RESEARCH REPORT

(DRAFT FOR BOOK)

Understanding the
structure of
Transnational Criminal
Networks operating in
the U.S./Mexico Border
and the Southeastern
Border of the European
Union
Luis Jorge Garay Salamanca
Academic Director
Eduardo Salcedo-Albarn
Coordinator and Researcher
Georgi Petrunov
Nikolay Yanev
John P. Sullivan
Diana Enriquez
Researchers
Understanding the structure of Transnational Criminal
Networks operating in the U.S./Mexico Border and the
Southeastern Border of the European Union
By
Vortex Foundation (Colombia) and Risk Monitor (Bulgaria) with the support of
the Think Tank Fund of the Foundation Open Society Institute, Grant No.
40022818
Luis Jorge Garay Salamanca
Academic Director
Eduardo Salcedo-Albarn
Coordinator and Researcher
Georgi Petrunov
Nikolay Yanev
John P. Sullivan
Diana Enriquez
Researchers
October 2013
2
3
Research report.
Understanding the structure of Transnational Criminal Networks operating in the U.S./Mexico Border and
the Southeastern Border of the European Union
Grant 40022818
Luis Jorge Garay Salamanca & Eduardo Salcedo-Albarn, editors and authors of chapter .
Oct., 2013.
Georgi Petrunov, John Sullivan and Diana Enriquez, authors. Oct., 2013.
Nikolay Yanev, researchers.
Alex Velev and Snezhina Atanassova, translation of Bulgarian sections.
Andrea Kuszewski, proofreading.
Text, audio and video included in this publication are protected by copyright laws. Reproduction
is permitted if the author and the editor are referenced and quoted.
Opinions and ideas expressed by the author do not compromise or reect the opinions of
Scientic Vortex Foundation or Risk Monitor.
Vortex Foundation, Bogot, Colombia.
Risk Monitor, Soa, Bulgaria.
2013. Copyright.
First draft, 2013.
Electronic Edition, Bogot, Colombia / Soa, Bulgaria.
4
Disclaimer
The facts and the analysis presented herein are sustained in documents and
interviews exposed in mass media and judicial records related to the criminals
networks analyzed. No primary information uncovering facts has been
gathered, which means that only secondary sources were consulted, from legal
to media documents.
In the case of the names mentioned, quoted or referenced on indictments with
the exception of those specically mentioned, quoted or referenced in the text
as denitively condemned-, the presumption of innocence, in observance of
individual rights is always preserved. The judicial truth is the jurisdiction of the
courts, which by law will decide whether the defendants are innocent or guilty.
1
It is stated that belonging to, participating in, being connected to, or appearing
on a network, as analyzed herein, does not imply having committed a criminal
act or being engaged in a criminal enterprise. It is always possible to belong,
participate, be connected, or appear on a network as an agent promoting
interests that are socially and institutionally benecial, or as a result of
coercion, among other reasons unrelated to criminal acts committed by the
agent.
5
1
Based on: Francesco Forgione. Maa Export. Cmo la Ndrangheta, la Cosa Nostra y la Camorra han
colonizado el mundo. Anagrama. Crnicas. Barcelona, 2010, pgs.11-12.
Table of Contents
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. Tiauitional State Captuie 11
Towaius the Co-opteu State Reconfiguiation 1S
0nueistanuing Ciiminal Netwoiks 16
Fiist ciiteiion of centiality: Biiect centiality, oi being the most connecteu
noueagent 19
Seconu ciiteiion of centiality: Betweenness, oi having the gieatest capacity
foi aibitiating infoimation 2u
Levels of social capital anu centiality inuicatois 24
Conceptual piinciples foi unueistanuing piocess of Co-opteu State
Reconfiguiation 26
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Ciime anu the Relationships between Nexico anu the 0niteu States S6
Coiiuption anu violence acioss the boiuei S9
violence in Nxico 4S
Two Countiies: Seveial Fionts 49
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Concentiation of capacity foi aibitiating infoimation 64
Inteiactions 7u
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... State ieconfiguiation in the 'hypeiboiuei' anu beyonu 94
. Conclusion: Conflict, Coiiuption, Collusion, anu Counteiing Co-option 1u1
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ueogiaphic location of Bulgaiia 1u7
Social anu Economic Enviionment 11u
Ciime anu Coiiuption in Bulgaiia 114
Tiansnational Ciiminal Netwoiks opeiating in the Southeastein Boiuei of
the Euiopean 0nion 119
:%*4. 8%2#9*$*#1 8/%&(1/ C(012%*2 7ST
Case 1. Biug Tianspoit Thiough Bulgaiia 127
Case 2. The Balkan Netwoik foi the Tiansit Tianspoitation of Biugs thiough
Bulgaiia 1S6
Case S. Buman Tiafficking Netwoik fiom Bulgaiia to Westein Euiope 1S2
. Case 4. Skimming Netwoik fiom Bulgaiia 169
6
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:%*4. W.$5&%69 XM.%2$*#1 *# $/. K&($/.29$.%# C&%'.% &F $/. Q(%&M.2#
J#*&# 2#' $/. K&($/.%# C&%'.% &F $/. J#*$.' K$2$.9 7,S
In-uepth Investigation of TCNs 187
Effective Actions against Coiiupt Public 0fficeis Assisting the 0peiations of
TCNs 191
Impioving the use of Special Investigation Nethous against TCNs 19S
Impioving inuepenuence of the juuiciaiy 197
Conuucting Complex Ciiminal anu Financial Investigations of TCN 198
Stiengthening Inteinational Coopeiation in the Fight against TCNs in
Bulgaiia 2uu
Aiticulating Bomestic Agencies insiue the 0niteu States to confiont the local
uimension of TCNs 2u1
. Baishei Sentences foi Nembeis of TCNs in Bulgaiia 2u4
Pievention 2uS
Incieasing the Knowleuge on TCNs 2uS
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7
Introduction
Systemic crime and systemic corruption, much like any other activity, require
the interaction of different agents. Some of those interactions are sporadic and
some are permanent. In general, there are many situations that social actors
create and must negotiate in their behavior (Radil, Flint, & Tita, 2010, p. 308),
and it is possible to model and analyze those situations when arranged as a
social network. Additionally several States and multilateral agencies
acknowledge Transnational Criminal Networks (TCNs) as one of the most
important threats for the domestic and transnational stability. Bearing this in
mind, the purpose of this document is to model and analyze situations of crime
consisting on Transnational Criminal Network (TCNs) operating in the southern
border of The United States and the Southeastern border of the European
Union, both regions concentrating some of the most dangerous and powerful
TCNs on a global scale.
The present document consists of eight sections. The rst is the
methodological and theoretical framework. The second is an introduction to the
current situation of crime in Mexico. The third is the model and analysis of a
TCN operating across Mexico and the United States, in which members of Los
8
Zetas and La Familia Michoacana participate on activities of drug and
hydrocarbons trafcking. The fourth section is an analysis of how the modeled
Mexican TCN operates inside the United States. Implications for the stability
and national security of the United States are also explored in the fourth section.
The fth section is an introduction to the situation of crime and corruption in
Bulgaria, herein interpreted as the southeastern border of the European Union.
In the sixth section four TCNs are modeled and analyzed: two consisting on
crime transiting through Bulgaria, related to Drug Trafcking, and two
consisting on exporting human trafcking from Bulgaria to Western Europe and
a Skimming network. The nal section is a summary of recommendations for
improving the confrontation of TCNs.
The present research was developed through an innovative collaboration
between Vortex Foundation (Colombia) and Risk Monitor (Bulgaria). Both
institutes engaged on the tasks of gathering, processing, modeling and
analyzing judicial information from the two different regions mentioned above.
Also, prominent scholars from Argentina, Mexico and the United States
participated in the analysis and interpretation of the ndings. This collaboration
in real time was carried out through a web platform developed by Vortex
Foundation. We thank to Think Tank Fund of Foundation Open Society Institute
9
for supporting this innovative scheme of transnational research through the
Grant 40022818.
10
Methodological Framework
By Eduardo Salcedo-Albaran and Luis Jorge Garay Salamanca
Traditional State Capture
It has been acknowledged that during the last decade, social processes of
corruption in different countries have shown novel featuresdifferent from
those that were typically recognized and dened by the traditional analysis of
corruption in the past decades. Usually, corruption in terms of public policy
has been dened as the abuse of the public function in order to obtain private
and exclusive benets (World Bank, 1997, p. 8). According to the World Bank,
when a government ofcial accepts or requests bribes for his(her) private
benet, he(she) is abusing his(her) public function. Specically, the World Bank
points out that this should be the most widely analyzed type of corruption
(World Bank, 1997).
Analyses regarding corruption have focused on bribery practices and the
interaction between public and private individuals pursuing mainly economic
11
interests. However, in countries such as Colombia, Mexico and Guatemala,
among others, the intervention of illegal armed groups, drug trafckers and the
use of coercive means replacing or complementing bribery, are features
justifying the concepts of violent corruption (Mockus, 2008), armed
corruption (Flores, 2008), or narco-corruption (Cepeda, 1997). This means
that the participation of drug trafckers and other unlawful organizations is a
distinctive feature of a type of corruption emerging in the last decades;
however, the use of coercive methods and the participation of unlawful
individuals is usually omitted from traditional corruption analysis (Presidency
of the Republic of Colombia, 2005). In general, the connections between
international criminal organizations, and between them and their host
governments, in the postCold War period remain poorly
understood (Greenhill, 2009). For instance, a number of studies on State
Capture (StC) carried out in the late 1990sspecically, in the case of the East
European countries during their transition to a market economyfocused on
bribery by economic groups to inuence law making, which resulted in those
groups obtaining tax or administrative benets (Pesic, 2007). Even though
those countries displayed strong maa activity related to prostitution,
trafcking of nuclear weapons and/or illicit drugs, and other illegal activities,
studies about corruption and StC during that period generally did not look into
12
the action of those unlawful agents, but rather focused on the illegal actions of
lawful agents, such as rms carrying out corruption throughout bribery.
In this sense, a distinctive feature of the traditional State Capture (StC)
analysis is the omission of the intervention of unlawful groups and methods of
coercion that complement, and sometimes substitute bribery. Usually the StC is
dened as the intervention of the private sector (Olsen, Petrowski, &
Greenhalgh, 2010) in the drafting of laws, decrees, regulations, and public
policies in order to obtain long-lasting individual benets, and are mainly of
economic nature (Hellman, Jones, & Kaufmann, 2000; Hellman & Kaufmann,
2001; Hellman & Kaufmann, 2000). In that sense, a traditional StC situation
happens when companies and economic groups inuence legal and regulatory
institutions, mainly through bribery, in order to obtain economic or regulatory
benets. Therefore, the following are the main features of the traditional
concept of StC: It is (i) the action of lawful groups such as economic groups,
domestic and transnational rms, (ii) taking the form of corruption with both
economic motivation and consequences, (iii) implemented mainly through
bribery at the domestic and transnational level, and (iv) executed mainly on the
legislative and executive branches at the central level (Garay, Salcedo-Albarn,
Guerrero, & De Len-Beltrn, 2009a; Sreide, 2006).
13
Traditional StC may be interpreted as a type of systemic corruption
(Klitgaard, 1988; Klitgaard, MacLean-Abaroa, & Lindsay, 2001), unlike those
low-scale and sporadic corruption scenarios. An example of low-scale
corruption would be when a bribe is paid to have access to a public service.
However, when millions of dollars in bribes are paid by a company to obtain a
long-lasting tax benet, it turns into a large-scale corruption, taking the form of
traditional State Capture (StC) (Dix & Pok, 2009, p. 239). The causes and
consequences of the former tend to be sporadic and short-lived; on the other
hand, the scope of the latter tends to be long-lasting. Furthermore, few
government ofcials participate in low-scale corruptionthose that do are
mainly at the low administrative level. However, conguring a large-scale
corruption scenario requires the intervention of decision-making ofcials
occupying strategic roles within the hierarchy of public administration.
Subsequently, long-lasting agreements are usually reached under an advanced
StC situation.
Additionally, during traditional StC, social interactions ares usually
established in one direction: lawful agents outside of the State manipulate
legislative or other formal institutions. In other cases, when unlawful agents
intervene, an advanced stage of StC (AStC) is established, with social
interactions owing from unlawful toward lawful agents. Both cases are strictly
14
coherent with the literal sense of State Capture as a process that originated
outside the State, being carried out by an external agent or a group of agents
capturing ofcials or formal institutions.
Towards the Co-opted State Reconguration
A subsequent process dened as Co-opted State Reconguration (CStR) takes
place in complex stages, with the following characteristics: (i) Participation of
lawful and unlawful groups; (ii) the benets sought are not only economic, but
mainly judicial, political, and social; (iii) the use of coercion methods and/or
political alliances as a complement to, or as a substitution of bribery and (iv)
the sphere of inuence takes place in different branches of public power and at
different levels of public administration. Considering those characteristics,
Garay et al. (2009) dene the CStR as: The action of lawful and unlawful
organizations, which through unlawful practices seek to systematically modify
from inside the political regime and to inuence the drafting, modication,
interpretation, and application of the rules of the game and public policies.
These practices are undertaken with the purpose of obtaining sustained benets
and ensuring that their interests are validated politically and legally, as well as
gaining social legitimacy in the long run, although these interests do not follow
the founding principle of social welfare.
15
The co-opted reconguration concept consists of situations that can be
carried out in any direction. In a CStR situation, it is therefore possible to nd
scenarios in which lawful agents of a private or public nature co-opt
unlawful agents, and vice versa. In a CStR process, it is necessary for the legal
and illegal interests to be coordinated, independent of whether that coordination
is responding to a lawful or unlawful initiative. This coordination of interests is
sometimes registered as an inter-organizational co-optation (Burt, Christman, &
Kilburn, 1980). In this sense, the co-opted reconguration of a State must be
carried out through ofcials that co-opt or are co-opted. On the contrary, when
ofcials are being captured and manipulated from outside the States, then we
observe it as a typical situation of StC.
Understanding Criminal Networks
Any form of criminality, especially those usually related to organized crime
that inltrate and manipulate formal institutions, implies establishing social
interactions. These interactions, and the interacting agents, are arranged as a
social network: Social networks can be dened as a group of collaborating
(and/or competing) entities that are related to each other (den Bossche &
Segers, 2013, p. 39) or, in a simpler sense, A network is dened as a set of
nodes connected by ties. Nodes are typically actors, and can be people, teams,
16
organizations or information systems (Worrell, Wasko, & Johnstn, 2013, p.
128). From now on, each node will be referred to as an agent, bearing in mind
his/her moral and decisional capacity.
This perspective allows us to analyze characteristics such as the types of
agents, the nature of the interactions, ows and levels of information, and
therefore, quality of social capital (Degenne & Fors, 1999; Wasserman &
Faust, 1994; Guo, 2012). In general, Social Network Analysis provides a
collection of tools to explore patterns of relationships. At its best, social
network analysis provides a kind of X-ray into the social life of an
organisation, quanties features of relationships, and connects them to
constructs and outcomes of interest (den Bossche & Segers, 2013). In order to
proceed with such an analysis, some Social Network Analysis procedures are
applied herein and explained below.
Each point in a network, dened as a node, represents an individual, or
as it is referred here: an agent. An agent refers a moral agency unit; therefore, a
node represents an individual agent or a collective agent, as a rm. However,
the present analysis focuses on individual agents conforming a network. We
will be using the concept node/agent when referencing each point in the
networks analyzed herein.
17
On the other hand, each line connecting two nodes/agents, dened as an
arc or an edge, represents a social interaction. The edge indicates the presence
of interactions between nodes/agents, and the arrow shows the specic direction
of that interaction. For instance, if John speaks to Charlie, then there is an
arrow from a node representing John to a node representing Charlie.
The arrangement of the nodes and edges may be represented through
graphs. A graph is a nite set of n nodes connected through edges or arrows
(Degenne & Fors, 1999, p. 63). Graphs have been used in the social sciences
as a method of representing individuals arranged in a group, and their social
relationships (Degenne & Fors, 1999, p. 63; Bornholdt & Georg, 2003). In
criminology, graphs have also been used to identify structural features and
investigate illicit networks (Morselli, 2008; Johnson, Reitzel, Norwood,
McCoy, Cummings, & Tate, 2013; Radil, Flint, & Tita, 2010), situations of
corruption (Baker & Robert, 1993), and political discussions (Eveland &
Kleinman, 2013).
After constructing a graph that represents a set of interactions, we can
then analyze the characteristics and dynamics of the nodes/agents involved.
With this representation, it is possible to identify the central nodes, that is, the
most important agents of the group of individuals/agents that are involved in
the network.
18
Some nodes/agents are more relevant than others. An important node/
agent enjoys a relevant position in the conguration of the social relationships
within the network. This means that this node is a signicant contributor to and
denes the structure of that network. Being a relevant node/agent means two
specic things, dened by one of the following criteria: (i) That the node is very
connected or (ii) that the node is the central point of control for the ows of
information across the network. Both cases consist of central nodes/agents,
even though such centrality has two different meanings (Everett & Boratti,
2005). To identify those central nodes within a social group, it is necessary to
calculate centrality indicators. Two indicators of centrality are calculated and
used in this book, and each indicator is therefore coherent with a particular
criterion of centrality.
First criterion of centrality: Direct centrality, or being the most
connected node/agent
According to the rst meaning of centrality, it is possible to identify the most
connected node/agent by calculating the degree of direct individual centrality or
degree centrality (Degenne & Fors, 1999, p. 132). Therefore, the node/agent
with the highest degree of direct individual centrality is the node/agent with the
highest quantity of direct connections with other nodes/agents. With the
purpose of nding the relative centrality through the degree of individual
19
centrality, it is possible to calculate an index of relative or weighted centrality
for each node, () by dividing her score or absolute centrality by the maximum
possible centrality for the graph [when this indicator is calculated] () 0
denotes an isolated node, while 1 designates (Degenne & Fors, 1999, p. 133)
a node/agent that is connected with every other node/agent in the network.
The node/agent with a highest degree of individual centrality within a
network is referred to as a hub, which is the most connected node/agent,
resulting in a high concentration of social relationships. In this sense, the hub
represents a privileged position of inuence within the network. The hub is the
most popular agent; it is the most connected and most known agent within the
network. Central nodes, or hubs, have many more links than the peripheral
nodes/agents, which in this case implies more relationships and social contacts
(Degenne & Fors, 1999, p. 133).
Second criterion of centrality: Betweenness, or having the
greatest capacity for arbitrating information
A second criterion of centrality is based on the concepts of structural holes and
structural bridges (Burt, 2005; Burt, 1992; Burt, 1997; Burt, 1998; Burt, 2000).
According to these concepts, being highly connected, as in the case of the hub,
does not guarantee the largest concentration of social capital. Strong social
20
relationships are a source of social trust (Coleman, 1988). Nevertheless, after
several social interactions, each node/agent can get connected with every other
node/agent, and then information circulating within the network becomes
redundant. In this case, being a hub does not necessarily imply knowing more
or having a larger concentration of information. In fact, when each node/agent
is connected with every other node/agent, there is no hub because each node/
agent has the same amount of connections (Graph 1).
Graph 1. A clique
In this case, the degree of direct individual centrality does not provide
information about how relevant a node/agent is. Therefore, there is no
information about the levels of social capital because every node/agent has the
21
same amount. In this sense, some weakly connected individuals (), may still
be indispensable to certain transactions (Degenne & Fors, 1999, p. 135);
those weak links provide new information and enrich the levels of social capital
and are, therefore, highly important (Granovetter, 1973). This means that weak
ties are relevant for for the broad diffusion of information and maintenance of
larger social structures (Eveland & Kleinman, 2013). In this situation, a
question about social capital arises: How do you increase social capital when
the social network is closed and the information is redundant, or when each
node/agent is connected to every other node/agent?
When a social network with redundant information gets connected to
another network through a single node/agent or a single edge, the ow of non-
redundant information is increased across both networks. This connection
establishes a new network, and therefore new levels of social capital emerge
across these sub-networks, thus conguring a new network (Graph 2). The
single node/agent linking the previously unlinked networks may be interpreted
as a structural bridge, because it allows an interaction, which can be a ow of
information, to pass where there was a structural hole. The structural bridge
therefore has both a high concentration of information and social capital, and
even more importantly, is able to arbitrate the ow of information. The node/
agent acting as structural bridge not only increases the levels of social capital in
22
the new network, but also increases its own level of social capital; it becomes a
powerful node/agent even if it is not highly connected, because the information
between the two sub-networks is owing through it: The greater an
individuals actual or potential intermediary value to all members of a network,
the greater his control over communication ow and independence of others to
communicate (Degenne & Fors, 1999, p. 136). The following graph illustrates
a node/agent acting as structural bridge.
Graph 2. Two cliques connected through a single node/agent
In order to determine how relevant a node/agent is for the potential
conformation of a network, it is not enough to pay attention to the amount of
connections; it is also necessary to evaluate the centrality indicator of
betweenness. This indicator determines if a specic node/agent is
23
intermediating among other nodes/agents of the network; the node/agent with
the higher indicator of betweenness is the node/agent with the higher power or
potential to arbitrate information: Such an individual can easily inuence the
group by withholding and/or distorting information that passes through her
hands. She is also in a better position to coordinate information for the entire
group. From all of the above, she clearly occupies a central position (Degenne
& Fors, 1999, p. 136). The betweenness centrality hence identies if a specic
node/agent appears to a larger or shorter extent in the geodesic routes of the
network.
Levels of social capital and centrality indicators
It is possible to identify and analyze the structure of social relationships by
calculating centrality indicators, since these indicators determine the relevance
of a particular node/agent or a group of nodes/agents within the structure of a
social network. The individual sense of social capital is metaphorically
explained as something that the individual possesses (De Len-Beltrn &
Salcedo-Albarn, 2008) and increases according to the amount and type of
social interactions. This notion of social capital is coherent with the calculation
of direct individual centrality.
24
Nonetheless, it is also possible to calculate the level of social capital for
a group of nodes/agents by using the group centrality indicator (Everett &
Boratti, 2005). After selecting a group of nodes/agents within a social network,
group centrality consists of calculating the amount of contacts that other nodes/
agents share with this specic group. In this sense, as shown in Graph 3, the
degree of group centrality determines the level of social capital that is owing
between a group that is located inside a network, and other nodes/agents outside
that group, but inside the network.
Graph 3. A module, or sub-network, inside a network
In general, the concepts of group centrality and individual centrality are
related to alternative methodological approaches used to understand the
structure of a social network (Degenne & Fors, 1999). Given that our purpose
25
is to identify the most relevant agents in the network structure, the indicators of
individual centrality will be calculated to identify and understand the role
played by certain important agents.
Since the analysis proposed in this book focuses on individual social
capital, the direct individual centrality indicator is calculated for each node/
agent of a social network. This indicator allows us to identify the nodes/agents
with the largest amount of individual links; these tend to be the most relevant
agents in the conformation of the social network (Everett & Boratti, 2005;
Degenne & Fors, 1999). In the absence of these agents, important changes in
the structure of the social network can be expected.
Conceptual principles for understanding process of Co-opted
State Reconguration
Garay et al. (2009) have noted that the notion of a fully recongured State is a
theoretical benchmark. History supports the assertion that there is no State in
which StC & CStR processes have been completed; instead, we see a constant
tension between groups and individuals trying to manage the entire State. The
State is a complex organization composed of many individuals and
organizations, in which many functional roles converge. This is why it is almost
impossible, in practical terms, for a unique group or person with vested
interests to capture and recongure all functions of a State. Nevertheless, the
26
theoretical entity of a fully recongured State by a group with unied interests
is as benchmark to determine when some States have been more deeply affected
by StC & CStR processes. The principles for analyzing those levels of
reconguration are presented below:
1. A social situation is a set of agents with functional/organizational and
functional/institutional roles.
2. Agents, bearing in mind their moral agency description, are interpreted
as moral agents. This means that it is possible to identify a collective
purpose in a group, and that purpose can be morally evaluated according
to any moral system.
3. The functional/organizational role of an agent is dened as any action
performed in function of his/her belongingness to an organization -for
instance, a civil, criminal, judicial, or any other organization, either
governmental or private.
4. The functional/institutional role of an agent is dened with reference to
any action aiming to the promotion or obstruction of some formal or
informal institutions, either lawful or unlawful. Those formal and
informal institutions can be socially benecial or socially perverse;
27
therefore, the functional/institutional role can be morally and socially
evaluated according to the social benets generated.
5. An agent may intervene in a social network playing a lawful functional/
organizational role, while at the same time playing an unlawful
functional/institutional role. Therefore, the analysis cannot be restrained
to just the functional/organizational role of an agent. For instance, the
following situations may be found:
a. An agent with the functional/organizational role of trafc
ofcer that in his functional/institutional role promotes trafc
law enforcement.
b. An agent with the functional/organizational role of trafc
ofcer that in his functional/institutional role obstructs trafc
law enforcement -for example, accepting bribes.
6. The analysis of the functional/organizational and functional/institutional
roles allows a classication as follows: lawful agent (bright), unlawful
agent (dark) or undened (grey), as follows:
a. The lawful agent (bright) is that agent who belongs to a lawful
organization and plays a lawful functional/institutional role.
28
b. The unlawful agent (dark) is that agent who belongs to an
unlawful organization and plays an unlawful functional/
institutional role. This agent not only obstructs compliance with
the lawful functional/institutional role or openly promotes its
non-compliance, but also contributes to compliance with the
unlawful functional/institutional role.
c. The undened agent (grey) is the agent whose exercised
functions do not fall under either situation 6.a) or 6.b). An
example of undened agent (grey) is the trafc ofcer who,
while belonging to a lawful organization, obstructs compliance
with trafc laws.
7. Lawful (bright), unlawful (dark), or undened (grey) agents establish
social relationships.
8. Social relationships result in actions that may be interpreted as aiming to
transmit psychosocial information in the wide sense of the term. This
transmission of information occurs by virtue of the execution of
neurological and psychological mechanisms within a social context.
29
9. Some actions aimed at transmission of information are approved within
the institutional context, and others are not. The former are considered
lawful actions, and the latter unlawful actions. For instance:
a. If agent X murdered agent Y as a result of socio-psychological
disapproval of Ys behavior, in most institutional contexts, X
performed an unlawful action.
b. If X communicated verbally to Y in order to express the same
disapproval, in most institutional contexts, X performed a lawful
action.
10. Actions dening social relationships can be analyzed in quantitative and
qualitative terms:
a. Actions developed within the context of social relationships may
be morally evaluated by virtue of its lawfulness or unlawfulness.
b. Also, actions developed within the context of social relationships
may be categorized, classied, and quantied in neutral
quantitative and qualitative terms.
11. With principles 1 to 10 it is possible to dene a social situation as: A set
of lawful, unlawful, or undened agents that establish social
30
relationships, which may be characterized, classied, and empirically
analyzed.
a. A social situation is dened in terms of social relationships.
b. A social relationship is dened in terms of actions.
c. Actions dening social relationships:
i. Are oriented towards the communication of psychosocial
information.
ii. Can be classied as lawful or unlawful in a specic
institutional context.
d. In this sense, the institutional and psychological dynamics of
social reality are interconnected.
12. The set of agents and social relationships set forth in 11 is a state of
things of social reality; it is an ontological arrangement of things, with
epistemological interpretation at the symbolic and institutional level.
This ontological arrangement with epistemological interpretation
denes social reality (Searle, 1995) that is analyzed as a discrete event,
although it is a continuous one, consisting of a socio-cultural evolution
process.
31
13. The selection of observable variables actions, in this case that
denes a social situation, is the result of an arbitrary decision of the
analyst-observer (De Len-Beltrn & Salcedo-Albarn, 2003).
14. Each social relationship, or at least the emission or reception of
psychological information that ows during the transmission process of
the relationship, occurs in a spatial ambit and a temporal ambit that is
theoretically discrete.
15. Therefore, the social situation, congured by a set of social
relationships, also has a spatial and temporal dimension that can be
theoretically delimited.
16. Since it is possible to delimit a temporal and spatial context for a social
situation (with temporal and spatial dimensions), it is also possible to
identify the specic institutional context in which that situation occurs.
17. Bearing in mind all principles 1 to 16, but mainly principle 9, the
empirical analysis of a social relationship or social situation allows
inferring information about the institutional context in which the set of
social relations or the social situation is developed.
32
Based on these principles, the SNAID methodology allows diagnosing a
social situation within (i) an institutional context, (ii) a temporal context and
(iii) a spatial ambit that usually has as benchmark a geo-administrative unit,
whether it is local, regional or national. The diagnosis is the result of the
qualitative and quantitative analysis of a social situation.
Lastly, the social situations that capture the attention of this analysis
include unlawful agents and/or social relationships. In this sense, a social
network may be: (i) lawful if it is congured only by bright agents, (ii)
unlawful if it is congured only by dark agents and (iii) undened if it is
congured by a combination of dark and bright agents, or by grey agents. It can
be therefore expected that StC and CStR situations are examples of grey
networks.
33
34
Transnational Crime and Mexico
By Diana Enriquez
Since President Calderon declared the war on drugs in 2006, Mexicos
organized criminal networks have signicantly changed the dynamic of illegal
activities between the United States and Mexico. Their effects have even
impacted the general scenario of crime across the Western Hemisphere. Pax
narcotica, as the truce between local trafckers and government ofcials
came to be known, allowed these criminal Mexican organizations to collaborate
with locals, including authorities (Astorga, 2005). Basically, the understanding
between both parties was that local authorities would not interfere with the
criminal networks activities, and in return, they would receive a percentage of
the prots. As it is discussed herein, similar situations still happen in Mexico.
The United States drug market always provided opportunity for criminal
groups along the border, particularly in cities like Ciudad Juarez, but the real
drug market expansion came in the 1960s, when the demand for narcotics in the
United States and Europe seem insatiable (Robinson, 2002). Since then, the
nature of illegal trade between Mexico and the United States has undergone
several structural changes, including, but not limited to, new drug varieties,
35
human trafcking, imitation products, and weapons, among others. One key
asset that the Mexican drug syndicates had over all others in Latin America,
however, was the Mexico-US border: this advantage keeps them at the forefront
of all illegal market transactions with the United States (Vulliamy, 2010, p. 24).
Crime and the Relationships between Mexico and the United
States
The drug trade plays a key role in border relations between the United States
and Mexico, since Mexico is still an important economic partner for the United
States, holding $100 billion in direct US investments as the United States third
largest trading partner (Shirk D. A., 2011, p. 4). Drug trafc along the border
has only increased in recent years, especially given the strength of the US drug
market. Experts believe that Mexico controls the majority of the United States
drug market as a piece of the $323 billion/year criminal industry that operates
through networks worldwide (Vulliamy, 2010). This is consistent with the fact
that surveys in the United States revealed that 21.8 million people admitted
drug use at some point in the previous month, and that the market for
synthetic drugs and cocaine was growing again (Shirk D. A., 2011, p. 13). The
size of the market is somewhere around 3-4% of Mexicos GDP/year, offering
employment to around 500,000 people (Shirk D. A., 2011).
36
Criminal networks focused on drug trafcking, among other criminal
markets, make around $30 billion a year selling Cocaine, Marijuana,
Methamphetamines, and Heroin in the United States (Padgett, 2011). Crime
syndicates make 60% of their prot from selling Marijuana to the United States,
and 90% of the cocaine supplied to the United States market travels through
Mexico before entering the US. These criminal networks supplement their
income from other means as well, including kidnappings within Mexico,
pirating of CDs and DVDs, and other black market sales through counterfeited
products (Padgett, 2011). Additionally, as we will discuss here, hydrocarbons
smuggling and human trafcking are currently relevant protable criminal
activities. Criminal networks in Mexico are not clearly dened in their
industries or alliances; more often than not, they partake in several criminal
industries including extortion, drug trafcking, and car theft (Inter-American
Dialogue, 2013). This situation leads to agreements and confrontations between
cartels, gangs, and various forms of organized crime, which are constantly
changing as a result of pressures inside and outside the drug trafcking market
itself. Finally, cartels and other organized criminal networks have developed a
protable market in private protection against the backdrop of increasing
violence (Inter-American Dialogue, 2013). The legal and illegal market
between both countries explains why controlling the 2000-mile US-Mexico
37
border is extremely challenging for both sides; the same markets provide
important trade routes for smugglers which allows constant ows of various
forms of trafcking on either side of the border.
Partnerships between the United States and Mexico grow increasingly
important in this ght against the drug cartels, though some believe the courses
of action taken by these two governments are not working. While the United
States has pledged $1.5 billion in the Merida Initiative there has been very little
oversight of judicial reform, therefore resulting in the majority of the funds
going towards purchasing equipment (Hernandez, 2010). The most recent
delegation from the United States to Mexico, under Secretary of State Hilary
Clinton, addressed the need to reduce the demand for drugs in the United States
as an additional factor in Mexicos recovery (Associated Press, 2010).
Additionally, changing drug laws in some States of the United States have
coincided with politicians from various countries proposing decriminalization
of marijuana as a solution to curbing violence. The Mexican ambassador
Sakruhan argues that legalization will not, in fact, end the violence, nor stunt
the growth of these organized criminal networks. The criminal networks have
thought ahead and already diversied their activities to the point that they could
support themselves in other illicit industries without the prots from marijuana
that benet their operations at present (Sandon, 2012; Garay & Salcedo-
38
Albaran, 2012). The border has been a valuable asset to criminal groups in
Mexico and the United States who take advantage of the resources available in
their networks. The challenge Mexico and the United States currently face
requires managing the increasingly sophisticated and fractured criminal
networks spreading across different regions of Mexico, including the Border
States.
2
Corruption and violence across the border
The United States already invests $3 billion/year into its border patrol, and the
current administration under President Obama seeks to increase border security
against migrants crossing illegal and smugglers (Shirk D. A., 2011, p. vii).
American politicians like Arizona Senator John McCain and governor Jan
Brewer express concerns that spill-over violence creates pathways for terrorists
and criminals to come to the United States (Isacson & Meyer, p. 4). Border
patrol is also not exempt from the corruption plaguing Mexican law
enforcement bodies; for instance, in one case, law enforcement discovered that
it costs $25,000 in bribes to bring a truckload of marijuana across the border
(Conroy, 2012). Another case found that it costs $1,200 to bring a suitcase full
39
2
Robinson, J. (2002, 2-July). Decades of Drug Use: Data From the '60s and '70s. Retrieved
2013, 9-January from Gallup: http://www.gallup.com/poll/6331/decades-drug-use-data-
from-60s-70s.aspx
of cocaine by TSA agents in the airport (Conroy, 2012). In 2010, 50% of
organized criminal violence in Mexico took place along the border. While this
number dropped in 2011 to 44% of violent crimes, it was still concentrated
within four of Mexicos border states (Isacson & Meyer, p. 5). At the same
time, violence is decreasing in United States border cities like El Paso and
Brownsville, Texas (Isacson & Meyer, p. 6). This could represent two different
types of criminal activity depending on the country of operation: violence in
Mexico, and corruption in the United States (Salcedo-Albaran & Garay
Salamanca, 2011).
Ciudad Juarez is at the forefront of international coverage on Mexicos
drug war, because its homicide rates have skyrocketed since 2006. Obstacles for
controlling criminal activity, including violence, can be explained by the fact
that Mexicos total security budget is estimated to be $7 billion, compared to
the $30 billion that the cartels have at their disposal from the drug trafcking
market alone (Canales, 2009). In practical terms, the budget that the cartels
have at their disposal changes depending on the source but, in any case, it can
be thought that such a budget is enough for confronting and operating at a
domestic and transnational scale. Additionally, the high levels of corruption in
local governments, the judiciary, and law enforcement operations, continue to
40
limit the abilities of the government to make signicant progress against the
security threat (Lacey, 2010).
Cartels and gangs have diversied their operations in recent years to
ensure their longer-term presence along the border. The Juarez Cartel runs a
successful extortion bracket, offering private protection to local businesses
that pay them off every month (Lacey, 2010). Los Zetas are also well known
for kidnapping migrants moving through Mexico and seeking to cross the
border. The Tijuana Cartel is working to rebuild its presence in Baja California
with new hitmen hired from San Diego Gang Barrio Logan (Borderland Beat,
2013). The Tijuana Cartel has currently focused its efforts on kidnapping and
ransoming former members, in an effort to reestablish discipline within the
cartel (Borderland Beat, 2013). The situation in Baja California continues to
deteriorate, as authorities report increasing numbers of homicides and
kidnappings carried about by members of the Sinaloa Cartel and the Arellano
Felix Organization (Borderland Beat, 2013). The Arellano Felix Organization
and Sinaloa nd themselves at a stand-off for the territory. Military pressure,
internal disputes, and the drug market have caused some shifts in the major
cartels, and factions have split to form their own operations. New cartels have
splintered off from the major cartels to form their own local groups: Sangre-Z
split from the Zetas and now operates in Northern and central Mexico, Golfo
41
Nueva Generacin split from the Gulf Cartel and holds territory near
Matamoros, and the Corona, which split from the Sinaloa Cartel and occupies
territory in Jalisco (Pachico, 2013).
Certain gangs are growing in prominence along the US-Mexico border
and threaten local law enforcements ability to navigate and control the local
crime scene. In total, Ciudad Juarez has around 900 recognizable street gangs,
many of whom are employed by major cartels, and others who are looking to
expand into the drug trade as independent operators (Dudley, 2013). Barrio
Azteca, for instance, is a gang with more than 5,000 members operating in
Ciudad Juarez (Dudley, 2013). While numerous other smaller gangs operate in
the area, this one oversees much of the criminal activity happening in the city
(Dudley, 2013). They raise revenue through extortion, human trafcking, and
local drug distribution (Dudley, 2013). While the Sinaloa and the Juarez Cartel
control fought over territory in Juarez, they pitted local gangs against each
other. Juarez armed a group called La Linea, which recruits from current and
former local police ofcers, while Sinaloa Cartel hired professional assassins in
a group they refer to as la Nueva Gente (Dudley, 2013). Sinaloa challenged
Juarezs hold over its trade points and storage facilities through its local forces
(Dudley, 2013).
42
Part of the trouble that the federal government of Mexico faces when
dealing with the drug cartels and the escalating violence comes from the
weaknesses of institutions at the state and local level, bearing in mind that, in
this case, weakness is not just due to a low number of enforcement ofcers. For
instance, while Calderon initially sent 6,500 troops to the southern state of
Michoacn to end drug violence, today there are 45,000 federal troops deployed
along with the police forces to manage the security threat (Borderland Beat,
2010). However, in cities like Ciudad Juarez, police ofcers are recruited into
service for cartels like La Linea, the Juarezs cartels armed branch (Dudley,
2013). The Policemen recruited by cartels and local gangs provide an additional
service: they are paid off for illegally protecting people and goods moving
through the region (Dudley, 2013). Other cartels like Los Zetas also recruit
from current and former policemen to handle some of their on-the-ground
operations (Dudley, 2013).
In a political climate where important parts of society lack faith in both
public institutions and government ofcials due to Mexicos high rates of
impunity, the army seemed like the best option for maintaining public faith and
support in the drug wars; according to public polls in 2010, the army ranked 3
rd

