WHO ARE WE?

AMERICA'S GREAT DEBATE

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

Twenty-first C e n t u r y America tember 11 brutally awakened Americans to the new reality distance no longer meant invulnerability. Americans found lves in a new war fought on many h n t s , the most important ich was right at home. After September 11, President Bush We refuse to live in fear." But this new world is a fearful and Americans have no choice but to live with fear if not in oping with these new threats requires difficult trade-offs the preservation of what Americans have assumed to be ditional freedoms and the preservation now of that most t freedom which they had taken for granted: the freedom

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CHAPTER 1 2

Twenty-first Century h e r i c a : Vulnerability, Religion, and National

I
nerability is central to how Americans define themselves new phase in the evolution of their national identity. In the en Americans spoke of their "homeland" they usually meant try from which they o r their ancestors had come to e new vulnerability made it clear to Americans, as ewman explained in Chapter 1, that America is their and that the security of that homeland has to be the prition of government Vulnerability gives new salience to identity. Vulnerability does not, however, end the identity r conflicts of the previous half century ult, at the end of the twentieth century the Creed was the 1source of national identity for most Americans. TWO factors d i s importance. First, as ethnicity and race lost salience and otestant cultwe came under serious attack, the Creed was e only unchallenged sunivor of the four major historical ts of American identity. Second, the Creed had acquired SaNS, comparable to what it had in the Revolution, as the haracteristic distinguishing America fmm the ideologies of an, Japanese, and Soviet enemies. Hence many Americans ve that America could he multiracial, multiethnic, and 1x1 core, and yet still be a coherent nation with its idened solely by the Creed. Is this, however, really the w e ? Can e defined only by a political ideology? ral considerations suggest the answer is no. A creed alone

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h e r i c a n identity began a new phase with the new ce salience and substance in this phase are being shaped by new mlnerability to external attack and by a new N m to gion in most of the world. ofthe soviet Union, the United States be w i t h the only superpower, holding a commanding lead every dimension of global power. September 11 demons was more vulnerable to attack than it had ever, that it almost two hundred years. The last time that somet september 11 happened in the continental United States ~~~~t 25, 1814, when the British burned the White H 1815 ~mericans came to assume that security and invu were inherent and lasting characteristics of their nation. Th tieth.cenNry-s were fought across thousands of miles 0 behind which they sat safe and free. Geographical se the contextfor how they detined themselves as a nafion.

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WHO ARE WE?

Historically, American identity has involved three 0th componentsas well as die Creed. For the Creed to become source ofnational identity would be a sharp break from th addition, few nations have ever been defined only by an idea set of political principles. The most notable modern cases ' communist states where that ideology was used either t people of different cu~tures and nationalities, as with Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, or to separates from other people of the same nationality, as with East and NO& Korea. These creedal or ideologically defined s the result of coercion. When communism lost its ap'pea incentive to maintain these entities ended with the Cold

Twenty-first C e n t u r y America

343

People can with relative ease change their political i Communists have become fervent anti-communists; denlo era]$ have embraced Marxism; socialists have adopted c ~n 2000, there could well have been in Dresden peop eighties who in their youth were sincere Nags, then beta communists, and after 1989 were sincere democrats. T the former communist world in the 1990s, former mmm regularly redefined themselves as liberal democrats, free

nondiscrimination, rule of law-are markers of how to ze a society. They do not detine the extent, boundaries, or ition of that society. Some proponents of a creedal concept argue that the Creed's political principles are in theory ble to people everywl~ere. If this is the case, however, they t be the only basis for distinguishing Americans from other . Democracy in various forms has spread to many more es, and 110 significant other secular ideology exists. Russians, e, Indians, and Indonesians who subscribe to the creedal les share something with Americans but they do not thereby Anmicans so long as they stay in their homeland, remain ed to that homeland and its culture, and identify primarily eir fellow Russians, Chinese, Indians, and Indonesians. They Americans only if they also migrate to America, participate rican life, learn America's language, history, and customs, erica's Anglo-Protestant culture, and identify primarily nca rather than with their country of birth. le are not likely to find in political principles the deep emocontent and meaning provided by kith and kin, blood and g, culture and nationality. These attachments may have little asis in fact but they do satisfy a deep human longing for meanommunity. The idea that "We are all liberal democratic in d ~ American e Creed" seems unlikely to satisfy that need. n, Ernest Renan said, may be "a daily plebiscite," but it is a te on whether or not to maintain an existing inheritance. ~tis, an also said, "the culmination of a long past of endeavors, sacd devotion."' W~thout that inheritance, no nation exists, and bisdte rejects that inheritance, the nation ends. America is "a d~the soul of a church." The soul of a church,however, do= solely or even primarily in i s theological dogma, but in its ymns, practices, moral commandments and prohibitions, rophets, saints, gods, and devils. So also a nation may, as oes, have a creed, but its soul is d e h e d by& common his~tions, cxlture, heroes and villains, victories and defeats, in its "mnystic chords of memory." reed was the product of people with a distinct Angloant culture. Although other peoples have embraced elemens

WHO ARE WE?

