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G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191 April 30, 1957 SALVADOR A. ARANETA, ET ., ET AL., petitioners, vs. T!E !ON.

"AGNO S. GAT"A#TAN, ET ., ET AL., respondents. E$E%&#EL SOR#ANO, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. SALVADOR ARANETA, ET ., ET AL., respondents-appellants. Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon for petitioners. San Juan, Africa and Benedicto for respondents. 'EL#$, J.( San Miguel Bay, located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, a part of the National waters of the Philippines with an e tension of about !"# s$uare miles and an average depth of appro imately % fathoms &'tter trawl e plorations in Philippine waters p. !(, ) h. B*, is considered as the most important fishing area in the Pacific side of the Bicol region. Sometime in (+"#, trawl ( operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places migrated to this region most of them settling at Sabang, Calabanga, Camarines Sur, for the purpose of using this particular method of fishing in said bay. 'n account of the belief of sustenance fishermen that the operation of this ,ind of gear caused the depletion of the marine resources of that area, there arose a general clamor among the ma-ority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay. .his move was manifested in the resolution of /ecember (0, (+"1 &) h. 2*, passed by the Municipal Mayors3 4eague condemning the operation of trawls as the cause of the wanton destruction of the shrimp specie and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay by declaring it closed for trawl fishing at a certain period of the year. 5n another resolution dated March !6, (+"7, the same 4eague of Municipal Mayor, prayed the President to protect them and the fish resources of San Miguel Bay by banning the operation of trawls therein &) h. 7*. .he Provincial 8overnor also made proper presentations to this effect and petitions in behalf of the non-trawl fishermen were li,ewise presented to the President by social and civic organi9ations as the N:M2;)4 &National Movement for 2ree )lections* and the C'MP:/;) &Committee for Philippine :ction in /evelopment, ;econstruction and )ducation*, recommending the cancellation of the licenses of trawl operators after investigation, if such in$uiry would substantiate the charges that the operation of said fishing method was detrimental to the welfare of the ma-ority of the inhabitants &) h. !*. 5n response to these pleas, the President issued on :pril ", (+"7, ) ecutive 'rder No. !! &"# 'ff. 8a9., (7!(* prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, but said e ecutive order was amended by ) ecutive 'rder No. %%, issued on September !1, (+"7 &"# 'ff. 8a9., 7#16*, apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl fishing during the typhoon season only. 'n November !, (+"7, however, ) ecutive 'rder No. 0# &"# 'ff. 8a9., "(+0* was issued reviving ) ecutive 'rder No. !!, to ta,e effect after /ecember 1(, (+"7. : group of 'tter trawl operators too, the matter to the court by filing a complaint for in-unction and<or declaratory relief with preliminary in-unction with the Court of 2irst 5nstance of Manila, doc,eted as Civil Case No. !70%6, praying that a writ of preliminary in-unction be issued to restrain the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources and the /irector of 2isheries from enforcing said e ecutive order= to declare the same null and void, and for such other relief as may be -ust and e$uitable in the premises. .he Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources and the /irector of 2isheries, represented by the 4egal :dviser of said /epartment and a Special :ttorney of the 'ffice of the Solicitor 8eneral, answered the complaint alleging, among other things, that of the (0 plaintiff &) e$uiel Soriano, .eodora /onato, 2elipe Concepcion, >enancio Correa, Santo 8aviana, :lfredo 8eneral, Constancio 8utierre9, :rsenio de 8u9man, Pedro 4a9aro, Porfirio 4a9aro, /el-ie de 4eon, ?ose Nepomuceno, Bayani Pingol, Claudio Salgado, Porfirio, San ?uan, 4uis Sioco, Casimiro >illar and )nri$ue >oluntad*, only (( were issued license to operate fishing boats for the year (+"7 &:nne B, petition @ 4-00+"*= that the e ecutive orders in $uestion were issued accordance with law= that the encouragement by the Bureau of 2isheries of the use of 'tter trawls should not be construed to mean that the general welfare of the public could be disregarded, and set up the defenses that since plaintiffs $uestion the validity of the e ecutive orders issued by the President, then the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources and the /irector of 2isheries were not the real parties in interest= that said e ecutive orders do not constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law, and therefore prayed that the complaint be dismissed &) h. B, petition, 4-00+"*. /uring the trial of the case, the 8overnor of Camarines Sur appearing for the municipalities of Siruma, .inambac, Calabanga, Cabusao and Sipocot, in said province, called the attention of the Court that the Solicitor 8eneral had not been notified of the proceeding. .o this manifestation, the Court ruled that in view of the circumstances of the case, and as the Solicitor 8eneral would only be interested in maintaining the legality of the e ecutive orders sought to be impugned, section 7 of ;ule %% could be interpreted to mean that the trial could go on and the Solicitor 8eneral could be notified before -udgement is entered. :fter the evidence for both parties was submitted and the Solicitor 8eneral was allowed to file his memorandum, the Court rendered decision on 2ebruary !, (+"", the last part of which reads as followsA .he power to close any definite area of the Philippine waters, from the fact that Congress has seen fit to define under what conditions it may be done by the enactment of the sections cited, in the mind of Congress must be of transcendental significance. 5t is primarily within the fields of legislation not of e ecutionA for it goes far and says who can and who can not fish in definite territorial waters. .he court can not accept that Congress had intended to abdicate its inherent right to legislate on this matter of national importance. .o accept respondents3 view would be to sanction the e ercise of legislative power by e ecutive decrees. 5f it is San Miguel Bay now, it may be /avao 8ulf tomorrow, and so on. .hat may be done only by Congress. .his being the conclusion, there is hardly need to go any further. Bntil the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by e ecutive proclamation. .he remedy for respondents and population of the coastal towns of Camarines Sur is to go to the 4egislature. .he result will be to issue the writ prayed for, even though this be to stri,e at public clamor and to annul the orders of the President issued in response therefor. .his is a tas, unwelcome and unpleasant= unfortunately, courts of -ustice use only one measure for both the rich and poor, and are not bound by the more popular cause when they give -udgments.

5N >5)C CD);)'2, granted= ) ecutive 'rder Nos. !!, %% and 0# are declared invalid= the in-unction prayed for is ordered to issue= no pronouncement as to costs. Petitioners immediately filed an e -parte motion for the issuance of a writ of in-unction which was opposed by the Solicitor 8eneral and after the parties had filed their respective memoranda, the Court issued an order dated 2ebruary (+, (+"", denying respondents3 motion to set aside -udgement and ordering them to file a bond in the sum of P1#,### on or before March (, (+"", as a condition for the non-issuance of the in-unction prayed for by petitioners pending appeal. .he Solicitor 8eneral filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied for lac, of merit, and the Court, acting upon the motion for new trial filed by respondents, issued another order on March 1, (+%", denying said motion and granting the in-unction prayed for by petitioners upon the latter3s filing a bond for P1#,### unless respondents could secure a writ of preliminary in-unction from the Supreme Court on or before March (", (+"". ;espondents, therefore, brought the matter to this Court in a petition for prohibition and certiorariwith preliminary in-unction, doc,eted as 8.;. No. 4-00+", and on the same day filed a notice to appeal from the order of the lower court dated 2ebruary !, (+"", which appeal was doc,eted in this Court as 8.;. No. 4-+(+(. 5n the petition for prohibition and certiorari, petitioners &respondents therein* contended among other things, that the order of, the respondent ?udge re$uiring petitioners Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources and the /irector of 2isheries to post a bond in the sum of P1#,### on or before March (, (+"", had been issued without -urisdiction or in e cess thereof, or at the very least with grave abuse of discretion, because by re$uiring the bond, the ;epublic of the Philippines was in effect made a party defendant and therefore transformed the suit into one against the 8overnment which is beyond the -urisdiction of the respondent ?udge to entertain= that the failure to give the Solicitor 8eneral the opportunity to defend the validity of the challenged e ecutive orders resulted in the receipt of ob-ectionable matters at the hearing= that ;ule %% of the ;ules of Court does not empower a court of law to pass upon the validity of an e ecutive order in a declaratory relief proceeding= that the respondent ?udge did not have the power to grant the in-unction as Section 7 of ;ule 1+ does not apply to declaratory relief proceedings but only to in-unction, receivership and patent accounting proceedings= and prayed that a writ of preliminary in-unction be issued to en-oin the respondent ?udge from enforcing its order of March 1, (+"", and for such other relief as may be deem -ust and e$uitable in the premises. .his petition was given due course and the hearing on the merits was set by this Court for :pril (!, (+"", but no writ of preliminary in-unction was issued. Meanwhile, the appeal &8.;. No. 4-+(+(* was heard on 'ctober 1, (+"%, wherein respondents-appellants ascribed to the lower court the commission of the following errorsA (. 5n ruling that the President has no authority to issue ) ecutive 'rders Nos. !!, %% and 0# banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay= !. 5n holding that the power to declare a closed area for fishing purposes has not been delegated to the President of the Philippines under the 2isheries :ct= 1. 5n not considering ) ecutive 'rders Nos. !!, %% and 0# as declaring a closed season pursuant to Section 6, :ct 7##1, as amended, otherwise ,nown as the 2isheries :ct= 7. 5n holding that to uphold the validity of ) ecutive 'rders Nos. !! and 0# would be to sanction the e ercise of legislative power by e ecutive decrees= ". 5n its suggestion that the only remedy for respondents and the people of the coastal towns of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte is to go to the 4egislature= and %. 5n declaring ) ecutive 'rders Nos. !!, %% and 0# invalid and in ordering the in-unction prayed for to issue. :s 'ur decision in the prohibition and certiorari case &8.;. No. 4-00+"* would depend, in the last analysis, on 'ur ruling in the appeal of the respondents in case 8.;. No. 4-+(+(, Ce shall first proceed to dispose of the latter case. 5t is indisputable that the President issued ) ecutive 'rders Nos. !!, %% and 0# in response to the clamor of the inhabitants of the municipalities along the coastline of San Miguel Bay. .hey read as followsA )E)CB.5>) ';/); No. !! P;'D5B5.5N8 .D) BS) '2 .;:C4S 5N S:N M58B)4 B:F 5n order to effectively protect the municipal fisheries of San Miguel Bay, Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, and to conserve fish and other a$uatic resources of the area, 5, ;:M'N M:8S:FS:F, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order thatA (. 2ishing by means of trawls &utase, otter and<or peren9ella* of any ,ind, in the waters comprised within San Miguel Bay, is hereby prohibited. !. .rawl shall mean, for the purpose of this 'rder, a fishing net made in the form of a bag with the mouth ,ept open by a device, the whole affair being towed, dragged, trailed or trawled on the bottom of the sea to capture demersal, ground or bottom species. 1. >iolation of the provisions of this 'rder shall sub-ect the offender to the penalty provided under Section 01 of :ct 7++1, or more than si months, or both, in the discretion of the Court. /one in the City of Manila, this "th day of :pril, nineteen hundred and fifty-four and of the 5ndependence of the Philippines, the eighth. &"# 'ff. 8a9. (7!(*

)E)CB.5>) ';/); No. %% :M)N/5N8 )E)CB.5>) ';/); No. !!, /:.)/ :P;54 ", (+"7, )N.5.4)/ GP;'D5B5.5N8 .D) BS) '2 .;:C4S 5N S:N M58B)4 B:FG By virtue of the powers voted in me by law, 5, ;:M'N M:8S:FS:F, President of the Philippines, do hereby amend ) ecutive 'rder No. !!, dated :pril ", (+"7, so as to allow fishing by means of trawls, as defined in said ) ecutive 'rder, within that portion of San Miguel Bay north of a straight line drawn from .acubtacuban Dill in the Municipality of .inambac, Province of Camarines Sur. 2ishing by means of trawls south of said line shall still be absolutely prohibited. /one in the City of Manila, this !1rd day of September, in the year of our 4ord, nineteen hundred and fifty-four, and of the 5ndependence of the Philippines, the ninth.G &"# 'ff. 8a9. 7#16*. )E)CB.5>) ';/); No. 0#. 2B;.D); :M)N/5N8 )E)CB.5>) ';/); No. !!, /:.)/ :P;54 ", (+"7, :S :M)N/)/ BF )E)CB.5>) ';/); No. %%, /:.)/ S)P.)MB); !1, (+"7. By virtue of the powers vested in me by law, 5, ;:M'N M:8S:FS:F, President of the Philippines, do hereby amend ) ecutive 'rder No. %% dated September !1, (+"7, so as to allow fishing by means of trawls, as defined in ) ecutive 'rder No. !!, dated :pril ", (+"7, within the portion of San Miguel Bay North of a straight line drawn from .acubtacuban Dill in the Municipality of Mercedes, Province of Camarines Norte to Balocbaloc Point in the Municipality of .inambac, Province of Camarines Sur, until /ecember 1(, (+"7, only. .hereafter, the provisions of said ) ecutive 'rder No. !! absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all the waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay shall be revived and given full force and effect as originally provided therein. /one in the City of Manila, this !nd day of November, in the year of 'ur 4ord, nineteen hundred and fifty-four and of the 5ndependence of the Philippines, the ninth. &"# 'ff. 8a9. "(+0* 5t is li,ewise admitted that petitioners assailed the validity of said e ecutive orders in their petition for a writ of in-unction and<or declaratory relief filed with the Court of 2irst 5nstance of Manila, and that the lower court, upon declaring ) ecutive 'rders Nos. !!, %% and 0# invalid, issued an order re$uiring the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources and the /irector of 2isheries to post a bond for P1#,### if the writ of in-unction restraining them from enforcing the e ecutive orders in $uestion must be stayed. .he Solicitor 8eneral avers that the constitutionality of an e ecutive order cannot be ventilated in a declaratory relief proceeding. Ce find this untenable, for this Court ta,ing cogni9ance of an appeal from the decision of the lower court in the case of Hilado s. !e la "osta, et al., 01 Phil., 76(, which involves the constitutionality of another e ecutive order presented in an action for declaratory relief, in effect accepted the propriety of such action. .his $uestion being eliminated, the main issues left for 'ur determination with respect to defendants3 appeal &8.;. No. 4-+(+(*, areA &(* Chether the Secretary of an ) ecutive /epartment and the /irector of a Bureau, acting in their capacities as such 8overnment officials, could lawfully be re$uired to post a bond in an action against them= &!* Chether the President of the Philippines has authority to issue ) ecutive 'rders Nos. !!, %% and 0#, banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay, or, said in other words, whether said ) ecutive 'rders Nos. !!, %% and 0# were issued in accordance with law= and. &1* Chether ) ecutive 'rders Nos. !!, %% and 0# were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the e ercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the President. Counsel for both parties presented commendable e haustive defenses in support of their respective stands. Certainly, these cases deserve such efforts, not only because the constitutionality of an act of a coordinate branch in our tripartite system of 8overnment is in issue, but also because of the number of inhabitants, admittedly classified as Gsubsistence fishermenG, that may be affected by any ruling that Ce may promulgate herein. 5. :s to the first proposition, it is an elementary rule of procedure that an appeal stays the e ecution of a -udgment. :n e ception is offered by section 7 of ;ule 1+ of the ;ules of Court which provides thatA S)C. 7. 5N?BNC.5'N, ;)C)5>);SD5P :N/ P:.)N. :CC'BN.5N8, N'. S.:F)/. @ Bnless otherwise ordered by the court, a -udgment in an action for in-unction or in a receivership action, or a -udgment or order directing an accounting in an action for infringement of letter patent, shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is ta,en or during the pendency of an appeal. .he trial court, however, in its discretion, when an appeal is ta,en from a -udgement granting, dissolving or denying an in-unction, may ma,e an order suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting such in-unction during the pendency of an appeal, upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it may consider proper for the security of the rights of the adverse party. .his provision was the basis of the order of the lower court dated 2ebruary (+, (+"", re$uiring the filing by the respondents of a bond for P1#,### as a condition for the non-issuance of the in-unction prayed for by plaintiffs therein, and which the Solicitor 8eneral charged to have been issued in e cess of -urisdiction. .he State3s counsel, however, alleges that while -udgment could be stayed in in-unction, receivership and patent accounting cases and although the complaint was styled G5n-unction, and<or /eclaratory ;elief with Preliminary 5n-unctionG, the case is necessarily one for declaratory relief, there being no allegation sufficient to convince the Court that the plaintiffs intended it to be one for in-unction. But aside from the title of the complaint, Ce find that plaintiffs pray for the declaration of the nullity of ) ecutive 'rder Nos. !!, %% and 0#= the issuance of a writ of preliminary in-unction, and for such other relief as may be deemed -ust and e$uitable. .his Court has already held that there are only two re$uisites

to be satisfied if an in-unction is to issue, namely, the e istence of the right sought to be protected, and that the acts against which the in-unction is to be directed are violative of said right &North Negros Sugar Co., 5nc. s. Serafin Didalgo, %1 Phil., %%7*. .here is no $uestion that at least (( of the complaining trawl operators were duly licensed to operate in any of the national waters of the Philippines, and it is undeniable that the e ecutive enactment3s sought to be annulled are detrimental to their interests. :nd considering further that the granting or refusal of an in-unction, whether temporary or permanent, rests in the sound discretion of the Court, ta,ing into account the circumstances and the facts of the particular case &;odulfa s. :lfonso, 6% Phil,, !!", 7! 'ff. 8a9., !71+*, Ce find no abuse of discretion when the trial Court treated the complaint as one for in-unction and declaratory relief and e ecuted the -udgment pursuant to the provisions of section 7 of ;ule 1+ of the ;ules of Court. 'n the other hand, it shall be remembered that the party defendants in Civil Case No. !70%6 of the Court of 2irst 5nstance of Manila are Salvador :raneta, as Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources, and, /eogracias >illadolid, as /irector of 2isheries, and were sued in such capacities because they were the officers charged with duty of carrying out the statutes, orders and regulations on fishing and fisheries. 5n its order of 2ebruary (+, (+"", the trial court denied defendants3 motion to set aside -udgment and they were re$uired to file a bond for P1#,### to answer for damages that plaintiffs were allegedly suffering at that time, as otherwise the in-unction prayed for by the latter would be issued. Because of these facts, Ce agree with the Solicitor 8eneral when he says that the action, being one against herein petitioners as such 8overnment officials, is essentially one against the 8overnment, and to re$uire these officials to file a bond would be indirectly a re$uirement against the 8overnment for as regards bonds or damages that may be proved, if any, the real party in interest would be the ;epublic of the Philippines &4. S. Moon and Co. s. Darrison, 71 Phi., 1+= Salgado s. ;amos, %7 Phil., 6!7-6!6, and others*. .he reason for this pronouncement is understandable= the State undoubtedly is always solvent &.olentino s. Carlos %% Phil., (7#= 8overnment of the P. 5. s. ?udge of the Court of 2irst 5nstance of 5loilo, 17 Phil., (%6, cited in ?oa$uin 8utierre9 et al. s. Camus et al. H 8.;. No. 4-%6!", promulgated 'ctober 1#, (+"7*. Dowever, as the records show that herein petitioners failed to put up the bond re$uired by the lower court, allegedly due to difficulties encountered with the :uditor 8eneral3s 'ffice &giving the impression that they were willing to put up said bond but failed to do so for reasons beyond their control*, and that the orders sub-ects of the prohibition and certiorari proceedings in 8.;. No. 4-00+", were enforced, if at all, ! in accordance with section 7 of ;ule 1+, which Ce hold to be applicable to the case at bar, the issue as to the regularity or ade$uacy of re$uiring herein petitioners to post a bond, becomes moot and academic. 55. Passing upon the $uestion involved in the second proposition, the trial -udge e tending the controversy to the determination of which between the 4egislative, and ) ecutive /epartments of the 8overnment had Gthe power to close any definite area of the Philippine watersG instead of limiting the same to the real issue raised by the enactment of ) ecutive 'rders No. !!, !% and 0#, especially the first and the last G absolutel# prohibitin$ fishin$ b# means tra%ls in all the waters comprised within the San Miguel BayG, ruled in favor of Congress had not intended to abdicate its power to legislate on the matter, he maintained as stated before, that Guntil the trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by e ecutive proclamationG, and that Gthe remedy for respondents and population of the coastal towns of Camarines Sur is to go to 4egislature,G and thus declared said ) ecutive 'rders Nos. !!, %% and 0# invalidG. .he Solicitor 8eneral, on the contrary, asserts that the President is empowered by law to issue the e ecutive enactment3s in $uestion. Sections %, (1 and 6" of :ct No. 7##1, ,nown as the 2isheries 4aw, the latter two sections as amended by section ( of Commonwealth :ct No. 76(, read as followsA S)C. %. C';/S :N/ PD;:S)S /)25N)/. @Cords and terms used in this :ct shall be construed as followsA

.:I) or .:I5N8 includes pursuing, shooting, ,illing, capturing, trapping, snaring, and netting fish and other a$uatic animals, and all lesser acts, such as disturbin$, wounding, stupefying= or placing, setting, drawing, or using any net or other device commonly used to ta,e or collect fish and other a$uatic animals, %hether the# result in ta&in$ or not, and includes every attempt to ta,e and every act of assistance to every other person in ta,ing or attempting to ta,e or collect fish and other a$uatic animalsA P;'>5/)/, .hat whenever ta,ing is allowed by law, reference is had to ta,ing by lawful means and in lawful manner.

S)C. (1. P;'.)C.5'N '2 2;F '; 25SD )88S. @ ) cept for scientific or educational purpose or for propagation, it shall be unla%ful to ta,e or catch fry or fish eggs and the small fish, not more than three &1* centimeters long, ,nown as siliniasi, in the territorial waters of the Philippines. To%ards this end, the Secretar# of A$riculture and "ommerce shall be authorized to pro ide b# re$ulations such restrictions as ma# be deemed necessar# to be imposed on TH' (S' O) A*+ ),SH,*G *'T O- ),SH,*G !'.,"' )O- TH' P-OT'"T,O* O) )-+ O- ),SH 'GGS/ Pro ided, ho%e er, .hat the Secretary of :griculture and Commerce shall permit the ta,ing of young of certain species of fish ,nown as hipon under such restrictions as may be deemed necessary. S)C. 6". 25SD ;)2B8))S :N/ S:NC.B:;5)S. @ Bpon the recommendation of the officer or chief of the bureau, office or service concerned, the Secretary of :griculture and Commerce may set aside and establish fishery reservation or fish refuges and sanctuaries to be administered in the manner to be prescribed by him. :ll streams, ponds and waters within the game refuge, birds, sanctuaries, national par,s, botanical gardens, communal forest and communal pastures are hereby declared fishing refuges and sanctuaries. ,t shall be unla%ful for an# person, to ta&e, destro# or &ill in an# of the places aforementioned, or in an# manner disturb or dri e a%a# or ta&e therefrom, an# fish fr# or fish e$$s. :ct No. 7##1 further provides as followsA S)C. 01. '.D); >5'4:.5'NS. @ :ny other violation of the provisions of this :ct or any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall sub-ect the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than si months, or both, in the discretion of the Court. :s may be seen from the -ust $uoted provisions, the law declares unlawful and fi es the penalty for the ta,ing &e cept for scientific or educational purposes or for propagation*, destroying or ,illing of any fish fry or fish eggs, and the Secretary of :griculture and Commerce &now the Secretary of

:griculture and Natural ;esources* is authori9ed to promulgate regulations restricting the use of any fish net or fishing device &which includes the net used by trawl fishermen* for the protection of fry or fish eggs, as well as to set aside and establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries to be administered in the manner prescribed by him, from which no person could lawfully ta,e, destroy or ,ill in any of the places aforementioned, or in any manner disturb or drive away or ta,e therefrom any small or immature fish, fry or fish eggs. 5t is true that said section 6" mentions certain streams, ponds and waters %ithin the game refuges, . . . communal forest, etc., which the law itself declares fish refuges and sanctuaries, but this enumeration of places does not curtail the general and unlimited power of the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources in the first part of section 6", to set aside and establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries, which naturally include seas or bays, li,e the San Miguel Bay in Camarines. 2rom the resolution passed at the Conference of Municipal Mayors held at .inambac, Camarines Sur, on /ecember (0, (+"1 &) h. 2*, the following manifestation is madeA CD);):S, the continuous operation of said trawls even during the close season as specified in said ) ecutive 'rder No. !# caused the wanton destruction of the mother shrimps laying their eggs and the millions of eggs laid and the inevitable e termination of the shrimps specie= in order to save the shrimps specie from eventual e termination and in order to conserve the shrimps specie for posterity= 5n the brief submitted by the N:M2;)4 and addressed to the President of the Philippines &) h. !*, in support of the petition of San Miguel Bay fishermen &allegedly %, (6" in number*, praying that trawlers be banned from operating in San Miguel Bay, it is stated thatA .he trawls ram and destroy the fish corrals. .he heavy trawl nets dig deep into the ocean bed. .hey destroy the fish foods which lies below the ocean floor. .heir daytime catches net millions of shrimps scooped up from the mud. 5n their nets they bring up the life of the seaA algea, shell fish and star fish . . . .he absence of some species or the apparent decline in the catch of some fishermen operating in the bay may be due to several factors, namelyA the indiscriminate catchin$ of fr# and immature sizes of fishes , the wide-spread use of e plosives inside as well as at the mouth and approaches of the bay, and the e0tensi e operation of the trawls. &p.+, ;eport of Santos B. ;asalan, ) h. :* '0tensi e Operation of Tra%lsA @ .he strenuous effect of the operations of the (6 T-A12S of the demersal fisheries of San 3i$uel Ba# is better appreciated when we consider the fact that out of its about 0"# s$uare ,ilometers area, only about 1"# s$uare ,ilometers of " fathoms up could be trawled. Cith their continuous operation, is greatly strained. .his is shown by the fact that in view of the nonobservance of the close season from May to 'ctober, each year, ma4orit# of their catch are immature. 5f their operation would continue unrestricted, the supply would be greatly depleted. &p. ((*, ;eport of Santos B. ;asalan, ) h. :* San Miguel Bay @ can sustain 5 to 6 small tra%lers &'tter .rawl ) plorations in Philippine Caters, ;esearch ;eport !" of the 2ish and Cildlife Service, Bnited States /epartment of the 5nterior, p. + ) hibit B*. :ccording to :nne : of the complaint filed in the lower court in Civil Case No. !70%6 @ 8.;. No. 4-+(+( &) h. /, p. "1 of the folder of ) hibits*, the (0 plaintiffs-appellees operate !+ trawling boats, and their operation must be in a big scale considering the investments plaintiffs have made therefore, amounting to P106,### &;ecord on :ppeal, p. (%-(6*. 5n virtue of the aforementioned provisions of law and the manifestation -ust copied, Ce are of the opinion that with or without said ) ecutive 'rders, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come, under the law, within the powers of the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources, who in compliance with his duties may even cause the criminal prosecution of those who in violation of his instructions, regulations or orders are caught fishing with trawls in the Philippine waters. Now, if under the law the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources has authority to regulate or ban the fishing by trawl which, it is claimed, obno ious for it carries away fish eggs and fry3s which should be preserved, can the President of the Philippines e ercise that same power and authorityJ Section (#&(*, :rticle >55 of the Constitution of the Philippines prescribesA S)C. (# &(*. .he President shall have control of all the e ecutive departments, bureaus or offices, e ercises general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and ta,e care that the laws be faithfully e ecuted. Section %1 of the ;evised :dministrative Code reads as followsA S)C. %1. )E)CB.5>) ';/);S :N/ )E)CB.5>) P;'C4:M:.5'N. @ :dministrative acts and commands of the President of the Philippines touching the organi9ation or mode of operation of the 8overnment or rearranging or read-usting any of the district, divisions, parts or ports of the Philippines, and all acts and commands $o ernin$ the $eneral performance of duties b# public emplo#ees or disposin$ of issues of $eneral concern shall be made in e0ecuti e orders.

;egarding department organi9ation Section 67 of the ;evised :dministrative Code also provides thatA All e0ecuti e functions of the $o ernment of the -epublic of the Philippines shall be directl# under the '0ecuti e !epartments sub-ect to the supervision and control of the President of the Philippines in matters of general policy. .he /epartments are established for the proper distribution of the wor, of the ) ecutive, for the performance of the functions e pressly assigned to them by law, and in order that each branch of the administration may have a chief responsible for its direction and policy. )ach /epartment Secretary shall assume the burden of, and responsibility for, all activities of the 8overnment under his control and super ision. 2or administrative purposes the President of the Philippines shall be considered the /epartment Dead of the ) ecutive 'ffice.

'ne of the e ecutive departments is that of :griculture and Natural ;esources which by law is placed under the direction and control of the Secretary, who e ercises its functions sub-ect to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines &Sec. 6", ;. :. C.*. Moreover, Ge ecutive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations relative to matters under the supervision or -urisdiction of a /epartment, the promulgation whereof is e pressly assigned by law to the President of the Philippines, shall as a general rule, be issued upon proposition and recommendation of the respective /epartmentG &Sec. 6+-:, ;.:.C.*, and there can be no doubt that the promulgation of the $uestioned ) ecutive 'rders was upon the proposition and recommendation of the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources and that is why said Secretary, who was and is called upon to enforce said e ecutive 'rders, was made a party defendant in one of the cases at bar &8.;. No. 4-+(+(*. 2or the foregoing reasons Ce do hesitate to declare that ) ecutive 'rders Nos. !!, %% and 0#, series of (+"7, of the President, are valid and issued by authority of law. 555. But does the e ercise of such authority by the President constitute and undue delegation of the powers of CongressJ :s already held by this Court, the true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and the conferring of authority or discretion as to the e ecution of law consists in that the former necessary involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, wile in the latter the authority or discretion as to its e ecution has to be e ercised under and in pursuance of the law. .he first cannot be done= to the latter no valid ob-ection can be made &Cru9 s.Foungberg, "% Phil., !17, !1+. See also ;ubi, et al. s. .he Provincial Board of Mindoro, 1+ Phil., %%#*. 5n the case of (. S. s. An$ Tan$ Ho, 71 Phil. (, Ce also heldA .D) P'C); .' /)4)8:.). @ .he 4egislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. 5f :ct No. !0%0 is a law unto itself, and it does nothing more than to authori9e the 8overnor-8eneral to ma,e rules and regulations to carry it into effect, then the 4egislature created the law. .here is no delegation of power and it is valid. 'n the other hand, if the act within itself does not define a crime and is not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to ma,e it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the 8overnor-8eneral, the act is delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void. 2rom the provisions of :ct No. 7##1 of the 4egislature, as amended by Commonwealth :ct No. 76(, which have been afore$uoted, Ce find that Congress &a* declared it unlawful Gto ta,e or catch fry or fish eggs in the territorial waters of the Philippines= &b* towards this end, it authori9ed the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources to provide by the regulations such restrictions as may be deemed necessary to be imposed on the use of an# fishin$ net or fishin$ de ice for the protection of fish fr# or fish e$$s &Sec. (1*= &c* it authori9ed the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources to set aside and establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries to be administered in the manner to be prescribed by him and declared it unla%ful for an# person to ta&e, destro# or &ill in an# of said places, or, in an# manner disturb or dri e a%a# or ta&e therefrom, an# fish fr# or fish e$$s&See. 6"*= and &d* it penali9es the e ecution of such acts declared unlawful and in violation of this :ct &No. 7##1* or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, ma,ing the offender sub-ect to a fine of not more than P!##, or imprisonment for not more than % months, or both, in the discretion of the court &Sec. 01*. 2rom the foregoing it may be seen that in so far as the protection of fish fry or fish egg is concerned, the 2isheries :ct is complete in itself, leaving to the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources the promulgation of rules and regulations to carry into effect the legislative intent. 5t also appears from the e hibits on record in these cases that fishing with trawls causes Ga wanton destruction of the mother shrimps laying their eggs and the millions of eggs laid and the inevitable e termination of the shrimps specieG &) h. 2*, and that, Gthe trawls ram and destroy the fish corrals. .he heavy trawl nets dig deep into the ocean bed. .hey destroy the fish food which lies below the ocean floor. .heir daytime catches net millions of shrimps scooped up from the mud. 5n their nets they bring up the life of the seaG &) h- !*. 5n the light of these facts it is clear to 'ur mind that for the protection of fry or fish eggs and small and immature fishes, Congress intended with the promulgation of :ct No. 7##1, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing device li,e trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of sea food, and to that end authori9ed the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources to provide by regulations such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the a$uatic resources of the land. Conse$uently, when the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued ) ecutive 'rder No. 0# absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an an ious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern &Sec. %1, ;.:.C.* which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law. Cherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations Ce render -udgement, as followsA &a* /eclaring that the issues involved in case 8.;. No. 4-00+" have become moot, as no writ of preliminary in-unction has been issued by this Court the respondent ?udge of the Court of 2irst 5nstance of Manila Branch E5>, from enforcing his order of March 1, (+""= and &b* ;eversing the decision appealed from in case 8. ;. No. 4-+(+(= dissolving the writ of in-unction prayed for in the lower court by plaintiffs, if any has been actually issued by the court a 7uo= and declaring ) ecutive 'rders Nos. !!, %% and 0#, series of (+"7, valid for having been issued by authority of the Constitution, the ;evised :dministrative Code and the 2isheries :ct. Cithout pronouncement as to costs. 5t is so ordered. Ben$zon, Padilla, 3ontema#or, Bautista An$elo, 2abrador, "oncepcion, -e#es, J.B.2. and 'ndencia, JJ., concur. .D5;/ /5>5S5'N )G.R. No. 139813. *an+ar, 31, -001. *OEL/#TO-ONON, petitioner, vs. !ON. *&DGE NEL#A 0A1 'ERNANDE2, R.T. . /r. 50 3 1+4r5o 1rin64sa i5, and 1ala7an, and ELEG#O %&E*ANO, *R., respondents. DE #S#ON GON2AGA-RE0ES, J.( .his Petition for "ertiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of in-unction see,s the reversal of the 'rder of the ;egional .rial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, K(L Branch "# in SP4. P;'C. N'. (#"% entitled M)legio 2. Nue-ano, ?r., petitioner vs. ?oel Bito-'non, et. al., respondentsO which denied herein petitionerPs motion to dismiss the Petition for ;eview of the ;esolution of the Board of )lection Supervisors dated :ugust !", (++6 in case number 4-(#-+6 filed by herein private respondent with said court.

5t appears from the records that the petitioner, ?oel Bito-'non is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay .acras, Narra, Palawan and is the Municipal 4iga Chapter President for the Municipality of Narra, Palawan. .he private respondent, )legio Nue-ano, ?r. on the other hand, is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay ;i9al, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal 4iga Chapter President for the Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both 'non and Nue-ano were candidates for the position of ) ecutive >ice-President in the :ugust !1, (++6 election for the 4iga ng Barangay Provincial Chapter of the province of Palawan. 'non was proclaimed the winning candidate in the said election prompting Nue-ano to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of )lection Supervisors &B)S*, which was decided against him on :ugust !", (++6. Not satisfied with the decision of the B)S, Nue-ano filed a Petition for ;eview of the decision of the B)S with the ;egional .rial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City &;.C*. 'n :pril !%, (+++, 'non filed a motion to dismiss the Petition for ;eview raising the issue of -urisdiction. 'non claimed that the ;.C had no -urisdiction to review the decisions rendered by the B)S in any post proclamation electoral protest in connection with the (++6 4iga ng mga Barangay election of officers and directors. 5n his motion to dismiss, 'non claimed that the Supplemental 8uidelines for the (++6 4iga ng mga Barangay election issued by the /548 on :ugust ((, (++6 in its Memorandum Circular No. +6-(+1, providing for review of decisions or resolutions of the B)S by the regular courts of law is an ultra iresact and is void for being issued without or in e cess of -urisdiction, as its issuance is not a mere act of supervision but rather an e ercise of control over the 4igaPs internal organi9ation. 'n ?une !!, (+++, the ;.C denied 'nonPs motion to dismiss. 5n its order, the ;.C ratiocinated that the Secretary of the /epartment of 5nterior and 4ocal 8overnmentK!L is vested with the power Mto establish and prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision of local government units and the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units.O K1L .he ;.C added that /548 Circular No. +6-(+1 was issued by the /548 Secretary pursuant to his rule-ma,ing power as provided for under Section 6, Chapter 55, Boo, 5> of the :dministrative Code.K7L Conse$uently, the ;.C ruled that it had -urisdiction over the petition for review filed by Nue-ada. K"L Motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid 'rder was denied K%L prompting the petitioner to file the present petition wherein the following issues are raisedA A. 8!ET!ER OR NOT T!E %&EST#ONED 1ROV#S#ON #N "E"ORAND&" SE RETAR0 #N E$ ESS O' !#S A&T!OR#T0. /. 8!ET!ER OR NOT T!E RES1ONDENT *&DGE %&EST#ONED ORDERS.K6L #R &LAR 97-193 8AS #SS&ED /0 T!E D#LG

O""#TTED GRAVE A/&SE O' D#S RET#ON #N #SS&#NG T!E

5n support of his petition, 'non argues that the MSupplemental 8uidelines for the (++6 Synchroni9ed )lection of the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters and for the )lection of the National Chapter of the 4iga ng mga BarangayO contradicts the M5mplementing ;ules and 8uidelines for the (++6 8eneral )lections of the 4iga ng mga Barangay 'fficers and /irectorsO and is therefore invalid. 'non alleges that the 4iga ng mga Barangay &458:* is not a local government unit considering that a local government unit must have its own source of income, a certain number of population, and a specific land area in order to e ist or be created as such. Conse$uently, the /548 only has a limited supervisory authority over the 458:. Moreover, 'non argues that even if the /548 has supervisory authority over the 458:, the act of the /548 in issuing Memorandum Circular No. +6-(+1 or the supplemental rules and guidelines for the conduct of the (++6 458: elections had the effect of modifying, altering and nullifying the rules prescribed by the National 4iga Board. 'non posits that the issuance of said guidelines allowing an appeal of the decision of the B)S to the regular courts rather than to the National 4iga Board is no longer an e ercise of supervision but an e ercise of control. K0L 5n his comment to the petition, private respondent Nue-ano argues that the Secretary of the /548 has competent authority to issue rules and regulations li,e Memorandum Circular No. +6-0+1. .he Secretary of /548Ps rule-ma,ing power is conferred by the :dministrative Code. Considering that the Memorandum Circular was issued pursuant to his rule ma,ing power, Nue-ano insists that the lower court did not commit any reversible error when it denied 'nonPs motion to dismiss. K+L 'n the other hand, the public respondent represented herein by the Solicitor 8eneral, filed a separate Manifestation and Motion in 4ieu of Comment agreeing with the position of petitioner 'non. .he Solicitor 8eneral affirms 'nonPs claim that in issuing the $uestioned Memorandum Circular, the Secretary of the /548 effectively amended the rules and guidelines promulgated by National 4iga Board. .his act was no longer a mere act of supervision but one of control. .he Solicitor 8eneral submits that the ;.C committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the petition for review of the B)S decision filed before it for failure of the petitioner to e haust the rightful remedy which was to appeal to the National 4iga Board.
K(#L

'n 'ctober !6, (+++, this Court denied petitioner 'nonPs motion for the issuance of restraining order for lac, of merit.:fter a careful review of the case, we sustain the position of the petitioner. .he resolution of the present controversy re$uires an e amination of the $uestioned provision of Memorandum Circular No. +6-(+1 and the 5mplementing ;ules and 8uidelines for the (++6 8eneral )lections of the 4iga ng mga Barangay 'fficers and /irectors &8B5/)45N)S*. .he memorandum circular reads, insofar as pertinent, as followsA M:ny post-proclamation protest must be filed with the B)S within twenty-four &!7* hours from the closing of the election. .he B)S shall decide the same within forty-eight &70* hours from receipt thereof. .he decision of the B)S shall be final and immediately e ecutory %ithout pre4udice to the filin$ of a Petition for -e ie% %ith the re$ular courts of la%. OK((L &emphasis supplied* 'n the other hand, the 8B5/)45N)S provides that the B)S shall have the following among its dutiesA M.o resolve any post-proclamation electoral protest which must be submitted in writing to this Board within twenty-four &!7* hours from the close of election= provided said Board shall render its decision within forty-eight &70* hours from receipt hereof= and provided further that the decision must be submitted to the National 4iga Dead$uarters within twenty-four &!7* hours from the said decision. .he decision of the Board of )lection Supervisors in this respect shall be sub4ect to re ie% b# the *ational 2i$a Board the decision of %hich shall be final and e0ecutor# .OK(!L &emphasis supplied* Memorandum Circular No. +6-(+1 was issued by the /548 Secretary pursuant to the power of general supervision of the President over all local government units which was delegated to the /548 Secretary by virtue of :dministrative 'rder No. !%6 dated 2ebruary (0, (++!. K(1L .he PresidentPs power of general supervision over local government units is conferred upon him by the Constitution. K(7L .he power of supervision is defined as Mthe power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law.O K("L .his is distinguished from the power of control or Mthe power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the -udgment of the former for the latter.O K(%L

'n many occasions in the past, this court has had the opportunity to distinguish the power of supervision from the power of control. 5n Taule s. Santos,K(6L we held that the Chief ) ecutive wielded no more authority than that of chec,ing whether a local government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. De cannot interfere with local governments provided that the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body= it does not include any restraining authority over such body. K(0L 'fficers in control lay down the rules in the doing of an act. 5f they are not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officers merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. 5f the rules are not observed, he may order the wor, done or re-done to conform to the prescribed rules. De cannot prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. K(+L /oes the PresidentPs power of general supervision e tend to the liga ng mga barangay, which is not a local government unitJ K!#L Ce rule in the affirmative. 5n 'pinion No. 7(, Series of (++", the /epartment of ?ustice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organi9ation, being an association, federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government officials. .he 4ocal 8overnment CodeK!(L defines the liga ng mga barangay as an organi9ation of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystalli9ing issues affecting barangay government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto. K!!L .he liga shall have chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels. .he municipal and city chapters of the liga shall be composed of the barangay representatives of the municipal and city barangays respectively. .he duly elected presidents of the component municipal and city chapters shall constitute the provincial chapter or the metropolitan political subdivision chapter. .he duly elected presidents of highly urbani9ed cities, provincial chapters, the Metropolitan Manila chapter and metropolitan political subdivision chapters shall constitute the National 4iga ng mga Barangay. K!1L .he liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels directly elect a president, a vice-president and five &"* members of the board of directors. .he board shall appoint its secretary and treasurer and create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter.K!7L .he ligas are primarily governed by the provisions of the 4ocal 8overnment Code. K!"L Dowever, their respective constitution and by-laws shall govern all other matters affecting the internal organi9ation of the liga not otherwise provided for in the 4ocal 8overnment Code provided that the constitution and by-laws shall be suppletory to the provisions of Boo, 555, .itle >5 of the 4ocal 8overnment Code and shall always conform to the provisions of the Constitution and e isting laws.K!%L Daving in mind the foregoing principles, we rule that Memorandum Circular No. +6-(+1 of the /548 insofar as it authori9es the filing a Petition for ;eview of the decision of the B)S with the regular courts in a post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality. Ce agree with both the petitioner and the Solicitor 8eneral that in authori9ing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the B)S with the regular courts, the /548 Secretary in effect amended and modified the 8B5/)45N)S promulgated by the National 4iga Board and adopted by the 458: which provides that the decision of the B)S shall be sub-ect to review by the National 4iga Board. .he amendment of the 8B5/)45N)S is more than an e ercise of the power of supervision but is an e ercise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the 458:. :lthough the /548 is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the :dministrative Code limits its authority to merely Mmonitoring complianceO by local government units of such issuances.K!6L .o monitor means Mto watch, observe or chec,O and is compatible with the power of supervision of the /548 Secretary over local governments, which is limited to chec,ing whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments. K!0L Besides, any doubt as to the power of the /548 Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government. K!+L .he public respondent -udge therefore committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac, or e cess of -urisdiction in not dismissing the respondentPs Petition for ;eview for failure to e haust all administrative remedies and for lac, of -urisdiction. 8!ERE'ORE, the instant petition is hereby 8;:N.)/. .he 'rder of the ;egional .rial Court dated ?une !!, (+++ is ;)>);S)/ and S). :S5/). .he Petition for ;eview filed by the private respondent doc,eted as SP4. P;'C. N'. (#"% is /5SM5SS)/. SO ORDERED. 3elo, 8"hairman9, .itu$, Pan$aniban, and Sando al:Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-39:79 O65o;4r -:, 1931 "A&R# #O R&2, petitioner-appellant, vs. STANTON 0O&NG/ERG, Dir465or o< 5=4 /+r4a+ o< Ani>al #nd+s5r,, respondent-appellee. Jose +ulo for appellant. Office of the Solicitor:General -e#es for appellee.