among the most trusted institutions in the country, behind the Catholic Church
and institutions of higher education (Ellingwood, 2010).
43
Given the number of different law enforcement teams running
operations across Mexico, there are still problems in coordinating operations in
the face of so much corruption and limited resources. The local police forces
are especially susceptible to bribery due to their very low wages and poor
training (Associated Press, 2012). The local police forces, the Federal
Preventative Police, the National Army, and other security teams, coordinate
some projects simultaneously without clear networks for communication
(Aguilar, 2012). However, impunity remains as one of the largest problems in
Mexico (Daly, Heinle, & Shirk, 2012; Associated Press, 2012)
Additionally, the criminal networks have access to powerful weapons
that are smuggled into the country from the United States. According to the
United States Bureau on Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, 70% of
the weapons seized from the cartels in the past year came from the United
States, and others point to Guatemala as another major smuggling point for
weapons going into Mexico (Shirk D. A., 2011).
Along with some rough gures to approximate the damage Mexicos
drug war has done to society, there are crimes that tend to go underreported,
like kidnapping, prostitution, and domestic violence. Domestic violence in
cities along the border frequently goes unreported, due to limited security
options for victims who report these crimes to authorities, and very low
44
numbers of investigations actually carried out against perpetrators. In addition
to more common cases of domestic violence, the number of women reported as
murdered in femicides has increased from 1,085 in 2007 to 1,926 in 2009 in
Mexico (Cattan, 2011; Graham, 2010). Ciudad Juarez had 313 murders
targeting women in 2010 alone, while the state of Chihuahua experienced 440
murders targeting women total (Cattan, 2011).
On the other hand, human trafcking accounts for $6.6 billion going
into Mexico every year (Graham, 2010). The Council on Hemispheric Affairs
estimates that around 100,000 women are trafcked out of Latin America each
year as prostitutes (Graham, 2010). Women face threats from trafckers and
their pimps if they report themselves to the police, so many of these cases also
go unreported. In addition to the migrants that pay to be taken across the border
by coyotes and offering bribes to local cartel leaders as part of a protection
bracket, the cartels have taken to targeting other people in protable human
trafcking schemes (O'Connor, 2011).
Violence in Mxico
The death toll from violence in Mexico reached 47,500 people, according to the
federal governments statistics for 2012 (Shoichet, 2012). Competition between
45
the larger cartels means higher rates of violence from turf wars, targeted
homicides, and other types of violence, with the 2012 homicide rate reaching 24
people per 100,000 inhabitants (Fausset, 2012). Some of this targeted violence
is visible in the growing crime rates for states like Veracruz, which are
attractive for criminal groups like Los Zetas and others who want to control
alternative port cities. It is unclear how many of these registered homicides are
the result of drug cartel violence or other kinds of criminal activity independent
of the drug war. That said, the rise in homicide rates in Mexico visibly spiked
with the beginning of the war on drugs after 2006. While the numbers of
homicides in the country continue to increase, the majority of the crime from
gang-related violence is focused in just 7% of Mexican towns (Under the
Volcano, 2010).
46
Source: los ministerios pblicos dependientes de las procuraduras estatales
(SNSP), http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulo&Article=2099329
The worst geographical areas of violence are Baja California, Sinaloa,
Chihuahua, Guerrero, and Michoacn, while other border states like Tamaulipas
are widely acknowledged to be out of control and run under the decisive
inuence of drug cartels. These areas correspond to the territories of the six
largest drug gangs as well as the areas of high trafc, and therefore have a
higher concentration of competing gangs trying to make use of the networks
into the United States. For example, Ciudad Juarez went from 317 murders in
2007 to 1,623 murders in 2008 (O'Rourke & Byrd, 2010, p. 13). Monthly
murder rates in this city, now recognized as one of the most dangerous cities in
the world, are as high 3,200 people in 2011. That is 200 murders per 100,000
47
residents (Shirk D. A., 2011). An estimated 10,000 people are working for
various criminal networks in the city of Ciudad Juarez alone, and many of these
individuals, even at the lowest levels, earn far more here than they would while
working under legal and formal employment (Shirk D. A., 2011). Examples of
these turf wars can be seen in the cities like Torren, Coahuila, where the
Sinaloa Cartel and Los Zetas are ghting for control of the city. Prior to the
drug war, areas like the state of Sinaloa had lower rates of violence because
they were controlled by a single cartel that reached agreements with other
groups (Shirk D. A., 2011). The size and number of cartels and other criminal
networks change depending on market demands and reactions to new law
enforcement measures (Inter-American Dialogue, 2013).
The impact of Mexicos cartels and their more recent shifts in power has
changed the landscape of criminal activity in Mexico in a profound way. Some
argue that local violence in states like Guerrero and Jalisco, territories not
directly controlled by the major cartels, can be attributed more to the splintering
of larger cartels and the emerging middle or smaller-sized criminal networks
gaining power in the region (Corcoran, 2012). Mexicos Attorney General Jesus
Murillo Karam stated that he believed somewhere between 60-80 cartels were
operating across the country. The Mexican government is also aware of the
presence of larger transnational gangs, like MS-13 and Barrio 18, which
48
sometimes work alongside the cartels in addition to demanding payments for
protection from migrants traveling through Central America and Mexico
(Hernandez, 2010; Seekle, 2009). In terms of gang violence, cities like Ciudad
Juarez are packed with upwards of 500 youth gangs with membership totaling
somewhere between 15,000-25,000 people (Gutierrez, 2010). Many gangs are
employed by the cartels to trafc weapons, drugs, or people, through their
neighborhoods (Corcoran, 2012).
The security threat in a city like Ciudad Juarez is partially due to the
city planning; the city has pockets of extreme poverty, without schools for
children or youth, and with no other job alternative outside of the
maquiladoras. As a result, this city has become one of the most important
recruiting sites for the drug cartels. In recent years some of the youth gangs,
like Barrio Azteca and Los Mexicles have formed partnerships with cartels
like the Juarez Cartel (Dudley, 2013).
Two Countries: Several Fronts
The security threats that Mexico faces along its borders are not completely
unique to this particular region, but the US-Mexico border is particularly
challenging for a number of reasons. First, the United States continues to be one
49
of the largest drug markets in the world, attracting drug trafcking
organizations from around the world to invest in local markets and trade routes
to the United States. Second, the US-Mexican border has long expanses of
undeveloped land and dangerous desert passages. As border security increases
in some of the easier crossing points, migrants and trafckers alike are forced to
cross through some of the most difcult sections of desert along the border. As
these new crossing points develop to open trade routes for drugs, weapons, and
human trafc between the United States and Mexico, violence has shifted from
cities like Ciudad Juarez to others, like Nuevo Laredo. Finally, new cartel
recruitment tactics make it increasingly difcult for the Mexican government to
control the spread of cartel activity across the border. The Zetas, in particular,
have expanded their presence into new areas of Mexico by recruiting local
gangs, who know the territories and the local communities, into their ranks.
The next front that the Mexican government needs to address is the
media, and the public opinion of the drug war, in order to reestablish its
credibility. To date, the government has not always been transparent about the
measures it takes to ght the cartels and handle corrupt ofcials. As a result, its
credibility has suffered. The Mexican government is waging a war with local
gangs and cartel members in order to establish itself as a credible local
authority. In recent years, the reputation of the government, particularly on a
50
local level, has suffered from increasing numbers of publically visible
corruption scandals, judicial impunity, and botched cover-ups. Gangs, cartels,
and other criminal organizations do particularly well in areas that face extended
periods of civil unrest and weak government structures. Additionally, the added
military presence along the US-Mexico border is increasingly unwelcome,
causing further civil unrest in local border communities. The military has
become, in some ways, the rst line of contact between civilians along the
border and the government. The other way the Mexican government can
maintain a local presence in these communities is through the media, but it has
not successfully managed its media image or coverage of the drug war, often
allowing criminal organizations to dictate how events are explained in the news.
As the Mexican government ghts to manage the border violence and
trafc of illegal goods, they also face an internal battle to keep their military
troops and government ofcials motivated in the ght against the cartels. As the
economic strength of the cartels grows, the Mexican government will continue
to nd itself under-resourced when going head-to-head with technologically
sophisticated cartels like the Zetas. Local recruitment has helped several cartels
to improve their trade routes and outrun military ofcials, many of whom are
new to the area and less familiar than the local gang members are. Corruption is
still an enormous problem for the Mexican government, particularly along the
51
border and in major drug growing/exporting areas of the country. The ght to
clean up the border will need to be a joint effort between local authorities in the
communities affected by violence and the national government, as they
compromise and work together to improve local infrastructure and address key
topics like the increasing drug use and gang recruitment in the region.
Finally, the US drug market has remained stable over the last few years,
despite attempts by the US government to manage its eradication efforts abroad,
and strong punitive measures within the country. Drug eradication efforts alone
are not effective in reducing drug trafc and violence along the border region,
especially as some of the cartels expand their operations into human trafc and
other types of illegal markets. The ght against Mexicos cartels is not one-
dimensional: cutting off drug production in the country and drug trafc at major
crossing points along the border will not be enough to stabilize the region. The
US and Mexican governments will need to take a far more comprehensive
approach to address several underlying issues that promote the drug trade and
increasing border violence in the region.
52
Los Zetas and La Familia Michoacana:
Beyond Mexico and Drug Trafcking
By Luis Jorge Garay Salamanca and Eduardo Salcedo-Albarn
Mexico is currently one of the most important hotspots of criminal activity with
effects in the Western Hemisphere. In this criminal dynamic, the Sinaloa Cartel,
The Gulf Cartel, La Familia Michoana and Los Zetas are some of the most
relevant criminal networks that originated in Mexico, but currently reach and
operate in different countries across Latin America, Europe, Africa, and even
Asia. While the operations of criminal networks inside of Mexico are severely
violent, outside of Mexico, their operations mainly consist of smuggling,
transportation and distribution of illegal drugs, and other such activities. Los
Zetas, initially created out of former elite army soldiers, was the armed wing
of the criminal network known as the Gulf Cartel [Cartel del Golfo] at the
beginning of the present century. However, very quickly Los Zetas began
operating as an independent criminal network, currently challenging the Gulf
Cartel for control of trafcking routes and plazas, meaning gaining local
power in municipalities.
53
In 2003, Mexican authorities imprisoned Osiel Crdenas Guilln, leader
of the Gulf Cartel, who was also in charge of creating Los Zetas at the end of
the nineties. As a result, Los Zetas found an opportunity to take control of the
routes and the infrastructure of the Gulf Cartel. Osiel Crdenas was extradited
in 2007, which then increased the confrontation between Los Zetas and the
Gulf Cartel.
The current local control carried out by Los Zetas, partially as a result
of the confrontation with the Gulf Cartel, implies agreements with local
authoritiesthis includes members of the municipal police, political leaders,
and other public servants who provide access to decisions regarding the local
public administration. Additionally, as we have analyzed herein, private agents
establish agreements with criminal networks like Los Zetas, in order to
participate in money laundering schemes. Similar agreements, which include
the participation of politicians, public servants, and private nodes/agents, have
also been observed in models of other criminal networks, such as La Familia
Michoacana (Garay & Salcedo-Albaran, 2012).
In fact, another criminal network that is also highly relevant in the
Mexican crime scene was formerly known as La Familia
Michoacana [Michoacana Family], and currently known as Caballeros
54
Templarios [Templar Knights], after a confrontation between two leaders of
the network: Servando Gmez Martinez aka La Tuta and Jos de Jess
Mndez Vargas aka El Chango Mndez.
Bearing in mind and understanding the current complex structure of the
criminal networks operating across Central America and the United States,
herein we analyze a model that includes information regarding the structure and
operation of La Familia Michoacana and Los Zetas. These two criminal
networks are articulated in the present model, sometimes through interactions
of confrontation, and sometimes through collaboration.
While Los Zetas and La Familia Michoana both have great impact
in the dynamics of crime in Mexico, Los Zetas, as a whole network, has a
stronger presence in various countries across Central Americanot only as
result of their drug trafcking, but also due to its participation in other criminal
activities such as smuggling, extortion, and human trafcking, among others.
For instance, criminal activity by Los Zetas has been registered in Nicaragua,
Guatemala, El Salvador and Colombia (InSight Crime, 2011). As it is discussed
below, the level of decentralization, which implies counting with operative units
in different countries, is one the main reasons why Los Zetas is able to
effectively operate across several criminal activities and markets.
55
The network analyzed in the present section, which includes interactions
between members of La Familia Michoacana, Los Zetas, and the Gulf
Cartel, consists of 552 interactions among 313 nodes/agents. The model is built
on and supported by judicial records containing facts from 2002 to 2010. In this
sense, the model reports facts regarding important changes observed in the
crime dynamics of Mexicofor instance, the initial collaboration between the
Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas, and the current cruel confrontation going on
between Los Zetas, Los Caballeros Templarios and the Gulf Cartel.
Because of the quantity of nodes/agents and interactions, the present
network can be interpreted as a complex one, allowing us to better understand
the relevant characteristics of both the evolution and the current operative
structure of Los Zetas. This means that we analyze the present as a single
one, despite the fact it is sometimes possible to nd subnetworks that are not
directly articulated to the network as a whole.
The present network also illustrates the different types of interactions
between Los Zetas, the Gulf Cartel, and La Familia Michoana. For
instance, we can observe a trend in which drug trafcking networks take
advantage of the already-established structures of interactions, in order to
participate in other criminal markets and activities. Specically, the present
56
network is an example of how a drug trafcking network participates in the
illegal extraction, transport, and smuggling of hydrocarbons.
In recent years, members of Los Zetas network have been engaged in
other illegal markets and illegal activities that are not specically related to
drug trafcking. These include extortion, racketeering, and specically, the
smuggling of humans and natural resources. Bearing this in mind, a great
portion of the network analyzed below is focused on the illegal extraction and
smuggling of hydrocarbons, that are the property of the National rm in charge
of the domestic and international transport and trading of Mexican Oil
[Petrleos de Mxico, PEMEX].
The interactions in the present network are mainly established between
dark nodes/agents dened as drug trafckers, and gray nodes/agents dened as
public servants. However, as we will discuss, we can also observe the
participation of private nodes/agents, specically carrying out the money
laundering processes that are executed within the nancial structure of the
network, as well as buying trafcked hydrocarbons inside the United States.
The present network is, therefore, an interesting example of how public
and private nodes/agents co-opt and are co-opted by criminal nodes/agents, in
order to accomplish unlawful purposes. In this way, the present network is
57
similar to other cases that have already been analyzed in Mexico (Garay &
Salcedo-Albaran, 2012), such as La Familia Michoacana, where almost the
entire network is articulated by nodes/agents dened as public servants and
drug trafckers.
Among those gray nodes/agents in which the organizational and the
institutional role do not coincide (Garay, Salcedo-Albarn, & De Len-Beltrn,
2010), one of the most interesting is Miguel ngel Almaraz Maldonado, due to
his high exposure in the Mexican national media. Former director of the Party
of the Democratic Revolution [Partido de la Revolucin Democrtica, PRD] in
the State of Tamaulipas between 2005 and 2007 (Guzmn & Gastn, 2009)
the case of Almaraz, identied in the present network with the code FUPBL-
VIALOZEMNAMgained the attention of the Mexican national media after
being captured in 2009 for participating in a massive criminal network of
hydrocarbons trafcking. In fact, in the context of the present network, Almaraz
was in charge of directing and administrating the activities of other members
of the criminal network who were also under prosecution by Mexican
authorities. Additionally, as we would expect, members of the present criminal
network also engage in money laundering as a result of the drugs and
hydrocarbons trafcking. This means that in the present network, criminal
58
activities were registered that included drug trafcking, hydrocarbons
trafcking, and money laundering, as well as several violent criminal activities.
Regarding the drug trafcking activity, which continues to be a relevant
activity of Los Zetas network, Osiel Crdenas Guilln, a former lord of the
Gulf Cartel, appears to be in charge of making the most important decisions
related to transporting the illegal drugs across Mexico and towards the United
States. As discussed below, this node/agent is highly relevant for the
articulation of the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas. Initially, Osiel Crdenas Guilln
was in charge of creating Los Zetas to reinforce the Gulf Cartels military
strength. Then, even after being extradited to the United States, Osiel Crdenas
continued to act as a relevant member for the articulation and confrontation of
both criminal networks, since Los Zetas constantly point out that Osiel
Crdenas was providing information to the United States authorities regarding
the structure and inner operation of Los Zetas.
Another relevant drug trafcker in the present network is Roberto
Rodriguez Crdenas, who operated in Guatemala. Specially, this node/agent
participated in the mass murder registered in Guatemala at the tourist place
known as La Laguna, in 2008, which called the attention of national media at
Guatemala. In fact, Guatemalan courts sentenced 14 members of Los Zetas in
59
2010 for their participation in the mass murder (Prensa Libre, 2010). This node/
agent is highly relevant for evidencing the articulation and operation of
members of Los Zetas across Mexico and Guatemala. In this sense, the
present network illustrates a remarkable transnational dimension, with
permanent and non-sporadic activity in various countries of Central and South
America.
Concentration of interactions
The drug trafcker Osiel Crdenas Guilln, original member of the Gulf Cartel
[Cartel del Gofo], identied with the code NA-LICADEGOOCRGN, registers
the highest amount of direct interactions, with a direct centrality indicator of
4,2%. In the present network, which includes facts from the period in which
Los Zetas operated as the armed wing of the Gulf Cartel, Osiel Crdenas
Guilln is the hub. Osiel Crdenas interacted with several hitmen operating as
Zetas, providing them instructions for homicides. Some of the nodes/agents
executing the orders of Osiel Crdenas were: (i) Gonzalo Gerenzano Escribano,
identied with the code SI-LOZEGGE, (ii) Isidro Lara Florez aka "El
Colchn", identied with the code SI-LOZEILFECN, (iii) Jos Ramn Dvila
Lpez aka "El Cholo", identied with the code SI-LOZEJRNDVLPEC, and (iv)
60
Hctor Manuel Sauceda Gamboa aka "El Caris", identied with the code NA-
LOZEHCMSGEC (Graph 4).
Even after being imprisoned by Mexican authorities in 2003, and
extradited to the United States in 2007, Osiel Crdenas Guiln currently
remains as a relevant node/agent in the recent drug trafcking scenario at
Mexico. For instance, in 2012 Los Zetas accused Osiel Crdenas Guillen of
providing information to the DEA regarding their activity. Los Zetas even
pointed out that Osiel Crdenas provided information for operations carried out
by the Gulf Cartel and Los Caballeros Templarios (formerly known as La
Familia Michoana) against Los Zetas (Revista Proceso, 2012).
The second node/agent with the highest capacity to establish direct
interactions is a political leader with a high public prole, Miguel ngel
Almaraz Maldonado, identied by the code LDEPOTIVIALOZEMNAM. This
node/agent registers a direct centrality indicator of 3.1% and participates in
interactions specically related to the nancial structure of the most recent
criminal structure of Los Zetas. In fact, Almaraz Maldonado is one of the
most relevant nodes/agents articulating the entire nancial and operative
structure of the sub-network in charge of the illegal extraction of hydrocarbons.
For instance, Almaraz participates in interactions consisting of bribing public
servants for transportation of the stolen hydrocarbons, as well as renting the
61
trucks used for that purpose. This is, therefore, a highly relevant gray node/
agent who establishes interactions across both the lawful and unlawful sections
of the network.
The third node/agent with the highest capacity to establish interactions
is PR-MIBADEARODEHIJVV, a private node/agent in charge of opening and
managing various bank accounts that were used for massive money laundering
processes. This node/agent registers a direct centrality indicator of 2.7%, and
congures a relevant triad between the political, private, and criminal sections
of the network. This means that the three nodes/agents described above allow
for the ow of criminal, political, and nancial resources and information. In
this sense, the fact that Los Zetas are able to operate in the stealing,
transportation, and smuggling of hydrocarbons, is the result of their capacity to
effectively establish interactions with grey nodes/agents operating within lawful
organizational institutions, such as political parties and nancial institutions.
The three nodes/agents mentioned above have similar levels of
relevance in the articulation of the network: 4.2%, 3.1%, and 2.7%. In fact (as
illustrated in the Annex 1), the direct centrality indicator has a homogeneous
decreasing trend. The establishment of direct interactions is not highly
concentrated in just a few nodes/agents, which means that the network is highly
resilient in terms of the structure of interactions. On the other hand, as it is
62
discussed below, three nodes/agents control the capacity to arbitrate information
and intervene in the ows of information. This means that the capacity to
intervene and arbitrate in the geodesic routes of the network is more
concentrated than the capacity to interact in a direct way.
63
Graph 4. Radial distribution. Location (higher in the nucleus) and size
illustrate the direct centrality degree (amount of direct interactions)
Concentration of capacity for arbitrating information
The drug trafcker Osiel Crdenas Guilln, one of the original members of the
Gulf Cartel when Los Zetas operated as its armed group, and described in the
64
previous section as the hub with the highest indicator of direct centrality, is also
the structural bridge with the highest indicator of betweenness. Therefore, this
node/agent has the highest capacity to arbitrate information and intervene in the
ows of information or geodesic routes of the entire network, with a
betweenness indicator of 13.9% (Graph 5).
Two nodes/agents register the second highest indicator of betweenness.
On one hand, the drug trafcker Omar Lormendez Pitala aka "El Pita",
identied with the code SI-LOZEOLPAEP, registers a betweenness indicator of
8.9%. This node/agent is a murderer (hitman) that provides relevant information
regarding the inner structure of Los Zetas, including various homicides
committed in the framework of the criminal network. El Pita is in charge of
establishing interactions with public servants, such as a member of the local
police at the municipality of Lzaro Crdenas and Petacalco, in the State of
Guerrero. It is therefore interesting to learn how a hitman who directly
ordered and executing homicides, was also able to establish interactions with
public servants, in order to obtain protection and information from the local
police. This situation explains how even a node/agent participating in the sub-
networks in charge of executing violence, registers a high indicator of
betweenness. Also, El Pita established interactions with La Tuta, one of the
most important leaders of La Familia Michoacana, which also explains his
65
role as a relevant structural bridge that connects sub-networksnot only inside
the criminal network of Los Zetas, but also with other criminal networks such
as La Familia Michoacana.
On the other hand, Miguel ngel Almarz Maldonado, identied with
the code LDEPOTIVIALOZEMNAM, also registers a betweenness indicator of
8.9%. This capacity is explained because Almaraz Maldonado operates from a
private role with access to information from the political and private spheres, as
well as the local public administration. Almaraz Maldonado connects lawful
and unlawful structures inside the network.
The third highest indicator is registered by NA-FAMISGMMNLTEP,
code that identies the drug trafcker Servando Gmez Martnez "La Tuta"
"El Profe". This node/agent registers an indicator of 8.2%, which is explained
by his operating inside the criminal network of La Familia. His interactions
with members of other criminal networks, such as the meetings with El Pita,
allow us to understand his capacity to arbitrate information across sub-
networks.
The rst 20 nodes/agents with the highest capacity to intervene in the
routes of information, including the three described above, register a
betweenness indicator of 1%. This shows their relative capacity for arbitrating
66
information between other nodes/agents, and even in some cases, for operating
as structural bridges between sub-networks, such as the rst four nodes/agents
described above. Among the group of the 20 nodes/agents with the highest
indicator of betweeneess, only the twelfth is a public servant, identied in the
sources as aka Karen. This node/agent, that is not referenced in the sources
with a real name, was a local police ofcer that collaborated with Los
Zetasnot only providing information or security, which is usually observed
when members of the local police collaborate with criminal networks in Mexico
but also packing loads of illegal drugs to get them ready for local and
international distribution.
Karen is an interesting case of institutional cooptation carried out by
Los Zetas. Even when this node/agent was a member of the local police, it is
also counted in the judicial records as part of the criminal network of Los
Zetas. In fact, Karen also provides relevant information regarding the
operative structure of the network, specically providing information about
other public ofcials of the local police who, while on duty, were also active
members of Los Zetas. For example, Karen explains that he began working
with Los Zetas because his ofcial commander at the municipal police
offered him the task of taking care of the cars used for transporting illegal drugs
and money from and to Nuevo Laredo. When Karen began working with Los
67
Zetas, he received a payment of US $300 every two weeks. Karen explains
that, at that moment, another police commander from the Operative Police
Group [Grupo Operativo Policiaco, GOP] was in charge of paying him for his
services. In this sense, Karen is registered as the node/agent with the twelfth
highest betweenness indicator because of his capacity for participation in
various interactions between nodes/agents that operated inside the local police,
while providing support for Los Zetas. In total, thirteen out of the 313 nodes/
agents of the network belong to the local police.
68
Graph 5. Radial distribution. Location (higher in the nucleus) and size
illustrate the betweenness indicator (capacity for intervening in the routes
of information)
69
Interactions
The total amount of interactions modeled in the present network is 552. The
most important type of interaction registered 17% out of total interactions,
which describes the internal command structure of Los Zetas, specically
related to drug trafcking, which is illustrated in the graph below (Graph 6).
Therefore, those nodes/agents participating in interactions of the command
structure can be dened as members of Los Zetas, specically participating
in activities related to drug trafcking.
However, it is important to bear in mind that there is another category of
interactions that also belongs to Los Zetas, but specically related to oil and
hydrocarbons smuggling. This structure is, therefore, also part of Los Zetas,
but not related to drug trafcking; but rather, in charge of executing the illegal
activities of stealing hydrocarbons inside of Mexico, transporting it, and
smuggling it into the United States. Those activities modeled in the present
network are built on facts dated from 2006 to 2009.
70
Graph 6. Interaction 1. Internal command structure of Los Zetas,
specically related with drug trafcking. Location (higher in the nucleus)
and size illustrate the betweenness indicator (capacity for intervening in the
routes of information).
Even though the structure responsible for executing the hydrocarbons
smuggling is not as important, in terms of the amount of interactions, as the one
71
responsible for drug trafcking, it is the sixth highest in the network,
accounting for 6% out of the total amount of interactions. The type of
interaction Oil Trafck inner structure is relevant because it illustrates the
complexity of the sub-network that is focused on this activity. For instance,
several private nodes/agents participate in this structure, operating through
rms that transport and distribute oil and hydrocarbons inside the United States.
Additionally, being part of Los Zetas, the participation of nodes/agents within
nancial institutions in charge of carrying out the money laundering process, as
well as ofcials operating through Mexican customs agencies, were also
registered. The graph below (Graph 7), illustrates the structure of those specic
interactions that were established with customs ofcials inside Mexico.
72
Graph 7. Joint operation with customs ofcial. Location (higher in the
nucleus) and size illustrate the betweenness indicator (capacity for
intervening in the routes of information).
73
Graph 8. Joint operation with customs ofcial (Sub-network)
Bearing in mind that oil and hydrocarbons are smuggled inside the
United States, we would also expect to see participation from ofcials operating
inside the customs agencies of the United States. However, since the judicial
sources sustaining the present networks belong to Mexican authorities, there is
74
no specic information regarding the participation and/or interaction with
ofcials from the United States. This means that according to the sources, all
the customs ofcials collaborating with the criminal objectives of the network
were Mexicans. Therefore, it is important to gather information from the courts
and security agencies inside the United States, regarding corruption in the
border patrol. In fact, there is a reference to United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) ofcials, explaining how the ICE gathered
intelligence regarding the operation of the smuggling network, and specically,
in regards to the rms that bought the trafcked loads of hydrocarbons inside
the United States. In this sense, according to the information, the ICE ofcials,
who can be dened as bright nodes/agents, provided useful information to
Mexican authorities regarding the structure of the American rms collaborating
with the smuggling structure of Los Zetas. According to that information,
those rms buying hydrocarbon condensate inside the United States paid
$800.000 for each tank.
75
Graph 9. Interaction 6. Hydrocarbons smuggling structure. Location
(higher in the nucleus) and size illustrate the betweenness indicator
(capacity for intervening in the routes of information)
76
Graph 10. Interaction 6. Hydrocarbons smuggling structure (Sub-network)
The second type of interaction with the highest concentration, 14%, is
related to the money laundering process carried out by the criminal network,
77
specically the transfer of money between accounts, which is a nancial
procedure for evading currency controls. The structure focused on money
laundering, which is illustrated in the graph below (Graph 11), supported the
drug trafcking and oil smuggling sub-networks. The fact that this type of
interaction registers as the second highest percentage of relevance, allows us to
infer that money laundering was a highly important process carried out in this
network.
Graph 11. Structure of Money laundering consisting on wire transfers.
Location (higher in the nucleus) and size illustrate the betweenness
indicator (capacity for intervening in the routes of information)
78
79
Graph 12. Structure of Money laundering consisting on wire transfers
(Sub-network)
The third most relevant type of interaction, with 8%, consists of those in
which a node/agent A points out that he knows something about a node/agent
80
B, or that simply knows the node/agent B. Its not even relevant if the nodes/
agents A and B have met; which means that this type of interaction includes all
those psychological ties in which someone has information about someone.
Therefore, this type of interaction does not include situations in which the
nodes/agents directly participate in the operative structure of the network;
however, this type of interaction provides information regarding all those
nodes/agents that directly or indirectly have participated in different processes
carried out in the framework of the network.
The fourth most relevant type interaction, with 7%, is the one built on
family ties. As it can be observed, this type of interaction is distributed across
the network, which means it is not specically related with a single sub-
network (Graph 13). Finally, the fth most relevant type of interaction, with
6%, describes the command structure of the criminal network of La Familia
Michoacana. Therefore, those nodes/agents participating in the fth type of
interaction can be dened as direct members of La Familia (Graph 14).
81
Graph 13. Family structure. Location (higher in the nucleus) and size
illustrate the betweenness indicator (capacity for intervening in the routes
of information)
82
Graph 14. Michoacana Family. Location (higher in the nucleus) and size
illustrate the betweenness indicator (capacity for intervening in the routes
of information)
In general, the criminal network analyzed herein can be characterized as
a highly resilient network, as a result of a low level of centralization. On one
hand, the concentration of direct interactions, analyzed through the indicator of
83
direct centrality, homogeneously decreases across the entire network, with no
signicant distance among nodes/agents. In fact, the greatest distance in terms
of concentration of direct centrality is only 1%, between the rst and the second
nodes/agents with the highest indicator.
On the other hand, the concentration of the capacity for intervening in
the routes of information, analyzed through the indicator of betweenness,
illustrates a situation of higher concentration, when compared to the indicator of
direct centrality. However, the level of centralization, in terms of the capacity
for arbitrating the ows of information, is still low when compared with other
criminal networks (Garay & Salcedo-Albaran, 2012). This means that the
network is highly resilient in terms of the structure of direct interactions, and is
less resilient in terms of the concentration of information. In any case, the
network is relatively resilient, which means that it would be necessary to
remove or neutralize several nodes/agents, simultaneously, in order to achieve
disarticulation of the network.
Concentration of nodes/agents
As we explained at the beginning of the present chapter, the analyzed model is
composed mainly of drug trafckers and public servants. After categorizing and
84
calculating the percent concentrations of nodes/agents, we found that the most
important type of nodes/agents is drug trafckers with 53%, followed by
public servants with 16% (Figure 1). This means that 69% of all the nodes/
agents interacting in the entire network are drug trafckers meaning direct
members of Los Zetas, La Familia Michoacana or the Gulf Cartel and
public servants. The same high degree of relevance of drug trafckers and
public servants has been observed in other criminal networks analyzed in
Mexico, such as in the case of La Familia Michoanca network, in which 67%
out of the total amount of nodes/agents were drug trafckers, and 27% were
public servants (Garay, Salcedo-Albarn, & De Len-Beltrn, 2010).
Figure 1. Concentration of 313 Nodes/agents
85
When analyzing the nodes/agents categorized as drug-trafckers, it was
possible to identify those that belonged to Los Zetas, to La Familia
Michoacana, or to the Gulf Cartel. Regarding those concentrations, it is
important to call attention to the number of the members of Los Zetas (Figure
2).
Figure 2. Concentration of drug/trafckers of the network
Finally, bearing in mind the importance of the public servants in this
network, the following are the concentrations of the 50 nodes/agents classied
under this category (Figure 3).
86
Figure 3. Concentration of public servants participating in of the
network
In total, 44 nodes/agents were classied as operating in the security
sector, which includes the police at the national, state and municipal levels,
the Army, the customs agency, and the Border Patrol of Mexico. Table 1 below
illustrates the relevant participation of customs ofcials and the municipal
police. In total, 12 customs ofcials participated in the network, representing
the 25% of all the public servants participating in the network. According to the
information provided by witnesses and former members of Los Zetas, those
customs ofcials received a payment, in cash, by Los Zetas at the end of each
87
month, in exchange for allowing the transportation of loads of illegal drugs and
hydrocarbons. The following is the complete list of those nodes/agents
classied in this sector.
Table 1
Type of node/agent %%
Customs o!cial 25
Municipal Policeman 11
Municipal Policeman at Hidalgo City, Michoacn, who collaborates with "Familia
Michoacana") 7
Federal Policeman 7
Commander at Municipal Police 7
Second Rank Municipal Police 5
Municipal Policeman at Zitacuaro City, Michoacn, who collaborates with "Familia
Michoacana". 7
Supervisor, Municipal police 2
Army Soldier 2
Municipal policeman at Zitacuaro City and Hidalgo City 2
Municipal Policeman at Zitacuaro City, Michoacn. 2
Municipal policeman at Hidalgo City 2
Ministerial Policeman 2
Federal policeman who collaborates with "Familia Michoacana" 2
Policeman 2
O!cer of Public Security at Hidalgo city, Michoacn 2
88
Operative Police Group (Grupo Operativo Policaco) 2
Director of State Public Security 2
Coordinator of Municipal Police 2
Commander of Operative Police Group (Grupo Operativo Policaco) 2
Administrative Customs o!cial 2
89
Cross-Border Connections: Criminal Inter-
Penetration at the US-Mexico Hyperborder
By John P. Sullivan
The United States (US) and Mexico share a complex border and a common
threat for transnational organized crime. The US-Mexico border is one of the
most complex in the world. At rst glance, cross-border threats appear to be
concentrated along the nearly 2,000 mile long frontier. This frontera divides the
American states of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas from their
Mexican counterparts: Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo
Len, and Tamaulipas. Yet, as I will describe, the impact of cross-border
criminal connections reach far from the frontera and inuences crime and
corruption in major cities and exurban enclaves far from the actual border.
The contested border
The US-Mexico borderwhich I refer to as the hyperborder, due to its
intense complexity and interactionsis home to both licit and illicit trade
90
(Sullivan J. P., 2014).
3
Commerce and people transverse its long span through
the 45 designated border crossings, contraband smuggling and illegal crossings
occurring at many ad hoc transit points. The hyperborder is actually a border
zone and home to 24 million persons90% of whom live in the zones 14 twin
cities. These twin, or sister cities, are west to east (US-MX): San Diego-
Tijuana, Calexico-Mexicali, Yuma-San Luis Rio Colorado, Nogales-Nogales,
Naco-Naco, Douglas-Agua Prieta, Columbus-Las Palomas, El Paso-Ciudad
Jurez, Presido-Oinaga, Del Rio-Cd. Acua, Eagle Pass-Piedras Negras,
Laredo-Nuevo Laredo, Mc Allen-Reynosa, and Brownsville-Matamoros. These
twin cities are also key plazas for the trans-shipment of drugs and other
contraband in the illicit space of ows (Sullivan & Elkus, 2009).
Security issues at the border involve crime, corruption, and conict.
Specic issues encountered are:

Illegal/undocumented immigration/migration

Human trafcking and slavery

Drug trafcking

Small arms trafcking

Smuggling of all types of contraband

91
3
The term hyperborder originates with Fernando Romero, an architect; see Fernando Romero/LAR,
Hyperborder: The Contemporary U.S.-Mexico Border and Its Future. New York: Princeton Architectural
Press, 2008.

Money laundering

Cross-border violence

Corruption
Smuggling is a bi-directional affair. Drugs and people move north, arms and
funds ow south. Tunnels, trains, vehicles, aircraft (including ultralights), and
vessels (including go-fast boats, pangas, and narco-submarines, actually low-
prole semi-submersible vessels) enable this activity. Historically, the region
has been contested, as bandits and criminals sought to exploit the seams of
weak governance and weak state presence.
Narcos seeking hyperprots from the seemingly insatiable U.S. demand for
drugs brings corruption, instability, and violence to this dynamic cross-cultural
incubator of innovation. Cross-border family ties, cross-border cultural
references (including narcocorridos), and cross-border gangs, make this a
crucible of state reconguration.
While border zones are natural incubators of conict, they are also
incubators of economic extraction and corruption. The Zetas, for example, have
been implicated in laundering money through horse racing in the U.S. Part of
this conspiracy involved alleged attempts to bribe a federal judge (Thompson,
2012; Schladen, 2013a; Schladen, 2013b). The vast size of global illicit ows
92
makes borders a lucrative node in the global political economy. Cross-border
remittances (licit and illicit) combine with money-laundering and criminal
inter-penetration to fuel the locus of state reconguration. For the U.S., illegal
narcotics constitute a $60 billion annual industry from which Mexican
gangsters earn at least $6-7 billion each year (Caulkins, Reuter, Iguchi, &
Chiesa, 2005; Brambila Macias, 2008; Shirk D. , 2011).
Narcotics are not the only commodities owing through the borders illicit
pipelines. Hydrocarbons (oil and petroleum) hijacked from illegal taps (tomas
clandestinas) on the Petrleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) network also fuel the
cross-border criminal trade (Grillo, 2011). PEMEX loses at least $2 billion per
year in this theft tax. As Sullivan and Elkus noted:
Corruption is a key additive in the petro-extraction racket. Not only are PEMEX
workers and ofcials corrupted by cartels, but also insider trading and collusion help
fuel a lucrative cross-border enterprise. For example, a Texas oil executive says his
company was one of several that bought stolen Mexican petroleum and sold the
illicit products to large corporations including German chemical giant BASF. These
racketeer-inuenced transactions, which were uncovered by a joint US-Mexican
investigation, involved several American and multinational corporations (Sullivan &
Elkus, Open Veins of Mexico, 2011).
4
A U.S. criminal gang link is suspected, but has not been veried. It is
widely believed, as discussed in the Mexican criminal network modeled herein,
93
4
See also "BASF bought stolen Mexican oil says Texan executive," Deutsche Welle, 22 August 2009;
"From Bush White House to Zetas La Empresa," NarcoGuerra Times, 22 August 2009; Martha Mendoza,
"Court: Stolen Mexican oil sold to large company," Associated Press, 21 August 2009.
that Los Zetas have been diverting stolen oil from Mexico into Texas. As a
result, in a case popularly known as the Pemex Condensate Theft Ring
Lawsuit, PEMEX has sued several U.S. oil interests in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas in Houston (Maney, 2011).
Certainly, petro-extraction challenges the Mexican states legitimacy and
solvency. Potential entrenched gang capacity manipulating the hydrocarbon
market on the US side of the border is equally disturbing. Here we see a hint of
the potential for Co-opted State Reconguration (CStR) playing itself out on
both sides of the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo).
5
State reconguration in the hyperborder and beyond
As Garay Salamanca and Salcedo-Albarn (2011, 2012)
6
have noted, state
capture and state reconguration are features of transnational criminal
challenges to states. In essence, cartels and afliated gangs are criminal soldiers
or armed non-state actors that contest each other for economic domination of
criminal plazas, and contest the state for freedom of action. In Mexico, this has
led to sub-state failure (as seen in the hyper-violence of Ciudad Jurez, the
states of Michoacn and Tamaulipas, and elsewhere) (Sullivan J. , 2012b). In
94
5
See especially Eduardo Salcedo-Albarn and Luis Jorge Garay, How Corruption Affects National
Security of the United States, Small Wars Journal-El Centro, 06 October 2011.
6
Ibid.
the United States, while there has been a fear of spillover violence, the situation
is much more subtle. Some cross-border violence (executions, kidnappings,
ambushes, and even narcobloqueos) (Sullivan J. , 2013b) has occurred, but
corruption and co-option of government ofcials is the greater concern. As
(Sullivan J. , 2013a) noted in a recent Baker Blog essay:
Americans often view the spillover of crime or violence as a one-way transaction,
from Mexico into the United States. In reality, the actual threat is mutual inter-
penetration of both the U.S. and Mexico by criminal networks and activities. While
the United States is concerned about cartel violence, Mexico fears the inow of U.S.
arms and the seemingly never-ending demand for drugs. Recall the story of Miguel
Trevio Morales, former drug lord and leader of the criminal organization known as
Los Zetas: Morales started as a gangster in Nuevo Laredo and honed his skills while
living in Dallas before he returned to Mexico to eventually ascend to the leadership
of the brutal Los Zetas. Other cross-border fertilization is seen in the case of L.A.-
bred Mara Salvatrucha and El Pasos Barrio Azteca that is active in Ciudad Juarez as
well.
Cartel-gang inter-penetration is a feature of deviant globalization
(Gilman, Goldhammer, & Weber, 2011)

where transnational gangs forge
alliances on both sides of the border actually, many borders to facilitate
their illicit ows of commerce. As a consequence, Mexican cartels operate
in the U.S. and forge alliances with U.S. gangs. Notable cross-border gang
alliances essentially transnational gangs (Sullivan J. , 2008b) include
MS-13 (Mara Salvatrucha), 18
th
Street, San Diegos Logan Heights gangs,
Barrio Azteca/Los Aztecas, and La Lnea.
95
The Barrio Azteca (BA)/Los Aztecas/La Lnea complex is of special
note, due not only to its cross-border activity, but also the nexus between
prison and street gangs, and their hybrid mutation of combat power
(Sullivan J. , 2011). The BA formed an alliance with the Vicente Carrillo
Fuentes (or Jurez) Cartel to battle the Sinaloa Federation. It taxes street
level drug sales in El Paso, West Texas, and southeast New Mexico. Its
activities include drug trafcking, extortion, money laundering,
kidnapping, arson, prostitution, and murder enforcement. It has a range
of local allies including several El Paso gangs such as Puro Barrio
Sandoval, Barrio Cantu Rifa, Varrio Hacienda Heights, Varrio
Northeast, and the Colonel Street Locos.
7
Its rivals include Los
Mexicles and the Artistas Asesinos (AA), who are vassals of Chapo
Guzmans Sinaloa Federation. The BA, in conjunction with La Lnea,
has been tied to brutal massacres, attacks on the community, and
assassinations of U.S. consular personnel. Their tools of the trade include
mass shootings, grenades, and car bombs. Their ability to operate
effectively on both sides of the frontier make them valuable allies to the
96
7
Varrio is a gang slang variant of the Spanish Barrio. This slang term is used by Hispanic street gangs in
California and throughout the southwest United States.
cartels, and a threat to police and the community on both sides of the
border.
At its heart, BA is a prison gang. Other notable prison gangs afliated
or connected with cartels include the Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos,
Tang Blast, the Texas syndicate, Mexikanemi (Texas Mexican
Maa), La Eme (California Mexican Maa), and la Nuestra Familia.
Street gangs linked to cartels include the Latin Kings, MS-13, 18
th

