded the
NLF player for li)t"ining that result against a
US target. The number to the RtGHT 01 the
primdry resuft i1 the points awarded to the US
plaver when he obtains that result against an
NLF target. Additionallv. the "h" to
the J<3ft 01 the NLF playe(s point award
,ndicates a US heli<:opter shot dOY</n (if indeed
1M NLF plaver lirin" at It heliCOPted
BUILDING
ROAD
BERM TREELINE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
RIVER BROKEN
TERRAIN
OPEN
TERRAIN
FOREST
I
I
I
I
I
I
..
CASUAL TV COMBAT RESULTS TABLE (OPTIONAL COMBAT
Odds (Atli,l( I;er's Strength to Defender's Terrain Strength)
Roll
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 to 3 1 to 2 1 to 1 2 to 1 3 to 1 4 to 1
p
P P
p
P PiWI
-
p p
P (WIA)
h P (W'
p p
P(WIA) h P (WI A) h- PI,
p p
P(WIA) h P(WIA) h P (KIA)
h".:j
P P P (WIA) h P(WIA) h P (KIA) h- PIK
p p P (WIA) h P(KIA) h P (KIA) h P (2
c.su.lty Com""t RetlJlts: Tho' C<JallV Com-
bel Tab!<- SlIrp!;tnts m! Poi ,ts Con,bat
Results Table when Players employ the 0p-
tional Cas.ualty wh'. The ef/eets 01 the
Cosutllty Table applV to units of ei ther lid.).
P- Pinned; thoc units roceiving fire tlre not
to (0(. or lire in th!>ir
PkoverTun.
I,. one helicopter dWroyed by NLF lif being
tllt.'CI upOn by NLFL
WfA- Wounded in Action; each unit, in th!
f'ex u....o..r lire, ;t,,,o on(' Cdsuatty. "2WIA
n' "that each mit" :ho: h+: ;(din, TWO
;oaIties of thai typ
KIA- Killed on AClion; each un,t, In the hex
Ulldt'r fire, sustains one <:asualty. '2KIA"
meens that each un,t in ttl< hex $l.Jsldins two
wallO
In IlOna of the more ",veru oulcomes, .n,lS
will !llstain casualto s 01 both types, Un,ls
-.'.

which liUSlaln co.uall. ,S )(11 P
Ptayllf Turns !total) unles ,rli'
thn.oe hexes Of a Friendly
Fritlndly medical un,t, In wh
I)innud for only one Play!'r TlJ r
When a unit sustain1 cealldl;
Play.., receives pOint,;. I
,titws, the number of p "n
ClISUaltv-mllio::ting Pi ...... "
of <:dSUdlty and th,' idl'ntity "f
the CaJUalty Po,nts Schedul .
casuallies, ,- a Q,,,-,
the unit. NLF ',1> ,Itp '
two turn'i) flUY
carryillg casuelt, ....,- S,
WIth c"suallie;,; they may
Plavt!f-TurM of !)Pill'! PInned
after a Medl<:.)1 unot
thtlm of CdSlJath.s. Mt!ciir" , ell
any number 01 :a5l.uttit/s. Nt.
carrv.ng C<:t'JUdI toes d J n It Il.;M;
AU:w.nce redu::ad.
w
Z
-
m
c::e
gffi
",,,,
C)
z
-
c
...
-
::;:)
'"
"'
0<
0_
o
oN
.,
0
- ~
0
~

0
~
,
~
~

" 5

I
0

g
~

0

"
0
0
5 " 0
- 0
o -;;;
p
-
c: - ~
.q
zz
w-
,.<1:
0'"
",,,,
' ~
'"
w
>
-
'"
!iii
'H! '
.

o
E
POINTS COMBAT RESULTS TABLE
Odds (Attacker 5 Strengt h to Defender 's Terrain Strength)
Roll 1 to 3 , to 2 1 to 1 2 to 1 310 1 4 to 1 Roll
,
2
3
4
5
6
7
8



20 p - lO

20 . ' 0 h20 P 10

20- . 10 20- P 10 h40 0 -20

20 . 10 h20- P -10 h40 0 '5 h60 D 25

20

10 h20 P 10 h40 D 15 haO 0 35

20

10 h20 p olO h40 0 15 h 120 0 50
Odds lower than 1 to 3 are treated as 1 to
3 Odds greater than 4 to I are treated as
4 to 1 The promary effect of the I,re upon
the target IS shown In Boldface P - Pinned
Unit may not move or f,re 10 liS ensuing
Player Turn D .. Destroyed all the units In
that he)( are destroyed (remowd Irom the
map) The number to the LEFT 01 the primary
result IS the number 01 POints awarded the
NLF player for obtaining that result against a
US target The number to the RIGHT of the
pnmary result IS the pOints awarded to the US
player when he obtainS that resul t against an
NLF target Add,"onally, the lowercase h to
the Jelt of the NLF player's POlOt award
Indicates a US helicopter shot down (,f Indeed
the NLF player IS firing at a heli copter)
BUILDING
ROAD
BERM TREELINE
,
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
RIVER BROKEN
TERRAIN
OPEN
TERRAIN
FOREST
John Kr ,lmel
CASUALTY COMBAT RESULTS TABLE (OPTIONAL COMBAT RESOLUTION SYSTEM)
Odds (Attacker s St rength to Defender's Terrain Strength)
Roll
,
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 to 3 1 to 2 1 to 1 2 to 1 3 to 1 4 to 1



