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Re-‐Navigation
Research
Christopher
G
Nutter
September 09
Nutter
and
Associates
Consulting
Waitt
Institute
for
Discovery
Re-‐Navigation
Report
Acknowledgements
The
authors
and
principal
researchers,
Christopher
G.
Nutter
and
Michael
F.
DiBello,
gratefully
thank
the
Waitt
Institute
for
Discovery
for
their
exceptionally
professional
guidance,
assistance
and
total
support
for
this
research.
Without
their
commitment
and
encouragement
this
project
would
likely
have
not
been
completed.
We
want
to
thank,
and
extend
our
professional
respect,
to
all
of
our
published
colleagues
before
us,
who
researched
and
investigated
this
accident
for
decades,
and
who
contributed
an
important
body
of
knowledge
and
understanding
to
this
circumstance
of
a
historical
missing
aircraft.
The
dedication
and
tireless
efforts
from
these
authors
and
researchers
set
a
very
high
standard.
Finally
we’d
like
to
appreciate
and
recognize
the
sacrifices
made
by
our
families
as
we
embarked
on
this
enormous
task
to
review
more
than
71
years
worth
of
research
and
evidence.
The
challenge
was
worthy
of
our
full
commitment.
The
support
from
our
families
and
our
Research
Team
at
the
Waitt
Institute
for
Discovery
was
critically
important
to
sustain
the
effort.
Executive
Summary
This
research
was
designed
to
conduct
a
detailed
assessment
of
the
body
of
foregoing
World
Flight
research,
critically
review
evidence
in
prior
related
works,
validate
or
critique
those
works,
and
localize
future
search
options.
A
reduction
in
the
planned
search
area
would
enhance
the
project
by
reducing
search
time
on
station.
Approaching
this
task
as
a
location
of
a
lost
aircraft,
and
definition
of
a
probable
search
area,
required
understanding,
to
the
fullest
extent
possible,
the
exact
possible
flight
paths,
profiles,
speeds,
flight
times,
fuel
consumption,
and
pilot
behaviors.
Specifically
in
this
case,
these
factors
would
determine
flight
time
endurance
remaining
upon
arrival
in
the
Howland
area
–
directly
related
to
where
the
aircraft
could
be
located.
With
little
direct
information
on
any
of
these
factors,
and
the
importance
of
accurate
assessment,
this
information
had
to
be
created
from
widely
disparate
sources,
research,
and
analysis.
A
detailed
review
was
conducted
of
at
least
ten
authors
writing
directly
about
the
World
Flight,
more
than
a
dozen
reports,
and
more
than
8,000
pages
of
data
associated
with
the
World
Flight
attempt.
Other
documents
examined
included
the
entire
Amelia
Earhart
Papers
of
the
George
Palmer
Putnam
Collection
of
2,221
images
from
the
Purdue
University
e-‐archives;
Lockheed
Electra
and
period
aircraft
operating
manuals;
meteorological
and
oceanographic
data
including
the
Lae-‐Howland
geographical
climatology;
the
effects
of
the
Northern
Equatorial
Current,
and
Northern
Equatorial
Counter
Current
in
the
Howland
area;
and
other
authors/pieces
with
various
theories
about
the
disappearance
of
Amelia
Earhart
and
Fred
Noonan.
Aerodynamic
engineering
data
and
aircraft
performance
were
examined
in
great
detail,
from
many
sources
and
authoritative
records.
Aircraft
performance
is
a
major,
critically
important
variable
in
this
analysis,
and
largely
determines
the
vertical
and
lateral
flight
profile
from
Lae
to
Howland
Island.
Amelia
Earhart’s
collection
of
flight
notes,
biography,
life
events,
and
her
career
in
aviation
were
closely
studied
to
gain
insight
into
her
motivations
and
beliefs.
Perhaps
most
important,
we
wanted
to
understand
Amelia’s
behaviors
-‐-‐
how
she
planned
missions,
flew
aircraft,
thought
about
flying
them,
and
how
she
actually
conducted
her
flights
throughout
her
career
in
the
air.
Recreating
the
Lae-‐Howland
flight
segment,
using
as
much
hard
data
and
facts
as
were
available,
was
critical
to
meeting
research
objectives.
A
faithful
re-‐creation
based
on
fact
was
the
primary
objective,
and
offered
the
best
chance
to
accurately
locate
the
aircraft.
Three
possible
flight
paths
were
defined
and
evaluated,
each
terminating
in
a
high
confidence,
End-‐of-‐
Navigation
point.
Among
the
three
paths,
one
path
appears
most
likely
(Path
C),
with
a
very
high
confidence
End-‐of-‐Navigation
point;
one
path
is
unlikely
(Path
A);
and
one
is
possible
but
with
a
lower
confidence
that
it
was
executed
(Path
B).
The
highest
confidence
Path
C
results
from
a
rigorous
path
recalculation,
aerodynamic
performance
and
fuel
consumption
assessments,
with
significant
cross-‐validation
of
results
and
conclusions.
Error
sensitivity
analyses
were
performed
on
results
for
variable
wind
velocities,
wind
directions,
and
fuel
consumption.
A
Search
Grid
was
constructed
around
this
Path
C
End-‐of-‐Navigation
point
to
accommodate
terminal
area
maneuvering
that
was
inferred
from
aviation
experience,
and
application
of
the
most
likely
behavior
for
Amelia
Earhart
and
Fred
Noonan,
on
July
2,
1937.
The
search
grid
was
initially
oriented,
and
modified,
as
shown
in
Appendix
2,
further
refining
Autonomous
Underwater
Vehicle
search
strategies.
Several
iterations
of
the
grid
with
the
Search
Team
resulted
in
the
final
search
grid
included
in
this
report.
Previous estimates of position for Amelia Earhart and Fred Noonan’s Electra include
The following are among higher confidence data that support analyses
• The
fuel
load
of
the
Electra
leaving
Lae
was
likely
between
1080-‐1100
US
gallons.
o Chater
reports
the
fuel
load
at
1100
gallons.
o Collopy
reports
the
fuel
load
at
1100
gallons.
o Swenson
and
Culick
calculate
the
fuel
load
at
1080
gallons.
• Thunderstorms
were
forecast
in
at
least
two
weather
reports
from
Hawaii,
at
250-‐300
miles
east
of
Lae,
and
Amelia
received
one
of
these
reports
before
leaving
Lae.
The
second
report
was
broadcast
from
Lae,
to
AE,
during
the
first
7
hours
of
the
mission.
• The
Electra
departed
Lae
at
0000
GMT.
• Of
thirteen
position
reports
made
by
Amelia
Earhart
from
Lae-‐Howland,
only
two
included
a
latitude
and
longitude
position,
and
one
of
those
is
potentially
in
error
in
time
and/or
location.
o This
is
unusual
given
Fred
Noonan’s
experience
with
making
detailed
position
reports
on
South
Pacific
proving
flights
with
Pan
Am
in
1935.
o Before
joining
the
World
Flight,
Fred
wrote
about
the
importance
of
complete
position
reports,
including
latitude
and
longitude,
air
and
ground
speeds,
wind
direction
and
speed,
and
outside
air
temperature,
in
a
post-‐flight
report
following
one
of
these
trips.
• The
Lae-‐Howland
reporting
history
is
also
unusual
and
unlike
that
accomplished
on
the
Oakland
to
Honolulu,
first
leg
attempt.
o On
this
initial
attempt,
Amelia
made
9
position
reports,
4
with
position
latitude/longitude
data,
and
on
which
Fred’s
log
shows
approximately
35
celestial
and/or
navigation
fix
computations
taken
en
route.
o “…In
all
cases
[Oakland-‐Honolulu
initial
World
Flight
Attempt]
Earhart
provided
dead
reckoning
positions.
Of
the
four
documented
positions,
three
were
provided
with
times,
but
the
wording
provided
by
the
USCG
Hawaiian
Sector
leads
to
some
ambiguity
as
to
when
Earhart
stated
these
positions.
Interestingly,
all
four
messages
indicate
that
the
positions
provided
were
well
prior
to
the
actual
broadcast
times.
[The
aircraft
is
beyond
the
waypoint
reported].
Based
upon
this
analysis,
one
can
easily
speculate
that
Noonan's
method
was
to
project
future
positions
via
dead
reckoning,
and
provide
that
information
to
the
pilot
sometime
prior
to
the
radio
broadcasts.
In
no
instance
does
Earhart
provide
timely
information,
nor
does
she
provide
an
actual
navigational/celestial
fix
and
time
of
the
fix
to
help
constrain
exactly
where
the
plane
was.”1
o “In
summary
[Oakland-‐Honolulu
initial
World
Flight
Attempt]
Noonan
made
use
of
seven
radio
bearings,
14
star/planet
LOPs
(of
which
nine
were
used
for
navigational
fixes),
and
the
plane
made
only
four
course
corrections.
Analysis
of
the
flight
path
versus
weather
maps
produced
after
this
date
show
major
concurrence
with
the
winds
aloft
patterns.
It
is
clear
that
the
navigator’s
major
responsibility
was
to
monitor
the
progress
of
the
flight,
and
to
suggest
course
corrections
only
when
deviations
from
desired
flight
path
became
too
extreme.
Use
of
projected,
future
DR
positions
allowed
Noonan
to
check
his
forecasts
vs.
later
navigational
fixes
to
update
his
speed
and
direction
over
the
ground,
and
to
offer
approximate
positions,
when
necessary.”2
• Fred
Noonan
may
have
used
this
technique,
if
only
partially
reported
by
Amelia
Earhart,
on
the
Lae-‐Howland
segment.
There
is
no
evidence
to
support
that
Fred
functioned
differently
on
this,
his
most
difficult
segment,
than
on
prior
segments.
The
lack
of
reporting
integrity
and
consistency
may
be
understandable
in
that
throughout
the
World
Flight,
position
reporting
was
infrequent,
and
accomplished
mostly
on
the
Lae
to
Howland
segment.
• From
AE’s
aircraft
performance
and
re-‐calculated
time
of
arrival
at
waypoints,
compared
with
the
time
AE
reported
those
waypoints,
there
is
behavioral
consistency
in
the
technique
outlined
above.
o This
helps
to
characterize
the
reasonableness
of
these
comparisons,
understand
the
probability
associated
with
each
path,
and
assess
the
accuracy
of
navigation.
• Of
note
is
that
at
1745
GMT,
AE
reported
“about
200
miles
out.”
This
was
a
position
likely
provided
by
FN
using
celestial
fixes
throughout
the
night
of
good
visibility,
made
from
excellent
celestial
bodies
available,
and
therefore,
an
accurate
position.
1
Randall
S.
Jacobson,
Ph.
D.,
The
World
Flight,
First
Attempt,
Oakland
to
Honolulu
(TIGHAR.ORG,
2006).
2
Ibid.
o The
aircraft’s
distance
from
the
1937
Howland
Island
coordinates
at
the
time
of
this
report
is
204
nautical
miles,
according
to
the
Path
C
re-‐calculations.
o The
report
and
the
position
occur
at
AE’s
typical
reporting
time
of
15
and
45
minutes
past
the
hour.
o This
appears
that
at
1745,
the
Electra
was
on
track
and
on
course
to
Howland,
and
FN
calculated
their
position
with
good
accuracy
for
1937
equipment
and
methods.
This
level
of
accuracy,
while
not
routine
in
that
period,
was
certainly
possible.
o This
creates
the
possibility
that
something
happened
in
the
last
200
nautical
miles
distance
to
Howland
Island.
• After
0718
GMT,
position
reports
were
made
in
the
blind.
o Amelia
had
no
pre-‐arranged
communications
between
Lae
and
Itasca.
o There
were
no
arrangements
for
communicating
with
Ontario.
o There
were
no
arrangements
for
communicating
with
Nauru
Island.
• Aircraft
aerodynamic
performance
was
established
with
a
high
degree
of
confidence
through
data
integration
from
many
sources,
and
with
consideration
for
pilot
behavioral
performance.
• While
radio
strength
is
not
entirely
related
to
distance,
strengths
associated
with
the
final
few
reports
are
the
only
indication
of
possible
relative
terminal
area
position.
Our
research
concludes
for
Path
C,
the
most
likely
path,
an
End-‐of-‐Navigation
point
35-‐28nm
southwest
of
Howland
Island,
bearing
067
degrees
to
the
1937
position
of
Howland
Island.
A
water
entry
area
is
shown
for
three
fuel
exhaustion
scenarios
(Swenson
and
Culick,
Nutter,
and
Kelly
Johnson)
which
plot
theoretical
points
of
fuel
exhaustion
following
AE’s
arrival
at
the
End-‐of-‐Navigation
point,
as
a
function
of
fuel
remaining
at
the
End-‐of-‐Navigation
point.
These
comprise
theoretical
position
boundary
limits,
assuming
AE
conducted
the
search
pattern
depicted,
throughout
terminal
maneuvering
in
search
of
Howland
and
Itasca.
A
high
confidence
water
entry
area
is
shown
for
the
time
2013
GMT
until
2100
GMT,
likely
from
either
fuel
exhaustion,
or
from
controlled
flight
into
terrain,
resulting
from
loss
of
situational
awareness,
fatigue,
or
abnormal
mechanical
circumstances.
The
maximum
fuel
remaining
at
1912
GMT
is
computed
at
123
gallons,
and
with
a
failure
of
the
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer
(discussed
later
in
this
report),
the
fuel
remaining
may
have
been
63
gallons,
enough
for
approximately
90
minutes
flying
time.
Fuel
consumption
is
discussed
extensively
later
in
this
report.
It
is
very
likely
that
fuel
exhaustion
occurred
between
2013
GMT
and
2100
GMT.
Conduct research, audits, and review of other previous work and assessments.
Investigate
the
“accident”
Project,
in
terms
of
standard
accident
investigation
methodologies,
and
conduct
new
research
to
achieve
acceptable
location
assessments,
narrow
the
area
of
interest,
and/or
validate
planned
search
strategies.
Data
Sources
Direct
evidence
consists
of
actual
aircraft
performance,
AE
reports
and
flight
logs,
operating
manual
data,
and
reference
publication
information
such
as
the
Lockheed
Electra
Flight
Operating
Manual,
the
celestial
Almanac
Pub
249
used
for
celestial
navigation,
and
data
from
the
engine’s
manufacturer,
Pratt-‐
Whitney.
All
other
data
is
considered
supplemental,
useful
and
important,
but
subject
to
less
accuracy
than
validated,
direct
evidence.
MSI
is
a
forensic
and
creative
approach
to
a
data
fusion
process,
integrating
information
from
multiple
sources.
MSI
can
sometimes
corroborate
a
finding
as
fact,
refute
assertions
made
as
fact,
and
provide
boundary
limits
on
the
most
likely
conditions
and
conclusions.
Research
Reviews
This
research
methodology
included
an
integrated
study
and
analysis
of
the
following
publications.
Amelia Earhart, The Mystery Solved, Elgen M. and Marie K. Long, Simon and Schuster, 1999
Analysis of Amelia Earhart’s Final Flight July 2, 1937, G. Swenson and F.E.C. Culick, JPL, CIT
Cruise Report 24 July, 1937 CDR Warner Thompson, Commanding Officer, Itasca (Gillespie disk)
Earhart’s
Flight
Into
Yesterday,
Captain
Laurance
Safford
(USN-‐R)
with
Cameron
Warren
and
Robert
Payne,
Paladwr
Press,
2003
Kelley Johnson Telegrams -‐ Electra test flight data and World Flight performance recommendations
Lockheed Report 487 -‐ June 1936 by Clarence L. “Kelly” Johnson and W.C. Nelson
Missing, Believed Killed, Roy Conyers Nesbit, Sutton Publishing LTD (UK), 2002
No Limits, Linda Finch with Donald Smith, World Flight, Inc., 1996
The Cooper Report -‐ Daniel Cooper, Army Corps on Itasca
Weather Reports from accounts by Collopy, Chater, Itasca logs and historical meteorological data
Definitions
AE
–
Amelia
Earhart
FN – Fred Noonan
GS – Ground Speed
Historical
Perspective
The
World
Flight
attempt
commenced
at
1630
on
March
17,
1937
with
a
departure
from
Oakland,
CA
for
Honolulu,
HI.
The
flight
departed
with
947
gallons
of
fuel,
at
a
gross
weight
of
14,000
lbs.
Takeoff
power
was
set
at
1100
Brake
Horsepower
(engines
were
rated
at
600
HP
per
engine
with
takeoff
power
time
limited)
and
shortly
after
becoming
airborne,
AE
reduced
the
power
in
keeping
with
her
characteristic
“kind”
treatment
of
engines.3
It
is
relevant
that
AE
frequently
gave
human
qualities
to
her
machinery,
particularly
to
engines,
and
referred
to
them
in
humanistic
terms.
AE
seemed
to
always
endeavor
to
treat
her
equipment
with
kindness,
not
demand
“too
much”
from
faithful
engines,
or
push
the
airframe
“too
hard”
in
speed,
turbulence
or
during
landings.
She
wrote,
“Once
aloft
[from
Oakland],
I
throttled
down.
Engines
have
human
attributes
–
they
usually
respond
to
kindly
treatment.
With
a
long
grind
before
them
I
wished
to
give
mine
the
least
possible
punishment.”4
This
behavior
is
reflected,
and
to
some
extent,
governs,
AE’s
aircraft
performance
throughout
her
World
Flight
segments,
which
can
be
generally
considered
“consistently
conservative.”
3
Elgen
M.
and
Marie
K.
Long,
Amelia
Earhart
-‐-‐
The
Mystery
Solved
(New
York:
Simon
and
Schuster,
1999)
56.
4
Amelia
Earhart,
Last
Flight
(Rahway,
N.J:
Harcourt,
Brace
and
Company,
1937)
58.
En
route
to
Honolulu,
high
tailwinds
pushed
ground
speed
at
one
point
to
180
mph,
and
AE
slowed
to
120
mph
indicated
airspeed
at
10,000
feet
so
as
not
to
arrive
before
sunrise,
burning
slightly
less
than
20
gallons
per
hour
(GPH).
It
was
not
specified
if
this
was
20
GPH
total,
or
per
engine,
but
it
is
likely
a
per
engine
consumption
rate,
for
40
gallons
per
hour
total.
This
conforms
to
Pratt-‐Whitney
engine
data.
(This
data
point
is
useful
for
consideration
of
maximum
endurance
speed,
and
fuel
consumption
rate,
during
terminal
area
maneuvering
in
the
vicinity
of
Howland
Island.
In
this
environment,
fuel
consumption
rate
for
analysis
was
defined
in
this
research
as
40
GPH
at
120
mph
indicated
airspeed.
Indicated
air
speed
is
roughly
equivalent
to
ground
speed
at
low
altitudes,
and
construction
of
the
search
grid
used
a
120
mph
ground
speed.)
FN
instructed
AE
to
begin
a
descent
at
80
miles
from
Makapu.
This
was
approximately
in
line
with
recommendations
made
by
Lockheed
and
Kelly
Johnson5,
to
commence
descents
at
100-‐150
statute
miles
at
200-‐300
feet
per
minute
descent
rate,
using
slightly
less
than
cruise
power,
and
approximately
maintaining
cruise
speed.6
This
guidance
is
also
consistent
with
the
Electra
Operating
manual
from
an
airline
company,
for
the
Lockheed
10A
Electra
aircraft.
FN
likely
worked
in
nautical
miles,
and
80
nautical
miles
is
92
statute
miles,
within
9%
of
the
recommended
minimum
descent
distance.
The
flight
time
of
15
hours
47
minutes,
over
the
2410
statute
miles,
resulted
in
an
average
ground
speed
of
152.7
mph.
This
was
a
higher
speed
than
normally
flown
for
long
mission
distances,
a
result
of
the
higher-‐than-‐anticipated
tail
wind
conditions.
On
the
subsequent
flight
segment
from
Hawaii,
a
takeoff
mishap
resulted
in
aircraft
damage
requiring
repairs
to
the
Electra,
made
at
Lockheed
in
Burbank,
CA.
The
aircraft
was
shipped
to
Lockheed
via
surface
vessel.
This
accident
resulted
in
canceling
the
first
World
Flight
attempt,
and
delayed
the
second
World
Flight
attempt
while
repairs
were
made
to
AE’s
damaged
aircraft.
During
these
repairs
at
Lockheed,
apparently,
one
of
the
original
two
starboard
side
fuselage
windows
was
replaced
with
aircraft
skin
sheet
metal,
at
approximately
amidships.
Comparative
photographs
reveal
this
alteration,
not
considered
significant
to
either
navigation
or
the
mission.
This
alteration
has
not
been
addressed
in
previous
research.
Three
aft
windows
remained,
two
on
the
left
side
at
the
entrance
door
and
just
forward
of
the
door
at
the
navigator
station,
and
one
on
the
right
side
of
the
fuselage,
for
FN
navigation.
5
Clarence
L.
“Kelly”
Johnson
and
W.C.
Nelson,
Lockheed
Report
487
Range
Study
of
Lockheed
Electra
Bimotor
Airplane
(California,
Lockheed
Aircraft
Company
-‐
June
1936).
6
Kelley
Johnson,
Telegrams
-‐
Electra
flight
test
data
and
World
Flight
performance
recommendations
(Western
Union
11
March
1937).
An
aircraft
and
contents
pre-‐shipping
inventory,
made
by
military
personnel
at
Luke
Field7,
revealed
two
important
items.
One
was
a
collection
of
11
insect
collection
tubes,
also
described
by
AE
as
about
1
meter
in
length
with
the
circumference
of
a
broom
handle.
These
were
used
to
collect
air
samples,
and
specimens,
en
route
at
various
places
around
the
world,
in
conjunction
with
government
and
university
research8.
These
may
be
identifiable
in
a
debris
field.
Second,
the
inclusion
of
6x30
binoculars
was
an
indication
that
binoculars
may
have
been
used
in
the
final
terminal
area
search
for
Howland.
While life vests were noted, a life raft was not noted in this inventory.
Following
repairs
completed
on
May
19,
1937,
NR16020
was
flown
to
Oakland,
CA
on
May
21,
1937,
then
to
Tucson,
AZ;
El
Paso,
TX;
New
Orleans,
LA;
and
to
Miami,
FL,
arriving
the
afternoon
of
May
23,
1937
for
a
week
of
final
World
Flight
preparations.