OSTRAND, J.: .his is a petition brought originally before the Court of 2irst 5nstance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory in-unction against the respondent, Stanton Foungberg, as /irector of the Bureau of :nimal 5ndustry, re$uiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle

imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. .he petitioner attac,ed the constitutionality of :ct No. 1("", which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine 5slands. :mong other things in the allegation of the petition, it is asserted that G:ct No. 1("" of the Philippine 4egislature was enacted for the sole purpose of preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into the Philippine 5slands from foreign countries, as shown by an e planatory note and te t of Senate Bill No. 1!0 as introduced in the Philippine 4egislature, ... .G .he :ct in $uestion reads as followsA S)C.5'N (. :fter March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five e isting contracts for the importation of cattle into this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it shall be strictly prohibited to import, bring or introduce into the Philippine 5slands any cattle from foreign countriesA Pro ided, ho%e er, .hat at any time after said date, the 8overnor-8eneral, with the concurrence of the presiding officers of both Douses, may raise such prohibition entirely or in part if the conditions of the country ma,e this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and live stoc, of the lands. S)C. !. :ll acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this :ct are hereby repealed. S)C. 1. .his :ct shall ta,e effect on its approval. :pproved, March 0, (+!7. .he respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. .he demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, &(* that if :ct No. 1("" were declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because :ct No. 1#"! would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for= and &!* that :ct No. 1("" was constitutional and, therefore, valid. .he court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file another complaint. 2rom that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court. .he appellee contends that even if :ct No. 1("" be declared unconstitutional by the fact alleged by the petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner can not be allowed to import cattle from :ustralia for the reason that, while :ct No. 1("" were declared unconstitutional, :ct No. 1#"! would automatically become effective. :ct No. 1#"! reads as followsA S)C.5'N (. Section seventeen hundred and si ty-two of :ct Numbered .wenty-seven hundred and eleven, ,nown as the :dministrative Code, is hereby amended to read as followsA GS)C. (6%!. Brin$in$ of animals imported from forei$n countries into the Philippine ,slands . @ 5t shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to import, bring or introduce live cattle into the Philippine 5slands from any foreign country. .he /irector of :griculture may, with the approval of the head of the department first had, authori9e the importation, bringing or introduction of various classes of thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these 5slands, and such as may be necessary for the improvement of the breed, not to e ceed five hundred head per annumA Pro ided, ho%e er, .hat the /irector of :griculture shall in all cases permit the importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serumAPro ided, further, .hat all live cattle from foreign countries the importation, bringing or introduction of which into the 5slands is authori9ed by this :ct, shall be submitted to regulations issued by the /irector of :griculture, with the approval of the head of the department, prior to authori9ing its transfer to other provinces. G:t the time of the approval of this :ct, the 8overnor-8eneral shall issue regulations and others to provide against a raising of the price of both fresh and refrigerated meat. .he 8overnor-8eneral also may, by e ecutive order, suspend, this prohibition for a fi ed period in case local conditions re$uire it.G S)C. !. .his :ct shall ta,e effect si months after approval. :pproved, March (7, (+!!. .he petitioner does not present any allegations in regard to :ct No. 1#"! to show its nullity or unconstitutionality though it appears clearly that in the absence of :ct No. 1("" the former act would ma,e it impossible for the /irector of the Bureau of :nimal 5ndustry to grant the petitioner a permit for the importation of the cattle without the approval of the head of the corresponding department. :n unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of laws by implication, since, being void, it is not inconsistent with such former laws. &5 4ewis Sutherland, Statutory Construction !nd ed., p. 7"0, citing Mc:llister s. Damlin, 01 Cal., 1%(= !1 Pac., 1"6= 'range Country s. Darris, +6 Cal., %##= 1! Pac., "+7= Carr s. State, (!6 5nd., !#7= (( 4.;.:., 16#, etc.* .his court has several times declared that it will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless it is necessary to do so &Mc8irr s. Damilton and :breu, 1# Phil., "%1, "%0= Calter ). 'lsen Q Co. s. :ldanese and .rinidad, 71 Phil., !"+* but in this case it is not necessary to pass upon the validity of the statute attac,ed by the petitioner because even if it were declared unconstitutional, the petitioner would not be entitled to relief inasmuch as :ct No. 1#"! is not in issue. But aside from the provisions of :ct No. 1#"!, we are of the opinion that :ct No. 1("" is entirely valid. :s shown in paragraph 0 of the amended petition, the 4egislature passed :ct No. 1("" to protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through importation of foreign cattle. 5t is now generally recogni9ed that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are ob-ects within the scope of the police power &(! C.?., +!6= % ;.C.4., !#1-!#% and decisions cited therein= ;eid s. Colorado, (06 B.S., (16, (76, ("!= Fea9el s. :le ander, "0 5ll., !"7*. 5n this connection it is said in the case of Pun9alan s. 2erriols and Provincial Board of Batangas &(+ Phil., !(7*, that the provisions of the :ct of Congress of ?uly (, (+#!, did not have the effect of denying to the 8overnment of the Philippine 5slands the right to the e ercise of the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. .he facts recited in paragraph 0 of the amended petition shows that at the time the :ct No. 1("" was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor

and it cannot be said that the 4egislature e ceeded its power in passing the :ct. .hat being so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the :ct upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted. &% ;.C.4., !71 and decisions cited therein.*;a%phil.net 5n his third assignment of error the petitioner claims that G.he lower court erred in not holding that the power given by :ct No. 1("" to the 8overnor-8eneral to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers.G Ce do not thin, that such is the case= as ?udge ;anney of the 'hio Supreme Court in Cincinnati, Cilmington and Ranesville ;ailroad Co. s. Commissioners of Clinton County &( 'hio St., 66, 00* said in such caseA .he true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to ma,e the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its e ecution, to be e ercised under and in pursuance of the law. .he first cannot be done= to the latter no valid ob-ection can be made. Bnder his fourth assignment of error the appellant argues that :ct No. 1("" amends section 1 of the .ariff 4aw, but it will be noted that :ct No. 1("" is not an absolute prohibition of the importation of cattle and it does not add any provision to section 1 of the .ariff 4aw. :s stated in the brief of the :ttorney-8eneralA G5t is a complete statute in itself. 5t does not ma,e any reference to the .ariff 4aw. 5t does not permit the importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the .ariff 4aw. 5t is not a tariff measure but a $uarantine measure, a statute adopted under the police power of the Philippine 8overnment. 5t is at most a Ssupplement3 or an Saddition3 to the .ariff 4aw. &See Mac4eary s. Babcoc,, 0! N.)., 7"1, 7""= (%+ 5nd., !!0 for distinction between Ssupplemental3 and Samendatory3 and '3Pry s. B.S., !7+ B.S., 1!1= %1 4aw. ed., %!%, for distinction between Saddition3 and Samendment.3*G .he decision appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered. A ance<a, ".J., Johnson, Street, 3alcolm, .illamor, -omualdez, .illa:-eal, and ,mperial, JJ., concur. G.R. No. L-50908 *an+ar, 31, 1989 "AR0 ON E1 #ON /A&T#STA and ENR#%&E D. /A&T#STA, petitioners, vs. AL'REDO L. *&#N#O, RO"EO '. ED& and '#DEL V. RA"OS, respondents. 3ar# "oncepcion Bautista for and in his o%n behalf. The Solicitor General for respondents.

'ERNANDO, C.J.: .he validity of an energy conservation measure, 4etter of 5nstruction No. 0%+, issued on May 1(, (+6+ @ the response to the protracted oil crisis that dates bac, to (+67 @ is put in issue in this prohibition proceeding filed by petitioners, spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and )nri$ue /. Bautista, for being allegedly violative of the due process and e$ual protection guarantees 1 of the Constitution. .he use of private motor vehicles with D and )D plates on wee,-ends and holidays was banned from GK(!A##L a.m. Saturday morning to "A## a.m. Monday morning, or (A## a.m. of the holiday to "A## a.m. of the day after the holiday.G - Motor vehicles of the following classifications are e emptedA &a* S &Service*= &b* . &.ruc,*= &e* /P4 &/iplomatic*= &d* CC &Consular Corps*= &e* .C &.ourist Cars*. 3 Pursuant thereto, respondent :lfredo 4. ?uinio, then Minister of Public Cor,s, .ransportation and Communications and respondent ;omeo P. )du, then Commissioner of 4and .ransportation Commission issued on ?une ((, (+6+, Memorandum Circular No. 1+, which imposed Gthe penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the above-specified vehiclesG found violating such 4etter of 5nstruction. 95t was then alleged by petitioners that Gwhile the purpose for the issuance of the 4'5 0%+ is laudable, to wit, energy conservation, the provision banning the use of D and )D KvehiclesL is unfair, discriminatory, Kamounting to anL arbitrary classificationG and thus in contravention of the e$ual protection clause. 5 Moreover, for them, such 4etter of 5nstruction is a denial of due process, more specifically, Gof their right to use and en-oy their private property and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings, reunions and outings on wee,-ends and holidays,G inviting attention to the fact that others not included in the ban en-oying Gunrestricted freedom.G : 5t would follow, so they contend that Memorandum Circular No. 1+ imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license is li,ewise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of Gundue delegation of legislative power.G 7 5t is to be noted that such Memorandum Circular does not impose the penalty of confiscation but merely that of impounding, fine, and for the third offense that of cancellation of certificate of registration and for the rest of the year or for ninety days whichever is longer. .his Court gave due course to the petition re$uiring respondent to answer. .here was admission of the facts as substantially alleged e cept, as previously noted, that the ban starts at (!A## a.m. rather than (A## a.m. of a Saturday or of a holiday and as to the mention of a Cilly3s Iaiser -eep being registered in the name of a certain .eresita Brbina, about which respondents had no ,nowledge. .here was a denial of the allegations that the classification of vehicles into heavy D and e tra heavy &)D* on the other hand and light and bantam on the other hand was violative of e$ual protection and the regulation as to the use of the former cars on the dates specified a transgression of due process. .he answer li,ewise denied that there was an undue delegation of legislative power, reference being made to the 4and .ransportation and .raffic Code. 8 .here was also a procedural ob-ection raised, namely, that what is sought amounts at most to an advisory opinion rather than an a-udication of a case or controversy. Petitioners filed a motion to be allowed to reply to the answer. 5t was granted. .he reply, considering its e haustive character serving as its memorandum, stressed anew what it emphasi9ed as the arbitrary, unreasonable, and oppressive aspects of the challenged 4etter of 5nstruction and Memorandum Circular No. 1+. 5t disputed what it characteri9ed as an Gerroneous and arbitrary presumption that heavy car owners unnecessarily use and therefore waste gasoline whenever they drive their cars on wee,-ends and holidays=G 9 it stigmati9ed the ban as defeating its Gavowed purpose in the case of the affluent who own not only heavy limousines but also many small cars KasL they may be compelled to use at least two small cars=G 10 referred to the high cost of ta is or other public transports for those Gnot able to afford e pensive small cars KpossiblyL only one heavy and possible old model=G 11 cited the case of Gmany eight cylinder vehicles which because of their weight have been registered as light but in fact consume more or as much gasoline as the banned vehicles.G 1- .heir conclusion is that Gthe ban imposed, in result and effect is class legislation.G 13

.he parties were re$uired to submit memoranda. ;espondents did so but not petitioners. .hey relied on their reply to the answer @ as noted, a rather comprehensive pleading. 2or reasons to be set forth, this Court holds that the petition cannot prosper. (. 2irst as to the procedural ob-ection. 5n the memorandum for respondents, one of the issues raised was whether Gthe power of -udicial review may be invo,ed considering the inade$uacy of the record and the highly abstract and academic $uestions raised by the petitioners.G 19 5t is inaccurate to say that the record is inade$uate. 5t does not admit of doubt that the ban applies to petitioners who are Gthe registered owners of an eight cylinder (+%+ Buic,, and the vendees of a si cylinder Cilly3s ,aiser -eep, which are both classified as heavy or D.G 15 .o that e tent, therefore, the enforcement of the assailed 4etter of 5nstruction will amount to a deprivation of what otherwise would be a valid e ercise of a property right. .hus they fall s$uarely within Gthe unchallenged ruleG as to who may raise a constitutional $uestion, namely, to $uote the language of ?ustice 4aurel in the leading case of People . .era, 1:Gthat the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct in-ury as a result of its enforcement. 17 Moreover, that rule has been considerably rela ed. 18 .he $uestion then is neither abstract nor academic as contended by respondents. !. .here is, however, this formidable obstacle that confronts petitioners. Chat they see, is for this Court to hold that a 4etter of 5nstruction, a regulatory measure precisely enacted to cope with the serious and grave problem of energy conservation, is void on its face. Such a tas, is rendered unusually difficult by what has been referred to by ?ustice 4aurel in the leading case of An$ara . 'lectoral "ommission 19 as the Gpresumption of constitutionalityG and by the same -urist in the case of People . .era -0 in slightly different words Ga presumption that such an act falls within constitutional limitations.G .here is need then for a factual foundation of invalidity. 5n the language of 'rmita:3alate Hotel = 3otel Operations Association, ,nc. . "it# 3a#or or 3anilaA G5t admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here. .he principle has been nowhere better e pressed than in the leading case of O>Gorman = +oun$ . Hartford )ire ,nsurance "o., where the :merican Supreme Court through ?ustice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thusA 3.he statute here $uestioned deals with a sub-ect clearly within the scope of the police power. Ce are as,ed to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. :s underlying $uestions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.3 G -1 1. 5t is true, of course, that there may be instances where a police power measure may, because of its arbitrary, oppressive or un-ust character, be held offensive to the due process clause and, therefore, may, when challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding, be declared void on its face. .his is not one of them. : recital of the whereas clauses of the 4etter of 5nstruction ma,es it clear. .husA GKChereasL, developments in the international petroleum supply situation continue to follow a trend of limited production and spiralling prices thereby precluding the possibility of immediate relief in supplies within the foreseeable future= KChereasL, the uncertainty of fuel supply availability underscores a compelling need for the adoption of positive measures designed to insure the viability of the country3s economy and sustain its developmental growth= KChereasL, to cushion the effect of increasing oil prices and avoid fuel supply disruptions, it is imperative to adopt a program directed towards the -udicious use of our energy resources complemented with intensified conservation efforts and efficient utili9ation thereof= H H H.G --.hat is undeniable is that the action ta,en is an appropriate response to a problem that presses urgently for solution. 5t may not be the only alternative, but its reasonableness is immediately apparent. .hus, to repeat, substantive due process, which is the epitome of reasonableness and fair play, is not ignored, much less infringed. 7. 5n the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the assailed governmental action deals with the use of one3s property, the latter is accorded much leeway. .hat is settled law. Chat is more, it is good law. /ue process, therefore, cannot be validly invo,ed. :s stressed in the cited )rmita-Malate Dotel decisionA G.o hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characteri9ed as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, e tending as it does 3to all the great public needs.3 5t would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is 3that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.3 G -3 ". .he due process $uestion having been disposed of, there is still the ob-ection based on the e$ual protection clause to be considered. : governmental act may not be offensive to the due process clause, but may run counter to such a guarantee. Such is the case when there is no rational basis for the classification followed. .hat is the point raised by petitioners. 2or them, there is no rational -ustification for the ban being imposed on vehicles classified as heavy &D* and e tra-heavy &)D*, for precisely those owned by them fall within such category. .ested by the applicable standard that must be satisfied to avoid the charge of a denial of e$ual protection, the ob-ection of petitioners is shown to be lac,ing in merit. Such a classification on its face cannot be characteri9ed as an affront to reason. : legal norm according to J.3. Tuason = "o., ,nc. s. 2and Tenure Administration, -9 Gwhether embodied in a rule, principle, or standard, constitutes a defense against anarchy at one e treme and tyranny at the other. .hereby, people living together in a community with its myriad and comple problems can minimi9e the friction and reduce the conflicts, to assure, at the very least, a peaceful ordering of e istence. .he 5deal situation is for the law3s benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. 'nly thus could chance and favor be e cluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the 5dea of law. .he actual, given things as they are and li,ely to continue to be, cannot appro imate the 5deal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not ta,e into account the realties of the situation. H H H .o assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. .hose adversely affected may under such circumstances invo,e the e$ual protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. 5t suffices then that the laws operate e$ually and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. 2avoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. 2or the principle is that e$ual protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not 5dentical are analogous. 5f law be loo,ed upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group e$ually binding on the rest.G -5 %. Nor does it militate against the validity of the 4etter of 5nstruction -ust because the ban imposed does not go as far as it could have and therefore could be less efficacious in character. .hat was the solution which for the President e pressing a power validly lodged in him, recommended itself. .here was a situation that called for a corrective measure. De decided that what was issued by him would do -ust that or, at the very least, help in easing the situation. .hat it did not cover other matters which could very well have been regulated does not call for a declaration of nullity. .he President, to paraphrase 2utz . Araneta, -: Gis not re$uired by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all or none.G -7 5t is $uite obvious then that no e$ual protection $uestion arises.

6. 5t may not be amiss to refer to a (+0( :merican Supreme Court decision, 3innesota . "lo er 2eaf "reamer# "ompan#. -8 ;espondent along with several other business corporations adversely affected involved in the manufacture and utili9ation of plastic mil, containers filed suit in a Minnesota district court see,ing to en-oin enforcement of a Minnesota statute banning the retail sale of mil, in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, but permitting such sale in other nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, such as paperboard, mil, cartons. :fter conducting e tensive evidentiary hearings, the Minnesota court en-oined enforcement of the statute, finding that it violated among others the e$ual protection clause of the 2ourteenth :mendment to the 2ederal Constitution. .he Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. 'n certiorari, the Bnited States Supreme Court reversed, with only ?ustice Stevens dissenting. .he opinion by ?ustice Brennan noted that Gproponents of the legislation argued that it would promote resource conservation, ease solid waste disposal problems, and conserve energy.G -9 .hat sufficed for the Court to conclude Gthat the ban on plastic nonreturnable mil, containers bears a rational relation to the State3s ob-ectives, and must be sustained under the )$ual Protection Clause.G 30 5t does show that notwithstanding the Gnew e$ual protection approachG with its emphasis on Gsuspect classificationG and Gfundamental rights and interests standard,G a concept so ably e pounded by professor 8unther, the Grational relation testG 31 still retains its validity. Not that there could be any ob-ection to the classification here followed as being in any way susceptible to such a pe-orative e pression as GsuspectG or that the assailed 4etter of 5nstruction does not $ualify under Gthe fundamental rights and interestsG standard 0. .here was set forth in the petition what were referred to as Gother reasonable measures which the authorities concerned with energy conservation can ta,e immediately, which are in fact acceptable and obviously called for and should have been done long ago, to witA (. re$uire and establish ta i stands e$uipped with efficient telephone and communication systems= !. strict implementation and observance of cargo truc, hours on main arteries= 1. strict observance of traffic rules= 7. effective solution of traffic problems and decongestion of traffic through rerouting and $uic, repair of roads and efficient operation of double dec,er buses= ". rationing of gasoline to avoid panic buying and give the private car owner the option and responsibility of deciding on the use of his allocation= %. allow neon and electrically devised advertising signs only from five o3cloc, p.m. to nine o3cloc, p.m. 6. prohibit immediately the importation of heavy and lu ury cars and seriously re-e amine the car manufacturing program.G 3- :dmittedly, such measures are conducive to energy conservation. .he $uestion before us however is limited to whether or not 4etter of 5nstruction 0%+ as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 1+ is violative of certain constitutional rights. 5t goes no further than that. .he determination of the mode and manner through which the ob-ective of minimi9ing the consumption of oil products may be attained is left to the discretion of the political branches. 33 :bsent therefore the alleged infringement of constitutional rights, more precisely the due process and e$ual protection guarantees, this Court cannot ad-udge 4etter of 5nstruction No. 0%+ as tainted by unconstitutionality. +. 5t was li,ewise contended that Memorandum Circular No. 1+, issued by the then respondent Minister of Public Cor,s, .ransportation and Communications, and then respondent 4and .ransportation Commissioner, imposing the penalties Gof fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of license is li,ewise unconstitutional,G petitioners invo,ing the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. 39 .o that e tent that a 4etter of 5nstruction may be viewed as an e ercise of the decree-ma,ing power of the President, then such an argument is futile. 5f, however, viewed as a compliance with the duty to ta,e care that the laws be faithfully e ecuted, as a conse$uence of which subordinate e ecutive officials may in turn issue implementing rules and regulations, then the ob-ection would properly be considered as an ultra ires allegation. .here is this relevant e cerpt from Teo0on . 3ember of the Board of Administrators? 35 G(. .he recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of the statute, necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment, may be found in the early case of (nited States . Barrias decided in (+#0. .hen came, in a (+(7 decision, (nited States . Tupasi 3olina, a delineation of the scope of such competence. .husA 3'f course the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be e tended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid.3 5n (+1%, in People . Santos, this Court e pressed its disapproval of an administrative order that would amount to an e cess of the regulatory power vested in an administrative official. Ce reaffirmed such a doctrine in a (+"( decision, where we again made clear that where an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the :ct, 3the mandate of the :ct must prevail and must be followed.3 ?ustice Barrera, spea,ing for the Court in .ictorias 3illin$ "ompan#, ,nc. . Social Securit# "ommission, citing Par,er as well as /avis did tersely sum up the matter thusA 3: rule is binding on tile courts so long as the procedure fi ed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom H H H. 'n the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.3 5t cannot be otherwise as the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in whom all e ecutive power resides, to ta,e care that the laws be faithfully e ecuted. No lesser administrative e ecutive office or agency then can, contrary to the e press language of the Constitution, assert for itself a more e tensive prerogative.G 3: 5t was alleged in the :nswer of Solicitor 8eneral )stelito P. Mendo9a that 4etter of 5nstruction 0%+ and Memorandum Circular No. 1+ were adopted pursuant to the 4and .ransportation and .raffic Code. 37 5t contains a specific provision as to penalties. 38 .husA G2or violation of any provisions of this :ct or regulations promulgated pursuant hereto, not hereinbefore specifically punished, a fine of not less than ten nor more than fifty pesos shall be imposed.G 39 Memorandum Circular No. 1+ cannot be held to be ultra ires as long as the fine imposed is not less than ten nor more than fifty pesos. :s to suspension of registration, 90 the Code, insofar as applicable, providesA GChenever it shall appear from the records of the Commission that during any twelve-month period more than three warnings for violations of this :ct have been given to the owner of a motor vehicle, or that the said owner has been convicted by a competent court more than once for violation of such laws, the Commissioner may, in his discretion, suspend the certificate of registration for a period not e ceeding ninety days and, thereupon, shall re$uire the immediate surrender of the number plates H H H.G 91 5t follows that while the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid under the 4and .ransportation and .raffic Code, the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory -ustification. .o apply that portion of Memorandum Circular No. 1+ would be ultra ires. 5t must li,ewise be made clear that a penalty even if warranted can only be imposed in accordance with the procedure re$uired by law. 9CD);)2';), the petition is dismissed. A7uino, Guerrero, !e "astro, 3elencio:Herrera, 'scolin, -elo a and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur. 3a&asiar and "oncepcion J., too& no part. G.R. No. 15:559 RODOL'O S. DE *ES&S, EDEL8#NA DG. 1AR&NGAO, and RE/E A A. /AR/O, 145i5ion4rs, ?4rs+s #V#L SERV# E O""#SS#ON@ S A and L8&A E"1LO0EES ASSO #AT#ON 'OR 1ROGRESS, @LEA1A R4pr4s4n54d ;, #5s =air>an, LEONARDO . R&2, R4spond4n5s. S4p54>;4r 30, -005

DE #S#ON 1ANGAN#/AN, J.( C ords and phrases in a statute must be given their natural, ordinary, and commonly accepted meaning. /ue regard should be given to the conte t in which they are used. Settled is the rule that under Section (1 of Presidential /ecree &P/* (+0, per diem is precisely intended to be the compensation of members of the board of directors of water districts. By specifying the compensation they are entitled to receive, limiting the amount they are allowed to receive each month, and stating in the same paragraph that they shall receive no compensation other than the specified per diems, the law $uite clearly mandates that directors of water districts be authori9ed to receive only those per diems. No other compensation or allowance in whatever form shall be given to or received by them. T=4 as4 Before us is a Petition for ;eviewK(L under ;ule 7" of the ;ules of Court, challenging the ?uly (#, !##( /ecision K!L of the Court of :ppeals &C:* in C:-8; SP No. 7#%(1, as well as the /ecember ((, !##! C: ;esolution K1Ldenying petitionersP Motion for ;econsideration. .he decretal portion of the assailed /ecision readsA M8!ERE'ORE, premises considered, the petition is par5iall, Bran54d and the assailed ;esolution of the Civil Service Commission dated (( ?uly (++" is hereby "OD#'#ED in accordance with the foregoing dis$uisition.OK7L 'n the other hand, the ?uly ((, (++" ;esolution K"L of the Civil Service Commission &CSC* mentioned above disposed as followsA M8!ERE'ORE, the Commission hereby rules that it is illegal for any 4CB: officer or employee who sits as member of the board of directors of a water district to receive and collect any additional, double, or indirect compensation from said water district, e cept per diems pursuant to Section (1 of P/ (+0, as amended.OK%L T=4 'a65s .he facts are narrated by the C: as followsA M.he 4CB: )mployees :ssociation for Progress &4):P*, through its Chairman, 4eonardo C. Cru9, filed with the CSC a complaint against Camilo P. Cabili and :ntonio ;. /e >era, Chairman of the Board of .rustees and :dministrator, respectively, of the 4ocal Cater Btilities :dministration &4CB:* for alleged violation of ;: %6(1, otherwise ,nown as the TCode of Conduct and )thical Standards for Public 'fficials and )mployeesP. M.he complaint stemmed from the alleged failure or refusal of Cabili and /e >era to give due course or respond to the Memorandum dated !% :ugust (++7 of 4):P re$uesting investigation on the allegation of columnist 4ito :. Catapusan in the TBeatwatchP column of the !1 :ugust (++7 issue of the Manila Bulletin that Cater /istricts are Tmil,ing cowsP of certain 4CB: officials. 4):P li,ewise $uestioned the propriety and legality of the act of 4CB: /eputy :dministrator ;odolfo de ?esus in collecting<receiving per diems, ;:.:, discretionary fund, and other e traordinary and miscellaneous e penses from the 'longapo City Cater /istrict where he was designated as member of the board of directors, aside from what he was already receiving from his present position. M5n his comment to 4):PPs complaint, 4CB: :dministrator /e >era claimed, inter alia, that under the 4CB: Charter &P/ (+0 as amended*, 4CB: is vested with corporate authority to ta,e over the policy-ma,ing and management functions of defaulting water districts in order to protect its financial investment. Section 0 of the /ecree authori9es 4CB: to appoint any of its personnel to sit in the board of directors of a water district that has availed financial assistance from 4CB: and any such personnel so appointed is entitled to en-oy the rights and privileges pertaining to a regular director. :dministrator /e >era thus contended, in essence, that sans any specific guidelines on remuneration, any 4CB: personnel who sits as a member of the board of directors of a water district is entitled to receive the same compensation and benefits which other members en-oy, in addition to what he regularly and normally receives as a personnel of 4CB:. M5n ;esolution No. +"-7#61 dated (( ?uly (++", the CSC dismissed the charge for violation of ;: %6(1 against 4CB: Chairman Cabili and :dministrator /e >era. .he CSC however ruled that Tit is illegal for any 4CB: officer or employee who sits as a member of the board of directors of a water district to receive and collect any additional, double or indirect compensation from said water district e cept per diems pursuant to Section (1 of P/ (+0, as amendedP. .he CSC based its ruling on Section 0, :rticle 5E &B* of the (+06 Constitution. M4CB: Chairman Cabili and :dministrator /e >era moved for reconsideration of ;esolution No. +"-7#61, contending that the CSC erroneously and short-sightedly interpreted the provision of the Constitution relative to additional, double or indirect compensation. Cabili and /e >era li,ewise $uestioned the authority of the CSC to act upon the complaint filed by 4):P on the ground that the complaint was not under oath, hence, violative of CSC ;esolution No. +7-#"!( prescribing the Bniform ;ules of Procedure in the Conduct of :dministrative 5nvestigation. M5n ;esolution No. +%-!#6+ dated !( March (++%, the CSC denied the motion for reconsideration and affirmed ;esolution No. +"-7#61. MBnsatisfied, 4CB: Chairman Cabili and :dministrator /e >era elevated the case to Kthe C:L .

M/uring the pendency of the petition Kwith the C:L, two &!* separate motions for intervention were filed by :bundio 4. ',it on the one hand, and ;odolfo S. de ?esus, )delwina /8. Parungao and ;ebecca :. Barbo, on the other. Movants allege

personal and legal interest in the legal issues and sub-ect matter of the instant petition for being members of the board of directors, either as interim director or 4CB:-appointed % th member of water districts. M.here being no opposition from Kthe partiesL, the KC:L granted the motions for intervention and allowed intervenorsmovants to file their respective petitions-in-intervention. @,nter enors, in their separate petitions:in:inter ention, essentiall# support the le$alit# of the benefits $ranted to them b# la% andAor pertinent 21(A -esolutions in their capacit# as members of the board of directors of %ater districts. These benefits include -epresentation and Transportation Allo%ance 8-ATA9, Tra el Allo%ance, '0tra:ordinar# 3iscellaneous '0penses 8'3'9, "hristmas Bonus, "ash Gift, (niform Allo%ance, -ice Allo%ance, 3edicalA!ental Benefit and Producti it# ,ncenti e Pa#.BK6L R+linB o< 5=4 o+r5 o< App4als .ac,ling the procedural issue first, the C: said that the provision re$uiring an administrative complaint to be in writing, verified and sworn to by the complainant, is not -urisdictional in nature. Strict compliance with these formal re$uisites may be dispensed with in order to serve the ends of substantial -ustice. 2urthermore, the present petitioners were deemed to have waived their ob-ection to the procedural defect when they failed to raise it seasonably. Modifying the ;esolution of the CSC, the C: gave the $ualification that, in view of the proscription on double compensation, the 4CB:designated %th members of the boards of defaulting water districts were not automatically entitled to the same compensation and benefit pac,age ordinarily granted to regular members of the board of directors. :llowing those benefits would depend on the followingA &(* whether they were e pressly allowed by law= &!* their nature= and &1* whether the % th board members already en-oyed the same benefits as those received by the regular employees of the 4CB:. .he C: held that Section (1 of P/ (+0 e pressly allowed the directors of water districts to be granted per diems,which thereby constituted an e ception to the constitutional prohibition on double compensation. ;epresentation and .ransportation :llowances &;:.:* and travel allowances were found to be, by their nature, remunerative= hence, they were not deemed included in the prohibition, unless the 4CB: had already granted the same benefits to its employees tas,ed to sit as the %th members of the boards of directors. 2ound to be non-remunerative in character and thus constitutionally infirm was the grant to the directors of ) traordinary Miscellaneous ) penses &)M)* and rice allowances, as well as medical and dental benefits. .he grant of a uniform allowance might have been allowed if the directors ordinarily wore uniforms in the discharge of their functions. 4astly, the grant of Christmas bonuses, cash gifts and productivity incentive bonuses were described by the C: as essentially gratuitous in nature. 5t ruled that the grant of Christmas bonuses and cash gifts to the appointed % thmembers of the boards of directors must be disallowed, since they were already receiving those benefits as regular employees of the 4CB:. 'n the other hand, the grant of productivity incentive bonuses was allowed, in view of the directorsP role in helping the financially strapped water district regain its losses. Dence, this Petition.K0L #ss+4s Petitioners raise the following issues for our considerationA 5. MChether or not Public ;espondent Civil Service Commission has plenary -urisdiction to motu proprio construe P./. (+0, as amended. 55. MChether or not Sec. (1 of P./. (+0, as amended, prohibits 4CB:-designated representatives to the Boards of C/s to receive certain allowances and benefits on top of regular per diems. 555. MChether or not the designated representatives of 4CB: to the Boards of C/s are liable to refund certain allowances and bonuses which are found in violation of Sec. (1 of P/ (+0, as amended.O K+L T=4 o+r5Cs R+linB .he Petition is partly meritorious. 'irs5 #ss+4( Jurisdiction of the CSC Petitioners argue that the CSC had no plenary -urisdiction to construe any provision of P/ (+0, as amended, on matters pertaining to compensation and other benefits of water district directors. ;elying on 3arilao 1ater "onsumers Association . ,ntermediate Appellate "ourt, K(#L petitioners contend that it is the 4CB:, not the CSC, that has the power to issue rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the law under which water districts operate and function. Ce disagree. 5n the cited case, this Court held that proceedings for the dissolution of water districts should be lodged with the regular courts. 5n reaching this conclusion, it thus discussed the functions and powers of the 4CB: as followsA

M.he 4CB: does not appear to have any ad-udicatory functions. 5t is, as already pointed out, Tprimarily a speciali9ed lending institution for the promotion, development and financing of local water utilities,P with power to prescribe minimum standards and regulations regarding maintenance, operation, personnel training, accounting and fiscal practices for local water utilities, to furnish technical assistance and personnel training programs therefor= monitor and evaluate local water standards= and effect systems integration, -oint investment and operations, district anne ation and deanne ation whenever economically warranted. .he 4CB: has $uasi--udicial power only as regards rates or charges fi ed by water districts, which it may review to establish compliance with the provisions of P/ (+0 .OK((L Clearly, that case is not in point and will not convince this Court to sustain the claim of petitioners. .hey allege that the CSC usurped the functions of the 4CB: in e ercising, motu proprio, plenary -urisdiction to construe Section (1 of P/ (+0. 2or the Court to sustain them would be to allow the board of an administrative agency, by merely issuing a resolution, to derogate the broad and e tensive powers granted by the Constitution to a constitutional commission li,e the CSC.K(!L Parenthetically, the tas, of safeguarding the proper use of government funds rests primarily with the Commission on :udit &C':*. 5n !e Jesus . "ommission on Audit,K(1L this Court ruled that it was the C': that had the power to determine the legality and regularity of the grant of allowances and benefits to 4CB:-designated members of the boards of water districts. Mandated by the Constitution K(7L to audit all government agencies, including government-owned and -controlled corporations with original charters, the C': is vested with Mthe authority to determine whether government entities comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds.O K("L 5n "i il Ser ice "ommission . Pobre,K(%L however, the Court recogni9ed an instance in which the C': had concurrent -urisdiction with the CSC. .he Court ruled as followsA M.he C':, the CSC and the Commission on )lections are e$ually pre-eminent in their respective spheres. Neither one may claim dominance over the others. 5n case of conflicting rulings, it is the ?udiciary which interprets the meaning of the law and ascertains which view shall prevail.OK(6L .he present case involves the acts of 4CB: officials who are concurrently designated as members of the boards of directors of water districts. .his Court has consistently ruled that water districts are government-owned and -controlled corporations with original charters, since they have been created pursuant to P/ (+0. Dence, they are under the -urisdiction of the CSC. K(0L :rticle 5E-B of the (+06 Constitution provides as followsA MS)C. !. &(* .he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the 8overnment, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. MS)C. 1. .he Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the 8overnment, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. 5t shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ran,s, and institutionali9e a management climate conducive to public accountability. 5t shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.O

Section 1 is deemed to include the power to Mpromulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions.O K(+L 5t must be pointed out that the present controversy originated from an administrative case filed with the CSC for violations of the Code of Conduct and )thical Standards for Public 'fficials and )mployees &;: %6(1*. Necessarily, it was incumbent on the CSC to construe, in relation to that case pending before it, the provisions of P/ (+0. Settled is the rule that when a law confers -urisdiction, all the incidental powers necessary for its effectiveK!#L e ercise are included in the conferment. S46ond #ss+4( Allowances and Benefits Other Than 14r Di4>s Prohibited .he compensation of directors of water districts is governed by Section (1 of P/ (+0, as amended, which readsA MSec. (1. "ompensation. - )ach director shall receive a per diem, to be determined by the board, for each meeting of the board actually attended by him, but no director shall receive per diems in any given month in e cess of the e$uivalent of the total per diems of four meetings in any given month. *o director shall recei e other compensation for ser ices to the district. M:ny per diem in e cess of P"# shall be sub-ect to approval of the :dministration.O &)mphasis supplied* Contrary to the interpretation of the CSC, petitioners argue that the term McompensationO as used in Section (1 of P/ (+0 does not include ;:.:, )M), bonuses and other benefits. Chether the per diem is the only compensation allowed for directors of water districts is a $uestion that has already been settled in Ba#ba# 1ater !istrict . "ommission on Audit,K!(L which we $uote in part, as followsA MBnder U(1 of this /ecree, per diem is precisely intended to be the compensation of members of KtheL board of directors of water districts. 5ndeed, words and phrases in a statute must be given their natural, ordinary, and commonly-accepted meaning, due regard being given to the conte t in which the words and phrases are used. By specifying the compensation which a director is entitled to receive and by limiting the amount he<she is allowed to receive in a month, and, in the same paragraph, providing TNo director shall receive other compensationP than the amount provided for per diems, the law $uite clearly indicates that

directors of water districts are authori9ed to receive only the per diem authori9ed by law and no other compensation or allowance in whatever form.OK!!L T=ird #ss+4( Refund of Allowances and Benefits :lthough neither the CSC nor the C: ordered them to refund the monetary allowances and benefits found to be in violation of Section (1 of P/ (+0, petitioners assert that they should not be re$uired to do so, because they had received those benefits in good faith. .his issue has been settled in several other casesK!1L beginning with !e Jesus . "ommission on Audit,K!7L in which this Court pronounced thusA M . Petitioners here received the additional allowances and bonuses in good faith under the honest belief that 4CB: Board ;esolution No. 1(1 authori9ed such payment. :t the time petitioners received the additional allowances and bonuses, the Court had not yet decided Ba#ba# 1ater !istrict. Petitioners had no ,nowledge that such payment was without legal basis. .hus, being in good faith, petitioners need not refund the allowances and bonuses they received but disallowed by the C':.O K!"L Considering that the instant controversy had also arisen prior to the promulgation of Ba#ba# 1ater !istrict . "ommission on Audit, K!%L the present petitioners need not refund the allowances and bonuses they have already received in good faith. CD);)2';), the Petition is PART ! "RA#T$%. .he ?uly ((, (++" ;esolution of the CSC is R$&#STAT$%, with the 'O%&(&CAT&O# that petitioners need not refund the ;epresentation and .ransportation :llowances &;:.:*, .ravel :llowances, ) traordinary and Miscellaneous ) penses &)M)*, Christmas bonuses and cash gifts, uniform allowances, rice allowances, medical and dental benefits, and productivity incentive bonuses already received by them in good faith as members of the boards of directors of water districts. No pronouncements as to costs. S' ';/);)/. )N B:NC

)G.R. No. 1-5955. *+n4 19, 1997. 8#L"ER GREGO, petitioner, vs. O""#SS#ON ON ELE T#ONS and !&"/ERTO /AS O, respondents. DE #S#ON RO"ERO, J.( .he instant special civil action for certiorari and prohibition impugns the resolution of the Commission on )lections &C'M)4)C* en banc in SP: No. +"-!(! dated ?uly 1(, (++%, dismissing petitionerPs motion for reconsideration of an earlier resolution rendered by the C'M)4)CPs 2irst /ivision on 'ctober %, (++", which also dismissed the petition for dis$ualification K(L filed by petitioner Cilmer 8rego against private respondent Dumberto Basco. .he essential and undisputed factual antecedents of the case are as followsA 'n 'ctober 1(, (+0(, Basco was removed from his position as /eputy Sheriff by no less than this Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain Nena .ordesillas. .he Court heldA MCD);)2';), 25N/5N8 .D) ;)SP'N/)N. /)PB.F SD);522 DBMB);.' B:SC' '2 .D) C5.F C'B;. '2 M:N54: 8B54.F '2 S);5'BS M5SC'N/BC. 5N '225C) 2'; .D) S)C'N/ .5M), D) 5S D);)BF /5SM5SS)/ 2;'M .D) S);>5C) C5.D 2';2)5.B;) '2 :44 ;).5;)M)N. B)N)25.S :N/ C5.D P;)?B/5C) .' ;)5NS.:.)M)N. .' :NF P'S5.5'N 5N .D) N:.5'N:4 '; 4'C:4 8'>);NM)N., 5NC4B/5N8 5.S :8)NC5)S :N/ 5NS.;BM)N.:45.5)S, '; 8'>);NM)N.-'CN)/ '; C'N.;'44)/ C';P';:.5'NS. OK!L Subse$uently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second /istrict of the City of Manila during the ?anuary (0, (+00, local elections. De won and, accordingly, assumed office. :fter his term, Basco sought re-election in the May ((, (++! synchroni9ed national elections. :gain, he succeeded in his bid and he was elected as one of the si &%* City Councilors. Dowever, his victory this time did not remain unchallenged. 5n the midst of his successful re-election, he found himself besieged by lawsuits of his opponents in the polls who wanted to dislodge him from his position. 'ne such case was a petition for 7uo %arrantoK1L filed before the C'M)4)C by Cenon ;on$uillo, another candidate for councilor in the same district, who alleged BascoPs ineligibility to be elected councilor on the basis of the .ordesillas ruling. :t about the same time, two more cases were also commenced by Donorio 4ope9 55 in the 'ffice of the 'mbudsman and in the /epartment of 5nterior and 4ocal 8overnment. K7L :ll these challenges were, however, dismissed, thus, paving the way for BascoPs continued stay in office. /espite the odds previously encountered, Basco remained undaunted and ran again for councilor in the May 0, (++", local elections see,ing a third and final term. 'nce again, he beat the odds by emerging si th in a battle for si councilor seats. :s in the past, however, his right to office was again contested. 'n May (1, (++", petitioner 8rego, claiming to be a registered voter of Precinct No. +%%, /istrict 55, City of Manila, filed with the C'M)4)C a petition for dis$ualification, praying for BascoPs dis$ualification, for the suspension of his proclamation, and for the declaration of ;omualdo S. Maranan as the si th duly elected Councilor of ManilaPs Second /istrict. 'n the same day, the Chairman of the Manila City Board of Canvassers &B'C* was duly furnished with a copy of the petition. .he other members of the B'C learned about this petition only two days later. .he C'M)4)C conducted a hearing of the case on May (7, (++", where it ordered the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda.