Street, Sureos, and Norteos (it should be noted that Sureo gangs
maintain an afliation with La Eme and Norteo gangs maintain an
afliation with la Nuestra Familia within the California corrections
system). Sureos in Southern California and South Carolina are also
reputed to have a working relationship with Los Zetas in Mexico
(National Gang Intelligence Center, 2011).
Table 1 describes documented alliances among Mexican cartels and
U.S. gangs. The scope of cartel collaboration with U.S. gangs varies among
gangs (even among cliques within gangs). At the core of this variation is
the strength of linkages and interactions among the cartels and gangs,
familial ties, and diaspora links. The relationships are also volatile, and ebb
and ow with the rhythm of street and jailhouse violence. Nevertheless,
97
ties exist and often result in reciprocal prot and an expanding powerbase
of criminal inuence. Mexican cartels currently control most of the
cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamine shipped into the U.S. As
a consequence, U.S. gangs play roles as enforcers during the cross-border
transshipments, and as proxies for the cartels on the street. This includes
street level sales, street enforcers, conducting kidnappings, and collecting
the proceeds from sales. Notable in this regard is the Sinaloa Cartels use of
Los Angeles gangs as criminal laborers.
8
Functionally, gangs in the U.S. can serve one of three roles in relation
to cartels. They can act in a transactional business relationship, they can act
as partners, or they can serve as a franchise (National Gang Intelligence
Center, 2011). Transactional business relationships involve the gangs
buying drugs from the cartel for resale. In partnerships, the gangs sell drugs
or provide services such as transport, warehousing and security, on behalf
of the cartel for a piece of the prot. In the franchise setting the gangs
serves as a local extension of the cartels. La Eme is an example of a
partnership, for example with the Tijuana Cartel; Barrio Azteca is an
example of a franchise, in this case for the Jurez Cartel; and 38
th
Street in
Los Angeles is an example of a resale business relationship.
98
8
ibid, p. 26.
La Familia Michoacana (LFM), and its splinter-successor Los
Caballeros Templarios [The Knights Templar], have well-established links
with U.S. gangs. They operate in California and Texas which are perhaps
their strongest U.S. outposts, New Mexico, Georgia, Illinois, North and
South Carolina, Florida, and Washington, D.C. Their U.S. brokers move
drugs and launder the proceeds of their sales through small shops,
nightclubs, and car dealerships. In Southern California, they relied on a
pact with the Tijuana Cartel to allow transshipment through the Tijuana
Plaza (Gmez, 2011).
LFM and La Eme were recently forging a sustained alliance known
as The Project. Forged in the Los Angeles County Jail, a key Eme
stronghold, the alliance was stalled by Federal indictments: At least 44
separate suspects indicted, and synchronized raids that netted $20 million
in meth in August 2013 (Rockhy & Cadiz Klemack, 2013).
The powerhouse of Mexican cartels is, in many respects, the Sinaloa
Cartel, the keystone of the Sinaloa federation. This organization is perhaps
the largest and most mature cartel in the current constellation of narco-
gangs and cartels. Based in Culiacn, Sinaloa, the group is frequently
assessed as the most powerful in the world. Not surprisingly, it has a
99
mature and well-developed reach into the U.S., and maintains alliances
with a broad range of gangs transporting product to Arizona, California,
Texas, New York, and notably Chicago, where it is believed to be the
stimulus for a surge in gang crime. Sinaloas Chicagoland operation is
centered in the citys Little Village. Strong local demand, and a robust
transshipment capacity fueled by several converging Interstate highways,
have led the Chicago Crime Commission to name the cartels ostensible
leader Joaquin Chapo Guzman, Public Enemy No. 1, a title once held
by notorious Maosi Al Capone. Chicago itself has over 120,000 gang
members, and the well-established Gangster Disciples have forged an
alliance with Chapos Boys (Turnage, 2013).
Los Zetas also operate in the U.S. and maintain alliances with U.S.
gangs. The most salient example of Zeta-Gang interaction, and perhaps the
most ominous, is the alleged alliance between the Zetas and MS-13 (Mara
Salvatrucha). MS-13 is a decentralized gang with a core in Los Angeles
and key nodes in San Salvador and Northern Virginia. In Mexico, it is
reported to act as foot soldiers contractors or tactical allies with several
cartels, most notably Los Zetas. MS-13 maintains a neo-feudal structure
where inuence shapes transaction and power arrangements. They are
100
known as brutal enforcers (a trait they share with the Zetas) and are key
players in drug and human trafcking (Sullivan & Elkus, 2012a).
Conclusion: Conict, Corruption, Collusion, and Countering
Co-option
Certainly, cross-border gangs suggest the potential for an increase in
violence and conict. And indeed, U.S. gangs increasingly nd it benecial
and lucrative to inter-operate with or ally with cartels. As a consequence,
U.S. gangs on both the border and upstream in Americas cities are
increasingly becoming part of a transnational network of gangs. Cartels
require armed/violent structures to counter threats and challenges from
other illicit enterprises and from the state. Specically, cartels and their
illicit networks need local capacity and personnel to protect operations
(plazas, transport routes, clandestine labs, business processes, and
personnel), to protect clients who purchase protection, to extract street
taxes, and to attack adversaries and exert their will. These personnel can
be internal operatives, or allies and outsourced enforcers such as
contractors, sicarios, and gangs.
The gangs, in turn, benet from this relationship, as it enhances the
potential to garner prot and plunder. They also stand to accumulate power
101
in the occult world of corruption, where co-opted government ofcials and
police collude with gagsters for their own benet. In the U.S., cartel-related
violence remains low. Collusive corruption still works, but the on-going
inter-penetration of cartels and gangs across frontiers portends the real
potential for State Capture (StC) and Co-opted State Reconguration
(CStR) to rear its ugly head and erode the bonds of public trust, which
ultimately lead to insecurity and direct confrontation with states.
In the last chapter, various strategies against Transnational Criminal
Networks are discussed. However, at this point it is important to point out
that enhanced intelligence, tactical capacity, and above all, anti-corruption
measures to ensure continued police professionalism and resist criminal
capture of governance capacities, must be encouraged. This will require
transparency and co-operation on both sides of the border. Addressing
cross-border violence and corruption demands bi-lateral co-operation.
Indeed it will soon demand multi-lateral co-operation as Mexican cartels
penetrate Canada and Latin America.
The challenge of confronting Transnational Criminal Networks and
gangs must be incorporated into not only border security, but also broad-
based crime control and efforts to contain public corruption. Ofcials from
the US-Mexico Binational Commission, a Working Group on Homeland
102
Security and Border Cooperation, the US-Mexico Military Commission,
the Border Governors Conference, the Conference of Border Attorneys
General, along with police professional associations and civil society, must
join together to build 21
st
Century border security for the hyperborder and
beyond.
103
Table 1. Mexican Cartel-US Gang Alliances
Cartel Aligned with
The Sinaloa Cartel (aka Guzman-
Loera Organization or Pacic Cartel)
Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos
New Mexico Syndicate
Los Carnales
Latin Kings
Mexican Maa (Eme) (California)
Sureos
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13)
Arizona Mexican Maa (Old & New)
Wet Back Power
Sinaloa Cowboys
West Texas Tangos
Border Brothers (California)
Border Brothers (Arizona)
La Familia Michoacana Cartel
(Formerly part of Los Zetas under
the authority of the Gulf Cartel)
Sureos
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13)
West Texas Tangos
Los Zetas Barrio Azteca
Hermanos de Pistoleros latinos
Mexikanemi
Texas Syndicate
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13)
Vicente Cardenas-Guillen Cartel (Gulf
Cartel)
Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos
Partido Revolutionary Mexicano
Raza Unida
Texas Chicano Brotherhood
Vicente Carrillo-Fuentes Cartel (Jurez
Cartel)
Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos
Barrio Azteca
New Mexico Syndicate
Los Carnales
Arellano-Flix Cartel (Tijuana Cartel) Mexican Maa (Eme) (California)
Sureos
Arizona Mexican Maa (Old & New)
Border Brothers (California)
Source: National Gang intelligence Center, 2011 National Gang Threat
Assessment, APPENDIX B. MDTOs Alliances and Rivals.
104
105
Transnational Crime and the Southeastern
Border of the European Union
By Georgi Petrunov
This chapter examines the transnational criminal networks (TCN) operating in
the Southeastern border of the European Union (SBEU). More specically, the
analysis focuses on TCN operating in the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria,
which became the external border of the European Union after the countrys
accession to the EU in 2007. The primary data used for the analysis is based on
court rulings from four criminal trial cases in Bulgaria. The indictments for
each of the four cases were also studied, in order to provide more details about
the criminal activities of the TCN.
The rst part of the analysis provides general information about Bulgaria
and the specic context in which the TCN operate. In this part, we also discuss
the geographic location of the country and the international transportation
channels running through its territory. The analysis touches on the
socioeconomic situation and the overall development of criminality and
corruption in Bulgaria. The second part discusses transnational criminality in
Bulgaria, with a brief overview of the history of transnational crime, typical
106
forms of crime, and a typology of transnational criminality. Part three presents a
network analysis of four cases
9
of TCN operating in the SBEU, based on the
court rulings in each of the four cases. The nal part of this chapter draws some
important conclusions and makes recommendations for further reforms needed
to tackle the transnational criminal networks operating in the SBEU.
Geographic location of Bulgaria
Bulgaria is a small post-socialist country, located on the Balkan Peninsula, with
an area of 110,994 sq.km. and a population of 7,364,570 (according to the 2011
census). The country is at the crossroads between Europe, Asia, and Africa. It
borders with Turkey, Greece, and Macedonia to the south, Serbia to the west,
with Romania to the north along the Danube River, and the Black Sea to the
east. Five of the ten pan-European transport corridors, which have signicant
geo-economic role for Central and Eastern Europe, run through the territory of
Bulgaria. These are corridors IV, VII, VIII, IX and X (Association of the
Bulgarian Businesses for International Shipping and Cargo Travel). The
107
9
Project team members and contributors for the analysis of Bulgarian cases from Risk Monitor:
the primary data analsys for this paper was conducted by Georgi Petrunov (cases 1-3);
translated by Snezhina Atanassova; case 4 was prepared by Nikolay Yanev and was translated
by Alexander Velev. Analysis of the information in Vortex 2.0: Eduardo Salcedo-Albaran.
Sections 5 and 6 of the present document were written by Georgi Petrunov and translated by
Snezhina Atanassova.
European transport corridor (ETC) IV connects the Central European countries
with the Aegean Sea (with the sea port in Thessaloniki). The Bulgarian section
of the corridor (connecting the cities of Vidin and Soa, via the border
checkpoint Kulata), is 446 km long. ETC VII is a river route, along the rivers
Rhine, Main, and the Danube, connecting the Western European countries
through which the rivers run with the Black Sea Region countries. ETC VIII
connects the Adriatic Sea and the countries in the Black Sea Region, Russia,
and the Central Asia Countries; the corridor runs through Albania, Macedonia,
and Bulgaria. The Bulgarian section of ETC VII is 639 km long, starting at
border checkpoint Gyueshevo and connecting the Bulgarian cities of Pernik-
Soa-Burgas-Varna. ETC IX runs through Romania and Bulgaria and connects
the Northern European countries with the Aegean Sea port in Alexandrupolis.
The Bulgarian section of corridor IX is 460 km long, with the route transiting
through the cities of Russe Veliko Tarnovo Gabrovo Stara Zagora
Dimitrovgrad Kardjali.
The European Transport Corridor X was established to help overcome the
isolation of former Yugoslavia and to aid the peace building efforts in the
region. The corridor starts in Austria with detours in the territory of Germany
and Hungary, transiting through Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia and
Bulgaria. Through the border checkpoint Kapitan Andreevo in Bulgaria, the
108
route continues to Turkey and Greece. The Bulgarian section of the corridor X
is 356 km long. Checkpoint Kapitan Andreevo is part of the external
southeastern border of the EU, and also the largest land border checkpoint in
Europe. The checkpoint lies on the historically important silk route, which
connects Asia and Europe and is still in use today.
Bulgaria has a strategic geographic location with respect to the movement
of people and goods between Europe and Asia, which also makes it an attractive
territory for TCN. Following its accession to the EU in 2007, Bulgaria now an
external border to the Union was obligated to beef up the security levels at the
border checkpoints, and introduce various border control mechanisms in
compliance with the European security requirements. Regardless of the efforts
and measures taken so far by the current and previous governments, Bulgarias
accession into the Schengen Area
10
of passport-free travel has been delayed, as
several Member States consider the country a high risk with respect to
organized crime and institutional corruption.
109
10
Agreement of the EU countries for the removal of the internal borders between the Member
States and shared border control at the external border check points.
Social and Economic Environment
Bulgarias socialist past continues to determine the countrys present
development. The communist legacy of the last 45 years is a signicant factor,
considering the country was ruled by the communist party and was part of the
former Soviet Block. The transition, which started in 1989, from a totalitarian
to a democratic government, and from a centralized, state-run to a market
economy, has had a fundamental impact on the Bulgarian society. The transition
led to economic liberalization, free trade, deregulation, and privatization of the
state-owned enterprises, decreasing the role of the state, and increasing the role
of the private sector. Each segment of society underwent radical changes,
whose goal was to attain prosperity and more economic possibilities. However,
24 years after the collapse of communism, Bulgaria still ranks lowest in the EU
in terms of economic performance, poverty, and inequality, but it tops the lists
for corruption and organized crime.
Todays Bulgarian society which is by no means an exception in the
global scene is deeply polarized and ridden by economic inequality, with weak
institutions controlled by the oligarchy, or by explicitly criminal structures. The
economic resources and the key power mechanisms are in the hands of the
representatives/offspring of the former communist party elite and associated
110
criminal elements, which successfully branded themselves as the new corporate
elite of Bulgaria.
Bulgaria is the poorest country in the European Union, with the lowest
income per capita and monthly wages. It is also one of the countries with the
highest levels of income inequality and the risk of poverty among the EU
Member States (Zhelyazkova, 2011). According to data from (Eurostat, 2013)
Bulgaria is the country with the lowest GDP per capita: measured in purchasing
power, it is only 45 per cent of the EU average. The minimum monthly salary
for 2013 was approximately C150.
11
The average monthly income per person,
per household, was approximately C200, with a poverty line of approximately
C100 (Open Society Institute Soa, 2012). Further statistics show that 19.5%
of the households lived below the poverty line. A growing number of people
join the so-called working poor, as employment does not guarantee
overcoming poverty. According to an analysis of the Institute for Social and
Trade Union Studies of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in
Bulgaria (CITUB) (2005) 684,000 people or 33% of the workforce in the
country are classied as working poor: they are employed in sectors in which
the wages are below 75% of the average wage for the country. Wages are low
even in sectors with some economic growth. On the one hand, this
111
11
The highest minimum monthly salary in the EU has Luxemburg, approximately 1870 euro.
circumstance demoralizes the individuals, and consequently, the quality of labor
production drops (the labor productivity drops, too). On the other hand, it
demotivates the unemployed to look for jobs they prefer to stay on welfare and
work in the grey economy, rather than take an ofcial job with wages that are
not sufcient to provide basic necessities for themselves and their families.
Unemployment is another critical problem in Bulgaria. The
unemployment rate for the rst quarter of 2013 is 13.8%, which marks a 0.9%
increase from the same period in 2012. Long-term unemployment (people who
are unemployed for one year or longer) is also at a critically high level,
comprising 55% of all the unemployed. In addition, Bulgaria has a staggering
rate of youth unemployment (National Statistical Institute, 2013). A study
conducted by (Eurofund, 2012) found that one-quarter of Bulgarians between
15 and 29 years were neither employed nor in school. Surrounded by images of
success and an incessant drive for more consumption and material possessions,
the young people are easily lured by the promises of easy money, gained from
crime. In this context many young people prefer to leave Bulgaria in search of a
better life abroad. According to ofcial statistics, over half a million Bulgarian
citizens have left the country in the last ten years (Hugh, 2013) and over 1.5
million have left the country since 1985. Considering the total population of the
112
country these numbers are staggering. The large number of Bulgarian emigrants
is one of the factors that drive young people to join criminal groups and TCN.
The low income is coupled with the low education and lack of
professional qualication for many of the young people. Recent scores from
international tests such as PISA, show that the Bulgarian high-school graduates
lack professional skills. Many experts claim that the Bulgarian school curricula
do not contribute to developing critical and problem-solving skills in the
students; schools do not provide the students with the information and training
needed to survive in an increasingly competitive economic and social
environment (Center for Control and Quality Assessment of School Education,
2011). The economic crisis has made the situation worse for the Bulgarian
schools; the continuing budget cuts have made it very difcult to maintain
many of the school facilities around the country. As a result, many schools in
remote, sparsely populated areas were closed in recent years. In addition, each
year almost 3% of the school-age children drop out of school. There are many
reasons for this, but experts regard the poor quality of life and the low income
as the most important. Especially vulnerable are Roma communities (meaning
Romani population) around the country. An Amnesty International Report nds
that Between 65 and 70 per cent of Bulgarias Roma population are
unemployed [...]. Some 18 per cent of Roma are illiterate and another 65 per
113
cent have never completed high school. UNICEF reported that almost half of
Romani homes are not connected to running water, and 20% of Romani
children have never been to school (Amnesty International, 2008).
The difcult socioeconomic conditions in Bulgaria, coupled with
widespread poverty and unemployment, make specic groups of society
particularly vulnerable to criminal networks. This facilitates the TCN operating
in the SBEU in the recruitment of victims and perpetrators of criminal
activities; lured by the promise of money, many individuals take the risk to
commit a crime.
Crime and Corruption in Bulgaria
Following the fall of communism, there was an outburst of criminal activity in
the country. As (Stankov, 2012) points out, after 1989, crime and criminal
activities became part and parcel of everyday life, taking over the social
structures and operating under the faade of legal economic enterprises. The
rst half of the 1990s was marked by institutional chaos, and total lack of
government control over the situation in the country; this was a time of shady
privatization deals and denationalization of state-owned resources, which went
straight into the hands of people linked with the former communist elite. The
institutional chaos is a fertile ground for the emerging large oligarchic
114
structures and violent criminal groups. Unlike the latter, the oligarchic
structures amass their wealth not through violence and crime, but through their
tight connections with the people in power. Bribing high-level government
ofcials, the representatives of the economic groupings manage to take over the
state resources, transforming them into their private property. The oligarchy is
one of the main, and very successful, actors in the privatization process. In the
words of the current president of Bulgaria, Rossen Plevneliev, the process of
privatization in the country was the worst in Europe [], assets worth 30
billion euro were sold for only 3 billion. We still suffer the consequences of this
process today [...] (Plevneliev, 2012).
In the rst half of the 1990s, violent crime groups consisted primarily of
former combative sports athletes (e.g., boxing, wrestling), former ofcers of the
state security services, and criminals. In the rst years following the fall of
communism, these groups monopolized the security sector and used it to
racketeer the newly established private businesses, masking their criminal
activity as business protection. Initially, many security rms served as front
ofces for the racketeering; later on they were transformed into insurance
companies. In addition to racketeering, the criminal groups also sought to take
control over key segments of the black market, such as car jacking, prostitution,
human trafcking, etc. By the mid-90s, some of the criminal groups hsd risen to
115
the top in the criminal world, disposing over large nancial and power
resources; they monopolized the criminal markets and took over the smaller
crime groups. In time, the larger groups began to splinter, and new rival groups
emerged; for example, the new SIK insurance group was an offshoot of the
VIS group. These two groups formed alternative camps around which many
other criminal and economic groups began to gravitate. At a later point, these
two chief criminal groups broke up into smaller, independent criminal actors.
In the second half of the 1990s, the 20
th
century, and the beginning of the
21
st
, Bulgaria was the stage of many turf wars and contract killings targeting
various business owners and criminal bosses. The survivors of the wars entered
the legal economy as legitimate businessmen. However, most of them also
retained their positions in the criminal markets, while other new players
emerged. In the past few years, the main criminal markets for organized crime
in Bulgaria are VAT fraud, smuggling of goods and excise contraband, sexual
exploitation and prostitution, drug trafcking, production of synthetic drugs,
counterfeit currency, fraud, etc.
An important enabling factor for the development of organized crime in
Bulgaria, even today, is the widespread corruption. Corruption makes possible
the inltration of public institutions and the business by the criminal structures.
The Chairman of the National Security Committee of the 36
th
National
116
Assembly of Bulgaria declared that the organized crime has reached the
highest levels of power and has its secret lobbies in the police, in the judiciary,
in the Parliament, and in the government, but nobody even cares to ght this
process. (Boyadjieva, 1996). Research studies refer to a process of
privtization of crossborder transactions by bribing state ofcials in the
Customs Agency, the border police and other regulatory and law-enforcement
bodie. (Center for the Study of Democracy, 2003). Yet, none of the top-level
ofcials have been found guilty in corruption cases. Usually, the lower-level
public ofcers become the scapegoats.
Many of the state institutions are captured and/or co-opted by organized
crime. In some cases, former crime bosses are appointed in key public
positions. This helps them to launder their criminal biography and gives them
access to public resources, in order to eliminate rivals and to gain control over
new criminal markets. The symbiosis of criminal groups and public power led
to the introduction of specic legislation serving the interests of criminal
groups. A glaring example of this type of criminal cooperation is the
amendment to the Criminal Code of the Republic of Bulgaria, known as Vanko
1. In 2006, several members of parliament introduced an amendment, seeking
to reduce the maximum sentencing for the crime solicitation for prostitution.
117
Thanks to this amendment, an infamous rapper by the name of Vanko 1,
convicted for solicitation for prostitution and serving a 12-year sentence, was
released from prison after only three years.
When corruption takes over the highest levels of power in society, all of
the public institutions are at risk of being captured or coopted, including the
judicial system, law enforcement, healthcare and education, all the way down to
the ofcer who is in charge of handling the paperwork in the administration.
This is largely conrmed by the Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency
International (2012)