On
June
1,
1937
at
0556
local
time
(1056
GMT)
in
Miami,
NR16020
departed
for
Oakland,
CA
via
an
eastbound
equatorial
route
around
the
world.
Aboard
were
AE
and
FN.
Their
first
stop
was
San
Juan,
Puerto
Rico.
Amelia
and
Fred’s
plan
called
for
a
flight
time
of
7
hours
40
minutes
on
this
leg.
AE
indicates
they
arrived
at
approximately
1310
local
time,
at
1810
GMT,
with
an
approximate
actual
flight
time
for
1153
statute
miles
of
7
hours
18
minutes,
and
an
average
ground
speed
of
157.9
mph.
References
to
aircraft
and
mission
performance
throughout
the
World
Flight
provide
an
audit
trail
of
characteristic
and
historical
data
concerning
speeds,
engine
power
settings,
fuel
consumption,
flight
behaviors,
human
factors,
fatigue
management,
navigation,
and
progress
toward
achieving
World
Flight
mission
objectives.
This
data
provides
a
statistical
basis
to
compare
with
re-‐calculated
navigation
and
aircraft
performance,
providing
a
quality
assurance
function
that
methodology
is
reasonable,
reliable,
and
affords
improved
accuracy.
Time
Reference
Additional
central
factors
involved
in
this
research
were
Time
and
Radio
Schedules
(transmit
and
receive
plans
among
various
parties).
These
issues
are
well
documented
by
Long,
Safford,
and
Itasca
logs.
These
complexities
are
important
to
establishing
an
accurate
timeline,
which
is
necessary
to
document
the
flight
profile
and
likely
end
point
of
the
mission.
Resolving
all
time
issues
was
critical
to
accurate
re-‐
construction.
7
Ric
Gillespie,
Finding
Amelia:
Luke
Field
Inventory,
CD-‐ROM
(Maryland:
Naval
Institute
Press,
2006).
8
Fred
C.
Meier,
Department
of
Agriculture.
Perhaps
Long
said
it
best9,
“At
that
point,
Howland
Island,
and
the
three
ships
[USS
Ontario,
USS
Swan,
and
Itasca]
were
operating
with
their
individual
clocks
set
in
five
different
time
zones
and
their
calendars
on
two
different
days
and
dates.
Two
were
set
in
zones
where
the
whole
hour
came
at
the
same
time
as
the
Greenwich
whole
hour;
two
had
their
clocks
set
a
half
hour
different
from
Greenwich
time;
the
fifth,
Earhart’s,
was
variable
and
changed
with
her
movements.
With
the
International
Date
Line
in
the
middle
of
the
assembled
ships
and
stations,
the
system
was
all
but
incomprehensible.
Any
requirement
that
an
action
be
timed
to
occur
on
the
hour
as
supposed
to
on
the
half
hour,
at
a
quarter
before
the
hour
as
opposed
to
a
quarter
after
the
hour,
or
at
any
specific
number
of
minutes
before
or
after
the
hour,
was
wide
open
to
misinterpretation….”
Further,
Long
states,
“…Howland
Island
was
using
the
10+30
hour
time
zone
–the
same
as
Hawaii
standard
time
–
while
the
Itasca
was
using
the
11+30
hour
time
zone;
the
two
were
one-‐half
mile
apart,
but
one
hour
different
in
time.
The
research
methodology
for
The
Project
baselined
all
calculations
to
Greenwich
Time,
also
known
as
Greenwich
Mean
Time
(GMT)
or
Universal
Coordinated
Time
(UCT).
9
Elgen
M.
and
Marie
K.
Long,
Amelia
Earhart
-‐-‐
The
Mystery
Solved
(New
York:
Simon
and
Schuster,
1999)
165.
Local / GMT
Report Originator Description
Time
1 July WX 2330 GMT Itasca SFC NE 14 mph. At 9000 feet E-NE 31 mph. LONG p206.
Takeoff Lae 1000 Lae
Lae 1080-1150 gallons aboard.
on 2 July 0000 GMT
CB 300 miles east. Winds E-SE 25 knots (29 mph) to
2 July WX 0000 GMT Fleet Base Pearl Harbor ONTARIO then E-ENE 20 knots (23 mph) to Howland.
CHATER Report – Large Notebook. CHATER p7-8.
Baro 29.89 Temp 83 deg F winds E 3. Cloudy CI CI STR CU
CUMI moving from E. Sea smooth…NARU 8 AM (not clear
local or GMT but assume local taken before takeoff but not
WX 0000 GMT received by AE since it arrived Lae at 1000 local, at takeoff),
Upper Air Observation 2000 feet 90 degrees 14 mph; 4000
feet 90 degrees 12 mph; 7500 feet 90 degrees 24 mph.
CHATER.
1418 Lae Local Height 7000 feet. Speed 140 knots. Everything OK. Received
Position AE
0418 GMT by Lae. CHATER. (Speed not specified as to type).
1519 Lae Local Height10000 feet. Position 150.7 east 7.3 south; cumulous
Position AE
0519 GMT clouds; everything OK. [Problematic report.] CHATER.
CHATER reports this as 4.33 South 159.7 East; Height 8000
feet over cumulous clouds. Wind 23 knots.
SAFFORD reports this as LAT 4 deg 33 min. LONG 159 deg
06 min. SAFFORD (p30) states “on course” at 750-795 miles.
SAFFORD concludes this is at 7 minutes before sunset, 10
miles west of the Nukumanu Islands. If same course and
speed held, ETA Howland should be 2100-2145 GMT.
Unfortunately, SAFFORD reports Itasca did not receive this
1718 Lae Local
Position AE position report until after AE was overdue and missing.
0718 GMT
SAFFORD (p30.)
ComHawSec reports this in post accident summary reports
and message logs to ITASCA that “LAE, NEW GUINEA
REPORTS LAST CONTACT WITH EARHART PLANE BY
LAE RADIO WAS AT 1720 [LAE LOCAL] FRIDAY GAVE
HER POSITION AS 4.33 SOUTH 159.6 EAST WHICH IS
ABOUT 795 MILES DIRECTLY ON HER ROUTE TO
HOWLAND 0030. (Pink tab in large notebook)
Says he plotted this giving him 750 miles and ground speed
103 knots (118 mph). Says Lexington’s plot gave 785 miles
Progress Author Briand
and 111 knots (128 mph). HAWSEC reports 795 miles on
course to Howland. SAFFORD.
MSG from Lae via Naval
2 July Radio Tutuila to Itasca AE left Lae 1000 local due Howland 18 hours. LONG p207.
(Black) received Itasca
Clarence Purdue and Harvard
Flight Plan Lae-Howland 2556 miles 17 hours 1 minute.
Williams Collections
1100-1200 GMT Nauru Island - Mr. Cude, Director of Police
Position 1030 GMT AE reported receiving radio from AE “Ship in Sight..” SAFFORD
p31.
Mid-point plane guard [SAFFORD p 30 states this is at 1030
GMT, but in the ONTARIO LOG, it gives an “8 PM” position. If
Ontario used the same local time as Lae, this equates to
being on station at 10 hours mission elapsed time. If Ontario
1030 GMT used a one-hour time zone change, they’d be on station at 9
Position USS ONTARIO
hours mission elapsed time.
ONTARIO position logged with precision as S 2 deg 59 min
30 sec / E 165 deg 20 min 00 sec.
Included WX. Wind- east 15 knots. Blue sky cumulous
moving from East. Amount 40%. (It was night, so Blue sky
A
fundamental
research
strategy
was
centered
in
an
attempt
to
recreate
the
aerodynamic
and
environmental
aircraft
performance
on
the
final
flight,
from
well-‐established
fact,
well-‐founded
inference,
logical
and
experienced-‐based
assumptions,
and
a
critical
application
of
statistical
analysis
of
historical
flight
parameters,
human
factors
and
behaviors.
An
area
of
inescapable
uncertainty
in
the
true
location
of
this
aircraft
will
always
exist
until
a
discovery
is
made.
This
research
resulted
in
improvements
in
understanding
the
associated
flight
path,
mission
elapsed
and
endurance
times,
fuel
consumption,
and
the
probability
for
artifact
detection.
Methodology
Our
research
methodology
included
a
new
approach
to
the
navigation
of
the
flight
profile.
Previous
works
generally
used
averages
of
total
distance,
divided
by
mission
time,
to
ascertain
location.
This research took a different approach by modeling the Electra with the following references
• Corroborated
Lockheed
10A
operating
data,
with
virtually
the
same
horsepower
per
pound
of
aircraft
weight
as
the
Lockheed
10E,
slightly
less
frontal
area
due
to
smaller
engine
cowlings,
and
a
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer
of
the
type
used
by
AE
• Data
from
AE
Electra
flights
prior
to
the
World
Flight
• Historical
statistical
speed
data
from
AE’s
prior
World
Flight
segments
• Validated
data
from
Long’s
wind
assessments
• Swenson
and
Culick’s
aircraft
drag,
speed
and
fuel
consumption
computational
results
• Aircraft
and
engine
performance
from
operating
manuals
of
aircraft
using
the
same
engine
as
in
AE’s
Electra
(North
American
T-‐6,
for
example)
• Fuel
consumption
analysis
referencing
actual
Pratt-‐Whitney
Specific
Fuel
Consumption
(SFC)
data
for
the
R-‐1340-‐S3H1
engine,
used
by
AE’s
Lockheed
10E.
A
software
model
was
created
in
Jeppesen
FliteStar
flight
planning
software,
and
used
to
construct
flight
plans
from
Lae
to
Howland
via
three
paths.
Takeoff,
climb,
cruise,
and
descent
were
re-‐calculated
by
segments,
with
performance
integrated
manually
from
multiple
sources.
Fuel
consumption
was
examined
by
profile
segments,
summed
across
the
profile,
and
validated
from
multiple
source
data.
A
more
precise,
manual
computational
analysis
of
fuel
consumption
was
made
from
resources,
further
refining
this
important
factor.
While
each
Flight
Path
will
be
examined
in
detail,
in
general,
Flight
Path
A
arrives
almost
everywhere,
too
early,
and
at
1912
GMT
has
actually
over-‐flown
Howland
Island
by
enough
to
possibly
preclude
visual
acquisition
of
the
island,
or
the
Itasca.
Flight
Path
B
passes
through
the
incorrectly
reported
0519
GMT
longitude
position
at
2
hours
18
minutes,
and
is
then
early
at
the
0718
GMT
position
report.
AT
1912
GMT,
this
Path
B
arrives
at
the
1937
position
coordinates
for
Howland
Island.
Path
B
is
also
misaligned
with
navigation
reporting
position
and
time,
and
despite
arriving
at
Howland
Island,
no
person
saw
or
heard
the
Electra.
Path
B
may
have
passed
through
the
0519
GMT
reported
position,
at
an
actual
time
of
0218
GMT,
with
these
times
misreported
by
Chater10
or
Collopy.11
Reduced
mission
headwinds
during
the
last
8
hours
of
the
Lae
to
Howland
segment,
could
result
in
Path
B
beyond
Howland
Island.
A
5-‐10nm
lateral
error
could
result
in
nobody
hearing
or
seeing
the
Electra,
10
Eric
Chater,
Letter
to
friend
Mr.
M.E.
Griffin,
Placer
Management
Limited
(New
Guinea:
/LP
25
July,
1937).
11
J.
A.
Collopy,
Report
to
Civil
Aviation
Board
(Salamaua:
28
August,
1937).
and
the
aircraft
at
a
wind-‐adjusted
Path
B
End-‐of-‐Navigation
point,
20nm
northeast-‐to-‐southeast
of
Howland
Island.
The evidence suggests that the 0519 GMT reported longitude may be incorrect.
Correcting
the
0519
GMT
position
report
in
longitude,
with
the
actual
position
along
the
E
157.0
longitude,
vice
the
E
150.7
longitude
reported
by
Chater12,
creates
Path
C.
This
path
is
reasonably
aligned
with
all
navigation
reporting
positions
and
times
within
5%
of
the
time
the
aircraft
was
at
that
point.
Key
factors
such
as
entering
the
visual
horizon
to
Nauru
Island,
where
AE
reported
seeing
lights
on
the
island,
are
aligned
in
time
and
position.
AE
arrives
slightly
short
of
Howland
Island
due
to
what
is
possibly
a
navigational
error,
or
miscalculation
between
200nm
and
100nm
west
of
Howland
Island,
between
1745
GMT
and
1815
GMT.
One
possible
error
is
a
sunrise
celestial
calculation
of
refraction,
or
dip
angle
computational
error,
of
31-‐70
nm
depending
on
altitude
at
the
time
the
fix
was
taken,
such
that
“If
the
correction
was
not
made,
Noonan
would
have
calculated
that
the
Electra
was
nearer
Howland
Island
than
was
the
case.”13
Other
errors
are
possible,
including
that
FN
made
no
errors
and
AE
decided
to
descend
slightly
early,
perhaps
to
keep
Howland
ahead
of
them
to
facilitate
visual
acquisition.
This
behavior
would
not
be
atypical
for
AE,
as
demonstrated
on
the
Natal-‐Dakar
segment
when
she
turned
opposite
to
FN’s
suggested
direction.
At
the
1,000
feet
altitude
reported
by
AE
approaching
Howland
Island,
AE
is
at
the
edge
of
a
visual
acquisition
range
to
the
island
and
Itasca.
Due
to
the
rising
sun
directly
ahead,
visual
acquisition
would
require
being
much
closer
to
the
Island.
Lateral
track
errors
are
possible,
but
there
is
no
factual
data
upon
which
to
make
assessments
of
lateral
navigation
deviations
from
the
planned
course,
and
no
evidence
of
lateral
track
error.
On
the
contrary,
the
available
data
indicates
AE
adhered
well
to
the
track
from
Lae
to
Howland
Island.
While
all
three
paths
are
possible,
Path
A
may
be
unlikely.
Path
B
is
possible,
in
that
it
deviates
south
of
track
for
weather
avoidance,
and
passes
through
the
point
chronicled
at
0519
GMT,
at
an
actual
time
of
0218
GMT.
The
numerals
“5”
and
“2”
could
have
been
confused.
Path
C
is
likely.
The
evidence
for
en
route
aircraft
performance,
mission
times,
position
reporting,
and
key
milestones,
are
all
well
aligned
with
navigation
Path
C.
Even
with
reduced
second-‐half
mission
winds,
Path
C
concludes
short
of
Howland
Island,
in
the
designed
Primary
Search
Grid.
A
final
AE
radio
report
at
2013
GMT
with
no
further
communication
from
AE,
indicates
a
possible
scenario
in
which
the
Electra
contacted
the
water
during
terminal
area
maneuvering,
perhaps
due
to
pilot
fatigue,
loss
of
situational
awareness,
or
due
to
fuel
exhaustion,
after
2013
GMT.
A
fuel
12
Eric
Chater,
Letter
to
friend
Mr.
M.E.
Griffin,
Placer
Management
Limited
(New
Guinea:
/LP
25
July,
1937).
13
Roy
Nesbit,
Missing
Believed
Killed
(Gloucestershire
U.K:
Sutton
Publishing
Limited,
2002)
26.
consumption
analysis
(updated
from
Appendix
1)
creates
an
endurance
window
until
2100
GMT.
Fuel
exhaustion
between
2013
GMT
and
2100
GMT
is
likely.
Evidence
from
Itasca
weather
reports
for
the
morning
of
July
2,
1937
indicates
light
winds
and
a
calm
surface.
Calm
seas
are
difficult
to
fly
over
at
lower
altitudes
because
the
pilot
can
lose
awareness
of
altitude.
At
sea,
the
horizon
and
sea
surface
can
blend
into
an
uncertain
mirage
without
sufficient
detail
to
visually
maintain
desired
altitude
above
the
smooth
water
surface.
Unintentional
contact
with
the
sea
is
a
constant
hazard
during
low
altitude
maneuvers
over
calm
sea
surfaces.
End-of-Navigation
Point
An
End-‐of-‐Navigation
point
(EON)
was
identified
on
each
path,
at
1912
GMT
when
AE
thought,
and
reported,
she
had
arrived
at
Howland
Island
(1937
coordinates).
The
End-‐of-‐Navigation
point
(EON)
is
determined
by
the
lateral
path,
vertical
profile
dynamics,
and
aircraft
performance.
The
EON
point
is
the
commencement
point
for
terminal
search
maneuvering,
and
construction
of
search
grids.
Wind
effects
and
reasonable
navigation
errors
were
then
considered
with
terminal
maneuvering
to
create
containment
zones
that
comprise
the
Primary
(west)
and
Secondary
(east)
Search
Grid
zones.
On
the
two
most
likely
Paths,
Path
B
and
C,
the
effects
of
modified
winds
from
20
degrees
left
of
the
nose
at
18
knots
(approximately
25%
less
velocity)
were
examined
to
produce
an
error
tolerance
for
the
case
in
which
AE
held
a
magnetic
course
only,
with
no
overnight
wind
correction
applied.
• A
scenario
examined
the
effect
of
a
wind
change
for
the
last
8.5
hours
of
the
mission.
• A
second
scenario
examined
the
effect
of
a
wind
change
for
the
final
2.0
hours.
Reduced
second-‐half
winds
are
supported
by
data
from
weather
forecasts
from
Hawaii,
and
surface
vessel
weather
reports
in
the
area
of
the
flight.
Both
Hawaii
preflight
weather
forecasts
contained
reduced
second-‐half
mission
wind
velocities.
Grid
Search
areas
are
containment
zones
accommodating
these
effects,
which
move
the
End-‐of-‐
Navigation
point
slightly
east,
and
slightly
southeast,
of
the
original
track.
Milestone
waypoints
for
AE
position
reports
were
placed
on
each
path
at
the
GMT
times
that
AE
made
the
report,
to
see
where
on
the
path,
in
time,
these
might
have
occurred.
With
consideration
for
tolerances
in
reporting
behavior,
variance
in
position
reporting,
and
error
in
fixing
positions,
the
aircraft
locations
over
the
earth
at
the
times
of
the
reports,
support
validation
of
the
analysis.
This
helped
provide
context
to
path
construction
and
timing.
EON
Locations
All
three
paths
are
executed
based
on
as
much
factual
data
as
possible,
concluding
in
End-‐of-‐Navigation
points
at
time
1912
GMT.
The
location
of
the
aircraft
on
each
path,
at
this
time,
is
shown
below:
• Path
A
is
the
great
circle
direct
path
from
Lae
to
Howland
Island,
with
an
EON
bearing
from
the
island
066
degrees
magnetic
at
22nm
past
the
1937
Howland
Island
coordinates.
o N 00° 54' 22.2W176° 21' 33.9
• Path
B
passes
through
the
waypoint
reported
by
Chater
at
0519
(a
point
with
discrepancies
in
location
and/or
time),
with
an
EON
at
the
1937
Howland
Island
coordinates.
o N 00° 49' 00.0W176° 43' 00.0
• Path
C
passes
through
a
longitude-‐modified
0519
GMT
waypoint
with
an
EON
bearing
from
the
island
247
degrees
magnetic
at
35nm
short
of
the
1937
Howland
Island
coordinates.
o N 00° 40' 51.7W177° 16' 41.1
Path
Depictions
The
three
paths
are
depicted
below
with
the
time
of
arrival
at
two
important
AE
position
reports.
For
the
0519
GMT
and
0718
GMT
waypoints,
the
aircraft
could
have
arrived
at
the
waypoint
before
the
waypoint
was
reported,
consistent
with
Fred’s
navigation
techniques
demonstrated
on
the
Oakland
to
Honolulu
segment,
and
Amelia’s
reporting
of
Fred’s
waypoints
on
that
flight.
While
the
Oakland-‐Hawaii
segment
revealed
FN
and
AE
waypoint
arrival
and
reporting
techniques,
the
Lae
to
Howland
segment
uniquely
included
passage
over
landmasses,
unlike
the
Oakland-‐Honolulu
and
Natal-‐Dakar
oceanic
crossings.
All
three
paths
contain
over-‐flight
of
good,
visible
island
waypoints,
where
checks
of
position,
time,
and
fuel
consumption
could
have
been
made
with
good
precision.
On
these
unique
segments,
it
is
possible
that
a
position
report
was
issued
shortly
after
establishing
the
aircraft
at
the
waypoint,
approximately
10-‐15
minutes
later,
a
time
that
also
was
very
close
to
AE’s
pre-‐
scheduled
reporting
at
15
and
45
past
the
hour.
Figure
1
-‐
Three
Possible
Paths
and
Initial
Position
Reports.
These
winds
estimates
were
surprisingly
accurate,
corroborated
by
AE’s
0718
GMT
in-‐flight
position
report
that
included
winds,
at
23
knots,
and
from
wind
reports
from
Nauru
Island,
and
surface
vessels.
Second-‐half
mission
winds
were
very
likely
at
reduced
velocity
and
from
slightly
left
of
the
track
from
Lae
to
Howland.
14
ComHawSec
Fleet
Base
Pearl
Harbor
messages,
(Hawaii:
Headquarters,
1-‐2
July,
1937).
15
Chater,
Letter
to
Mr.
M.
E.
Griffin,
6-‐7.
These
wind
profiles
were
modeled
by
out
team
in
the
Jeppesen
FliteStar
software
and
in
sensitivity
analyses
resulting
in
establishing
the
search
grid.
AE
was
well
aware
of
the
existence
of
hazardous
weather,
between
Lae
and
Howland.
In
fact,
weather
forecasts
from
Hawaii
contained
admonition
to
avoid
flying
through
these
dangerous
thunderstorms.
AE
previously
experienced
heavy
weather,
from
Natal
to
Dakar,
and
likely
heeded
Hawaii’s
warnings.
Fred
writes,
in
a
letter
to
his
friend,
movie
actor
Eugene
Pallette,
“…The
flight
from
Natal,
Brazil
to
Africa
produced
the
worst
weather
we
have
experienced
–
heavy
rain
and
dense
cloud
formations
necessitated
flying
blind
for
ten
of
the
thirteen
hours
we
were
in
flight.”16
AE
also
felt
compelled
to
comment
on
the
rain,
“…the
heaviest
rain
I
ever
saw.