Before the parties could comply with this directive, however, the Manila City B'C proclaimed Basco on May (6, (++", as a duly elected councilor for the Second /istrict of Manila, placing si th among several candidates who vied for the seats. K"L Basco immediately too, his oath of office before the Donorable Ma. ;uby Bithao-Camarista, Presiding ?udge, Metropolitan .rial Court, Branch 5, Manila. 5n view of such proclamation, petitioner lost no time in filing an Brgent Motion see,ing to annul what he considered to be an illegal and hasty proclamation made on May (6, (++", by the Manila City B'C. De reiterated BascoPs dis$ualification and prayed anew that candidate ;omualdo S. Maranan be declared the winner. :s e pected, Basco countered said motion by filing his Brgent 'pposition toA Brgent Motion &with ;eservation to Submit :nswer and<or Motion to /ismiss :gainst 5nstant Petition for /is$ualification with .emporary ;estraining 'rder*. 'n ?une ", (++", Basco filed his Motion to /ismiss Serving :s :nswer pursuant to the reservation he made earlier, summari9ing his contentions and praying as followsA M;espondent thus now submits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief for the following reasonsA (. .he respondent cannot be dis$ualified on the ground of Section 7# paragraph b of the 4ocal 8overnment Code because the .ordesillas decision is barred by laches, prescription, res -udicata, lis pendens, bar by prior -udgment, law of the case and stare decisis= !. Section 7K#L par. B of the 4ocal 8overnment Code may not be validly applied to persons who were dismissed prior to its effectivity. .o do so would ma,e it e post facto, bill of attainder, and retroactive legislation which impairs vested rights. 5t is also a class legislation and unconstitutional on the account. 1. ;espondent had already been proclaimed. :nd the petition being a preproclamation contest under the Mar$ue9 v. Comelec ;uling, supra, it should be dismissed by virtue of said pronouncement. 7. ;espondentPs three-time election as candidate for councilor constitutes implied pardon by the people of previous misconduct &:guinaldo v. Comelec 8.;. (#"(!0= ;ice v. State (%( SC;: 7#(= Montgomery v. Newell 7# SC !d 7(0(= People v. Bashaw (1# P. !nd !16, etc.*. ". :s petition to nullify certificate of candidacy, the instant case has prescribed= it was premature as an election protest and it was not brought by a proper party in interest as such protest.A 1RA0ER CD);)2';) it is respectfully prayed that the instant case be dismissed on instant motion to dismiss the prayer for restraining order denied &sic*. 5f this Donorable 'ffice is not minded to dismiss, it is respectfully prayed that instant motion be considered as respondentPs answer. :ll other reliefs and remedies -ust and proper in the premises are li,ewise hereby prayed for.O :fter the partiesP respective memoranda had been filed, the C'M)4)CPs 2irst /ivision resolved to dismiss the petition for dis$ualification on 'ctober %, (++", ruling that Mthe administrative penalty imposed by the Supreme Court on respondent Basco on 'ctober 1(, (+0( was wiped away and condoned by the electorate which elected himO and that on account of BascoPs proclamation on May (6, (+%", as the si th duly elected councilor of the Second /istrict of Manila, Mthe petition would no longer be viable.O K%L PetitionerPs motion for reconsideration of said resolution was later denied by the C'M)4)C en banc in its assailed resolution promulgated on ?uly 1(, (++%.K6L Dence, this petition. Petitioner argues that Basco should be dis$ualified from running for any elective position since he had been Mremoved from office as a result of an administrative caseO pursuant to Section 7# &b* of ;epublic :ct No. 6(%#, otherwise ,nown as the 4ocal 8overnment Code &the Code*, which too, effect on ?anuary (, (++!.K0L Petitioner wants the Court to li,ewise resolve the following issues, namelyA (. Chether or not Section 7# &b* of ;epublic :ct No. 6(%# applies retroactively to those removed from office before it too, effect on ?anuary (, (++!= !. Chether or not private respondentPs election in (+00, (++! and in (++" as City Councilor of Manila wiped away and condoned the administrative penalty against him= 1. Chether or not private respondentPs proclamation as si th winning candidate on May (6, (++", while the dis$ualification case was still pending consideration by C'M)4)C, is void ab initio= and 7. Chether or not ;omualdo S. Maranan, who placed seventh among the candidates for City Councilor of Manila, may be declared a winner pursuant to Section % of ;epublic :ct No. %%7%. Chile we do not necessarily agree with the conclusions and reasons of the C'M)4)C in the assailed resolution, nonetheless, we find no grave abuse of discretion on its part in dismissing the petition for dis$ualification. .he instant petition must, therefore, fail. Ce shall discuss the issues raised by petitioner in seriatim. 5. !oes Section 6C 8b9 of -epublic Act *o. D;EC appl# retroacti el# to those remo ed from office before it too& effect on Januar# ;, ;FFGH Section 7# &b* of the 4ocal 8overnment Code under which petitioner anchors BascoPs alleged dis$ualification to run as City Councilor statesA MS)C. 7#. /is$ualifications. - .he following persons are dis$ualified from running for any elective local positionA

&b*

.hose removed from office as a result of an administrative case=

.O 5n this regard, petitioner submits that although the Code too, effect only on ?anuary (, (++!, Section 7# &b* must nonetheless be given retroactive effect and applied to BascoPs dismissal from office which too, place in (+0(. 5t is stressed that the provision of the law as worded does not mention or even $ualify the date of removal from office of the candidate in order for dis$ualification thereunder to attach. Dence, petitioner impresses upon the Court that as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an administrative case, regardless of whether it too, place during or prior to the effectivity of the Code, the dis$ualification applies. K+L .o him, this interpretation is made more evident by the manner in which the provisions of Section 7# are couched. Since the past tense is used in enumerating the grounds for dis$ualification, petitioner strongly contends that the provision must have also referred to removal from office occurring prior to the effectivity of the Code. K(#L Ce do not, however, subscribe to petitionerPs view. 'ur refusal to give retroactive application to the provision of Section 7# &b* is already a settled issue and there e ist no compelling reasons for us to depart therefrom. .hus, in :guinaldo vs. C'M)4)C,K((L reiterated in the more recent cases of ;eyes vs. C'M)4)CK(!L and Salalima vs. 8uingona, ?r.,K(1L we ruled, thusA M.he C'M)4)C applied Section 7# &b* of the 4ocal 8overnment Code &;epublic :ct 6(%#* which providesA TSec. 7#. .he following persons are dis$ualified from running for any elective local positionsA

&b*

.hose removed from office as a result of an administrative case.

;epublic :ct 6(%# too, effect only on ?anuary (, (++!. .he rule isA

T Cell-settled is the principle that while the 4egislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect in-uriously vested rights, it is e$ually true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is e pressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. P &?ones vs. Summers, (#" Cal. :pp. "(, !0% Pac. (#+1= B.S. vs. Chyel !0 &!d* 1#= )spiritu v. Cipriano, "" SC;: "11 K(+67L, cited in Nilo vs. Court of :ppeals, (!0 SC;: "(+ K(+67L. See also Pu9on v. :bellera, (%+ SC;: 60+ K(+0+L= :l-:manah 5slamic 5nvestment Ban, of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission, et al., 8.;. No. (##"++, :pril 0, (++!*. .here is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively. 5t, therefore, follows that KSectionL 7# &b* of the 4ocal 8overnment Code is not applicable to the present case.O &Bnderscoring supplied*. .hat the provision of the Code in $uestion does not $ualify the date of a candidatePs removal from office and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter us from the applying the law prospectively. .he basic tenet in legal hermeneutics that laws operate only prospectively and not retroactively provides the $ualification sought by petitioner. : statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage. 2e0 prospicit, non respicit. .he law loo,s forward, not bac,ward.K(7L 55. !id pri ate respondentIs election to office as "it# "ouncilor of 3anila in the ;FJJ, ;FFG and ;FFK elections %ipe a%a# and condone the administrati e penalt# a$ainst him, thus restorin$ his eli$ibilit# for public officeH Petitioner maintains the negative. De $uotes the earlier ruling of the Court in 2rivaldo v. C'M)4)CK("L to the effect that a candidatePs dis$ualification cannot be erased by the electorate alone through the instrumentality of the ballot. .husA M &.*he $ualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. .he will of the people as e pressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mista,enly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was $ualified. O :t first glance, there seems to be a prima facie semblance of merit to petitionerPs argument. Dowever, the issue of whether or not BascoPs triple election to office cured his alleged ineligibility is actually beside the point because the argument proceeds on the assumption that he was in the first place dis$ualified when he ran in the three previous elections. .his assumption, of course, is untenable considering that Basco was N'. sub-ect to any dis$ualification at all under Section 7# &b* of the 4ocal 8overnment Code which, as we said earlier, applies only to those removed from office on or after ?anuary (, (++!. 5n view of the irrelevance of the issue posed by petitioner, there is no more reason for the Court to still dwell on the matter at length. :nent BascoPs alleged circumvention of the prohibition in .ordesillas against reinstatement to any position in the national or local government, including its agencies and instrumentalities, as well as government-owned or controlled corporations, we are of the view that petitionerPs contention is baseless. Neither does petitionerPs argument that the term Many positionO is broad enough to cover without distinction both appointive and local positions merit any consideration. Contrary to petitionerPs assertion, the .ordesillas decision did not bar Basco from running for any elective position. :s can be gleaned from the decretal portion of the said decision, the Court couched the prohibition in this wiseA M :N/ C5.D P;)?B/5C) .' ;)5NS.:.)M)N. .' :NF P'S5.5'N 5N .D) N:.5'N:4 '; 4'C:4 8'>);NM)N., 5NC4B/5N8 5.S :8)NC5)S :N/ 5NS.;BM)N.:45.5)S, '; 8'>);NM)N.-'CN)/ '; C'N.;'44)/ C';P';:.5'NS.O 5n this regard, particular attention is directed to the use of the term Mreinstatement.O Bnder the former Civil Service /ecree, K(%L the law applicable at the time Basco, a public officer, was administratively dismissed from office, the term MreinstatementO had a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position. .husA

M:;.5C4) >555. P);S'NN)4 P'45C5)S :N/ S.:N/:;/S. S)C. !7. Personnel :ctions. -

&d* ;einstatement. - :ny person who has been permanently :PP'5N.)/ to a position in the career service and who has, through no delin$uency or misconduct, been separated therefrom, may be reinstated to a position in the same level for which he is $ualified. .O &)mphasis and underscoring supplied*. .he ;ules on Personnel :ctions and Policies issued by the Civil Service Commission on November (#, (+6", K(6L provides a clearer definition. 5t readsA M;B4) >5. '.D); P);S'NN)4 :C.5'NS. S)C. 6. ;einstatement is the ;):PP'5NM)N. of a person who was previously separated from the service through no delin$uency or misconduct on his part from a position in the career service to which he was permanently appointed, to a position for which he is $ualified.O &)mphasis and underscoring supplied*. 5n light of these definitions, there is, therefore, no basis for holding that Basco is li,ewise barred from running for an elective position inasmuch as what is contemplated by the prohibition in .ordesillas is reinstatement to an appointive position. 555. ,s pri ate respondentIs proclamation as si0th %innin$ candidate on 3a# ;D, ;FFK, %hile the dis7ualification case %as still pendin$ consideration b# "O3'2'", oid ab initioH .o support its position, petitioner argues that Basco violated the provisions of Section !#, paragraph &i* of ;epublic :ct No. 6(%%, Section % of ;epublic :ct No. %%7%, as well as our ruling in the cases of /uremdes v. C'M)4)C,K(0L Benito v. C'M)4)CK(+L and :guam v. C'M)4)C.K!#L Ce are not convinced. .he provisions and cases cited are all misplaced and $uoted out of conte t. 2or the sa,e of clarity, let us tac,le each one by one. Section !#, paragraph &i* of ;ep. :ct 6(%% readsA MS)C. !#. Procedure in /isposition of Contested )lection ;eturns.-

&i* .he board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authori9ed by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the ob-ections brought to it on appeal by the losing party. :ny proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election. .O .he inapplicability of the abovementioned provision to the present case is very much patent on its face considering that the same refers only to a void proclamation in relation to contested returns and N'. to contested $ualifications of a candidate. Ne t, petitioner cites Section % of ;ep. :ct %%7% which statesA MS)C. %. )ffect of /is$ualification Case. - :ny candidate who has been declared by final -udgment to be dis$ualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. 5f for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final -udgment before an election to be dis$ualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, in$uiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.O &Bnderscoring supplied*. .his provision, however, does not support petitionerPs contention that the C'M)4)C, or more properly spea,ing, the Manila City B'C, should have suspended the proclamation. .he use of the word MmayO indicates that the suspension of a proclamation is merely directory andpermissive in nature and operates to confer discretion.K!(L Chat is merely made mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the continuation of the trial and hearing of the action, in$uiry or protest. .hus, in view of this discretion granted to the C'M)4)C, the $uestion of whether or not evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant suspension of proclamation must be left for its own determination and the Court cannot interfere therewith and substitute its own -udgment unless such discretion has been e ercised whimsically and capriciously. K!!L .he C'M)4)C, as an administrative agency and a speciali9ed constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, K!1L has more than enough e pertise in its field that its findings or conclusions are generally respected and even given finality.K!7L .he C'M)4)C has not found any ground to suspend the proclamation and the records li,ewise fail to show any so as to warrant a different conclusion from this Court. Dence, there is no ample -ustification to hold that the C'M)4)C gravely abused its discretion. 5t is to be noted that Section ", ;ule !" of the C'M)4)C ;ules of Procedure K!"L states thatA MS)C. ". )ffect of petition if unresolved before completion of canvass. received the winning number of votes in such election.O &D*is proclamation shall be suspended notwithstanding the fact that he

Dowever, being merely an implementing rule, the same must not override, but instead remain consistent with and in harmony with the law it see,s to apply and implement. :dministrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law. K!%L .hus, in Miners :ssociation of the Philippines, 5nc. v. 2actoran, ?r.,K!6L the Court ruled thatA MCe reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment. .he principle was enunciated as early as (+#0 in the case of (nited States . Barrias. .he scope of the e ercise of such rule-ma,ing power was clearly e pressed in the case of (nited States . Tupasi 3olina, decided in (+(7, thusA T'f course, the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be e tended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provision of the law, they are valid.P ;ecently, the case of People . 3aceren gave a brief delineation of the scope of said power of administrative officialsA :dministrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be e tended &B.S. v. .upasi Molina, supra*. :n administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress & Santos v. )sten9o, (#+ Phil. 7(+, 7!!= .eo on vs. Members of the Board of :dministrators, 4-!"%(+, ?une 1#, (+6#, 11 SC;: "0"= Manuel vs. 8eneral :uditing 'ffice, 4-!0+"!, /ecember !+, (+6(, 7! SC;: %%#= /eluao vs. Casteel, 4-!(+#%, :ugust !+, (+%+, !+ SC;: 1"#*. .he rule-ma,ing power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. .he power cannot be e tended to amending or e panding the statutory re$uirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. ;ules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned &Bniversity of Santo .omas v. Board of .a :ppeals, +1 Phil. 16%, 10!, citing (! C.?. 07"-7%. :s to invalid regulations, see Collector of 5nternal ;evenue v. >illaflor, %+ Phil. 1(+= Cise Q Co. v. Meer, 60 Phil. %"", %6% / /el Mar v. Phil. >eterans :dministration, 4-!6!++, ?une !6, (+61, "( SC;: 17#, 17+*.

.he rule or regulations should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency &/avis, :dministrative 4aw, p. (+7, (+6, cited in >ictorias Milling Co., 5nc. v. Social Security Commission, ((7 Phil. """, ""0*. 5n case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law &People v. 4im, (#0 Phil. (#+(*.O Since Section % of ;ep. :ct %%7%, the law which Section " of ;ule !" of the C'M)4)C ;ules of Procedure see,s to implement, employed the word Mmay,O it is, therefore, improper and highly irregular for the C'M)4)C to have used instead the word MshallO in its rules. Moreover, there is no reason why the Manila City B'C should not have proclaimed Basco as the si th winning City Councilor. :bsent any determination of irregularity in the election returns, as well as an order en-oining the canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is a mandatory and ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers concerned to count the votes based on such returns and declare the result. .his has been the rule as early as in the case of /i9on v. Provincial Board of Canvassers of 4aguna K!0L where we clarified the nature of the functions of the Board of Canvassers, vi9.A M.he simple purpose and duty of the canvassing board is to ascertain and declare the apparent result of the voting. :ll other $uestions are to be tried before the court or other tribunal for contesting elections or in $uo warranto proceedings.O &+ ;.C.4., p. (((#* .o the same effect is the following $uotationA M Chere there is no $uestion as to the genuineness of the returns or that all the returns are before them, the powers and duties of canvassers are limited to the mechanical or mathematical function of ascertaining and declaring the apparent result of the election by adding or compiling the votes cast for each candidate as shown on the face of the returns before them, and then declaring or certifying the result so ascertained. &!# C.?., !##-!#(*O KBnderscoring suppliedL 2inally, the cases of /uremdes, Benito and :guam, supra, cited by petitioner are all irrelevant and inapplicable to the factual circumstances at bar and serve no other purpose than to muddle the real issue. .hese three cases do not in any manner refer to void proclamations resulting from the mere pendency of a dis$ualification case. 5n /uremdes, the proclamation was deemed void ab initio because the same was made contrary to the provisions of the 'mnibus )lection Code regarding the suspension of proclamation in cases of contested election returns. 5n Benito, the proclamation of petitioner Benito was rendered ineffective due to the Board of CanvassersP violation of its ministerial duty to proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes and pave the way to succession in office. 5n said case, the candidate receiving the highest number of votes for the mayoralty position died but the Board of Canvassers, instead of proclaiming the deceased candidate winner, declared Benito, a mere second-placer, the mayor. 4astly, in :guam, the nullification of the proclamation proceeded from the fact that it was based only on advanced copies of election returns which, under the law then prevailing, could not have been a proper and legal basis for proclamation. Cith no precedent clearly in point, petitionerPs arguments must, therefore, be re-ected. 5>. 3a# -omualdo S. 3aranan, a se enth placer, be le$all# declared a %innin$ candidateH

'bviously, he may not be declared a winner. 5n the first place, Basco was a duly $ualified candidate pursuant to our dis$uisition above. 2urthermore, he clearly received the winning number of votes which put him in si th place. .hus, petitionerPs emphatic reference to 4abo v. C'M)4)C,K!+L where we laid down a possible e ception to the rule that a second placer may be declared the winning candidate, finds no application in this case. .he e ception is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namelyA &(* the one who obtained the highest number of votes is

dis$ualified= and &!* the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidatePs dis$ualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Both assumptions, however, are absent in this case. PetitionerPs allegation that Basco was well-,nown to have been dis$ualified in the small community where he ran as a candidate is purely speculative and con-ectural, unsupported as it is by any convincing facts of record to show notoriety of his alleged dis$ualification. K1#L 5n sum, we see the dismissal of the petition for dis$ualification as not having been attended by grave abuse of discretion. .here is then no more legal impediment for private respondentPs continuance in office as City Councilor for the Second /istrict of Manila. 8!ERE'ORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby /5SM5SS)/ for lac, of merit. .he assailed resolution of respondent Commission on )lections &C'M)4)C* is SP: +"-!(! dated ?uly 1(, (++% is hereby :225;M)/. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. *ar asa, "J., -e$alado, !a ide, Jr., 3elo, Puno, .itu$, 3endoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Pan$aniban, and Torres, Jr., J., concur. G.R. No. L-58-89 *+l, -9, 198VALENT#NO L. LEGAS1#, petitioner, vs. T!E !ONORA/LE "#N#STER O' '#NAN E and T!E !ONORA/LE O""#SS#ONER andDor T!E /&REA& O' #NTERNAL REVEN&EE respondents. /ARREDO, J.: Petition filed by the Donorable >alentino 4. 4egaspi, incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, praying that this Court declare Presidential /ecree (07# Ggranting ta amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposesG unconstitutional. .he petition contains the following allegationsA ". .hat said decree was issued by the President under supposed legislative powers granted him under :mendment No. % of the Constitution proclaimed in full force and effect as of 'ctober !6, (+6% pursuant to Proclamation No. ("+" and which is $uoted as followsA Chenever in the ?udgment of the President, there e ists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National :ssembly fails or is unable to act ade$uately on any matter for any reason that in his -udgment re$uires immediate action, he may in order to meet the e igency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land. %. .hat said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution G&.*he legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang PambansaG &Sec. (, :rticle >555* and the President may grant amnesty only with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa &Sec. ((, :rt. >55*= 6. .hat :mendment No. % is not one of the powers granted the President by the Constitution as amended in the plebiscite of :pril 6, (+0(= that while Section (% of :rt. >55 of the Constitution providesA :ll powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the (+1" Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein provided for on conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are hereby vested in the President unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise. such re-confirmation of e isting powers did not mean to include the President3s legislative powers under :mendment No. %A by Gthe laws of the land which are not herein provided for or conferred upon any officialG only those laws that have been passed by the e isting and<or prior legislature are intended= 0. .hat the ;espondents are intending and in fact implementing the provisions of the $uestioned decree and the same tends to affect all ta payers in the Philippines including herein Petitioner= that he is now in a $uandary on whether to ta,e advantage of the benefits of said decree since the same is of doubtful constitutionality leaving him no protection as guaranteed by the decree and thus sub-ect him to prosecution for violation of which otherwise would have held him immune under said decree= +. .hat as a member of the Batasang Pambansa he ,nows that the sub-ect of the $uestioned decree has not been brought to the attention of the Batasang Pambansa re$uiring immediate attention, the fact being that the original ta amnesty decree which the $uestioned decree amended or modified has long been effective and implemented by the ;espondents while the Batasang Pambansa was in session= (#. .hat Presidential /ecree No. (07# is patently null and void having been passed without the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa and it is li,ewise of public interest and of the nation that the $uestion of whether the President retained his legislative power after lifting Martial 4aw and after the Constitution was amended on :pril 6, (+0( be resolved= ((. .hat the $uestioned decree being the first dated after the lifting of Martial 4aw and the :pril 6 amendments brings to test the validity of the e ercise of standby emergency powers invo,ed in :mendment No. %. &Pp. 1-%, record.* :s the petitioner himself puts it in his memorandum, the issue isA Chether the (+61 Constitution as amended by Plebiscite-;eferendum of (+6%, retained the same amendments, more particularly :mendment No. %, after it was again amended in the Plebiscite held on :pril 6, (+0(J

'n the issue thus formulated by petitioner, it is maintained that G:mendment No. % is rendered inoperable, deleted and<or repealed by the amendments of :pril 6, (+0(G. 'pening his discussion of this proposition thusA :mendment No. % as originally submitted to the people for ratification under Pres. /ec. No. (#11, and thereafter approved reads as followsA Chenever in the -udgment of the President &Prime Minister*, there e ists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the 5nterim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National :ssembly fails or is unable to act ade$uately on any matter for any reason that in his -udgment re$uires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the e igency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall form part of the law of the land. 1hether the matter or that there %as an e0i$enc# %hich re7uired immediate action let it be conceded that in the 4ud$ment of the President such facts do e0ist. &)mphasis ours* 5t is to be observed that the original te t mentions President &Prime Minister*. .his is so because under No. 1 of the same amendment, ... .he incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to e ercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organi9ed and ready to discharge its functions, and li,ewise he shall continue to e ercise his powers and prerogatives under the (+1" Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution. Parenthetically, the term G5ncumbent PresidentG employed in the transitory provisions could only refer to President 2erdinand ). Marcos &:$uino vs. Commission on )lections, %! SC;: !6"*. :fter the :pril 6 amendments there e ists no longer Ga President &Prime Minister*G but G: PresidentGand G: Prime Minister.G .hey are now two different offices which cannot be held by a single person @ not a transitory one but a regular one provided for and governed by the main provisions of the newly amended Constitution. Subse$uent events accept the reality that we are no longer governed by the transitory provisions of the Constitution. &Pp. !6-!0, ;ecord.* petitioner rationali9es his affirmative position thereon this wiseA 5s :mendment No. % of the (+61 Constitution as approved in (+6% reproduced or unaffected by the :pril 6, (+0( amendmentJ 'r, is it considered repealed by 'missionJ .he Constitutional provisions of the Presidency do not restate the provisions of :mendment No. % which grants the President &Prime Minister* limited powers to legislate. .his is tantamount to a withdrawal or deletion of such grant. .here is no way by which the incumbent President be referred to anymore as the Gincumbent PresidentG in the amendment of (+6%. Chile it is true that :mendment No. % fails to distinguish between GincumbentG and GregularG all provisions with reference to the powers of the Presidency is deemed foreclosed by :rticle >55 of the newly amended Constitution. :rticle >55 enumerates presidential powers. .o construe that the (+6% :mendments are still applicable, other than that referring to the 5nterim Batasang Pambansa would be an incompatibility to the application of the present constitutional provisions. 8enerally ta,en, the (+6% amendments are amendments to the transitory provisions of the Constitution. 5nsofar as the office of the President or the Prime Minister is concerned they have ceased to be governed by the transitory provisions but under the newly amended Constitution. Batas Pambansa Blg. (!" called for the election of a President under the newly amended Constitution. President Marcos ran as candidate and was proclaimed the duly elected President of the Philippines by resolution no. ! of the Batasang Pambansa dated ?une !(, (+0(. De too, his oath of office as the duly elected President. .he Prime Minister, the Members of the Cabinet and the ) ecutive Committee too, their oaths after having been appointed and are now e ercising their functions pursuant to the new provisions. Ce even consider ourselves the 2ourth ;epublic because of a new system of government. Chat particular part of the newly amended Constitution would :mendment No. % fit inJ President 2erdinand ). Marcos ceased to be the incumbent resident referred to in the transitory provisions or in the (+6% amendments. .he Solicitor 8eneral argued that :mendment No. % provided for the contingency that the office would be separated consisting of a ceremonial President and a Prime Minister who will be he e ecutive. Fet, without e press constitutional grant the President now assumes a power intended to be that of the Prime Minister. .he intent of the (+0( amendments could not be interpreted any other way e cept that after the amendment it would no longer be proper to e ercise those reposed upon the Prime Minister. Powers previously reposed upon the Prime Minister were e pressly removed from him and given to the President. :mendment No. % is not one of those. .he proposed amendments under Batasan . No. (#7 became Nuestion No. ( in the ballot of :pril 6, (+0( plebiscite to which the voter was as,ed &B.P. Blg. (!!*A /o you vote for the approval of an amendment to the Constitution and to :mendment No. !, as proposed by the Batasang Pambansa in ;esolution No. !, which, in substance, calls for the establishment of a modified parliamentary system, amending for this purpose :rticles >55, >555 and 5E of the Constitution, with the following principal featuresA ...

Nowhere in feature &(* was it submitted that the President would en-oy conditional or $ualified legislative powers as modified parliamentary system. .he original intent to set out the original act or section as amended is most commonly indicated by a statement in the amendatory act that the original law is amended to Gread as follows.G .he new statute is a substitute for the original act or section. 'nly those provisions of the original act or section repeated in the amendment are retained &Paras vs. 4and ;egistration Commission, ?uly !%, (+%#, 4-(%#((*. .hat G.he 4egislative power shall be vested in the Batasang PambansaG is an old provision which has been retained. .his in essence was Nuestion No. ( in the :pril 6 Plebiscite as to who e ercise legislative powers and who are to e ecute. Nowhere in the approved :mendment can it be hinted that the hybrid-type of government also includes a one-man legislature. .he intent to repose legislation only upon the Batasan is very apparent. .he adoption of the new Constitution repeals and supersedes all the provisions of the older one not continued in force by the new instrument &(% C.?.S. 00*. &Pp. 1#-11, ;ecord.* :fter mature study and deliberation and considering the peculiar circumstances that dictated the formulation of :mendment No. %, the Court3s conclusion is, that :ssemblyman-Petitioners posture lac,s, to say the least, sufficient merit. Constitutional law is not simply the literal application of the words of the Charter. .he ancient and familiar rule of constitutional construction that has consistently maintained its intrinsic and transcendental worth is that the meaning and understanding conveyed by the language, albeit plain, of any of its provisions do not only portray the influence of current events and developments but li,ewise the inescapable imperative considerations rooted in the historical bac,ground and environment at the time of its adoption and thereby caused their being written as part and parcel thereof. :s long as this Court adheres closest to this perspective in viewing any attac, against any part of the Constitution, to the end of determining what it actually encompasses and how it should be understood, no one can say Ce have misguided 'urselves. None can reasonably contend Ce are treading the wrong way. .rue enough :rticle >555, Sec. ( of the Philippine Constitution as amended in (+0( e plicitly ordains that G&.*he legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang PambansaG. Section !, however, readily reveals that the Batasang Pambansa contemplated in that Section ( is the regular assembly &formerly referred to as National :ssembly, now as Batasang Pambansa @ evidently to indigeni9e the nomenclature, which, incidentally should have been done also with the Pangulo and Pangunang Ministro*, to be elected in May (+07, per Sec. "&(* of the same :rticle. .hus, to begin with, in the instant case, Ce must ,eep in mind that at least for the present and until (+07, what can be properly discussed here are only the legislative powers of the interim Batasang Pambansa as such. Cithout intending any reflection on any of those responsible for the 5dea, it may be that it is for non-essential reasons that the current legislative assembly is being referred to generally simply as the Batasang Pambansa. 2or in legal truth and in actual fact, and as e pressly admitted by petitioner, it is inherently no more no less than the same interim. Batasang Pambansa created by :mendment No. ! by virtue of the ;eferendumPlebiscite of 'ctober (%-(6, (+6%. :nd, in this connection, it may be observed that indubitably, and as a necessary and logical conse$uence, the amendment of :mendment No. ! in (+0( carried with it the corresponding appropriate ad-ustments literal and otherwise of :mendment Nos. 1 and 7, although these latter two were not specifically mentioned in the proposal pursuant to BP-C: ;esolution No. 7 of the Batasan, acting as a constituent body nor in the Plebiscite ;eferendum :ct itself, much less in the ballots presented to and used by the voters. .his is because it cannot be denied that :mendments 1 and 7 are by their very nature inseparable parts of amendment No. !. But e amining closely how the (+0( amendments altered :mendment No. !, it will be readily seen that the only change consisted of the noninclusion of the Gincumbent PresidentG as member of the assembly in pursuance of the fundamental ob-ective to separate the Presidency from the regular legislative body and thereby establish in our country a modified form of parliamentary government more appropriate for and suitable to the peculiar conditions of our political development and the idiosyncrasies of our people, and at the same time introduce into it features that would strengthen its structure so as to enable the government to cope with emergencies or abnormal situations, not only li,e those that presently e ist but even those that might arise in the future. .hus, it is characteri9ed with a presidency more powerful than the idea of a strong President desired by President Nue9on and actually embodied in the (+1" Constitution. 5t is, therefore, evident that the reference to :mendment No. ! in the amendments of (+0( was not intended at all to convert or upgrade the present e isting assembly into the regular Batasang Pambansa. .o repeat, what we have now is still the interim Batasang Pambansa created in (+6%. 5mportantly, it must be said that had the present Batasan, acting as a constituent body, ever thought of ma,ing itself the regular National :ssembly, the very odious spectacle that the people re-ected when in the referendum of ?anuary (#-(", (+61 they repulsed and repudiated the interim National :ssembly provided for in Sections ( and ! of :rticle E>55 &.ransitory Provisions* of the (+61 Constitution whereby the members of the old Congress of the Philippines made themselves automatically members of the interim assembly would have resuscitated, and we can readily imagine how the reaction of our people would have been e actly the same as in (+61 and for sure the (+0( proposed constitutional amendment affecting the Batasang would again have been denied sanction by our people. Daving arrived at the ineludible that the present Batasan is still interim, it also ineluctably follows that its legislative authority cannot be more e clusive now after (+0( amendments than when it was originally created in (+6%. .hus even as the interim Batasan which came into being Gin lieu of the 5nterim National :ssemblyG by virtue of :mendment No. ! conse$uently ac$uired Gthe same powers and its Members @ the same functions, responsibilities, rights and privileges, and dis$ualifications as the regular National :ssembly and the members thereofG, there can be no $uestion that coeval with the creation of the interim Batasan, :mendment No. % came into force and effect. :nd :mendment No. % mandates in une$uivocal and unambiguous terms the grant of concurrent legislative authority to an official &the President KPrime MinisterL* who is not in the Batasan itself. 5n brief, the ine orable logic of the events that brought forth the present Batasan leads to no other conclusion than that the legislative authority vested in it by :mendment No. !, read together with Section (, :rticle E>55 and Section (, of :rticle >555 of the (+61 Constitution, is sub-ect to the e ternal concurrent legislative prerogative that :mendment No. % vests on the GPresident &Prime Minister*.G :ctually, the insistence of petitioner that :mendment No. % has been repealed by the (+0( amendments springs from another point of view. 5t is fundamentally based on analysis and ratiocination related to the language and tenor thereof. Petitioner maintains that said amendments vested

e traordinary legislative powers on Gthe President &Prime Minister*G and on nobody else, and since there is no one who is President &Prime Minister* under our present governmental set-up pursuant to (+0( amendments, no one in the e isting government can e ercise said powers. .he persuasive force of such theory is more apparent than real. :s Ce have said earlier, the Constitution is not merely a literal document to be always read according to the plain and ordinary signification of its words. Beneath and beyond the literal terms of the Charter, li,e a mine of incalculably immense treasures, are elements and factors radiating from political and economic developments of the situation prevailing at the time of the inclusion of any particular provision thereof or amendment thereto. 5t is only from the light of the implications of such elements and factors that the real essence and significance of the words of the constitutional provision under scrutiny can be properly and ade$uately seen and comprehended. Cith reference to :mendment No. %, it is of decisive importance that anyone who would try to decipher its true import should be ac$uainted with its ration d>tre, i.e., the whys and the wherefores thereof. Contrary to the imputations of petitioner, this amendment is not rooted in the authoritarian, much less dictatorial tendencies or inclinations of anyone. :ny tinge or tint of authoritarianism in it is not there for the sa,e of the 5deology of dictatorship or authoritarian itself. Such hue of a one-man authoritarianism it somehow connotes is there only because it is so dictated by paramount considerations that are needed in order to safeguard the very e istence and integrity of the nation and all that it stands for. Perhaps the truism@ almost a dogma@well recogni9ed by constitutionalists and political scientists of all persuasions as a convenient pragmatic rule for survival of nations, namely, that in an emergency, the best form of government is a dictatorship, might have been in the mind of those who formulated it, but it is $uite obvious, as will be e plained anon, that other fundamental factors must have been ta,en into account in order precisely to minimi9e the rigors and generally feared oppressiveness of a dictatorship in an unrestricted martial regime, its being dubbed as martial law GPhilippine styleG notwithstanding. :t this -uncture, it must be emphatically made clear that e plicitly the power that :mendment No. % vests upon the GPresident &Prime Minister*G are to be e ercised only on two specified occasions, namely, &(* Gwhen in &his -udgment* a grave emergency e ists or there is a threat or imminence thereofG and &!* Gwhenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National :ssembly &now regular Batasang Pambansa* fails or is unable to act ade$uately on any matter for any reason that in his -udgment re$uires immediate action.G .he power is to Gissue necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction which shall form part of the law of the land.G :s the tenor of the amendment readily imparts, such power may be e ercised even when the Batasan is in session. 'bviously, therefore, it is a power that is in the nature of the other Powers which the Constitution directly confers upon the President or allows to be delegated to him by the Batasan in times of crises and emergencies. 5ndeed, it is but fitting and proper that in framing the fundamental law of the land which sets up a form of government and defines and delimits the powers thereof and its officers, reserving as they must plenary sovereignty to themselves, the people should prudently provide what powers may and should be e ercised by the government and<or its officials in times of crises and emergencies that could -eopardi9e the very life and<or territorial integrity of the country. )ven as individual rights and liberties are valued and enshrined as inviolable, the people, as they write their Charter thru a convention or other legitimate means, cannot ignore that in the event of war, insurrection, rebellion or invasion, including any other critical situation, any one of which cannot but affect the regular course of normal constitutional processes and institutions as well as the prerogatives and freedoms of individual citi9ens of and inhabitants within the country, appropriate protective, defensive and rehabilitative measures must be provided therein and may be made to function or operate. :ccordingly, both in the (+1" Constitution of the Philippines and in that of (+61, the following provisions were precisely intended to operate during such perilous situationsA (. 5n times of war or other national emergency, the Batasang Pambansa may by law authori9e the President for a limited period and sub-ect to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to e ercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Bnless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Batasang Pambansa, such powers shall cease upon its ne t ad-ournment. .he (+1" version of this provision differs from it in that what was granted to the President was not the broad authority Gto e ercise such powers necessary and properG but only to issue rules and regulations purported to accomplish the same ob-ective. !. Section (#&!* of :rticle >55 of the (+1" Constitution provided thusA ... &!* .he President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. 5n case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety re$uires it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under the martial law... Bnder Section (! of :rticle 5E of the (+61 Constitution, e actly the same powers were conferred on the Prime Minister. Dowever, what is now Section + of :rticle >555 under the (+0( amendments transferred all said powers to the President. :s can be seen, as authori9ed by the Commander-in-Chief clause of all our Constitutions, there have been as there still are three other measures that may be resorted to during an emergency, namelyA &(* Call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when public safety re$uires it= &!* Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and &1* Place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. 5t appears, therefore, that within the four corners of the Constitution itself, whether that of (+1" or that of (+61, there were four constitutionally designed ways of coping with abnormal situations in the country, namelyA &(* the so-called emergency powers delegated by the assembly to the President= &!* the calling of the armed forces= &1* the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and &7* the placing of the country or any