which measures the level of corruption in public
institutions in 176 countries. According to the 2012 report, Bulgaria ranks
second in the list for most corrupt countries in the EU (with Greece in the top
spot). The corruption levels in Bulgaria were higher in 2001-2007, and dropped
slightly afterwards.
The high levels of crime and corruption in Bulgaria create a fertile ground
for the development and operations of transnational criminal networks. The EC
(2012) Monitoring reports on Bulgaria point out that the ght against organized
crime has not been effective, as corruption continues to ourish and the reforms
in the judiciary are stalled.
118
Transnational Criminal Networks operating in the Southeastern
Border of the European Union
The evolution of the transnational contraband channels in Bulgaria can be
traced back to the 1970s and 1980s. During the communist times, Bulgarias
international contacts were limited to the countries of the former Soviet Block.
On the other hand, the state leadership needed access to foreign currency. The
solution was to create Bulgarian companies/rms, which were controlled by the
state, but operated abroad and conducted foreign trade activities with the
Western European countries. In some cases, major deals took place using
contraband channels. For example, during the war in the Near East, the export
of captagon turned out a very protable business: captagon is a psychotropic
substance and a strong stimulant, very similar to the modern synthetic drugs.
Special contraband channels were created to export the drug. As some
researchers claim, these operations must have been known to and were even
run by high-level ofcials (Haydinyak, 2002).
Captagon was produced in several pharmaceutical companies in the
country, while the Bulgarian foreign trade companies were in charge of its
distribution. The drugs destination was the Near East and Africa, through
underground transit channels, managed by the Bulgarian secret services.
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Similar channels existed and were used for smuggling weapons. Following the
collapse of communism, the operational networks and contacts remained in the
hands of the individuals who knew the channels and the markets, but were now
using them for their own private benet. In other words, with the fall of
communism emerged the opportunities to establish powerful TCN. In the new
circumstances, the TCN were not controlled by the communist state and were
free to use the contraband channels to trafc whatever they could: drugs,
weapons, stolen vehicles, cigarettes, etc. One of the key activities for the TCN
was the transit of heroin through Bulgaria to the heroin markets in Western
Europe.
The communist contraband channels were not limited to Africa and Asia;
they included Latin American countries for weapons trafcking; in fact, the
same channels were used to establish TCN with Latin American criminal
groups. One recent example for a TCN with the participation of Bulgarian and
Latin American crime groups is the case of a former wrestler, named Evelin
Banev, aka Brendo, who was tried and convicted in Italy in 2013 for cocaine
trafcking from Latin America. He was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment.
Brendo is considered one of the world leaders of transnational crime, like
another infamous Bulgarian crime boss, Ivan Todorov, aka Doctora, who was
killed in 2006 in Bulgaria.
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The European Union Organized Crime Threat Assessment Report (2011a)
points out that in recent years many new cocaine trafcking routes have been
established, using Black Sea ports, including the port at the Bulgarian city of
Varna. Cocaine is trafcked in a number of ways: (i) in containers carried by
cargo ships, (ii) cocaine mixed with pure, (iii) cocaine diluted in wine, (iv)
clothing starched in a cocaine solution, (v) lling in pipes and cavities in
machinery with cocaine, (vi) molding cocaine in various shapes, (vii) hiding it
in heavy duty agricultural machinery, among others. After it is trafcked to
Bulgaria, the cocaine is transported to markets in Western Europe. This is how
TCN which are specialized in trafcking heroin are becoming key players in the
cocaine business as well, using the well-established contraband channels of the
past. In addition, trafckers also use a barter system in which heroin is
exchanged for cocaine in Turkey and countries in the Near East. The former
Bulgarian Minister of Interior, Tzvetan Tzvetanov, has made many allegations,
claiming that the big contraband bosses who are currently controlling the
contraband channels established during communism, could not have done it
without the support and protection from almost every single government since
the fall of the regime.
There are also single players on this market, though they operate on a
much smaller scale. In the early 1990s, the main method for importing goods
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from Turkey was the co-called suitcase trade. Suitcase traders traveled to the
foreign countries, using public transport or their own vehicles, and purchased
goods that they could easily import to Bulgaria. After they sold the goods, they
went back to buy more. Along with smuggling goods, many people became
part of heroin trafcking networks, serving most of the time as mules to
transport the drugs to Western Europe.
One of the key factors that has contributed to the emergence of the
Bulgarian transnational crime is the UN export restrictions to the countries in
former Yugoslavia, the so-called Yugo embargo in 1992-1995. According to
researchers, the Yugo embargo literally led to an outbreak of new maa-type
structures and organized crime in the country (Prodanov & Panev, 1996).
During the embargo period, large-scale contraband channels, highly protable,
were used for smuggling petrol, weapons and other goods, banned for import to
Yugoslavia. This period was appropriate for new TCN involving crime groups
from Bulgaria and the other Balkan countries, i.e. Serbia, Albania, Kosovo, and
Montenegro. The Balkan TCNs continued to run their business long after the
Yugo embargo was lifted. One of the cases described below deals with a Balkan
TCN.
In the mid-90s, the suitcase trade was replaced by well-organized
contraband channels, run by the violent crime groups and oligarchic structures
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that dominated the market during the Yugo embargo. They have continuously
received full support of corrupt state ofcials, including at the highest political
levels. In addition to smuggling goods from Turkey, China, and Dubai, these
criminal groups took hold of the transnational drug trafcking routes, in
particular the heroin routes, which run through Bulgaria to Western Europe.
The Bulgarian TCNs have very good contacts with the Arab world and
Turkish nationals, which control the heroin trade. In some cases, the Bulgarian
TCNs receive heroin in exchange for stolen cars or synthetic drugs, mainly
amphetamines produced in Bulgaria. Because of the small domestic market in
Bulgaria and the high dilution of the proposed drugs, only a small fraction of
the trafcked drugs remains in Bulgaria; the main part is trafcked to Western
Europe. This is why the Bulgarian TCNs are mostly in charge of the transit
routes for the drugs, in particular, heroin, using the so-called silk route which
connects the Near East with Western Europe. Heroin is usually transported by
land, smuggled from Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey, hidden in secret
compartments in cars or trucks, or smuggled by mules to Bulgaria. To avoid the
risk of getting caught, the higher-level members of the TCNs recruit people as
mules to smuggle the heroin to Bulgaria. The mules usually do not have contact
with the members of the TCNs and only know the person who has recruited
them. One such example is described below: Once the heroin enters Bulgaria
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the territory of the EU it is reloaded on trucks and cars, registered in EU
countries, and leaves for the destination cities in Western Europe.
Following Bulgarias accession to the EU in 2007 and the lifting of the
visa restrictions for Bulgarian citizens to travel in the EU (six years earlier in
2001), takes place another major development in Bulgarian transnational crime,
i.e. the export of crime from Bulgaria. The countrys accession to the EU
created new opportunities for the criminal groups, which successfully extended
their operations to the big criminal markets in Western Europe. This period of
expansion coincided with the period of further splintering of the large violent
crime groups in the country; many criminals who were low in the hierarchy and
newly emerging crime groups took their operations abroad. It is important to
note that members of the violent crime groups have had the opportunity to
travel to Central Europe even before the lifting of the visa restrictions; in that
period, they were mainly engaged in car theft and trafcking of prostitutes.
However, the large-scale export of crime from Bulgaria received a huge boost
with the countrys entry to the EU. Essentially, this is a process whereby crime
generated in the SBEU is exported to the other member states, which threatens
the security of the entire Union. The main crimes exported from Bulgaria are
related to human trafcking, credit card skimming, counterfeit currency, and car
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theft. In recent years, the most prevalent crimes are human trafcking and
skimming; further details are provided below.
Europol (2008) identies Bulgaria as one of the six main source countries
of victims who are trafcked within the EU. Bulgaria also ranks high on the list
of countries with the most trafckers. In a report, (Europol, 2011b) points out
that the Bulgarian crime groups are probably the most threatening to society as
a whole. Enabling factors for the expansion of human trafcking are the poor
social and economic conditions, and the low income of large social groups. The
lack of opportunities for better paying jobs at home makes people more
vulnerable to the trafckers. The victims of trafcking are lured by the
promises of money and good jobs abroad, and thus they become an easy prey
for the trafcking networks.
In addition to human trafcking, another large-scale criminal activity
controlled by Bulgarian TCN is the so-called skimming. The criminals
engaged in skimming are very mobile and operate not only in Europe, but also
in the USA and Russia. Skimming usually happens in two ways. In the rst, a
special device called skimmer, which is used to read data from the credit or
debit card, is installed in the ATM (automated teller machine). A micro camera
is also installed which records the customers PIN. Afterwards, the criminals
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produce the so-called white plastics, which contain the information from the
real debit/credit cards, and use them to withdraw money from the bank accounts
of the victims. Another, more expensive way to steal money, is buying personal
data and bank account numbers from various hackers sites.
As described, the Bulgarian transnational crime posits a double threat for
the EU. On the one hand, as the Southeastern border of the Union, Bulgaria is
responsible for dismantling the trafcking channels established along the so-
called silk route from Asia to Europe, which have been in operation for
decades. On the other hand, a further threat to the EU is the criminal activity
generated in the very region of the Southeastern border of the EU.
In the following section, we present the results of the network analysis of
four cases of TCNs operating in the SBEU. Two of the cases deal with drug
trafcking from Bulgaria to Western Europe; the other two are cases of the
export of crime from Bulgaria, and deal with human trafcking and credit card
fraud. The analysis draws upon information from the court dossiers of each of
the four cases.
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Crime Transiting Through Bulgaria
By Georgi Petrunov
Case 1. Drug Transport Through Bulgaria
The rst TCN is relatively small in size, but very active in the transport of drugs
through Bulgaria to Western European countries. The group of three
perpetrators transported over 48 kilograms of heroin from Turkey through the
border checkpoint Kapitan Andreevo. Two of the group members were charged
as instigators of the crime, and the third as the perpetrator. The drug suppliers
have not been identied, so the part of the TCN operating on Turkish territory
remains unknown. The court documents conrm that a customs ofcer at the
checkpoint Kapitan Andreevo aided the group. However, the investigation
failed to identify this ofcer and no charges were brought against him/her. The
indictment and the trial focused on the transportation of the drugs, and the
mules were the only perpetrators who were convicted. The core of the group
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was one of the mules, the person who was in charge of transporting the heroin
from Turkey.
The Hub: The agent in the center of the group with the highest level of
direct individual centrality is MUDRSMT. He concentrates 23.8% of the total
social relationships established in the network (Graph 1). This person agreed to
travel to Turkey, where he left his car at a previously agreed upon place and
returned back to Bulgaria, the car loaded with drugs. He is in contact with many
of the defendants, which explains his central position in the network relations.
The network itself is rather small, which allows identifying the characteristics
of each of its members. This will clarify each of their roles in the drug
trafcking ring.
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Graph 1. Size of the node illustrates the direct centrality indicator
(amount of interactions of each node).
Core node 1/ hub: MUDRSMT, code used to identify the mule (driver).
His direct centrality indicator is 23.8%. This person made trips to Turkey and
back to Bulgaria. MUDRSMT claims that he followed the instructions of
INHKH (core node 6). He made one trip but the second time he was caught by
the police; in a secret compartment of the car the police discovered 98 packages
with 48,203 kilo of heroin, with a purity level of 55.2%-64.2%, valued at
5,598,410 Bulgarian leva (approximately 2.8 million euro). For his rst trip,
MUDRSMT was paid only 340 euro, but was promised 2000 euro for the
second trip, and agreed to stay in the TCN. He struck a plea agreement and
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received a 7-year strict prison regime sentence and had to pay a ne in the
amount of 100 000 leva (approximately 50 000 euro).
Core node 2: MUSGIVAV, code used to identify the girlfriend of
MUDRSMT (core node 1). She has a direct centrality indicator of 19%, placing
her second in direct network connections. She traveled with him to Turkey;
according to the instructions of INHKH, he had to be accompanied by a
woman. She was a witness in the trial.
Core node 3: Two agents TUACX1 and Core node 4 TUACX have the
same direct centrality indicator: of 11.9%. They are members of the Turkish
TCN, who have not been identied by the investigation. TUACX1 and TUACX
were supposed to wait for the driver in Silivry (Istanbul region), Turkey, take
him to downtown Istanbul, and leave him there to walk around with his
girlfriend, while they drove the car to an unknown place. They returned the car
in two hours, with the heroin hidden inside it.
Core node 5: DRTRRILEGSM, code used to identify the leader of the
drug trafcking ring. He has a direct centrality indicator of 9.5%. The
indictment identies him as the mastermind behind the criminal network. He
kept the car in Bulgaria; he decided when the trips should be made, when to
cross the border control/checkpoint, to whom and where to take the car in
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Turkey, and where to leave it afterwards in Soa. He was sentenced to seven
years imprisonment, serving time in a strict prison regime for the initial period
of the sentence, and had to pay a ne in the amount of 100 000 leva
(approximately 50 000 euro).
Core node 6: INHKH, code used to identify an accomplice to the
mastermind and an intermediary between him and the mule. This persons
direct centrality indicator is the same as that of DRTRRILEGSM, 9.5%. He
gave the exact instructions about where, with whom, and when to make the trip
to Turkey. For his involvement in the drug trafcking scheme, he received 200
leva (approximately 100 euro) a week from DRTRRILEGSM, and was paid 500
euro after the rst successful trip. He was sentenced to seven years
imprisonment, serving time in a strict prison regime for the initial period of the
sentence, and had to pay a ne in the amount of 100 000 leva (approximately
50 000 euro).
Core node 7: Three of the agents have the same direct centrality indicator,
4.8%: these are agents Core node 7 COOFOPINTUN, Core node 8 BUACX,
and Core node 9 BUACAP.
COOFOPINTUN, is the code used to identify the agent Niki. This
person remains unidentied. Presumably this person was in charge of the
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smooth running of the operation in Turkey. The driver had no direct contact
with him, but had his phone number in case of emergency.
BUACAP, is the code used to identify the Bulgarian accessory. He
received instructions to get the car from a parking lot in Soa, but was caught
by the police. He testied in the trial.
BUACX, is the code refers to an unidentied Bulgarian accessory, who
supposedly helped BUACAP to get the car from a parking lot in Soa; he
managed to escape the police when they arrested BUACAP.
The high direct centrality indicator of Core node 1 depends not on the
position of the agent in the network, but on the specic information uncovered
during the investigation of the drug trafcking. The transportation of the drugs
is only one of the elements of the drug trafcking operation. The identication
of the so-called mules and the seizure of the shipment spoiled the deal but did
not expose the entire ring, as exemplied in this case. Situations such as this
one, in which the judicial information focuses on the lower levels of the
criminal network, have implications on the way in which prosecutions are
conducted, and in general, in the design and implementation of public security
policies.
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The Structural Bridge
Looking at the network structure and the ow of information within the
network as shown in Graph 2, it can be observed that MUDRSMT is not only a
hub, but is also found to have the largest indicator of betweenness, 79.2%. The
remaining 20.8% are concentrated in the core node 2: MUSGIVAV, while the
other agents show a zero score for this indicator. In other words, the two agents
get into all geodesic routes chartered in the network. Their role as structural
bridges is to connect the Bulgarian organizers and the Turkish drug dealers.
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Graph 2. Uniform radial distribution. Size illustrates the betweenness
indicator (capacity for intervening in the routes of information).
Interactions
Financial Relations and Internal Management of the Group
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This category applies to almost all of the relationship types in the drug
trafcking network, as the nancial interests are the main motives that keep the
group together. From the very beginning, the group leader DRTRRILEGSM
informed INHKH of his intentions, and the latter agreed to join the group
voluntarily in exchange for money. The car driver also agreed to participate,
lured by the promised payment of 2000 euro.
Violence and Corruption
There are no indications of force, coercion or corruption applied in the
articulation of this network.
Family/Intimate relations
This category applies only to the relations between the driver and his travel
companion on the trip to Turkey. The relationships have no signicant inuence
on the network operations.
Conclusions: Characteristics of the Drug Transportation Network
The Hub and the Structural Bridge are the same
The direct centrality indicator and the betweenness indicators demonstrate that
MUDRSMT is not only the hub, but also the structural bridge in the network.
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The results reect not so much the positioning of the top node/agent in the
hierarchy of the TCN, but the specic focus in the investigation on the drug
transportation. The investigation focused on the drug trafcking and did not
pursue the other members of the network, its organizers, neither the network
members in Turkey.
The Network Nucleus Has no Complex Module of Stabilizer Nodes
There is not a set of nodes close to the nucleus. Indeed, Graph 2 shows that the
nodes with largest direct centrality indicators after the hub are far away from
the nucleus.
Concentration of social relations
The concentration of the categories identied in the network is as follows: a)
Financial Relations accounting for around 98.4% of the total relations
established in the network; b) Family/Intimate relations accounting for 1.6%.
Case 2. The Balkan Network for the Transit Transportation of
Drugs through Bulgaria
The TCN described in this case is headed by a Serbian maa boss who
smuggles amphetamines from Bulgaria to Turkey, imports heroin from Turkey
to Bulgaria and trafcks the heroin to Western Europe. The barter system drug
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deals are a common place for the TCNs operating in the SBEU. The indictment
and the court dossier show that the investigations focus was mainly on the
transportation of the drugs. The most detailed information concerns the
transport logistics and the network members at the lower levels who follow the
instructions and the orders of the higher-ranking criminals. As in the case
described above, the evidence gathered by the investigation did not lead to the
perpetrators on the Turkish side, i.e. the drug suppliers. This, as discussed
below, illustrates the lack of institutional trans-border integration between
Bulgaria and Turkey, which makes impossible to disarticulate TCNs such as the
ones analyzed.
The Hub
The TCN clearly identies two nodes that have the highest number of
relationships and a direct centrality indicator above 15%. This is signicant,
keeping in mind that for half of the network members, the direct centrality
indicator is below 2%. The most connected node is DIOFMEACOFKUNAP,
with a direct centrality indicator of 18.6%. This person can be described as the
bosss right hand. He is engaged in almost all of the actions related to the drug
trafcking from the organization to the transportation, which accounts for his
status as the most connected node (Graph 3).
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Graph 3. Size illustrates the direct centrality indicator (amount of
interactions of each node). Dark blue lines represent interactions of
corruption. Orange lines represent family ties. Navy blue lines represent
nancial interactions. Purple lines represent interactions of control at the
border agencies.
We can observe two nodes of important size, and a great amount of nodes
with an almost minute size. In what follows, the rst 12 core nodes with a direct
centrality indicator above 2% are introduced.
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Core 1/ hub: DIOFMEACOFKUNAP identies the accomplice of the
drug leader. This is the person with the highest direct centrality indicator.
DIOFMEACOFKUNAP was a pharmaceutical distributor, frequently traveling
to Turkey to import drugs for the shop owned by his spouse in Bulgaria. After
that person was introduced to the leader of the drug ring, he decided to join the
crime group and was aware from the very beginning of the objectives of the
TCN. DIOFMEACOFKUNAP was in charge of providing a warehouse for the
amphetamines, securing the vehicle to trafc the drugs, and connecting the boss
with a person at the customs who could guarantee the safe crossing of the
border. The involvement of the agent in almost all activities of the network
explains why he is the most connected node. The spouses of the two agents
were also closely related. DIOFMEACOFKUNAP was sentenced to 10 years of
imprisonment and a ne of 100 000 leva (approximately 50,000 euro).
Core node 2: DRLOBK, code used to identify the leader of the organized
criminal group and nucleus of the TCN, with a direct centrality indicator of
15.7%. The TCN operated entirely under his control and instructions. Media
publications describe him as a big drug lord in the Balkans. In 2000 and 2007,
DRLOBK was convicted by a Bulgarian court of law for illegally entering the
territory of the country and for using forged IDs. He was declared persona non
grata in 2004 for a period of 10 years, and a threat to national security. Despite
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this, he entered and resided in the country numerous times, using false IDs. He
established contacts with people producing amphetamines, and worked with
Serbian and Turkish nationals, dealers of amphetamines and heroin. DRLOBK
organized, nanced, and controlled a TCN for trafcking amphetamines to
Turkey, and trafcking heroin from Turkey through Bulgaria and Serbia to
Western European countries. He was sentenced to 16 years of imprisonment in
a strict prison regime for the initial period of the sentence, and was ned
220,000 leva (approximately 110 000 euro).
Core node 3: FOCUOFMSY, code used to identify a former customs
ofcer, who uses his connections with his former colleagues to facilitate safe
border checks and smuggling of the drugs. He has a direct social relationship
indicator of 9.3%, making him the third most relevant agent/node in the
networks conguration. Close ties existed between the families of node 1 and
node 3; DIOFMEACOFKUNAP and his spouse were best man and bridesmaid
at the wedding of FOCUOFMSY. For the drug ring boss, FOCUOFMSY is the
intermediary between he and the customs ofcers who were part of the crime.
FOCUOFMSY was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment in a strict prison
regime for the initial period of the sentence, and ordered to pay a ne in the
amount of 200 000 leva (approximately 100 000 euro). He was convicted for
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participation in an organized crime group, and as an accomplice in trafcking
drugs from Turkey to Bulgaria.
Core node 4: ACOFKUSPD, code used to identify the accomplice of the
drug ring boss. He was involved in the organization of the drug trafcking
channel, traveled with the drug boss, and attended meetings with other persons
involved in the trafcking, also acting as supervisor for the other accomplices.
He has a direct social relationship indicator of 7.9%. With his girlfriend,
ACOFKUSPD looked after the car, which was used to smuggle amphetamines
to Turkey, and was in contact with FOCUOFMSY (core node 3), who was in
charge of securing the safe crossing of the border. He was sentenced to 14 years
of imprisonment in a strict prison regime for the initial period of the sentence,
and ordered to pay a ne in the amount of 270 000 leva (approximately 135 000
euro).
The four agents described above were tried and convicted for their
involvement in an organized crime group for the purpose of trafcking drugs;
core node 2 was convicted for being the leader and mastermind of the criminal
activities. The members of the TCN described below were witnesses in the trial,
but also played an important role in the drug trafcking network.
Core node 5: CLSTOWVKP, code used to identify the spouse of
DIOFMEACOFKUNAP (core node 1). This agent/node has an indicator of
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6.4%. She was not charged as a perpetrator in the criminal activities; she knew
the key members of the network and had close business relationships with some
of them (with the spouse of the drug boss); she also maintained close
relationships with core node 4 and his spouse. CLSTOWVKP accompanied
DIOFMEACOFKUNAP on his trips smuggling amphetamines to Turkey, and
was in contact with other members of the criminal network, both Bulgarian and
Turkish, which accounts for the agents relatively high direct centrality
indicator.
Core node 6: TRCODSS, code used to identify the girlfriend of
ACOFKUSPD (core node 4). The direct social relations indicator of this agent
is 5%. She accompanied core node 4 on the trips to Turkey for smuggling
amphetamines, and had contact with the other members of the criminal group,
both Bulgarian and Turkish, which accounts for the agents relatively high
direct centrality indicator.
Core node 7: CUINMAT, code used to identify the customs inspector at
border control point Kapitan Andreevo. This agent/node has an indicator of
4.3%. He plays a key role in the drug trafcking deal; on the request of a former
colleague of his (core node 3), the ofcer let the vehicle loaded with
amphetamines pass the border checkpoint safely. Despite this, he was only
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called to testify in the trial and no charges were led against him, neither for
corruption nor being an accessory to a TCN.
Core node 8: SPOFDRLOVK, code used to identify the spouse of the
drug boss, also has an indicator of 4.3%. She has close connections with the
members of the TCN and their spouses. She was a business partner of
CLSTOWVKP, the spouse of node 1, and the two of them imported clothes
from Turkey to Bulgaria. No charge was brought against her, nor was she called
to testify in the trial.
Core node 9: CADEACDBT, code used to identify the bosss assistant,
who has an indicator of 3.6%. This person accompanied the drug boss on his
trips, followed the bosss orders and the communications in the TCN; he found
people to do the trafcking. He was called to testify in the trial.
Core node 10: SPOFYAENY, code used to identify the spouse of core
node 3. This agent has an indicator of 3.6%. SPOFYAENY maintained close
contact with the members of the criminal network. Initially, she had close
relations with the spouse of node 1, and later on both initiated the contact
between their husbands, who organized the drug trafcking. She was a witness
to the case.
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Core node 11: DRDEX, code used to identify one of the Turkish agents
who has not been identied so far. This agent has an indicator of 2.9%. This
agent was in contact with the people who smuggled the amphetamines from
Bulgaria to Turkey and supplied them with the heroin.
Core node 12: COOFBKUASKUINCAOUHICRACSMS, code used to
identify the bosss assistant. This agent has an indicator of 2.1%. He is a blood
relative of the boss, supports the TCNs activity, and manages the
communication between the boss and other external people. This node/agent
also takes care of various tasks and orders given by the boss. He was a witness
in the trial.
The rest of the agents in the TCN have a direct centrality indicator below
2%. Most of them had to perform individual tasks given to them by a member
of the group and did not get into contact with the rest of the group. The high
direct centrality indicators of the rst two node/agents demonstrate their key
role for the functioning of the TCN. The boss was in charge of deciding what
and how the TCN was supposed to operate; he is located in the center of the
network and manages the ow of information, which is also reected in his
indicator of betweenness (Graph 3). The closeness of DIOFMEACOFKUNAP
to the nucleus, and the multiple connections in which hes implied, illustrates
the level of trust between the boss and the node/agent. This means that the
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structure of the network is mainly the result of the articulating work of node 1
and node 2 who were able to establish directly 34.3% of all relationships in the
TCN. These two agents also serve as stabilizer nodes.
The Structural Bridge
DIOFMEACOFKUNAP is the most connected node, however, this does not
imply that most of the information was arbitrated by him, nor that most of the
social capital was generated by him. The quantity of relationships does not
necessarily entail a better position of power within the social network. It is
therefore important to determine and identify the node appearing in the middle
of the geodesic routes of the TCN, which plays the role of structural bridge.
This can be done by calculating the indicator of betweenness. Even though
DIOFMEACOFKUNAP has the highest direct centrality indicator, he trails
DRLOBK in the indicator of betweenness. That is, the TCN boss DRLOBK is
the most important arbitrator of information; he decides when and to whom to
channel the relevant information. He gets into 36.3% of all the geodesic
routes chartered in the TCN. This means that he has the highest concentration
of power in which to manage the information of the TCN. Nevertheless,
DIOFMEACOFKUNAP also concentrates a high level of betweenness: 30.5%.
Core node 1 and core node 2 together concentrate 66.8% of the capacity to
manage information (Graph 4). This feature of the network is reected in the
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fact that 16 out of the 25 members of the TCN have a zero score for the
indicator of betweenness. Out of the 9 nodes/agents who have an indicator of
betweenness above zero, 2 have a relatively high score: CADEACDBT with
11.2% and FOCUOFMSY with 8.7%. This shows they also have some power to
intervene and manage the information ows in the network. The other 5 nodes/
agents have an indicator of betweenness below 3%. Using his connections as a
car dealer, CADEACDBT accompanied the drug boss on his trips and took part
in the preparation of the drug trafcking. FOCUOFMSY, who is a former
customs ofcer, used his connections to link the drug trafckers and the
customs ofcers.
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Graph 4. Uniform radial distribution. Size illustrates the betwenness
indicator (capacity to arbitrate information). Dark blue lines represent
interactions of corruption. Orange lines represent family ties. Navy blue
lines represent nancial interactions. Purple lines represent interactions of
control at the border agencies.
Interactions
In this part we describe the main categories of social relationships articulating
the TCN. In this network, the categories of the social relationships are as
follows.
Financial relations and Internal Management of the Group
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This category applies mainly to the relationships between the members of the
network, established for the purpose of drug trafcking and nancial gains. The
network boss provided the contacts for the producers of the amphetamines that
are exported to Turkey, and the heroin suppliers from Turkey. The investigation
did not identify anyone else besides the network boss as the main contact point
between Serbian and Turkish drug producers and drug dealers. The other
members of the TCN played a key role in the trafcking process, but they acted
on the orders of the boss. They were primarily responsible for the logistics and
the transportation of the drugs, while the boss was the mastermind behind the
entire operation.
There is no indication that force or coercion was part of the TCNs
operations. Each member of the TCN participated voluntarily, driven by the
prospect of nancial gains; each of them was aware of the purpose of the TCN
from the very beginning.
Family/Intimate relations
Family ties represent a signicant part of the social relations in this TCN. All
four of the convicted perpetrators worked with their spouses. Every time a
member of the TCN made a trip to trafc drugs, his spouse accompanied him.
The high direct centrality indicators of the TCN members and of their spouses
148
also conrm the central role of the family connections in the network
conguration.
In the network, we observe not only close husband-wife relationships, but
also close friendly relations between the individual families. The close family
ties increase the trust between the network members. In one circumstance, the
TCN boss was aided by his cousin.
Corruption and Bribery
This category applies to the agents who provided a shield for the drug
trafckers to pass through the border checkpoint without a customs inspection.
Specically, a member of the TCN, an ex-customs ofcer, provided the
information about when it was safe to cross the border. The court dossier
reveals that a then employee of the customs ofce assisted in providing a shield
for the drug trafckers. Allegedly, this person persuaded his colleagues at the
checkpoint to not carry out a thorough inspection of the vehicle that carried the
drugs. Regardless of the evidence, the customs ofcer was not considered a
member of the TCN, and was only a witness in the trial.
149
Conclusions: Characteristics of the Drug Trafcking Network
In view of the direct centrality and betweenness indicators, the following are the
main characteristics of the analyzed network.
The Hub is the closest associate of the boss
The individual with the highest number of direct social relationships is
DIOFMEACOFKUNAP, the bosss right hand. He carried out the majority of
the tasks given by the network boss. He was aware of the intentions of the drug
boss from the very beginning, and played active part in carrying out the
criminal activities. This individual had no prior criminal record, he was a
distributor of pharmaceutical products and his wife had a business selling goods
imported from Turkey. Because of their business, they had to travel frequently
to Turkey, importing goods to Bulgaria in large quantities. This made the
agents involvement in the drug trafcking scheme easier.
The stabilizer nodes are the leader of the group and his closest associate
The drug boss and his closest associate can be described as the stabilizing
nucleus of the network. These agents account for 34.3% of the social
relationships in the network, and concentrate 66.8% of the capacity to manage
information. DIOFMEACOFKUNAP is closest to the TCN leader, who is the
150
network nucleus. The rest of the nodes are signicantly removed from the
nucleus, located in the network periphery. The absence of either of the two
agents would cause the network to crumble, or would signicantly change its
structure.
The structural bridge is the leader of the group
Even though DIOFMEACOFKUNAP is the individual with the highest number
of connections in the network, he is not the node with the highest potential to