The
heavens
fairly
opened.
Tons
of
water
descended,
a
buffeting
weight
bearing
so
heavily
on
the
ship
I
could
almost
feel
it.”17
Midday
cumulous
buildups
over
landmasses,
such
as
the
island
of
New
Britain,
may
have
also
presented
hazardous
weather
on
the
direct
route
to
Howland
Island
that
could
be
avoided
with
a
relatively
minor
deviation
southeast,
across
very
good
landmarks.
From
their
Atlantic
crossing
segment,
Natal
to
Dakar,
AE
and
FN
possibly,
and
intentionally,
planned
a
southerly
deviation
around
New
Guinea
area
weather,
one
with
few
penalties
and
several
advantages.
Path
C
passes
over
Choiseul
Island,
the
first
island
south
of
Bougainville
Island.
Both
Bougainville
and
Choiseul
are
prominent
visual
landmarks.
Bougainville’s
mountains
exceed
8,000
feet
in
the
northern
half
of
the
island,
but
are
easily
avoided.
Choiseul’s
highest
terrain
is
approximately
2,000
feet.
This
deviation
on
Path
C
added
only
42nm
to
the
overall
mission
distance.
The
path
also
facilitated
an
afternoon
setting-‐sun
celestial
fix,
from
the
left
side
of
the
aircraft,
inbound
to
the
0718
GMT
reporting
point
near
Nukumanu
Island.
16
FN
letter
from
Dakar,
Senegal,
French
West
Africa,
June
9,
1937
to
Eugene
Pallette,
Hollywood
Roosevelt
Hotel.
17
Amelia
Earhart,
Last
Flight,
128.
Figure
2
–
Path
depictions
and
supporting
Factors
for
Path
C.
Figure
3
-‐
Pilot-‐eye
view
approaching
the
0718
GMT
position
on
Path
C.
Only
on
Path
C
do
all
initial
position
reports
in
time
coincide
reasonably
and
closely
with
AE
reported
positions
in
space,
and
they
agree
in
time
within
5%.
From
the
Oakland
to
Honolulu
navigation
logs,
position
reports
were
often
made
at
some
time
after
passing
the
reported
position,
and
with
the
aircraft
not
co-‐located
with
the
reported
position.
The
lag
between
position
passage,
and
reporting,
is
understandable
in
that
it
was
AE’s
first
real
navigation
challenge
working
with
Fred
Noonan
and
Paul
Mantz,
and
there
were
no
landmarks
corresponding
to
reported
positions
and
times.
AE
and
FN
may
have
sought
to
be
more
precise
on
the
Lae
to
Howland
segment,
to
more
closely
report
positions
and
times.
The
data
supports
such
an
intention.
A more detailed analysis of Path C is contained in Part IV.
Considering
past
AE
behaviors,
a
lack
of
radio
reports
after
2013
GMT,
and
further
analysis
of
an
important
instrument
in
the
Electra
(the
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer),
there
is
a
high
probability
that
only
approximately
60
gallons
of
fuel
remained
at
1912
GMT
–
enough
for
90
minutes
flight
time.
A fuel exhaustion time from 2013 GMT to 2100 GMT is highly likely.
This
conclusion
is
well
supported
by
the
following
analysis,
completed
after
Appendix
1
was
published,
involving
the
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer.
A
fundamental
question
has
always
plagued
investigators
and
researchers,
regarding
theories
of
excessive
fuel
consumption
on
the
Lae-‐Howland
segment,
arrival
with
far
less
than
planned
fuel
reserves,
and
premature
fuel
exhaustion
prior
to
landing
on
Howland
Island.
AE’s
takeoff
fuel
quantity
at
Lae,
according
to
Lockheed,
Paul
Mantz,
Kelly
Johnson,
Swenson
and
Culick,
and
our
own
independent
analysis,
should
have
enabled
the
Electra
to
fly
further
and
longer
than
it
apparently
flew
–
as
much
as
3
to
4
hours
longer.
If AE was short of fuel, how would it be possible to burn more fuel than planned?
All
prior
researchers
addressing
this
question
concluded
that
excessive
fuel
consumption
was
due
to
one
of
the
following
• Incremental
en
route
navigation
adding
distance
to
the
planned
route.
o This
would
require
adding
hours
of
en
route
time
to
the
original
route
distance.
• Excessively
high
and
inappropriate
operating
altitudes
for
the
gross
weight
of
the
Electra,
especially
early
in
the
mission,
requiring
excessive
engine
power
and
fuel
consumption
o Evidence
from
AE’s
0418
GMT
position
report
at
“height
7,000
feet,”
the
0519
GMT
position
report
at
“height
10,000
feet,”
and
the
0718
GMT
report
at
“height
8,000
feet”
indicates
that
the
aircraft
is
approximately
at
the
optimum
altitude
prescribed
by
Kelly
Johnson,
and
not
high
enough
to
produce
excessive
fuel
consumption.
• Excessive
headwinds,
well
above
forecasts,
caused
higher
than
planned
power
settings
and
resulting
fuel
consumption
o Evidence
exists
to
validate
Long’s
headwind
value,
which
was
initially
more
than
forecast
on
30
June
and
1
July,
but
within
the
range
of
forecasted
winds
on
2
July.
o 2
July
weather
forecasts
included
winds
that
were
expected
to
be
reduced
in
the
second-‐
half
of
the
mission,
during
the
final
8
hours
of
the
flight.
None of these traditional positions explain excessive fuel consumption, are all are considered not valid.
If
AE
arrived
in
the
Howland
area
with
critically
low
fuel
quantity
remaining,
i.e.,
below
planned
reserves,
there
may
be
a
more
scientific,
and
more
likely,
explanation
for
excessive
fuel
consumption.
This
arises
from
understanding
the
importance
of
the
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer
equipment
to
achieving
long
range
flight
in
the
Lockheed
Electra.
The
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer
(CFA),
sometimes
referred
to
as
the
Cambridge
Exhaust
Analyzer,
was
a
very
important
tool
in
the
World
Flight
attempt
plan.
The
CFA
monitors
exhaust
gases,
enabling
the
pilot
to
precisely
and
safely
set
the
optimum
mixture
control
of
the
fuel-‐air
mixture,
to
ratios
that
allow
achieving
optimum
engine
performance,
minimum
fuel
consumption,
and
therefore,
maximum
aircraft
range.
The
CFA
assures
that
minimum
fuel
is
consumed,
with
no
adverse
effect
on
engine
health.
We
showed
in
Appendix
1
that
a
fuel
burn
variance
of
just
1-‐2
GPH
per
engine,
or
2-‐4
GPH
total
additional
fuel
consumption,
could
explain
a
significant
fuel
remaining
variance.
Appendix
1
fuel
remaining
by
our
calculation
was
123
gallons
at
1912
GMT,
enough
fuel
for
3
hours
flight
time.
If
an
inoperative
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer
resulted
in
AE
burning
4
GPH
above
plan
(less
than
10%
variance)
for
15
hours,
the
aircraft
would
arrive
at
1912
GMT
with
fuel
quantity
at
just
63
gallons,
approximately
90
minutes
fuel
remaining.
An
airline’s
Electra
Operating
Manual
states
that
without
the
CFA,
the
fuel-‐air
mixture
must
be
manually
set
to
a
more
rich
mixture,
to
prevent
engine
damage.
The
resulting
higher
fuel
consumption
reduces
aircraft
range.
In
fact,
the
Electra
manual
states
that
maximum
chart
ranges
cannot
be
achieved
without
a
functioning
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer.
The
CFA
was
used
extensively
on
the
Kelly
Johnson
test
flights
of
AE's
aircraft,
to
maximize
engine
efficiency,
and
obtain
the
gallons
per
hour
fuel
consumption
rate
for
different
power
settings.
Every
flight
test
data
point
contained
an
associated
CFA
value.
These
CFA,
manifold
pressure
and
propeller
RPM
settings
were
supplied
to
AE
as
mission
profile
specifications,
including
as
detailed
cruise
specifications
issued
by
Kelly
Johnson
for
the
World
Flight.
• “To
enable
close
control
to
be
maintained
over
the
mixture
strength,
a
Cambridge
gas
analyzer
is
connected
into
the
exhaust
system.”
•
“The
complete
performance
has
been
computed
conservatively
based
on
actual
flight
test
results
on
Model
10E.
Fuel
consumption
data
is
based
on
results
that
have
been
obtained
in
flight
with
careful
mixture
control.
To
get
a
range
of
4500
miles
it
will
be
necessary
to
calibrate
the
Cambridge
Analyzer
so
that
the
fuel
consumption
curve
shown
on
page
13
can
be
obtained.”
• “The
Cambridge
Gas
Analyzers
should
be
carefully
calibrated
in
flight
to
see
if
the
fuel
consumption
data
used
in
this
analysis
can
be
obtained.”
o The
report
L487
was
dated
June
19,
1936,
and
subsequently,
test
flights
were
conducted
by
Kelly
Johnson,
using
the
calibrated
Cambridge
Gas
Analyzer,
to
identify
World
Flight
performance
specifications
for
AE.
o These
recommendations
were
contained
in
three
telegrams
from
Kelly
Johnson
to
AE
dated
11
March
1937.18
Clearly,
the
CFA
was
very
important,
and
AE
adhered
to
these
CFA
settings
very
closely
for
all
flight
profiles.
18
Kelley
Johnson,
Telegrams
for
Electra
flight
test
data
and
World
Flight
performance
recommendations
(Western
Union
11
March
1937).
Figure
4
-‐
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer
Apparently
the
CFA
was
also
somewhat
fragile,
as
it
was
frequently
being
repaired
throughout
the
World
Flight,
at
many
of
AE’s
intermediate
stops
where
maintenance
was
available.
The
leads
to
the
exhaust
stack,
the
analysis
cells,
and
calibration
were
reported
as
problematic.
• The
CFA
failed
en
route
to
Karachi,
and
on
JUN
16,
1937
AE
sent
a
telegram
to
George
Putnam,
“FUEL
ANALYSER
OUT
ASCERTAIN
FROM
CAMBRIDGE
INSTRUMENT
IF
POSSIBLE
GET
REPLACEMENT
OR
IF
ANYONE
AVAILABLE
TO
REPAIR
HESITATE
ATTEMPT
PACIFIC
WITHOUT
[author’s
emphasis]
CABLE
CALCUTTA.”19
o George
Putnam
replied,
“KLM
USES
CAMBRIDGE
CABLING
AMSTERDAM
HEADQUARTERS
TO
ARRANGE
CALCUTTA
SUPPLY
NEW
ANALYSIS
CELL
IF
NECESSARY
WHICH
BELIEVE
FAULTY
STOP….”20
During
3
days
of
maintenance
in
Bandoeng,
JUN
21,
22,
and
23,
the
CFA
was
again,
repaired.
Among
a
long
list
of
maintenance
performed
on
AE’s
Electra,
specifically21
• “Two
broken
leads
in
left
analyzer
cell
of
exhaust
analyzer
repaired.”
• “Switch
on
junction
box
of
exhaust
analyzer
repaired.”
• “Transmitter
on
left
engine
of
Eclipse
flow
meter
repaired
(soldering
between
pivot
and
internal
magneto
loose)
and
transmitter
adjusted.”
• Alternator
of
Eclipse
flow
meter
cleaned.
• Oil
and
fuel
filter
strainers
cleaned.
• Thermocouple
No.
3
lead,
starboard
engine
repaired.
• Thermocouple
No.2
lead,
port
engine,
replaced.
We
know
from
AE's
logs
that
she
then
flew
from
Bandoeng
to
Surabaya,
Indonesia,
and
the
next
day,
flew
back
to
Bandoeng
for
repairs
to
“an
instrument
necessary
for
long
range
flight.”22
In
AE’s
own
words:
“In
the
air,
and
afterward,
we
found
that
our
mechanical
troubles
had
not
been
cured.
Certain
further
adjustments
of
faulty
long-‐distance
flying
instruments
were
necessary,
and
so
I
had
to
do
one
of
the
most
difficult
things
I
had
ever
done
in
aviation.
Instead
of
keeping
on
I
turned
back
the
next
day
to
Bandoeng.
With
good
weather
ahead,
the
Electra
herself
working
perfectly,
and
pilot
and
navigator
eager
to
go,
it
was
especially
hard
to
have
to
be
“sensible.”
However,
lack
of
essential
instruments
in
working
order
would
increase
unduly
the
hazards
ahead.
At
Bandoeng
were
the
admirable
Dutch
technicians
and
equipment,
and
wisdom
directed
we
should
return
for
their
friendly
succor23.”
19
Amelia
Earhart,
Telegram
to
George
Putnam
(Purdue
Collection),
JUN
16,
1937.
20
George
Putnam,
Telegram
to
Amelia
Earhart
(Purdue
Collection),
JUN
16,
1937.
21
T.
D.
Knilm,
Bandoeng
Inspection
Report
Lockheed
Electra
Reg.Markings
NR
16020
(Purdue
Collection),
June
23,
1937.
22
Amelia
Earhart,
Last
Flight,
211.
23
Ibid.
There
is
likely
only
one
"instrument
necessary
for
long
range
flight"
that
AE
would
not
need
on
shorter
range
flights
–
the
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer
–
and
it
may
be
the
subject
instrument
referenced
in
AE’s
single
passage,
and
in
letters
written
by
Fred
Noonan.
The
Electra
also
contained
Eclipse
fuel
flow
meters,
and
while
occasionally
problematic
throughout
the
World
Flight,
the
fuel
flow
meters
were
not
necessary,
and
were
never
more
accurate
than
the
CFA.
This
single
passage
concerning
an
“instrument
necessary
for
long
range
flight”
was
not
further
explained,
or
developed
anywhere
in
the
research,
and
no
researchers
have
addressed
this
aspect
of
the
mission.
Fred
also
commented
on
this
seemingly
important,
instrument.
In
letters
he
wrote
to
Ms.
Helen
Day,
a
friend
in
Miami,
FN
alluded
to
what
was
likely,
the
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer24
• 22
June
1937
–
from
Bandoeng,
Java
–
“We
arrived
here
yesterday
from
Singapore[,]
and
as
some
minor
instrument
adjustments
were
necessary
we
decided
to
remain
here
an
additional
day.”
• 27
June
1937
-‐
FN
writes
again
from
Koepang,
Timor
Island,
Dutch
East
Indies
after
arriving
from
Surabaya,
Java,
in
which
he
references
the
previous
few
days,
“…we
spent
considerably
more
time
in
Java
than
we
expected
to
–
had
some
minor
but
important
instrument
adjustments
to
be
made,
and
as
the
Dutch
Line
is
using
the
new
DC3
Douglas
–
equipped
with
similar
instruments
–
we
decided
to
have
the
work
done
in
their
shops
at
Bandoeng.
We
remained
there
from
last
Sunday
until
yesterday
–
Saturday.
Took
off
once
and
got
as
far
as
Surabaya
–
about
three
hundred
and
fifty
miles
–
only
to
have
the
instruments
fail
again
–
so
returned
to
Bandoeng.
They
are
functioning
perfectly
now,
thank
goodness
for
the
Dutch
mechanics.”
In
a
short
period
of
time,
this
“long
range
instrument,”
which
may
be
the
Electra’s
CFA,
had
recently
failed
inbound
to
Bandoeng.
It
likely
failed
again
after
leaving
Bandoeng.
And
even
following
the
return
to
Bandoeng,
and
repairs,
the
CFA
failed
just
two
flight
segments
later,
from
Darwin
to
Lae.
It
was
serviced
in
Lae
according
to
servicing
records
there,
which
detailed
replacement
of
an
analysis
cell,
which
AE
had
aboard
the
Electra.25
The
Lae
Chief
Engineer’s
Report26contains
entries
for
repairs
to
AE’s
Electra
before
embarking
on
the
Lae
to
Howland
Island
segment.
24
Fred
Noonan,
Letters
to
Helen
Day
(Self
published
June
1937).
25
J.
A.
Collopy,
Report
to
Civil
Aviation
Board
(Salamaua:
28
August,
1937).
26
Ibid.
En
route
to
Howland
Island,
it
is
quite
possible
that
AE
suffered
yet
another
failure
of
the
CFA,
which
would
adversely
affect
fuel
consumption.
Without
the
CFA,
AE
could
not
set
optimum
power,
or
minimum
fuel
consumption
rates,
nor
attain
maximum
aircraft
range
for
the
fuel
load
from
Lae
to
Howland.
At
the
point
of
failure,
AE
may
have
determined
that
returning
to
Lae,
or
perhaps,
Bandoeng,
for
another
repair
of
the
CFA,
was
complicated
by
weather,
and
unnecessary
if
careful
setting
of
the
engine
mixture
was
monitored.
A
return
would
require
an
excessive
amount
of
time,
perhaps
deemed
unacceptable
to
maintaining
the
arrival
schedule
in
Hawaii
of
4
July
1937.
For
whatever
reason,
AE
may
have
elected
to
continue
without
operable
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzers,
perhaps
on
one,
or
both,
engines.
The
result
was
likely
increased
fuel
consumption,
which
resulted
in
arriving
in
the
Howland
area
with
perhaps
half
the
quantity
theoretically
possible.
Throughout
this
research,
attempts
to
acquire
documentary
evidence
of
the
difference
in
fuel
consumption
between
using
and
not
using
the
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer,
were
unsuccessful.
It
is
not
clear
that
such
data
exists
at
all,
or
was
ever
compiled
by
the
Cambridge
Instrument
Company,27
Lockheed,
or
Pratt-‐Whitney.
Of
note
is
that
all
of
Kelly
Johnson’s
performance
recommendations
resulted
from
use
of
the
CFA.
It
may
have
been
so
important
that
AE
actually
backtracked
an
entire
flying
day,
and
invested
another
ground
maintenance
day,
to
have
this
instrument
“necessary
for
long
range
flight,”
repaired.
• “Sperry
Gyro
Horizon
(lateral
and
fore
and
aft
level)
removed,
cleaned,
oiled,
and
replaced,
as
this
reported
showing
machine
in
right
wing
low
position
when
actually
horizontal.”
The
Sperry
autopilot
equipment
was
problematic
in
Miami
before
commencing
the
flight
to
San
Juan,
Puerto
Rico.
Pan
Am
mechanics
identified
the
problem,
which
was
a
faulty
initial
installation
at
Burbank,
CA.
They
corrected
the
problems
and
the
equipment
worked
perfectly
leaving
Miami
for
San
Juan.29
27
Cambridge
Instrument
Company,
LTD,
13
Grosvenor
Place,
London.
28
J.
A.
Collopy,
Report
to
Civil
Aviation
Board
(Salamaua:
28
August,
1937).
But this equipment was never identified as problematic throughout the World Flight.
Separate
redundant
flight
attitude
instruments
of
which
there
were
likely
two,
one
for
the
left
seat
pilot
and
one
for
the
right
seat
pilot,
were
necessary
for
instrument
flight
in
clouds,
and
at
night,
during
any
flight
segment,
not
specifically
for
“long
range
flight,”
since
the
aircraft
could
be
flown
manually.
• One artificial horizon instrument was repaired in Bandoeng30 (bar stuck in case).
It
is
possible
that
had
the
Sperry
Gyro
Horizon
autopilot
failed,
depending
at
what
time
that
occurred,
AE
may
have
been
compelled
to
return
to
Lae,
and
abort
the
long
distance,
night,
overwater
segment
to
Howland.
Since
there
were
redundant
and
backup
artificial
horizon
instruments
to
reference
in
manually
flying
the
aircraft,
it
is
doubtful
a
failure
of
the
autopilot
system
alone
would
cause
a
turn
back
to
Lae.
The
most
compelling
evidence
that
the
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer
was
the
subject
of
the
“instrument
necessary
for
long
range
flight”
was
AE’s
investment
in
having
it
repaired
multiple
times,
and
AE’s
telegram
to
George
Putnam,
from
Karachi,
mentioned
above.
As
AE
stated,
“…HESITATE
ATTEMPT
PACIFIC
WITHOUT
[Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer]…”
and
this
largely
substantiates
that
the
CFA
was
indeed
the
necessary
instrument,
and
that
had
it
failed
from
Lae
to
Howland,
would
certainly
have
resulted
in
increased
fuel
consumption.
29
Elgen
Long,
Amelia
Earhart
The
Mystery
Solved,
130.
30
T.
D.
Knilm,
Bandoeng
Inspection
Report
Lockheed
Electra
Reg.Markings
NR
16020
(Purdue
Collection),
June
23,
1937.
• If
AE
began
with
1080
gallons,
and
flew
this
Kelly
Johnson
profile
(“modified”
for
takeoff,
climb
and
descent)
requiring
920
gallons,
the
total
fuel
remaining
would
have
been
160
gallons
at
1912
GMT,
or
4
hours
endurance.
• Computer
flight
profile
modeling
of
all
available
data,
but
largely
from
Kelley
Johnson
and
L487
data,
also
indicate
the
total
fuel
remaining
would
have
been
160
gallons
at
1912
GMT,
or
4
hours
endurance.
o While
our
Jeppesen
software
model
results,
in
terms
of
fuel
used,
corroborate
the
Kelly
Johnson/L487
Report,
our
further
analysis
offers
increased
accuracy
in
this
area.
• Swenson
and
Culick’s
analysis
concluded
that
AE
had
enough
fuel
for
20
hours
38
minutes
total
mission
time.
Subtracting
the
known
mission
time
of
19
hours
12
minutes,
results
in
approximately
1
hour
26
minutes
remaining
endurance.
o This
represents
57.3
gallons
remaining
at
1912
GMT.
• Our
research,
using
a
specific
flight
profile
segment
analysis
technique,
results
in
a
total
mission
fuel
burn
of
957
gallons.
AE
should
have
arrived
at
time
1912
GMT
with
123
gallons,
enough
for
3
hours
04
minutes
endurance.
A
failure
of
the
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer
would
have
increased
fuel
consumption,
possibly
accounting
for
the
entire
"over
burn"
of
fuel,
from
the
amount
that
should
have
produced
a
sufficiently
comfortable
range
and
endurance
upon
arrival
to
the
Howland
area,
to
a
quantity
that
may
have
precipitated
the
initial
check
in
at
1912
GMT
"we
should
be
on
you,
gas
is
running
low."