part thereof under martial law. Bnderstandably, it is to be supposed that these measures are to be resorted to one after the other according to the degree of gravity of the situation. : bac,ward glance at our past e periences since the implantation of :merican sovereignty in our country at the turn of the century should remind us that at one time or another all of these four measures have been resorted to, albeit martial law proclamations in the long past were limited in area and duration because of the locali9ed nature of the disturbances they were meant to remedy. Bearing all the foregoing considerations in mind, the $uestion that naturally arises at this -uncture is what need is there for the power contemplated in :mendment No. %J Chy does the country have to have a one-man legislating authority concurrent with the Batasang PambansaJ :re the abovediscussed safeguards not enoughJ :t this point, it must be noted that :mendment No. % does not refer only to the interim Batasang Pambansa but also to the regular GNational :ssemblyG &now Batasang Pambansa*, a consideration which lends force to the conclusion that the (+0( amendments could not have been intended nor understood to do away with it. Chat, indeed, is the fundamental ration d>tre of :mendment No. %J 5t is to be recalled that the said amendment was formulated in 'ctober (+6%, more than fully four years after the whole Philippines was first placed under martial law pursuant to Proclamation (#0( dated September !(, (+6!. .rue, without loss of time, President Marcos made it clear that there was no military ta,e-over of the government, and that much less was there being established a revolutionary government, even as he declared that said martial law was of a double-barrelled typed, unfamiliar to traditional constitutionalists and political scientists @ for two basic and transcendental ob-ectives were intended by itA &(* the $uelling of nationwide subversive activities characteristic not only of a rebellion but of a state of war fanned by a foreign power of a different 5deology from ours, and not e cluding the stopping effectively of a brewing, if not a strong separatist movement in Mindanao, and &!* the establishment of a New Society by the institution of disciplinary measures designed to eradicate the deep-rooted causes of the rebellion and elevate the standards of living education and culture of our people, and most of an the social amelioration of the poor and underprivileged in the farms and in the barrios, to the end that hopefully insurgency may not rear its head in this country again. .he immediate reaction of some sectors of the nation was of astonishment and dismay, for even if everyone ,new that the gravity of the disorder, lawlessness, social in-ustice, youth and student activism and other disturbing movements had reached a point of peril, they felt that martial law over the whole country was not yet warranted. Corse, political motivations were ascribed to be behind the proclamation, what with the then constitutionally une tendible term of President Marcos about to e pire, and this suspicion became more credible when opposition leaders and outspo,en anti-administration media people who did not hesitate to resort even to libel were immediately placed under indefinite detention in military camps and other unusual restrictions were imposed on travel, communication, freedom of speech and of the press, etc. 5n a word, the martial law regime was anathema to no small portion of the populace. Criticisms or ob-ections thereto were, of course, mostly covert, but there were even instances of open resistance. .ruth to tell, martial law is generally unwelcome anywhere in the world. :nd when it is prolonged without anyone ,nowing when it would be lifted, the feeling of discontent grows and spreads. 5ndeed, it is difficult to describe fully in an opinion li,e this all that many consider obno ious in martial law. Suffice it to say that the New Society that came out of it did have its laudatory features appreciated by large segments of the people, but with many cases of abuses of the military marring such receptive attitude, the clamor for the early lifting of martial law became more and more audible. Ce can definitely say that no one more than President Marcos was aware of those feelings and sentiments and, in fact, even of the undercurrents of resistance. :nd as Ce visuali9e the situation he found himself in, he was faced with no less than a dilemma. De was convinced of the advantages, not personally to him, but to general welfare of martial law, but at the same time he was also conscious that martial law, in any form @ call it Philippine style, smiling, benign or with any other euphemistic ad-ective @ was growing to be more and more distasteful. )ven the New Society it was supposed to bring about was slowly losing its splendor. Bac,sliding was creeping in some ways, discipline was loosening. But over and above all such adverse developments, the perils to national security and public order still remained, if in a slightly lesser degree. 5t was in the light of the above circumstances and as a means of solving the dilemma aforementioned that the concept embodied in :mendment No. % was born. 5n brief, the central 5dea that emerged was that martial law may be earlier lifted, but to safeguard our country and people against any abrupt dangerous situation which would warrant the e ercise of some authoritarian powers, the latter must be constitutionally allowed, thereby to obviate the need to proclaim martial law and its concomitants, principally the assertion by the military of prerogatives that made them appear superior to the civilian authorities below the President. 5n other words, the problem was what may be needed for national survival or the restoration of normalcy in the face of a crisis or an emergency should be reconciled with the popular mentality and attitude of the people against martial law. Ce have said earlier that the Constitution has four built-in measures to cope with crises and emergencies. .o reiterate, they areA &a* emergency powers e pressly delegated by the Batasan= &b* call of the armed forces, who otherwise are supposed to be in the barrac,s= &c* suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus= and &d* martial law. 'f these four, the people disli,e martial law most and would, if possible, do away with it in the Constitution. :nd the President who first conceived of what is now :mendment No. % ,new this. .hus, 'ur understanding of the development of events and attitudes that led to the adoption of :mendment No. % is that in addition to the four measures authori9ed in the body of the charter, this amendment is supposed to be a fifth one purportedly designed to ma,e it practically unnecessary to proclaim martial law, e cept in instances of actual surface warfare or rebellious activities or very sophisticated subversive actions that cannot be ade$uately met without martial law itself. >ery evidently, the purpose of :mendment No. % is that the Philippines be henceforth spared of martial law unless manifest e treme situations should ever demand it. .o recapitulate, the amendments of 'ctober (+6% were deliberately designed against martial law. .he creation thereby of the interim Batasang Pambansa in lieu of the interim National :ssembly which never came into being because of vehement and -ustified popular repudiation thereof was definitely an indispensable step towards the lifting of martial law. )veryone can understand that martial law could not be lifted without a legislative body to ma,e the laws. .he legislative authority could not be left in the hands of the President &Prime Minister*. 5t would have been anachronistic to lift martial law and still leave the law-ma,ing authority with the President &Prime Minister* alone. ;elatedly but more importantly, the vesting of the legislative authority to the interim Batasang Pambansa, without more or e clusively, would have maintained the safeguards of national security only to the four traditional constitutional measures repeatedly discussed above, including martial law. .he framers of the amendment reali9ed only too well they had to loo, for a remedy thereto, the disli,e of the people, -ustified or not, of martial law.

:nd so, to ma,e the proclamation of martial law remotest, but nevertheless enable the government to meet emergencies effectively, they conceived the 5dea of granting to the President &Prime Minister* the power endowed to him by :mendment No. %. S,eptics and hardcore critics of the administration there must be who would sarcastically allude to :mendment No. % as martial law -ust the same but only li,e a dog with merely another collar. : word of e planation is thus called for of the vital differences between one and the other. .he attitude of those who are opposed to :mendment No. % must be due to lac, of sufficient ac$uaintance with the real essence of the various constitutionally authori9ed emergency measures imperatively needed to safeguard the national security and integrity already discussed above. .he delegation of legislative power thru the issuance of rules and regulations to carry out a national policy declared by the Batasan has its own virtues as a restrained way of conferring law-ma,ing authority to the ) ecutive during an emergency. 5t is limited, restricted, sub-ect to conditions and temporary. 5t is obviously the simplest remedy to cope with an abnormal situation resulting in the least violence to revered democratic republican processes constitutionally established. But being purely a political and legislative remedy, it cannot be ade$uate when lawless violence becomes generali9ed and public safety is in -eopardy, hence the need to call out the armed forces. :nd when such situation still aggravates to the point of re$uiring the preventive incarceration or detention of certain leaders or over active elements, it becomes inevitable to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Should matters really go out of hand even after the putting into effect of the measures aforementioned, under the constitution. without :mendment No. %, the only recourse would be to proclaim martial law. But inasmuch as martial law is an e treme measure that carries with it repressive and restrictive elements unpopular to liberty loving and democratically minded sectors of the country, it is but natural to thin, of it only as a very last resort. Cell, it is to avoid the necessity of resorting to the proclamation of martial law that :mendment No. % was conceived. Paraphrasing President Marcos himself, martial law is the law of the gun, that implies coercion and an active and direct role in the government by the military. .hus, the virtue of :mendment No. % is that such undesirable features of martial law do not have to accompany the e ercise of the power thereby conferred on the ) ecutive. .o be sure, the calling out of the armed forces and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which are concomitants of martial law, may be left out or need not be resorted to when the President acts by virtue of such power. 5t is, therefore, evident that it is grossly erroneous to say that :mendment No. % is in reality no less than disguised martial law. :pparently conceding, at least in $ratia ar$umenti, the truth and the logic of all the foregoing discussion and conclusions, petitioner raises the $uestion of how can :mendment No. % fit into the new set up under the (+0( amendments, which abolished the dual position of President Marcos of President-Prime Minister mandated by the (+6% :mendment No. 1. :ccording to petitioner, President Marcos is President now &no longer PresidentPrime Minister* pursuant to the (+0( amendments and by virtue of his election as such as proclaimed by the Batasan on ?une !(, (+0(. Not without a bit of sarcasm, petitioner even refers to the reference to the status of our government after the inauguration of President Marcos as the 2ourth ;epublic. Dow then, petitioner as,s, can the President of the 2ourth Philippine ;epublic e ercise powers granted to the President-Prime Minister of the provisional government established by the .ransitory Provisions and conferred upon him only by :mendment No. % of 'ctober (+6%J 5f Ce go solely by the rules of literature, a considerable degree of plausibility, as Ce have intimated earlier in this opinion, may be conceded to the pose of petitioner. 5t indeed seems that since the positions of President and Prime Minister have been separated by the (+0( amendments and the same do not state to whom the power under :mendment No. % would appertain, neither the present President nor the present Prime Minister can e ercise such power. But again, Ce hold that petitioner is laboring under a misconception of facts and of the principles of constitutional construction. )arlier hereinabove, Ce discoursed on the inevitability of the conclusion that the current Batasan, being merely interim Gin lieu of the interim National :ssemblyG established under Section ( of the .ransitory Provisions, it is sub-ect to the provisions of :mendment No. % which was approved and ratified together with the creation of the Batasan. Ce have also made a rather e tensive e position of the whys and wherefores behind :mendment No. %. :s may be noted, the ultimate thrust of 'ur discussion is to establish as a legal proposition that behind and beneath the words of the amendment, the literal reference to Gthe President &Prime Minister*G in :mendment No. % was the intention to ma,e such reference descriptive of the person on whom is vested the totality of the e ecutive power under the system of government established thereby. 2or as a matter of general principle in constitutional law, belonging as he does to the political department of the government, it is only with such official that, the high prerogative of policy determination can be shared. :nd in this connection, it is very important to note that the amendment does not spea, of the Gincumbent PresidentG only, as in the other amendments, li,e Nos. (, 1 and ", but of the President, meaning to include all future presidents. More, :mendment No. % ma,es mention not only of the interim Batasan but also of the regular one. :ll these unmista,ably imply that the power conferred upon the President thereby was not for President Marcos alone but for whoever might be President of the Philippines in the future. :s to the parenthetical mention therein of the Prime Minister, Ce are of the considered view that it was necessary to do so because under the governmental system then, which was mar,edly Prime Ministerial, the substantive e ecutive powers were vested in the Prime Minister, the President being merely the symbolical and ceremonial head of state, and the two positions were being held by one and the same person. 5n other words, the power was contemplated to be conferred upon whomsoever was vested the e ecutive power, and that is as it should be, for, to reiterate, from the very nature of the power itself, the authority to legislate should be allowed, if at all, to be shared only with one in the political department, directly deriving power from the vote of the people. Cithal, as the Solicitor 8eneral aptly posits, it is neither sound nor in consonance with well and long settled principles of constitutional construction to recogni9e amendments or repeals of constitutional provisions by implications, specially in regard to a transcendental matter as that herein under discussion. 5ndeed, the fact that :mendment No. % was not in any way or sense mentioned in the amendments submitted to the people for ratification in (+0( and there being nothing in the latter intrinsically inconsistent with the former, it is safe to conclude that it would be deceiving the people themselves and depriving them of something they had decided in (+6% to be part of the fundamental law of the land to now eliminate the power conferred by them upon the ) ecutive of sharing legislative authority with the Batasan on appropriate occasions of emergency and urgency. :nent petitioner3s claim that the President may not constitutionally grant the amnesty provided for in P./. (07#, to 'ur mind, the following well ta,en brief answer of the Solicitor 8eneral, with whom Ce fully agree, is more than sufficient to dispose of the same adversely to petitioner3s stanceA

Petitioner argues that Presidential /ecree (07# is li,ewise invalid for it did not en-oy the concurrence of the Batasan. De relies on :rticle >55, Section (( of the Constitution which provides that @ .he President may, e cept in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty. :gain, we beg to disagree. :rticle >55, sec. ((, applies only when the President is e ercising his power of e ecutive clemency. 5n the case at bar, Presidential /ecree (07# was issued pursuant to his power to legislate under :mendment No. %. 5t ought to be indubitable that when the President acts as legislator as in the case at bar, he does not need the concurrence of the Batasan. ;ather, he e ercises concurrent authority vested by the Constitution. Ce cannot close this opinion without underscoring the patent tendency and unrelenting effort of the leadership of the country to ma,e our government and our way of life indigenously 2ilipino as much as it is possible to ma,e them so. 5t has, of course, tried its utmost to see what is good in other lands, but it has chosen generally to bring out what is best in our own traditions, usages, customs and systems that have proven efficacious and beneficial during the times of our forebears. .he sanggunians and barangays, which have inherited from the 2ilipinos of the past and that have been institutionali9ed in Constitutional :mendment No. 6 of (+6% have, as everyone can see, proven to be unsha,able bedroc,s for the foundation of duly constituted governmental authority with firm nationwide mass base. 'ur present government, if in some ways similar to any foreign one, is in truth a product of our own genius in political science and matters of government. Nowhere else in the world but in the Philippines are martial law decrees and acts sub-ect to the -udicial scrutiny of the Supreme Court. :mendment No. % is of the same strain. 5t is our native and indigenous way of coping with crucial situations. Ce are 2ilipinos, so much so that the writer of this opinion has purposely avoided reference to, much less lifted $uotations from alien -urisprudence and authorities. 5f only in this particular case, it is but appropriate to use language and style of our own. :ll the above premises ta,en into account. 'ur considered conclusion and -udgment is that :mendment No. % of 'ctober (+6% of the Constitution of (+61 has not been in anyway altered or modified, much less repealed by the constitutional amendments of (+0(. CD);)2';), the petition is dismissed. No costs. 3a&asiar, "oncepcion, Jr. Guerrero, Plana, 'scolin, .as7uez and -elo a, JJ., concur. 3elencio:Herrera, J., concur in the result. Teehan&ee, ,., reser es his ote. Gutierrez, Jr. J., is on lea e. G.R. No. 910-3 *+l, 13, 1990 "ETRO1OL#TAN TRA''# O""AND 8EST TRA''# D#STR# T, petitioner, vs. !ON. ARSEN#O ". GONONG, in =is 6apa6i5, as 1r4sidinB *+dB4 o< 5=4 R4Bional Trial o+r5, /ran6= 8 a5 "anila, and DANTE S. DAV#D, respondents. !ante S. !a id for and in his o%n behalf as pri ate respondent. R&2, J.: Ce deal here with a practice ,nown to many motorists in Metro ManilaA the removal of the license plates of illegally par,ed vehicles. .his was challenged by the private respondent in the regional trial court of Manila, which held the practice unlawful. .he petitioner is now before us, urging reversal of the decision for grave abuse of discretion. .he original complaint was filed with the said court on :ugust (#, (+0+, by /ante S. /avid, a lawyer, who claimed that the rear license plate, of his car was removed by the Metropolitan .raffic Command while the vehicle was par,ed on )scolta. De $uestioned the petitioner3s act on the ground not only that the car was not illegally par,ed but, more importantly, that there was no ordinance or law authori9ing such removal. De as,ed that the practice be permanently en-oined and that in the meantime a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary in-unction be issued. ?udge :rsenio M. 8onong issued a temporary restraining order on :ugust (7, (+0+, and hearings on the writ of preliminary in-unction were held on :ugust (0, !1, and !", (+0+. .he writ was granted on this last date. .he parties also agreed to submit the case for resolution on the sole issue of whether there was a law or ordinance authori9ing the removal of the license plates of illegally par,ed vehicles. .he parties then submitted simultaneous memoranda in support of their respective positions, following which the respondent -udge rendered the assailed decision. 5n ruling for the complainant, ?udge 8onong held that 4'5 71, which the defendant had invo,ed, did not empower it Gto detach, remove and confiscate vehicle plates of motor vehicles illegally par,ed and unattended as in the case at bar. 5t merely authori9es the removal of said vehicles when they are obstacles to free passage or continued flow of traffic on streets and highways.G :t any rate, he said, the 4'5 had been repealed by P/ (%#". Moreover, the defendant had not been able to point to any MMC rule or regulation or to any city ordinance to -ustify the $uestioned act. 'n the allegation that the practice was Gthe root cause of graft and corruption or at the very least the e$uivalent of street rac,et among defendant3s deployed agents,G Dis Donor made the following pointed observationsA :t this -uncture, it may not be amiss to say, that if the arbitrary and capricious detachment and confiscation of vehicles plates illegally par,ed and unattended as in the act complained of in the instant case, the image of the man clothed in a traffic or police

uniform will be greatly impaired if not cursed with disrespect on the part of those who have suffered at his hands. Corse, he will cease &if he had not already ceased* to be the law-abiding, courageous and valiant protector of a citi9en of the ;epublic that he is meant to be, and instead his real oppressor and enemy, thereby fortifying the contemporaneous public perception that he is a dyed-in-the-wool e tortionist if not an unmitigated chiseler. 1 5t bears noting that this petition should have been filed first with the Court of :ppeals, which has concurrent -urisdiction with this Court on decisions of the regional trial courts involving $uestions of law. Dowever, in view of the importance of the issue raised, we have decided to ta,e cogni9ance thereof under ;ule %" of the ;ules of Court so we can address and resolve the $uestion directly. Bpon the filing of this petition, we issued a temporary restraining order dated 2ebruary %, (++#, to prevent enforcement of the said decision until further orders from this Court. .hereafter, we re$uired a comment from the private respondent, to which the petitioner filed a reply as also directed. .he petitioner reiterates and reinforces its argument in the court below and insists that 4'5 71 remains in force despite the issuance of P/ (%#". 5t contends that there is no inconsistency between the two measures because the former deals with illegally par,ed vehicles anywhere in the Philippines whereas the latter deals with the regulation of the flow of traffic in the Metro Manila area only. .he two measures may be enforced together because implied repeals are not favored and, furthermore, to loo, at them another way, 4'5 71 is the special law dealing only with illegal par,ing while P/ (%#" is the general law dealing with all other ,inds of traffic violations. .he special law must of course prevail over the general law. .he petitioner also deplores the above-$uoted remar,s of the trial -udge, pointing out that the parties had agreed to limit the issue to whether there was a statutory basis for the act complained of. :nd even assuming that abuses have been committed in the enforcement of 4'5 71, the remedy is not to disregard it or consider it revo,ed but to prosecute the guilty parties. 5n his comment, the private respondent argues that 4'5 71 has been repealed by P/ (%#", which specifies all the sanctions available against the various traffic violations, including illegal par,ing. De stresses that removal and confiscation of the license plates of illegally par,ed vehicles is not one of them, the penalties being limited in the decree to imposition of fine and suspension or revocation of driver3s licenses or certificates of public convenience, etc. '0pressio unius est e0clusio alterius. De agrees that the special law prevails over the general law but maintains it is P/ (%#" that is the special law because it is applicable only on Metro Manila and 4'5 71 that is the general law because it was intended to operate throughout the country. :s for his allegation that the challenged practice is a source of graft, he maintains that it was not improper to discuss it in his memorandum because it was pertinent to the central issue under consideration. 2inally, he claims that removal and confiscation of the license plate without notice and hearing violates due process because such license plate is a form of property protected by the Bill of ;ights against unlawful deprivation. 5n its reply, the petitioner faults the private respondent for belatedly raising the constitutionality of 4'5 71, suggesting faintly that this should not be permitted. 5n any case, it maintains, the license plate is not property in the constitutional sense, being merely the identification of the vehicle, and its Gtemporary confiscationG does not deprive the owner of the use of the vehicle itself. Dence, there is no unlawful ta,ing under the due process clause. .he petitioner also ta,es issue with the contention that it is P/ (%#" that should be considered the special law because of its limited territorial application. ;epeal of 4'5 71 on that ground would run counter to the legislative intention as it is in fact in Metro Manila that the problem of illegal par,ing is most acute. 4'5 71, entitled Measures to )ffect a Continuing 2low of .ransportation on Streets and Dighways, was issued on November !0, (+6!, with the following pertinent provisionsA Motor vehicles that stall on the streets and highways, streets and sidewal,s, shall immediately be removed by their owners<users= otherwise said vehicles shall be dealt with and disposed in the manner stated hereunder= (. 2or the first offense the stalled or illegally par,ed vehicle shall be removed, towed and impounded at the e pense of the owner, user or claimant= !. 2or the second and subse$uent offenses, the registry plates of the vehicles shall be confiscated and the owner3s certificate of registration cancelled. &)mphasis supplied*. P/ (%#" &8ranting the Metropolitan Manila Commission Central Powers ;elated to .raffic Management, Providing Penalties, and for 'ther Purposes* was issued, also by President Marcos, on November !(, (+60, and pertinently providesA Section (. .he Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose fines and otherwise discipline drivers and operators of motor vehicles for violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations in Metropolitan Manila in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed. 2or his purpose, the powers of the 4and .ransportation Commission and the Board of .ransportation under e isting laws over such violations and punishment thereof are hereby transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission. Chen the proper penalty to be imposed is suspension or revocation of driver3s license or certificate of public convenience, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or its representatives shall suspend or revo,e such license or certificate. .he suspended or revo,ed driver3s license or the report of suspension or revocation of the certificate of public convenience shall be sent to the 4and .ransportation Commission or the Board of .ransportation, as the case may be, for their records update.

Section 1. >iolations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed within a twelve-month period, rec,oned from the date of birth of the licensee, shall sub-ect the violator to graduated fines as followsA P(#.## for the first offense, P!#.## for the second offense, P"#.## for the third offense, a one-year suspension of driver3s license for the fourth offense, and a revocation of the driver3 license for the fifth offenseA Provided, .hat the Metropolitan Manila Commission may impose higher penalties as it may deem proper for violations of its ordinances prohibiting or regulating the use of certain public roads, streets or thoroughfares in Metropolitan Manila.

Section ". 5n case of traffic violations, the driver3s license shall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall be immediately issued a traffic citation tic,et prescribed by the Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state the violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the violation and an advice that he can ma,e payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the violation was committed or to the Philippine National Ban, or Philippine >eterans Ban, or their branches within seven days from the date of issuance of the citation tic,et. 5f the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or the law enforcement agency concerned shall endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriate proceedings preparatory to the filing of the case with the competent traffic court, city or municipal court. 5f at the time a driver renews his driver3s license and records show that he has an unpaid fine, his driver3s license shall not be renewed until he has paid the fine and corresponding surcharges.

Section 0. 5nsofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. &)mphasis supplied*. : careful reading of the above decree will show that removal and confiscation of the license plate of any illegally par,ed vehicle is not among the specified penalties. Moreover, although the Metropolitan Manila Commission is authori9ed by the decree to Gotherwise disciplineG and Gimpose higher penaltiesG on traffic violators, whatever sanctions it may impose must be Gin such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed.G .he petitioner has not pointed to any such additional sanctions, relying instead on its argument that the applicable authority for the $uestioned act is 4'5 71. .he petitioner stresses that under the decree, Gthe powers of the 4and .ransportation Commission and the Board of .ransportation over such violations and punishment thereof are &hereby* transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission,G and one of such laws is 4'5 71. .he penalties prescribed by the 4'5 are therefore deemed incorporated in P/ (%#" as additional to the other penalties therein specified. 5t would appear that what the 4'5 punishes is not a traffic violation but a traffic obstruction, which is an altogether different offense. : violation imports an intentional breach or disregard of a rule, as where a driver leaves his vehicle in a no-par,ing area against a ,nown and usually visible prohibition. Contrary to the common impression, 4'5 71 does not punish illegal par,ing per se but par,ing of stalled vehicles, i.e., those that involuntarily stop on the road due to some une pected trouble such as engine defect, lac, of gasoline, punctured tires, or other similar cause. .he vehicle is deemed illegally par,ed because it obstructs the flow of traffic, but only because it has stalled. .he obstruction is not deliberate. 5n fact, even the petitioner recogni9es that Gthere is a world of difference between a stalled vehicle and an illegally par,ed and unattended oneG and suggests a different treatment for either. G.he first means one which stopped unnecessarily or bro,e down while the second means one which stopped to accomplish something, including temporary rest. 4'5 71 deals with motor vehicles Gthat stall on the streets and highways3 and not those that are intentionally par,ed in a public place in violation of a traffic law or regulation. .he purpose of the 4'5 evidently is to discipline the motorist into ,eeping his vehicle in good condition before going out into the streets so as not to cause inconvenience to the public when the car brea,s down and bloc,s other vehicles. .hat is why, for the first offense, the stalled vehicle is immediately towed at the owner3s e pense to clear the street of the traffic obstruction. Chere it appears that the owner has not learned from his first e perience because the vehicle has stalled again, presumably due to his failure to repair it, the penalty shall be confiscation of the license plate and cancellation of the certificate of registration petition. 5t is worth noting that it is not the driver3s license that is confiscated and canceled when the vehicle stalls on a public street. .he 4'5 goes against the vehicle itself. .he ob-ect of the measure is to ensure that only motor vehicles in good condition may use the public streets, and this is effected by confiscating the license plates and canceling the certificates of registration of those vehicles that are not roadworthy. 5n the case of the private respondent, it is not alleged or shown that his vehicle stalled on a public thoroughfare and obstructed the flow of traffic. .he charge against him is that he purposely par,ed his vehicle in a no par,ing area &although this is disputed by him*. iLtLc:aMsl .he act, if true, is a traffic violation that may not be punished under 4'5 71. .he applicable law is P/ (%#", which does not include removal and confiscation of the license plate of the vehicle among the imposable penalties. 5ndeed, even if 4'5 71 were applicable, the penalty of confiscation would still not be -ustified as it has not been alleged, much less shown, that the illegal par,ing was a second or subse$uent offense. .hat circumstance must be established at a trial before a court of -ustice where the vehicle owner shall have a right to be heard in his defense. .he second or subse$uent offense cannot be simply pronounced by the traffic authorities without hearing and without proof. Confiscation of the registry plate without a -udicial finding that the offense charge is a second or subse$uent one would, unless the owner concedes this point, be invalid. Chile it is true that the license plate is strictly spea,ing not a property right, it does not follow that it may be removed or confiscated without lawful cause. /ue process is a guaranty against all forms of official arbitrariness. Bnder the principle that ours is a government of laws and not of men, every official must act by and within the authority of a valid law and cannot -ustify the lac, of it on the prete t alone of good intentions. 5t is recalled that more than seventy years ago, the mayor of Manila deported one hundred seventy prostitutes to /avao for the protection of the morals and health of the city. .his Court ac,nowledged his praiseworthy purpose but -ust the same annulled his unauthori9ed act, holding that no one could ta,e the law into his own hands. 3 Ce can rule no less in the case before us. Ce find that there is no inconsistency between 4'5 71 and P/ (%#", whichever is considered the special law either because of its sub-ect or its territorial application. .he former deals with motor vehicles that have stalled on a public road while the latter deals with motor vehicles that have been deliberately par,ed in a no-par,ing area= and while both cover illegal par,ing of motor vehicles, the offense is accidental under the first measure and intentional under the second. .his e plains why the sanctions are different. .he purpose of the 4'5 is to discourage the use of the public streets by motor vehicles that are li,ely to brea, down while that of the decree is to penali9e the driver for his defiance of the traffic laws.

:s it has not been shown that the private respondent3s motor vehicle had stalled because of an engine defect or some other accidental cause and, no less importantly, that it had stalled on the road for a second or subse$uent time, confiscation of the license plate cannot be -ustified under 4'5 71. :nd neither can that sanction be sustained under P/ (%#", which clearly provides that Gin case of traffic violations, &even* the driver3s license shall not be confiscated,G let alone the license plate of the motor vehicle. 5f at all, the private respondent may be held liable for illegal par,ing only and sub-ected to any of the specific penalties mentioned in Section 1 of the decree. Ce recogni9e the problem of the traffic policeman who comes upon an illegally par,ed and unattended vehicle and is unable to serve a citation on the offending driver who is nowhere in sight. But that problem is not addressed to the courts= it is for the legislative and administrative authorities to solve. Chat is clear to the Court is that the difficulty cannot be avoided by the removal of the license plate of the offending vehicle because the petitioner has not shown that this penalty is authori9ed by a valid law or ordinance. .he petitioner complains that the respondent -udge did not confine himself to the issue agreed upon by the parties and made gratuitous accusations that were not only irrelevant but virtually condemned the whole traffic force as corrupt. :ssuming that this issue was indeed not properly raised at the trial, the Court is nevertheless not inhibited from considering it in this proceeding, on the basis of its own impressions on the matter. .his Court is not isolated from the mainstream of society and secluded in a world of its own, unconcerned with the daily lives of the rest of the nation. 'n the contrary, the members of this Court mi with the people and ,now their problems and complaints. :nd among these are the alleged abuses of the police in connection with the issue now before us. 5t is claimed that the removal of the license plates of illegally par,ed motor vehicles in Metro Manila has become a veritable gold mine for some police officers. .o be sure, we do not have hard, provable facts at hand but only vague and unsubstantiated rumors that could be no more than malicious and invented charges. Nevertheless, these accusations have become too prevalent and apparently too persuasive that they cannot be simply swept under the rug. .he widespread report is that civilian Gagents,G mostly street urchins under the control and direction of certain policemen, remove these license plates from illegally par,ed vehicles and later discreetly suggest to the owners that these may be retrieved for an unofficial fee. .his ranges from P"#.## to P!##.##, depending on the type of vehicle. 5f the owner agrees, payment is usually made and the license plate returned at a private rende9vous. No official receipt is issued. )verything is done $uietly. .he owners, it is said, prefer this ,ind of fast settlement to the inconvenience of an official proceeding that may entail not only the payment of a higher fine but also other administrative impositions, li,e attendance at a traffic seminar. .he Court is not saying that these reports are true nor is it stigmati9ing the entire police force on the basis of these unsubstantiated charges. But it does believe and stress that the proper authorities should ta,e official notice of these reports instead of blandly dismissing them as mere canards that do not deserve their attention and concern. :n in$uiry is in our view indicated. .he old adage that where there3s smo,e there3s fire is not necessarily true and can hardly be the rationale of a -udicial conclusion= but the Court feels -ust the same that serious steps should be ta,en, especially because of the persistence of these charges, to determine the source of the smo,e. Ce reali9e the seriousness of our traffic problems, particularly in Metro Manila, and commend the earnest efforts of the police to effect a smoother flow of vehicles in the public thoroughfares for the comfort and convenience of the people. But we must add, as a reminder that must be made, that such efforts must be authori9ed by a valid law, which must clearly define the offenses proscribed and as clearly specify the penalties prescribed. CD);)2';), the petition is /5SM5SS)/. .he Court holds that 4'5 71 is valid but may be applied only against motor vehicles that have stalled in the public streets due to some involuntary cause and not those that have been intentionally par,ed in violation of the traffic laws. .he challenged decision of the trial court is :225;M)/ in so far as it en-oins confiscation of the private respondent3s license plate for alleged deliberate illegal par,ing, which is sub-ect to a different penalty. .he temporary restraining order dated 2ebruary %, (++#, is 452.)/. S' ';/);)/. )ernan, ".J., *ar asa, 3elencio:Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, )eliciano, Ganca#co, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, "ortes, Gri<o:A7uino, 3edialdea and -e$alado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 130775. S4p54>;4r -7, -009.

T!E NAT#ONAL L#GA NG "GA /ARANGA0, r4pr4s4n54d ;, ALE$ L. DAV#D in =is 6apa6i5, as Na5ional 1r4sid4n5 and <or =is o7n 14rson, 1r4sid4n5 ALE$ L. DAV#D, petitioners, vs. !ON. V# TOR#A #SA/EL A. 1AREDES, 1r4sidinB *+dB4, R4Bional Trial o+r5, /ran6= 1-9, aloo6an i5,, and T!E DE1ART"ENT O' #NTER#OR and LO AL GOVERN"ENT, r4pr4s4n54d 5=4 !ON. SE RETAR0 RO/ERT 2. /AR/ERS and "AN&EL A. RA0OS, respondents. )G.R. No. 131939. S4p54>;4r -7, -009. LEANDRO 0ANGOT, /ON#'A #O LA 8ASAN and /ON0 TA #O, petitioners, vs. D#LG S46r45ar, RO/ERT 2. /AR/ERS and D#LG &nd4rs46r45ar, "AN&EL SAN !E2, respondents. DE TinBa, J.( #S#ON

:t bottom, the present petition in$uires into the essential nature of the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a# and $uestions the e tent of the power of Secretary of the /epartment of 5nterior and 4ocal 8overnment &/548*, as alter e$o of the President. More immediately, the petition disputes the validity of the appointment of the /548 as the interim careta&er of the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a#. 'n (( ?une (++6, private respondent Manuel :. ;ayos Kas petitioner thereinL, Punon$ Baran$a# of Barangay "!, /istrict 55, Rone ", /istrict 55, Caloocan City, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary in-unction and<or temporary restraining order and damages before the ;egional .rial Court &;.C* of Caloocan, K(L alleging that respondent therein :le 4. /avid Know petitionerL, Punon$ Baran$a# of Baran$a# 66, Rone 6, Caloocan City and then president of the 2i$a Chapter of Caloocan City and of the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a#National Chapter, committed certain irregularities in the notice, venue and conduct of the proposed synchroni9ed 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a#elections in (++6. :ccording to the petition, the irregularities consisted of the followingA &(* the publication of the notice in the 3anila Bulletin but without notifying in writing the individual punon$ baran$a#s of Caloocan City=K!L &!* the Notice of Meeting dated #0 ?une (++6 for the 4iga Chapter of Caloocan City did not specify whether the meeting scheduled on (7 ?une (++6 was to be held at 0A## a.m. or 0A## p.m., and worse, the meeting was to be held in 4ingayen, Pangasinan=K1L and &1* the deadline for the filing of the Certificates of Candidacy having been set at "A## p.m. of the third Mday prior to the above election dayO, or on (( ?une (++6, K7L ;ayos failed to meet said deadline since he was not able to obtain a certified true copy of the C'M)4)C Certificate of Canvas and Proclamation of Cinning Candidate, which were needed to be a delegate, to vote and be voted for in the 2i$a election. 'n (1 ?une (++6, the ) ecutive ?udge issued a temporary restraining order &.;'*, effective for seventy-two &6!* hours, en-oining the holding of the general membership and election meeting of 2i$a Chapter of Caloocan City on (7 ?une (+6".K"L Dowever, the .;' was allegedly not properly served on herein petitioner /avid, and so the election for the officers of the 2i$a-Caloocan was held as scheduled.K%L Petitioner /avid was proclaimed President of the 2i$a:Caloocan, and thereafter too, his oath and assumed the position of e0: officio member of the San$$unian$ Panlun$sod of Caloocan. 'n (6 ?uly (++6, respondent ;ayos filed a second petition, this time for 7uo %arranto, mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary in-unction and<or temporary restraining order and damages, against /avid, Nancy Nuimpo, Presiding 'fficer of the San$$unian$ Panlun$sod of Caloocan City, and Secretary Barbers.K6L ;ayos alleged that he was elected President of the 2i$a Caloocan Chapter in the elections held on (7 ?une (++6 by the members of the Caloocan Chapter pursuant to their ;esolution<Petition No. ##(-+6. K0L 'n (0 ?uly (++6, the presiding -udge granted the .;', en-oining therein respondents /avid, Nuimpo and Secretary Barbers from proceeding with the synchroni9ed elections for the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters of the 2i$a scheduled on (+ ?uly (++6, but only for the purpose of maintaining the status 7uo and effective for a period not e ceeding seventy-two &6!* hours.K+L )ventually, on (0 ?uly (++6, at petitioner /avidPs instance, Special Civil :ction &SC:* No. C-"(! pending before Branch (!% was consolidated with SC: No. C-"#0 pending before Branch (!7. K(#L Before the consolidation of the cases, on !" ?uly (++6, the /548 through respondent Secretary Barbers, filed in SC: No. C-"(! an (r$ent 3otion,K((L invo,ing the PresidentPs power of general supervision over all local government units and see,ing the following reliefsA CD);)2';), in the interest of the much-needed delivery of basic services to the people, the maintenance of public order and to further protect the interests of the forty-one thousand barangays all over the country, herein respondent respectfully praysA a* .hat the /epartment of the 5nterior and 4ocal 8overnment &/548*, pursuant to its delegated power of general supervision, be appointed as the 5nterim Careta,er to manage and administer the affairs of the 4iga, until such time that the new set of National 4iga 'fficers shall have been duly elected and assumed office= ... K(!L .he prayer for in-unctive reliefs was anchored on the following groundsA &(* the /548 Secretary e ercises the power of general supervision over all government units by virtue of :dministrative 'rder No. !%6 dated (0 2ebruary (++!= &!* the 4iga ng mga Barangay is a government organi9ation= &1* undue interference by some local elective officials during the Municipal and City Chapter elections of the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a#= &7* improper issuance of confirmations of the elected 2i$a Chapter officers by petitioner /avid and the National 2i$a Board= &"* the need for the /548 to provide remedies measured in view of the confusion and chaos sweeping the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a# and the incapacity of the National 2i$a Board to address the problems properly. 'n 1( ?uly (++6, petitioner /avid opposed the /548Ps (r$ent 3otion, claiming that the /548, being a respondent in the case, is not allowed to see, any sanction against a co-respondent li,e /avid, such as by filing a cross-claim, without first see,ing leave of court. K(1L De also alleged that the /548Ps re$uest to be appointed interim careta,er constitutes undue interference in the internal affairs of the 2i$a, since the 2i$a is not sub-ect to /548 control and supervision.K(7L .hree &1* days after filing its (r$ent 3otion, on !0 ?uly (++6, and before it was acted upon by the lower court, the /548 through then Bndersecretary Manuel Sanche9, issued Memorandum Circular No. +6-(6%. K("L 5t cited the reported violations of the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a#Constitution and By-4aws by /avid and Mwidespread chaos and confusionO among local government officials as to who were the $ualified e0:officio 2i$a members in their respective san$unians.K(%L Pending the appointment of the /548 Mas the ,nterim "areta&er of the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a# by the court and until the officers and board members of the national 2i$a Chapter have been elected and have assumed office,O the Memorandum Circular directed all provincial governors, vice governors, city mayors, city vice mayors, members of the san$$unian$ panlala%i$an and panlun$sod, /548 regional directors and other concerned officers, as followsA (. :ll concerned are directed not to recogni9e and<or honor any 4iga Presidents of the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters as e -officio members of the sanggunian concerned until further notice from the Courts or this /epartment= !. :ll concerned are directed to disregard any pronouncement and<or directive issued by Mr. :le /avid on any issue or matter relating to the affairs of the 4iga ng mga Barangay until further notice from the Courts or this /epartment. K(6L 'n #7 :ugust (++6, public respondent ?udge >ictoria 5sabel :. Paredes issued the assailed order, K(0L the pertinent portions of which read, thusA .he authority of the /548 to e ercise general supervisory -urisdiction over local government units, including the different leagues created under the 4ocal 8overnment Code of (++( &;: 6(%#* finds basis in :dministrative 'rder No. !%6 dated 2ebruary (0, (++!. Specifically, Section ( &a* of the said :dministrative 'rder provides a broad premise for the supervisory power of the /548. :dministratively, the /548Ps supervision has been tacitly recogni9ed by the local barangays, municipalities, cities and provinces as shown by the evidences presented by respondent /avid himself &See :nne es M:O to MCO*. .he fact that the /548 has sought to refer the matters therein to the National 4iga Board</irectorate does not ipso facto mean

that it has lost -urisdiction to act directly therein. ?urisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be claimed or lost through agreements or inaction by individuals. Chat respondent /avid may term as MinterferenceO should careta,ership be allowed, this Court would rather view as a necessary and desirable corollary to the e ercise of supervision.K(+L Political motivations must not preclude, hamper, or obstruct the delivery of basic services and the per$uisites of public service. 5n this case, the fact of confusion arising from conflicting appointments, non-action, and uninformed or wavering decisions of the incumbent National 4iga Board</irectorate, having been satisfactorily established, cannot simply be brushed aside as being politically motivated or arising therefrom. 5t is incumbent, therefore, that the /548 e ercise a more active role in the supervision of the affairs and operations of the National 4iga Board< /irectorate at least until such time that the regular National 4iga Board</irectorate may have been elected, $ualified and assumed office. K!#L