arbitrate information. This position is saved for the group leader, DRLOBK. He
concentrates the largest amount of social capital and has the highest
betweenness indicator. DIOFMEACOFKUNAP also has a high betweenness
indicator and ranks second in the hierarchy for channeling the information ow
to the other agents. The two agents together concentrate 66.8% of the capacity
to manage information.
Concentration of interactions
The concentration of the categories identied in the TCN is as follows: a)
Financial Relations accounting for around 80% of the total relations established
in the network; b) Corruption and Bribery accounting for 5.1%; c) Family/
Intimate relations accounting for 13.9%.
151
Export of Crime from Bulgaria
Case 3. Human Trafcking Network from Bulgaria to Western
Europe
In the early stages of its operations, the TCN described below was mainly
engaged in solicitation for prostitution and pimping in one of Bulgarias seaside
resorts. The court dossier provides evidence that the crime group had a
prominent leader, who was behind the groups formation from the beginning,
and has subsequently controlled the groups activities. Each group member was
in charge of recruiting girls for prostitution; they mostly used two recruitment
methods: promising large amounts of money quickly, and intimate/emotional
relationship used to force the girls into prostitution. The girls knew in advance
the conditions of work, the prices of the individual sexual services, the
percentage of their earnings, etc. Regardless of the womens consent to
prostitute for the criminal group, they are identied as victims of trafcking.
The Bulgarian Criminal Code does not regard the consent of the victims of
trafcking as a relevant factor determining guilt or innocence. A prosecutor
from the Supreme Prosecutors Ofce of Cassation points out that Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Kosovo are the only countries that classify trafcking in human
beings as a felony, without regard to the victims consent (Dikov, Human
152
trafcking Current State and Trends, 2012,December). The consensual
involvement of the victim in the trafcking does not exonerate the perpetrator
for the commission of any forms of this crime.
The group imposed strict rules with regard to accounting for the money
earned. The prostitutes were under the constant control of the members of the
TCN, as well as under constant video surveillance in the club where they
worked. The criminals used physical violence and imposed nancial penalties if
any of the women did not follow the orders or tried to keep back money.
Typically, the prostitutes received half of what they had earned, but sometimes
they didnt receive any money. Physical violence and force were widely used by
the criminal group. The criminals also controlled the women with threats of
violence and physical abuse against their families and relatives.
Two years into the groups operations, the leader decided to expand the
groups activity and to export women. The destination country was Belgium
(Brussels), where prostitution is legal. The organization of the trafcking was in
the hands of the leader, while his associates were in charge of the trafcking
activities. The girls traveled to Belgium using public transportation; the
trafckers covered the trip costs.
The court dossier does not provide evidence for the use of bribery or
cooperation with corrupt state ofcials. The crime group operated from 2001 to
153
2006, and the investigation identied 17 victims that were forced to prostitute
in Bulgaria and were afterwards trafcked to Western Europe for the purpose of
sexual exploitation.
The Hub
The agent with the highest degree of direct individual centrality is
LEOFORCRGREID, who is the groups leader. He is also the node with the
highest number of direct connections with other node. He concentrates 11.1%
of the total social relationships established in the network (Graph 5).
154
Graph 5. Size illustrates the direct centrality indicator (amount of
interactions of each node). Navy blue lines represent nancial interactions.
Red lines represent interactions of coercion.
155
Graph 5.1. Size illustrates the direct centrality indicator (amount of
interactions of each node). Only structure of coercion interactions is
highlighted.
Second in place with the highest percentage of direct centrality indicator
is MAOFBRSUANTRAVI, who concentrates 10.1% of the total social
relationships established in the network. Below is the description of the seven
members of the TCN. They also rank in the rst seven positions for the highest
direct centrality indicators. The description of the agents is important because it
156
illustrates the relationships within the network, as well as the networks mode
of functioning.
Core node 1/hub: LEOFORCRGREID, code used to identify the leader of
the organized criminal group. As mentioned above, he holds the highest direct
centrality indicator, 11.1%. As the groups leader, LEOFORCRGREID built
relationships of hierarchy, full subordination and control of the members of the
crime group. All criminal activity was executed under his direct supervision and
control. He was also the last instance to approve who could be employed to
work for the group. The control exercised by the leader accounts for the high
percentage of social relations in which he is involved in the TCN.
LEOFORCRGREID was found guilty of leading an organized crime
group, solicitation for prostitution for the purpose of nancial gain, and
trafcking of human beings for sexual exploitation. The defendant confessed
the crimes and was thus eligible for a reduced sentence (the law stipulates a 5 to
15-year prison sentence). He was sentenced to four years and eleven months
imprisonment and a ne of 15 000 leva (approximately 7 500 euro).
Core node 2: MAOFBRSUANTRAVI, code used to identify the manager
of the club where the prostitutes worked. This agent is second in importance in
the network with a direct centrality indicator of 10.1%. He took part in almost
all of the activities of the network: recruiting girls, serving as a bodyguard for
157
the prostitutes, collecting the turnover, and transporting the women to Belgium.
This agent also pleaded guilty and made a confession; he was sentenced to four
years of imprisonment serving in general prison conditions, and a ne of 5 000
leva (approximately 2 500 euro).
Core node 3: PITRYBD, code used to identify a pimp/trafcker, with a
direct centrality indicator of 7.9%. He was involved in the group from the very
beginning. He was primarily in charge of the trafcking of the girls, their
accommodation in Brussels, arranging for their workplaces (windows) in the
city, as well as supervising their job. The girls reported the amount they had
earned to him; he was also in charge of transferring the money to the group
leader (core node 1) in Bulgaria. This person also confessed and pleaded guilty
to all counts in the indictment, and was sentenced to four years of imprisonment
and a ne of 5 000 leva (approximately 2 500 euro).
Core node 4: BOOFTHLESUMZP, code used to identify the bodyguard
of the leader. This agent has a 7.9% direct centrality indicator. He was involved
in the group from the very beginning and was the second in rank. He was in
charge of recruiting girls and soliciting them to prostitute; he served as the
leaders bodyguard and a bodyguard for the prostitutes; he also controlled and
collected the cash at the end of the day. On the orders of the leader,
BOOFTHLESUMZP punished the women and those who did not submit the
158
earned money, broke the rules, or tried to hide money. This network member
also confessed and was sentenced to four years of imprisonment and a ne of
5 000 leva (approximately 2 500 euro).
Core node 5: PITRKAT, code used to identify a pimp/trafcker. This
agent holds a 7.4% direct centrality indicator. He was primarily in charge of the
international trafcking of the women, their accommodation in Brussels,
arranging their work places at windows in the city, and supervising their work.
The girls reported the money they had earned to him; he was also in charge of
transferring the money to the leader (core node 1) in Bulgaria. Like the others,
he pleaded guilty and confessed, and was sentenced to four years in prison and
a ne of 5 000 leva (approximately 2 500 euro).
Core node 6: PIASTDT, code used to identify a pimp. The direct
centrality indicator of this agent is 5.8%. He was involved in the group from the
beginning and took part in all of the criminal activities. He was primarily
involved in the recruitment of women. Like the other members of the group, he
pleaded guilty and confessed, and was sentenced to four years of imprisonment
and a ne of 5 000 leva (approximately 2 500 euro).
Core node 7: BOSUOFPRDSD, code used to identify a bodyguard/
supervisor of the prostitutes. This node/agent has a direct centrality indicator of
159
5.3%. The variation in the indicators value between this agent and the node/
agent of core node 6 is negligible. This node/agent was a member of the TCN
from June 2001 to February 2004. He was involved in the criminal activities,
many times serving as supervisor and guard of the prostituted women in
Bulgaria. He left the group because of disagreements with the leader (core node
1) about the jobs he was assigned to do. Like the rest of the members of the
group, he pleaded guilty and confessed, and was sentenced to four years of
imprisonment and a ne of 5 000 leva (approximately 2 500 euro).
The rest of the nodes/agents in the TCN are the victims of trafcking and
several unidentied intermediaries between the members of the crime group
and the victims. All of the seventeen victims testied in court against the
members of the TCN. Their testimonies conrmed the roles and the function of
each of the members of the group. The high direct centrality indicators of the
two agents ranked rst proves their crucial role for the functioning of the
criminal network.
The closeness of MAOFBRSUANTRAVI to the nucleus, and the multiple
relationships in which he was involved, show the high level of trust between he
and the leader. This means that the structure of the network is mainly the result
of the articulating work of core node 1 and core node 2, who together were able
160
to directly establish 21.2% of all relationships in the network. These two agents
therefore also serve as stabilizer nodes of the TCN.
The Structural Bridge
The analysis of the TCNs structure, regarding the control and information
ows within it, shows the group leader LEOFORCRGREID as the hub, who
also has the highest indicator of betweenness. That classies him not only as the
most connected and known agent in the network, but also as the agent with the
highest capacity to manage information between nodes/agents.
LEOFORCRGREID is involved in 29 per cent of all the geodesic routes
chartered in the network, which implies that he concentrates a high degree of
power to manage the information of the network. MAOFBRSUANTRAVI also
appears with a high level of betweenness, 22.9 per cent. It is also evident that
core node 1 and core node 2 concentrate 51.9 per cent of the capacity to manage
information. This is a remarkable concentration of information ows. The
remaining 30 nodes/agents concentrate less than half of the potential for
information arbitration. In practical terms, only 15 of the 30 agents have a
betweenness indicator higher than zero (Graph 6).
161
Graph 6. Size and location (highest in the nucleus) illustrates the
betweenness indicator (capacity to arbitrate information). Navy blue lines
represent nancial interactions. Red lines represent interactions of
coercion.
This implies that the network exhibits the same structure with respect to
the centrality degree indicator and to the betweenness indicator. In the network
there are two clearly distinguished nodes/agents with the highest betweenness
indicator, i.e. with a signicant role for the functioning of the TCN, as well as a
162
large number of agents whose absence would not impact the structures
conguration in any way.
Interactions
Financial Relations and Internal Management of the Group
The relations within the group can be dened as hierarchical; the decisions
regarding when, how, and who is to going to act are in the hands of the
networks boss. He decides which of the recruited women will work for the
group, i.e. his associates merely execute his orders. The networks leader
determines the nancial conditions under which the girls are required to work;
he also collects the money earned by the prostitutes.
163
Graph 7. Size illustrates the betwenness indicator (capacity to
arbitrate information). Only structure of nancial interactions is
highlighted.
The Graph 7 shows that the nancial relations unify almost all the nodes
in the TCN. In fact, this is one of the main features of this criminal activity;
namely, many of the women who get caught in trafcking rings are lured by the
promise of good earnings. The trafckers target the most vulnerable women and
164
those most at risk, such as women with no income, those that are unemployed,
have no qualications or skills, victims of domestic violence, etc. In the case
described above, some of the women have initiated the contact with the TCN,
in search of a job. That means, these women got into the trafcking ring
voluntarily. However, once they got caught in the criminal network, it was very
hard for them to quit. Sexual exploitation and human trafcking for the purpose
of sexual exploitation are perhaps the most protable criminal businesses, and
the lions share of the earned money always goes to the trafckers.
Violence and Coercion
Allegedly, this TCN was infamous for using physical violence and cruelty. The
trial revealed that the group leader had made the prostitutes work even during
their pregnancy, or shortly after they had a forced abortion. Physical violence
and nancial penalties were a regular and relevant procedure of the TCNs
operations, when the turnover was low, or when a woman was suspected of
trying to keep some of her earnings. The Graph 8 below shows that violence
was an integral part of the articulation of the network.
165
Graph 8. Size illustrates the betwenness indicator (capacity to
intervene in the interactions). Only structure of coercion interactions is
highlighted.
The leader concentrates a signicant number of relations that can be
dened as force or physical violence. In addition to physical violence, here we
can also include deception and false promises about intimate relationships,
which are common recruitment methods used by the trafckers in recruiting
girls.
166
Family/Intimate relations
The intimate relations form a signicant share of all the relations in the TCN.
Most often they are used to manipulate the women: under the pretense of
intimate relations and love, the trafckers force the women into prostitution. In
some cases, relatives recruited other relatives to prostitute; for example, a
woman who prostituted for the group recruited also her sister.
Conclusions: Characteristics of the Human Trafcking Network
According to the direct centrality and the betweenness indicators, the following
are the main characteristics of the TCN, engaging in human trafcking for
sexual exploitation from Bulgaria to countries in Western Europe.
The Hub and the Structural Bridge are the same
The direct centrality and betweenness indicators show that the leader of the
network LEOFORCRGREID is not only the hub, but also the structural bridge
in the network. This means that he can coordinate the relations in the TCN
without any intermediaries, concentrating a signicant share of all social
relations in the network. From the very beginning, LEOFORCRGREID
surrounded himself with people who accepted his leadership role. The group
was based on full subordination, control, and hierarchy, whereby the members
of the group followed the bosss orders and operated under his immediate
167
supervision. Each new member of the group had to be approved by the boss; the
women were under his full control and all the information about the groups
operations and nancial matters was given to him. The boss also recruited
women who were forced to prostitute, or were later on trafcked abroad. He has
the highest betweenness indicator, which means that besides being the
individual with the largest quantity of connections, LEOFORCRGREID also
has the largest potential to arbitrate information in the network.
Two nodes/agents stabilize the network the leader and his associate
It is important to note that the structure regarding the two indicators is the same,
i.e. each one of the positions is occupied by the same agent. For example,
MAOFBRSUANTRAVI ranks second with reference to the direct centrality
indicator and the betweenness indicator. He is trusted by the leader and is
involved in all of the groups activities. His closeness to the networks nucleus
and the high levels of the direct centrality and betweenness indicators are
evidence for the importance of the two agents, with respect to the structure and
functioning of the TCN. In case either of the two agents decided to leave the
group, it would signicantly impact the networks conguration, and might
even cause it to break up.
Concentration of Interactions
168
The concentration of the categories identied in the network is, as follows: a)
Financial Relations accounting for around 27.7% of the total relations
established in the network; b) Violence and Coercion accounting for around
69.6%; and c) Family/Intimate relations accounting for approximately 2.6% of
the total relations.
Case 4. Skimming Network from Bulgaria
The TCN described below is engaged in the so-called skimming, the
fraudulent obtaining of information from credit and/or debit cards. The sources
used for the description below are mainly media publications, according to
which the TCN used stolen personal data, credit and debit card numbers, bank
account numbers, etc. The information was bought for 50,000 USD from a
hackers website. The TCN was very well organized for the purpose of illegally
drawing money from credit cards in foreign countries. The stolen money was
deposited in the bank accounts of intermediaries, who afterwards would
withdraw the funds and transfer them to Bulgaria using Western Union, Money
Gram, or bank transfers. The money was deposited in the accounts of associates
of the group leader, who then received all the money in cash. The group
operated in several countries, mainly the USA, Germany, Portugal, Russia,
Ukraine, Armenia, Serbia, and Azerbaijan. The large number of money transfers
169
got the attention of the ofcers in the organized crime unit. However, it turned
out that the ofcer in charge of investigating the case was part of the ring and
assisted the TCN.
The Hub
ININTRTHWEUNLTA is the agent with the highest degree of direct individual
centrality. This is not the group leader, but one of the middlemen who made the
transfers through Western Union. He is the node with the highest quantity of
direct connections with other nodes. He concentrates 10.4% of the total social
relationships established in the network, which is only 0.4 percentage points
higher than the score of the networks leader, LEOFGROFHAIAM, who places
second with an indicator value of 10%. That means that the two agents enjoy
practically the same centrality status. They concentrate 20.4% of the direct
connections with other nodes, a very high percentage, keeping in mind that only
eight of the other agents have a direct centrality indicator above 2% (Graph 9).
170
Graph 9. Subnetworks. Size represents the direct centrality indicator
(amount of interactions of each node). Red lines represent interactions of
coercion. Blue lines represent nancial interactions. Orange lines represent
family ties.
The rst two nodes differ from the node that occupies third place by 3.6
and 3.2 percentage points, respectively, which means they are located at some
distance from the TCN nucleus.
SEOFTRTHWEUNAP
PAOFABATRAD
SEOFTRTHWEUNAP1
PAOFATRTHMOASK
SEOFTRTHWEUNAT
SEOFTRTHWEUNAF
SEOFTRTHWEUNAZ
SEOFTRTHWEUNAD
SEOFTRTHWEUNAH
SEOFTRTHWEUNAI
SEOFTRTHWEUNBB
SEOFTRTHWEUNBF
SEOFTRTHWEUNBKB
SEOFTRTHWEUNCC
SEOFTRTHWEUNCW
SEOFTRTHWEUNDL1
SEOFTRTHWEUNDDS
SEOFTRTHWEUNDD
SEOFTRTHWEUNDL
SEOFTRTHWEUNDF
PAOFABATRDLV
ACPOOFDMM
PAOFABATRDND
ININABATREMM
SEOFTRTHWEUNEU
ININABATREMD
ININABATREIT
ININABATREPM
SEOFTRTHWEUNEK
ACASINTHMOLAFAP
ININABATRGSM
PAOFABATRGG
PAOFABATRGIG
ININABATRGVD
SEOFTRTHWEUNGD
SEOFTRTHWEUNIL
SEOFTRTHWEUNIS
SEOFTRTHWEUNIIC
PAOFABATRIP
SEOFTRTHWEUNIG
LEOFGROFHAIAM
SEOFTRTHWEUNIK
SEOFTRTHWEUNIP2
SEOFTRTHWEUNIP
SEOFTRTHWEUNIP1
SEOFTRTHWEUNJF
SEOFTRTHWEUNJN
SEOFTRTHWSUNKV
ININABATRKSI
ININTRTHWEUNKIG
SEOFTRTHWEUNKB
SEOFTRTHWEUNKOVN
SEOFTRTHWEUNKI
SEOFTRTHWSUNKO
SEOFTRTHWEUNLH
SEOFTRTHWEUNLK
ININTRTHWEUNLTA
SEOFTRTHWEUNLS
SEOFTRTHWEUNMSB
SEOFTRTHWEUNMB
PAOFABATRMIA
SEOFTRTHWEUNMR
PAOFABATRMM
SEOFTRTHWEUNMH
ININTRTHWEUNMGA
SEOFTRTHWEUNNGH
SEOFTRTHWEUNND
ININTRTHMONDN
SEOFTRTHWEUNNI
PAOFABATRNPT
ININABATRNGS
SEOFTRTHWEUNOG
SEOFTRTHWEUNON
ININTRTHWEUNOSP
SEOFTRTHWEUNPAB
PAOFABATRPP
PAOFABATRPPM
ININTRTHWEUNPVP
SEOFTRTHWEUNRK
SEOFTRTHWEUNRG
PAOFABATRRYD
SEOFTRTHWEUNRA
SEOFTRTHWEUNSJ
SEOFTRTHWEUNSZK
SEOFTRTHWEUNSH
SEOFTRTHWEUNSZ
SEOFTRTHWEUNSN1
ININABATRSIL
PAOFABATRSTT
SEOFTRTHWEUNSN
SEOFTRTHWEUNTI
PAOFABATRTJK
ININTRTHWEUNTVK
SEOFTRTHWEUNTC
ACASINTHMOLATMI
SEOFTRTHWEUNTZ
SEOFTRTHWEUNVS
SEOFTRTHWEUNVA
ACPAOFABATRVPP
COOWVJ
SEOFTRTHWEUNVM
SEOFTRTHWEUNVRT
SEOFTRTHWEUNVG
SEOFTRTHWEUNVN
ININABATRX
PAOFABATRX
171
The remaining 98 agents have an indicator value below 2%, which means
that the majority of the network members had only limited direct contact with
other members in the TCN; this is, therefore, a relatively centralized network.
The reason for that is the specic criminal activity of the group and its mode of
operations: a small group of people organizes and is responsible for drawing the
money from the credit/debit cards, but to ensure that the money is safely
transferred and laundered, many more intermediaries are engaged, until
eventually the money reaches the group leader. The network operated with
many sub-networks senders of money transfers concentrated around other
people who received the money, and who would afterwards deliver it to the
group leader.
Below is a description of the nodes showing the largest direct centrality
indicators, who also play a key role for the functioning of the TCN.
Core node 1/hub: ININTRTHWEUNLTA, code used to identify a
intermediary in charge of transferring money through Western Union. As
mentioned above, this person has the highest direct centrality indicator 10.4%.
ININTRTHWEUNLTA received in his bank account, or through money
transfers, numerous deposits from all parts of the world, which accounts for the
172
high level of the centrality indicator. The person withdrew the money and gave
it to the leader. He served as the hub of one of the sub-networks.
Core node 2: LEOFGROFHAIAM, code used to identify the group
leader, who collects the money received from his associates. He enjoys the
second highest direct centrality indicator, 10%. This node/agent confessed to all
the charges in the indictment: money laundering, instigator and accessory to the
crime, committing nancial crime, using threat and violence, etc. He was
sentenced to four years and six months imprisonment, and had to pay a ne of
5,000 leva (approximately 2,500 euro). His sentence was reduced by one year,
which is the time he spent in pre-trial detention.
Core node 3: ININTRTHWEUNTVK, code used to identify one of the
intermediaries between the senders of money and the TCN leader. His direct
centrality indicator is 6.8%. He is also the hub of one of the sub-networks.
Core node 4: ACASINTHMOLAFAP, code used to identify a close
associate of the leader. He ranks fth in direct centrality indicator, with a value
of 5.2%. He is also a hub for one of the sub-networks; he received money
transfers and then gave the money to the leader.
173
Core node 5: ININTRTHWEUNPVP, code used to identify one of the
intermediaries between the senders of money and the group leader, who has a
4.8% degree indicator. He was also a hub of a sub-network, received money
transfers and gave the cash to the leader.
Core node 6: ININTRTHWEUNKIG, code used to identify one of the
intermediaries between the senders of money and the group leader, who has a
4.4% degree indicator. He was also a hub of a sub-network, received money
transfers and gave the cash to the leader.
Core node 7: ACASINTHMOLATMI, code used to identify an
accomplice/assistant in the money laundering. He has a 3.2% degree indicator
and concentrates the relations with many senders of money through Western
Union. This node/agent acts as the hub of one of the sub-networks.
Core node 8: ININABATREMM, code used to identify an intermediary in
a bank transfer. He has a direct centrality indicator of 2%. He was an
intermediary for the bank transfers, but was forced by the leader of the TCN to
sell his share in the company, of which he owned 50%.
These eight nodes establish 46.8% of all relations in the network. The
remaining 53.2% of the relations are distributed among 98 nodes/agents. The
concentration of relations in these agents concentrating 46.8% of the
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interactions represents, as was mentioned above, their role as intermediaries
between the senders of money and the group leader.
The Structural Bridge
In addition to the number of relations determined through the centrality degree
indicator, the other factor that justies the position of power within the social
network is the agents capacity for arbitrating more information and for
generating more social perverse capital. It is therefore important to determine
and identify the node appearing in the middle of the geodesic routes of the
network, playing the role of structural bridge. With respect to this indicator, the
rst two nodes/agents switch positions. Thus, the TCN leader
LEOFGROFHAIAM ranks rst with 42.04% of the betweenness indicator.
This implies a signicant concentration of power to manage the information of
the network, considering the fact that 85 of all 107 members of the TCN have a
betweenness indicator of zero. The difference between the agents ranking rst
and second, respectively, is also signicant: 30.33 percentage points. This
conrms that the leader of the TCN is the most important arbitrator of
information, because he gets into 42.04% of all the geodesic routes chartered
in the network. Twenty agents have a betweenness indicator higher than zero,
and thus have some capacity to intervene in the ows of information of the
network. The indicator levels of the agents trailing the second core node
175
decrease gradually. The extremely high value of the betweenness indicator of
LEOFGROFHAIAM shows that the TCN has no set of nodes stabilizing the
network.
Interactions
Financial Relations and Internal Management of the Group
The TCN was articulated for the purpose of credit card skimming and
laundering money generated by the crime. Bearing in mind the specics of the
criminal activity, this category applies to almost all relations in the TCN. The
group leader, as the mastermind, instigator, and organizer of the criminal
activity, concentrates the highest number of relations, as he is also the person
who receives the money (Graph 10).
176
Graph 10. Subnetworks. Size represents the betwenness indicator
(capacity to intervene in the interactions). Only the nancial interactions
are highlighted.
Corruption and Bribery
177
SEOFTRTHWEUNAP
PAOFABATRAD
SEOFTRTHWEUNAP1
PAOFATRTHMOASK
SEOFTRTHWEUNAT
SEOFTRTHWEUNAF
SEOFTRTHWEUNAZ
SEOFTRTHWEUNAD
SEOFTRTHWEUNAH
SEOFTRTHWEUNAI
SEOFTRTHWEUNBB
SEOFTRTHWEUNBF
SEOFTRTHWEUNBKB
SEOFTRTHWEUNCC
SEOFTRTHWEUNCW
SEOFTRTHWEUNDL1
SEOFTRTHWEUNDDS
SEOFTRTHWEUNDD
SEOFTRTHWEUNDL
SEOFTRTHWEUNDF
PAOFABATRDLV
ACPOOFDMM
PAOFABATRDND
ININABATREMM
SEOFTRTHWEUNEU
ININABATREMD
ININABATREIT
ININABATREPM
SEOFTRTHWEUNEK
ACASINTHMOLAFAP
ININABATRGSM
PAOFABATRGG
PAOFABATRGIG
ININABATRGVD
SEOFTRTHWEUNGD
SEOFTRTHWEUNIL
SEOFTRTHWEUNIS
SEOFTRTHWEUNIIC
PAOFABATRIP
SEOFTRTHWEUNIG
LEOFGROFHAIAM
SEOFTRTHWEUNIK
SEOFTRTHWEUNIP2
SEOFTRTHWEUNIP
SEOFTRTHWEUNIP1
SEOFTRTHWEUNJF
SEOFTRTHWEUNJN
SEOFTRTHWSUNKV
ININABATRKSI
ININTRTHWEUNKIG
SEOFTRTHWEUNKB
SEOFTRTHWEUNKOVN
SEOFTRTHWEUNKI
SEOFTRTHWSUNKO
SEOFTRTHWEUNLH
SEOFTRTHWEUNLK
ININTRTHWEUNLTA
SEOFTRTHWEUNLS
SEOFTRTHWEUNMSB
SEOFTRTHWEUNMB
PAOFABATRMIA
SEOFTRTHWEUNMR
PAOFABATRMM
SEOFTRTHWEUNMH
ININTRTHWEUNMGA
SEOFTRTHWEUNNGH
SEOFTRTHWEUNND
ININTRTHMONDN
SEOFTRTHWEUNNI
PAOFABATRNPT
ININABATRNGS
SEOFTRTHWEUNOG
SEOFTRTHWEUNON
ININTRTHWEUNOSP
SEOFTRTHWEUNPAB
PAOFABATRPP
PAOFABATRPPM
ININTRTHWEUNPVP
SEOFTRTHWEUNRK
SEOFTRTHWEUNRG
PAOFABATRRYD
SEOFTRTHWEUNRA
SEOFTRTHWEUNSJ
SEOFTRTHWEUNSZK
SEOFTRTHWEUNSH
SEOFTRTHWEUNSZ
SEOFTRTHWEUNSN1
ININABATRSIL
PAOFABATRSTT
SEOFTRTHWEUNSN
SEOFTRTHWEUNTI
PAOFABATRTJK
ININTRTHWEUNTVK
SEOFTRTHWEUNTC
ACASINTHMOLATMI
SEOFTRTHWEUNTZ
SEOFTRTHWEUNVS
SEOFTRTHWEUNVA
ACPAOFABATRVPP
COOWVJ
SEOFTRTHWEUNVM
SEOFTRTHWEUNVRT
SEOFTRTHWEUNVG
SEOFTRTHWEUNVN
ININABATRX
PAOFABATRX
This category applies to the relations with a police ofcer who was
investigating the case. Working on the case, he contacted the leader of the TCN
and offered to cooperate with the group in exchange for protection money.
Eventually, the police ofcer became part of the money transferring scam.
Violence and Coercion
All the members of the TCN, including the senders of money and the
intermediaries, joined the TCN voluntarily, lured by the promise of nancial
gains. The relations between the group members are strictly nancial, and no
violence or coercion was detected. There was only one case when force and
threats of violence were used against two of the intermediaries. They owned a
company and were forced by the TCN leader and one of his associates
(ACASINTHMOLAFAP) to sell their shares and transfer the ownership rights
to the TCN. The TCN needed a legitimate business through which to launder
the criminal proceeds.
Family/Intimate relations
Laundering the proceeds of crime using multiple money transfers required
working with trusted people. Therefore, some of the intermediaries in the TCN
used the bank accounts of their relatives (parents, children, and spouses), to
transfer the money.
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Conclusions: Characteristics of the Skimming Network
According to the direct centrality and betweenness indicators, the following are
the main characteristics of the network, which was engaged in skimming and
money laundering.
The Hub: two nodes have similar centrality indicator
The direct centrality indicator shows that two agents share roughly the same
indicator values: ININTRTHWEUNLTA with 10.4% and the TCN leader,
LEOFGROFHAIAM, with 10%. ININTRTHWEUNLTA is the hub of one of
the sub-networks and concentrates relations with the money senders from
various parts of the world, which accounts for his high score.
The Structural Bridge
LEOFGROFHAIAM is the structural bridge in the TCN with a betweenness
indicator of 42.04%. If we take into consideration the high value of the other
indicator, it appears that he has the capacity to coordinate the relations within
the TCN without intermediaries, concentrating a large share of the social
relations in the network. In practical terms, this node/agent is in charge of
organizing the entire skimming deal, while the other agents assist in the money-
laundering phase, sometimes requiring only a single bank transfer. This
situation represents, therefore, a highly centralized network.
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There is no module of stabilizer nodes in the nucleus of the network
In visual terms, it is observed that there are no nodes close to the nucleus of the
TCN, which means there is no module of stabilizer nodes in the nucleus of the
network.
Concentration of interactions
The concentration of the categories identied in this case is as follows: a)
Financial Relations accounting for 97.7% of the total relations established in
the network; b) Corruption and Bribery accounting for 0.3%; c) Violence and
Coercion accounting for 0.8%; d) Family/Intimate relations accounting for
around 1.1%.
The four cases discussed above show that even when corrupt state
ofcials had supported the TCN, they were not identied as part of the network.
This is especially clear in the determination of the concentration of social
relations. Only two instances of corruption are identied in two TCNs. The
nancial relations are key for the existence and operation of all TCNs, and only
in one of the networks (for human trafcking), force and violence have more
weight than nancial relations: this depends on the specics of the criminal
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activity and the methods used to recruit women to prostitute. The family
relations also play a role in the operation of the described TCNs; they are
present in all four cases.
The four TCNs that operate in the SBEU provide evidence that the
Bulgarian crime networks are a threat to the security in the EU for two main
reasons. On the one hand, they have become successfully integrated in, and
support large international crime groups transiting through Bulgaria. On the
other hand, Bulgarian organized crime has expanded its scope and outreach by
building TCNs and exporting crime to other countries in the EU. In order to
reduce the threat of transnational crime networks operating in the SBEU, the
following recommendations should be taken into account.
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Recommendations for Improving the
Counteraction of Transnational Crime Networks
Operating in the Southeastern Border of the
European Union and the Southern Border of the
United States
By Georgi Petrunov, Eduardo Salcedo-Albaran, Luis Jorge Garay Salamanca
and John P. Sullivan
Strengthening the efforts to counteract the TCNs operating in the SBEU is a key
condition for the security of the EU, just as strengthening the efforts to
counteract the TCNs operating in the Southern Border of the U.S. is a matter of
national security for the U.S. In a sense, it could be thought that it is even more
important for the security of the EU and the U.S. to strength the protocols to
confront TCNs operating across their borders, than just to restrict the movement
of regular undocumented citizens across the board, without specic targeting.
Regular citizens, when not related with the operation of TCNs, lack the
technical and moral training for engaging directly in criminal activities; only in
the long run can a regular citizen obtain the various skills required for engaging
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in successful criminal activities (De Len-Beltrn & Salcedo-Albarn, 2007).
This means that criminals belonging to TCNs have specic skills for carrying
on their criminal purposes; therefore, the standard and traditional indiscriminate
procedures and protocols applied for restricting the movement of regular
undocumented citizens will not be effective enough for the purpose of
restricting the operation of TCNs.
In fact, to be successful in tackling the operation of TCNs in the long run,
the States affected require further action, not only as regards the operations of
the TCNs, but also with respect to other social, economic and political critical
issues. On one hand, Mexico faces several social problems that cause and are
caused by the violence and general crime. On the other hand, the U.S. face
challenges for its national security resulting from the corruption affecting its
border, and the crime related to the domestic demand of illegal drugs. In the
EU, the growing economic inequalities between the member states also affect
the dynamic of crime. Economic disparities do not only create conditions for
the citizens lacking economic resources to participate in criminal networks in
the mid term, but also dene the dynamics of supply and demand among States.
The poverty levels in countries such as Bulgaria make people easier targets
either as perpetrators or victims of crime for the criminal networks, similar to
how it happens in Mexico, and even poor areas inside cities of the U.S.
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Tackling these issues requires long-term planning and sustained efforts to
improve social and economic conditions in the countries involved.
Additionally, the poor economic conditions in countries such as Bulgaria
drive many TCNs to supply illegal goods, and even trafc humans towards the
criminal markets in the more afuent countries in Western Europe, where
illegal goods are paid at higher prices. This means that various illegal markets
in which TCNs participate are characterized by constant ows of supply and
demand between countries with different levels of income, inside and outside
the EU, and inside and outside the US.
As discussed in the previous chapters, a serious challenge to any future
efforts against TCNs in Bulgaria is its geographic location: situated at the
crossroads between Asia and Europe, the country has been for decades
particularly attractive for transnational crime transiting through its territory.
This does not mean that Bulgaria is the only entrance path for penetrating the
EU, since several ows of crime also nd their way inside the EU from Latin
America and Africa, through the western countries of the EU. However,
Bulgaria remains as a highly relevant point of entrance through the entire
eastern region of the EU.
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In the same sense, Mexico is a relevant crossing point that connects the
richest country of the world, with criminal networks that supply illegal goods
form Central and South America; however, it does not mean that Mexico is the
only entrance point for crime inside the United States.
The overall level of criminality in Bulgaria is extremely high, which
requires further concerted efforts to reduce its levels. However, this cannot be
achieved without external assistance. Criminal groups with real and practical
power, running from behind the scenes, have captured, and sometimes co-
opted, many of the Bulgarian institutions; the media has extensively exposed
situations such as this. The same happens in Mexico where several scandals of
connections between criminals, public servants, political leaders and the private
sector agents have been exposed by media. This means that strong external
assistance for countering and protecting the domestic institutions is still
required. Temporary measures, such as the ICAG in Guatemala, seem to be a
good option when local institutions are highly co-opted.
Bulgarias admission in the Schengen Area a goal that has been high on
the political agenda in the past few yearswill be a real test, and recognition of
the countrys progress in the ght against organized crime and corruption.
Membership in the Schengen Area (2011)