P (WIA)

P (WIA) h P (WIA)

P (WIA) h P (WIA) h p (2WIA)

P (WIA) h P (WIA) h P (KIA) h- P (WIAlKIA)

P (WIA) h P(WIA) h- P (KIA) h P (KIA/2WIA)

P (WIA) h- P (KIA) h P (KIA) h- P (2KIA/2WIA)
Casualty Combat Results The Casualty Com
bat Results Table surplants the POints Combat
Results Table when Players employ the op-
tional Casualty rule The effects 01 the
Casualty Table apply to units of e,ther SIde
p .. Pinned, the unIts receiVing fore are not
alio'Aled 10 move or lore In theor en!aJlng
Player Turn
11- one helicopter destroyed by NLF /If oolng
flfed upon by NLF)
WIA" Wounded on ActIon, each un,t In the
he)( under life sustainS one casual ty ZWIA
means that each unit'" the he)( susta,ns TWO
casualties of !hat type
KIA- Killed In ACllon, each unIt In the he)(
under fife, sustains one ca9Jalty '2KIA
means that each unit In the hex sustains two
ca!aJalt,es 01 that type
(n some of the more severe outcomes un, ts
w,1( sustain casualties of both types. Uni ts
which sustain casualties are pinned for TWO
Player Turns (total) unless the units are Wi thin
three he)(es 01 a Fnendly commander or a
F"endly medical unIt In which case they are
pinned lor only one Playef Turn
When a Unit !aJstalns casualties the Enemy
Player rece,ves POints for Inillctlng those
casualties the number of POints awarded 10 a
casualty ,nfllctlng Player vanes With the type
of casualty and Ihe Ident,ty of the Player See
the Casualty POints SchedUle When II unit
sust ains casualties place a Casualty counter on
the un,! NLF Uni ts (after be'"9 pinned for
two turns) may move (but may no! fife) while
carrYing casualt,es US uni ts may not move
With casualties they may fire after two
Player Turns 01 being ponned They may only
move after a Medical un,t arnves to relieve
them 01 ca9Jaltles. Med,cal Units may carry
any number 01 casualties NLF umts which are
carrying ca9Jaltles do not have thelf Movement
Allowance reduced
Roll
,
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
INTERROGATION RESULTS TABLE
InterrogatIon Result s The U S Player rolls the
dIE! once at the end 01 each complete US
Player Turn In ......tuch lhe Peasant counler IS
being Interrogated Only one Peasan t counter
may be Interrogated per Player Turn A given
counter may only be Interrogated for
two consecutIve US Player Turns alter whIch
It may not 00 onterrogated again When
interrogation dOIl'S reveal the locahon of an
NlF cache the U S Player chooses which
type 01 cache 101 the ones ....d'catedl shall be
turned lace up the NLF Player chooses which
cache 01 that type he will turn up Caches
revealed by Interrogallon may not be moved
by the NLF Player I I the US Player chooses
a cache type whIch IS not available to be
revealed the NlF Player may choose the type
to be revealed If. .... the second turn of
interrogation the US Player Injures the
peasants be ng Questioned (") the NlF Player
,s awarded 15 Game POInts When NLF Poners
are under Interrogat,on the d,e ,5 rolled
CASUALTY POINT SCHEDULE
Ole Roll
,
2
3
First turn of
Interrogation
No Intelligence
Locate one Rice Cache
No Intelligence
Second turn of
Interrogation
No Intelligence
Locate one Ammo or Records Cache
Peasant Wounded *
4 Locate one Rice or Arms Cache Locate one Ammo or Radio Cache
5 No Intelligence Peasant Wounded"
6 Locate one Ammo Cache Locate one Ammo, Radio, or Records Cache
TWICE In the same US Player Turn the forst under interrogatIon US P' ilY' r subJt.x;ls f,VI.!
result '5 read Irom the First Turn' column pOlOts from h,s score
and the second result from the Second Turn'
column Both result s effected
II the second result '5 Peasant Wounded
then the Porter can be cons,dered as k,lIed
In all interrogatIon the US Play"r Itw
opt,on of stoppIng altl.!r the forst d C foil
MATERIAL POINTS SCHEDULE
(use With Casualty Combat Results Table) The US Player gains the potnts tndlcated for dispOSing of
each NLF cache 11'1 the followtng manner
Type of Casualty
Each WIA
Each KIA
POints awarded
to NLF for US
casualties
20
40
Each KIA or WIA abandoned 60
Each helicopter destroyed 20
Each peasant wounded
or killed by Enemy Player '5
GRUNT
pOints awarded
to US for NLF
casualttes
'0
'5
25
'0
Type of Cache Destroyed Captured
RICE 5 o
AMMUNITION 20 30
ARMS 20 30
RADIO EQUIPMENT 30 40
RECORDS '0 50
40xs 41xs 42xs 43xs 44xs 45xs
':OJ)YflUI1t 1971/Sunulallons Pubhcat,ons Inc Prmled In USA