CD);)2';), premises considered, the Brgent Motion of the /548 for appointment as interim careta,er, until such time that the regularly elected National 4iga Board of /irectors shall have $ualified and assumed office, to manage and administer the affairs of the National 4iga Board, is hereby 8;:N.)/.K!(L 'n (( :ugust (++6, petitioner /avid filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration of the assailed order and to declare respondent Secretary Barbers in contempt of Court.K!!L /avid claimed that the #7 :ugust (++6 order divested the duly elected members of the Board of /irectors of the 2i$a National /irectorate of their positions without due process of law. De also wanted Secretary Barbers declared in contempt for having issued, through his Bndersecretary, Memorandum Circular No. +6-(6%, even before respondent -udge issued the $uestioned order, in moc,ery of the -ustice system. De implied that Secretary Barbers ,new about respondent -udgePs $uestioned order even before it was promulgated. K!1L 'n (( :ugust (++6, the /548 issued Memorandum Circular No. +6-(+1, K!7L providing supplemental guidelines for the (++6 synchroni9ed elections of the provincial and metropolitan chapters and for the election of the national chapter of the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a#. .he Memorandum Circular set the synchroni9ed elections for the provincial and metropolitan chapters on !1 :ugust (++6 and for the national chapter on #% September (++6. 'n (! :ugust (++6, the /548 issued a Certificate of :ppointment K!"L in favor of respondent ;ayos as president of the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a# of Caloocan City. .he appointment purportedly served as ;ayosPs Mlegal basis for e0:officio membership in the San$$unian$ Panlun$sod of Caloocan CityO and Mto $ualify and participate in the forthcoming National Chapter )lection of the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a#.OK!%L 'n !1 :ugust (++6, the /548 conducted the synchroni9ed elections of Provincial and Metropolitan 2i$a Chapters. .hereafter, on #% September (++6, the National 2i$a Chapter held its election of officers and board of directors, wherein ?ames Marty 4. 4im was elected as President of the National 2i$a.K!6L 'n #( 'ctober (++6, public respondent -udge denied /avidPs motion for reconsideration, K!0L ruling that there was no factual or legal basis to reconsider the appointment of the /548 as interim careta,er of the National 2i$a Board and to cite Secretary Barbers in contempt of court. K!+L 'n (# 'ctober (++6, petitioners filed the instant Petition for "ertiorariK1#L under ;ule %" of the ;ules of Court, see,ing to annul public respondent -udgePs orders of #7 :ugust (++6 and #( 'ctober (++6. .hey dispute the latterPs opinion on the power of supervision of the President under the Constitution, through the /548 over local governments, which is the same as that of the /548Ps as shown by its application of the power on the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a#. Specifically, they claim that the public respondent -udgePs designation of the /548 as interim careta,er and the acts which the /548 sought to implement pursuant to its designation as such are beyond the scope of the Chief ) ecutivePs power of supervision. .o support the petition, petitioners argue that under :dministrative 'rder No. !%6, Series of (++!, the power of general supervision of the President over local government units does not apply to the 2i$a and its various chapters precisely because the 2i$a is not a local government unit, contrary to the stance of the respondents.K1(L Section "#6 of the 4ocal 8overnment Code &;epublic :ct No. 6(%#* K1!L provides that the 2i$a shall be governed by its own Constitution and Bylaws. Petitioners posit that the duly elected officers and directors of the National 2i$a elected in (++7 had a vested right to their positions and could only be removed therefrom for cause by affirmative vote of two-thirds &!<1* of the entire membership pursuant to the 2i$a Constitution and By-4aws, and not by mere issuances of the /548, even if bolstered by the dubious authori9ation of respondent -udge. K11L .hus, petitioners claim that the $uestioned order divested the then incumbent officers and directors of the 2i$a of their right to their respective offices without due process of law. :ssuming the 2i$a could be subsumed under the term Mlocal governments,O over which the President, through the /548 Secretary, has the power of supervision,K17L petitioners point out that still there is no legal or constitutional basis for the appointment of the /548 as interim careta,er. K1"L .hey stress that the actions contemplated by the /548 as interim careta,er go beyond supervision, as what it had sought and obtained was authority to alter, modify, nullify or set aside the actions of the 2i$a Board of /irectors and even to substitute its -udgment over that of the latter @ which are all clearly one of control.K1%L Petitioners $uestion the appointment of ;ayos as 2i$a-Caloocan President since at that time petitioner /avid was occupying that position which was still the sub-ect of the $uo %arranto proceedings ;ayos himself had instituted. K16LPetitioners li,ewise claim that /548 Memorandum Circular No. +6-(+1, providing supplemental guidelines for the synchroni9ed elections of the 2i$a, replaced the implementing rules adopted by the 2i$a pursuant to its Constitution and By-laws.K10L 5n fact, even before its appointment as interim careta,er, /548 specifically en-oined all heads of government units from recogni9ing petitioner /avid and<or honoring any of his pronouncements relating to the 4iga. K1+L Petitioners rely on decision in Taule . Santos,K7#L which, they claim, already passed upon the Me tent of authority of the then Secretary of 4ocal 8overnment over the &atipunan n$ m$a baran$a# or the barangay councils,O as it specifically ruled that the MSecretary Kof 4ocal 8overnmentL has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of officers of the ,atipunan.O K7(L 2or his part, respondent ;ayos avers that since the Secretary of the /548 supervises the acts of local officials by ensuring that they act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions and since members of the various leagues, such as the 2i$a in this case, are themselves officials of local government units, it follows that the 2i$a members are sub-ect to the power of supervision of the /548. K7!L De adds that as the /548Ps management and administration of the 2i$a affairs was limited only to the conduct of the elections, its actions were consistent with its rule-ma,ing power and power of supervision under e isting laws. K71L De asserts that in assailing the appointment of the /548 as interim careta,er , petitioners failed to cite any provision of positive law in support of their stance. .hus, he adds, Mif a law is silent, obscure or insufficient, a -udge may apply a rule he sees fit to resolve the issue, as long as the rule chosen is in harmony with general interest, order, morals and public policy,O K77L in consonance with :rticle + of the Civil Code.K7"L

'n the other hand, it is $uite significant that the Solicitor 8eneral has shared petitionersP position. De states that the /548Ps act of managing and administering the affairs of the National 2i$a Board are not merely acts of supervision but plain manifestations of control and direct ta,eover of the functions of the National 2i$a Board,K7%L going beyond the limits of the power of general supervision of the President over local governments. K76L Moreover, while the 2i$a may be deemed a government organi9ation, it is not strictly a local government unit over which the /548 has supervisory power.K70L Meanwhile, on !7 September (++0, ?ames Marty 4. 4im, the newly elected President of the National 2i$a, filed a 3otion for 2ea e to )ile "omment in ,nter ention,K7+L with his "omment in ,nter ention attached,K"#L invo,ing the validity of the /548Ps actions relative to the conduct of the 2i$a elections.K"(L 5n addition, he sought the dismissal of the instant petition on the following groundsA &(* the issue of validity or invalidity of the $uestioned order has been rendered moot and academic by the election of 2i$a officers= &!* the turn-over of the administration and management of 2i$a affairs to the 2i$a officers= and &1* the recognition and acceptance by the members of the 2i$a nationwide.K"!L 5n the interim, another petition, this time for Prohibition %ith Pra#er for a Temporar# -estrainin$ Order , K"1L was filed by several presidents of2i$a Chapters, praying that this Court declare the /548 Secretary and Bndersecretary are not vested with any constitutional or legal power to e ercise control or even supervision over the National 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a#, nor to ta,e over the functions of its officers or suspend its constitution= and declare void any and all acts committed by respondents therein in connection with their careta,ership of the 2i$a.K"7L .he petition was consolidated with 8.;. No. (1#66", but it was eventually dismissed because the petitioners failed to submit an affidavit of service and proof of service of the petition.K""L Meanwhile, on #( /ecember (++0, petitioner /avid died and was substituted by his legal representatives. K"%L Petitioners have raised a number of issues. K"6L 5ntegrated and simplified, these issues boil down to the $uestion of whether or not respondent ?udge acted with grave abuse of discretion in appointing the /548 as interim careta,er to administer and manage the affairs of the National2i$a Board, per its order dated #7 :ugust (++6. K"0L 5n turn, the resolution of the $uestion of grave abuse of discretion entails a couple of definitive issues, namelyA &(* whether the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a# is a government organi9ation that is sub-ect to the /548 SecretaryPs power of supervision over local governments as the alter e$o of the President, and &!* whether the respondent ?udgePs designation of the /548 as interim careta,er of the 2i$a has invested the /548 with control over the 2i$a and whether /548 Memorandum Circular No. +6-(6%, issued before it was designated as such interim careta,er, and /548 Memorandum Circular No. +6-(+1 and other acts which the /548 made in its capacity as interim careta,er of the 2i$a, involve supervision or control of the 2i$a. Dowever, the Court should first address the $uestion of mootness which intervenor 4im raised because, according to him, during the pendency of the present petition a general election was held= the new set of officers and directors had assumed their positions= and that supervening events the /548 had turned-over the management and administration of the 2i$a to new 2i$a officers and directors.K"+L ;espondent ;ayos has -oined him in this regard.K%#L 2orthwith, the Court declares that these supervening events have not rendered the instant petition moot, nor removed it from the -urisdiction of this Court. .his case transcends the elections ordered and conducted by the /548 as interim careta,er of the 2i$a and the 2i$a officers and directors who were elected to replace petitioner /avid and the former officers. :t the core of the petition is the validity of the /548Ps Mcareta,ershipO of the 2i$a and the official acts of the /548 as such careta,er which e ceeded the bounds of supervision and were e ercise of control. :t sta,e in this case is the reali9ation of the constitutionally ensconced principle of local government autonomy= K%(L the statutory ob-ective to enhance the capabilities of barangays and municipalities Mby providing them opportunities to participate actively in the implementation of national programs and pro-ects=O K%!L and the promotion of the avowed aim to ensure the independence and non-partisanship of the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a#. .he mantle of local autonomy would be eviscerated and remain an empty bu99word if unconstitutional, illegal and unwarranted intrusions in the affairs of the local governments are tolerated and left unchec,ed. 5ndeed, it is the declared policy of the State that its territorial and political subdivisions should en-oy genuine meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and ma,e them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. K%1L 5n the case of !e 2eon . 's$uerra,K%7L the Court ruled that even barangays are meant to possess genuine and meaningful local autonomy so that they may develop fully as self-reliant communities.K%"L 2urthermore, well-entrenched is the rule that courts will decide a $uestion otherwise moot and academic if it is Mcapable of repetition, yet evading review.OK%%L 2or the $uestion of whether the /548 may validly be appointed as interim careta,er, or assume a similar position and perform acts pursuant thereto, is li,ely to resurrect again, and yet the $uestion may not be decided before the actual assumption, or the termination of said assumption even. So too, dismissing the petition on the ground of mootness could lead to the wrong impression that the challenged order and issuances are valid. >erily, that does not appear to be the correct conclusion to ma,e since by applying opposite precedents to the issues the outcome points to invalidating the assailed order and memorandum circulars. .he resolution of the issues of whether the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a# is sub-ect to /548 supervision, and whether the $uestioned Mcareta,ershipO order of the respondent -udge and the challenged issuances and acts of the /548 constitute control in derogation of the Constitution, necessitates a brief overview of the baran$a#, as the lowest 48B, and the 2i$a, as a vehicle of governance and coordination. :s the basic political unit, the barangay serves as the primary planning and implementing unit of government policies, plans, programs, pro-ects and activities in the community, and as a forum wherein the collective views of the people may be e pressed, crystalli9ed and considered, and where disputes may be amicably settled.K%6L 'n the other hand, the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a#K%0L is the organi9ation of all baran$a#s, the primary purpose of which is the determination of the representation of the 2i$a in the san$$unians, and the ventilation, articulation, and crystalli9ation of issues affecting baran$a# government administration and securing solutions thereto, through proper and legal means. K%+L .he 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a# shall have chapters at the municipal, city and provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels. K6#L .he municipal and city chapters of the 2i$a are composed of thebaran$a# representatives from the municipality or city concerned. .he presidents of the municipal and city chapters of the 2i$a form the provincial or metropolitan political subdivision chapters of the 2i$a. .he presidents of the chapters of the 2i$a in highly urbani9ed cities, provinces and the Metro Manila area and other metropolitan political subdivisions constitute the National 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a#.K6(L :s conceptuali9ed in the 4ocal 8overnment Code, the baran$a# is positioned to influence and direct the development of the entire country. .his was heralded by the adoption of the bottom-to-top approach process of development which re$uires the development plans of the baran$a#to be considered in the development plans of the municipality, city or province, K6!L whose plans in turn are to be ta,en into account by

the central governmentK61L in its plans for the development of the entire country. K67L .he 2i$a is the vehicle assigned to ma,e this new development approach materiali9e and produce results. .he presidents of the 2i$a at the municipal, city and provincial levels, automatically become e0:officio members of the San$$unian$ Ba#an, San$$unian$ Panlun$sod and San$$unian$ Panlala%i$an, respectively. .hey shall serve as such only during their term of office as presidents of the 2i$a chapters, which in no case shall be beyond the term of office of the san$$unian concerned.K6"L .he 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a# has one principal aim, namelyA to promote the development of baran$a#s and secure the general welfare of their inhabitants.K6%L 5n line with this, the 2i$a is granted the following functions and dutiesA a* 8ive priority to programs designed for the total development of the barangays and in consonance with the policies, programs and pro-ects of the national government= b* :ssist in the education of barangay residents for peoplePs participation in local government administration in order to promote untied and concerted action to achieve country-wide development goals= c* Supplement the efforts of government in creating gainful employment within the barangay= d* :dopt measures to promote the welfare of barangay officials= e* Serve as forum of the barangays in order to forge lin,ages with government and non-governmental organi9ations and thereby promote the social, economic and political well-being of the barangays= and f* ) ercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions which will bring about stronger ties between barangays and promote the welfare of the barangay inhabitants. K66L .he 2i$as are primarily governed by the provisions of the 4ocal 8overnment Code. Dowever, they are empowered to ma,e their own constitution and by-laws to govern their operations. Sec. "#6 of the Code providesA Sec. "#6. "onstitution and B#:2a%s of the 2i$a and the 2ea$ues. - :ll other matters not herein otherwise provided for affecting the internal organi9ation of the leagues of local government units shall be governed by their respective constitution and by-laws which are hereby made suppletory to the provision of this ChapterAPro ided, .hat said Constitution and By-laws shall always conform to the provision of the Constitution and e isting laws. Pursuant to the 4ocal 8overnment Code, the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a# adopted its own Constitution and By-4aws. 5t provides that the corporate powers of the 2i$a, e pressed or implied, shall be vested in the board of directors of each level of the 2i$a which shallA a* Dave -urisdiction over all officers, directors and committees of the said 4iga= including the power of appointment, assignment and delegation= b* Dave general management of the business, property, and funds of said 4iga= c* Prepare and approve a budget showing anticipated receipts and e penditures for the year, including the plans or schemes for funding purposes= and d* Dave the power to suspend or remove from office any officer or member of the said board on grounds cited and in the manner provided in hereinunder provisions.K60L .he National 2i$a Board of /irectors promulgated the rules for the conduct of its 2i$aPs general elections.K6+L :nd, as early as !0 :pril (++6, the 2i$a National Chapter had already scheduled its general elections on (7 ?une (++6. K0#L .he controlling provision on the issues at hand is Section 7, :rticle E of the Constitution, which reads in partA Sec. .he President of the Philippines shall e ercise general supervision over local governments. .he (+1", (+61 and (+06 Constitutions uniformly differentiate the PresidentPs power of supervision over local governments and his power of control of the e ecutive departments bureaus and offices. K0(L Similar to the counterpart provisions in the earlier Constitutions, the provision in the (+06 Constitution provision has been interpreted to e clude the power of control. K0!L 5n the early case of 3ondano . Sil osa, et al. ,K01L this Court defined supervision as Moverseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties, and to ta,e such action as prescribed by law to compel his subordinates to perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the -udgment of the former for that of the latter. K07L 5n Taule . Santos,K0"L the Court held that the Constitution permits the President to wield no more authority than that of chec,ing whether a local government or its officers perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments.K0%L Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body= it does not include any restraining authority over such body. K06L .he case of !rilon . 2imK00L clearly defined the e tent of supervisory power, thusA V.he supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. 5f the rules are not observed, he may order the wor, done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. De may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. De has no -udgment on this matter e cept to see that the rules are followedV
K0+L

5n Section 7, :rticle E of the Constitution applicable to the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a#J 'therwise put, is the 2i$a legally susceptible to /548 suspensionJ

.his $uestion was resolved in Bito:Onon . )ernandez,K+#L where the Court ruled that the PresidentPs power of the general supervision, as e ercised therein by the /548 Secretary as his alter e$o, e tends to the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a#. /oes the PresidentPs power of general supervision e tend to the liga ng mga barangay, which is not a local government unitJ Ce rule in the affirmative. 5n 'pinion No. 7(, Series of (++", the /epartment of ?ustice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organi9ation, being an association, federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government officials. .he 4ocal 8overnment Code defines the liga ng mga barangay as an organi9ation of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystalli9ing issues affecting barangay government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto. K+(L .he rationale for ma,ing the 2i$a sub-ect to /548 supervision is $uite evident, whether from the perspectives of logic or of practicality. .he2i$a is an aggroupment of baran$a#s which are in turn represented therein by their respective punon$ baran$a#s. .he representatives of the2i$a sit in an e0 officio capacity at the municipal, city and provincial san$$unians. :s such, they en-oy all the powers and discharge all the functions of regular municipal councilors, city councilors or provincial board members, as the case may be. .hus, the 2i$a is the vehicle through which the baran$a# participates in the enactment of ordinances and formulation of policies at all the legislative local levels higher than thesan$$unian$ baran$a#, at the same time serving as the mechanism for the bottom-to-top approach of development. 5n the case at bar, even before the respondent ?udge designated the /548 as interim careta,er of the 2i$a, on !0 ?uly (++6, it issued Memorandum Circular No. +6-(6%, directing local government officials not to recogni9e /avid as the National 2i$a President and his pronouncements relating to the affairs of the 2i$a. Not only was the action premature, it even smac,ed of superciliousness and in-udiciousness. .he /548 is the topmost government agency which maintains coordination with, and e ercises supervision over local government units and its multi-level leagues. :s such, it should be forthright, circumspect and supportive in its dealings with the 2i$as especially the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a#. .he indispensable role played by the latter in the development of the barangays and the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants thereof deserve no less than the full support and respect of the other agencies of government. :s the Court held in the case of San Juan . "i il Ser ice "ommission, K+!L our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based.K+1L Chen the respondent -udge eventually appointed the /548 as interim careta,er to manage and administer the affairs of the 2i$a, she effectively removed the management from the National 2i$a Board and vested control of the 2i$a on the /548. )ven a cursory glance at the /548Ps prayer for appointment as interim careta,er of the 2i$a Mto >anaB4 and ad>inis54r 5=4 a<<airs o< 5=4 i)a, until such time that the new set of National 2i$a officers shall have been duly elected and assumed officeO reveals that what the /548 wanted was to ta,e control over the 2i$a. )ven if said Mcareta,ershipO was contemplated to last for a limited time, or only until a new set of officers assume office, the fact remains that it was a conferment of control in derogation of the Constitution. Cith his /epartment already appointed as interim careta,er of the 2i$a, Secretary Barbers nullified the results of the 2i$a elections and promulgated /548 Memorandum Circular No. +6-(+1 dated (( :ugust (++6, where he laid down the supplemental guidelines for the (++6 synchroni9ed elections of the provincial and metropolitan chapters and for the election of the national chapter of the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a#/scheduled dates for the new provincial, metropolitan and national chapter elections= and appointed respondent ;ayos as president of 2i$aCaloocan Chapter. .hese acts of the /548 went beyond the sphere of general supervision and constituted direct interference with the political affairs, not only of the 2i$a, but more importantly, of the barangay as an institution. .he election of 2i$a officers is part of the 2i$aIs internal organi9ation, for which the latter has already provided guidelines. 5n succession, the /548 assumed stewardship and -urisdiction over the 2i$a affairs, issued supplemental guidelines for the election, and nullified the effects of the 2i$a-conducted elections. Clearly, what the /548 wielded was the power of control which even the President does not have. 2urthermore, the /548 assumed control when it appointed respondent ;ayos as president of the 2i$a-Caloocan Chapter prior to the newly scheduled general 2i$a elections, although petitioner /avidPs term had not yet e pired. .he /548 substituted its choice, who was ;ayos, over the choice of ma-ority of the punon$ baran$a# of Caloocan, who was the incumbent President, petitioner /avid. .he latter was elected and had in fact been sitting as an e0:officio member of the san$$unian$ panlun$sod in accordance with the 2i$a Constitution and By-4aws. Fet, the /548 e tended the appointment to respondent ;ayos although it was aware that the position was the sub-ect of a 7uo %arranto proceeding instituted by ;ayos himself, thereby preempting the outcome of that case. 5t was bad enough that the /548 assumed the power of control, it was worse when it made use of the power with evident bias and partiality. :s the entity e ercising supervision over the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a#, the /548Ps authority over the 2i$a is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace them. 5n this particular case, the most that the /548 could do was review the acts of the incumbent officers of the 2i$a in the conduct of the elections to determine if they committed any violation of the 2i$aPs Constitution and By-laws and its implementing rules. 5f the National 2i$a Board and its officers had violated 2i$a rules, the /548 should have ordered the 2i$a to conduct another election in accordance with the 2i$aPs own rules, but not in obeisance to /548-dictated guidelines. Neither had the /548 the authority to remove the incumbent officers of the 2i$a and replace them, even temporarily, with unelected2i$a officers. 4i,e the local government units, the 2i$a n$ m$a Baran$a# is not sub-ect to control by the Chief ) ecutive or his alter e$o. 5n the Bito:OnonK+7L case, this Court held that /548 Memorandum Circular No. +6-(+1, insofar as it authori9ed the filing of a petition for review of the decision of the Board of )lection Supervisors &B)S* with the regular courts in a post-proclamation electoral protest, involved the e ercise of control as it in effect amended the guidelines already promulgated by the 2i$a. .he decision reads in partA . 'fficers in control, lay down the rules in the doing of an act. 5f they are not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or redone by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officers merely see to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. 5f the rules are not observed, he may order the wor, done or re-done to conform for to the prescribed rules. De cannot prescribe his own manner the doing of the act.

. .he amendment of the 8B5/)45N)S is more than an e ercise of the power of supervision but is an e ercise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the 458:. :lthough the /548 is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the :dministrative Code limits its authority to merely Mmonitoring compliance by local government units of such issuances. .o monitor means to Mwatch, observe or chec,O and is compatible with the power of supervision of the /548 Secretary over local governments, which is limited to chec,ing whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments. Besides, any doubt as to the power of the /548 Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government. K+"L 5n Taule,K+%L the Court ruled that the Secretary of 4ocal 8overnment had no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of officers of &atipunan n$ m$a baran$a# or barangay councils. 5n that case, a protest was lodged before the Secretary of 4ocal 8overnment regarding several irregularities in, and see,ing the nullification of, the election of officers of the 2ederation of :ssociations of Barangay Councils &2:BC* of Catanduanes. .hen 4ocal 8overnment Secretary 4uis Santos issued a resolution nullifying the election of officers and ordered a new one to be conducted. .he Court ruledA Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President over local governments, Ce hold that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the officers of the &atipunan. .o allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. 5t will in effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. 5n fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be presided by the ;egional /irector is a clear and direct interference by the /epartment with the political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to general supervision over local governments.K+6L :ll given, the Court is convinced that the assailed order was issued with grave abuse of discretion while the acts of the respondent Secretary, including /548 Memorandum Circulars No. +6-(6% and No. +6-(+1, are unconstitutional and ultra ires, as they all entailed the conferment or e ercise of control @ a power which is denied by the Constitution even to the President. 8!ERE'ORE, the Petition is 8;:N.)/. .he Order of the ;egional .rial Court dated #7 :ugust (++6 is S). :S5/) for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac, or e cess of -urisdiction. /548 Memorandum Circulars No. +6-(6% and No. +6-(+1, are declared >'5/ for being unconstitutional and ultra ires. No pronouncements as to costs. SO ORDERED. !a ide, Jr., ".J., Puno, Pan$aniban, Quisumbin$, +nares:Santia$o, Sando al:Gutierrez, "arpio, Austria:3artinez, "orona, "arpio:3orales, "alle4o, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur. "hico:*azario, J., on leave.

G.R. No. L--38-5

D464>;4r -9, 19:5

E""AN&EL 1ELAE2, petitioner, vs. T!E A&D#TOR GENERAL, respondent. Nulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General for respondent. ON E1 #ON, J.: /uring the period from September 7 to 'ctober !+, (+%7 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section %0 of the ;evised :dministrative Code, issued ) ecutive 'rders Nos. +1 to (!(, (!7 and (!% to (!+= creating thirty-three &11* municipalities enumerated in the margin.( Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November (#, (+%7 petitioner )mmanuel Pelae9, as >ice President of the Philippines and as ta payer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary in-unction, against the :uditor 8eneral, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any e penditure of public funds in implementation of said e ecutive orders and<or any disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said e ecutive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section %0 has been impliedly repealed by ;epublic :ct No. !16# and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. ;espondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is premature and that not all proper parties @ referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in $uestion @ have been impleaded. Subse$uently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned e ecutive orders @ because the latter have ta,en away from the former the barrios composing the new political subdivisions @ intervened in the case. Moreover, :ttorneys )nri$ue M. 2ernando and )mma Nuisumbing-2ernando were allowed to and did appear as amici curiae. .he third paragraph of Section 1 of ;epublic :ct No. !16#, readsA Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed e cept under the provisions of this :ct or by :ct of Congress. Pursuant to the first two &!* paragraphs of the same Section 1A :ll barrios e isting at the time of the passage of this :ct shall come under the provisions hereof.

Bpon petition of a ma-ority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the name of an e isting one may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. .he recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said councilA Provided, however, .hat no new barrio may be created if its population is less than five hundred persons. Dence, since ?anuary (, (+%#, when ;epublic :ct No. !16# became effective, barrios may Gnot be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changedG e cept by :ct of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board Gupon petition of a ma-ority of the voters in the areas affectedG and the Grecommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated.G Petitioner argues, accordinglyA G5f the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalitiesJG ;espondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can be created without creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the -urisdiction of the new municipality. .his theory overloo,s, however, the main import of the petitioner3s argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. .he cogency and force of this argument is too obvious to be denied or even $uestioned. 2ounded upon logic and e perience, it cannot be offset e cept by a clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to the contrary, and no such manifestation, subse$uent to the passage of ;epublic :ct No. !16+, has been brought to our attention. Moreover, section %0 of the ;evised :dministrative Code, upon which the disputed e ecutive orders are based, providesA .he &8overnor-8eneral* President of the Philippines may by e ecutive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, KtownshipL municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be re$uired, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may re$uireA Provided, .hat the authori9ation of the &Philippine 4egislature* Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. Chen action by the &8overnor-8eneral* President of the Philippines in accordance herewith ma,es necessary a change of the territory under the -urisdiction of any administrative officer or any -udicial officer, the &8overnor-8eneral* President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the /epartment having e ecutive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed. Bpon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an e$uitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be recommended by the &5nsular :uditor* :uditor 8eneral and approved by the &8overnor-8eneral* President of the Philippines. ;espondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon 3unicipalit# of "ardona s. 3unicipalit# of Bina<$onan &1% Phil. "76*, which, he claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territor# @ from an alread# e0istin$ municipality &Cardona* to another municipality &BinaWgonan*, li&e%ise, e0istin$ at the time of and prior to said transfer &See 8ov3t of the P.5. e rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of BinaWgonan K17 Phil. "(0, "(+-"!#(* @ in conse$uence of the fi ing and definition, pursuant to :ct No. (670, of the common boundaries of two municipalities. 5t is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fi such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of -urisdiction between ad-oining municipalities, may parta,e of an administrati e nature @ involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carr# into effect the law creating said municipalities @ the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially le$islati e in nature. 5n the language of other courts, it is Gstrictly a legislative functionG &State e rel. Diggins vs. :ic,len, ((+ S. 7!", ?anuary !, (+"+* or Gsolely and e0clusi el# the e ercise ofle$islati e powerG &Bdall vs. Severn, May !+, (+10, 6+ P. !d 176-17+*. :s the Supreme Court of Cashington has put it &.erritory e rel. Ielly vs. Stewart, 2ebruary (1, (0+#, !1 Pac. 7#", 7#+*, Gmunicipal corporations are purel# the creatures of statutes.G :lthough(a Congress may delegate to another branch of the 8overnment the power to fill in the details in the e ecution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said lawA &a* be complete in itself @ it must set forth therein the policy to be e ecuted, carried out or implemented by the delegate ! @ and &b* fi a standard @ the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable @ to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. !a 5ndeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, ma,e or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law= and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.!b Dence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to ma,e the law, but, also @ and this is worse @ to unma,e it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the :ct of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of chec,s and balances, and, conse$uently, undermining the very foundation of our ;epublican system. Section %0 of the ;evised :dministrative Code does not meet these well settled re$uirements for a valid delegation of the power to fi the details in the enforcement of a law. 5t does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. 5n this connection, we do not overloo, the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section %0, the PresidentA ... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public %elfare ma# re7uire . 5t is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase Gas the public welfare may re$uireG $ualified, not the clauses preceding the one -ust $uoted, but onl# the place to which the seat of the government may be transferred. .his fact becomes more apparent when we consider that said Section %0 was originally Section ( of :ct No. (670, 1 which provided that, Gwhenever in the -udgment of the 8overnor-8eneral the public %elfare re$uires, he may, by e ecutive order,G effect the changes enumerated therein &as in said section %0*, including the change of the seat of the

government Gto such place ... as the public interest re7uires.G .he opening statement of said Section ( of :ct No. (670 @ which was not included in Section %0 of the ;evised :dministrative Code @ governed the time at which, or the conditions under which, the powers therein conferred could be e ercised= whereas the last part of the first sentence of said section referred e0clusi el# to the place to which the seat of the government was to be transferred. :t any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we assumed that the phrase Gas the public welfare may re$uire,G in said Section %0, $ualifies all other clauses thereof. 5t is true that in "alalan$ s. 1illiams &6# Phil. 6!%* and People s. -osenthal &%0 Phil. 1!0*, this Court had upheld Gpublic welfareG and Gpublic interest,G respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to e ecute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases @ as all -udicial pronouncements @ must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents and have no binding effect. 7 .he law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the /irector of Public Cor,s, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Cor,s and Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations topromote safe transit upon national roads and streets. Bpon the other hand, the ;osenthal case referred to the authority of the 5nsular .reasurer, under :ct No. !"0(, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale ofspeculati e securities. Both cases involved grants to administrati e officers of powers related to the e ercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of $uestions of fact. Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section %0. :s above indicated, the creation of municipalities, is not an administrati e function, but one which is essentially and eminentl# le$islati e in character. .he $uestion of whether or not Gpublic interestG demands the e ercise of such power is not one of fact. it is Gpurel# a le$islati e$uestion G&Carolina->irginia Coastal Dighway vs. Coastal .urnpi,e :uthority, 67 S.). !d. 1(#-1(1, 1("1(0*, or apolitical $uestion &Bdall vs. Severn, 6+ P. !d. 176-17+*. :s the Supreme Court of Cisconsin has aptly characteri9ed it, Gthe $uestion as to whether incorporation is for the best interest of the community in any case is emphatically a 7uestion of public polic# and statecraftG &5n re >illage of North Milwau,ee, %6 N.C. (#11, (#1"-(#16*. 2or this reason, courts of -ustice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of legislative powers, state laws granting the -udicial department, the power to determine whether certain territories should be anne ed to a particular municipality &Bdall vs. Severn, supra, !"0-1"+*= or vesting in a Commission the right to determine the plan and frame of government of proposed villages and what functions shall be e ercised by the same, although the powers and functions of the village are specifically limited by statute &5n re Municipal Charters, 0% :tl. 1#6-1#0*= or conferring upon courts the authority to declare a given town or village incorporated, and designate its metes and bounds, upon petition of a ma-ority of the ta able inhabitants thereof, setting forth the area desired to be included in such village &.erritory e rel Ielly vs. Stewart, !1 Pac. 7#"-7#+*= or authori9ing the territory of a town, containing a given area and population, to be incorporated as a town, on certain steps being ta,en by the inhabitants thereof and on certain determination by a court and subse$uent vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the court is allowed to determine whether the lands embraced in the petition Gought -ustlyG to be included in the village, and whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such incorporation, and to enlarge and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village Gas -ustice may re$uireG &5n re >illages of North Milwau,ee, %6 N.C. (#1"-(#16*= or creating a Municipal Board of Control which shall determine whether or not the laying out, construction or operation of a toll road is in the Gpublic interestG and whether the re$uirements of the law had been complied with, in which case the board shall enter an order creating a municipal corporation and fi ing the name of the same &Carolina->irginia Coastal Dighway vs. Coastal .urnpi,e :uthority, 67 S.). !d. 1(#*. 5nsofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President is concerned, the case of Schechter Poultr# "orporation s. (.S. &6+ 4. )d. ("6#* is $uite relevant to the one at bar. .he Schechter case involved the constitutionality of Section 1 of the National 5ndustrial ;ecovery :ct authori9ing the President of the Bnited States to approve Gcodes of fair competitionG submitted to him by one or more trade or industrial associations or corporations which Gimpose no ine$uitable restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly representative,G provided that such codes are not designed Gto promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the policyG of said :ct. .he 2ederal Supreme Court heldA .o summari9e and conclude upon this pointA Sec. 1 of the ;ecovery :ct is without precedent. 5t supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. 5t does not underta,e to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure. 5nstead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authori9es the ma,ing of codes to prescribe them. 2or that legislative underta,ing, Sec. 1 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation, correction and e pansion described in Sec. (. 5n view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. Ce thin, that the code ma,ing authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. 5f the term Gunfair competitionG is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is Gvirtually unfettered.G and, conse$uently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that Gpublic welfare,G which has even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. 5n fact, if the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section %0 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be re$uired by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the ) ecutive, and would bring about a total collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold. 5t may not be amiss to note that the e0ecuti e orders in 7uestion %ere issued after the le$islati e bills for the creation of the municipalities in ol ed in this case had failed to pass "on$ress. : better proof of the fact that the issuance of said e ecutive orders entails the e ercise of purely legislative functions can hardly be given. :gain, Section (# &(* of :rticle >55 of our fundamental law ordainsA .he President shall have control of all the e ecutive departments, bureaus, or offices, e ercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and ta,e care that the laws be faithfully e ecuted. .he power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the e ercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the e ecutive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. .his power is denied by the Constitution to the ) ecutive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Cith respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of chec,ing whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Dence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act Cithin the scope of their

authority. De may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials ta,e appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its -urisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. De may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or ta,e any disciplinary action against him, e cept on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board." Bpon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant. % .hus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality &if he had it*, without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, e ercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution. .hen, also, the power of control of the President over e ecutive departments, bureaus or offices implies no morethan the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the e ercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authorit# either to abolish an e0ecuti e department or bureau, or to create a ne% one . :s a conse$uence, the alleged power of the President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the e ercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the e ecutive departments, bureaus or offices. 5n other words, Section %0 of the ;evised :dministrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above $uoted. 5nstead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the e ecutive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the e0act opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said e ecutive departments, bureaus or offices. 5n short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Section %0, as part of the ;evised :dministrative Code, approved on March (#, (+(6, must be deemed repealed by the subse$uent adoption of the Constitution, in (+1", which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.7 .here are only two &!* other points left for consideration, namely, respondent3s claim &a* that Gnot all the proper partiesG @ referring to the officers of the newly created municipalities @ Ghave been impleaded in this case,G and &b* that Gthe present petition is premature.G :s regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and the parties do not claim, that the officers of any of said municipalities have been appointed or elected and assumed office. :t any rate, the Solicitor 8eneral, who has appeared on behalf of respondent :uditor 8eneral, is the officer authori9ed by law Gto act and represent the 8overnment of the Philippines, its offices and agents, in any official investigation, proceeding or matter re$uiring the services of a lawyerG &Section (%%(, ;evised :dministrative Code*, and, in connection with the creation of the aforementioned municipalities, which involves a political, not proprietary, function, said local officials, if any, are mere agents or representatives of the national government. .heir interest in the case at bar has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly represented. 0 Cith respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet acted on any of the e ecutive order Q in $uestion and has not intimated how he would act in connection therewith. 5t is, however, a matter of common, public ,nowledge, sub-ect to -udicial cogni9ance, that the President has, for many years, issued e ecutive orders creating municipal corporations and that the same have been organi9ed and in actual operation, thus indicating, without peradventure of doubt, that the e penditures incidental thereto have been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit by the 8eneral :uditing 'ffice and its officials. .here is no reason to believe, therefore, that respondent would adopt a different policy as regards the new municipalities involved in this case, in the absence of an allegation to such effect, and none has been made by him. CD);)2';), the ) ecutive 'rders in $uestion are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any e penditure of public funds in implementation of said ) ecutive 'rders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. 5t is so ordered. Ben$zon, ".J., Bautista An$elo, -e#es, J.B.2., Barrera and !izon, JJ., concur. Naldi ar, J., too, no part. G.R. No. L-3-1:: O65o;4r 18, 1977 T!E 1EO1LE O' T!E 1!#L#11#NES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. !ON. "A$#"O A. "A EREN '#, S5a. r+F, LaB+na, *OSE /&ENAVENT&RA, GODO'REDO RE0ES, /EN*A"#N RE0ES, NA2AR#O A%&#NO and ARLO DEL ROSAR#O, accused-appellees. Office of the Solicitor General for appellant. -ustics ). de los -e#es, Jr. for appellees. A%&#NO, J.:t*+.,-h.w/, .his is a case involving the validity of a (+%6 regulation, penali9ing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources and the Commissioner of 2isheries under the old 2isheries 4aw and the law creating the 2isheries Commission. 'n March 6, (+%+ ?ose Buenaventura, 8odofredo ;eyes, Ben-amin ;eyes, Na9ario :$uino and Carlito del ;osario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cru9, 4aguna with having violated 2isheries :dministrative 'rder No. 07-(. 5t was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March (, (+%+ resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cru9 by Gusing their own motor banca, e$uipped with motor= with a generator colored green with attached dynamo colored gray or somewhat white= and electrocuting device locally ,nown as sensored with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or e$uipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any a$uatic animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and pre-udice of the populaceG &Criminal Case No. "7!+*.

Bpon motion of the accused, the municipal court $uashed the complaint. .he prosecution appealed. .he Court of 2irst 5nstance of 4aguna affirmed the order of dismissal &Civil Case No. SC-1%*. .he case is now before this Court on appeal by the prosecution under ;epublic :ct No. "77#. .he lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penali9e because electric current is not an obno ious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section 5 5 of the 2isheries 4aw and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. .he lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the e ecutive and -udicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. :s legal bac,ground, it should be stated that section (( of the 2isheries 4aw prohibits Gthe use of any obno ious or poisonous substanceG in fishing. Section 6% of the same law punishes any person who uses an obno ious or poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than si months nor more than five years. 5t is noteworthy that the 2isheries 4aw does not e pressly punish .electro fishing.G Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of 2isheries, promulgated 2isheries :dministrative 'rder No. 07 &%! '.8. (!!7*, prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. .he order is $uoted belowA <OP.QR%phS; SBB?)C.A P;'D5B5.5N8 )4)C.;' 25SD5N8 5N :44 C:.);S <OP.QR%phS; '2 .D) PD545PP5N)S. Pursuant to Section 7 of :ct No. 7##1, as amended, and Section 7 of ;.:. No. 1"(!, the following rules and regulations regarding the prohibition of electro fishing in all waters of the Philippines are promulgated for the information and guidance of all concerned. <OP.QR%phS; S)C.5'N (. @ !efinition. @ Cords and terms used in this 'rder (( construed as followsA &a* Philippine waters or territorial waters of the Philippines3 includes all waters of the Philippine :rchipelago, as defined in the t between the Bnited States and Spain, dated respectively the tenth of /ecember, eighteen hundred ninety eight and the seventh of November, nineteen hundred. 2or the purpose of this order, rivers, la,es and other bodies of fresh waters are included. &b* 'lectro )ishin$. @ )lectro fishing is the catching of fish with the use of electric current. .he e$uipment used are of many electrical devices which may be battery or generator-operated and from and available source of electric current. &c* 3Persons3 includes firm, corporation, association, agent or employee. &d* 32ish3 includes other a$uatic products. S)C. !. @ Prohibition. @ 5t shall be unlawful for any person to engage in electro fishing or to catch fish by the use of electric current in any portion of the Philippine waters e cept for research, educational and scientific purposes which must be covered by a permit issued by the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources which shall be carried at all times. S)C. 1. @ Penalt#. @ :ny violation of the provisions of this :dministrative 'rder shall sub-ect the offender to a fine of not e ceeding five hundred pesos &P"##.##* or imprisonment of not e tending si &%* months or both at the discretion of the Court. S)C. 7. @ -epealin$ Pro isions. @ :ll administrative orders or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this :dministrative 'rder are hereby revo,ed. S)C. ". @ 'ffecti it#. @ .his :dministrative 'rder shall ta,e effect si &%#* days after its publication in the 'ffice 8a9ette. 'n ?une !0, (+%6 the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources, upon the recommendation of the 2isheries Commission, issued 2isheries :dministrative 'rder No. 07-(, amending section ! of :dministrative 'rder No. 07, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh %ater fisheries &%1 '.8. ++%1*. .hus, the phrase Gin any portion of the Philippine watersG found in section !, was changed by the amendatory order to read as followsA Gin fresh %ater fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, la,es, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh water.G .he Court of 2irst 5nstance and the prosecution &p. (( of brief* assumed that electro fishing is punishable under section 01 of the 2isheries 4aw &not under section 6% thereof*, which provides that any other violation of that law Gor of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall sub-ect the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos &P!##*, or in t for not more than si months, or both, in the discretion of the court.G .hat assumption is incorrect because 1 of the afore$uoted :dministrative 'rder No. 07 imposes a fm of not e ceeding P"## on a person engaged in electro fishing, which amount the 01. 5t seems that the /epartment of 2isheries prescribed their own penalty for swift fishing which penalty is less than the severe penalty imposed in section 6% and which is not 5dentified to the at penalty imposed in section 01. Dad :dministrative 'rder No. 07 adopted the fighter penalty prescribed in on 01, then the crime of electro fishing would be within the e0clusi e ori$inal 4urisdiction of the inferior court &Sec. 77 KfL, ?udiciary 4aw= People vs. ;agasi, 4-!0%%1, September !!, Ce have discussed this pre point, not raised in the briefs, because it is obvious that the crime of electro fishing which is punishable with a sum up to P"##, falls within the concurrent ori$inal 4urisdiction of the inferior courts and the Court of 2irst instance &People vs. Na9areno, 4-7##16, :pril 1#, (+6%, 6# SC;: "1( and the cases cited therein*.