depends on a number of conditions
that the Bulgarian state must meet, for example:
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Responsibility for the control of the external borders of the Schengen
Area on behalf of the other member states, and issuing short-term visas
Successful cooperation with the other member states to maintain border
security after the internal border checks are removed
Strictly following the Schengen Area rules for the control of the land,
sea and air borders, issuing visas, police enforcement cooperation, and
protection of personal data
Connecting to the Schengen Information System
The level of preparedness of the candidate countries is evaluated to
guarantee that they meet the requirements and are ready to participate in the
system. The last assessment of Bulgaria, which took place in March 2011,
showed that the county has fullled the technical requirements. Nevertheless,
some of the EU member states remain skeptical towards Bulgaria and claim that
the countrys admission should be deferred until further progress is made in the
ght of organized crime and corruption. They are mainly concerned with the
land border with Turkey; there are talks for a partial lift of the ban on the water
and air borders. Bulgarias prospects to join Schengen depend on improving its
judiciary system and internal order. The biggest concern of the EU is the high
rate of organized crime and corruption in Bulgaria; that can facilitate the
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expansion of crime into Western Europe once Bulgaria joins the Schengen area.
The technical preparedness of Bulgaria will not be discussed further, assuming
that the country has to meet all the requirements in this respect.
Bearing in mind the characteristics of the TCNs analyzed above, several
key areas need to be improved in order to be successful in the ght against
TCN.
In-depth Investigation of TCNs
There are two relevant elements of criminal networks that are usually omitted in
the judicial investigations, specically in regions with high levels of corruption
and criminal inltration in the lawful institutions at the public and private level:
(i) The support to TCNs provided by gray nodes/agents operating inside those
institutions, such as public servants or political leaders, and (ii) the
transnational dimension of the local crime.
Investigating and prosecuting public servants, or other types of gray
node/agents operating within lawful institutions, usually requires procedures
that are more specic than those applied for investigating regular criminals, or
dark nodes/agents. Gray nodes/agents provide knowledge, nancial resources
and political and social capital that allow the successful operation of the TCNs.
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This provision has been dened, modeled and analyzed as part of a market of
institutional capacities, in which each agent sells those capacities that
complement the other nodes/agent capacities (Garay & Salcedo-Albaran,
2012). Gray nodes/agents provide the resources that TCNs lack. For instance,
public servants that collaborate with in TCNs, such as members of the police or
the judicial system, are those in charge of applying the policies against crime.
Therefore, they have the knowledge regarding how to use the blind spots of the
judicial system, which is a highly relevant capacity demanded by a TCN.
Private nodes/agents such as bankers and attorneys know how to use the blind
spots in the nancial and the prosecuting systems, which is also a relevant
capacity demanded by a TCN. It is therefore much more difcult to identify and
prosecute those gray nodes/agents in possession of relevant knowledge or
relevant capacities, than it is to identify and prosecute dark nodes/agents
operating completely outside the legal institutions, therefore lacking that
knowledge and those capacities. In this sense, specic measures for
strengthening schemes of counter-intelligence and internal affairs investigations
should be designed in order to really investigate TCNs. Even when gray nodes/
agents contribute to the success of TCNs in a highly relevant sense, authorities
tend to focus their attention on uncovering and prosecuting the dark nodes/
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agents in relation to common and traditional types of crime; in part, because
that is an easier task than uncovering and investigating the dark ones.
On the other hand, when authorities confront local crime, they tend to
omit the transnational causalities and effects, mainly because of a lack of
procedures, protocols or knowledge that allow them to understand the
transnational dynamics and articulate their efforts with foreign authorities. As a
result, and as expected, local authorities focus their efforts on confronting the
local expressions of crime, omitting the fact that there is an external cause
providing resources through supply or demand for re-articulating and re-
establishing local criminal networks. This appreciation applies for the hotspots
analyzed herein, not only to the cases of export of crime, but also to those of
crime transiting. For instance, in the rst case analyzed in Bulgaria, the
investigation concentrated only on the transportation of drugs, even though two
more groups were suspected to be involved, respectively the buyer and the
seller of the heroin. Even more interesting is the fact that the investigation
failed to identify all of the individuals involved in the transportation of drugs
from Turkey to Bulgaria. The investigators concentrated on specic phases of
the crime process, and managed to identify and arrest only the people involved
in the material and technical execution of criminal operations, such as the
mules, who are usually at the lower levels of the group and, even more
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importantly, are easily replaceable, without signicant impact on the groups
structure.
Such a bias was also observed in the investigation of the third and the
fourth TCNs modeled in Bulgaria as well. Media publications in Bulgaria
describe each of the TCN as a branch of a larger criminal organization, under
the control and the subordination of the bosses of these organizations. Yet, the
ofcial investigations reached only to the middle and low levels of the criminal
structures; typically, the low-level members who are easily replaced when
needed. Therefore, it is important for the judicial investigative task to go much
deeper and gather information regarding each of level and branch of the
criminal organization, including the top ones and the bosses across frontiers, in
order to build an exhaustive picture of how the criminal activity is carried out.
A similar situation is observed in Mexico, where the collaboration and
support provided by local authorities to Los Zetas is not yet understood in
depth. However, there is a difference between those cases analyzed in Mexico
and those analyzed in Bulgaria: In Mexico, it was possible to identify the
collaboration of some members of the local police through the judicial
documents consulted; however, in Bulgaria it was not possible. It cannot be
afrmed that the Mexican judicial system is a real example of prosecution
against public ofcials that collaborate with criminal networks; however, the
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small amount of mentions illustrating the collaboration of local police with Los
Zetas is a remarkable achievement when compared with the judicial documents
consulted in Bulgarian.
It should be considered a possibility, that the lack of attention to the
collaboration between TCNs and public ofcers reects the lack of knowledge
and technical capacity of the judicial system in Bulgaria. In this case, it is
highly important to improve the investigation capacities of the police and the
prosecutors; they should understand the basic concepts underlying the operation
of criminal network, and even more importantly, they should be able to
understand the complex structure of a network such as a transnational one.
However, it is also possible that those biased investigations are the result of
criminal inltration and manipulation, in which case it is important to design
and execute the above-mentioned procedures of counter-intelligence and
internal affairs.
Effective Actions against Corrupt Public Ofcers Assisting the
Operations of TCNs
When authorities pay attention to the gray nodes/agents supporting the
operation of TCNs, a complex social situation is uncovered. However,
uncovering the links between gray and dark nodes/agents is only a part of the
191
story. Effective efforts for disarticulating TCN would consist of a long judicial
process that includes carrying on effective judicial investigations, effective
indictments, and effective sanctions. Therefore, it is not only important to
improve the procedures for judicial investigation, but also to improve the
technical capacity of the prosecutors in charge of presenting indictments before
the judges. It is also important that the judges are capable of understanding the
characteristics of complex criminal networks, as well as having the legal
frameworks for effectively sanctioning the conspiracy, co-option, and
collaboration.
The efforts to identify and prosecute corrupt public ofcers who
cooperate with criminal organizations are extremely important; however, as
discussed above, this usually remains outside of the courtroom, such as in the
cases studied in Bulgaria. In this sense, the lack of attention to the participation
of public servants is a great concern in Bulgaria, even more so than in Mexico.
In spite of the fact that it is necessary to pay attention to the data regarding
effective administrative and penal sanctions against public servants for
collaborating with TCNs in Mexicowhich seem to be very modest indeedin
the consulted judicial records it was possible to nd pieces of information
explaining the interactions between local policemen and members of Los Zetas.
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However, in the cases analyzed in Bulgaria, there is almost a complete lack of
mention to the participation of public servants in the TCNs.
Corrupt practices are part and parcel of Bulgarias situation, which is a
condition for the successful action of TCNs, yet the investigations analyzed
herein did not discover relevant links of corruption or co-optation. In this sense,
it can be thought that the so-called legal truth does not reect the social
truth because, at the same time, there are numerous media publications with
detailed stories about corrupt public ofcers with ties to organized crime.
Unfortunately, in most cases the information from the media publications and
journalist investigations never reach the court. In the case of the Balkan TCN
involved in drug trafcking, the investigation did not identify any state ofcials
who might have supported the criminal organization and its boss, even when it
is almost obvious that different levels of ofcial collaboration were needed for
accomplishing the activities of the network. In a series of media publications,
on the other hand, it is possible to nd a very accurate description of the
criminal activities, including names and dates, among other pieces of
information, which corroborates the allegations of close and permanent
connections between top-level public ofcials and the TCN boss.
According to various media sources in Bulgaria, TCN enjoyed the support
of many state ofcials at the highest political levels. However, the analyzed
193
investigation failed to identify the corrupt public ofcers that were involved in
the criminal network.
Nevertheless, in one of the cases studied in this book, there was a
customs ofcer actively involved in the trafcking ring who helped the
trafckers cross safely the Bulgarian border at Kapitan Andreevo. However, the
customs ofcer was not indicted.
In the skimming case analyzed in Bulgaria, the police ofcer
investigating the TCN and the criminals were also closely connected. The
police ofcer himself approached the TCN boss and offered his help for
protection in exchange for money. In the course of time, the police ofcer
joined the criminal ring and helped to transfer money to Bulgaria. On the other
hand, as discussed in the Mexican cases, several members of the local police
were referenced as part of the structure of Los Zetas.
To deal effectively with corrupt public ofcials who support TCNs, the
judicial investigations need to carefully analyze the relevant information and
the opportunities for corruption that could potentially benet the criminal
groups, then take the respective measures to collect eligible evidence. This
requires, for instance:
194
(i) Acknowledging the relevance of gray nodes/agents, which means
acknowledging the fact that criminal networks are not only
articulated by dark nodes/agents.
(ii) Acknowledging the fact that TCNs can be articulated by hundreds
of nodes/agents.
(iii) Identifying the specic forms of interaction between public
servants (gray nodes/agents) and criminals (dark nodes/agents).
(iv) Identifying and analyzing the weakest institutions that allow
criminals to easily inltrate and co-opt lawful institutions.
Bearing in mind that sometimes the judiciary system lacks the
information for acknowledging and understanding the above mentioned facts
and characteristics of TCNs, even media sources analyzed by research
institutions, think tanks, and NGOs should be used. In this sense, a deeper
collaboration between scholars and research institutes should be encouraged, in
order to begin a process for providing concepts and methodologies that the
judiciary requires for understanding TCNs.
Improving the use of Special Investigation Methods against
TCNs
Using special investigation methods, such as undercover agents or controlled
delivery, is key in the ght against transnational organized crime, not only in
195
Bulgaria, but also in regions such as the Balkans. In the four cases of TCNs
operating in the SBEU or in the cases analyzed in Mexico, there is no evidence
that special investigation methods were used. For instance, in the Mexican
cases, the information regarding the structure of the TCN and the support
provided by local authorities is the result of testimonies, which means the
judicial investigators did not gather that information through special
investigations methods.
In the case of Bulgaria, it is also necessary to introduce new instruments
for the investigation of TCNs; for example, the so-called cooperating witnesses
perpetrators who agree to collaborate with the investigation. Introducing new
legislation to allow the use of this instrument will enable the investigation to get
to the highest levels of the organized crime, which are notoriously complex
structures and highly secretive, making them almost impenetrable using
conventional investigation methods. However, the introduction of this type of
instrument in Bulgaria also requires new regulations with regard to the
protection of those people, i.e. witness protection programs, relocation of the
witnesses and their families, and new jobs, among others.
196
Improving independence of the judiciary
Even more important for the success of this process, is the political
independence of the judiciary and the investigation. Further efforts are needed
to raise public awareness and establish a culture of zero tolerance for corruption
and co-optation between dark and gray nodes/agents. There are always two
parties in a corruption deal the party that gives, and the party that receives the
bribe. It is therefore necessary to introduce legislation and prosecute both
parties; harsher punishments will reduce the risk of corruption and the potential
benets of taking a bribe.
Special attention should be paid to public ofcials working in high-risk
administrative units. In addition to introducing sanctions for their involvement
in corrupt practices, there must be also a system of incentives to report cases of
corruption, as well as a protection program for whistleblowers, extending also
to their families. As certain administrative units and public ofcers are more at
risk of corruption, we recommend implementation of a differentiated risk-
assessment approach in evaluating the vulnerability to corruption of public
institutions.
197
Conducting Complex Criminal and Financial Investigations of
TCN
Another key factor for improving the counteraction of TCNs is the application
of an integrated approach in the investigation; this means, integrating the
nancial investigation in the criminal investigation of the networks, or
following the money trail. This is sometimes even tougher than understanding
the complex structure of a TCN. However, around the world several
declarations and institutional arrangements have been designed in order to
tackle the problem.
The investigations in the rst three cases described for Bulgaria focused
only on the purely traditional criminal activities and did not tackle the money
ows, even when it was a highly relevant aspect on each case. This was only
done in the fourth TCN case, but only because the criminal activity itself
skimming constitutes an economic crime, and hence, nancial investigation is
required by law. It is of utmost importance to conduct nancial investigations in
cases of transnational crime networks even if the statutory criminal activity
does not involve directly any economic crime.
A successful nancial investigation can also help the authorities tackle the
problem of money laundering; reducing the nancial power of the TCNs by
conscating the proceeds of crime will hamper the future operations of those
198
criminal networks and their ability to pay corrupt/co-opt ofcials and private
sector agents. Following the money trail is furthermore the key to get to the top
levels of TCNs and bring down the organizers. Integrating the nancial
investigation into the overall investigation process and following the money are
therefore crucially important for the success in dismantling TCNs.
In addition to the trans-border movement of illegal goods, nancial
transactions are also an important element supporting the activity of TCNs.
Those transactions are susceptible to tracking and seizure in order to weaken
the nances of the TCNs. The capacity to exercise violence and the economic
power, adding up to a exible structure allowing innovations when facing
government restrictions, are the major comparative advantages of TCNs.
Therefore, it is important to reinforce nancial monitoring mechanisms, in
charge of the domestic Financial Intelligence Units (FIU) in the countries
facing the trans-border criminal activity. For instance, the Mexican Unit of
Financial Intelligence of Treasury and Public Credit Secretariat [Unidad de
Inteligencia Financiera de la Secretara de Hacienda y Crdito Pblico] must
be strengthened. However, it is also important to establish a Bilateral Agency of
Financial Investigation (BAFI) that allows monitoring and sharing information
between the countries involved (Garay & Salcedo-Albaran, 2012).
199
Since 1995, EGMONT Group became an important tool for exchanging
information between FIUs around the world, allowing progress mainly in the
identication of judicial, coercive and hybrid mechanisms to prevent money
laundering. This framework, or any other provided by any multilateral agency
such as UNODC, can be used as the context for bilateral or multilateral
activities required for advancing the development of BAFIs (Garay & Salcedo-
Albaran, 2012).
Strengthening International Cooperation in the Fight against
TCNs in Bulgaria
The cases presented in this research reveal another loophole in the investigation
carried out in Bulgaria: there is no information provided by the authorities in
the neighboring Balkan countries, Serbia and Turkey. Because neither country
is a member of the EU, it is not possible to rely on the EU mechanisms for
international cooperation and coordination in the ght against crime. This has
prevented the investigation from getting to the Turkish accomplices in one of
the cases that have remained so far unidentied. The lack of international
cooperation limits the investigative process to the territory of only one country,
and hampers the efforts to bring down the entire TCNs. Therefore, countries in
the Balkan region should step up their cooperation efforts, for example, by
200
introducing joint investigation teams and expanding the investigation efforts to
the territories where the TCN operate.
One obstacle for a successful international cooperation in the Balkan
region is the language barrier, which slows down the communication and
information exchange between law enforcement agencies. Often, the
information exchange is much faster when the ofcers know each other and
have established good working relations with their international colleagues. In
this respect, it is highly recommended to build a network of contact points
between the prosecution ofces in each of the Balkan countries, in order to
improve the exchange of information and their collaboration.
Articulating Domestic Agencies inside the United States to
confront the local dimension of TCNs
Police and homeland security, which includes border patrol and customs
authorities, on both sides of the hyperborder and well into the heartland,
need to build capacity to sense, interdict, and contain cartel-gang inter-
penetration before it becomes an endemic threat to community and national
security. This will require municipal and state police, sheriffs deputies,
and federal agents to enhance their capacity to address cartel-gang threats.
However, current gang control efforts are sporadic and not well integrated
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with efforts to counter TCNs. Gang suppression and intervention efforts are
largely centered in areas that have faced historic challenges from street and
prison gangs. These include Los Angeles, Chicago, and areas of Texas.
Therefore, as gangs spread and connect with TCNs, especially Mexican
cartels, policing face the need to build new capacities. These include
investigations, gang patrols, and the need to link with prevention and
intervention specialists from the community.
Since street gangs often are linked to prison gangs (such as La
Eme), patrol and correctional intelligence and investigative efforts need to
be linked, more importantly, in a systemic and non-sporadic strategy. This
is difcult because in many areas police and corrections are addressed by
separate agencies. Even in sheriffs departments that handle both functions,
the specialties are separated into different bureaucratic units, usually
implying fragmented strategies. Furthermore, gang investigations, patrol,
vice, organized crime, and narcotics are specialties usually handled by
separate bureaucratic units. In fact, in areas challenged by cartels, one unit
may handle narcotics, while another handles gangs, and others still handle
community patrol, vice, and corruption control. In most cases, cartels are
viewed as a narcotics problem and counter-drug-strategies prevail. A
comprehensive approach is therefore needed, understanding the structures
202
of TCNs that articulate local expressions of crime, such as the cases
analyzed herein. This approach even requires bearing in mind that counter-
violence approaches are needed to contain cartel and gangs violence, and
counter-corruption efforts are needed to contain the threat of cartels and
gangs co-opting police and public ofcials (Sullivan J. , 2010b).
Counter-violence and counter-corruption efforts must be bolstered
in areas where they exist, and must be linked to new capacities in areas
challenged by gang and cartel expansion. These must include efforts at the
municipal (city and county), state, regional (in metropolitan areas or among
states), and federal levels since, each level of government faces specic
challenges from TCNs and gangs. Community violence is usually a local
effort; complex multi-state and transnational investigations and efforts to
curb public corruption usually fall to the federal level. Direct border
security functions are a federal responsibility, but addressing spillover and
inter-penetration in communities also requires state and local initiatives.
All of this must be synchronized and demand cooperation.
Intelligence is also major player in forging cooperation. Detailed
efforts to characterize current and emerging cartel-gang threats are need.
These should be complimented by a detailed network analysis of networks
of public corruption and collusion among corrupt ofcials and the cartel-
203
gang networks, such as the one developed in the present document for
understanding the structure of Los Zetas.
Harsher Sentences for Members of TCNs in Bulgaria
In the analyzed cases, some of the imposed sentences appear inadequate for the
crimes committed. This is true in particular for the third case and TCNs
involved in human trafcking in Bulgaria. Despite of the cruelty of the crime,
the long period in which the TCN operated, and the large number of victims,
the crime boss was sentenced only to 4 years 11 months of imprisonment and a
ne of 15 000 leva (approximately 7 500 euro). It is critical that in cases such as
this one, the sentences are higher, not only as an adequate punishment of the
perpetrator, but also because it will have a deterrence effect for other criminals.
In addition, longer and more severe sentences will make it more difcult for the
members of the TCN to resume their business once they leave prison, since
typically, most of the criminals return to their previous activity after serving
their time.
In this respect, it is also recommended to develop a new Criminal Code,
with adequate punishments for the crimes committed. The current CC dates
from 1968, and despite numerous amendments throughout the years, it is
204
obsolete and ineffective, mainly bearing in mind the social and economic
changes observed during the last three decades.
Prevention
The prosecution of crime is not enough to ght TCNs; adequate and
comprehensive policies for crime prevention are equally important. This is
especially true for crimes such as human trafcking. In a long-term perspective,
prevention should become the main focus in the efforts to ght organized crime,
and in particular, human trafcking.
Increasing the Knowledge on TCNs
It is difcult to access the information required for understanding and modeling