In
this
case,
there
would
be
no
gross
navigation
errors,
no
large,
unexpected
headwinds,
no
extraordinary
climbs
to
altitudes
well
in
excess
of
that
specified
by
Kelly
Johnson,
and
no
excessive
cruise
speeds
maintained
that
would
have
irresponsibly
burned
an
excessive
amount
of
fuel.
Such
speeds
would
have
been
statistically
abnormal,
well
outside
prescribed
ranges
and
inconsistent
with
AE’s
past
operating
performance.
Under
a
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer
failure
scenario,
the
aircraft
may
have
experienced
fuel
exhaustion
between
2013
GMT
and
2100
GMT.
Direct
evidence
includes
AE’s
flight
performance
on
earlier
World
Flight
segments,
in
which
weather,
winds
and
navigation
challenges
were
similar
to
the
final
flight
segment.
Terrain
was
a
factor
in
some
mission
segments,
however,
on
the
final
flight
segment,
only
Bougainville
Island
presented
a
terrain
consideration
with
mountains
reaching
approximately
8,000
feet.
Wherever
first-‐hand
factual
evidence
was
available
from
AE’s
flight
logs
and
accounts,
that
data
was
used
to
establish
AE’s
historical
flight
patterns.
Analysis
of
an
audit
of
World
Flight
mission
segments
provides
important
understanding
for
mission
performance.
This
data
is
also
important
when
considering
alternative
flight
profiles
and
mission
outcomes,
offered
by
various
authors.
When
alleged
mission
flight
parameters
fall
outside
an
established
pattern
of
historical
performance,
the
associated
theory
and
conclusions
demand
careful
scrutiny.
The
business
analogy
is
that
if
a
performance
factor
were
well
outside
statistical
Quality
Assurance
ranges,
such
as
Six-‐Sigma,
or
Control
Chart
limits,
it
would
exist
as
an
abnormal
data
point,
one
requiring
additional
validation.
Some
alternative
theories
about
the
World
Flight,
for
example,
require
aircraft
and
mission
performance
that
exceeds
capabilities
or
that
falls
well
outside
historical
patterns.
Winds
There
are
7
weather
reports
relevant
to
this
mission
segment.
Reported
wind
speeds
from
weather
observations
are
in
mph.
Only
AE’s
position
report
of
wind
speed
was
in
knots
at
0718
GMT.
Two
reports
are
from
Hawaii
Headquarters,
one
issued
1
July
and
handed
to
AE,
and
one
issued
2
July
and
broadcast
from
Lae
to
AE.31
Both
ship-‐based
and
shore-‐based
weather
reports
of
upper
winds
are
not
extremely
accurate
in
1937.
A
meteorograph
instrument
was
sent
aloft
under
a
tethered
balloon
or
kite,
where
it
recorded
a
few
parameters
for
examination
following
retrieval.
Upper
winds
may
also
have
been
established
from
an
observation
made
by
a
qualified
weather
person.
31
ComHawSec
Fleet
Base
Pearl
Harbor
messages,
(Hawaii:
Headquarters,
1-‐2
July,
1937).
Two
reports
are
from
Itasca,
both
at
noon
local
time.
One,
on
June
30,
1937
reported
winds
at
5000
feet
from
the
east
(090
deg)
at
22
mph.
The
other,
on
July
1,
1937
reported
winds
at
7000
feet
ENE
(060
deg)
at
30
mph
and
at
9000
feet
ENE
(060
deg)
at
31
mph.32
One
report
is
from
AE
at
0718
GMT
(1718
local
time)
on
July
2,
1937,
as
an
in-‐flight
position
report,
in
which
a
reference
to
“winds
23
knots”
is
made.
No
direction
was
specified.33
One
report
is
from
the
USS
Ontario,
July
2,
1937
bridge
logs,
that
reported
surface
wind
ENE
(060
degrees)
at
force
3-‐4
(up
to
16
knots)
but
it
is
only
a
surface
report
of
sea
state
and
winds.34
One
report
is
from
Nauru
Island,
on
July
2,
1937
at
0800
local
time
GMT,
approximately
3
hours
prior
to
AE’s
departure
from
Lae,
and
nearly
10-‐12
hours
prior
to
AE’s
arrival
in
the
vicinity
of
Nauru
Island,
en
route
to
Howland.
In
this
report,
upper
wind
values
were
reported
at
4000
feet
from
090
deg
at
12
mph
and
at
7500
feet
from
090
deg
at
24
mph.35
This
is
evidence
that
at
the
mid-‐point
of
the
Lae
to
Howland
Island
segment,
upper
winds
were
very
close
to
those
used
by
Long
(26.5
mph)
and
our
own
baseline
analysis.
Long36
assumed
a
constant
headwind
of
26.5
mph
(23
knots)
throughout
his
analysis.
In
arriving
at
this
value,
Long
likely
considered
the
AE
in-‐flight
position
report
at
0718
GMT
reported
wind
value,
and
a
single
Nauru
Island
weather
observation
with
wind
direction
and
values
linearly
extrapolated
to
assess
winds
at
AE
mission
altitudes
of
8,000
and
10,000
feet.
While
wind
profiles
are
often
not
linear,
over
small
altitude
differences,
a
linear
interpolation
is
sufficiently
accurate
for
this
analysis.
Evidence
exists
that
wind
velocity
was
reduced,
and
direction
shifted
slightly,
in
the
second-‐half
of
the
mission.
For
this
research,
the
authors
used
upper
winds
from
070
deg
magnetic
at
23
knots,
or
26.5
mph.
On
course
to
Howland
Island,
this
was
a
headwind
component
of
23
knots,
or
26.5
mph.
Sensitivity
analyses
for
second-‐half
wind
changes
were
completed,
with
resulting
aircraft
positions
contained
in
the
search
grid.
32
Itasca,
Message
logs.
33
Eric
Chater,
Letter
to
Mr.
M.
E.
Griffin,
8.
34
Randall
S.
Jacobson,
Ph.D.,
The
Final
Flight
–
Part
2,
(TIGHAR.org).
35
Laurence
Safford,
Amelia’s
Flight
Into
Yesterday,
195.
36
Elgen
Long,
Amelia
Earhart
–
The
Mystery
Solved,
18.
performance37;
research
by
Long;
and
research
by
Swenson
and
Culick38
with
aerodynamic
and
engine
performance
research.
Definition of speed is important in understanding a Lae-‐Howland specific segment analysis.
Below
is
a
table
compiled
from
two
reference
sources,
Long39
and
Finch.40
The
data
was
crosschecked
with
notes
reported
by
AE41,
providing
a
single
source
for
historic
mission
segment
examination.
The
data
show
that
in
30
World
Flight
legs,
excluding
3
test
flights
of
short
duration
(less
than
2.5
hours)
the
average
ground
speed
is
142.1
mph.
This
is
useful
in
assessing
various
AE
reported
speeds,
that
often
omitted
units
(statute
or
nautical
miles
per
hour),
or
what
type
of
speed
was
being
used
(indicated,
true
or
ground
speed).
AE
frequently
omitted
other
details,
such
as
altitude,
outside
air
temperature,
and
winds,
from
her
in-‐flight
reports.
Statistical
data
combined
with
report
times
and
positions,
helps
to
assess
the
reasonableness
of
aircraft
performance
and
to
corroborate
other
data.
A
report
of
speed
in
knots
likely
resulted
from
FN
calculations,
handed
to
AE
for
reporting,
since
FN
likely
worked
in
nautical
miles
from
navigation
charts,
and
AE’s
airspeed
indicator
was
calibrated
in
statute
miles
per
hour.
AE,
simply
due
to
the
state
of
aviation
in
1937,
most
likely
did
not
possess
the
tools
to
convert
statute
miles
per
hour
to
knots,
or
to
work
between
indicated,
true,
and
ground
speed,
from
the
cockpit
and
without
reference
to
published
tables
or
graphs.
AE’s
Lae
to
Howland
performance
is
defined
from
corroborating
power
settings,
Brake
Horsepower,
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer
indications,
L487
and
Kelly
Johnson
recommendations,
and
statistically
validated
to
calculated
and
historical
values.
These
values
can
be
used
to
determine
flight
path
data,
with
reasonable
assurance
that
a
re-‐calculated
flight
path
represents
an
accurate
calculation.
37
Amelia
Earhart,
Last
Flight.
38
F.
E.
C.
Culick,
Analysis
of
Amelia
Earhart’s
Final
Flight
(Consulting
Report).
39
Elgen
Long,
Amelia
Earhart
–
The
Mystery
Solved,
250.
40
Linda
Finch,
No
Limits,
(San
Antonio:
World
Flight,
Inc.,
1996)
113.
41
Amelia
Earhart,
Last
Flight.
FLIGHT AVG GS
FROM TO DATE TIME DIST NM TIME AVG GS KTS MPH
OAKLAND BURBANK 20-May-37 1550 283 2.25 125.78 144.75
BURBANK TUCSAN 21-May-37 1425 393 3.33 118.02 135.82
TUCSON NEW ORLEANS 22-May-37 730 1070 8.67 123.41 142.02
NEW ORLEANS MIAMI 23-May-37 910 586 5 117.20 134.87
MIAMI SAN JUAN 1-Jun-37 556 908 7.56 120.11 138.22
SAN JUAN CARIPITO 2-Jun-37 650 492 4.53 108.61 124.99
CARIPITO PARAMARIBO 3-Jun-37 848 610 4.83 126.29 145.34
PARAMARIBO FORTALEZA 4-Jun-37 710 1142 9.33 122.40 140.86
FORTALEZA NATAL 6-Jun-37 650 235 2.08 112.98 130.02
NATAL SAINT-LOUIS 7-Jun-37 313 1727 13.37 129.17 148.65
SAINT-LOUIS DAKAR 8-Jun-37 905 100 0.87 114.94 132.28
DAKAR GAO 10-Jun-37 651 1016 7.92 128.28 147.63
GAO FORT LAMY 11-Jun-37 610 910 6.63 137.25 157.95
FORT LAMY EL FASHER 12-Jun-37 1224 610 4.1 148.78 171.22
EL FASHER KHARTOUM 13-Jun-27 610 437 3.25 134.46 154.74
KHARTOUM MASSAWA 13-Jun-27 1050 400 2.83 141.34 162.66
MASSAWA ASSAB 14-Jun-37 730 241 2.43 99.18 114.13
ASSAB KARACHI 15-Jun-37 313 1627 13.37 121.69 140.04
KARACHI CALCUTTA 17-Jun-37 725 1178 8.33 141.42 162.74
CALCUTTA AKYAB 18-Jun-37 705 291 2.45 118.78 136.69
AKYAB RANGOON 19-Jun-37 842 268 2.5 107.20 123.37
RANGOON BANGKOK 20-Jun-37 630 315 2.72 115.81 133.27
BANGKOK SINGAPORE 20-Jun-37 1027 780 6.47 120.56 138.74
SINGAPORE BANDOENG 21-Jun-37 617 541 4.33 124.94 143.78
BANDOENG SURABYA 24-Jun-37 1400 310 2.58 120.16 138.27
SURABAYA BANDOENG 25-Jun-37 600 310 2.5 124.00 142.70
BANDOENG SURABAYA 26-Jun-37 1154 310 2.6 119.23 137.21
SURABAYA KOEPANG 27-Jun-37 630 668 5.5 121.45 139.77
KOEPANG DARWIN 28-Jun-37 630 445 3.43 129.74 149.30
DARWIN LAE 29-Jun-37 649 1012 7.72 131.09 150.86
This
graph
below
of
average
speeds
flown
on
each
World
Flight
mission
segment,
illustrates
two
important
conclusions.
• AE
typically
operated
at
parameters
specified
by
experts,
especially
for
longer
duration
flights.
• AE’s
performance
consistently
adheres
to
a
reasonably
small
range
of
speeds.
The
data
shows
a
larger
variance
in
speed
for
shorter
segment
lengths.
As
the
segment
length
increases,
the
speed
variance
decreases,
approaching
speeds
recommended
by
the
L487
Report42
and
Kelly
Johnson.43
This
process
increases
confidence
in
the
preflight
planning,
flight
parameter
specifications,
and,
for
the
few
longer
segments
flown
by
AE,
a
sense
that
these
values
were
typical.
The
final
mission
segment
is
not
included
in
this
data,
since
a
definite
completion
time
was
not
established.
Figure
5
–
Average
World
Flight
Ground
Speed
42
Clarence
L.
“Kelly”
Johnson
and
W.C.
Nelson,
Lockheed
Report
487
Range
Study
of
Lockheed
Electra
Bimotor
Airplane
(California,
Lockheed
Aircraft
Company
-‐
June
1936).
43
Kelley
Johnson,
Telegrams
-‐
Electra
flight
test
data
and
World
Flight
performance
recommendations
(Western
Union
11
March
1937).
This
graph
below
depicts
flight
segment
times,
providing
an
interesting
perspective
of
some
of
the
human
factors
involved
in
this
flight.
The
30
World
Flight
times
in
the
graph
average
5.1
hours
per
flight
segment.
For
comparison,
the
Lae
to
Howland
segment
was
planned
for
approximately
18
hours,
and
lasted
in
excess
of
20
hours.
• The
maximum
flight
time
prior
to
Lae,
was
13.37
hours,
recorded
for
two
mission
segments.
o No
other
mission
segment
was
more
than
10
hours.
• AE
had
completed
flights
of
durations
approaching
the
length
of
the
Lae-‐Howland
segment.
o On
May
20-‐21,
1932,
AE
completed
a
solo
transatlantic
crossing
in
14
hours
56
minutes.
o On
August
24-‐25,
1932
AE
completed
a
solo
non-‐stop
transcontinental
crossing
in
19
hours
5
minutes.
o On
July
7-‐8,
1933,
AE
completed
a
transcontinental
crossing
in
17
hours
7
min.
o On
January
11,
1935
AE
completed
a
solo
flight
from
Honolulu
to
Oakland
in
18
hours.
o On
May
8,
1935,
AE
completed
a
Mexico
City
to
Newark
flight
in
14
hours
19
minutes.
AE
was
no
stranger
to
long
flights,
yet
all
were
completed
2-‐5
years
earlier,
none
were
to
islands,
and
none
required
a
need
for
maximum
range
performance
and
fuel
management
to
the
level
required
from
Lae
to
Howland
Island.
This
data
provides
insight
into
not
only
the
challenge
undertaken
by
AE
and
FN,
but
the
complexity
of
this
operation
relative
to
their
previous
experience.
Figure
6
–
Average
Segment
Length
From
AE’s
0718
GMT
in-‐flight
position
report,
to
Howland
Island,
the
re-‐calculated
true
airspeed
was
determined
by
setting
power
in
accordance
with
L48744
and
Kelly
Johnson
recommendations,45
with
reference
to
direct
evidence
from
previous
flight
profiles,
statistical
reference,
and
behavior
where
AE
included
specifics
about
power
setting
and
speed,
in
flight
notes.
Lockheed
and
Pratt-‐Whitney
data
were
also
considered.
This technique produced en route speeds after 0718 GMT, of 138 knots true air speed, or 158.8 mph.
44
Clarence
L.
“Kelly”
Johnson
and
W.C.
Nelson,
Lockheed
Report
487
Range
Study
of
Lockheed
Electra.
45
Kelley
Johnson,
Telegrams
-‐
Electra
flight
test
data
and
World
Flight
performance
recommendations.
Applying
the
23
knots,
or
26.5
mph,
headwind
component,
produced
116
knots
ground
speed,
or
132.3
mph
ground
speed,
after
the
0718
GMT
position,
which
was
held
until
the
perceived
descent
point
to
Howland
Island
at
approximately
80
statute
miles
per
Kelly
Johnson,
Paul
Mantz
(OAK-‐HNL)
and
Fred
Noonan
recommendations.
Our
result
of
132.3
mph
ground
speed,
from
the
0718
GMT
position
to
Howland
Island,
is
only
1.7
mph
(1.2%)
less
than
Long’s
overall
mission
average
ground
speed.
Our
result
of
158.8
mph
true
air
speed
is
also
1.7
mph
(1.1%)
less
than
Long’s
overall
average
true
air
speed.
These
are
considered
valid
performance
numbers,
and
when
combined
in
a
discrete
and
stepwise
analysis,
the
modeling
technique
provides
a
more
accurate
profile.
• Despite
flying
a
Lockheed
Model
10A
aircraft
with
smaller
engines,
less
weight
and
likely
a
lower
drag
profile,
Pellegreno46
routinely
observed
ground
speeds
of
133-‐135
mph
during
a
Commemoration
Flight,
indicating
that
computed
speeds
are
in
the
range
of
reasonable
performance.
• Pellegreno’s
aircraft
has
effectively
the
same
horsepower-‐to-‐weight
ratio
as
AE’s
Electra
10E.
• Long
assumed
a
constant
overall
true
air
speed
of
160.547mph,
in
the
presence
of
a
constant
headwind
component
of
26.5
mph,
producing
an
overall
mission
average
ground
speed
of
134
mph.
• Long’s
approach
of
averaging
distance
and
time
was
updated
in
our
research
using
a
discrete
approach,
a
stepwise
analysis
at
each
waypoint,
facilitated
by
software.
Using
flight
planning
and
analysis
software
to
model
the
climb,
cruise,
descent
performance
and
wind
effects,
can
produce
a
more
accurate
overall
mission
analysis.
The
software
enabled
modeling
three
flight
paths,
sensitivity
analyses
from
headwind
speed
and
direction
modifications,
and
examination
of
route
timing
and
the
terminal
EON
position.
Further
corroboration
of
these
results
is
found
in
L48748
that
recommended
flying
at
155
mph
indicated
air
speed
at
2,000
feet,
145
mph
indicated
air
speed
at
4,000
feet,
and
135
mph
indicated
air
speed
at
8,000
feet.
This
profile
was
apparently
not
flown,
as
it
was
pre-‐empted
by
later
Kelly
Johnson
profile
recommendations,
which
appear
to
have
been
executed
and
adhered
to
on
many
World
Flight
segments,
including
the
Lae
to
Howland
Island
segment.
The
8,000
feet
speed
specification
is
very
near
what
AE
likely
flew.
The
later
Kelly
Johnson
recommendations
specified
flying
at
8,000
feet,
and
under
conditions
that
likely
existed
during
AE’s
flight,
are
equivalent
to
155.4
mph
true
air
speed.
Kelly
Johnson
Telegrams49
46
Ann
Pellegreno,
World
Flight
–
The
Earhart
Trail
(Ames,
Iowa:
Iowa
State
University
Press,
1971)
60,
177.
47
Elgen
Long,
Amelia
Earhart
–
The
Mystery
Solved,
194.
48
Ibid.
7
49
Kelley
Johnson,
Telegrams
-‐
Electra
flight
test
data
and
World
Flight
performance
recommendations.
indicated
power
settings
and
speeds,
showing
that
after
0718
GMT,
a
target
speed
would
be
133-‐158
mph
true
air
speed.
• This
data
and
resultant
recommendations
were
based
on
analytic
aerodynamic
calculations
including
wind
tunnel
testing,
and
actual
flight
test
data
from
AE’s
aircraft.
L48750
provided
values
for
flight
at
sea
level,
with
no
altitude
adjustments,
and
recommended
flying
150
mph
true
air
speed
in
still
air,
and
with
a
20
mph
headwind,
flying
154
mph
true
air
speed.
Table
2,
from
0718
GMT
to
approximately
1830
GMT,
compares
cruise
performance
in
statute
miles
per
hour
(MPH),
for
this
specific
cruise
segment.
AE adhered remarkably close to these recommendations. These speeds are highly corroborated.
The
MSI
and
modeling
process
forms
a
corroborating
body
of
evidence
of
the
likely
mission
flight
performance
actually
achieved
on
the
Lae
to
Howland
Island
mission
segment,
in
terms
of
speed,
fuel
consumption,
position
and
time.
MSI
incorporated
a
broader
range
of
corroborated
data
sources:
50
Clarence
L.
“Kelly”
Johnson
and
W.C.
Nelson,
Lockheed
Report
487
Range
Study
of
Lockheed
Electra.
8
51
Long
used
overall
averages
for
analysis.
Using
this
MSI
blending
process
we
calculate
performance
used
in
our
aircraft
modeling
and
flight
planning
process,
as
follows:
• Indicated
Air
Speed
within
2.3%
of
L487
and
0.8%
of
Long
• True
Air
Speed
within
2.2%
of
L487
and
1.1%
of
Long
• Ground
Speed
within
1.2%
of
L487
and
1.3%
of
Long
This
methodology
directly
affects
speed,
time,
fuel
consumption,
and
most
important,
final
position.
Except
for
lateral
navigation
track
errors
or
deviations
from
a
planned
path,
speed
and
fuel
consumption
are
the
most
fundamental
parameters
in
locating
the
Electra,
and
worthy
of
close
scrutiny.
Improved
Accuracy
Modern
methods
yielding
2%
improvements
in
a
solution
represent
approximately
50nm
in
a
final
EON
point
on
a
Lae
to
Howland
Island
segment.
Lockheed
Report
487
54
contains
extensive
aerodynamic
and
performance
analyses
of
the
Lockheed
Electra
Model
10E.
Completed
13
months
in
advance
of
the
actual
World
Flight
attempt,
this
report
detailed
a
recommended
flight
profile,
flight
parameter
recommendations,
and
supporting
aerodynamic
data.
Among
these,
are
useful
information
on
engine
power
settings
for
Brake
Horsepower
(BHP),
Manifold
Pressure
(MP),
propeller
RPM
(RPM),
fuel
flow
in
gallons
per
hour
(GPH),
flight
speed,
range,
fuel
consumption,
and
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer
settings.
These
conversions
are
important.
Charts,
tables,
AE
in-‐flight
position
reports
of
speed
and
distance,
Fred
Noonan’s
notes
to
AE
and
radio
logs
of
communications,
contain
either
no
definitions
for
the
metrics
being
reported,
or
when
a
unit
of
measure
is
defined,
it
sometimes
conflicts
with
other
reports,
historical
accounts,
or
engineering
data.