:nd since the instant case was filed in the municipal court of Sta. Cru9, 4aguna, a provincial capital, the order of d rendered by that municipal court was directly appealable to the Court, not to the Court of 2irst 5nstance of 4aguna &Sec. 7" and last par. of section 06 of the ?udiciary 4aw= )sperat vs. :vila, 4-!"++!, ?une 1#, (+%6, !# SC;: "+%*. 5t results that the Court of 2irst 5nstance of 4aguna had no appellate -urisdiction over the case. 5ts order affirming the municipal court3s order of dismissal is void for lac, of motion. .his appeal shall be treated as a direct appeal from the municipal court to this Court. &See People vs. /el ;osario, +6 Phil. %6*. 5n this appeal, the prosecution argues that :dministrative 'rders Nos. 07 and 07-( were not issued under section (( of the 2isheries 4aw which, as indicated above, punishes fishing by means of an obno ious or poisonous substance. .his contention is not well-ta,en because, as already stated, the Penal provision of :dministrative 'rder No. 07 implies that electro fishing is penali9ed as a form of fishing by means of an obno ious or poisonous substance under section ((. .he prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in fresh water fisheries &(* the rule-ma,ing power of the /epartment Secretary under section 7 of the 2isheries 4aw= &!* the function of the Commissioner of 2isheries to enforce the provisions of the 2isheries 4aw and the regulations Promulgated thereunder and to e ecute the rules and regulations consistent with the purpose for the creation of the 2isheries Commission and for the development of fisheries &Sec. 7KcL and KhL ;epublic :ct No. 1"(!= &1* the declared national policy to encourage, Promote and conserve our fishing resources &Sec. (, ;epublic :ct No. 1"(!*, and &7* section 01 of the 2isheries 4aw which provides that Gany other violation ofG the 2isheries 4aw or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder Gshall sub-ect the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than si months, or both, in the discretion of the court.G :s already pointed out above, the prosecution3s reference to section 01 is out of place because the penalty for electro fishing under :dministrative order No. 07 is not the same as the penalty fi ed in section 01. Ce are of the opinion that the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources and the Commissioner of 2isheries e ceeded their authority in issuing 2isheries :dministrative 'rders Nos. 07 and 07-( and that those orders are not warranted under the 2isheries Commission, ;epublic :ct No. 1"(!. .he reason is that the 2isheries 4aw does not e pressly prohibit electro fishing. :s electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources and the Commissioner of 2isheries are powerless to penali9e it. 5n other words, :dministrative 'rders Nos. 07 and 07-(, in penali9ing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Dad the lawma,ing body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old 2isheries 4aw. .hat law punishes &(* the use of obno ious or poisonous substance, or e plosive in fishing= &!* unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries= &1* unlawful ta,ing of marine molusca, &7* illegal ta,ing of sponges= &"* failure of licensed fishermen to report the ,ind and $uantity of fish caught, and &%* other violations. Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. :dministrative 'rder No. 07, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category of Gother violationsG because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty ne t lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obno ious or poisonous substances, fi ed in section 6%, and is not the same as the penalty for Gother violationsG of the law and regulations fi ed in section 01 of the 2isheries 4aw. .he lawma,ing body cannot delegate to an e ecutive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. 5t can authori9e the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. &People vs. ) conde (#( Phil. (( !", citing (( :m. ?ur. +%" on p. (( 1!*. 'riginally, :dministrative 'rder No. 07 punished electro fishing in all waters. 4ater, the ban against electro fishing was confined to fresh %ater fisheries. .he amendment created the impression that electro fishing is not condemnable per se. 5t could be tolerated in marine waters. .hat circumstances strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro fishing. Dowever, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the 2isheries 4aw and that it cannot be penali9ed merely by e ecutive revolution because Presidential /ecree No. 6#7, which is a revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was promulgated on May (%, (+6" &6( '.8. 7!%+*, e pressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas. .hat decree providesA <OP.QR%phS;S'". 55. @ ,lle$al fishin$, dealin$ in ille$all# cau$ht fish or fisher#Aa7uatic products . @ 5t shall he unlawful for any person to catch, ta,e or gather or cause to be caught, ta,en or gathered fish or fishery<a$uatic products in Philippine waters with the use of e plosives, obno ious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs &(*, &m* and &d*, respectively, of Section 1 hereofA ... .he decree :ct No. 7##1, as amended, ;epublic :cts Nos. 7!0, 1#70, 1"(! and 1"0%, Presidential /ecrees Nos. 71, "17 and ""1, and all , :cts, ) ecutive 'rders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with it &Sec. 7+, P. /. No. 6#7*. .he inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penali9ing electro fishing is a clear recognition of the deficiency or silence on that point of the old 2isheries 4aw. 5t is an admission that a mere e ecutive regulation is not legally ade$uate to penali9e electro fishing. Note that the definition of electro fishing, which is found in section ( &c* of 2isheries :dministrative 'rder No. 07 and which is not provided for the old 2isheries 4aw, is now found in section 1&d* of the decree. Note further that the decree penalty electro fishing by Gimprisonment from two &!* to four &7* yearsG, a punishment which is more severe than the penalty of a time of not e cluding P"## or imprisonment of not more than si months or both fi ed in section 1 of 2isheries :dministrative 'rder No. 07.

:n e amination of the rule-ma,ing power of e ecutive officials and administrative agencies and, in particular, of the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources &now Secretary of Natural ;esources* under the 2isheries 4aw sustains the view that he e his authority in penali9ing electro fishing by means of an administrative order. :dministrative agent are clothed with rule-ma,ing powers because the lawma,ing body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and comple situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. :ll that is re$uired is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes &People vs. ) conde (#( Phil. ((!"= /irector of 2orestry vs. MuW=o9, 4-!76+%, ?une !0, (+%0, !1 SC;: ((01, ((+0= 8eu,e,o vs. :raneta, (#! Phil. 6#%, 6(!*. .he lawma,ing body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute &B.S. vs. .upasi Molina, !+ Phil. ((+, (!", citing B.S. vs. 8rimaud !!# B.S. "#%= 5nterprovincial :utobus Co., 5nc. vs. Coll. of 5nternal ;evenue, +0 Phil. !+#, !+"-%*. .he grant of the rule-ma,ing power to administrative agencies is a rela ation of the principle of separation of powers and is an e ception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers. :dministrative regulations or Gsubordinate legislation calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of Gthe growing comple ity of modem life, the multiplication of the sub-ects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the lawG Calalang vs. Cilliams, 6# Phil. 6!%= People vs. ;osenthal and 'smeW=a, %0 Phil. 1!0*. :dministrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be e tended. &B.S. vs. .upasi Molina, supra*. :n administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress &Santos vs. )sten9o, (#+ Phil. 7(+, 7!!= .eo on vs. Members of the d of :dministrators, 4-!"%(+, ?une 1#, (+6#, 11 SC;: "0"= Manuel vs. 8eneral :uditing 'ffice, 4-!0+"!, /ecember !+, (+6(, 7! SC;: %%#= /eluao vs. Casteel, 4-!(+#%, :ugust !+, (+%+, !+ SC;: 1"#*. .he rule-ma,ing power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. .he power cannot be e tended to amending or e panding the statutory re$uirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. ;ules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. &Bniversity of Santo .omas vs. Board of .a : +1 Phil. 16%, 10!, citing (! C.?. 07"-7%. :s to invalid regulations, see of 5nternal ;evenue vs. >illaflor %+ Phil. 1(+, Cise Q Co. vs. Meer, 60 Phil. %"", %6%= /el March vs. Phil. >eterans :dministrative, 4!6!++, ?une !6, (+61, "( SC;: 17#, 17+*. .here is no $uestion that the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources has rule-ma,ing powers. Section 7 of the 2isheries law provides that the Secretary Gshall from time to time issue instructions, orders, and regulations consistentG with that law, Gas may be and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof.G .hat power is now vested in the Secretary of Natural ;esources by on 6 of the ;evised 2isheries law, Presidential /ecember No. 6#7. Section 7&h* of ;epublic :ct No. 1"(! empower the Co of 2isheries Gto prepare and e ecute upon the approval of the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources, forms instructions, rules and regulations consistent with the purposeG of that enactment Gand for the development of fisheries.G Section 6+&B* of the ;evised :dministrative Code provides that Gthe /epartment Dead shall have the power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit do so, all rules, regulates, orders, memorandums, and other instructions, not contrar# to la%, to regulate the proper wor,ing and harmonious and efficient administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his /epartment, and for the strict enforcement and proper e ecution of the laws relative to matters under the -urisdiction of said /epartment= but none of said rules or orders shall prescribe penalties for the violation thereof, e cept as e pressly authori9ed by law.G :dministrative regulations issued by a /epartment Dead in conformity with law have the force of law &>alerie vs. Secretary of culture and Natural ;esources, ((6 Phil. 6!+, 611= :nti$ue Sawmills, 5nc. vs. Rayco, 4- !##"(, May 1#, (+%%, (6 SC;: 1(%*. :s he e ercises the rule-ma,ing power by delegation of the lawma,ing body, it is a re$uisite that he should not transcend the bound demarcated by the statute for the e ercise of that power= otherwise, he would be improperly e ercising legislative power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawma,ing body. :rticle 6 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that administrative or e ecutive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.G :s noted by ?ustice 2ernando, Ge cept for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a public office must be in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can e ercise it.G Gdepartment 9eal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute.G &;adio Communications of the Philippines, 5nc. vs. Santiago, 4-!+!1%, :ugust !(, (+67, "0 SC;: 7+1, 7+%-0*. G;ules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, parta,e of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. .his is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after e pressing the policy, purposes, ob-ectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. .he details and the manner of carrying out the law are oftentimes left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. 5n this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law.G .he rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. &/avis, :dministrative 4aw, p. (+7, (+6, cited in >ictories Milling Co., 5nc. vs. Social Security Commission, ((7 Phil. """, ""0*. 5n case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law &People vs. 4im, (#0 Phil. (#+(*. .his Court in its decision in the 4im case, supra, promulgated on ?uly !%, (+%#, called the attention of technical men in the e ecutive departments, who draft rules and regulations, to the importance and necessity of closely following the legal provisions which they intend to implement so as to avoid any possible misunderstanding or confusion.

.he rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed by an e ecutive officer of the government in conformity with and based upon a statute authori9ing such regulation constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the provisions of the law &B.S. vs. .upasi Molina, !+ Phil. ((+, (!7*. 5n other words, a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can constitute a crime punishable as provided in the authori9ing statute and by virtue of the latter &People vs. ) conde (#( Phil. ((!", ((1!*. 5t has been held that Gto declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is a power vested e clusively in the legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body or agencyG &( :m. ?ur. !nd, sec. (!6, p. +10= .e as Co. vs. Montgomery, 61 2. Supp. "!6*. 5n the instant case the regulation penali9ing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the 2isheries 4aw, under which the regulation was issued, because the la% itself does not e0pressl# punish electro fishin$ . .he instant case is similar to People s. Santos, %1 Phil. 1##. .he Santos case involves section !0 of 2ish and 8ame :dministrative 'rder No. ! issued by the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources pursuant to the aforementioned section 7 of the 2isheries 4aw. Section !0 contains the proviso that a fishing boat not licensed under the 2isheries 4aw and under the said administrative order may fish within three ,ilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which -urisdiction is e ercised by naval and military reservations authorities of the Bnited States only upon receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be granted by the Secretary upon recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned. : violation of the proviso may be proceeded against under section 7" of the 2ederal Penal Code. :ugusto :. Santos was prosecuted under that provision in the Court of 2irst 5nstance of Cavite for having caused his two fishing boats to fish, loiter and anchor without permission from the Secretary within three ,ilometers from the shoreline of Corrigidor 5sland. .his Court held that the 2isheries 4aw does not prohibit boats not sub-ect to license from fishing within three ,ilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which -urisdiction is e ercised by naval and military authorities of the Bnited States, without permission from the Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities concerned. :s the said law does not penali9e the act mentioned in section !0 of the administrative order, the promulgation of that provision by the Secretary Gis e$uivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him, it being e pressly reservedG to the lawma,ing body. GSuch an act constitutes not only an e cess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary but also an e ercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and thereforeG the said provision Gis null and void and without effectG. Dence, the charge against Santos was dismiss. : penal statute is strictly construed. Chile an administrative agency has the right to ma,e ran,s and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. :n administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers e pressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. &8lustrom vs. State, !#% 8a. 617, "0 Second !d "17= See ! :m. ?r. !nd (!+-(1#*. Chere the legislature has delegated to e ecutive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an e press legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of e tending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-ma,ing power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate &State vs. Miles, Cash. !nd 1!!, (#" Pac. !nd "(*. 5n a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order is one which falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be scrutini9ed with special care. &State vs. Miles supra*. .he 3iles case involved a statute which authori9ed the State 8ame Commission Gto adopt, promulgate, amend and<or repeal, and enforce reasonable rules and regulations governing and<or prohibiting the ta&in$ of the various classes of game. Bnder that statute, the 8ame Commission promulgated a rule that Git shall be unlawful to offer, pay or receive any reward, pri9e or compensation for the hunting, pursuing, ta,ing, ,illing or displa#in$ of any game animal, game bird or game fish or any part thereof.G Beryl S. Miles, the owner of a sporting goods store, regularly offered a ten-down cash pri9e to the person displaying the largest deer in his store during the open for hunting such game animals. 2or that act, he was charged with a violation of the rule Promulgated by the State 8ame Commission. 5t was held that there was no statute penali9ing the displa# of game. Chat the statute penali9ed was the ta,ing of game. 5f the lawma,ing body desired to prohibit the display of game, it could have readily said so. 5t was not lawful for the administrative board to e tend or modify the statute. Dence, the indictment against Miles was $uashed. .he Miles case is similar to this case. CD);)2';), the lower court3s decision of ?une +, (+6# is set aside for lac, of appellate -urisdiction and the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of Sta. Cru9, 4aguna in Criminal Case No. "7!+ is affirmed. Costs de oficio. S' ';/);)/. Barredo, "oncepcion, Jr., Santos and Guerrero, JJ., concur.;T%phU;.<Vt )ernando and Antonio, JJ., too& no part. Guerrero, J., %as desi$nated to sit in the Second !i ision. G.R. No. 101-79 A+B+s5 :, 1991!#L#11#NE ASSO #AT#ON O' SERV# E E$1ORTERS, #N ., petitioner, vs.

!ON. R&/EN D. TORRES, as S46r45ar, o< 5=4 D4par5>4n5 o< La;or G E>plo,>4n5, and *OSE N. SAR"#ENTO, as Ad>inis5ra5or o< 5=4 1!#L#11#NE OVERSEAS E"1LO0"ENT AD"#N#STRAT#ON, respondents. !e Guzman, 3eneses = Associates for petitioner. GR#HO-A%&#NO, J.: .his petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by the Philippine :ssociation of Service ) porters &P:S)5, for short*, to prohibit and en-oin the Secretary of the /epartment of 4abor and )mployment &/'4)* and the :dministrator of the Philippine 'verseas )mployment :dministration &or P'):* from enforcing and implementing /'4) /epartment 'rder No. (%, Series of (++( and P'): Memorandum Circulars Nos. 1# and 16, Series of (++(, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of 2ilipino domestic helpers for Dong Iong and vesting in the /'4), through the facilities of the P'):, the tas, of processing and deploying such wor,ers. P:S)5 is the largest national organi9ation of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authori9ed by the P'):, to engaged in the business of obtaining overseas employment for 2ilipino landbased wor,ers, including domestic helpers. 'n ?une (, (++(, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by 2ilipino housemaids employed in Dong Iong, /'4) Secretary ;uben /. .orres issued /epartment 'rder No. (%, Series of (++(, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of G2ilipino domestic helpers going to Dong IongG &p. 1#, -ollo*. .he /'4) itself, through the P'): too, over the business of deploying such Dong Iong-bound wor,ers. 5n view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for )ilipino domestic helpers $oin$ to Hon$ Won$, the recruitment of the same by private employment agencies is hereb# temporaril# suspended effective ( ?uly (++(. :s such, the /'4) through the facilities of the Philippine 'verseas )mployment :dministration shall ta,e over the processing and deployment of household wor,ers bound for Dong Iong, sub-ect to guidelines to be issued for said purpose. 5n support of this policy, all /'4) ;egional /irectors and the Bureau of 4ocal )mployment3s regional offices are li,ewise directed to coordinate with the P'): in maintaining a manpower pool of prospective domestic helpers to Dong Iong on a regional basis. 2or compliance. &)mphasis ours= p. 1#, -ollo.* Pursuant to the above /'4) circular, the P'): issued Memorandum Circular No. 1#, Series of (++(, dated ?uly (#, (++(, providing 8B5/)45N)S on the 8overnment processing and deployment of 2ilipino domestic helpers to Dong Iong and the accreditation of Dong Iong recruitment agencies intending to hire 2ilipino domestic helpers. Sub-ectA 8uidelines on the .emporary 8overnment Processing and /eployment of /omestic Delpers to Dong Iong. Pursuant to /epartment 'rder No. (%, series of (++( and in order to operationali9e the temporary government processing and deployment of domestic helpers &/Ds* to Dong Iong resulting from the temporary suspension of recruitment by private employment agencies for said s,ill and host mar,et, the following guidelines and mechanisms shall govern the implementation of said policy. 5. Creation of a -oint P'):-'CC: Dousehold Cor,ers Placement Bnit &DCPB* :n ad hoc, one stop Dousehold Cor,ers Placement Bnit Kor DCPBL under the supervision of the P'): shall ta,e charge of the various operations involved in the Dong Iong-/D industry segmentA .he DCPB shall have the following functions in coordination with appropriate units and other entities concernedA (. Negotiations with and :ccreditation of Dong Iong ;ecruitment :gencies !. Manpower Pooling 1. Cor,er .raining and Briefing 7. Processing and /eployment ". Celfare Programs 55. /ocumentary ;e$uirements and 'ther Conditions for :ccreditation of Dong Iong ;ecruitment :gencies or Principals ;ecruitment agencies in Dong Iong intending to hire 2ilipino /Ds for their employers may negotiate with the DCPB in Manila directly or through the Philippine 4abor :ttache3s 'ffice in Dong Iong.

E. 5nterim :rrangement

:ll contracts stamped in Dong Iong as of ?une 1# shall continue to be processed by P'): until 1( ?uly (++( under the name of the Philippine agencies concerned. .hereafter, all contracts shall be processed with the DCPB. ;ecruitment agencies in Dong Iong shall submit to the Philippine Consulate 8eneral in Dong ,ong a list of their accepted applicants in their pool within the last wee, of ?uly. .he last day of acceptance shall be ?uly 1( which shall then be the basis of DCPB in accepting contracts for processing. :fter the e haustion of their respective pools the only source of applicants will be the P'): manpower pool. 2or strict compliance of all concerned. &pp. 1(-1", -ollo.* 'n :ugust (, (++(, the P'): :dministrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 16, Series of (++(, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic wor,ers for Dong Iong. .'A :ll Philippine and Dong Iong :gencies engaged in the recruitment of /omestic helpers for Dong Iong 2urther to Memorandum Circular No. 1#, series of (++( pertaining to the government processing and deployment of domestic helpers &/Ds* to Dong Iong, processin$ of emplo#ment contracts which have been attested by the Dong Iong Commissioner of 4abor up to 1# ?une (++( shall be processed by the P'): )mployment Contracts Processing Branch up to (" :ugust (++( only. )ffective (% :ugust (++(, all Dong Iong recruitment agent<s hiring /Ds from the Philippines shall recruit under the new scheme which re$uires prior accreditation which the P'):. ;ecruitment agencies in Dong Iong may apply for accreditation at the 'ffice of the 4abor :ttache, Philippine Consulate 8eneral where a P'): team is posted until 1( :ugust (++(. .hereafter, those who failed to have themselves accredited in Dong Iong may proceed to the P'):-'CC: Dousehold Cor,ers Placement Bnit in Manila for accreditation before their recruitment and processing of /Ds shall be allowed. ;ecruitment agencies in Dong Iong who have some accepted applicants in their pool after the cut-off period shall submit this list of wor,ers upon accreditation. 'nly those /Ds in said list will be allowed processing outside of the DCPB manpower pool. 2or strict compliance of all concerned. &)mphasis supplied, p. 1%, -ollo.* 'n September !, (++(, the petitioner, P:S)5, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned /'4) and P'): circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the following reasonsA (. that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and<or in e cess of their rule-ma,ing authority in issuing said circulars= !. that the assailed /'4) and P'): circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive= and 1. that the re$uirements of publication and filing with the 'ffice of the National :dministrative ;egister were not complied with. .here is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition. :rticle 1% of the 4abor Code grants the 4abor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. :rt. 1%. -e$ulator# Po%er. @ .he Secretary of 4abor shall have the power to restrict and re$ulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title K;egulation of ;ecruitment and Placement :ctivitiesL and is hereb# authorized to issue orders and promul$ate rules and re$ulations to carr# out the ob4ecti es and implement the pro isions of this title. &)mphasis ours.* 'n the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the P'):, which was created by ) ecutive 'rder No. 6+6 on May (, (+0! to ta,e over the functions of the 'verseas )mployment /evelopment Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of )mployment Services, is broad and far-ranging forA (. :mong the functions inherited by the P'): from the defunct Bureau of )mployment Services was the power and dutyA G!. .o establish and maintain a registration and<or licensing system to re$ulate pri ate sector participation in the recruitment and placement of %or&ers, locall# and o erseas , . . .G &:rt. (", 4abor Code, )mphasis supplied*. &p. (1, -ollo.* !. 5t assumed from the defunct 'verseas )mployment /evelopment Board the power and dutyA 1. .o recruit and place wor,ers for overseas employment of 2ilipino contract wor,ers on a government to government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate . . . &:rt. (6, 4abor Code.* &p. (1, -ollo.* 1. 2rom the National Seamen Board, the P'): too, overA

!. .o regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment= and secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen wor,ers and secure compliance therewith. &:rt. !#, 4abor Code.* .he vesture of $uasi-legislative and $uasi--udicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. 5t has been necessitated by Gthe growing comple ity of the modern societyG &Solid Domes, 5nc. vs. Payawal, (66 SC;: 6!, 6+*. More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society3s ramified activities. GSpeciali9ed in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more e pertise and dispatch than can be e pected from the legislature or the courts of -usticeG & ,bid.*. 5t is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of 2ilipino landbased wor,ers for overseas employment. : careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the Gadministrative and policing powers e pressly or by necessary implication conferredG upon the respondents &People vs. Maceren, 6+ SC;: 7"#*. .he power to Grestrict and regulate conferred by :rticle 1% of the 4abor Code involves a grant of police power &City of Naga vs. Court of :ppeals, !7 SC;: 0+0*. .o GrestrictG means Gto confine, limit or stopG &p. %!, -ollo* and whereas the power to GregulateG means Gthe power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patronsG &Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. :lcua9, (0# SC;: !(0*. .he Solicitor 8eneral, in his Comment, aptly observedA . . . Said :dministrative 'rder Ki.e., /'4) :dministrative 'rder No. (%L merely restricted the scope or area of petitioner3s business operations by e cluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for Dong Iong till after the establishment of the GmechanismsG that will enhance the protection of 2ilipino domestic helpers going to Dong Iong. 5n fine, other than the recruitment and deplo#ment of )ilipino domestic helpers for Hon$&on$, petitioner ma# still deplo# other class of )ilipino %or&ers either for Dong,ong and other countries and all other classes of 2ilipino wor,ers for other countries. Said administrative issuances, intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant violations of the rule against e cessive collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees and other charges committed by private employment agencies recruiting and deploying domestic helpers to Dong,ong. XThe# are reasonable, alid and 4ustified under the $eneral %elfare clause of the "onstitution, since the recruitment and deplo#ment business, as it is conducted toda#, is affected %ith public interest.

.he alleged ta,eover Kof the business of recruiting and placing 2ilipino domestic helpers in Dong,ongL is merely a remedial measure, and e pires after its purpose shall have been attained. .his is evident from the tenor of :dministrative 'rder No. (% that recruitment of 2ilipino domestic helpers going to Dong,ong by private employment agencies are hereby G temporaril# suspended effective ?uly (, (++(.G .he alleged ta,eover is limited in scope, being confined to recruitment of domestic helpers going to Dong,ong only.

. . . the -ustification for the ta,eover of the processing and deploying of domestic helpers for Dong,ong resulting from the restriction of the scope of petitioner3s business is confined solely to the unscrupulous practice of private employment agencies victimi9ing applicants for employment as domestic helpers for Dong,ong and not the whole recruitment business in the Philippines. &pp. %!-%",-ollo.* .he $uestioned circulars are therefore a valid e ercise of the police power as delegated to the e ecutive branch of 8overnment. Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lac, of power publication and filing in the 'ffice of the National :dministrative ;egister as re$uired in :rticle ! of the Civil Code, :rticle " of the 4abor Code and Sections 1&(* and 7, Chapter !, Boo, >55 of the :dministrative Code of (+06 which provideA :rt. !. 4aws shall ta,e effect after fifteen &("* days following the completion of their publication in the 'fficial 8a9atte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . &Civil Code.* :rt. ". -ules and -e$ulations. @ .he /epartment of 4abor and other government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen &("* days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation. &)mphasis supplied, 4abor Code, as amended.* Sec. 1. )ilin$. @ &(* ' er# a$enc# shall file %ith the (ni ersit# of the Philippines 2a% "enter, three 859 certified copies of e er# rule adopted b# it. ;ules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three &1* months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. &)mphasis supplied, Chapter !, Boo, >55 of the :dministrative Code of (+06.* Sec. 7. 'ffecti it#. @ ,n addition to other rule:ma&in$ re7uirements pro ided b# la% not inconsistent %ith this Boo&, each rule shall become effecti e fifteen 8;K9 da#s from the date of filin$ as abo e pro ided unless a different date is fi ed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the e istence of which must be e pressed in a statement accompanying the rule. .he agency shall ta,e appropriate measures to ma,e emergency rules ,nown to persons who may be affected by them. &)mphasis supplied, Chapter !, Boo, >55 of the :dministrative Code of (+06*.

'nce, more we advert to our ruling in Ta<ada s. Tu era, (7% SC;: 77% thatA . . . :dministrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement e isting law pursuant also to a valid delegation. &p. 776.* 5nterpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication re$uired of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. &p. 770.* Ce agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws. &p. 770.* 2or lac, of proper publication, the administrative circulars in $uestion may not be enforced and implemented. CD);)2';), the writ of prohibition is 8;:N.)/. .he implementation of /'4) /epartment 'rder No. (%, Series of (++(, and P'): Memorandum Circulars Nos. 1# and 16, Series of (++(, by the public respondents is hereby SBSP)N/)/ pending compliance with the statutory re$uirements of publication and filing under the aforementioned laws of the land. S' ';/);)/. *ar asa, ".J., Gutierrez, Jr., "ruz, )eliciano, Padilla, Bidin, 3edialdea, -e$alado, !a ide, Jr., -omero, *ocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 11-0-9 *an+ar, -8, 1999 1!#L#11#NE /ANI O' O""&N# AT#ONS, petitioner, vs. O""#SS#ONER O' #NTERNAL REVEN&E, O&RT O' TA$ A11EALS and O&RT O' A11EALS, respondent. %&#S&"/#NG, J.: .his petition for review assails the ;esolution 1 of the Court of :ppeals dated September !!, (++1 affirmin$ the /ecision - and a ;esolution 3 of the Court 'f .a :ppeals which denied the claims of the petitioner for ta refund and ta credits, and disposin$ as followsA 5N >5)C '2 :44, .D) 2';)8'5N8, the instant petition for review, is /)N5)/ due course. .he /ecision of the Court of .a :ppeals dated May !#, (++1 and its resolution dated ?uly !#, (++1, are hereby :225;M)/ in toto. S' ';/);)/. 9 .he Court of .a :ppeals earlier ruled as followsA CD);)2';), Petitioner3s claim for refund<ta credits of overpaid income ta for (+0" in the amount of P",!++,67+.+" is hereby denied for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. .he (+0% claim for refund amounting to P!17,#66.%+ is li,ewise denied since petitioner has opted and in all li,elihood automatically credited the same to the succeeding year. .he petition for review is dismissed for lac, of merit. S' ';/);)/. 5 .he facts on record show the antecedent circumstances pertinent to this case. Petitioner, Philippine Ban, of Communications &PBCom*, a commercial ban,ing corporation duly organi9ed under Philippine laws, filed its $uarterly income ta returns for the first and second $uarters of (+0", reported profits, and paid the total income ta of P",#(%,+"7.##. .he ta es due were settled by applying PBCom3s ta credit memos and accordingly, the Bureau of 5nternal ;evenue &B5;* issued .a /ebit Memo Nos. #67%-0" and #676-0" for P1,7#(,6#(.## and P(,%(",!"1.##, respectively. Subse$uently, however, PBCom suffered losses so that when it filed its :nnual 5ncome .a ;eturns for the year-ended /ecember 1(, (+0%, the petitioner li,ewise reported a net loss of P(7,(!+,%#!.##, and thus declared no ta payable for the year.

But during these two years, PBCom earned rental income from leased properties. .he lessees withheld and remitted to the B5; withholding creditable ta es of P!0!,6+"."# in (+0" and P!17,#66.%+ in (+0%. 'n :ugust 6, (+06, petitioner re$uested the Commissioner of 5nternal ;evenue, among others, for a ta credit of P",#(%,+"7.## representing the overpayment of ta es in the first and second $uarters of (+0". .hereafter, on ?uly !", (+00, petitioner filed a claim for refund of creditable ta es withheld by their lessees from property rentals in (+0" for P!0!,6+"."# and in (+0% for P!17,#66.%+. Pending the investigation of the respondent Commissioner of 5nternal ;evenue, petitioner instituted a Petition for ;eview on November (0, (+00 before the Court of .a :ppeals &C.:*. .he petition was doc,eted as C.: Case No. 71#+ entitledA GPhilippine Ban, of Communications vs. Commissioner of 5nternal ;evenue.G .he losses petitioner incurred as per the summary of petitioner3s claims for refund and ta credit for (+0" and (+0%, filed before the Court of .a :ppeals, are as followsA (+0" (+0% @@@ @@@ Net 5ncome &4oss* &P!",1(6,!00.##* &P(7,(!+,%#!.##* .a /ue N54 N54 Nuarterly ta . Payments Made ",#(%,+"7.## @ .a Cithheld at Source !0!,6+"."# !17,#66.%+ @@@@@@@@ @@@@@@@ ) cess .a Payments P",!++,67+."#J P!17,#66.%+ XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX J C.:3s decision reflects PBCom3s (+0" ta claim as P",!++,67+.+". : forty five centavo difference was noted. 'n May !#, (++1, the C.: rendered a decision which, as stated on the outset, denied the re$uest of petitioner for a ta refund or credit in the sum amount of P",!++,67+.+", on the ground that it was filed beyond the two-year reglementary period provided for by law. .he petitioner3s claim for refund in (+0% amounting to P!17,#66.%+ was li,ewise denied on the assumption that it was automatically credited by PBCom against its ta payment in the succeeding year. 'n ?une !!, (++1, petitioner filed a Motion for ;econsideration of the C.:3s decision but the same was denied due course for lac, of merit.
:

.hereafter, PBCom filed a petition for review of said decision and resolution of the C.: with the Court of :ppeals. Dowever on September !!, (++1, the Court of :ppeals affirmed in toto the C.:3s resolution dated ?uly !#, (++1. Dence this petition now before us. .he issues raised by the petitioner areA 5. Chether ta payer PBCom @ which relied in good faith on the formal assurances of B5; in ;MC No. 6-0" and did not immediately file with the C.: a petition for review as,ing for the refund<ta credit of its (+0"-0% e cess $uarterly income ta payments @ can be pre-udiced by the subse$uent B5; re-ection, applied retroactivity, of its assurances in ;MC No. 6-0" that the prescriptive period for the refund<ta credit of e cess $uarterly income ta payments is not two years but ten &(#*. 7 55. Chether the Court of :ppeals seriously erred in affirming the C.: decision which denied PBCom3s claim for the refund of P!17,#66.%+ income ta overpaid in (+0% on the mere speculation, without proof, that there were ta es due in (+06 and that PBCom availed of ta -crediting that year. 8 Simply stated, the main $uestion isA Chether or not the Court of :ppeals erred in denying the plea for ta refund or ta credits on the ground of prescription, despite petitioner3s reliance on ;MC No. 6-0", changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten yearsJ Petitioner argues that its claims for refund and ta credits are not yet barred by prescription relying on the applicability of ;evenue Memorandum Circular No. 6-0" issued on :pril (, (+0". .he circular states that overpaid income ta es are not covered by the two-year prescriptive period under the ta Code and that ta payers may claim refund or ta credits for the e cess $uarterly income ta with the B5; within ten &(#* years under :rticle ((77 of the Civil Code. .he pertinent portions of the circular readsA

;)>)NB) M)M';:N/BM C5;CB4:; N'. 6-0" SBB?)C.A P;'C)SS5N8 '2 ;)2BN/ '; .:E C;)/5. '2 )EC)SS C';P';:.) 5NC'M) .:E ;)SB4.5N8 2;'M .D) 2545N8 '2 .D) 25N:4 :/?BS.M)N. ;).B;N. .'A :ll 5nternal ;evenue 'fficers and 'thers Concerned. Sec. 0" :nd 0% 'f the National 5nternal ;evenue Code provideA

.he foregoing provisions are implemented by Section 6 of ;evenue ;egulations Nos. (#-66 which provide=

5t has been observed, however, that because of the e cess ta payments, corporations file claims for recovery of overpaid income ta with the Court of .a :ppeals within the two-year period from the date of payment, in accordance with sections !+! and !+" of the National 5nternal ;evenue Code. 5t is obvious that the filing of the case in court is to preserve the -udicial right of the corporation to claim the refund or ta credit. 5t should he noted, however, that this is not a case of erroneously or illegally paid ta under the provisions of Sections !+! and !+" of the .a Code. 5n the above provision of the ;egulations the corporation may re$uest for the refund of the overpaid income ta or claim for automatic ta credit. .o insure prompt action on corporate annual income ta returns showing refundable amounts arising from overpaid $uarterly income ta es, this 'ffice has promulgated ;evenue Memorandum 'rder No. 1!-6% dated ?une ((, (+6%, containing the procedure in processing said returns. Bnder these procedures, the returns are merely pre-audited which consist mainly of chec,ing mathematical accuracy of the figures of the return. :fter which, the refund or ta credit is granted, and, this procedure was adopted to facilitate immediate action on cases li,e this. 5n this regard, therefore, there is no need to file petitions for review in the Court of .a :ppeals in order to preserve the right to claim refund or ta credit the two year period. :s already stated, actions hereon by the Bureau are immediate after only a cursory pre-audit of the income ta returns. Moreover, a ta payer may recover from the Bureau of 5nternal ;evenue e cess income ta paid under the provisions of Section 0% of the .a Code within (# years from the date of payment considering that it is an obligation created by law &:rticle ((77 of the Civil Code*. 9 &)mphasis supplied.* Petitioner argues that the government is barred from asserting a position contrary to its declared circular if it would result to in-ustice to ta payers. Citing ABS "B* Broadcastin$ "orporation s. "ourt of Ta0 Appeals 10 petitioner claims that rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner of 5nternal ;evenue have no retroactive effect if it would be pre-udicial to ta payers, 5n :BS-CBN case, the Court held that the government is precluded from adopting a position inconsistent with one previously ta,en where in-ustice would result therefrom or where there has been a misrepresentation to the ta payer. Petitioner contends that Sec. !7% of the National 5nternal ;evenue Code e plicitly provides for this rules as followsA Sec. !7% *on:retroacti it# of rulin$sY :ny revocation, modification or reversal of any of the rules and regulations promulgated in accordance with the preceding section or any of the rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner shall not be given retroactive application if the revocation, modification or reversal will be pre-udicial to the ta payers e cept in the following casesA a*. where the ta payer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or in any document re$uired of him by the Bureau of 5nternal ;evenue= b*. where the facts subse$uently gathered by the Bureau of 5nternal ;evenue are materially different from the facts on which the ruling is based= c*. where the ta payer acted in bad faith. ;espondent Commissioner of 5nternal ;evenue, through Solicitor 8eneral, argues that the two-year prescriptive period for filing ta cases in court concerning income ta payments of Corporations is rec,oned from the date of filing the 2inal :d-usted 5ncome .a ;eturn, which is generally done on :pril (" following the close of the calendar year. :s precedents, respondent Commissioner cited cases which adhered to this principle, to wit A""-A ,n estments "orp. s. "ourt of Appeals, et al., 11 and "ommissioner of ,nternal -e enue s. T3Z Sales, ,nc., et al.. 1- ;espondent Commissioner also states that since the 2inal :d-usted 5ncome .a ;eturn of the petitioner for the ta able year (+0" was supposed to be filed on :pril (", (+0%, the latter had only until :pril (", (+00 to see, relief from the court. 2urther, respondent Commissioner stresses that when the petitioner filed the case before the C.: on November (0, (+00, the same was filed beyond the time fi ed by law, and such failure is fatal to petitioner3s cause of action. :fter a careful study of the records and applicable -urisprudence on the matter, we find that, contrary to the petitioner3s contention, the rela ation of revenue regulations by ;MC 6-0" is not warranted as it disregards the two-year prescriptive period set by law. Basic is the principle that Gta es are the lifeblood of the nation.G .he primary purpose is to generate funds for the State to finance the needs of the citi9enry and to advance the common weal. 13 /ue process of law under the Constitution does not re$uire -udicial proceedings in ta cases. .his

must necessarily be so because it is upon ta ation that the government chiefly relies to obtain the means to carry on its operations and it is of utmost importance that the modes adopted to enforce the collection of ta es levied should be summary and interfered with as little as possible. 19 2rom the same perspective, claims for refund or ta credit should be e ercised within the time fi ed by law because the B5; being an administrative body enforced to collect ta es, its functions should not be unduly delayed or hampered by incidental matters. Sec. !1# of the National 5nternal ;evenue Code &N5;C* of (+66 &now Sec. !!+, N5;C of (++6* provides for the prescriptive period for filing a court proceeding for the recovery of ta erroneously or illegally collected, iz.A Sec. !1#. -eco er# of ta0 erroneousl# or ille$all# collected. @ No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue ta hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been e cessive or in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner= but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such ta , penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress. 5n any case, no such suit or proceedin$s shall be$un after the e0piration of t%o #ears from the date of pa#ment of the ta0 or penalt# re$ardless of an# super enin$ cause that ma# arise after pa#ment =Pro ided ho%e er, .hat the Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor, refund or credit any ta , where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. &)mphasis supplied* .he rule states that the ta payer may file a claim for refund or credit with the Commissioner of 5nternal ;evenue, within two &!* years after payment of ta , before any suit in C.: is commenced. .he two-year prescriptive period provided, should be computed from the time of filing the :d-ustment ;eturn and final payment of the ta for the year. 5n "ommissioner of ,nternal -e enue s. Philippine American 2ife ,nsurance "o ., 15 this Court e plained the application of Sec. !1# of (+66 N5;C, as followsA Clearly, the prescriptive period of two years should commence to run only from the time that the refund is ascertained, which can only be determined after a final ad-ustment return is accomplished. 5n the present case, this date is :pril (%, (+07, and two years from this date would be :pril (%, (+0%. . . . :s we have earlier said in the .ME Sales case, Sections %0. 1: %+, 17 and 6# 18 on Nuarterly Corporate 5ncome .a Payment and Section 1!( should be considered in con-unction with it 19 Chen the :cting Commissioner of 5nternal ;evenue issued ;MC 6-0", changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years on claims of e cess $uarterly income ta payments, such circular created a clear inconsistency with the provision of Sec. !1# of (+66 N5;C. 5n so doing, the B5; did not simply interpret the law= rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by Congress. 5t bears repeating that ;evenue memorandum-circulars are considered administrative rulings &in the sense of more specific and less general interpretations of ta laws* which are issued from time to time by the Commissioner of 5nternal ;evenue. 5t is widely accepted that the interpretation placed upon a statute by the e ecutive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored if -udicially found to be erroneous. -0 .hus, courts will not countenance administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with the law they see, to apply and implement. -1 5n the case of People s. 2im, -- it was held that rules and regulations issued by administrative officials to implement a law cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the latter. :ppellant contends that Section ! of 2:' No. 16-( is void because it is not only inconsistent with but is contrary to the provisions and spirit of :ct. No 7##1 as amended, because whereas the prohibition prescribed in said 2isheries :ct was for any single period of time not e ceeding five years duration, 2:' No 16-( fi ed no period, that is to say, it establishes an absolute ban for all time. .his discrepancy between :ct No. 7##1 and 2:' No. 16-( was probably due to an oversight on the part of Secretary of :griculture and Natural ;esources. 'f course, in case of discrepancy, the basic :ct prevails, for the reason that the regulation or rule issued to implement a law cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the latter. . . . 5n this connection, the attention of the technical men in the offices of /epartment Deads who draft rules and regulation is called to the importance and necessity of closely following the terms and provisions of the law which they intended to implement, this to avoid any possible misunderstanding or confusion as in the present case. -3 2urther, fundamental is the rule that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mista,es or errors of its officials or agents. -9 :s pointed out by the respondent courts, the nullification of ;MC No. 6-0" issued by the :cting Commissioner of 5nternal ;evenue is an administrative interpretation which is not in harmony with Sec. !1# of (+66 N5;C. for being contrary to the e press provision of a statute. Dence, his interpretation could not be given weight for to do so would, in effect, amend the statute. 5t is li,ewise argued that the Commissioner of 5nternal ;evenue, after promulgating ;MC No. 6-0", is estopped by the principle of non-retroactively of B5; rulings. :gain Ce do not agree. .he Memorandum Circular, stating that a ta payer may recover the e cess income ta paid within (# years from date of payment because this is an obligation created by law, was issued by the :cting Commissioner of 5nternal ;evenue. 'n the other hand, the decision, stating that the ta payer should still file a claim for a refund or ta credit and corresponding petition fro review within the two-year prescription period, and that the lengthening of the period of limitation on refund from two to ten years would be adverse to public policy and run counter to the positive mandate of Sec. !1#, N5;C, - was the ruling and -udicial interpretation of the Court of .a :ppeals. )stoppel has no application in the case at bar because it was not the Commissioner of 5nternal ;evenue who denied petitioner3s claim of refund or ta credit. ;ather, it was the Court of .a :ppeals who denied &albeit correctly* the claim and in effect, ruled that the ;MC No. 6-0" issued by the Commissioner of 5nternal ;evenue is an administrative interpretation which is out of harmony with or contrary to the e press provision of a statute &specifically Sec. !1#, N5;C*, hence, cannot be given weight for to do so would in effect amend the statute. -5

:rt. 0 of the Civil Code -: recogni9es -udicial decisions, applying or interpreting statutes as part of the legal system of the country. But administrative decisions do not en-oy that level of recognition. : memorandum-circular of a bureau head could not operate to vest a ta payer with shield against -udicial action. 2or there are no vested rights to spea, of respecting a wrong construction of the law by the administrative officials and such wrong interpretation could not place the 8overnment in estoppel to correct or overrule the same. -7 Moreover, the non-retroactivity of rulings by the Commissioner of 5nternal ;evenue is not applicable in this case because the nullity of ;MC No. 6-0" was declared by respondent courts and not by the Commissioner of 5nternal ;evenue. 4astly, it must be noted that, as repeatedly held by this Court, a claim for refund is in the nature of a claim for e emption and should be construed in strictissimi 4uris against the ta payer. -8 'n the second issue, the petitioner alleges that the Court of :ppeals seriously erred in affirming C.:3s decision denying its claim for refund of P!17,#66.%+ &ta overpaid in (+0%*, based on mere speculation, without proof, that PBCom availed of the automatic ta credit in (+06. Sec. %+ of the (+66 N5;C -9 &now Sec. 6% of the (++6 N5;C* provides that any e cess of the total $uarterly payments over the actual income ta computed in the ad-ustment or final corporate income ta return, shall either&a* be refunded to the corporation, or &b* may be credited against the estimated $uarterly income ta liabilities for the $uarters of the succeeding ta able year. .he corporation must signify in its annual corporate ad-ustment return &by mar,ing the option bo provided in the B5; form* its intention, whether to re$uest for a refund or claim for an automatic ta credit for the succeeding ta able year. .o ease the administration of ta collection, these remedies are in the alternative, and the choice of one precludes the other. :s stated by respondent Court of :ppealsA 2inally, as to the claimed refund of income ta over-paid in (+0% @ the Court of .a :ppeals, after e amining the ad-usted final corporate annual income ta return for ta able year (+0%, found out that petitioner opted to apply for automatic ta credit. .his was the basis used & is:a is the fact that the (+06 annual corporate ta return was not offered by the petitioner as evidence* by the C.: in concluding that petitioner had indeed availed of and applied the automatic ta credit to the succeeding year, hence it can no longer as, for refund, as to KsicL the two remedies of refund and ta credit are alternative. 30 .hat the petitioner opted for an automatic ta credit in accordance with Sec. %+ of the (+66 N5;C, as specified in its (+0% 2inal :d-usted 5ncome .a ;eturn, is a finding of fact which we must respect. Moreover, the (+06 annual corporate ta return of the petitioner was not offered as evidence to contovert said fact. .hus, we are bound by the findings of fact by respondent courts, there being no showing of gross error or abuse on their part to disturb our reliance thereon. 31 CD);)2';), the, petition is hereby /)N5)/, .he decision of the Court of :ppeals appealed from is :225;M)/, with C'S.S against the petitioner.;[%phi;.n\t S' ';/);)/. Bellosillo, Puno, 3endoza, and Buena, JJ., concur.