TCNs, as well as for diagnosing the quality and capacities of the institutions in
charge of confronting those TCNs. Without information regarding the judicial
investigations and the processes of prosecution, it is impossible to understand
the specic structures underlying TCNs. Even more important, it is impossible
to understand how well the entire judicial system is confronting the TCNs.
Without factual information regarding the interactions among dark, bright and
205
gray nodes/agents, the entire understanding of the TCNs operating across states
will rely only on statistic and aggregated data.
When modeling the TCNs described above, we found that the
information included in the court dossiers is fragmentary and does not provide a
comprehensive view of the criminal network; this also reects the fragmentary
nature of the investigations and prosecutions. Additionally, the process of
accessing judicial records, legal documents and dossiers, proved to be a nearly
impossible task in Mexico and Bulgaria. This constitutes a paradox in Mexico,
bearing in mind that in Mexico, there is a law for transparency of information.
In Mexico and Bulgaria, there is no legal or administrative procedure that
allows a regular citizen to access the complete information of a case that is
already judged and closed. Most of the time, it is only possible to access the
judicial information that should be public, as a result of the favors of public
servants, such as in the case of Bulgaria, and journalists, in the case of Mexico,
who acknowledged how relevant it is to analyze the information in depth.
However, none of these possibilities allow diagnosing the levels of
criminal inltrations within the formal institutions, nor the real capacity of the
judicial system for prosecuting TCNs in an effective way. Only information
describing the real and practical interactions of the TCNs allows identifying
specic procedures of the agents involved and their interactions, and only
206
information describing the procedures carried out by the judiciary allows
diagnosing their level of accomplishment.
To improve the counteraction of TCNs operating in the SBEU, it is
necessary to have ongoing assessments and studies of the trends and
developments in criminal markets, to ensure an adequate level of knowledge
and up-to-date information. This is the only way to respond quickly and
effectively to the constantly changing environment and emergence of new
forms of crime. In-depth knowledge is vital for designing evidence-based
policies and measures to dismantle TCN, and the rst step to achieving this is to
access the factual information regarding investigations and prosecutions.
Bearing in mind how difcult it is to access the information generated
by the judicial system, as well as how important it is to model and analyze the
structure of specic TCNs, it was proposed above to adopt media information
as an initial source for carrying on analysis such as the present one. This could
be a starting point in the long path for understanding the real complexity of
TCNs that operate at a global state with great amount of economic,
institutional, and political resources; TCNs that sometimes confront and
sometimes co-opt local institutions operating in a rigid and local scale.
207
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Annex 1: Betweenness indicator and Direct Centrality Indicator for the
Mexican Network.
id - Mexican case Betweenness id - Mexican case Degree
NA-LICADEGOOCRGN 13.9 AMDEARGUNDEA 0.1
LDEPOTIVIALOZEMNAM 8.9 AMLMHN 0.2
SI-LOZEOLPAEP 8.9 CO-LOZEAEV 0.1
NA-FAMISGMMNLTEP 8.2 CO-LOZEAG 0.1
NA-FAMINMGLEC 7.2 CO-LOZEAMBEB 0.1
NA-LOZEHCMSGEC 5.7 CO-LOZEAV 0.1
SI-LOZEAL 4.9 CODECOOMNC 0.2
NA-FAMIJDJSMNVEC 4.3 CODECORMNC 0.2
SI-LOZEJRNDVLPEC 3.7 CODEHI-ZEMP 0.1
NA-ENCOLOZESTN 3.5 COYSI-LOZEAEWPW 0.1
PR-MIBADEARODEHIJVV 3.5 ENPLVAHETAFB 0.1
FUPBL-POMUAK 3.4 ES-LOZEEM 0.1
NA-FAMIUPAEC 2.3 ES-LOZEHCRDEC 0.1
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJAPR
2.2 FUPBL-ADDEADBBM 0.1
NA-FAMIARMLM 2.2 FUPBL-
CADEPRENCIDEMAMZ
0.3
TECO-MILOZEANHNMN 2.2 FUPBL-COGROPPOACPC 0.3
HELRM 1.1 FUPBL-COPOAMUS 0.1
NA-FAMIAAMNOMETN 1.1 FUPBL-COPOMUCACE 0.2
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEYCC
1 FUPBL-
COPOMUHCRCLLOGCR
0.1
NA-FAMICRMETS 1 FUPBL-COPOMUJCC 0.1
NA-FAMI-OPFISJSJR 0.9 FUPBL-DISEPBLESRZA 0.1
NA-FAMISDRZNNDRO 0.9 FUPBL-FUADAESMN 0.1
FUPBL-POMUJTLMDJ 0.8 FUPBL-FUADAVGAJN 0.1
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEOLMNBR
0.8 FUPBL-FUADCDPGV 0.1
NA-
CADEGOSERTRNLHNET
0.7 FUPBL-FUADEAA 0.1
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEMIPRSN
0.6 FUPBL-FUADECE 0.1
FUPBL-POMUJCRFM 0.5 FUPBL-FUADLMADCRDA 0.1
PR-
MIBADEARODEHILARRG
0.5 FUPBL-FUADMACCM 0.1
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZELIA
0.4 FUPBL-FUADMATGO 0.1
221
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZELJMNI
0.4 FUPBL-FUADMGEM 0.3
FUPBL-POMUFHNT 0.3 FUPBL-FUADRNGA 0.1
FUPBL-POMUJDJSMARET 0.3 FUPBL-FUADSAC 0.1
NA-LOZESEC 0.3 FUPBL-GROPPOACC 0.3
FUPBL-POAMU-CIHIJJCR 0.2 FUPBL-
OFSEPBLCIHIBCMNC
0.1
FUPBL-POMUZIMIN-
COFAMIJDJSGS
0.2 FUPBL-POAMU-CIHIJJCR 0.2
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJGMGM
0.2 FUPBL-POAMU-
ZIYCIHIICR
0.1
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZELRPR
0.2 FUPBL-POAORFM 0.2
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZENEHNGL
0.2 FUPBL-POFE-
COFAMIJDJSAR
0.2
NA-FAMIPMASLM 0.2 FUPBL-POFEAEP 0.1
NA-FULOZEAGNDZU 0.2 FUPBL-POFEAEY 0.2
NA-LOZEAEC5 0.2 FUPBL-POFEOPX 0
NA-LOZEAGM 0.2 FUPBL-POMIC 0.1
PRSMMN 0.2 FUPBL-POMU-ZIJVMNET 0.1
SI-LOZEILFECN 0.2 FUPBL-POMUAHNA 0.1
SI-LOZEJLPEC 0.2 FUPBL-POMUAK 1.5
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJLMB
0.1 FUPBL-POMUFCP 0.1
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJMPMN
0.1 FUPBL-POMUFHNT 1.3
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZERMNBR
0.1 FUPBL-POMUJCRFM 1.5
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZESCALJ
0.1 FUPBL-POMUJDJSMARET 1.3
NA-LOZEAEC3 0.1 FUPBL-POMUJTLMDJ 1.4
NA-LOZEAEC4 0.1 FUPBL-POMUMAHNP 0.1
NA-LOZEAET1 0.1 FUPBL-POMUMS 0.1
SI-LOZEGGE 0.1 FUPBL-POMUVNCLG 1.1
TECOK 0.1 FUPBL-POMUZIMIN-
COFAMIJDJSGS
1.2
AMDEARGUNDEA 0 FUPBL-PRMUBNS 0.1
AMLMHN 0 FUPBL-
PRMUDETAMBVNRGGR
0.1
CO-LOZEAEV 0 FUPBL-PRMURESCB 0.2
CO-LOZEAG 0 FUPBL-SEPOAMUGSR 0.1
CO-LOZEAMBEB 0 FUPBL-SEPOAMURGOJ 0.1
CO-LOZEAV 0 FUPBL-SODEINAAEC 0.1
CODECOOMNC 0 FUPBL-SUPOAMUMMC 0.1
CODECORMNC 0 FUPBLAER 0.2
222
CODEHI-ZEMP 0 GU-JUJOLENARNANMAR 0.2
COYSI-LOZEAEWPW 0 GU-JUJOLENARNMRAM 0.2
ENPLVAHETAFB 0 HEEMGL 0.2
ES-LOZEEM 0 HEFDRZEK 0.2
ES-LOZEHCRDEC 0 HEFMNV 0.4
FUPBL-ADDEADBBM 0 HEJMNV 0.4
FUPBL-
CADEPRENCIDEMAMZ
0 HELRM 0.5
FUPBL-COGROPPOACPC 0 HESAJOSEFSN 0.2
FUPBL-COPOAMUS 0 HIDEDLC 0
FUPBL-COPOMUCACE 0 INFAMIAZHNET 0.1
FUPBL-
COPOMUHCRCLLOGCR
0 INFAMIJALPBNEG 0.1
FUPBL-COPOMUJCC 0 LDEPOTIVIALOZEMNAM 3.1
FUPBL-DISEPBLESRZA 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEEAHN
0.3
FUPBL-FUADAESMN 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEGRV
0.2
FUPBL-FUADAVGAJN 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJAGA
0.1
FUPBL-FUADCDPGV 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJAPR
2.4
FUPBL-FUADEAA 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJBCC
0.5
FUPBL-FUADECE 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJEANCV
0.4
FUPBL-FUADLMADCRDA 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJGMGM
0.7
FUPBL-FUADMACCM 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJJA
0.6
FUPBL-FUADMATGO 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJLMB
0.6
FUPBL-FUADMGEM 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJMPMN
0.4
FUPBL-FUADRNGA 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJRD
0.2
FUPBL-FUADSAC 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJRLZGL
0.7
FUPBL-GROPPOACC 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJSANCV
0.2
FUPBL-
OFSEPBLCIHIBCMNC
0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJSOIC
0.4
FUPBL-POAMU-
ZIYCIHIICR
0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZELIA
0.3
FUPBL-POAORFM 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZELJMNI
1.2
FUPBL-POFE-
COFAMIJDJSAR
0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZELRPR
0.6
223
FUPBL-POFEAEP 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEMIPRSN
0.5
FUPBL-POFEAEY 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEMNGMCV
0.2
FUPBL-POFEOPX 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZENEHNGL
0.3
FUPBL-POMIC 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEOLMNBR
0.9
FUPBL-POMU-ZIJVMNET 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZERCA
0.5
FUPBL-POMUAHNA 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZERMNBR
0.5
FUPBL-POMUFCP 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZESCALJ
0.3
FUPBL-POMUMAHNP 0 MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEYCC
1.4
FUPBL-POMUMS 0 MIFAMIAEP 0.1
FUPBL-POMUVNCLG 0 MIFAMIAEP1 0.1
FUPBL-PRMUBNS 0 NA-CADEGO-ZEJGLDNEH 0.3
FUPBL-
PRMUDETAMBVNRGGR
0 NA-CADEGO-ZEMTOME 0.1
FUPBL-PRMURESCB 0 NA-CADEGOAER 0.1
FUPBL-SEPOAMUGSR 0 NA-CADEGOALLEGL 0.1
FUPBL-SEPOAMURGOJ 0 NA-CADEGOASEZET 0.1
FUPBL-SODEINAAEC 0 NA-CADEGOHELNCN 0.1
FUPBL-SUPOAMUMMC 0 NA-CADEGOHGCNG 0.1
FUPBLAER 0 NA-CADEGOMACEM 0.1
GU-JUJOLENARNANMAR 0 NA-CADEGOMAX 0.1
GU-JUJOLENARNMRAM 0 NA-CADEGOMRLNA 0.2
HEEMGL 0 NA-CADEGOOGAR 0.1
HEFDRZEK 0 NA-CADEGOPOO 0.1
HEFMNV 0 NA-CADEGOPRGPDP 1.2
HEJMNV 0 NA-
CADEGOSERTRNLHNET
0.8
HESAJOSEFSN 0 NA-CH-FAMIAGND 0.1
HIDEDLC 0 NA-CO-CADEGOAGDNMA 0.2
INFAMIAZHNET 0 NA-CO-
CADEGOMBAEMPEI
0.1
INFAMIJALPBNEG 0 NA-CO-CADEGORLAPGM 0.1
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEEAHN
0 NA-DICADEGO-ZAJJLNAN 0.4
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEGRV
0 NA-ENCOLOZESTN 0.5
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJAGA
0 NA-FAMI-LURNMMELED 0.2
224
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJBCC
0 NA-FAMI-OPFIACVR 0
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJEANCV
0 NA-FAMI-OPFIAQGEL 0.1
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJJA
0 NA-FAMI-OPFILMNGN 0.1
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJRD
0 NA-FAMI-OPFISJSJR 0.3
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJRLZGL
0 NA-FAMI-
OPFIWAAEWEWN
0.1
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJSANCV
0 NA-FAMIAAMNOMETN 0.8
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEJSOIC
0 NA-FAMIAASSNEP 0.1
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZEMNGMCV
0 NA-FAMIAB 0.2
MIBADEARODEHI-
VIALOZERCA
0 NA-FAMIAC 0.4
MIFAMIAEP 0 NA-FAMIAEC 0.2
MIFAMIAEP1 0 NA-FAMIAEL 0.1
NA-CADEGO-ZEJGLDNEH 0 NA-FAMIARMLM 0.6
NA-CADEGO-ZEMTOME 0 NA-FAMIAZ 0.1
NA-CADEGOAER 0 NA-FAMICRMETS 0.5
NA-CADEGOALLEGL 0 NA-FAMIDLPETJ 0.2
NA-CADEGOASEZET 0 NA-FAMIEOPAM 0.3
NA-CADEGOHELNCN 0 NA-FAMIEPSSKP 0.2
NA-CADEGOHGCNG 0 NA-FAMIGALEG 0.2
NA-CADEGOMACEM 0 NA-FAMIIRAEC 0.2
NA-CADEGOMAX 0 NA-FAMIJDJSMNVEC 2
NA-CADEGOMRLNA 0 NA-FAMINBMEN 0.3
NA-CADEGOOGAR 0 NA-FAMINMGLEC 1.9
NA-CADEGOPOO 0 NA-FAMIOTGH 0.1
NA-CADEGOPRGPDP 0 NA-FAMIPMASLM 1
NA-CH-FAMIAGND 0 NA-FAMIRNAMEH 0.2
NA-CO-CADEGOAGDNMA 0 NA-FAMIRSMEP 0.1
NA-CO-
CADEGOMBAEMPEI
0 NA-FAMISDRZNNDRO 0.6
NA-CO-CADEGORLAPGM 0 NA-FAMISGMMNLTEP 1.7
NA-DICADEGO-ZAJJLNAN 0 NA-FAMISSSELEVDS 0.2
NA-FAMI-LURNMMELED 0 NA-FAMIUPAEC 0.8
NA-FAMI-OPFIACVR 0 NA-FULOZEAGNDZU 0.4
NA-FAMI-OPFIAQGEL 0 NA-LICADEGOOCRGN 4.2
NA-FAMI-OPFILMNGN 0 NA-LILOZEHLLEL 2
225
NA-FAMI-
OPFIWAAEWEWN
0 NA-LOZEACDB 0.1
NA-FAMIAASSNEP 0 NA-LOZEAEC 0.2
NA-FAMIAB 0 NA-LOZEAEC1 0.1
NA-FAMIAC 0 NA-LOZEAEC2 0.1
NA-FAMIAEC 0 NA-LOZEAEC3 0.4
NA-FAMIAEL 0 NA-LOZEAEC4 0.4
NA-FAMIAZ 0 NA-LOZEAEC5 0.6
NA-FAMIDLPETJ 0 NA-LOZEAEF 0.1
NA-FAMIEOPAM 0 NA-LOZEAEG 0.2
NA-FAMIEPSSKP 0 NA-LOZEAEG1 0.1
NA-FAMIGALEG 0 NA-LOZEAEMOET 0.4
NA-FAMIIRAEC 0 NA-LOZEAEP 0.3
NA-FAMINBMEN 0 NA-LOZEAEP1 0.2
NA-FAMIOTGH 0 NA-LOZEAEP2 0.1
NA-FAMIRNAMEH 0 NA-LOZEAEP3 0.2
NA-FAMIRSMEP 0 NA-LOZEAET 0.1
NA-FAMISSSELEVDS 0 NA-LOZEAET1 0.4
NA-LILOZEHLLEL 0 NA-LOZEAEZ 0.1
NA-LOZEACDB 0 NA-LOZEAGM 0.4
NA-LOZEAEC 0 NA-LOZEAK 0.1
NA-LOZEAEC1 0 NA-LOZEALP 0.1
NA-LOZEAEC2 0 NA-LOZEAO 0.1
NA-LOZEAEF 0 NA-LOZEAP 0.1
NA-LOZEAEG 0 NA-LOZEAS 0.1
NA-LOZEAEG1 0 NA-LOZEDTT 0.2
NA-LOZEAEMOET 0 NA-LOZEEC 0.2
NA-LOZEAEP 0 NA-LOZEFAVZGNEP 0.1
NA-LOZEAEP1 0 NA-LOZEFVZLEPT 0.2
NA-LOZEAEP2 0 NA-LOZEGSGC 0.1
NA-LOZEAEP3 0 NA-LOZEGSMD 0.4
NA-LOZEAET 0 NA-LOZEGUAGAGA 0.1
NA-LOZEAEZ 0 NA-LOZEGULELC 0.1
NA-LOZEAK 0 NA-LOZEGURDLNGM 0.1
NA-LOZEALP 0 NA-LOZEGURLPC 0.1
NA-LOZEAO 0 NA-LOZEGURNQC 0.1
NA-LOZEAP 0 NA-LOZEGURRGCR 1.6
NA-LOZEAS 0 NA-LOZEGUSRSPR 0.1
NA-LOZEDTT 0 NA-LOZEHCMSGEC 0.7
NA-LOZEEC 0 NA-LOZEMDALPECM 0.1
226
NA-LOZEFAVZGNEP 0 NA-LOZERLGRJNRTMA 0.2
NA-LOZEFVZLEPT 0 NA-LOZESEC 0.5
NA-LOZEGSGC 0 NA-LOZET 0.5
NA-LOZEGSMD 0 NA-LOZETT 0.3
NA-LOZEGUAGAGA 0 NA-LOZEVCMVMEMECN 0.3
NA-LOZEGULELC 0 NA-LUALCDC 0.1
NA-LOZEGURDLNGM 0 NA-LUALG 0.1
NA-LOZEGURLPC 0 NAAEC 0.1
NA-LOZEGURNQC 0 NAAEYLPFN 0.2
NA-LOZEGURRGCR 0 NAAPASEF 0.1
NA-LOZEGUSRSPR 0 NADGAEC 0.2
NA-LOZEMDALPECM 0 NAECCEI 0.9
NA-LOZERLGRJNRTMA 0 NARAC 0.1
NA-LOZET 0 NARNLGL 0.1
NA-LOZETT 0 NARX 0.1
NA-LOZEVCMVMEMECN 0 NAVCABLPEG 0.1
NA-LUALCDC 0 PASEECCV 0.1
NA-LUALG 0 PI-LOZEMNRO 0.1
NAAEC 0 PI-LOZERRGR 0.1
NAAEYLPFN 0 PR-
ACSOYBSIDENOMAVTN
0.1
NAAPASEF 0 PR-ADIBSEADRIA 0.1
NADGAEC 0 PR-BAFIAGAAO 0
NAECCEI 0 PR-
DUAGRASMOMAIMDLN
0.2
NARAC 0 PR-DUOCADECAJMMNP 0.1
NARNLGL 0 PR-DUOEMFEFRFGMGM 0.2
NARX 0 PR-EMCOAJA 0.1
NAVCABLPEG 0 PR-EMCOAJCM 0.1
PASEECCV 0 PR-ENSGMCV 0.1
PI-LOZEMNRO 0 PR-HIARMAA 0.1
PI-LOZERRGR 0 PR-MIBADEARODEHIAW 0.2
PR-
ACSOYBSIDENOMAVTN
0 PR-MIBADEARODEHIJCBJ 0.4
PR-ADIBSEADRIA 0 PR-MIBADEARODEHIJVV 2.7
PR-BAFIAGAAO 0 PR-
MIBADEARODEHILARRG
0.3
PR-
DUAGRASMOMAIMDLN
0 PR-MIBADEARODEHIRCB 0.2
PR-DUOCADECAJMMNP 0 PR-PRCOAYOIANGAAM 0.3
PR-DUOEMFEFRFGMGM 0 PR-PREMFLROEXMAJGMA 0.4
PR-EMCOAJA 0 PR-PREMFLROEXSGLE 0.4
227
PR-EMCOAJCM 0 PR-TRGRASMOICP 0.1
PR-ENSGMCV 0 PR-TRGRASMOJSHNA 0.1
PR-HIARMAA 0 PR-TRROEXOONU 0.2
PR-MIBADEARODEHIAW 0 PRA 0.1
PR-MIBADEARODEHIJCBJ 0 PRDPRGL 0.1
PR-MIBADEARODEHIRCB 0 PRDUOEMACDFNFGA 0.4
PR-PRCOAYOIANGAAM 0 PRF 0.1
PR-PREMFLROEXMAJGMA 0 PRFV 0.1
PR-PREMFLROEXSGLE 0 PRHCMN 0.2
PR-TRGRASMOICP 0 PRLANGGL 0.1
PR-TRGRASMOJSHNA 0 PRMGAMNLM 0.1
PR-TRROEXOONU 0 PRPV 0.2
PRA 0 PRRCGM 0.2
PRDPRGL 0 PRSMMN 0.5
PRDUOEMACDFNFGA 0 SDI-LZACRDET 0.2
PRF 0 SI-FAMIAERET 0.1
PRFV 0 SI-FAMICMCERJRT 0.9
PRHCMN 0 SI-FAMIDEM 0.1
PRLANGGL 0 SI-FAMIEGNRLB 0.4
PRMGAMNLM 0 SI-FAMIFMNS 0.1
PRPV 0 SI-FAMIJAMABB 0.4
PRRCGM 0 SI-FAMIJJPPREP 0.1
SDI-LZACRDET 0 SI-FAMIRRVGLANFF 0.1
SI-FAMIAERET 0 SI-FAMISLPRGA 0.1
SI-FAMICMCERJRT 0 SI-LOZEAEA 0.1
SI-FAMIDEM 0 SI-LOZEAEA1 0.1
SI-FAMIEGNRLB 0 SI-LOZEAEB 0.2
SI-FAMIFMNS 0 SI-LOZEAED 0.1
SI-FAMIJAMABB 0 SI-LOZEAEE 0.1
SI-FAMIJJPPREP 0 SI-LOZEAEET 0.1
SI-FAMIRRVGLANFF 0 SI-LOZEAEG 0.1
SI-FAMISLPRGA 0 SI-LOZEAEL 0.1
SI-LOZEAEA 0 SI-LOZEAEM 0.1
SI-LOZEAEA1 0 SI-LOZEAEM1 0.1
SI-LOZEAEB 0 SI-LOZEAEQ 0.2
SI-LOZEAED 0 SI-LOZEAETS 0.1
SI-LOZEAEE 0 SI-LOZEAL 0.5
SI-LOZEAEET 0 SI-LOZEALPA 0.1
SI-LOZEAEG 0 SI-LOZEAP 0.1
228
SI-LOZEAEL 0 SI-LOZEATM 0.1
SI-LOZEAEM 0 SI-LOZEDEMREC 0.1
SI-LOZEAEM1 0 SI-LOZEDPRREC 0.2
SI-LOZEAEQ 0 SI-LOZEEC 0.1
SI-LOZEAETS 0 SI-LOZEEM 0.1
SI-LOZEALPA 0 SI-LOZEEM1 0.1
SI-LOZEAP 0 SI-LOZEEP 0.1
SI-LOZEATM 0 SI-LOZEEP1 0.1
SI-LOZEDEMREC 0 SI-LOZEEZB 0.1
SI-LOZEDPRREC 0 SI-LOZEGGE 0.3
SI-LOZEEC 0 SI-LOZEGNTJN 0.1
SI-LOZEEM 0 SI-LOZEILFECN 0.5
SI-LOZEEM1 0 SI-LOZEJLPEC 0.4
SI-LOZEEP 0 SI-LOZEJRNDVLPEC 1.5
SI-LOZEEP1 0 SI-LOZELHNL 0.2
SI-LOZEEZB 0 SI-LOZENVGA 0.1
SI-LOZEGNTJN 0 SI-LOZEOLPAEP 0.9
SI-LOZELHNL 0 TECO-MILOZEANHNMN 0.3
SI-LOZENVGA 0 TECO-MILOZEAR 0.2
TECO-MILOZEAR 0 TECO-MILOZEY 0.2
TECO-MILOZEY 0 TECOE 0.3
TECOE 0 TECOK 0.2
TECOMXIR 0 TECOMXIR 0.1
VCT-FUPBL-ALBUFCVLP 0 VCT-FUPBL-ALBUFCVLP 0.1
VCT-FUPBL-
PRCOPOAINJZM
0 VCT-FUPBL-
PRCOPOAINJZM
0.1
VCTARC 0 VCTARC 0.1
VCTEAZ 0 VCTEAZ 0.1
VCTFM 0 VCTFM 0.1
VCTGVGNL 0 VCTGVGNL 0.5
VCTILFN 0 VCTILFN 0.3
VCTJRVZGN 0 VCTJRVZGN 0.4
VCTJSGAH 0 VCTJSGAH 0.1
VCTLNLS 0 VCTLNLS 0.3
VCTMADLLL 0 VCTMADLLL 0.3
VCTMGUA 0 VCTMGUA 0.1
VCTTDC 0 VCTTDC 0.4
VCTVBNS 0 VCTVBNS 0.1
VCTVNGVZ 0 VCTVNGVZ 0.1
VCTVSV 0 VCTVSV 0.3
229
Annex 2: Betweenness indicator and Direct Centrality Indicator for Case 1,
Bulgaria.
Id - RM 1 Degree Betweenness
BUACAP 4.8 0
BUACX 4.8 0
COOFOPINTUN 4.8 0
DRTRRILEGSM 9.5 0
INHKH 9.5 0
MUDRSMT 23.8 79.2
MUSGIVAV 19 20.8
TUACX 11.9 0
TUACX1 11.9 0
Annex 3: Betweenness indicator and Direct Centrality Indicator for Case 2,
Bulgaria.
ID Node - RM 2 Betweenness ID Node - RM 2 Degree
DRLOBK 36.3 DIOFMEACOFKUNAP 18.6
DIOFMEACOFKUNAP 30.5 DRLOBK 15.7
CADEACDBT 11.2 FOCUOFMSY 9.3
FOCUOFMSY 8.7 ACOFKUSPD 7.9
DRTRDTL 3 CLSTOWVKP 6.4
ACOFKUSPD 2.9 TRCODSS 5
CUINMAT 2.8 CUINMAT 4.3
ACLONSS 2.8 SPOFDRLOVK 4.3
CLSTOWVKP 1.8 CADEACDBT 3.6
UNTUDEOFAMANHEX 0 SPOFYAENY 3.6
UNSEDRTRX 0 DRDEX 2.9
230
UNBUPROFAMX 0 COOFBKUASKUINCAOUHI
CRACSMS
2.1
TRCODSS 0 ACLONNS 1.4
SPOFYAENY 0 ACLONSS 1.4
SPOFDRLOVK 0 CALOMAS 1.4
ORTHDRTRCHINTUBEMA
OFKUN
0 CUINTDK 1.4
NOPUVI 0 DRTRDTL 1.4
MACOPDP 0 LECAOWLOHH 1.4
LEHOOWLONAS 0 NOPUVI 1.4
LECAOWLOHH 0 UNBUPROFAMX 1.4
DRDEX 0 UNSEDRTRX 1.4
CUINTDK 0 UNTUDEOFAMANHEX 1.4
COOFBKUASKUINCAOUHI
CRACSMS
0 LEHOOWLONAS 0.7
CALOMAS 0 MACOPDP 0.7
ACLONNS 0 ORTHDRTRCHINTUBEMA
OFKUN
0.7
Annex 4: Betweenness indicator and Direct Centrality Indicator for Case 3,
Bulgaria.
Id Node - RM 3 Degree Id Node - RM 3 Betweenness
LEOFORCRGREID 11.1 LEOFORCRGREID 29
MAOFBRSUANTRAVI 10.1 MAOFBRSUANTRAVI 22.9
PITRYBD 7.9 PITRYBD 8.4
BOOFTHLESUMZP 7.9 VIOFTRFOSEEXLTG 5.4
PITRKAT 7.4 VIOFTRFOSEEXJAD 5.4
PIASTDT 5.8 VIOFTRFOSEEXIT 5.4
BOSUOFPRDSD 5.3 VIOFTRFOSEEXDI 5.4
VIOFTRFOSEEXGT 4.2 BOOFTHLESUMZP 3.8
VIOFTRFOSEEXRB 4 PITRKAT 3.6
VIOFTRFOSEEXNMN 3.7 VIOFTRFOSEEXGT 2.8
VIOFTRFOSEEXBB 3.7 VIOFTRFOSEEXRB 2.6
VIOFTRFOSEEXTJT 2.6 VIOFTRFOSEEXMG 1.7
VIOFTRFOSEEXRGI 2.6 VIOFTRFOSEEXIK 1.7
VIOFTRFOSEEXMG 2.6 PIASTDT 1.1
231
VIOFTRFOSEEXIK 2.6 BOSUOFPRDSD 0.4
VIOFTRFOSEEXYDD 1.6 VIOFTRFOSEEXKI 0.1
VIOFTRFOSEEXPDA 1.6 VIOFTRFOSEEXBB 0.1
VIOFTRFOSEEXLTG 1.6 VIOFTRFOSEEXYDD 0
VIOFTRFOSEEXKI 1.6 VIOFTRFOSEEXX 0
VIOFTRFOSEEXKHK 1.6 VIOFTRFOSEEXTJT 0
VIOFTRFOSEEXIT 1.6 VIOFTRFOSEEXSKY 0
INM 1.6 VIOFTRFOSEEXRGI 0
VIOFTRFOSEEXJAD 1.3 VIOFTRFOSEEXPDA 0
VIOFTRFOSEEXDI 1.3 VIOFTRFOSEEXNMN 0
INX 1.1 VIOFTRFOSEEXKHK 0
PIX 0.8 VIOFTRFOSEEXI 0
VIOFTRFOSEEXSKY 0.5 UNX 0
VIOFTRFOSEEXI 0.5 PIX 0
UNX 0.5 INX1 0
ESINASECLX 0.5 INX 0
VIOFTRFOSEEXX 0.3 INM 0
INX1 0.3 ESINASECLX 0
Annex 5: Betweenness indicator and Direct Centrality Indicator for Case 4,
Bulgaria.
ID Betweenness ID - RM 4 Degree
LEOFGROFHAIAM 42.038 ININTRTHWEUNLTA 10.4
ININTRTHWEUNLTA 11.704 LEOFGROFHAIAM 10
ACPAOFABATRVPP 11.04 ININTRTHWEUNTVK 6.8
ACASINTHMOLAFAP 8.864 ACASINTHMOLAFAP 5.2
ININTRTHWEUNTVK 6.927 ININTRTHWEUNPVP 4.8
ININTRTHWEUNPVP 4.777 ININTRTHWEUNKIG 4.4
ININTRTHWEUNKIG 4.777 ACASINTHMOLATMI 3.2
ACASINTHMOLATMI 2.335 ININABATREMM 2
ININTRTHWEUNOSP 1.433 SEOFTRTHWEUNMSB 1.6
ACPOOFDMM 1.433 ININABATRGVD 1.6
ININABATREPM 1.062 ACPAOFABATRVPP 1.6
PAOFABATRPPM 0.584 SEOFTRTHWEUNPAB 1.2
232
ININABATRNGS 0.531 ININTRTHWEUNOSP 1.2
ININTRTHMONDN 0.478 ININABATREPM 1.2
ININABATRGSM 0.478 ININABATREIT 1.2
ININABATRGVD 0.372 ACPOOFDMM 1.2
ININABATREMM 0.372 SEOFTRTHWEUNVRT 0.8
ININABATREIT 0.292 SEOFTRTHWEUNDDS 0.8
ININABATRKSI 0.239 SEOFTRTHWEUNAZ 0.8
ININTRTHWEUNMGA 0.212 PAOFABATRX 0.8
SEOFTRTHWEUNMSB 0.053 PAOFABATRPPM 0.8
SEOFTRTHWSUNKV 0 PAOFABATRNPT 0.8
SEOFTRTHWSUNKO 0 PAOFABATRGIG 0.8
SEOFTRTHWEUNVS 0 ININTRTHWEUNMGA 0.8
SEOFTRTHWEUNVRT 0 ININTRTHMONDN 0.8
SEOFTRTHWEUNVN 0 ININABATRX 0.8
SEOFTRTHWEUNVM 0 ININABATRSIL 0.8
SEOFTRTHWEUNVG 0 ININABATRNGS 0.8
SEOFTRTHWEUNVA 0 ININABATRKSI 0.8
SEOFTRTHWEUNTZ 0 ININABATRGSM 0.8
SEOFTRTHWEUNTI 0 ININABATREMD 0.8
SEOFTRTHWEUNTC 0 COOWVJ 0.8
SEOFTRTHWEUNSZK 0 SEOFTRTHWSUNKV 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNSZ 0 SEOFTRTHWSUNKO 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNSN1 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNVS 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNSN 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNVN 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNSJ 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNVM 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNSH 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNVG 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNRK 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNVA 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNRG 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNTZ 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNRA 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNTI 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNPAB 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNTC 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNON 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNSZK 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNOG 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNSZ 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNNI 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNSN1 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNNGH 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNSN 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNND 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNSJ 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNMR 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNSH 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNMH 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNRK 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNMB 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNRG 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNLS 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNRA 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNLK 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNON 0.4
233
SEOFTRTHWEUNLH 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNOG 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNKOVN 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNNI 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNKI 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNNGH 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNKB 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNND 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNJN 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNMR 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNJF 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNMH 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNIS 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNMB 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNIP2 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNLS 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNIP1 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNLK 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNIP 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNLH 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNIL 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNKOVN 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNIK 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNKI 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNIIC 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNKB 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNIG 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNJN 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNGD 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNJF 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNEU 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNIS 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNEK 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNIP2 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNDL1 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNIP1 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNDL 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNIP 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNDF 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNIL 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNDDS 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNIK 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNDD 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNIIC 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNCW 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNIG 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNCC 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNGD 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNBKB 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNEU 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNBF 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNEK 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNBB 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNDL1 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNAZ 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNDL 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNAT 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNDF 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNAP1 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNDD 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNAP 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNCW 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNAI 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNCC 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNAH 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNBKB 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNAF 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNBF 0.4
SEOFTRTHWEUNAD 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNBB 0.4
PAOFATRTHMOASK 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNAT 0.4
PAOFABATRX 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNAP1 0.4
PAOFABATRTJK 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNAP 0.4
PAOFABATRSTT 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNAI 0.4
PAOFABATRRYD 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNAH 0.4
234
PAOFABATRPP 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNAF 0.4
PAOFABATRNPT 0 SEOFTRTHWEUNAD 0.4
PAOFABATRMM 0 PAOFATRTHMOASK 0.4
PAOFABATRMIA 0 PAOFABATRTJK 0.4
PAOFABATRIP 0 PAOFABATRSTT 0.4
PAOFABATRGIG 0 PAOFABATRRYD 0.4
PAOFABATRGG 0 PAOFABATRPP 0.4
PAOFABATRDND 0 PAOFABATRMM 0.4
PAOFABATRDLV 0 PAOFABATRMIA 0.4
PAOFABATRAD 0 PAOFABATRIP 0.4
ININABATRX 0 PAOFABATRGG 0.4
ININABATRSIL 0 PAOFABATRDND 0.4
ININABATREMD 0 PAOFABATRDLV 0.4
COOWVJ 0 PAOFABATRAD 0.4
235