Within
L487,56
and
in
most
every
resource,
flight
speed
is
frequently
not
defined
in
terms
of
the
units,
nautical
miles
per
hour
(knots)
or
statute
miles
per
hour
(MPH).
In
some
cases
in
the
same
report,
speed
units
are
mixed
in
different
charts
or
tabular
data,
and
flight
speed
is
sometimes
defined
in
one
graph,
and
not
defined
in
other
graphs
or
tables.
In every case, these precise units of measure require definition to enable meaningful analysis.
Flight
speed
is
an
important
metric.
There
are
three
flight
speed
measures
of
interest,
and
in
this
research
the
authors
have
been
required
to
calculate,
and
identify
the
measure
being
used
in
a
majority
of
historical
references.
• AE’s
airspeed
indicator
was
calibrated
in
statute
miles
per
hour,
or
MPH.
AE
flew
her
airplane
with
reference
to
MPH.
This
is
Indicated
Air
Speed
(IAS)
in
MPH.
• When
Indicated
Air
Speed
in
MPH
is
corrected
for
altitude
(pressure
and
temperature)
the
result
is
an
associated
True
Air
Speed
(TAS)
in
MPH.
This
is
“over
the
earth”
speed
in
a
no
wind
condition.
• When
TAS
in
MPH
is
corrected
for
headwinds
and
tailwinds,
the
result
is
Ground
Speed.
This
is
the
aircraft’s
actual
speed
over
the
ground,
in
the
air
mass
existing
at
the
time
of
flight.
• For
distances
measured
in
nautical
miles,
the
associated
speeds
are
defined
as
knots,
or
nautical
miles
per
hour.
While
AE’s
IAS
registered
in
MPH,
many
charts
such
as
aeronautical
and
marine
charts
are
presented
in
nautical
miles.
Fred
Noonan’s
chart
navigation
was
likely
in
nautical
miles,
requiring
a
conversion
from
nautical
miles
(or
NM
per
hour
which
is
defined
as
Knots)
to
statute
miles
(or
statute
MPH).
56
Clarence
L.
“Kelly”
Johnson
and
W.C.
Nelson,
Lockheed
Report
487
Range
Study
of
Lockheed
Electra.
57
Eric
Chater,
Letter
to
Mr.
M.
E.
Griffin
58
J.
A.
Collopy,
Report
to
Civil
Aviation
Board
(Salamaua:
28
August,
1937).
The
type
of
speed
is
not
specified.
It
could
be
140
knots
True
Airspeed,
Indicated
Airspeed,
or
Ground
Speed.
The
implications
of
each
are
very
important.
Referring
to
L487,59
for
ambient
meteorological
conditions
likely
at
0418,
area
weather
reports
indicate
outside
air
temperature
at
sea
level
of
approximately
83
degrees
F.
Using
the
standard
adiabatic
temperature
lapse
rate
of
-‐3.5
degrees
F
per
1000
fee
to
find
the
ambient
temperature
at
AE’s
cruise
altitude,
we
find
that
if
“140
knots”
were
an
indicated
air
speed,
it
would
imply
the
aircraft
was
flying
at
a
true
air
speed
beyond
the
Electra’s
performance
capability
at
its
gross
weight
at
0418
GMT.
Similarly,
if
“140
knots”
were
a
ground
speed,
with
an
assumed
23-‐knot
headwind
component
(26.5
mph
headwind
defined
by
Long),
the
true
airspeed
required
is
again,
beyond
the
Electra’s
performance
capability
at
its
gross
weight
at
0418
GMT.
If
“140
knots”
were
a
true
air
speed
(equivalent
to
161.1
mph
true
air
speed),
it
would
place
AE’s
indicated
airspeed
in
miles
per
hour
(143
mph
IAS),
in
the
range
of
historical
performance
and
Electra
capabilities,
and
near
the
speeds
prescribed
in
L487
and
Kelly
Johnson,60
and
Paul
Mantz
recommendations.
If
the
reported
speed
was
150
knots,
and
a
true
air
speed,
this
would
be
uncharacteristically
high
for
the
Electra’s
gross
weight
and
mission
time,
atypical
of
AE’s
performance,
and
beyond
statistical
norms.
At
140
knot,
and
161.1
mph
true
air
speed
with
the
assumed
26.5
mph
headwind
(Long),
AE’s
ground
speed
would
have
been
134.6
mph,
which
is
within
7
mph
(5.6%)
of
AE’s
statistical
range
of
historical
World
Flight
performance,
within
the
Electra’s
capabilities
at
that
gross
weight,
closely
aligned
with
flight
recommendations,
and
typical
for
the
mission
time
en
route.
The
conclusion
is
that
AE’s
report
of
“140
knots”
is
a
true
air
speed.
Fred
Noonan
likely
handed
AE
the
data
to
make
this
report
(in
knots),
and
AE
was
flying
very
close
to
recommended
or
prescribed
parameters.
This
precise
and
consistent
performance
is
typical
for
AE
throughout
the
World
Flight,
and
vitally
important
to
understanding
the
Lae
to
Howland
Island
mission
segment.
Further, Chater’s report61 is considered more accurate regarding this reference to speed.
Fred
likely
worked
in
knots
and
nautical
miles,
making
conversions
from
AE’s
indicated
airspeed
and
meteorological
data
such
as
outside
air
temperature.
There
would
be
no
instrument
indication
presenting
“knots”
to
AE
in
the
cockpit,
and
AE
would
likely
not
have
made
conversions
from
mph
to
knots
with
Fred
aboard,
and
possibly,
not
at
all.
The
charts
and
process
for
these
calculations
were
largely
unavailable
for
most
flying
in
1937.
The
conversions
were
not
easily
performed,
and
no
handy
calculators
existed
to
make
the
job
easier
or
more
reliable.
59
Clarence
L.
“Kelly”
Johnson
and
W.C.
Nelson,
Lockheed
Report
487
Range
Study
of
Lockheed
Electra.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
In 1937 aviation, flying was referenced to “miles per hour,” which is statute miles per hour.
The
ubiquitous
handheld
calculator,
the
E-‐6B
flight
computer,
made
it
possible
for
pilots
to
easily
and
rapidly
compute
speeds,
winds,
conversions,
and
other
flight
performance
data.
Unfortunately,
it
was
effectively
not
yet
invented
in
July
1937,
and
did
not
gain
widespread
use
until
mid-‐WWII.
62
Amelia
Earhart,
Last
Flight.
63
ibid.
131.
At
“9:41”
Natal
time,
on
June
7,
1937,
the
sun
azimuth
from
true
north
was
050.35
degrees,
and
its
elevation
above
the
horizon
was
+40.81
degrees.
AE
writes
that
“…they
can
hardly
believe
the
sun
is
north
of
them.…”
Their
true
course
to
Dakar
was
approximately
038
degrees.
The
sun
would
have
been
slightly
to
the
right
of
their
heading,
south
of
their
course,
if
they
were
on
course.
If
they
were
heading
in
a
more
easterly
direction,
the
sun
would
indeed
appear
north
of
them.
From
AE’s
logs
we
know
that
AE
was
north
of
course
at
some
point
in
the
crossing.
It
is
possible
that
these
observations
of
the
“…sun…north
of
them…”
were
made
after
a
heading
correction
to
rejoin
their
original
track
to
Dakar.
This
heading
correction
would
place
the
sun
to
their
left,
possibly
appearing
as
if
it
was
“north”
of
them.
These
observations
are
tremendous
insights
into
flight
parameters,
mission
timing,
how
AE
recorded
information,
and
the
accuracy
of
their
navigation.
The
importance
of
this
entry
is
significant
for
the
Lae-‐Howland
segment.
The
insight
here
is
that
with
a
high
overcast,
Fred
could
not
take
a
sight,
unless
the
“overcast”
was
actually
an
“undercast.”
Even
today,
pilots
observing
a
cloud
deck
below
them
in
cruise
flight
sometimes
refer
to
the
condition
as
an
overcast
sky.
The
term
“undercast”
is
not
widely
used,
or
common
in
the
“pilot-‐vernacular”
of
aviation
today,
and
in
1937
aviation,
it
likely
wasn’t
yet
conceived.
In several AE Lae to Howland in-‐flight position reports, references to “overcast” conditions are made.
Traditionally,
researchers
have
concluded,
in
reference
to
these
reports,
that
the
sky
above
AE
was
indeed
as
reported,
“overcast.”
However,
it
is
possible
that
we
have
misinterpreted
flight
conditions,
from
semantic
or
contextual
differences
between
today,
and
1937.
If
AE
was
in
fact
reporting
an
“undercast,”
which
we
believe
is
likely,
it
means
that
FN
had
good
celestial
navigation
targets
(as
AE
stated),
could
take
good
position
fixes,
and
assure
that
they
were
on
their
planned
track
from
Lae
to
Howland.
64
Amelia
Earhart,
Last
Flight.
This
conclusion
has
a
significant
effect
on
the
end-‐of-‐navigation
position.
It
essentially
allows
that
AE
had
a
good
opportunity
to
be
on
course
to
the
end-‐of-‐navigation
fix.
It
could
further
allow
that
AE
descended
at
the
perceived
descent
point,
slightly
early,
and
while
on
track.
The
Lae
to
Howland
implications
from
studying
these
World
Flight
segments
preclude
wildly
off-‐track
navigation
positions,
gross
timing
and
navigation
errors,
poor
en
route
weather
conditions,
or
excessive
fuel
use
due
to
large
un-‐forecast
headwinds,
or
in
greatly
varying
distances
flown
on
various
profiles
proposed
in
some
previous
works.
This understanding increases confidence in the end-‐of-‐navigation and fuel consumption calculations.
She
had
a
backup
plan,
as
she
frequently
detailed
throughout
her
flying
experiences,
which
called
for
delaying
that
takeoff
until
more
suitable
conditions
existed.
Her
backup
plans
for
fuel
generally
included
a
safety
margin.
AE
and
FN
examined
that
grass
runway
by
walking
its
length
with
flashlights,
and
ultimately
departed
as
planned,
“…we
got
into
the
air
easily.”
This
is
the
1937
equivalent
of
today’s
safety
risk
management
process.
In
Natal,
the
Electra
was
likely
refueled
to
approximately
80%
of
the
fuel
loaded
at
Lae.
The
Natal-‐Dakar
segment
of
approximately
1900
statute
miles
was
656
statute
miles
less
than
the
planned
distance
from
Lae-‐Howland,
or
approximately
74%
of
the
Lae-‐Howland
distance
At
AE’s
baseline
150
mph
still-‐air
ground
speed,
the
4.4
hour
difference
in
mission
time,
at
nominally
50
gallons
per
hour,
would
mean
218
less
gallons
of
fuel
were
required
at
Natal,
and
a
takeoff
fuel
load
from
Natal
was
approximately
862
gallons.
This
provided
more
than
4
hours
endurance
at
destination.
AE
stated
on
the
OAK-‐HNL
flight
segment
that
she
considered
4
hours
reserve
fuel
an
adequate
safety
margin,
“Incidentally,
we
arrived
at
Hawaii
with
more
than
four
hours’[sic]
supply
of
gasoline
remaining,
which
would
have
given
us
over
600
miles
of
additional
flying,
a
satisfactory
safety
margin.”65
It
is
important
to
note
in
that
passage,
that
AE’s
baseline
speed
is
150
mph
ground
speed
as
recommended,
and
apparently
50
GPH
as
a
general
fuel
consumption
rate.
Here, Natal to Dakar, we have the second incidence of knowing that AE planned for a 4-‐hour fuel reserve.
65
Amelia
Earhart,
Last
Flight,
63.
This
has
implications
for
the
Lae
to
Howland
segment,
in
terms
of
how
much
fuel
AE
planned
upon
arrival
at
Howland
Island.
While
perhaps
not
4
hours,
AE
may
have
planned
at
least
3
hours
fuel
remaining
at
Howland
Island,
120-‐150
gallons
of
fuel,
again
providing
us
with
a
valuable
insight
to
what
went
wrong
on
the
Lae
to
Howland
segment.
AE’s
details
of
the
Natal
to
Dakar
flight
parameters
after
6
hours
50
minutes
can
be
compared
with
her
in-‐flight
position
reports
from
Lae,
made
at
0718
GMT,
as
a
quality
assurance
process.
• Indicated
Air
Speed
140
(likely
in
mph
since
her
airspeed
indicator
was
calibrated
in
mph)
• Altitude
5,780
feet
• Manifold
pressure
26.5
inches
• RPM
1700
• Outside
Air
Temperature
60
(likely
indicated
air
temperature
in
degrees
Fahrenheit)
These
conditions
equate
to
approximately
a
power
setting
of
250
Brake
Horsepower
(BHP),
burning
approximately
46-‐49
gallons
per
hour
in
cruise
flight.
Accounting
for
an
estimated
70
gallons
for
climb
in
the
first
hour,
25
gallons
for
a
30-‐minute
descent,
and
a
cruise
portion
of
11.8
hours
at
an
average
47.5
gallons
per
hour,
the
Natal-‐St.
Louis
segment
should
have
consumed
655
gallons.
From
an
initial
fuel
load
of
862
gallons,
at
least
4
hours
fuel
remained
at
arrival
in
Dakar
(St.
Louis).
AE likely adhered as much as possible to these parameters during the Lae-‐Howland segment.
Our
Lae
to
Howland
specific
fuel
consumption
analysis
resulted
in
a
segment
fuel
consumption
of
957
gallons,
leaving
123
gallons
of
fuel
remaining
at
Howland.
We
have
two
different
mission
segments,
two
very
different
computational
methods
and
processes,
one
generalized
and
one
very
specific,
and
two
conclusions
for
segment
fuel
consumption,
that
differ
by
just
2.2%.
The
confidence
in
these
solutions,
the
Lae
to
Howland
analysis,
the
End-‐of-‐Navigation
point,
and
the
possible
location
of
the
Electra,
increases
with
each
MSI
corroboration.
Reproducing
Table
1
and
including
data
from
AE’s
Natal-‐St.
Louis
flight
segment
provides
analytical
corroboration,
and
again
reflects
AE’s
consistent,
disciplined
adherence
to
specified
flight
parameters.
Table 3 – Table 1 with added detail for Natal to Dakar mission segment.
Our
navigation
analyses
used
the
charted
coordinates
for
Howland
Island
in
1937,
from
Clarence
Williams,
on
AE’s
flight
planning
paperwork.
Elgen Long used [N 0 deg 49 min / W 176 deg 38 min].
Author
Captain
Riley,
in
a
piece
discussing
the
varying
coordinates
for
Howland
Island,
reported
the
1937
position
as
[N
0
deg
53
min
/
W
176
deg
35
min]
and
the
more
current
position
at
the
time
of
his
writing
as
[N
0
deg
48
min
/
W
176
deg
38
min].
Commanding
Officers
of
USS
Colorado,
USS
Lexington,
and
1st
LT
Daniel
Cooper
of
the
Army
Air
Corps
aboard
Itasca,
all
included
positions
for
Howland
Island
in
their
final
reports
for
this
accident.
Only
1st
LT
Cooper
used
the
same
coordinates
as
Clarence
Williams,
and
likely
AE
as
well.
Each
of
the
two
Navy
ships
used
different
coordinates
for
Howland
Island,
and
neither
matched
Williams’
and
Cooper’s
coordinates.
The U.S. Naval Observatory cites Howland Island coordinates as [N 0 deg 54 min / W 176 deg 36 min].
Google
Earth
shows
the
Howland
Island
coordinates
as
[N
0
deg
48
min
28
sec
/
W
176
deg
37
min].
These
are
based
on
the
WGS84
geodetic
datum.
A plot of Howland Island from Chart 617 4617 shows [N 0 deg 49 min / W 176 deg 40 min].
The
entries
here
are
for
completeness
–
all
of
the
variances
in
island
position
are
within
a
small
range.
The
most
important
factor
is
that
AE’s
position
for
Howland
Island
was
approximately
6nm
west
of
the
actual
island.
66
AE
estimated
20
mph
headwind
for
the
first
half
of
this
Natal-‐St.
Louis
flight
segment.
For
an
arrival
short
of
Howland,
this
only
adds
to
the
challenge
of
visual
acquisition.
Geodetic
Datums
This
area
was
examined
for
its
impact
on
the
mission.
While
many
geodetic
datums
are
presently
used
around
the
world,
the
differences
among
them
are
not
large
in
most
cases,
in
terms
of
locating
object
coordinates
within
a
few
hundred
feet
of
actual
locations.
Other
charting
and
location
differences
can
produce
more
significant
variance,
such
as
occurred
at
Howland
Island.
The
difference
between
the
1937
Howland
Island
position,
and
today’s
WGS84
coordinates
for
Howland
Island,
is
5.92
nautical
miles,
6.82
statute
miles,
on
a
bearing
from
the
1937
position
of
095.17
degrees
true.
The
actual
location
of
Howland
Island,
east
of
its
charted
position
in
1937,
was
not
a
trivial
threat
to
success.
Had
the
flight
from
Lae
to
Howland
been
executed
perfectly
in
all
respects,
AE
would
have
been
nearly
7
statute
miles
and,
at
maximum
endurance
speed,
approximately
3.5
minutes
flying
time,
west
of
the
actual
land
mass
of
Howland
Island.
Visual
acquisition
of
Howland
Island
from
10
miles
is
known
to
be
difficult
–
the
island
could
be
missed.
This was a significant handicap, given the difficulty of visually locating the very small island.
With
these
important
mission
flight
parameters
accurately
specified,
and
using
reasonable
assumptions
for
the
value
of
winds
aloft,
we
have
a
good
assessment
of
along-‐track
navigation.
Flight
Path
A
is
a
great
circle
direct
routing
from
Lae
to
Howland
Island.
As
mentioned
earlier,
this
is
not
a
likely
path
as
it
penetrates
forecast
areas
of
dangerous
convective
weather,
and
passes
over
large
land
masses
where
convective
weather
is
most
likely
to
exist.
Flight
Path
B
is
modified
from
Path
A
to
pass
through
the
incorrectly
reported,
or
stated,
0519
GMT
position,
known
to
be
incorrect
in
terms
of
longitude,
or
time.
Path
B
must
be
considered
for
two
reasons
instead
of
0218
GMT.
The
numeral
“5”
could
have
actually
been
reported
by
AE
as
a
“2,”
and
transcribed
in
error.
Flight
Path
C
is
an
alternative
flight
path
with
consideration
that
the
0519
GMT
report
of
longitude
was
either
incorrectly
reported
by
AE,
or
incorrectly
stated
by
Chater.67
Path
C
is
created
with
consideration
that
the
recounted
longitude
value
of
W
150.7
may
actually
have
been
W
157.0.
Using
this
new
position,
several
results
emerge,
notably
that
flight
path
modeling
in
speed
and
time
results
in
all
reported
positions
in
agreement
within
approximately
5%
of
the
in-‐flight
position
report
times.
This
is
more
precise
than
the
reporting
exhibited
on
the
first
Oakland
to
Honolulu
segment,
but,
as
the
most
critical
segment
of
the
flight,
AE
and
FN
may
have
worked
hard
to
be
more
precise
on
the
Lae
to
Howland
segment.
While
perfectly
understandable,
and
logical,
to
CDR
Thompson
at
the
time,
from
the
foregoing
analysis
it
is
possible
that
most
of
CDR
Thompson’s
linked
assessments
were
incorrect.
• AE’s
report
of
“clouds”
and
“overcast”
conditions,
and
a
final
altitude
of
1,000
feet,
led
CDR
Thompson
to
conclude
the
aircraft’s
approach
and
descent
to
Howland
Island
must
have
been
from
the
west
northwest
direction.
o This
was
likely
incorrect.
• CDR
Thompson
concluded
no
celestial
fixes
had
been
taken
throughout
the
night.
o Again,
this
conclusion
was
likely
incorrect.
• CDR
Thompson
assessed
that
a
sun
shot
might
have
been
obtained
at
sunrise
in
the
vicinity
of
Howland
Island.
He
assumed
a
sun
shot
was
made,
and
that
a
sun
LOP
was
correctly
computed,
and
accurately
placed
over
Howland
Island.
o The
sun
shot
assessment
was
likely
correct,
however,
it
is
apparent
that
the
sun
LOP,
while
a
correct
value
(337-‐157
deg
true),
did
not
overlay
Howland
Island.
• CDR
Thompson
assumed
that
the
sun’s
glare
was
responsible
for
AE
missing
the
island,
Itasca,
and
the
smoke
screen
produced
by
Itasca
to
aid
visual
acquisition.
o This
was
likely
a
factor.
67
Eric
Chater,
Letter
to
Mr.
M.
E.
Griffin.
68
Cruise
Report
24
July,
1937
CDR
Warner
Thompson,
Commanding
Officer,
Itasca
(TIGHAR).
• CDR
Thompson
assumed
that
AE
passed
within
200
miles
north
of
Howland
Island,
and
ditched
in
a
sector
bearing
true
337-‐045
degrees
from
Howland
Island
(presumably
the
correct
position
of
Howland
Island,
5.92
nm
east
of
AE’s
coordinates
for
Howland
Island),
at
a
distance
between
40
and
200
miles.
o The
evidence
does
not
support
this
conclusion.
Position Reporting
1. The
actual
longitude
at
0519
GMT
was
not
W
150.7
degrees,
but
rather,
W
157.0
degrees.
2. The
0519
GMT
time
reported
was
actually
at
0219
GMT.
Coordinate
Transposed
The
transposed
coordinate
creates
Path
C,
supported
by
these
factors.
• This
position,
when
contained
in
a
flight
path
reconstruction,
conforms
to
historic,
recommended,
and/or
statistical
speeds
and
times
demonstrated
by
AE.
• When
contained
in
the
mission
path,
this
point
results
in
all
other
reported
points,
times,
speeds
and
flight
performance
data,
conforming
to
Electra
capabilities,
AE
historical
performance,
engineering
recommendations,
and
pilot
behaviors.
• Path
C
is
a
reasonable
deviation
around
significant
convective
weather
east
of
Lae.
• At
the
157.0
west
longitude
position,
islands
are
large
and
clearly
visible,
well
charted,
and
allow
an
accurate
navigation
position
fix.