)G.R. No. 100981. *an+ar, --, 1997.

1!#L#11#NE #NTER#SLAND S!#11#NG ASSO #AT#ON O' T!E 1!#L#11#NES, ON'EREN E O' #NTER#SLAND S!#1-O8NERS AND O1ERATORS, &N#TED 1ETROLE&" TANIER O1ERATORS ASSO #AT#ON O' T!E 1!#L#11#NES, L#G!TERAGE ASSO #AT#ON O' T!E 1!#L#11#NES and 1#LOTAGE #NTEGRATED SERV# ES OR1ORAT#ON, petitioners, vs. O&RT O' A11EALS, &N#TED !AR/OR 1#LOTSK ASSO #AT#ON O' T!E 1!#L#11#NES, #N . and "AN#LA 1#LOTSK ASSO #AT#ON, respondents.

)G.R. Nos. 10371:-17. *an+ar, --, 1997.

!ON. 1ETE N# O"EDES 1RADO, in =is 6apa6i5, as S46r45ar, o< Transpor5a5ion and o>>+ni6a5ions and 5=4 1!#L#11#NE 1ORTS A&T!OR#T0, petitioners, vs. O&RT O' A11EALS, &N#TED !AR/OR 1#LOTSK ASSO #AT#ON O' T!E 1!#L#11#NES, #N ., respondents.

)G.R. No. 1077-0. *an+ar, --, 1997.

!ON. *ES&S /. GAR #A, *R., in =is 6apa6i5, as S46r45ar, o< Transpor5a5ion and o>>+ni6a5ions and =air>an o< 5=4 1!#L#11#NE 1ORTS A&T!OR#T0, O""ODORE ROGEL#O A. DA0AN, in =is 6apa6i5, as G4n4ral "anaB4r o< 5=4 1=ilippin4 1or5s A+5=ori5,, and S#"EON T. S#LVA, *R., in =is 6apa6i5, as 5=4 So+5= !ar;or "anaB4r, 1=ilippin4 1or5s A+5=ori5,, petitioners, vs. !ON. NA1OLEON R. 'LO*O, in =is 6apa6i5, as 5=4 1r4sidinB *+dB4 o< /ran6= -, R4Bional Trial o+r5 - "anila, &N#TED !AR/OR 1#LOTSK ASSO #AT#ON O' T!E 1!#L#11#NES and 5=4 "AN#LA 1#LOTSK ASSO #AT#ON, respondents.

DE "ENDO2A, J.(

#S#ON

Private respondent Bnited Darbor Pilots3 :ssociation of the Philippines, 5nc. &BDP:P* is the umbrella organi9ation of various groups rendering pilotage service in different ports of the Philippines. .he service consists of navigating a vessel from a specific point, usually about two &!* miles off shore, to an assigned area at the pier and vice versa. Chen a vessel arrives, a harbor pilot ta,es over the ship from its captain to maneuver it to a berth in the port, and when it departs, the harbor pilot also maneuvers it up to a specific point off shore. .he setup is re$uired by the fact that each port has peculiar topography with which a harbor pilot is presumed to be more familiar than a ship captain. .he Philippine Ports :uthority &PP:* is the government agency which regulates pilotage. Pursuant to Presidential /ecree No. 0"6, it has the power Gto supervise, control, regulate . . . such services as are necessary in the ports vested in, or belonging to the :uthorityG K(L and to Gcontrol, regulate and supervise pilotage and the conduct of pilots in any Port /istrict.G K!L 5t also has the power Gto impose, fi , prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees. . . for the services rendered by the :uthority or by any private organi9ation within a Port /istrict.O K1L .hese cases arose out of the efforts of harbor pilots to secure enforcement of ) ecutive 'rder No. (#00, which fi es the rates of pilotage service, and the e$ually determined efforts of the PP: and its officials, the herein petitioners, to bloc, enforcement of the e ecutive order, even as they promulgated their own orders which in the beginning fi ed lower rates of pilotage and later left the matter to self determination by parties to a pilotage contract.

#. T!E 'A TS

G.R. No. 10371: 'n 2ebruary 1, (+0%, shortly before the presidential elections, President 2erdinand ). Marcos, responding to the clamor of harbor pilots for an increase in pilotage rates, issued ) ecutive 'rder No. (#00, P;'>5/5N8 2'; BN52';M :N/ M'/525)/ ;:.)S 2'; P54'.:8) S);>5C)S ;)N/);)/ .' 2';)58N :N/ C':S.C5S) >)SS)4S 5N :44 P;5>:.) :N/ PBB45C P';.S. .he e ecutive order increased substantially the rates of the e isting pilotage fees previously fi ed by the PP:. Dowever, the PP: refused to enforce the e ecutive order on the ground that it had been drawn hastily and without prior consultation= that its enforcement would create disorder in the ports as the operators and owners of the maritime vessels had e pressed opposition to its implementation= and that the increase in pilotage, as mandated by it, was e orbitant and detrimental to port operations. K7L .he BDP:P then announced its intention to implement ).'. No. (#00 effective November (%, (+0%. .his in turn drew a warning from the PP: that disciplinary sanctions would be applied to those who would charge rates under ).'. No. (#00. .he PP: instead issued Memorandum Circular No. 71-0%, fi ing pilotage fees at rates lower than those provided in ).'. No. (#00. Conse$uently, the BDP:P filed on ?anuary 6, (+06 a complaint for in-unction with the ;egional .rial Court of Manila, against the then Minister of .ransportation and Communications, Dernando Pere9, and PP: 8eneral Manager, Primitivo S. Solis, ?r. 5t sought a writ of preliminary mandatory in-unction for the immediate implementation of ).'. No. (#00, as well as a temporary restraining order to stop PP: officials from imposing disciplinary sanctions against BDP:P members charging rates in accordance with ).'. No. (#00. .he case, doc,eted as Civil Case No. 06-10+(1, was raffled to Branch !0 of the ;egional .rial Court of Manila which issued a temporary restraining order, en-oining the PP: from threatening the BDP:P, its officers and its members with suspension and other disciplinary action for collecting pilotage fees pursuant to ).'. No. (#00. 'n March (%, (+06, the Chamber of Maritime 5ndustries of the Philippines, Cilliam 4ines, 5nc., 4oadstar Shipping Co., 5nc. and /elsen .ransport 4ines, 5nc., after obtaining leave, filed a -oint answer in intervention. 'n 2ebruary !%, (+00, while the case was pending, the PP: issued :dministrative 'rder No. #!-00, entitled 5MP4)M)N.5N8 8B5/)45N)S 'N 'P)N P54'.:8) S);>5C). .he PP: announced in its order that it was leaving to the contracting parties, i.e., the shipping lines and the pilots, the fi ing of mutually acceptable rates for pilotage services, thus abandoning the rates fi ed by it &PP:* under Memorandum Circular No. 71-0%, as well as those provided in ).'. No. (#00. .he administrative order providedA Section 1. .erms<Conditions on Pilotage Service. @ .he shipping line or vessel3s agent<representative and the harbor pilot<firm chosen by the former shall agree between themselves, among others, on what pilotage service shall be performed, the use of tugs and their rates, ta,ing into consideration the circumstances stated in Section (! of PP: :' No. #1-0", and such other conditions designed to ensure the safe movement of the vessel in pilotage areas<grounds. .he PP: then moved to dismiss the case, contending that the issuance of its order had rendered the case moot and academic and that conse$uently ).'. No. (#00 had ceased to be effective. .he BDP:P opposed the motion. .ogether with the Manila Pilots3 :ssociation &MP:*, it filed on May !", (+00 a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the ;.C-Manila, $uestioning the validity of :.'. No. #!-00. .his petition was doc,eted as Civil Case No. 00-776!% &Bnited Darbor Pilots3 :ssociation and Manila Pilots3 :ssociation . Don. ;ainerio ;eyes, as :cting Secretary of the /epartment of .ransportation and Communications and Chairman of the Philippine Ports :uthority &PP:* and Ma imo /umlao, ?r., as 8eneral Manager of the Philippine Ports :uthority &PP:*, et al.* and raffled to Branch ! of ;.C-Manila. .he factual antecedents of this case are discussed in 8.;. No. (##70( below. Meanwhile, in Civil Case 06-10+(1, the court, without resolving the motion to dismiss filed by the PP:, rendered a decision K"L holding that :.'. No. #!-00 did not render the case moot and academic and that the PP: was under obligation to comply with ).'. No. (#00 because the order had the force of law which the PP: could not repeal. .he then .ransportation Minister Dernando Pere9 and the PP: filed a petition for review. .he petition was filed in this Court which later referred the case to the Court of :ppeals where it was doc,eted as C: 8.;. SP. No. (0#6!. 'n the other hand the intervenors appealed to the Court of :ppeals where this case was doc,eted as C: 8.;. No. !("+#. .he two cases were then consolidated.

5n a decision rendered on 'ctober 7, (++(, the .welfth /ivision K%L of the Court of :ppeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, by dismissing C: 8.;. No. !("+# and denying C: 8.;. SP. No. (0#6!. Dence, this petition by the Secretary of .ransportation and Communications and the PP:. .he intervenor shipping lines did not appeal.

G.R. No. 100981 Meanwhile, in a petition for certiorari filed before ;.C-Manila, Branch ! &Civil Case No. 00-776!%*, the BDP:P and the MP: sought the annulment of :.'. No. #!-00, which in pertinent parts providedA Section (. Statement of Polic#. @ 5t is hereby declared that the provision of pilotage in ports<harbors<areas defined as compulsory in Section 0 of PP: :dministrative 'rder No. #1-0", entitled, G;ules and ;egulations 8overning Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage 2ees in Philippine PortsG shall be open to all licensed harbor pilots<pilotage firms<associations appointed<accredited by this authority to perform pilotage service. Section !. Persons Authorized to -ender Pilota$e. @ .he following individuals, persons or groups shall be appointed<accredited by this :uthority to provide pilotage serviceA a. Darbor Pilots of the present Pilotage :ssociations of the different pilotage districts in the Philippines. .heir probationary training as re$uired under Section 1( of PP: :' No. #1-0" shall be underta,en by any member of said :ssociation. b. Members<employees of any partnership<corporation or association, including 2ilipino shipmasters< captains of vessel &domestic<foreign* of Philippine ;egistry and individuals who meet the minimum $ualifications and comply with the re$uirements prescribed in Sec. !+ of PP: :' No. #1-0", aforestated, and who are appointed by said firm or association and accredited as harbor pilots by this authority. New Darbor Pilots who wish to be appointed<accredited by PP: under the open pilotage system either as an individual pilot or as a member of any Darbor Pilot partnership<association shall be re$uired to undergo a practical e amination, in addition to the written e amination given by the Philippine Coast 8uard, prior to their appointment< accreditation by this :uthority. .he BDP:P and MP:, as petitioners below, contended &(* that :.'. No. #!-00 was issued without the benefit of a public hearing= &!* that ).'. No. (#00 had not been repealed by any other ) ecutive 'rder or Presidential /ecree and, therefore, should be given effect= and &1* that :.'. No. #!-00 contravened P./. No. 0"6. 'n :ugust !(, (+0+, the Philippine 5nterisland Shipping :ssociation, Conference of 5nterisland Shipowners and 'perators, Bnited Petroleum .an,er 'perators of the Philippines, 4ighterage :ssociation of the Philippines, and Pilotage 5ntegrated Services Corp., were allowed to intervene. 'n September 0, (+0+, a writ of preliminary in-unction was issued by the court, en-oining the PP: from implementing :.'. No. #!-00 and, on 'ctober !%, (+0+, -udgment was rendered in favor of the petitioners therein. .he dispositive portion of the court3s decision K6L readsA CD);)2';), for all of the foregoing, the petition is hereby granted. (. ;espondents are hereby declared to have acted in e cess of -urisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac, of -urisdiction in approving ;esolution No. 0%# and in enacting Philippine Ports :uthority :dministrative 'rder No. #!-00, the sub-ect of which is G5mplementing 8uidelines on 'pen Pilotage ServiceG= !. Philippine Ports :uthority :dministrative 'rder No. #!-00 is declared null and void= 1. .he preliminary in-unction issued on September 0, (+0+ is made permanent= and 7. Cithout costs. S' ';/);)/. ;espondents and the intervenors below filed a -oint petition for certiorari in the Court of :ppeals &C: 8.;. SP No. (+"6#*, assailing the decision of the trial court. But their petition was dismissed for lac, of -urisdiction on the ground that the issue raised was purely legal. .he parties separately filed petitions for review before this Court. .he first one, by the PP: and its officers, was doc,eted as 8.;. No. (##(#+ &Don. Pete Nicomedes Prado, Philippine Ports :uthority and Commodore ;ogelio /ayan . Bnited Darbor Pilots3 :ssociation of the Philippines and Manila Pilots3 :ssociation*, while the second one, by the intervenors, was doc,eted as 8.;. No. (##70( &Philippine 5nterisland Shipping :ssociation of the Philippines, Conference of 5nterisland Ship 'wners and 'perators, Bnited Petroleum .an,er 'perators :ssociation of the Philippines, 5nc. . .he Court of :ppeals, Bnited Darbor Pilots3 :ssociation of the Philippines and Manila Pilots3 :ssociation.* .he petition filed by the government in 8.;. No. (##(#+ was dismissed for failure of petitioners to show that the Court of :ppeals committed a reversible error.K0L 'n the other hand, the petition of the intervenors in 8.;. No. (##70( was given due course.

G.R. No. 1077-0 2ollowing the denial of its petition in 8.;. No. (##(#+, the PP: issued on ?uly 1(, (++!, :dministrative 'rder No. #"-+!, placing harbor pilots under the control of the PP: with respect to the scheduling and assignment of service of vessels. .he PP: cited as -ustification Gpilotage delays . . . under the set-up where private respondents &BDP:P Q MP:* assign the pilots. 5ntentionally or otherwise, several vessels do not receive the pilotage service promptly, causing them operational disruptions and additional e penses<costs.G K+L

Private respondents BDP:P and MP: viewed the matter differently. 'n 'ctober !0, (++!, they as,ed the ;.C-Manila, Branch ! which heard and decided Civil Case No. 00-776!% to cite PP: officials in contempt of court. 'n the same day, the trial court issued an order restraining the herein petitioners from implementing :dministrative 'rder No. #"-+!. Dowever, the PP: proceeded to implement its order, prompting the BDP:P and MP: to move again to cite petitioners in contempt, even as they $uestioned the validity of :.'. No. #"-+!. :ccordingly the trial court issued another order on November 7, (++!, reiterating its previous order of 'ctober !0, (++! to petitioners to refrain from implementing :.'. No. #"-+! pending resolution of the petitions. Ma,ing a special appearance, petitioners $uestioned the -urisdiction of the court and moved for the dismissal of the petitions for contempt. :llegedly to prevent the disruption of pilotage services, petitioners created a special team of reserve pilots to ta,e over the pilotage service in the event members of BDP:P<MP: refused to render pilotage services. 2or the third time respondents moved to cite petitioners in contempt of court. :gain petitioners $uestioned the court3s -urisdiction and manifested that they were adopting their previous motion to dismiss petitions for contempt filed against them. 'n November (6, (++!, the trial court denied the petitioners3 motion and set the contempt petitions for hearing on November (+, (++!. Dence, this petition, which was doc,eted as 8.;. No. (#66!# &Don. ?esus B. 8arcia, ?r. in his capacity as Secretary of .ransportation and Communications and Chairman of the Philippine Ports :uthority, Commodore ;ogelio :. /ayan, in his capacity as 8eneral Manager of the Philippine Ports :uthority and Simeon .. Silva, ?r., in his capacity as the South Darbor Manager, Philippine Ports :uthority . Don. Napoleon 2lo-o, in his capacity as the Presiding ?udge of Branch !, ;.C, Manila, BDP:P and MP:*. Pending resolution of this case, the Court ordered the parties to maintain the status 7uo as of 'ctober 1(, (++!.

##. T!E #SS&ES AND T!E#R D#S1OS#T#ON .he issues raised areA 5. CD).D); '; N'. ;)SP'N/)N. C'B;. '2 :PP):4S );;)/ 5N :225;M5N8 .D) CD:44)N8)/ /)C5S5'N '2 ;.C-M:N54:, B;:NCD 7(, CD5CD ;B4)/ .D:.A &:* C5>54 C:S) N'. 06-10+(1 D:S N'. B)C'M) M''. :N/ :C:/)M5C C5.D .D) 5SSB:NC) '2 :/M5N5S.;:.5>) ';/); N'. #!-00= :N/ D);)5N P).5.5'N);S :;) B'BN/ .' C'MP4F C5.D ).'. N'. (#00=

&B* 55.

CD).D); '; N'. .D) C'B;. '2 :PP):4S C'MM5..)/ ;)>);S5B4) );;'; 5N /5SM5SS5N8 C: 8.;. SP. N'. (+"6# 2'; 4:CI '2 ?B;5S/5C.5'NJ CD).D); '; N'. ;)SP'N/)N. ?B/8) N:P'4)'N 24'?' C'MM5..)/ 8;:>) :BBS) '2 /5SC;).5'N 5N :SSBM5N8 ?B;5S/5C.5'N '>); .D) P).5.5'NS 2'; C'N.)MP. 254)/ BF P;5>:.) ;)SP'N/)N.S :S : ;)SB4. '2 .D) 5SSB:NC) '2 :.'. N'. #"-+!J

555.

.hese issues will be discussed in seriatim.

A. 0hether $1ecutive Order #o. 2344 is 5alid and Petitioners are Bound to Obe6 it 7".R. #os. 23892:;29< ) ecutive 'rder No. (#00 readsA )E)CB.5>) ';/); No. (#00 P;'>5/5N8 2'; BN52';M :N/ M'/525)/ ;:.)S 2'; P54'.:8) S);>5C)S ;)N/);)/ .' 2';)58N :N/ C':S.C5S) >)SS)4S 5N :44 P;5>:.) '; PBB45C PD545PP5N) P';.S. CD);):S, the Bnited Darbor Pilots3 :ssociation of the Philippines has clamored for the rationali9ation of pilotage service charges, through the imposition of uniform and ad-usted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports, whether public or private= CD);):S, the plea of the :ssociation has been echoed by a great number of Members of Parliament and other persons and groups= N'C, .D);)2';), 5, 2);/5N:N/ ). M:;C'S, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and by law, do hereby direct and orderA Section (. .he following shall be the rate of pilotage fees or charges based on tonnage for services rendered to both foreign and coastwise vessels= 2or 2oreign >essels )$uivalent ;ate in BS Y or its Peso

4ess than

"##8. "##8. to !,"##8. to ",###8. to (#,###8. to (",###8. to !#,###8. to 1#,###8. to 7#,###8. to %#,###8. to 0#,###8. to (##,###8. to (!#,###8. to to (7#,###8.

(1#,###8.

Y 1#.## !,"##8. ",###8. (#,###8. (",###8. !#,###8. 1#,###8. 7#,###8. %#,###8. 0#,###8. (##,###8. (!#,###8. (1#,###8. 6%%.%6

71.11 6(.11 (11.%6 (0(.%6 !76.## 1##.## 7(%.%6 701.11 ""#.## %(%.%6 %%%.%6 6(%.%6

'ver (7#,### gross tonnage Y#.#" or its peso e$uivalent every e cess tonnage. ;ate for doc,ing and undoc,ing anchorage, conduction and shifting other related special services is e$ual to (##Z. Pilotage services shall be compulsory in government and private wharves or piers, 2or Coastwise >esselsA (## and under "## "## and under %## %## and under (,### (,### and under 1,### 1,### and under ",### ",### and over gross tons ;egular gross tons gross tons gross tons gross tons gross tons P 7(.6# "".%# %+.%# (1+.!# 1##.##

S)C. !. Cith respect to foreign vessels, payment of pilotage services shall be made in dollars or in pesos at the prevailing e change rate. S)C. 1. :ll orders, letters of instruction, rules, regulations and other issuances inconsistent with this ) ecutive 'rder are hereby repealed or amended accordingly. S)C. 7. .his ) ecutive 'rder shall ta,e effect immediately. /one in the City of Manila, this 1rd day of 2ebruary, in the year of our 4ord, nineteen hundred and eighty-si . &Sgd.* 2);/5N:N/ ). M:;C'S President of the Philippines By the PresidentA &Sgd.* ?B:N C. .B>);: Presidential ) ecutive :ssistant Petitioners contend that ).'. No. (#00 was merely an administrative issuance of then President 2erdinand ). Marcos and, as such, it could be superseded by an order of the PP:. .hey argue that to consider ).'. No. (#00 a statute would be to deprive the PP: of its power under its charter to fi pilotage rates. .he contention has no merit. .he fi ing of rates is essentially a legislative power. K(#L 5ndeed, the great battle over the validity of the e ercise of this power by administrative agencies was fought in the (+!#s on the issue of undue delegation precisely because the power delegated was legislative. .he growing comple ity of modern society, the multiplication of the sub-ects of governmental regulations and the increased difficulty of administering the laws made the creation of administrative agencies and the delegation to them of legislative power necessary. K((L .here is no basis for petitioners3 argument that rate fi ing is merely an e ercise of administrative power= that if President Marcos had power to revise the rates previously fi ed by the PP: through the issuance of ).'. No. (#00, the PP: could in turn revise those fi ed by the President, as the PP: actually did in :.'. No. 71-0%, which fi ed lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely left the fees to be paid for pilotage to the agreement of the parties to a contract. .he orders previously issued by the PP: were in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in the e ercise of delegated power. :s such these could only be amended or revised by law, as the President did by ).'. No. (#00. 5t is not an answer to say that ).'. No. (#00 should not be considered a statute because that would imply the withdrawal of power from the PP:. Chat determines whether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its form but its nature. Dere, as we have already said, the power to fi the rates of charges for services, including pilotage service, has always been regarded as legislative in character. Nor is there any doubt of the power of the then President to fi rates. 'n 2ebruary 1, (+0%, when he issued ).'. No. (#00, President Marcos was authori9ed under :mendment No. % of the (+61 Constitution to e ercise legislative power, -ust as he was under the original (+61 Constitution, when he issued P./. N'. 0"6 which created the PP:, endowing it with the power to regulate pilotage service in Philippine ports. :lthough the power to fi rates for pilotage had been delegated to the PP:, it became necessary to rationali9e the rates of charges fi ed by it through the imposition of uniform rates. .hat is what the President did in promulgating ).'. No. (#00. :s the President could delegate the ratema,ing power to the PP:, so could he e ercise it in specific instances without thereby withdrawing the power vested by P./. No. 0"6, Section !#&a* in the PP: Gto impose, fi , prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or fees... for the services rendered by the :uthority or by any private organi9ation within a Port /istrict.G 5t is worthy to note that ).'. No. (#00 provides for ad-usted pilotage service rates without withdrawing the power of the PP: to impose, prescribe, increase or decrease rates, charges or fees. .he reason is because ).'. N'. (#00 is not meant simply to fi new pilotage rates. 5ts

legislative purpose is the Grationali9ation of pilotage service charges, through the imposition of uniform and ad-usted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports.G .he case presented is similar to the fi ing of wages under the Cage ;ationali9ation :ct &;.:. No. %6!6* whereby minimum wages are determined by Congress and provided by law, sub-ect to revision by Cage Boards should later conditions warrant their revision. 5t cannot be denied that Congress may intervene anytime despite the e istence of administrative agencies entrusted with wage-fi ing powers, by virtue of the former3s plenary power of legislation. Chen Congress does so, the result is not the withdrawal of the powers delegated to the Cage Boards but cooperative lawma,ing in an area where initiative and e pertise are re$uired. .he Court of :ppeals is correct in holding that @ .he power of the PP: to fi pilotage rates and its authority to regulate pilotage still remain notwithstanding the fact that a schedule for pilotage fees has already been prescribed by the $uestioned e ecutive order. PP: is at liberty to fi new rates of pilotage sub4ect onl# to the limitation that such ne% rates should not $o belo% the rates fi0ed under '.O. ;CJJ . .he rationale behind the limitation is no different from what has been previously stated. Being a mere administrative agency, PP: cannot validly issue orders or regulations that would have the effect of rendering nugatory the provisions of the legislative issuance such as those of the e ecutive order in $uestion.&emphasis supplied* Petitioners refused to implement ).'. No. (#00 on the ground that it was issued without notice to the PP: and that it was nothing but a Gpolitical gimmic,G resorted to by then President Marcos. .his perception obviously stemmed from the fact that ).'. No. (#00 was issued shortly before the presidential elections in (+0%. But lac, of notice to the PP: is not proof that the necessary factual basis for the order was wanting. .o the contrary, the presumption is that the President had before him pertinent data on which he based the rates prescribed in his order. Nor is the fact that the order might have been issued to curry favor with the voters a reason for the PP: to refuse to enforce the order in $uestion. 5t is not unusual for lawma,ers to have in mind partisan political consideration in sponsoring legislation. Fet that is not a ground for invalidating a statute. Moreover, an in$uiry into legislative motivation is not proper since the only relevant $uestion is whether in issuing it the President violated constitutional and statutory restrictions on his power. .he PP: did not have any ob-ection to the order based on constitutional ground. 5n fact the nearest to a challenge on constitutional grounds was that mounted not by the PP: but by the intervenors below which claimed that the rates fi ed in ).'. N'. (#00 were e orbitant and unreasonable. Dowever, both the trial court and the Court of :ppeals overruled the ob-ections and the intervenors apparently accepted the ruling because they did not appeal further to this Court. .here is, therefore, no legal basis for PP:3s intransigence, after failing to get the new administration of President :$uino to revo,e the order by issuing it own order in the form of :.'. N'. #!-00. 5t is noteworthy that if President Marcos had legislative power under :mendment No. % of the (+61 ConstitutionK(!L so did President :$uino under the Provisional &2reedom* Constitution K(1L who could, had she thought ).'. No. (#00 to be a mere Gpolitical gimmic,,G have -ust as easily revo,ed her predecessor3s order. 5t is tempting to as, if the administrative agency would have shown the same act of defiance of the President3s order had there been no change of administration. Chat this Court said in 4a Perla Cigar and Cigarette 2actory . Capapas,G K(7L mutatis mutandis may be applied to the cases at barA Cas it within the powers of the then Collector :ng-angco to refuse to collect the duties that must be paidJ .hat is the crucial point of in$uiry. Ce hold that it was not. Precisely, he had to give the above legal provisions, $uite e plicit in character, force and effect. Dis obligation was to collect the revenue for the government in accordance with e isting legal provisions, e ecutive agreements and e0ecuti e orders certainl# not e0cluded. De would not be living up to his official designation if he were permitted to act otherwise. De was not named Collector of Customs for nothing. . . . Certainly, if the President himself were called upon to e ecute the laws faithfully, a Collector of Customs, himself a subordinate e ecutive official, cannot be considered as e empt in any wise from such an obligation of fealty. Similarly, if the President cannot suspend the operation of any law, it would be presumptuous in the e treme for one in the position of then Collector :ng-angco to consider himself as possessed of such a prerogative. . . . Ce conclude that ).'. No. (#00 is a valid statute and that the PP: is duty bound to comply with its provisions. .he PP: may increase the rates but it may not decrease them below those mandated by ).'. No. (#00. 2inally, the PP: cannot refuse to implement ).'. No. (#00 or alter it as it did in promulgating Memorandum Circular No. 71-0%. Much less could the PP: abrogate the rates fi ed and leave the fi ing of rates for pilotage service to the contracting parties as it did through :. '. No. #!-00, Section 1. .heretofore the policy was one of governmental regulation of the pilotage business. By leaving the matter to the determination of the parties, the PP: -ettisoned this policy and changed it to laisse9-faire, something which only the legislature, or whoever is vested with lawma,ing authority, could do.

B. 0hether the Court of Appeals had Jurisdiction over the Appeal of &ntervenors fro= the %ecision of the Trial Court &nvalidatin) Ad=inistrative Order #o. 3>;44 of the PPA 7".R. #o. 233?42< .he Court of :ppeals dismissed the -oint appeal of the government and the intervenors from the trial court3s decision in Civil Case No. 00776!% on the ground that the issues raised were purely legal $uestions. K("L .he appellate court statedA :fter a painsta,ing review of the records Ce resolved to dismiss the petition for lac, of -urisdiction. 2rom the facts, it is clear that the main issue proffered by the appellant is whether or not the respondent Philippine Ports :uthority could validly issue rules and regulations adopting the Gopen pilotage policyG pursuant to its charter &P./. 0"6*. ....

5t must be noted that while the court a 7uo had clearly recogni9ed the intricate legal issue involved, it nevertheless decided it on the merits which apparently resolved only the procedural aspect that -ustified it in declaring the $uestioned order as null and void. Chile Ce recogni9e the basic re$uirements of due process, the same cannot ta,e precedence in the case at bar in lieu of the fact that the resolution of the present case is purely a legal $uestion. Moreover, it appears that appellants in the court below had filed a manifestation and motion waiving their presentation of evidence. 5nstead, they opted to submit a comprehensive memorandum of the case on the ground that the pivotal issue raised in the petition below is purely legal in character. &p. !1(, ;ecords* :t this -uncture, Ce are at a loss why appellants had elevated the present action before Bs where at the outset they already noted that the issue is purely legal. 5f in the case of Murillo . Consul &B/I-+670, ;esolution en banc, March (, (++#* the Supreme Court laid down the rule that Gif an appeal by notice of appeal is ta,en from the ;egional .rial Court to the Court of :ppeals, and in the latter Court, the appellant raised naught but issues of law, the appeal should be dismissed for lac, of -urisdiction &page ", ;esolution in Murillo*,G then with more reason where as in the case at bar publicappellants thru the 'ffice of the Solicitor 8eneral in their memorandum manifested that the controversy has reference to the pure legal $uestion of the validity of the $uestioned administrative order. Conse$uently, Ce have no other recourse but to dismiss the petition on the strength of these pronouncements. :s already stated, from this decision, both the government and the intervenors separately brought petitions for review to this Court. 5n 8.;. No. (##(#+, the government3s petition was dismissed for lac, of showing that the appellate court committed reversible error. .he dismissal of the government3s petition goes far to sustain the dismissal of the intervenors3 petition in 8.;. No. (##70( for the review of the same decision of the Court of :ppeals. :fter all, the intervenors3 petition is based on substantially the same grounds as those stated in the government3s petition. 5t is now settled that the dismissal of a petition for review on certiorari is an ad-udication on the merits of a controversy. K(%L Such dismissal can only mean that the Supreme Court agrees with the findings and conclusions of the Court of :ppeals or that the decision sought to be reviewed is correct. K(6L 5t is significant to note that the Secretary of .ransportation and Communications and the PP:, petitioners in 8.;. No. (##(#+, have conceded the finality of the dismissal of their appeal. K(0L .hus, the administrative policy, the validity of which herein petitioners see, to -ustify by their appeal, has already been abandoned by the very administrative agency which adopted it, with the result that the $uestion of validity of :.'. No. #!-00 is now moot and academic. C. 0hether the Trial Court has Jurisdiction to @ear and %ecide the Conte=pt Char)es a)ainst Petitioners 7".R. #o. 2399>3< :s already noted, following the dismissal of the government3s appeal in 8.;. No. (##(#+, the PP: abandoned :.'. No. #!-00 which provided for G'pen Pilotage System.G But it subse$uently promulgated :dministrative 'rder No. #"-+!, under which the PP: assumed the power of scheduling and assigning pilots to service vessels, allegedly regardless of whether the pilots assigned are or are not members of the BDP:P and the MP: which theretofore had been the e clusive agencies rendering pilotage service in Philippine ports. .he BDP:P and the MP: saw the adoption of this system as a return to the G'pen Pilotage SystemG and, therefore, a violation of the trial court3s decision invalidating the G'pen Pilotage System.G .hey considered this to be a contempt of the trial court. Petitioners moved to dismiss the motions for contempt against them. .hey contend that even if the motions were filed as incidents of Civil Case No. 00-776!%, the ;.C-Manila, Branch ! did not have -urisdiction to hear them because the main case was no longer before the court and the fact was that the contempt citation was not an incident of the case, not even of its e ecution, but a new matter raising a new cause of action which must be litigated in a separate action, even as petitioners denied they had committed any contumacious act by the issuance of :.'. No. #"-+!. Private respondents maintained that their petitions were mere incidents of Civil Case No. 00-776!% and that the trial court has -urisdiction because in fact this Court had not yet remanded the case to the court a 7uo for e ecution of its decision. Private respondents complain that petitioners are trying to circumvent the final and e ecutory decision of the court in Civil Case No. 00-776!%, through the issuance of :.'. No. #"-+!. :s already noted, however, the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 00-776!% en-oined petitioners from implementing the so called G'pen Pilotage SystemG embodied in : '. No. #!-00. 5f, as alleged, :.'. No. #"-+! is in substance a reenactment of :.'. No. #!-00, then there is basis for private respondents3 invocation of the trial court3s -urisdiction to punish for contempt. Still it is argued that the trial court lost -urisdiction over Civil Case No. 0067!%, upon the perfection of their appeal from its decision. .hat is indeed true. G.he appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and this last court becomes thereby charged with the authority to deal with contempt3s committed after perfection of the appeal.G K(+L .he trial court would have -urisdiction only in the event of an attempt to bloc, e ecution of its decision and that would be after the remand of the case to the trial court. K!#L Bntil then the trial court would have no -urisdiction to deal with alleged contemptuous acts. .he fly in the ointment, however, is that by accepting the dismissal of their petition for review in 8.;. No. (##(#+, petitioners rendered e ecution of the decision of the trial court superfluous. :ny attempt by them, therefore, to disobey the court3s final in-unction as embodied in its decision would be properly sub-ect to punishment for contempt. Petitioners3 contention that private respondents3 complaint must be the sub-ect of a separate action would nullify contempt proceedings as means of securing obedience to the lawful processes of a court. Petitioners3 theory would reward ingenuity and cunning in devising orders which substantially are the same as the order previously prohibited by the court. Ce hold that the trial court has -urisdiction to hear the motions for contempt filed by private respondent, sub-ect to any valid defense which petitioners may interpose.

###. *&DG"ENT

8!ERE'ORE, the several petitions in these cases are /5SM5SS)/. SO ORDERED. *ar asa, ".J., Padilla, !a ide, Jr., -omero, Bellosillo, 3elo, Puno, .itu$, Wapunan, )rancisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Pan$aniban, andTorres, Jr., JJ., concur. -e$alado, J., no part [ related to a counsel in 8.;. No. (##70(.

G.R. No. L-75:97 *+n4 18, 1987 VALENT#N T#O doinB ;+sin4ss +nd4r 5=4 na>4 and s5,l4 o< O"# ENTER1R#SES, petitioner, vs. V#DEOGRA" REG&LATOR0 /OARD, "#N#STER O' '#NAN E, "ETRO "AN#LA O""#SS#ON, #T0 "A0OR and #T0 TREAS&RER O' "AN#LA, respondents. *elson +. *$ for petitioner. The "it# 2e$al Officer for respondents "it# 3a#or and "it# Treasurer.