of this creed, the Creed itself is the result, as Myrdal argue ~ ~ ~ traditions, l i ~ dissenting h Protestantism, and Enlighte ideas of the eighteenth-century settlers. "The customs Americans of the United States are, then," Tocqueville sa peculiar cause which renders that people the only 0 ~merican nations that is able to support a democratic gov Their democratic institutions are the product "of the pra rience, the habits, the opinions, in short, of the custo ~ ~ ~ ~ "Wei the~people s of . the ~ United 2 States" had to en common ethnicity, race, culture, language, and religion b could "ordab and establish this Constitntion ofthk United America." The Creed is unlikely to retain its salience abandon the Anglo-Protestant cnlnlre in which it has A multicultural America will, in time, become a mu with groups with different cultures espousin political values and principles rooted in their particular September 11 dramatically symbolized the end of the

Twenty-first C e n t u r y America

in politics and culture.'" By the end of the century, the relius resurgence had become sufficiently extensive to generate m among secularists who had thought history was on their side. ligion is intrudimg in areas that are very disturbing," as the chairf one secular humanist group complained in 2002.' aspects of this development were of crucial importance. First, bers and proportions of Americans who were evangelical testants or who identified themselves as "born-again Christians" eased significantlyin the latter decades of the cennuy, as did the er and activities of evangelical organizations. Second, large ers of Americans became concerned about what they saw as the e in values, morality, and standards in American society and e to feel personal needs for believing and belonging that seclogies and institutions did not satisfy. The interaction of lytizing and institutional dynamism of the Christian cons and the spiritual needs and moral concerns of large of Americans made religion a key factor in public life and lity again a central feature of American identity.
o f Conservative C W f y . Between 1990 and 2000, the growing denominations in terms of adherents were the ons (with a 19.3 percent increase) and the conservative evanI Christian Churches and Churches of Christ (18.6 percent ase) and the Assemblies of God (18.5 percent increase), folby the Catholic Church (16.2 percent increase). The nhip of the Southern Baptist Convention increased by 17 between 1973 and 1985, while mainline Protestant groups

identity takes on new relevaice in this environment.

AMERICANS TURN TO RELIGION

In, 1984, the Reverend Richard John Neuhaus ~ublish

The Naked Public Square: Religion and D m w a c y in Amen' he decried the absence of religious influences, perspec groups from American public life. A decade later the s filling up rapidly. In the 1990s, religious ideas, conce groups, and discourse underwent a dramatic resurgenc presence of religion in public life far exceeded what it h lier in that century. "One of the most striking and features of late-20th-century American life," Patric observed, "has been the re-emergence of religious feeling

ealed to 30 percent or more of the American people. The rt to organize this constituency comprehensively was the Majority, founded by Jerry Falwell in 1979. It faded in the 980s and was siiperseded by the Christian Coalition, estahby Pat Robertson in 1989, which by 1995 reporredly involved

WHO ARE WE?

roughly 1.7 million people. Other evangelical organiza included Focus on the Family, with two million SuPPorte American Family Association, with 600,000 memben, the P Keepers, involving hundreds of thousands of men, and Con women for ~merica, which with 600,000 members was purpo the largest women's organization in the counU$ Christian multiplied in number and circulation. By 1995, some 130pu were bringing out Christian books, and forty-five others were k g textbooks and other school materials. The sales of books, marketed by seven thousand Christian book retailers to $3 billion a year between 1980 and 1995. Christian nove best-sellers, with the Left Behind series by Tim LaHaye andJ ~ ~ ~selling k i 17 ~ million s copies by 2001. Five million co ~ r ~ ~aretti's n k three religious novels had been sold by 199 1995, there were more than 1,300 religious radio stations television stations. By the late 1990s, a huge network of retail stores had come into existence selling a variety of with Christian themes and doing billions of dollars' wo six hundred or more mega-churches with congregations thousand to twenty thousand t h a t had emerged by 2002. In the 1990s, extending their reach beyond their co stimency, kvangelical organizations, most notably the C coalition, moved into politics and elections. Thqrfocused roots organizing, local issues, and raising funds in small from large numbers of supporters. Numerous in the gelicals traditionally voted Democratic. As they b politically conscious, however, their artisan loyalties chan matically. Fifty-one percent of evangelicals voted for Ji in 1976, but Ronald Reagan successfully appealed to the and by 1988 they were solidly Republican. In 2000, Ge Bush received 84 percent of the votes of white Protestants who attended church regularly, and evang up perhaps 40 percent of his mtal vote.' Evangelicals ha key force within the Republican Party The Christian Coalition and other groups were mu cwful in appealing to the general public on particular i