Time
Error
It
is
possible
that
the
report
at
0519
GMT
was
actually
made
at
0219
GMT,
with
the
error
recorded
as
a
“5”
instead
of
a
“2.”
69
Eric
Chater,
Letter
to
Mr.
M.
E.
Griffin.
• Supporting
this
theory
is
the
Electra’s
performance
on
the
mission
results
in
the
aircraft
passing
the
reported
position
coordinates
at
0218
GMT.
• Accepting
the
“Time
Error
Theory”
creates
Path
B.
AE reports “winds 23 knots” which becomes a basis for every researcher’s calculations.
The
reported
aircraft
altitude
is
consistent
with
preflight
planning.
The
reported
winds
show
that
AE
and
Fred
had
good
navigation
fixes
and
knew
their
winds
–
unfortunately,
they
just
didn’t
report
the
wind
direction,
which
is
important
to
identify
the
headwind
component,
and
subsequently,
key
flight
speeds
and
times.
The
assumption
that
these
were
“headwinds”
produces
the
26.5
mph
headwind
component
identified
by
Long,
and
used
by
every
author
referring
to
this
event.
Previous
analysis
results
show
that
forecast
and
actual
winds
were
very
close
at
the
0718
GMT
position,
but
likely
diminished
after
passing
the
Nauru
Island
area.
In
a
letter
from
Mr.
T.
H.
Cude,
Director
of
Police,
Nauru
Island,
to
Dr.
Francis
Holbrook
of
Fordham
University,
he
stated
he
heard
AE
broadcasting
to
Harold
Barnes,
Chief
Wireless
Operator
at
Nauru
Island,
several
times
between
10-‐11
PM
that
she
could
see
the
lights
on
Nauru
Island.
The
lights
she
referred
to
were
the
flood-‐lights
strung
out
along
the
two
1,000-‐foot
cableways
situated
on
top
of
the
island
to
permit
mining
at
night.71
• Note that 10-‐11 PM on Nauru Island corresponds to 10-‐11 GMT.
The
lights
on
Nauru
Island
were
at
an
approximate
elevation
of
556
feet
above
sea
level,
and
AE
could
not
have
seen
these
lights
until
entering
the
visual
horizon
to
Nauru
Island
at
AE’s
cruise
altitude.
The
Figure
below
shows
the
Electra’s
arrival
times
on
each
Path
A,
B,
and
C,
at
the
USS
Ontario
which
was
assigned
a
station
at
the
half-‐way
point
of
the
mission
and
in
the
vicinity
of
Nauru
Island,
entering
the
visual
horizon
to
Nauru
Island,
and
relative
to
two
positions
estimated
by
researchers
for
the
location
of
the
SS
Myrtlebank.
70
Elgen
Long,
Amelia
Earhart
–
The
Mystery
Solved,
20.
71
Laurance
Safford,
Amelia’s
Flight
Into
Yesterday,
(McLean,
Virginia:
Paladwr
Press,
2003)
31-‐33.
• Any
Path
A,
B,
or
C
could
result
in
AE
reporting
the
Nauru
Island
lights
at
the
times
logged
for
her
reports.
At
1030,
if
USS
Ontario
was
the
ship
referred
to
in
AE’s
in-‐flight
position
report,
it
does
not
make
sense
the
report
would
be,
“a
ship
in
sight
ahead,”
because
on
any
Path,
USS
Ontario
would
have
been
behind
her.
The
“ship
in
sight
ahead”
was
likely
the
SS
Myrtlebank.
This
is
based
on
the
navigation
times,
the
visual
horizon
distance
to
Nauru
Island
and
AE’s
proximity
to
SS
Myrtlebank,
the
area
of
location
of
the
SS
Myrtlebank
on
its
voyage
from
New
Zealand
to
Nauru
Island,
and
the
size
of
SS
Myrtlebank
at
420
feet,
,
and
much
larger,
than
the
185
foot
USS
Ontario.
• At 1030 GMT, only the SS Myrtlebank is “ahead” of AE on any Path A, B, or C.
This
places
AE
in
a
location
in
time
and
space,
from
which
the
integrity
of
a
flight
path
reconstruction,
and
ultimately,
the
final
location
of
wreckage,
can
be
considered
with
some
sense
of
confidence
that
AE
and
FN
were
largely
on
course,
and
on
track,
to
Howland
Island,
at
1030
GMT.
Figure
7
-‐
Penetration
of
the
visual
horizon
to
Nauru
Island.
This
position
was
prepared
by
FN,
likely
using
celestial
navigation
stars
and/or
planets
with
good
visibility.
These
provide
the
most
accurate
fixes,
and
this
fix
appears
to
have
been
very
accurate.
Celestial
fixes
are
much
more
accurate
than
a
sun
fix,
which
would
have
been
used
to
prepare
the
1815
GMT
report.
Table 4 – Electra position on each Path at the time of these two in-‐flight position reports.
ROUTE 200 Miles Out 1745 GMT 100 Miles Out 1815 GMT
If
these
are
accurate
results,
AE
likely
descended
early,
perhaps
at
1825
GMT,
in
accordance
with
descent
specifications
and
past
historical
performance.
The result is the Path C End-‐of-‐Navigation point, short of Howland Island.
Modern
fatigue
guidelines
in
human
factors
attempt
to
assure
that
employees
are
not
on
duty
beyond
16
hours
of
wakefulness,
with
duty
times
ranging
from
approximately
8-‐16
hours,
depending
on
industry
and
regulatory
requirements.
Both acute and chronic sleep loss affect fatigue, and can decrease performance.
AE
and
FN
arrived
in
Lae,
Papua
New
Guinea73
on
the
afternoon
of
Tuesday,
June
29,
1937.
They’d
been
on
duty
for
30
consecutive
days,
largely
flying
1
mission
per
day
averaging
5.1
hours
flying
per
day.
For
the
previous
7
flying
days,
only
two
flights
exceeded
5
hours,
and
five
flights
were
much
less
than
5
hours.
• There
were
3
days
in
Bandoeng,
from
June
21-‐23,
for
aircraft
maintenance
and
no
flying.
• June
24
and
June
25
were
flying
days.
•
June
26
was
a
non-‐flying
day
again,
in
Bandoeng,
where
AE
returned
for
maintenance
repairs.
• June
27-‐29
were
flying
days.
• June
29
included
7
hours
40
minutes
from
Darwin,
Australia
to
Lae,
New
Guinea.74
• June
30
was
a
non-‐flying
day,
however,
AE
was
at
work
on
radio
traffic
at
0615,
and
testing
aircraft
radios
at
noon.
• On
July
1
at
0635
o AE
conducted
a
short,
30-‐minute
test
flight.
o FN
got
a
time
signal
check
at
2220
local
time.
• On
July
2
at
0800,
FN
got
another
time
signal
check.
• On
July
2,
AE
departed
Lae
at
1000
local
time.
In the 11 days from June 21-‐July 1, 5 days were non-‐flying days, and 5 days were flying days.
In
the
72
hours
before
departing
Lae,
AE
flew
7
hours
40
minutes
Darwin
to
Lae,
and
a
30-‐minute
test
flight,
for
a
total
of
8
hours
10
minutes,
in
two
days
of
flying.
72
“Fatigue,
alcohol
and
performance
impairment,”
Dawson
and
Reid,
The
Queen
Elizabeth
Hospital,
Woodville,
South
Australia,
17
July
1997
73
Purdue
University,
George
Palmer
Putnam
Collection
of
Amelia
Earhart
Papers
74
Eric
Chater,
Letter
to
Mr.
M.
E.
Griffin,
3.
It
is
likely
AE
and
FN
rested
normally
June
29,
June
30,
and
July
1.
Arising
early
was
AE’s
standard
habitual
norm
on
the
World
Flight,
and
that
was
adhered
to
while
in
Lae.
The
Human
Factors
conclusions
are
that
AE
and
FN
were
reasonably
well
rested
in
Lae,
with
two
days
of
non-‐flying
(excepting
the
early
and
short
test
flight)
before
departing
on
the
final
Lae
to
Howland
segment.
They
had
relatively
short
duty
days
during
the
past
7
flying
days,
with
no
reports
or
indications
of
acute
sleep
loss,
and
no
illness
reported.
July
1
was
an
early,
but
normal
day
for
both
crewmembers,
and
afforded
a
reasonable
sleep
opportunity
prior
to
arising
for
their
flight
to
Howland.
Previous
World
Flight
mission
flight
times
ranged
from
0.87
to
13.37
hours,
with
a
mean
flight
segment,
or
“stage
length”
of
5.1
hours.
Standard
deviation
for
this
data
is
3.22
hours.
Ninety-‐five
percent
of
the
World
Flight
stage
length
flight
times
were
less
than
11.5
hours.
The
Lae-‐Howland
segment
was
65%
longer
than
most
of
the
previous
mission
segments.
AE
and
FN
appear
to
have
conscientiously
prepared
for
their
mission
to
Howland,
were
well
rested
prior
to
commencing
this
challenging
segment,
and
from
a
Human
Factors
perspective,
the
conclusion
is
that
no
extraordinary
pre-‐mission
factors
adversely
affected
preparations
and
rest
for
the
Pacific
crossing.
The
Lae
to
Howland
segment
included
approximately
a
24-‐hour
continuous
duty
period.
FN
was
getting
a
time
check
at
0800
local
time
and
AE
was
likely
already
at
the
aircraft.
Both
likely
arose
at
approximately
0500-‐0600,
if
not
slightly
earlier.
They
would
be
awake
for
23
hours
when
they
reported
“on
you”
at
1912
GMT
on
July
2,
after
concluding
the
most
demanding
navigation
and
landing
site
acquisition
challenge
of
the
entire
World
Flight.
Despite
their
rested
beginning
to
the
Lae-‐Howland
flight
segment,
their
time-‐on-‐task
and
time
awake
combined
to
increase
fatigue
and
risk.
This
reduced
human
performance
to
levels
associated
with
alcohol-‐related
cognitive
impairment
at
0.10%
concentration
of
blood
alcohol,
likely
interfered
with
terminal
maneuvering,
radio
work,
searching,
and
visual
acquisition
of
Howland
Island
or
Itasca.
At
this
level
of
fatigue,
significant
challenges
to
fly
the
aircraft
at
lower
altitudes,
operate
radio
equipment
that
was,
to
some
extent,
unfamiliar
and
untested,
navigate
and
visually
search
for
Howland
Island
proved
to
be
insurmountable.
The
implications
of
this
accident
scenario,
whether
a
water
impact
resulted
from
fatigue
or
fuel
exhaustion,
are
that
the
aircraft
location
should
be
relatively
close
to
its
estimated
end-‐of-‐navigation
position.
Celestial
Navigation
Below
are
the
July
2,
1937
celestial
opportunities
for
key
navigational
fixes
along
the
route
from
Lae
to
Howland
Island.
In
general
the
sky
was
still
quite
bright
during
the
time
the
Electra
passed
the
position
of
USS
Ontario.
Combined
with
the
ship’s
small
size,
it
is
possible
that
USS
Ontario
was
not
visually
acquired
by
AE
or
FN.
Subsequent
to
passing
the
USS
Ontario’s
position,
a
darkening
sky
would
have
enhanced
celestial
navigation
opportunities,
with
consideration
for
weather.
Navigation
stars,
weather
permitting,
were
available
from
the
side
view
cabin
windows,
where
FN
conducted
his
navigation
and
charting.
The
implications
of
these
conditions
and
celestial
body
positions
in
the
night
sky,
were
that
no
radical
aircraft
course
changes
were
necessary
for
FN
to
take
good
celestial
fixes
on
stars,
which
facilitated
a
higher
probability
that
the
aircraft
could
accurately
remain
on
a
track
to
Howland
Island.
Numerous
sight
reduction
table
corrections,
required
to
be
applied
to
a
star
fix,
are
additional
sources
of
potential
error.
Although
FN
was
among
the
best
navigators
of
his
day,
cumulative
fatigue
throughout
this
flight
segment
could
have
resulted
in
errors.
The
data
shows
this
is
not
likely,
but
always
possible.
On
Path
C
the
1745
GMT
report
at
“200
miles
out”
was
made
at
204
nm
from
the
1937
position
of
Howland
Island,
likely
from
good
celestial
navigation
fixes,
and
likely
very
accurate.
The
1815
GMT
report
at
“100
miles
out”
was
made
at
146
nm
from
Howland
Island.
If
the
first
report
was
accurate,
a
refraction
calculation
error
at
AE’s
altitudes
could
produce
the
error
evident
in
the
second
report.
This
error
would
result
in
AE
descending
early,
and
arriving
early,
to
what
they
thought
would
be
Howland
Island.
AE
may
also
have
simply
estimated
the
“about
100
miles
out”
position,
and
started
an
early
descent,
with
no
FN
errors
involved.
Below
is
a
table
of
position
reports
and
the
primary
stars
available
to
FN
for
celestial
navigation.
Weather
was
reported
by
Itasca
as
good,
and
likely
good
en
route.
AE’s
report
of
“overcast”
skies
is
possibly
a
report
of
an
“undercast”
because
along
with
these
reports
on
previous
segments,
she
adds
the
report
of
good
visibility
for
navigational
celestial
fixes.
1815
GMT
Deneb
Vega
Fomalhaut
Acherner
Venus
Jupiter
Moon
Saturn
Alderbaran
“100
out”
1.3
0.1
1.3
0.6
-‐3.7
-‐2.8
-‐12.6
-‐0.24
1.1
Full
The
faintest
stars
visible
to
the
naked
eye
under
perfect
conditions
are
magnitude
6.5.
Brighter
stars
have
lower
magnitudes,
with
negative
numbers
indicating
very
bright
stars.
The
brightest
star
is
Sirius
at
magnitude
-‐1.6.
Throughout
the
evening
hours
from
Lae
to
Howland,
there
is
no
moon
visible
because
its
elevation
is
below
the
horizon.
The
moon
rises
early
at
0123
Howland
local
time
in
the
morning
and
sets
at
midday
1351
local
time.
Thus,
bright
stars
are
more
visible
without
moonlight.
The
official
sunrise
at
Howland
is
contained
in
the
following
US
Naval
Observatory
data.
Civil
twilight
begins
in
the
morning
when
the
geometric
center
of
the
Sun
is
6°
below
the
horizon,
and
ends
at
sunrise.
The
angular
diameter
of
the
sun
is
0.5
degrees.
At
civil
twilight,
bright
stars
and
planets
are
visible,
and
outdoor
activities
may
proceed
with
no
additional
illumination.
At
civil
twilight
on
Howland
Island,
on
July
2,
1937,
the
Sun’s
azimuth
is
067
degrees
true,
the
moon
azimuth
is
38.5
degrees
true,
or
approximately
30
degrees
left
of
AE’s
inbound
course.
The
moon
elevation
is
73.4
degrees,
with
an
illumination
of
37%.
The
moon
is
visible
during
the
final
hours
inbound
to
Howland
Island.
Figure
8
-‐
Important
data
for
Howland
Island.
AE
would
have
intended
this
EON
point
as
Howland
Island.
The
LOP
would
actually
lie
well
short
of
Howland
Island.
Time at the turn point would be 1900 GMT, with another 40nm remaining on the LOP.
The LOP segment would require 20 minutes to the EON point at 1920 GMT.
If AE had flown the LOP, they may not have reported “on you” at 1912 GMT.
Instead,
the
flight
modeling
data
indicates
AE
flew
a
direct
course
during
descent
towards
an
EON
point,
which
she
presumed
would
be
Howland
Island,
and
where
she
anticipated
a
DF
steer
to
the
Itasca,
with
visual
acquisition
of
Howland
Island’s
landing
strip.
Regardless
of
whether
or
not
AE
flew
a
LOP,
the
EON
point
for
the
LOP
is
virtually
co-‐located
with
the
EON
point
for
a
straight
in
descent,
at
1912
GMT.
The
aircraft
is
effectively
at
the
same
EON
position
for
either
terminal
flight
track.
Adjusting
latitude
by
+/-‐
3
degrees
to
approximate
a
lateral
course
error
of
180nm
results
in
the
sun
azimuth
of
a
sun
shot
remaining
at
approximately
067
degrees
true.
The
337-‐157
degrees
true
LOP
value
gives
us
no
information
as
to
the
potential
for
a
lateral
position
error
when
the
sun
fix
was
taken.
Advancing
longitude
has
no
effect
on
the
value
of
the
337-‐157
degrees
true
LOP.
Again,
the
LOP
value
gives
us
no
information
as
to
the
potential
for
an
along-‐track
error.
Advancing
the
time
to
1928
GMT
to
2013
GMT
produces
a
line
of
position
at
333-‐153
degrees
true.
This
gives
us
information
that
FN’s
337-‐157
degrees
true
LOP
was
based
on
a
sunrise
fix.
This
reasoning
supports
that
the
“about
100
miles
out”
report
was
made
possibly
using
a
sun
shot
for
this
position
fix
(stars
would
not
be
visible),
with
a
possible
error
that
caused
the
aircraft
position
to
be
further
from
Howland
Island
than
the
calculations
showed.
This
may
have
led
to
an
early
descent
to
the
EON
point,
because
descents
were
made
at
approximately
70-‐80nm
from
the
destination,
leaving
the
aircraft
at
the
EON
point,
short
of
Howland
Island.
The
search
grids
are
oriented
around
the
Path
C
EON
point
to
the
west,
and
the
Path
A
and
B
EON
points
to
the
northeast
of
the
1937
Howland
Island
coordinates.
Standard
Grid
This
is
the
final
search
grid.
Terminal
area
maneuvering,
as
well
as
wind
effects
on
the
flight’s
EON
point
are
contained
in
these
search
grids.
Bathymetric
Grid
This
NOAA
image
includes
the
bathymetric
characteristics
of
the
search
area.
Debris
Field
Following
the
Natal-‐Dakar
flight
segment,
AE
describes
a
project
conducted
during
the
World
Flight
in
which
air
samples
were
being
taken,
in
a
study
of
upper
air
microorganisms.75
These
were
performed
by
AE
and
FN
for
Dr.
Fred
C.
Meier
of
the
Department
of
Agriculture,
and
were
similar
to
experiments
carried
out
on
some
of
Charles
Lindbergh’s
flights.
The
collection
devices
were
aluminum
cylinders,
and
AE
reported
having
a
supply
aboard
exceeding
a
dozen
broomstick-‐sized
collection
cylinders.
These
were
mentioned
in
AE’s
logs
and
the
Luke
Field
aircraft
inventory
established
following
the
initial
westbound
World
Flight
attempt
and
crash
at
Luke
Field.
These
cylinders,
if
distributed
post-‐impact,
would
be
characteristic
shapes
in
a
debris
field
that
could
be
used
to
assist
in
identifying
the
wreckage.
In
Situ
Documentation
Ideally
the
entire
structure
should
be
documented
as
it
is
found,
from
as
many
angles
as
possible
for
360
degrees
around
the
wreckage.
Interest
areas
include
• Condition
of
fuselage,
wings,
engines,
propellers,
flaps,
and
control
surfaces.
o Impact
damage
is
important
to
computing
impact
dynamics.
• Debris
field
mapping
and
geo-‐referencing
of
anything
found
in
the
debris
field.
• If
possible,
cockpit
documentation
of
controls,
instrument
indications,
and
items
found
in
the
cockpit
are
valuable
to
the
crash
analysis.
Accident
investigators
should
be
on-‐site
to
observe
and
record
information
prior
to
recovery,
and
to
examine
wreckage
as
it
is
recovered.
Dimensional
Data
Below
are
basic
dimensional
data
for
a
Lockheed
10A
airframe.
AE’s
Lockheed
10E
had
larger
engines
and
other
modifications.
75
Amelia
Earhart,
Last
Flight,
133.
Figure
9
-‐
From
Purdue's
Collection
–
Basic
Data
–
From
Lockheed,
Burbank,
CA.
Figure
10
-‐
From
Purdue's
Collection
-‐
Three-‐view
Drawings.
Exemplars
Below
are
basic
images
for
general
structural
reference.
Long’s
research
is
by
far,
the
most
complete,
comprehensive,
and
accurate
work
done
to
locate
this
accident
aircraft.
Documentation
of
the
entire
mission
is
very
thorough,
and
where
literary
license
is
taken
to
craft
the
publication,
it
does
not
materially
detract
from
the
research
work.
Rather
than
reiterate
Long’s
extensive
analysis,
the
following
are
significant
points
as
they
relate
to
our
work
in
review,
analysis,
and
aircraft
localization:
• Valid
assessment
of
headwind
at
23
knots,
26.5
mph
throughout
mission.
o We
investigate
reduced
headwind
and
increased
crosswind
effects
on
final
position.
o These
effects
are
contained
in
the
Primary
Search
Grids.
• Flight
path
Lae-‐Howland
passes
through
three
points
that
are
updated.
o No
evidence
the
flight
was
at
the
point
reported
at
0519
GMT.
Long’s
path
through
this
point
may
simply
conform
to
tradition.
o No
evidence
the
flight
passed
directly
over
the
SS
Myrtlebank.
This
point
is
40-‐60nm
north
of
track
from
Lae
to
Howland.
There
is
no
evidence
the
flight
did
not
overfly
SS
Myrtlebank,
and
the
final
End-‐
of-‐Navigation
point(s)
should
not
be
affected
by
the
small
lateral
track
deviation
abeam
Nauru
Island,
if
indeed,
AE
was
slightly
closer
to
Nauru
and
did
fly
closer
to
SS
Myrtlebank.
o No
evidence
the
flight
was
north
of
track,
or
Howland,
at
any
time
This
conclusion
appears
to
have
come
from
CDR
Thompson
of
Itasca
• Distance
and
time
averages
are
valid
assessments,
remarkably
accurate
for
the
analysis
methods
used,
and
comprise
a
very
credible
basis
for
track
plot
and
terminal
area
arrival
at
Howland.
o Validates
an
arrival
near
Howland
with
insufficient
fuel
to
exit
the
Howland
area
• Long
creates
a
reference
to
“Itasca
standard
time
(IST)”
in
addition
to
the
already
confusing
Howland
Standard
Time
and
GMT
references.