"ELEN #O-!ERRERA, J.: .his petition was filed on September (, (+0% by petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected. 5t assails the constitutionality of Presidential /ecree No. (+06 entitled G:n :ct Creating the >ideogram ;egulatory BoardG with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry &hereinafter briefly referred to as the B':;/*. .he /ecree was promulgated on 'ctober ", (+0" and too, effect on :pril (#, (+0%, fifteen &("* days after completion of its publication in the 'fficial 8a9ette. 'n November ", (+0", a month after the promulgation of the abovementioned decree, Presidential /ecree No. (++7 amended the National 5nternal ;evenue Code providing, inter aliaA S)C. (17. .ideo Tapes. @ .here shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playbac,, regardless of length, an annual ta of five pesos= Provided, .hat locally manufactured or imported blan, video tapes shall be sub-ect to sales ta . 'n 'ctober !1, (+0%, the 8reater Manila .heaters :ssociation, 5ntegrated Movie Producers, 5mporters and /istributors :ssociation of the Philippines, and Philippine Motion Pictures Producers :ssociation, hereinafter collectively referred to as the 5ntervenors, were permitted by the Court to intervene in the case, over petitioner3s opposition, upon the allegations that intervention was necessary for the complete protection of their rights and that their Gsurvival and very e istence is threatened by the unregulated proliferation of film piracy.G .he 5ntervenors were thereafter allowed to file their Comment in 5ntervention. .he rationale behind the enactment of the /)C;)), is set out in its preambular clauses as followsA (. CD);):S, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly pre-udiced the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent &7#Z* and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor3s specific, amusement and other ta es, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P7"# Million annually in government revenues= !. CD);):S, videogram&s* establishments collectively earn around P%## Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and such earnings have not been sub-ected to ta , thereby depriving the 8overnment of appro imately P(0# Million in ta es each year= 1. CD);):S, the unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry, particularly the more than (,!## movie houses and theaters throughout the country, and occasioned industry-wide displacement and unemployment due to the shutdown of numerous moviehouses and theaters= 7. GCD);):S, in order to ensure national economic recovery, it is imperative for the 8overnment to create an environment conducive to growth and development of all business industries, including the movie industry which has an accumulated investment of about P1 Billion= ". CD);):S, proper ta ation of the activities of videogram establishments will not only alleviate the dire financial condition of the movie industry upon which more than 6",### families and "##,### wor,ers depend for their livelihood, but also provide an additional source of revenue for the 8overnment, and at the same time rationali9e the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms= %. CD);):S, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features constitutes a clear and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the youth, and impairs the mandate of the Constitution for the State to support the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character and promote their physical, intellectual, and social wellbeing=

6. CD);):S, civic-minded citi9ens and groups have called for remedial measures to curb these blatant malpractices which have flaunted our censorship and copyright laws= 0. CD);):S, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the national economic recovery program, bold emergency measures must be adopted with dispatch= ... &Numbering of paragraphs supplied*. Petitioner3s attac, on the constitutionality of the /)C;)) rests on the following groundsA (. Section (# thereof, which imposes a ta of 1#Z on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a ;5/); and the same is not germane to the sub-ect matter thereof= !. .he ta imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and<or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution= 1. .here is no factual nor legal basis for the e ercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by :mendment No. %= 7. .here is undue delegation of power and authority= ". .he /ecree is an e0:post facto law= and %. .here is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not. Ce shall consider the foregoing ob-ections in seriatim. (. .he Constitutional re$uirement that Gevery bill shall embrace only one sub-ect which shall be e pressed in the title thereofG 1 is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute see,s to achieve. 5t is not necessary that the title e press each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. .he re$uirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the sub-ect matter e pressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general sub-ect and title. - :n act having a single general sub-ect, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general sub-ect, and may be considered in furtherance of such sub-ect by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general ob-ect.G 3 .he rule also is that the constitutional re$uirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. 9 5t should be given practical rather than technical construction. 5 .ested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner3s contention that the ta provision of the /)C;)) is a rider is without merit. .hat section reads, inter aliaA Section (#. Ta0 on Sale, 2ease or !isposition of .ideo$rams . @ Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a ta of thirty percent &1#Z* of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. 2ifty percent &"#Z* of the proceeds of the ta collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent &"#Z* shall acrrue to the municipality where the ta is collected= P;'>5/)/, .hat in Metropolitan Manila, the ta shall be shared e$ually by the City<Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.

.he foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general ob-ect of the /)C;)), which is the regulation of the video industry through the >ideogram ;egulatory Board as e pressed in its title. .he ta provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general sub-ect and title. :s a tool for regulation : it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the /)C;)). .he e press purpose of the /)C;)) to include ta ation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationali9e the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles ! and ", supra. .hose preambles e plain the motives of the lawma,er in presenting the measure. .he title of the /)C;)), which is the creation of the >ideogram ;egulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes e pressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. 5t is unnecessary to e press all those ob-ectives in the title or that the latter be an inde to the body of the /)C;)). 7 !. Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent &1#Z* ta imposed is harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint of trade. Dowever, it is beyond serious $uestion that a ta does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities ta ed. 8 .he power to impose ta es is one so unlimited in force and so searching in e tent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is sub-ect to any restrictions whatever, e cept such as rest in the discretion of the authority which e ercises it. 9 5n imposing a ta , the legislature acts upon its constituents. .his is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive ta ation. 10 .he ta imposed by the /)C;)) is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the reali9ation that earnings of videogram establishments of around P%## million per annum have not been sub-ected to ta , thereby depriving the 8overnment of an additional source of revenue. 5t is an end-user ta , imposed on retailers for every videogram they ma,e available for public viewing. 5t is similar to the 1#Z amusement ta imposed or borne by the movie industry which the theater-owners pay to the government, but which is passed on to the entire cost of the admission tic,et, thus shifting the ta burden on the buying or the viewing public. 5t is a ta that is imposed uniformly on all videogram operators. .he levy of the 1#Z ta is for a public purpose. 5t was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. :nd while it was also an ob-ective of the /)C;)) to protect the movie industry, the ta remains a valid imposition.

.he public purpose of a ta may legally e ist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the ta was to favor one industry over another. 11 5t is inherent in the power to ta that a state be free to select the sub-ects of ta ation, and it has been repeatedly held that Gine$uities which result from a singling out of one particular class for ta ation or e emption infringe no constitutional limitationG. 1- .a ation has been made the implement of the state3s police power. 13 :t bottom, the rate of ta is a matter better addressed to the ta ing legislature. 1. Petitioner argues that there was no legal nor factual basis for the promulgation of the /)C;)) by the former President under :mendment No. % of the (+61 Constitution providing that Gwhenever in the -udgment of the President ... , there e ists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National :ssembly fails or is unable to act ade$uately on any matter for any reason that in his -udgment re$uires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the e igency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land.G 5n refutation, the 5ntervenors and the Solicitor 8eneral3s 'ffice aver that the 0th GwhereasG clause sufficiently summari9es the -ustification in that grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the national economic recovery program necessitated bold emergency measures to be adopted with dispatch. Chatever the reasons Gin the -udgmentG of the then President, considering that the issue of the validity of the e ercise of legislative power under the said :mendment still pends resolution in several other cases, we reserve resolution of the $uestion raised at the proper time. 7. Neither can it be successfully argued that the /)C;)) contains an undue delegation of legislative power. .he grant in Section (( of the /)C;)) of authority to the B':;/ to Gsolicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputi9e, for a fi ed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the BoardG is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its e ecution, enforcement, and implementation. G.he true distinction is between the delegation of power to ma,e the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its e ecution to be e ercised under and in pursuance of the law. .he first cannot be done= to the latter, no valid ob-ection can be made.G 19 Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the B':;/ to solicit such assistance is for a Gfi ed and limited periodG with the deputi9ed agencies concerned being Gsub-ect to the direction and control of the B':;/.G .hat the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmati9e the /)C;)) as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without ade$uate remedy in law. ". .he /)C;)) is not violative of the e0 post facto principle. :n e0 post facto law is, among other categories, one which Galters the legal rules of evidence, and authori9es conviction upon less or different testimony than the law re$uired at the time of the commission of the offense.G 5t is petitioner3s position that Section (" of the /)C;)) in providing thatA :ll videogram establishments in the Philippines are hereby given a period of forty-five &7"* days after the effectivity of this /ecree within which to register with and secure a permit from the B':;/ to engage in the videogram business and to register with the B':;/ all their inventories of videograms, including videotapes, discs, cassettes or other technical improvements or variations thereof, before they could be sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of. .hereafter any videogram found in the possession of any person engaged in the videogram business without the re$uired proof of registration by the B':;/, shall be prima facie evidence of violation of the /ecree, whether the possession of such videogram be for private showing and<or public e hibition. raises immediately a prima facie evidence of violation of the /)C;)) when the re$uired proof of registration of any videogram cannot be presented and thus parta,es of the nature of an e0 post facto law. .he argument is untenable. :s this Court held in the recent case of .allarta s. "ourt of Appeals, et al. 15 ... it is now well settled that Gthere is no constitutional ob-ection to the passage of a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the e perience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocenceG &People vs. Mingoa +! Phil. 0"% K(+"1L at 0"0-"+, citing ( C''4)F, : .;):.5S) 'N .D) C'NS.5.B.5'N:4 45M5.:.5'NS, %1+-%7(*. :nd the Glegislature may enact that when certain facts have been proved that they shall be prima facie evidence of the e istence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate facts presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lac, of connection between the two in common e perienceG. 1: :pplied to the challenged provision, there is no $uestion that there is a rational connection between the fact proved, which is non-registration, and the ultimate fact presumed which is violation of the /)C;)), besides the fact that the prima facie presumption of violation of the /)C;)) attaches only after a forty-five-day period counted from its effectivity and is, therefore, neither retrospective in character. %. Ce do not share petitioner3s fears that the video industry is being over-regulated and being eased out of e istence as if it were a nuisance. Being a relatively new industry, the need for its regulation was apparent. Chile the underlying ob-ective of the /)C;)) is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no $uestion that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering Gthe unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy= the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent se$uences= and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually unta ed since mere payment of Mayor3s permit and municipal license fees are re$uired to engage in business. 17 .he enactment of the /ecree since :pril (#, (+0% has not brought about the GdemiseG of the video industry. 'n the contrary, video establishments are seen to have proliferated in many places notwithstanding the 1#Z ta imposed.

5n the last analysis, what petitioner basically $uestions is the necessity, wisdom and e pediency of the /)C;)). .hese considerations, however, are primarily and e clusively a matter of legislative concern. 'nly congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action ta,en, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. .his is as it ought to be. .he principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its -urisdiction to such a sphere. .here would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the -udiciary would substitute its own. 5f there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of -ustice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. .he attac, on the validity of the challenged provision li,ewise insofar as there may be ob-ections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained. 18 5n fine, petitioner has not overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to a challenged statute. Ce find no clear violation of the Constitution which would -ustify us in pronouncing Presidential /ecree No. (+06 as unconstitutional and void. CD);)2';), the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs. S' ';/);)/. Teehan&ee, 8".J.9, +ap, )ernan, *ar asa, Gutierrez, Jr., "ruz, Paras, )eliciano, Ganca#co, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and "ortes, JJ., concur. G.R. No. 171-'4;r+ar, -7, 19--

T!E &N#TED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANG TANG !O, defendant-appellant. 1illiams = )errier for appellant. Actin$ Attorne#:General Tuason for appellee. *O!NS, J.: :t its special session of (+(+, the Philippine 4egislature passed :ct No. !0%0, entitled G:n :ct penali9ing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under e traordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authori9ing the 8overnor8eneral, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and ma,ing an appropriation for this purpose,G the material provisions of which are as followsA Section (. .he 8overnor-8eneral is hereby authori9ed, whenever, for any cause, conditions arise resulting in an e traordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this :ct, to witA &a* .o prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn. &b* .o establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or sale of the commodities referred to or have such distribution or sale made by the 8overnment itself. &c* .o fi , from time to time the $uantities of palay rice, or corn that a company or individual may ac$uire, and the ma imum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand. &d* . . . S)C. !. 5t shall be unlawful to destroy, limit, prevent or in any other manner obstruct the production or milling of palay, rice or corn for the purpose of raising the prices thereof= to corner or hoard said products as defined in section three of this :ct= . . . Section 1 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the meaning of this :ct, but does not specify the price of rice or define any basic for fi ing the price. S)C. 7. .he violations of any of the provisions of this :ct or of the regulations, orders and decrees promulgated in accordance therewith shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousands pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both, in the discretion of the courtA Pro ided, .hat in the case of companies or corporations the manager or administrator shall be criminally liable. S)C. 6. :t any time that the 8overnor-8eneral, with the consent of the Council of State, shall consider that the public interest re$uires the application of the provisions of this :ct, he shall so declare by proclamation, and any provisions of other laws inconsistent herewith shall from then on be temporarily suspended. Bpon the cessation of the reasons for which such proclamation was issued, the 8overnor-8eneral, with the consent of the Council of State, shall declare the application of this :ct to have li,ewise terminated, and all laws temporarily suspended by virtue of the same shall again ta,e effect, but such termination shall not prevent the prosecution of any proceedings or cause begun prior to such termination, nor the filing of any proceedings for an offense committed during the period covered by the 8overnor-8eneral3s proclamation.

:ugust (, (+(+, the 8overnor-8eneral issued a proclamation fi ing the price at which rice should be sold. :ugust 0, (+(+, a complaint was filed against the defendant, :ng .ang Do, charging him with the sale of rice at an e cessive price as followsA .he undersigned accuses :ng .ang Do of a violation of ) ecutive 'rder No. "1 of the 8overnor-8eneral of the Philippines, dated the (st of :ugust, (+(+, in relation with the provisions of sections (, ! and 7 of :ct No. !0%0, committed as followsA .hat on or about the %th day of :ugust, (+(+, in the city of Manila, Philippine 5slands, the said :ng .ang Do, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro .rinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos &P.0#*, which is a price greater than that fi ed by ) ecutive 'rder No. "1 of the 8overnor-8eneral of the Philippines, dated the (st of :ugust, (+(+, under the authority of section ( of :ct No. !0%0. Contrary to law. Bpon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months3 imprisonment and to pay a fine of P"##, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding ) ecutive 'rder No. "1 of (+(+, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence. .he official records show that the :ct was to ta,e effect on its approval= that it was approved ?uly 1#, (+(+= that the 8overnor-8eneral issued his proclamation on the (st of :ugust, (+(+= and that the law was first published on the (1th of :ugust, (+(+= and that the proclamation itself was first published on the !#th of :ugust, (+(+. .he $uestion here involves an analysis and construction of :ct No. !0%0, in so far as it authori9es the 8overnor-8eneral to fi the price at which rice should be sold. 5t will be noted that section ( authori9es the 8overnor-8eneral, with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an e traordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the :ct. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the 8overnor-8eneral. .he 4egislature does not underta,e to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the 8overnor-8eneral shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued Gfor any cause,G and leaves the $uestion as to what is Gany causeG to the discretion of the 8overnor-8eneral. .he :ct also saysA G2or any cause, conditions arise resulting in an e traordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn.G .he 4egislature does not specify or define what is Gan e traordinary rise.G .hat is also left to the discretion of the 8overnor-8eneral. .he :ct also says that the 8overnor-8eneral, Gwith the consent of the Council of State,G is authori9ed to issue and promulgate Gtemporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this :ct.G 5t does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall ta,e effect. .hat is to say, the 4egislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole -udgement and discretion of the 8overnor-8eneral to say what is or what is not Ga cause,G and what is or what is not Gan e traordinary rise in the price of rice,G and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the :ct. Bnder this state of facts, if the law is valid and the 8overnor-8eneral issues a proclamation fi ing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. .here may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been e traordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, but, if the 8overnor-8eneral found the e istence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime. By the organic law of the Philippine 5slands and the Constitution of the Bnited States all powers are vested in the 4egislative, ) ecutive and ?udiciary. 5t is the duty of the 4egislature to ma,e the law= of the ) ecutive to e ecute the law= and of the ?udiciary to construe the law. .he 4egislature has no authority to e ecute or construe the law, the ) ecutive has no authority to ma,e or construe the law, and the ?udiciary has no power to ma,e or e ecute the law. Sub-ect to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own -urisdiction, and it is for the ?udiciary only to say when any :ct of the 4egislature is or is not constitutional. :ssuming, without deciding, that the 4egislature itself has the power to fi the price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that power legally delegated by :ct No. !0%0J 5n other words, does the :ct delegate legislative power to the 8overnor-8eneralJ By the 'rganic 4aw, all 4egislative power is vested in the 4egislature, and the power conferred upon the 4egislature to ma,e laws cannot be delegated to the 8overnor-8eneral, or any one else. .he 4egislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. 5f :ct no !0%0 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authori9e the 8overnor-8eneral to ma,e rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the 4egislature itself created the law. .here is no delegation of power and it is valid. 'n the other hand, if the :ct within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to ma,e it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the 8overnor-8eneral, then the :ct is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void. .he Supreme Court of the Bnited States in what is ,nown as the Gran$er "ases &+7 B.S., (01-(06= !7 4. ed., +7*, first laid down the ruleA ;ailroad companies are engaged in a public employment affecting the public interest and, under the decision in Munn s. 5ll., ante, 66, are sub-ect to legislative control as to their rates of fare and freight unless protected by their charters. .he 5llinois statute of Mar. !1, (067, to establish reasonable ma imum rates of charges for the transportation of freights and passengers on the different railroads of the State is not void as being repugnant to the Constitution of the Bnited States or to that of the State. 5t was there for the first time held in substance that a railroad was a public utility, and that, being a public utility, the State had power to establish reasonable ma imum freight and passenger rates. .his was followed by the State of Minnesota in enacting a similar law, providing for, and empowering, a railroad commission to hear and determine what was a -ust and reasonable rate. .he constitutionality of this law was attac,ed and upheld by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in a learned and e haustive opinion by ?ustice Mitchell, in the case of State s. Chicago, Milwau,ee Q St. Paul ry. Co. &10 Minn., !0(*, in which the court heldA -e$ulations of rail%a# tariffs Y "onclusi eness of commission>s tariffs . @ Bnder 4aws (006, c. (#, sec. 0, the determination of the railroad and warehouse commission as to what are e$ual and reasonable fares and rates for the transportation of persons and property by a railway company is conclusive, and, in proceedings by mandamus to compel compliance with the tariff of rates recommended and published by them, no issue can be raised or in$uiry had on that $uestion.

Same Y constitution Y !ele$ation of po%er to commission. @ .he authority thus given to the commission to determine, in the e ercise of their discretion and -udgement, what are e$ual and reasonable rates, is not a delegation of legislative power. 5t will be noted that the law creating the railroad commission e pressly provides @ .hat all charges by any common carrier for the transportation of passengers and property shall be e$ual and reasonable. Cith that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the railroad commission to investigate all the facts, to hear and determine what is a -ust and reasonable rate. )ven then that law does not ma,e the violation of the order of the commission a crime. .he only remedy is a civil proceeding. 5t was there held @ .hat the legislative itself has the power to regulate railroad charges is now too well settled to re$uire either argument or citation of authority. .he difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the power to adopt rules and regulations, or to investigate and determine the facts, in order to carry into effect a law already passed, is apparent. .he true distinction is between the delegation of power to ma,e the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and the conferring an authority or discretion to be e ercised under and in pursuance of the law. .he legislature enacts that all freights rates and passenger fares should be -ust and reasonable. 5t had the undoubted power to fi these rates at whatever it deemed e$ual and reasonable. .hey have not delegated to the commission any authority or discretion as to what the law shall be, @ which would not be allowable, @ but have merely conferred upon it an authority and discretion, to be e ercised in the e ecution of the law, and under and in pursuance of it, which is entirely permissible. .he legislature itself has passed upon the e pediency of the law, and what is shall be. .he commission is intrusted with no authority or discretion upon these $uestions. 5t can neither ma,e nor unma,e a single provision of law. 5t is merely charged with the administration of the law, and with no other power. .he delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court of Cisconsin in /owling s. 4ancoshire 5ns. Co. &+! Cis., %1*. .he opinion saysA G.he true distinction is between the delegation of power to ma,e the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its e ecution, to be e ercised under and in pursuance of the law. .he first cannot be done= to the latter no valid ob-ection can be made.G .he act, in our -udgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy re$uired to ta,e the place of all others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to maters involving the e ercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use as an act in confirmity to which all fire insurance policies were re$uired to be issued. .he result of all the cases on this sub-ect is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the -udgement of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to ta,e effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event. .he delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court in Bnited States s. 8rimaud &!!# B.S., "#%= "" 4. ed., "%1*, where it was held that the rules and regulations of the Secretary of :griculture as to a trespass on government land in a forest reserve were valid constitutional. .he :ct there provided that the Secretary of :griculture G. . . may ma,e such rules and regulations and establish such service as will insure the ob-ect of such reservations= namely, to regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction= and an# iolation of the pro isions of this act or such rules and re$ulations shall be punished , . . .G .he brief of the Bnited States Solicitor-8eneral saysA 5n refusing permits to use a forest reservation for stoc, gra9ing, e cept upon stated terms or in stated ways, the Secretary of :griculture merely assert and enforces the proprietary right of the Bnited States over land which it owns. .he regulation of the Secretary, therefore, is not an e ercise of legislative, or even of administrative, power= but is an ordinary and legitimate refusal of the landowner3s authori9ed agent to allow person having no right in the land to use it as they will. .he right of proprietary control is altogether different from governmental authority. .he opinion saysA 2rom the beginning of the government, various acts have been passed conferring upon e ecutive officers power to ma,e rules and regulations, @ not for the government of their departments, but for administering the laws which did govern. None of these statutes could confer legislative power. But when Congress had legislated power. But when Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it could give to those who were to act under such general provisions Gpower to fill up the detailsG by the establishment of administrative rules and regulations, the violation of which could be punished by fine or imprisonment fi ed by Congress, or by penalties fi ed by Congress, or measured by the in-ury done. .hat GCongress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle universally recogni9ed as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.G

5f, after the passage of the act and the promulgation of the rule, the defendants drove and gra9ed their sheep upon the reserve, in violation of the regulations, they were ma,ing an unlawful use of the government3s property. 5n doing so they thereby made themselves liable to the penalty imposed by Congress. .he sub-ects as to which the Secretary can regulate are defined. .he lands are set apart as a forest reserve. De is re$uired to ma,e provisions to protect them from depredations and from harmful uses. De is authori9ed 3to regulate the occupancy and use and to preserve the forests from destruction.3 : violation of reasonable rules regulating the use and occupancy of the property is made a crime, not by the Secretary, but by Congress.G .he above are leading cases in the Bnited States on the $uestion of delegating legislative power. 5t will be noted that in the G8ranger Cases,G it was held that a railroad company was a public corporation, and that a railroad was a public utility, and that, for such reasons, the legislature had the power to fi and determine -ust and reasonable rates for freight and passengers. .he Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were -ust and reasonable, the legislature could delegate the power to ascertain the facts and determine from the facts what were -ust and reasonable rates,. and that in vesting the commission with such power was not a delegation of legislative power. .he Cisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a GCisconsin standard policy of fire insurance,G and the court held that Gthe act, . . . wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy re$uired to ta,e the place of all others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the e ercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated.G .he case of the Bnited States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations which were promulgated by the Secretary of :griculture for 8overnment land in the forest reserve. .hese decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate it legislative authority. .he line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is pointed out and clearly defined. :s the Supreme Court of Cisconsin saysA .hat no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other department of the government, e ecutive or -udicial, is a fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government established by the constitution. Chere an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in li,e manner, that its operation shall be suspended. .he legislature cannot delegate its power to ma,e a law, but it can ma,e a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law ma,es, or intends to ma,e, its own action to depend. .he >illage of 4ittle Chute enacted an ordinance which providesA :ll saloons in said village shall be closed at (( o3cloc, P.M. each day and remain closed until " o3cloc, on the following morning, unless by special permission of the president. Construing it in (1% Cis., "!%= (!0 :. S. ;., ((##, ( the Supreme Court of that State saysA Ce regard the ordinance as void for two reasons= 2irst, because it attempts to confer arbitrary power upon an e ecutive officer, and allows him, in e ecuting the ordinance, to ma,e un-ust and groundless discriminations among persons similarly situated= second, because the power to regulate saloons is a law-ma,ing power vested in the village board, which cannot be delegated. : legislative body cannot delegate to a mere administrative officer power to ma,e a law, but it can ma,e a law with provisions that it shall go into effect or be suspended in its operations upon the ascertainment of a fact or state of facts by an administrative officer or board. 5n the present case the ordinance by its terms gives power to the president to decide arbitrary, and in the e ercise of his own discretion, when a saloon shall close. .his is an attempt to vest legislative discretion in him, and cannot be sustained. .he legal principle involved there is s$uarely in point here. 5t must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. !0%0, and before any rules and regulations were promulgated by the 8overnor-8eneral, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per Gganta,G and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fi ing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. .hat is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Dence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the 8overnor-8eneral issued the proclamation. .here was no act of the 4egislature ma,ing it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime. .he ) ecutive order! providesA &"* .he ma imum selling price of palay, rice or corn is hereby fi ed, for the time being as followsA 5n Manila @ Palay at P%.6" per sac, of "6\ ,ilos, or !+ centavos per ganta.

;ice at P(" per sac, of "6\ ,ilos, or %1 centavos per ganta. Corn at P0 per sac, of "6\ ,ilos, or 17 centavos per ganta. 5n the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the ma imum price shall be the Manila price less the cost of transportation from the source of supply and necessary handling e penses to the place of sale, to be determined by the provincial treasurers or their deputies. 5n provinces, obtaining their supplies from Manila or other producing provinces, the ma imum price shall be the authori9ed price at the place of supply or the Manila price as the case may be, plus the transportation cost, from the place of supply and the necessary handling e penses, to the place of sale, to be determined by the provincial treasurers or their deputies. &%* Provincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby directed to communicate with, and e ecute all instructions emanating from the /irector of Commerce and 5ndustry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities. .he law says that the 8overnor-8eneral may fi Gthe ma imum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand.G .he law is a general law and not a local or special law. .he proclamation underta,es to fi one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in other and different provinces in the Philippine 5slands, and delegates the power to determine the other and different prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies. Dere, then, you would have a delegation of legislative power to the 8overnor-8eneral, and a delegation by him of that power to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who Gare hereby directed to communicate with, and e ecute all instructions emanating from the /irector of Commerce and 5ndustry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities.G .he issuance of the proclamation by the 8overnor-8eneral was the e ercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a sub delegation of that power. :ssuming that it is valid, :ct No. !0%0 is a general law and does not authori9e the 8overnor-8eneral to fi one price of rice in Manila and another price in 5loilo. 5t only purports to authori9e him to fi the price of rice in the Philippine 5slands under a law, which is 8eneral and uniform, and not local or special. Bnder the terms of the law, the price of rice fi ed in the proclamation must be the same all over the 5slands. .here cannot be one price at Manila and another at 5loilo. :gain, it is a mater of common ,nowledge, and of which this court will ta,e -udicial notice, that there are many ,inds of rice with different and corresponding mar,et values, and that there is a wide range in the price, which varies with the grade and $uality. :ct No. !0%0 ma,es no distinction in price for the grade or $uality of the rice, and the proclamation, upon which the defendant was tried and convicted, fi es the selling price of rice in Manila Gat P(" per sac, of "6\ ,ilos, or %1 centavos per ganta,G and is uniform as to all grades of rice, and says nothing about grade or $uality. :gain, it will be noted that the law is confined to palay, rice and corn. .hey are products of the Philippine 5slands. Demp, tobacco, coconut, chic,ens, eggs, and many other things are also products. :ny law which single out palay, rice or corn from the numerous other products of the 5slands is not general or uniform, but is a local or special law. 5f such a law is valid, then by the same principle, the 8overnor-8eneral could be authori9ed by proclamation to fi the price of meat, eggs, chic,ens, coconut, hemp, and tobacco, or any other product of the 5slands. 5n the very nature of things, all of that class of laws should be general and uniform. 'therwise, there would be an un-ust discrimination of property rights, which, under the law, must be e$ual and inform. :ct No. !0%0 is nothing more than a floating law, which, in the discretion and by a proclamation of the 8overnor-8eneral, ma,es it a floating crime to sell rice at a price in e cess of the proclamation, without regard to grade or $uality. Chen :ct No. !0%0 is analy9ed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the 8overnor-8eneral which constitutes the crime. Cithout that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. 5n other words, the 4egislature left it to the sole discretion of the 8overnor-8eneral to say what was and what was not Gany causeG for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not Gan e traordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,G and under certain undefined conditions to fi the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or $uality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. .he 4egislature did not specify or define what was Gany cause,G or what was Gan e traordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,G Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. 5n the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. .he alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the 8overnor-8eneral issued the proclamation. .he act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or $ualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale Gof one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos &P#.0#* which is a price greater than that fi ed by ) ecutive order No. "1.G Ce are clearly of the opinion and hold that :ct No. !0%0, in so far as it underta,es to authori9ed the 8overnor-8eneral in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fi ing the price of rice, and to ma,e the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to ma,e the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void. 5t may be urged that there was an e traordinary rise in the price of rice and profiteering, which wor,ed a severe hardship on the poorer classes, and that an emergency e isted, but the $uestion here presented is the constitutionality of a particular portion of a statute, and none of such matters is an argument for, or against, its constitutionality. .he Constitution is something solid, permanent an substantial. 5ts stability protects the life, liberty and property rights of the rich and the poor ali,e, and that protection ought not to change with the wind or any emergency condition. .he fundamental $uestion involved in this case is the right of the people of the Philippine 5slands to be and live under a republican form of government. Ce ma,e the broad statement that no state or nation, living under republican form of government, under the terms and conditions specified in :ct No. !0%0, has ever enacted a law delegating the power to any one, to fi the price at which rice should be sold. .hat power can never be delegated under a republican form of government. 5n the fi ing of the price at which the defendant should sell his rice, the law was not dealing with government property. 5t was dealing with private property and private rights, which are sacred under the Constitution. 5f this law should be sustained, upon the same principle and for the same reason, the 4egislature could authori9e the 8overnor-8eneral to fi the price of every product or commodity in the Philippine 5slands, and empower him to ma,e it a crime to sell any product at any other or different price. 5t may be said that this was a war measure, and that for such reason the provision of the Constitution should be suspended. But the Stubborn fact remains that at all times the -udicial power was in full force and effect, and that while that power was in force and effect, such a provision of the Constitution could not be, and was not, suspended even in times of war. 5t may be claimed that during the war, the Bnited States 8overnment

undertoo, to, and did, fi the price at which wheat and flour should be bought and sold, and that is true. .here, the Bnited States had declared war, and at the time was at war with other nations, and it was a war measure, but it is also true that in doing so, and as a part of the same act, the Bnited States commandeered all the wheat and flour, and too, possession of it, either actual or constructive, and the government itself became the owner of the wheat and flour, and fi ed the price to be paid for it. .hat is not this case. Dere the rice sold was the personal and private property of the defendant, who sold it to one of his customers. .he government had not bought and did not claim to own the rice, or have any interest in it, and at the time of the alleged sale, it was the personal, private property of the defendant. 5t may be that the law was passed in the interest of the public, but the members of this court have ta,en on solemn oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, and it ought not to be construed to meet the changing winds or emergency conditions. :gain, we say that no state or nation under a republican form of government ever enacted a law authori9ing any e ecutive, under the conditions states, to fi the price at which a price person would sell his own rice, and ma,e the broad statement that no decision of any court, on principle or by analogy, will ever be found which sustains the constitutionality of the particular portion of :ct No. !0%0 here in $uestion. By the terms of the 'rganic :ct, sub-ect only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested e clusively in the 4egislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine 5slands. :s to the $uestion here involved, the authority of the 8overnor8eneral to fi the ma imum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner power in violation of the organic law. .his opinion is confined to the particular $uestion here involved, which is the right of the 8overnor-8eneral, upon the terms and conditions stated in the :ct, to fi the price of rice and ma,e it a crime to sell it at a higher price, and which holds that portions of the :ct unconstitutional. 5t does not decide or underta,e to construe the constitutionality of any of the remaining portions of the :ct. .he -udgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged. So ordered. Araullo, ".J., Johnson, Street and Ostrand, JJ., concur. -omualdez, J., concurs in the result. G.R. No. 79957 "ar6= -0, 1987 REST#T&TO 0NOT, petitioner, vs. #NTER"ED#ATE A11ELLATE O&RT, T!E STAT#ON O""ANDER, #NTEGRATED NAT#ONAL 1OL# E, /AROTA N&EVO, #LO#LO and T!E REG#ONAL D#RE TOR, /&REA& O' AN#"AL #ND&STR0, REG#ON #V, #LO#LO #T0, respondents. -amon A. Gonzales for petitioner. R&2, J.: .he essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of .hemistocles to :lcibiades GStri,e @ but hear me first]G 5t is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of ) ecutive 'rder No. %!%-:. .he said e ecutive order reads in full as followsA CD);):S, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the re$uirements of ) ecutive 'rder No. %!% particularly with respect to age= CD);):S, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead= and CD);):S, in order to achieve the purposes and ob-ectives of ) ecutive 'rder No. %!% and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said ) ecutive 'rder and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and carabeef sub-ect of the violation= N'C, .D);)2';), 5, 2);/5N:N/ ). M:;C'S, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the followingA S)C.5'N (. ) ecutive 'rder No. %!% is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, se , physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. .he carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this ) ecutive 'rder as amended shall be sub-ect to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat 5nspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the /irector of :nimal 5ndustry may see fit, in the case of carabaos. S)C.5'N !. .his ) ecutive 'rder shall ta,e effect immediately. /one in the City of Manila, this !"th day of 'ctober, in the year of 'ur 4ord, nineteen hundred and eighty. &S8/.* 2);/5N:N/ ). M:;C'S President ;epublic of the Philippines

.he petitioner had transported si carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to 5loilo on ?anuary (1, (+07, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, 5loilo, for violation of the above measure. 1.he petitioner sued for recovery, and the ;egional .rial Court of 5loilo City issued a writ of reple in upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P(!,###.##. :fter considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. .he court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the e ecutive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lac, of authority and also for its presumed validity. .he petitioner appealed the decision to the 5ntermediate :ppellate Court, J 3 which upheld the trial court, JJ and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari. .he thrust of his petition is that the e ecutive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authori9es outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. Dis claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. De complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. .here is also a challenge to the improper e ercise of the legislative power by the former President under :mendment No. % of the (+61 Constitution. 9 Chile also involving the same e ecutive order, the case of Pesi$an . An$eles 5 is not applicable here. .he $uestion raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the 'fficial 8a9ette before it could be considered enforceable. Ce imposed the re$uirement then on the basis of due process of law. 5n doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor 8eneral, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of ) ecutive 'rder No. %!%-:. .hat is an entirely different matter. .his Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in e amining constitutional $uestions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, sub-ect only to review by the highest tribunal. : Ce have -urisdiction under the Constitution to Greview, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide,G final -udgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 .his simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts. :nd while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. 5ndeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then Gwill be the time to ma,e the hammer fall, and heavily,G 8 to recall ?ustice 4aurel3s trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is $uestioned. 'n the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished -urist, 9 and so heal the wound or e cise the affliction. ?udicial power authori9es this= and when the e ercise is demanded, there should be no shir,ing of the tas, for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court. .he challenged measure is denominated an e ecutive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an e isting law. 5t was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of ta,ing care that the laws were faithfully e ecuted but in the e ercise of his legislative authority under :mendment No. %. 5t was provided thereunder that whenever in his -udgment there e isted a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or was unable to act ade$uately on any matter that in his -udgment re$uired immediate action, he could, in order to meet the e igency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. :s there is no showing of any e igency to -ustify the e ercise of that e traordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to $uestion the validity of the e ecutive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President Gin his -udgment, G a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. 2or the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental $uestion of due process. 5t is part of the art of constitution-ma,ing that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmista,able language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. .hat is the 5deal. 5n the case of the due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely ,ept ambiguous. 5n fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of (+17, but it was re-ected by /elegate ?ose P. 4aurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of ;ights, who forcefully argued against it. De was sustained by the body. 10 .he due process clause was ,ept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. .his was felt necessary because due process is not, li,e some provisions of the fundamental law, an Giron ruleG laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. 2le ibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. .he very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to ma,e it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may re$uire. :ware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in a legal strait-ac,et that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. 5nstead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be Ggradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and e clusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise.G 11 .hus, ?ustice 2eli 2ran,furter of the B.S. Supreme Court, for e ample, would go no farther than to define due process @ and in so doing sums it all up @ as nothing more and nothing less than Gthe embodiment of the sporting 5dea of fair play.G 1Chen the barons of )ngland e tracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its sub-ects e cept by the lawful -udgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmar, of the free society. .he solemn vow that Iing ?ohn made at ;unnymede in (!(" has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause. .he closed mind has no place in the open society. 5t is part of the sporting 5dea of fair play to hear Gthe other sideG before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in -udgment. 'bviously, one side is only one-half of the $uestion= the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. 5t is indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling after e amination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but

in its totality. : -udgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the prete t that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power. .he minimum re$uirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally spea,ing, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. 5t is a gratifying commentary on our -udicial system that the -urisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. Ce have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to Gthe law of the land,G which /aniel Cebster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous /artmouth College Case, 19 as Gthe law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon in$uiry and renders -udgment only after trial.G 5t has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mista,en 9eal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword. .his is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted e ceptions. .he conclusive presumption, for e ample, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human e perience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 .here are instances when the need for e peditions action will -ustify omission of these re$uisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, li,e a mad dog on the loose, which may be ,illed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. .he passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 1: 2ilthy restaurants may be summarily padloc,ed in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 5n such instances, previous -udicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger. .he protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. .he police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it e tends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing ta ation and eminent domain. .he individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead @ from the womb to beyond the tomb @ in practically everything he does or owns. 5ts reach is virtually limitless. 5t is a ubi$uitous and often unwelcome intrusion. )ven so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. :nd the -ustification is found in the venerable 4atin ma ims, Salus populi est suprema le0 and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number. 5t is this power that is now invo,ed by the government to -ustify ) ecutive 'rder No. %!%-:, amending the basic rule in ) ecutive 'rder No. %!%, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos e cept under certain conditions. .he original measure was issued for the reason, as e pressed in one of its Chereases, that Gpresent conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs.G Ce affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. 5n the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not ta,en steps to protect and preserve them. : similar prohibition was challenged in (nited States . Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. .he defendant had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao without the re$uired permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. .he conviction was affirmed. .he law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate ,illing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. :n epidemic had stric,en many of these animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine. 2urthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the conse$uent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals. .he Court held that the $uestioned statute was a valid e ercise of the police power and declared in part as followsA .o -ustify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, re$uire such interference= and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ... 2rom what has been said, we thin, it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was re$uired by Gthe interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular classG and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural wor, or draft purposes was a Greasonably necessaryG limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to en-oy the lu ury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected. 5n the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the .oribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man3s tractor, so to spea,, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful sub-ect of ) ecutive 'rder No. %!%. .he method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. .here is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals e cept where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the e ecutive order will be conserving those still fit for farm wor, or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful sub-ect as the original e ecutive order, we cannot say with e$ual certainty that it complies with the second re$uirement, iz., that there be a lawful method. Ce note that to strengthen the original measure, ) ecutive 'rder No. %!%-: imposes an absolute ban not on the slau$hter of the carabaos but on their mo ement, providing that Gno carabao regardless of age, se , physical condition or purpose &sic* and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another.G .he ob-ect of the prohibition escapes us. .he reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the $uestioned measure is missing

Ce do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be ,illed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. 'bviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will ma,e it easier to ,ill them there. :s for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says e ecutive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply ,illing the animal. Perhaps so. Dowever, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat. )ven if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to rec,on with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. .he penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the e ecutive authorities, usually the police only. 5n the .oribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Bnder the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government. 5n the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P(!,###.##, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. .he e ecutive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. .he measure struc, at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play. 5t has already been remar,ed that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual re$uirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. 5t is also conceded that summary action may be validly ta,en in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily -udicial only. -0 5n the e ceptional cases accepted, however. there is a -ustification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediac# of the problem sought to be corrected and the ur$enc# of the need to correct it. 5n the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner3s peremptory treatment. .he properties involved were not even inimical per se as to re$uire their instant destruction. .here certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the e ecutive order should not have been proved first in a court of -ustice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesi$an . An$eles, -1 ) ecutive 'rder No. %!%-: is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of -ustice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused. Ce also mar,, on top of all this, the $uestionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the $uestioned e ecutive order. 5t is there authori9ed that the sei9ed property shall Gbe distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat 5nspection Commissionma# see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the /irector of :nimal 5ndustryma# see fit, in the case of carabaos.G &)mphasis supplied.* .he phrase ]ma# see fit] is an e tremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. 5t is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. 'ne searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they ma,e their distribution. .here is none. .heir options are apparently boundless. Cho shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosenJ 'nly the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own e clusive discretion. /efinitely, there is here a Groving commission,G a wide and sweeping authority that is not Gcanali9ed within ban,s that ,eep it from overflowing,G in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers. .o sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid e ercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. /ue process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. .he conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to ad-udge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on -udicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. .here is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily ta,en. 2or these reasons, we hereby declare ) ecutive 'rder No. %!%: unconstitutional. Ce agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner3s carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the e ecutive order in accordance with its mandate. .he law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. 5t would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the e ecutive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to e ecute it. )ven the trial court, in fact, and the Court of :ppeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority, to $uestion the order we now annul. .he Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would never have reached us and the ta,ing of his property under the challenged measure would have become a fait accompli despite its invalidity. Ce commend him for his spirit. Cithout the present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relin$uished rights. .he strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invo,e them whenever they are ignored or violated. ;ights are but weapons on the wall if, li,e e pensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. ;ights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. .hey become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are ,ept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them. CD);)2';), ) ecutive 'rder No. %!%-: is hereby declared unconstitutional. ) cept as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of :ppeals is reversed. .he supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs. S' ';/);)/.

Teehan&ee, ".J., +ap, )ernan, *ar asa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Ganca#co, Padilla Bidin Sarmiento and "ortes, JJ., concur. 3elencio:Herrera and )eliciano, JJ., are on lea e.