• Long
advances
a
compounding
10%
of
navigation
distance
error
model,
that,
while
somewhat
subjective
and
lacking
of
a
more
rigorous
analytical
conclusion,
is
a
reasonable
approach
to
a
location
methodology.
This
research
is
well
done.
The
engineering
assessments
are
based
on
L487
and
wind
tunnel
testing
performed
in
1935
and
contained
in
a
test
report,
GALCIT
Report
No.
161P.
Standard
aerodynamics
equations
are
applied
to
determine
performance.
1. The
magnitude
of
headwinds
and
their
constant
velocity
throughout
the
entire
flight.
a. This
value,
from
Long,
was
26.5
mph.
2. A
constant
true
air
speed
flown
throughout
the
entire
flight.
a. This
value,
From
Long,
was
161.5
mph.
3. Initial
fuel
load.
a. This
initial
value
was
reported
by
Chater
and
Collopy.
b. Swenson
and
Culick,
et
al,
applied
adjustments
for
temperature
and
volume
to
arrive
at
an
initial
fuel
load
of
1080
gallons,
vice
the
value
of
1100
gallons
reported
by
Collopy.
4. Flight
Path.
a. The
authors
used
the
path
constructed
by
Long.
5. Altitudes.
a. The
authors
used
In-‐flight
position
reports
as
the
basis
for
reconstructing
the
vertical
flight
path
profile
between
Lae
and
Howland
Island.
6. Ship
Sighting.
a. The
authors
addressed
the
relative
reliability
in
the
1030
ship
sighting
report
by
AE
i. They
concluded
that
the
vessel
observed
was
either
the
USS
Ontario,
or
SS
Myrtlebank.
b. Their
assessment
is
based
on
assumed
aircraft
ground
speed
and
time
to
the
ship
sighting,
and
a
projection
forward
to
the
Howland
area
arrival
time.
This
helps
to
establish
a
time
abeam
Nauru
Island,
in
their
path
reconstruction.
The
authors’
work
is
very
credible.
They
presented
a
good
baseline
fuel
consumption
analysis,
and
created
numerous
alternate
scenarios
as
functions
of
headwind,
fuel
consumption
and
error
tolerance.
Their
assumptions
for
headwind,
aircraft
true
air
speed,
initial
fuel
load,
fuel
consumption
and
endurance
are
appropriate
given
the
scarcity
of
facts.
Their
conclusions
are
valuable
and
interesting
in
assessing
boundary
values
for
mission
parameters.
The
authors’
choice
to
use
Long’s
26.5
mph
headwinds
is
prudent
and
replicated
by
virtually
all
researchers.
Similarly,
assuming
aircraft
true
airspeed
of
161.5
mph
is
considered
valid.
Swenson
and
Culick
and
Long
plot
AE’s
flight
path
at
the
ship
sighting
as
passing
over
the
assumed
ship’s
position,
which
very
slightly
affects
distance,
timing,
and
position.
Swenson
and
Culick
do
not
project
this
path
point,
slightly
north
of
the
great
circle
direct
route
from
Lae
to
Howland
(Path
A),
to
an
end
point
north
of
Howland,
as
Long
does.
Swenson
and
Culick’s
path
from
the
ship
sighting
converges
to
Path
A
as
it
proceeds
direct
to
Howland
from
the
ship
sighting
point.
The Swenson and Culick, et al, conclusions below, are validated as follows
1. Initial
fuel
load
and
preflight
planning
should
have
enabled
flight
for
20
hours
38
minutes.
2. Actual
mission
time
to
initial
arrival
near
Howland
was
19
hours
12
minutes.
3. This
should
have
allowed
post-‐arrival
endurance
of
1
hour
16
minutes.
4. The
ship
sighted
was
SS
Myrtlebank,
based
on
assumed
average
headwind
and
aircraft
ground
speed
and
time,
and
projecting
those
parameters
forward
to
an
estimated
arrival
at
Howland
at
1912
GMT.
5. AE
was
within
100
miles
[units
not
specified]
of
Howland
based
on
radio
strength.
6. “…AE’s
flight…ended
in
the
ocean
short
of
her
intended
landing
place.”
Safford,
Laurance
Earhart’s
Flight
Into
Yesterday
–
The
Facts
Without
the
Fiction
(Paladwr
Press,
2003)
Captain
Laurance
Safford
passed
away
before
this
book
was
published.
Co-‐editors
Cameron
Warren
and
Bob
Payne
salvaged
the
original
manuscript
and
its
supporting
exhibits,
presenting
the
work
in
this
publication.
Most
of
Safford’s
work
involves
the
communications
in
the
planning
and
search
phases
of
the
mission.
Safford
devotes
only
38
of
199
pages
to
the
actual
Lae
to
Howland
mission
segment.
Most
of
his
work
is
with
radio
logs
and
communications,
coordination,
control
(operational
as
well
as
administrative),
and
the
search
effort.
This is no surprise as Captain Safford’s Navy career was in Cryptology, and Intelligence.
Safford’s
conclusion
(p115)
is
that
AE
crashed
at
N
01.00
degrees
and
E
178.00
degrees,
with
a
95%
probability
of
a
final
position
within
100
miles
[units
not
specified]
of
this
location.
• This is approximately 325 miles [units not specified] west of Howland Island.
Safford’s
inclusion
of
logs,
messages,
radio
communications,
and
the
attention
to
command
and
control
issues
associated
with
the
mission
planning
and
conduct
of
search
operations,
is
valuable
in
adding
background
detail
to
our
overall
analysis.
Perhaps
the
most
valuable
information
from
Safford
concerns
the
Itasca
search
patterns,
and
search
decisions,
made
by
its
commanding
officer,
CDR
Thompson.
In
his
messaged
assessment
to
COMDESRON
2,
CDR
Thompson
concluded
that
AE
was
within
250
miles
[units
not
specified]
of
Itasca,
based
on
signal
strength,
and
went
down
within
250
miles
[units
not
specified]
of
Howland
Island
between
337
degrees
and
45
degrees
true
and
not
nearer
than
30
miles
[units
not
specified].
CDR Thompson and Itasca assumed AE had laterally deviated north and had overflown Howland.
Safford
is
critical
of
many
elements
of
this
mission
and
his
work
does
a
credible
job
of
detailing
errors
and
inconsistencies.
Nesbit,
Roy
Missing
Believed
Killed
(Sutton
Publishing
LTD,
2002)
In
this
work
detailing
the
accounts
of
famous
missing
persons,
the
author
devotes
34
pages
in
a
total
173
pages
to
AE’s
life
and
final
flight.
The
book
is
an
account
of
5
accidents
involving
famous
people.
The
author
details
the
Electra
aircraft
from
Lockheed
documents,
including
interesting
details
concerning
fuel
tank
arrangements
and
capacities,
previous
flight
segments,
aircraft
weights
and
speeds,
flight
times
and
position.
• The
author
depicts
a
flight
path
directly
over
Nauru
Island,
assuming
this
path
from
the
AE
report
of
seeing
Nauru
Island’s
lights.
This
path
discounts
the
involvement
of
USS
Ontario,
and
SS
Myrtlebank,
but
validates
identifying
lights
on
Nauru
Island.
Most
interesting
and
valuable
are
the
author’s
references
to
celestial
navigation,
and
the
effect
on
the
Lae-‐Howland
flight
from
various
aspects
of
celestial
navigation,
including
navigation
errors.
The
author
is
an
experienced
aircraft
navigator,
with
experience
near
the
era
of
AE’s
World
Flight
and
with
the
USAAF
in
WWII.
The
author
“recreates”
an
assumed
series
of
actions
taken
inside
the
Electra,
by
Fred
Noonan
and
centered
on
celestial
navigation,
during
the
final
portion
of
the
flight.
This
recreation
begins
with
the
AE
In-‐flight
position
report
of
200
miles
out
[units
not
specified]
at
1745
GMT,
and
includes
a
proposed
resolution
of
this
position,
with
the
next
report
at
1815
of
100
miles
out
[units
not
specified].
The
author
generally
concludes
that
these
reports
are
consistent
with
an
increasing
accuracy
of
navigation
provided
by
the
fixing
of
position
based
on
sunrise.
Further,
the
author
discusses
the
Line
of
Position,
how
it
is
used,
and
how
it
may
have
been
used
by
Noonan,
if
he
used
such
a
technique
at
all.
No
conclusions
are
provided.
The
author
details
(p26)
one
source
of
navigation
error
in
using
a
sun
fix
at
sunrise.
The
error
arises
in
defining
the
sunrise
time,
and
angle
to
the
sun
itself,
at
the
time
of
first
sighting
of
the
rising
sun.
• “On
the
sea,
the
angle
is
essentially
zero,
however,
in
an
aircraft
at
altitude,
the
occupants
view
the
sun
rise
at
an
earlier
time
than
if
viewed
from
the
sea
surface.
This
difference
is
accounted
for
by
correction
factors
in
sight
reduction
tables.”
Failing
to
correct
a
sun
shot
for
this
angular
value,
according
to
the
author
[no
mile
units
specified],
results
in
a
31-‐mile
error
at
1000
feet,
44
miles
at
2000
feet,
70
miles
at
5000
feet.
• This
error
produces
an
aircraft
position
that
is
closer
to
Howland
than
the
actual
aircraft
position.
Further,
the
author
contends
that
the
“200
miles
out”
report
was
more
accurate
than
the
“100
miles
out”
report,
if
this
error
were
made.
• The
author
concludes
this
error
was
made,
and
that
AE
was
flying
north
and
south
along
a
Sun
Line
of
Position,
located
at
least
31
miles
[units
not
specified]
west
of
Howland
Island.
In
general,
the
author
publishes
interesting
aircraft
information,
and
covers
the
celestial
navigation
issues
and
error
potential
very
well.
The
work
concludes
that
a
sun
shot
error
produced
a
final
position
at
least
31
miles
west
of
Howland
Island,
and
that
AE
had
flown
north
and
south
along
a
337-‐157
line
through
this
position.
Valuable
data
from
this
1967
Commemorative
Flight
includes
references
to
climb
speed
of
100-‐120
mph,
and
20
minutes
time
to
climb
to
1000
feet
after
a
gross
weight
takeoff.
This
reference
is
made
twice
and
the
author
comments
that
this
is
normal
performance
for
her
Electra.
The
author
cites
several
cruise
performance
values
which
provide
good
comparisons
for
AE
mission
analysis,
in
speed
and
fuel
consumption,
despite
flying
an
Electra
model
10A
with
smaller
engines,
but
effectively
the
same
horsepower-‐to-‐weight
ratio,
as
for
AE’s
Electra
10E.
The
author
also
cites
en
route
winds
throughout
the
flight
from
Lae
to
Nauru
Island,
indicating
useful
information
about
the
behavior
of
en
route
winds
in
this
area.
Pellegrino
cites
work
published
by
Polhemus
(p208)
in
which
Polhemus
calculates
AE’s
initial
fuel
at
Lae
at
900
gallons,
and
that
AE
executed
a
direct
(great
circle)
flight
path
to
Howland.
Polhemus
estimates
AE’s
final
position
“…in
the
vicinity
of
Howland
Island….”
Near
Howland
Island,
as
Pellegreno
was
flying
on
the
Line
of
Position
heading
157
degrees
at
1905
GMT
(p160),
a
squall
appeared
over
where
Howland
Island
should
be.
The
flight
adjusted
course
slightly
to
avoid
the
squall,
but
continued
to
pursue
visual
acquisition
of
the
island.
With
pilot
Pellegreno
flying,
and
two
dedicated
observers
(one
in
the
cockpit
right
seat
and
one
in
the
cabin),
Howland
Island
could
not
be
found
until
approximately
1957
GMT,
when
the
person
in
the
cabin
spotted
what
he
thought
was
land.
They
had
less
than
20
minutes
remaining
fuel
on
station
to
devote
to
the
search
for
the
Island,
and
as
Pellegreno
later
said,
“we
nearly
missed
it.”
This,
after
searching
for
nearly
an
hour.
They
were
approximately
10-‐12
miles
[units
not
specified]
north
of
Howland
Island
at
the
moment
they
visually
acquired
the
island.
Pelllegreno’s
account
of
her
thoughts
and
feelings
upon
arriving
and
not
seeing
Howland,
then
conducting
a
protracted
search
with
limited
fuel
resources,
is
extremely
interesting
as
a
human
factors
and
operational
comparison
to
what
may
have
occurred
on
AE’s
mission.
Pellegreno
writes
a
compelling
narrative
here,
one
that
can
not
help
but
evoke
a
sense
of
urgency,
desperation,
and
elevated
tension.
Pellegreno’s
flight
had
the
advantage
of
better
navigation
equipment,
a
third
set
of
human
eyes,
a
nearby
ship
providing
good
DF
bearings,
and
the
luxury
of
having
departed
Nauru
Island,
with
a
Canton
Island
destination.
With
all
of
these
advantages,
they
nearly
missed
visually
acquiring
Howland
Island.
This
account
demonstrates
the
great
challenge
attempted
by
Amelia
and
Fred,
and
provides
a
good
assessment
of
the
difficulty
in
visually
acquiring
tiny
Howland
Island.
Finch,
Linda
No
Limits
(World
Flight,
Inc.,
1996)
This
account
of
preparations
for
a
1997
Commemorative
Flight
details
most
known
facts
and
assumptions
concerning
AE’s
flight
from
Lae
to
Howland
Island.
Strippel,
Dick
Amelia
Earhart
–
The
Myth
and
the
Reality
(Exposition
Press,
1972)
The author concludes that initial fuel load was 980 gallons, based on two calculations
• A
gross
weight
and
takeoff
distance
analysis
for
Lae’s
grass
airfield
in
1937,
that
results
in
a
possible
takeoff
weight
and
fuel
load.
The
author
concludes
the
ship
sighted
was
USS
Ontario
because
had
it
been
SS
Myrtlebank,
the
position
and
time
error
would
have
exceeded
Noonan’s
standard
performance
for
navigation
accuracy.
The author recounts a number of scenario theories, possible errors, and the effects of those errors.
The
only
actual
position
statement
in
this
work
is
from
Captain
J.S.
Dowell
of
the
USS
Lexington
(p156)
who
concludes
“…at
2030
the
plane
landed
on
the
sea
to
the
northwest
of
Howland
Island,
within
120
miles
[units
not
specified]
of
the
island.”
The
author’s
Appendices
contain
interesting
and
useful
information
regarding
aircraft
configuration,
performance,
and
some
details
of
the
declassified
messages
and
logs
contained
in
national
archives.
Gillespie,
Ric
Finding
Amelia
–
The
True
Story
of
the
Earhart
Disappearance
(Naval
Institute
Press,
2006)
The
International
Group
for
Historic
Aircraft
Recovery
(TIGHAR)
and
the
author
have
compiled
a
comprehensive
and
useful
website,
and
this
publication,
including
a
resource
CD
containing
AE-‐related
information,
research
and
data.
This
work
supports
an
alternate
theory
that
AE
landed
the
Electra
on
Gardner
Island
in
the
1937
Phoenix
Island
Group.
Gardner
Island
is
now
Nikumaroro
Island
in
the
Republic
of
Kiribati,
approximately
400
statute
miles
southeast
of
Howland
Island.
This
theory
emanates
from
essentially
the
immediate
four-‐day
period
following
the
disappearance
of
AE,
information
for
up
to
two
weeks
following
the
disappearance
of
AE,
and
multiple
expeditions
to
Nikumaroro
by
TIGHAR
personnel
during
which
artifacts
were
found
that
are
claimed
to
possibly
be
linked
to
the
AE
mission.
These
artifacts
have
not
yet
been
validated
or
documented
as
coming
from
AE’s
mission,
however,
the
discoveries
are
interesting.
Main
support
for
the
theory
comes
from
analysis
of
radio
transmissions
allegedly
made
by
AE,
and
received
by
experienced
radio
operators
at
Honolulu,
Wake
Island,
and
Midway
Island
radio
operator
stations.
The
signals
and
attempted
direction
finding
(DF)
bearings
from
these
three
stations
converge
somewhat
close
to
Gardner
Island,
lending
to
TIGHAR’s
theory
that
AE
crash
landed
the
Electra
on
Gardner
or
very
near
it,
making
landfall
and
transmitting
radio
calls.
Numerous
challenges
exist
in
these
theories,
not
the
least
of
which
is
whether
or
not
the
Electra
could
have
flown
to
Gardner
Island
at
all,
or
transmit
any
signal
with
inoperative
engines
and
generators,
or
do
so
following
an
off-‐field
landing
or
water
ditching.
Interestingly,
the
best
DF
bearings
on
good,
strong
radio
signals
in
1937
contained
some
directional
variance
under
the
best
conditions.
If
the
DF
bearing
signals
received
by
Honolulu,
and
Midway
Island
are
adjusted
by
a
10
degree
variability
in
directional
reliability,
and
in
the
direction
of
common
sense
toward
the
area
most
likely
containing
the
Electra,
and
the
Wake
Island
bearing
is
given
a
+/-‐10
degree
azimuth
variance
since
it
was
reported
as
a
strong
signal
and
bearing,
the
area
bounded
by
the
convergence
of
these
adjusted
signal
directions
is
a
centroid
approximately
90-‐123
nm
southwest
of
Howland
Island,
and
260nm
northwest
of
Gardner
Island.
Questions
remain
concerning
whether
or
not
the
Electra
could
transmit
these
radio
signals
following
a
water
ditching,
if
AE
had
any
backup
or
portable
radio
transmitting
equipment
aboard
the
Electra
on
the
Lae-‐Howland
mission
segment,
or
if
a
life
raft
was
aboard
the
Electra,
which
AE
may
have
occupied
while
transmitting
and
drifting
towards
Gardner
Island.
The
research
of
many
investigators
indicates
that
flying
a
total
of
more
than
4
hours
fuel
after
1912
GMT,
is
not
likely.
If
AE’s
last
transmission
was
at
2013
GMT,
an
hour
after
arriving
at
Howland,
and
they
commenced
a
divert
to
Gardner
Island,
then
AE
would
have
had
to
arrive
at
Howland
Island
with
more
than
5
hours
fuel
remaining.
Swenson
and
Culick’s
thorough
aerodynamic
analysis
precludes
such
a
fuel
state,
and
other
researchers
corroborate
these
findings.
However,
the
author
makes
some
compelling
arguments
for
TIGHAR’s
theories,
discusses
interesting
discoveries
made
on
Nikomororo
Island,
and
provides
evidence
to
consider
TIGHAR’s
alternative
theories.
The
only
clue
to
what
may
have
justified
this
assessment
in
CDR
Thompson’s
own
mind,
is
his
belief
that
had
AE
been
south,
they
would
have
visually
acquired
either
Baker
or
Howland
Island,
the
Itasca,
the
smoke
being
created
by
Itasca,
and
that
missing
all
of
this
was
clear
evidence
of
the
aircraft
being
far
to
the
north.
Hewlett
Schlereth
Celestial
Navigation
in
a
Nutshell
(Sheridan
House,
2000)
The
author
provides
an
excellent
primer
in
the
process,
mechanics,
and
administrative
details
for
executing
celestial
navigation.
The dip angle or refraction error is among other errors well explained.
This work is an excellent background in understanding what occurs in celestial navigation.
Earhart,
Amelia
Last
Flight
(Harcourt,
Brace
and
Company,
1937)
This
critically
important
work
provides
the
only
record
of
the
World
Flight,
AE’s
flight
log
information,
operational
and
administrative
data,
and
insight
into
human
factors
and
behaviors
relevant
to
the
World
Flight
mission
segments.
The
publication
is
a
collection
of
writings
from
AE
to
her
husband,
George
Palmer
Putnam,
who
published
the
book
in
the
same
year
AE
was
missing
on
the
World
Flight
mission.
The chart below shows AE’s approximate distance from Itasca for each of AE’s en route position reports.
No
specific
conclusions
can
be
made
from
this
data,
although,
it
has
merit
for
qualitative
assessments.
Final
AE
radio
transmissions
were
logged
with
strong
signal
strengths,
alluding
to
an
aircraft
very
near
the
Itasca.
APPENDIX
Search
Strategy
Refinement
Abbreviations
• AE
-‐
Amelia
Earhart
• BHP
-‐
Brake
Horse
Power
• CFIT
-‐
Controlled
Flight
Into
Terrain
• EON
-‐
End
of
Navigation
Point
• FN
-‐
Fred
Noonan
• GPH
-‐
US
Gallons
Per
Hour
• LOP
-‐
Line
of
Position
• L487
-‐
Lockheed
and
Kelly
Johnson
Report
487
• SFC
-‐
Specific
Fuel
Consumption
(lbs/BHP/hr)
We
agree
with
Long
and
other
researchers
that
NR
16020
was
not
lost
en
route,
did
not
land
at
Howland
or
Baker
Island,
and
lacked
sufficient
fuel
(shown
later)
to
reach
any
other
land
mass.
Therefore,
we
focus
on
a
failure
to
arrive
scenario,
where
the
aircraft
possibly
crashed,
experienced
a
Controlled
Flight
Into
Terrain
(CFIT)
event,
or
exhausted
its
fuel
supply.
• A
crash
event
could
result
from
a
loss
of
control,
or
a
mechanical
malfunction.
• A
CFIT
event
is
an
inadvertent
collision
with
terrain
(water),
often
involving
a
loss
of
situational
awareness,
but
with
the
aircraft
flying
normally
in
terms
of
configuration,
speed
and
attitude.
o Flying
over
smooth
water
conditions
reported
by
Itasca,
is
a
challenge.
o Depth
perception
is
more
difficult
than
while
flying
over
rougher
seas.
• A
fuel
exhaustion
event
could
produce
a
survivable,
controlled
water
ditching.
Various
calculations
result
in
sufficient
fuel
at
1912
GMT
to
conduct
a
1.5-‐4.0
hour
search,
but
more
likely
a
search
in
the
range
of
1.5-‐3.1
hours.
After
2013
GMT,
the
total
absence
of
radio
communications
is
unusual,
supporting
two
possibilities.
1. The
aircraft
may
have
impacted
the
water
prior
to
fuel
exhaustion.
2. Fuel
exhaustion
precluded
further
radio
communications.
This
could
result
from
a
mission
fuel
over-‐burn
for
unknown
reasons.
For
example
a. Zero
fuel
at
2030
GMT
would
indicate
a
mission
over-‐burn
of
71
gallons.
b. Zero
fuel
at
2100
GMT
would
indicate
a
mission
over-‐burn
of
51
gallons.
These
examples
represent
a
2.4
to
3.5
GPH
variance
in
total
fuel
consumption
from
planning
calculations.
The
per-‐engine
fuel
use
variance
of
1.2
to
1.75
GPH
is
certainly
possible.
A
search
strategy
requires
calculation
of
where
the
aircraft
is
in
time
and
space,
and
how
much
fuel
and
time
remained,
after
arriving
in
the
Howland
area
at
1912
GMT.
Reference
Grids
Reference
points
are
plotted
in
the
search
grids,
including
the
Path
C
End
of
Navigation
(EON)
point
and
a
2013
GMT
position.
There
is
evidence
that
winds
in
the
final
8.5
hours
of
the
mission
either
decreased
in
headwind
component,
and/or
shifted
direction
to
come
from
slightly
left
of
course
and
at
reduced
strength.
In
order
to
address
the
effects
of
winds
that
may
not
have
been
detected
or
accounted
for
by
AE
and
FN,
an
analysis
was
completed
for
a
range
of
possible
wind
values.
This
analysis
applied
various
realistic
wind
values
to
fixed
headings
the
crew
could
have
maintained.
The
resulting
End
of
Navigation
points
are
contained
in
the
existing
search
grid.
The
Search
Plan
is
oriented
along
a
337-‐157
degrees
magnetic
compass
heading,
perpendicular
to
the
planned
magnetic
ground
track
from
Lae
to
Howland.
The
Search
Plan
accounts
for
possible
cross-‐track
error
en
route,
as
well
as
subsequent
Line
of
Position
(LOP)
ground
tracks
in
the
terminal
area
as
functions
of
true
or
magnetic
tracks.
The
LOP
established
by
FN
at
Howland
sunrise
in
preparation
for
AE’s
“about
100
miles
out”
position
report
at
1815
GMT,
was
337-‐157
degrees
true.
We
assess
AE
did
not
fly
the
LOP
initially,
nor
until
at
least
1928
GMT
(“…circling…”),
when
they
reported
flying
the
LOP
at
2013
GMT.
At
2013
GMT,
AE
reported,
“WE
ARE
ON
THE
LINE
OF
POSITION
157-‐337,
WILL
REPEAT
THIS
MESSAGE.
WE
WILL
REPEAT
THIS
MESSAGE
ON
6210
KCS.
WAIT
LISTENING
ON
6210
KCS.
WE
ARE
RUNNING
NORTH
AND
SOUTH.”
This
report
is
61
minutes
after
initial
arrival
at
where
they
thought
Howland
Island
was,
following
an
initial
search
of
the
area.
After
the
“circling”
report
at
1928
GMT,
they
likely
commenced
flying
the
LOP
tracks
in
a
rectangular
pattern,
progressing
further
east
on
each
LOP,
while
attempting
to
contact
Itasca
and
visually
acquire
Howland
Island.
Anxiety
was
reported
in
AE’s
2013
GMT
radio
transmission.
It
would
be
possible
that
under
the
circumstances,
AE
flew
northwest
on
a
heading
of
337
degrees
magnetic.
not accounting for a magnetic variation correction to FN’s LOP if it was indeed in degrees True.
The
10-‐degree
difference
between
true
and
magnetic
courses
in
search
grid
orientation
was
constructed
to
examine
positional
effects
on
search
operations.
Fuel
Remaining
The
amount
of
fuel
remaining
in
the
Electra
at
1912
GMT
is
important
because
it
determines
how
long
the
aircraft
could
stay
airborne,
and
how
far
it
could
fly,
before
fuel
exhaustion.
The amount of fuel remaining is a function of how much fuel was consumed.
This analysis is a challenge due to the need for estimation in the absence of empirical data.
Direct
evidence
from
AE,
and
World
Flight
data,
corroborate
that
mission
segments
were
flown
adhering
closely
to
the
accurate
Kelly
Johnson
specifications.
It
was
not
possible
to
conduct
test
flights
on
the
aircraft
to
acquire
necessary
performance
data
because
there
are
very
few
remaining
Lockheed
Electra
10E
aircraft.
The
one
article
we
photo-‐documented
is
not
flyable.
In
order
to
make
an
assessment
of
fuel
consumption,
and
the
possible
amount
remaining,
other
data
were
examined.
Fuel
Consumption
Constants
used
in
this
analysis
are
• Fuel
weight
is
6
pounds
per
gallon
(also
used
by
Swenson
and
Culick).
• Maximum
endurance
speed
is
120
mph
at
40
GPH.
o Estimated
from
L487
and
Pratt-‐Whitney
engine
data
(35-‐40
GPH).
• Takeoff
fuel
quantity
is
1080
US
gallons
(Swenson
and
Culick).
Each of these resources is limited to some extent, in its usefulness.
• Lockheed
Report
487
is
largely
analytical,
reflecting
computations
vice
actual
aircraft
performance.
The
L487
Report
includes
brake
horsepower,
however,
it
does
not
specifically
cover
engine
power
settings
frequently
used
and
reported
by
AE
in
her
flight
notes.
• None
of
the
three
Kelly
Johnson
telegrams
(issued
post-‐L487
Report)
containing
flight
test
data
mention
the
gross
weight
of
the
Electra
as
tested,
the
speed
associated
with
each
power
setting,
outside
air
temperature,
or
the
brake
horsepower
at
which
fuel
consumption
data
were
recorded.
From
the
Kelly
Johnson
flight
test
data,
notably
the
third
Telegram
to
AE,
mission
profile
recommendations
were
made
for
altitude,
power
setting,
and
fuel
consumption.
These
recommended
settings
were
grouped
into
3-‐hour
segments,
reflecting
that
Electra
aircraft
performance
is
relatively
unaffected
by
small
gross
weight
changes.
For
constant
altitude,
constant
speed
cruise
flight,
lift
must
balance
weight,
and
engine
power
must
balance
the
total
vehicle
drag
from
all
sources.
An
aircraft
design
axiom
is
that
an
“aircraft
climbs
on
its
engines.”
Excess
engine
power
beyond
that
required
for
cruise
flight
where
vehicle
drag
is
balanced
by
engine
power,
can
be
used
to
climb,
and
where
excess
power
is
limited,
climb
rate
is
also
limited.
Report
L487
indicates
climb
rates
at
AE’s
operating
weight,
should
be
in
the
range
of
600-‐700
feet
per
minute.
However,
Pellegreno
reported
routinely
requiring
20
minutes
to
reach
1,000
feet,
after
takeoff.
L487
optimum
initial
cruise
altitudes
were
2,000-‐4,000
feet.
Kelly
Johnson
modified
the
initial
cruise
altitude
to
8,000
feet.
In
practice,
climbing
the
heavy
Electra
to
8,000
feet,
10,000
feet,
or
higher,
likely
required
30-‐60
minutes
at
high
power
settings
of
approximately
500-‐550
BHP
and
high
fuel
consumption
ranging
from
95-‐110
GPH
(Pratt-‐Whitney).
AE’s
Electra
gross
weight
is
important
because
the
mission
routinely
operated
at
high
gross
weight.
Takeoff
from
Lae
was
at
approximately
15,500
pounds,
47.6%
above
design
maximum
gross
weight.
The
Lae
to
Howland
mission
average
gross
weight
was
approximately
22.9%
above
design
maximum
gross
weight.
One
concern
was
that
if
the
Kelly
Johnson
flight
tests
were
performed
at
significantly
“lower-‐than-‐actual-‐
mission”
aircraft
weights,
the
resulting
profile
recommendations
could
result
in
AE
experiencing
less
climb
rate,
slower
aircraft
speed,
and
higher
fuel
consumption
throughout
the
World
Flight.
The
empirical
data
from
Kelly
Johnson’s
flight
tests
are
very
close
to
Pratt-‐Whitney
engine
data,
and
likely
resulted
from
either
testing
the
Electra
at
actual
operational
weights,
or
from
computational
corrections
to
test
data,
producing
the
three
Telegrams
recommending
the
following
fuel
consumption
planning
data.
This
data
agrees
well
with
fuel
consumption
data
we
derived
by
calculations
from
Pratt-‐Whitney
engine
data
supplied
by
the
Smithsonian
Institution,
and
from
flight
handbooks
for
other
aircraft
using
the
same
engine
as
in
AE’s
Electra.
Kelly
Johnson
specified
settings
for
3-‐hour
cruise
segments,
however,
he
did
not
specify
takeoff,
climb
or
descent
fuel
consumption
data.
Combining
Pratt-‐Whitney
engine
data,
with
Kelly
Johnson’s
recommendations
and
data,
offers
a
more
complete
profile
of
fuel
consumption.
• If
AE
began
with
1080
gallons,
and
flew
this
Kelly
Johnson
profile
(“adjusted”
for
takeoff,
climb
and
descent)
requiring
920
gallons,
the
total
fuel
remaining
would
have
been
160
gallons
at
1912
GMT,
or
4
hours
endurance.
• Computer
flight
profile
modeling
of
data
largely
from
Kelly
Johnson
and
L487
data,
also
indicate
the
total
fuel
remaining
would
have
been
160
gallons
at
1912
GMT,
or
4
hours
endurance.
o While
our
Jeppesen
software
model
results,
in
terms
of
fuel
used,
corroborate
the
Kelly
Johnson/L487
Report,
our
further
analysis
offers
increased
accuracy
in
this
area.
• Swenson
and
Culick’s
analysis
concluded
that
AE
had
enough
fuel
for
20
hours
38
minutes
total
mission
time.
Subtracting
the
known
mission
time
of
19
hours
12
minutes,
results
in
approximately
1
hour
26
minutes
remaining
endurance.
o This
represents
57.3
gallons
remaining
at
1912
GMT.
• Our
research,
using
a
specific
flight
profile
segment
analysis
technique,
results
in
a
total
mission
fuel
burn
of
957
gallons.
Under
the
best
circumstances
AE
should
have
arrived
at
time
1912
GMT
with
123
gallons,
enough
for
3
hours
04
minutes
endurance.
o This
figure
could
have
been
reduced
due
to
malfunction
of
the
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer
and
increased
fuel
consumption
en
route
due
to
cruise
altitude
choices,
winds
or
other
factors.
Below
4
hours
fuel
quantity,
even
were
it
planned,
AE
would
likely
consider
this
a
low
fuel
quantity
situation,
as
she
reported
at
1912
GMT.
• With
fuel
remaining
of
4
hours,
per
Kelly
Johnson/L487,
and
software
modeling
solutions,
it
is
not
likely
that
AE
would
have
reported
a
low
fuel
condition.
• With
fuel
remaining
of
1
hour
26
minutes,
per
Swenson
and
Culick,
it
is
likely
AE
would
have
reported
a
low
fuel
condition,
but
possibly
with
a
sense
of
urgency,
due
to
the
extreme
nature
of
her
fuel
quantity,
with
just
57.6
total
gallons
remaining.
o Our
analysis
of
3
hours
04
minutes
fuel
remaining
falls
within
the
range
for
AE
to
report
a
low
fuel
condition,
but
without
a
sense
of
urgency.
This
figure
could
have
been
reduced
due
to
malfunction
of
the
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer
and
increased
fuel
consumption
en
route
due
to
cruise
altitude
choices,
winds
or
other
factors.
Unfortunately,
AE
made
no
reference
to
actual
fuel
burn,
and
drawing
conclusions
in
this
area
requires
analysis
from
a
broad
spectrum
of
data.
Assembling
various
aircraft
performance
data
elements
from
pre-‐mission
preparations,
and
30
days
of
the
World
Flight,
provides
information
on
engine
settings,
speeds,
altitudes,
etc.
These
can
be
used
to
assess
BHP,
from
which
specific
fuel
consumption
(SFC)
can
be
derived.
The
engine’s
specific
fuel
consumption
(SFC)
is
an
engineering
parameter,
defined
as
“pounds
of
fuel
per
brake
horsepower
per
hour.”
Since
this
term
is
difficult
to
put
into
perspective,
a
more
useful
metric
is
gallons
per
hour
(GPH).
SFC can be directly converted to GPH, and related to miles per gallon, range, and endurance.
We
examined
Pratt-‐Whitney
documents
from
the
Smithsonian
Institute
for
AE’s
engines,
Swenson
and
Culick’s
SFC
calculations,
and
flight
handbook
engine
operating
data
for
nearly
the
same
engine
installed
in
a
North
American
T-‐6
single
engine
aircraft,
as
well
as
for
the
Lockheed
10A
aircraft,
in
context
with
all
other
performance
data.
While
the
lack
of
Electra
10E-‐specific
operating
data
hampered
the
investigation,
we
found
that
published
operating
information
also
varies
among
sources.
Examples
include
• For
takeoff,
the
Pratt-‐Whitney
R-‐1340-‐S3H1
engine
has
a
5-‐minute
time
limit
at
that
power
setting,
per
Pratt-‐Whitney
documents.
• The
L487
report
specifies
setting
takeoff
power
for
1
minute,
then
directs
a
power
reduction
“…as
soon
as
it
is
safe…”
(L487
p6).
It
does
not
define
climb
conditions.
• Swenson
and
Culick
discusses
a
climb
power
setting
of
420
brake
horsepower
(BHP).
The
source
of
this
specification
is
not
provided.
• Pratt-‐Whitney
specifies
550
BHP
for
climb,
in
engine
data
charts.
For
cruise
power,
Swenson
and
Culick
does
not
discuss
power
settings.
L487
specifies
for
AE’s
initial
gross
weight,
a
cruise
power
setting
must
be
375-‐400
BHP.
The
graph
below
is
plotted
from
Pratt-‐Whitney
engine
data
for
AE’s
engines.
The
GPH
curve
(parabola)
is
relatively
flat
in
the
range
of
250-‐400
BHP
typically
used
for
cruise
flight,
producing
a
linear
relationship
of
BHP
and
GPH.
60.0
59.4
54.8
50.0
50.4
47.0
43.5
40.0
40.6
30.0
GPH
20.0
10.0
0.0
200
250
300
350
400
450
BHP
Figure
12
-‐
From
Pratt-‐Whitney
Engine
Data
BHP
setting
is
important
to
a
mission
fuel
analysis,
because
fuel
consumption
is
directly
proportional
to
BHP
and
gross
weight.
At
initial
heavy
gross
weights,
higher
BHP
in
the
range
of
375-‐400
BHP
is
required,
while
at
lower
gross
weights
(achieved
at
approximately
one
third
of
the
mission
distance)
power
can
be
reduced
to
more
economical
settings,
such
as
250
BHP,
to
maintain
prescribed
speeds
and
altitudes,
and
achieved
desired
ranges.
The
table
below
compares
sources
of
fuel
consumption
data,
with
the
associated
effect
on
the
mission
fuel
used
(Total
Gallons
Required).
As
corroboration,
the
P&W
R-‐1340-‐AN-‐1
engine
in
the
North
American
T-‐6
aircraft
achieves
its
best
long-‐
range
cruise
at
5,000-‐10,000
feet
altitude,
burning
22-‐23
GPH.
For
simplicity,
we
can
double
this
value,
to
approximate
a
representative
cruise
value
for
the
twin-‐engine
Electra
of
44-‐46
GPH.
Differences among source data are relatively reasonable for the 1937 period
• AT-‐6
engine
GPH
data,
doubled
to
approximate
Electra
fuel
consumption,
is
within
10%
of
simple
(non-‐weighted)
averages
for
Kelly
Johnson
and
Pratt-‐Whitney
data.
• Kelly
Johnson
and
Pratt-‐Whitney
GPH
data
are
within
3%
to
7%.
• L487
specifies
initial
cruise
fuel
consumption
of
57
GPH
o Within
4%-‐8%
of
Pratt-‐Whitney
data.
o Within
5%-‐11%
of
Kelly
Johnson
data.
• Kelly
Johnson
and
L487
cruise
fuel
burn
at
250
BHP
is
39.2
GPH
o Within
4%
of
Pratt-‐Whitney’s
published
chart
data.
o Two-‐thirds
of
the
Lae
to
Howland
mission
was
specified
to
be
flown
at
250
BHP,
which
was
also
used
by
AE
during
the
Natal
to
Dakar
Atlantic
Ocean
crossing,
earlier
on
the
World
Flight.
Pratt-‐Whitney
engine
data
examined,
to
date,
is
for
standard
conditions
of
pressure
and
temperature.
The
Lae
to
Howland
environmental
conditions
in
temperature
were
warmer
than
sea
level
standard,
which
increases
fuel
flow.
Flying
at
high
altitude,
while
not
exceeding
optimum
altitude,
has
a
small
positive
effect
on
reducing
fuel
flow
for
AE’s
engines.
These
effects
could
account
for
differences
between
Pratt-‐Whitney
engine
data,
and
Kelly
Johnson
flight
test
data.
After
departing
Lae
with
1080
US
gallons,
and
arriving
in
the
Howland
area
at
1912
GMT,
Fuel
Remaining
values
from
Kelly
Johnson,
L487,
and
our
specific
analyses,
are
all
among
the
9
unique
results
from
Swenson
and
Culick’s
interesting
and
comprehensive
sensitivity
analysis.
These
9
unique
results
are
shown
on
the
following
graph.
These
serve
as
increasing
confidence
in
identifying
reasonable
values
for
fuel
consumption,
fuel
remaining,
endurance
time
after
1912
GMT,
and
where
the
Electra
could
be
located.
15
10
Time
5
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
Case
Number
Figure
13
–
Swenson
and
Culick
conclusions
(Average
21.37
hours.
Standard
Deviation
1.58
hours)
• AE
had
sufficient
fuel
for
the
Lae
to
Howland
flight
under
existing
environmental
conditions,
for
Paths
A,
B
and
C,
plus
adequate
reserves
for
a
terminal
area
search.
• After
2013
GMT
there
were
no
further
transmissions
heard
from
NR
16020.
o Given
AE’s
communication
history,
this
is
uncharacteristic.
o AE
transmissions
are
expected
at
2030
GMT,
2045
GMT,
and
2100
GMT.
o This
supports
a
theory
of
a
pre-‐fuel
exhaustion
water
impact,
possibly
between
2013
GMT
and
2100
GMT.
This
may
result
from
a
CFIT
event,
or
a
mission
fuel
over-‐burn.
• The
fuel
consumption
rates
in
GPH
computed
from
Kelly
Johnson,
L487,
and
Pratt-‐Whitney
engine
data,
reasonably
agree
with
empirical
data
from
AE
flight
logs
and
position
reports,
in
the
range
of
250
BHP
prescribed
for
mission
cruise.
• A
summation
of
discrete,
mission
segment
analyses
can
produce
a
more
accurate
result
in
fuel
consumption,
using
BHP
and
SFC
with
all
other
data.
• Reaching
Gardner
Island,
at
approximately
400
statute
miles
distant,
at
120
mph
would
require
3
hours
22
minutes,
after
2013
GMT,
or
4
hours
22
minutes
after
arriving
at
Howland
Island
at
1912
GMT.
o Only
Case
4
and
5
in
Swenson
and
Culick’s
analysis
enable
this
result.
Position estimates result from search maneuvering and estimates of aircraft position in time.
• At
the
Path
C
EON
point,
the
aircraft
flys
west
for
10sm,
then
east
for
10sm,
then
east
another
10sm.
At
that
point,
AE
reported,
“circling,”
and
embarks
on
flying
the
LOP
as
a
magnetic
compass
heading
337
degrees.
• The
LOP
is
flown
for
20
minutes,
covering
40sm.
• A
turn
east
then
to
a
compass
heading
of
157
degrees,
requires
6-‐7
minutes,
where
the
aircraft
then
searches
southeast.
• This
pattern
is
continued
until
reaching
a
4-‐hour
fuel
exhaustion
point.
Three
key
locations
are
added
to
the
search
area,
corresponding
to
fuel
remaining
calculations,
from
Swenson
and
Culick,
Kelly
Johnson/L487,
and
our
analysis.
• It
is
realistic
to
expect
further
AE
radio
reports
from
2030
GMT
to
2100
GMT,
or
later.
• The
aircraft
would
be
located
in
the
search
grid
at
2100
GMT.
• Of
the
three
fuel
remaining
calculation
scenarios
o The
Kelly
Johnson/L487
point
is
considered
least
likely.
o The
Swenson
and
Culick
point
is
considered
possible.
o A
point
between
our
most
optimistic
calculation
and
the
Swenson
and
Culick
result
is
considered
the
most
likely
of
the
fuel
exhaustion
scenarios,
allowing
the
possibility
of
an
en
route
failure
of
the
Cambridge
Fuel
Analyzer,
slightly
increased
fuel
consumption
rates,
and
reduced
fuel
remaining
in
the
Howland
Island
area.
Search
Considerations
If
AE
used
fuel
differently
from
this
analysis,
she
likely
used
more
fuel,
not
less
fuel,
resulting
in
fuel
exhaustion
in
less
than
3
hours
04
minutes,
and
within
the
Search
Grid.
Intentionally
passing
overhead
the
island
to
establish
a
position
is
a
reasonable
intention.
Unfortunately,
there
is
no
evidence
to
support
the
theory.
If
we
suppose
that
it
did
occur,
then
the
course
to
Howland
Island
from
overhead
Nauru
Island
converges
with
the
Path
C
track,
terminating
within
a
few
miles
northwest
of
the
Path
C
End-‐of-‐Navigation
point.
No
matter
how
close
to
Nauru
Island
the
Electra
passed,
at
1912
GMT
on
Path
C
it
would
be
located
within
the
Search
Grid,
very
near
the
Path
C
EON
point.
From a position overhead Nauru Island, another possible course would parallel Path C to 1912 GMT.
This
is
considered
unlikely,
as
it
would
indicate
intentional
navigation
to
a
point
other
than
Howland
Island,
or
a
failure
to
correctly
navigate
to
Howland
Island.
Conclusion
The
effects
of
reasonable
lateral
deviations
place
the
aircraft
in
the
existing
Search
Grid
for
scenarios
of
wind
and
weather
considered
possible,
or
likely.
Appendix
2