Twenty-first Century America to remove Clinton from office failed in the Senate and was not orsed by the American public. Their efforts to prohibit abomon to promote other policies that challenged centrist opinion came aught. Their substantial electoral activities in 1998, including hristian Coalition's disaibution of 45 million voter gujdes, did reduce the gabs they had hoped for. Following that election, lservative Christians were ready to give up politics and conon promoting their values at the individual and c 0 m - v The "political mobilization of conservative Christians has ,"Andrew Kohut and his associates concluded in 2000. TWO later, it was reported that many of them had become "disillud with the world of Caesar," and the Christian Coalition was shadow of its former self."8 limited success of the Christian conservatives in pushing ar items on their political agenda was overshadowed by their 5s in responding to the psychological and moral needs of ricms. They advanced a compelling arpment that morality lue, which ultimately derive from religion and which had the 1970s and 1980s, must be reasserted in social and polit. The "religious-conservative movement," as ~ ~ v i d an said in 1999, was comparable to the civil rights and movements of the mid-twentieth century in the impact it on American thought, values, and discourse. "Religious cons have changed the American conversation. They have who participates in that conversation, they have changed ions brought to bear on that conversation, they have tone of that conversation, and they have changed the of it. They may even eventually change the conclusion of ole Shields, president of People for the ~merican way, a organization opposed to the Christian right, regretfully "They've changed the rules. What's bad is good, what's good All of what they have done changes how we think about

a!ndReligion. The religious conservatives were able to gioll back into the public square only because vast numben 'cans were eager to welcome it there. In the 1980s,

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WHO ARE WE?

Americans increasingly and overwhelmingly focused on could be interpreted as evidence of moral decay: tolerant behavior previously considered unacceptable, teenage pre single-parent families, mounting divorce rates, high levels widespread drug use, pornography and violence in the me the perception that large numbers of people were living the on the welfare rolls funded by hardworkingtaxpayer there seemed to be feelings, first, that more meaningful community and civil society had disappeared, and, as Pumam demonstrated, Americans were bowling alone ra coming together; and, second, that the prevailing deriving from the 1960s, held there were no absolut moral principles and everything was relative. and behavioral standards in schools had eroded, and A m Daniel PaaickMoynihan said, "defining delinquencydoum, foms of belief and behavior, short of the clea tolerated. Facing these challenges, Americans increasingly turned gion and religions concepts to meet what Michael Sand "the vague but pervasive hunger for a public life of lar ings."lQAs the sponsors of a 2000 poll on religion in concluded: "One message arrived loud and clear: strongly equate religion with personal ethics and hehavio ering it an antidote to the moral declme they perceive in o today. Crime, greed, uncaring parents, believe that all these problems would be mi more religious. And to most citizens, it doe gion is involved."" Between 1987 and 1997, Kohut an colleagues demonstrate, increases of 10 percent or more the proportions of Americans who "strongly agreed" th no doubt God existed, that inevitably they their sins before God on Judgment Day, that God per cles in today's world, that prayerwas an important part of th life, and that clear guidelines distinguishing good from e weryone everywhere. These increases took place in eve religious category: evangelical, mainline, and black Pr Catholics, and even seculars. In 2002, after the attacks on

Twenty-first Century America 349 t of Americans believed that the apocalyptic prophecies of ok of Revelation would come mie." e need ofAmericans to secure moral reassurance and psychoa1 security from religion took popular form in the exaaord'mary 1craze that swept the country in the 1990s. In 1993,69 percent s said they believed in angels, stimulating CBS to launch Angel, which by 1998 had become one of 737's most rograms, with 18 million viewers. It "touched a chord," executive accurately observed, 'which America desperts."" Evangelical preachers and writers also responded to nt. As the sociologistJames Davison Hunter has shown, the of evangelical ministers such as James Dobson, on the Family, were a "breathtaking" combir~ation of ology and traditional biblical teaching. The evangelought "to co-opt psychology for their own purposes, making cepts subordinate to biblical wisdom. The premise is ychology provides tools that are, by themselves, theologind morally nentral but useful all the same when linked to the of the Christian faith."" e turn to religion was evident in the corporate world. "Driven arch for meaning, unsatisfied by bigger paycheh or lofty tions, and a desire to reconnect with their faith," it was d in 1998, "white-collar workers are crowding breakfast er meetings and lunchtime Bible studies in conference rooms versity clubs." Reportedly the number of workplace an groups doubled to ten thousand between 1987 and 1997, me there also were an estimated one thousand Torah and ed Muslim study groups in the American corporate world. onps, it was argued, provided an antidote to the "rampant ,cut-throat competition, and greed" prevalent in 'or denominations also tended to renun to or to adopt more onal religious practices. In the 1970s, the country's largest tant denomination, the Southern Baptist Convention, with 16 n menibers, had moved in a conservative direction, endorsing ~cal inerrancy," the belief that the Bible is the very word of ,,completelywithout error. In subsequent years, it affirmed its sition to abortion and homosexuality and its approval of the

WHO ARE WE? to their husbands, the latter stance c of to lose one ofits more prominent members, Ji-Y Carter. he leaders of Reform Judaism overwhelmingly voted to many of the rituals and practices associated with Orthodox induding wearing of the yarmulke and expanded use of H ~~~i~~ the 1990s the number of Catholic dioceses Per masses in L ~ & or in English and Latin increased from six to 1 70 percent of the total." B~ the 1990s, Americans overwhelmingly ~ U P P O * ~ a~ role for religion in American public life. In a 1991 survey, 78 of the respondents favored allowing children on school gro to have voluntary Bible classes, and to hold mee say voluntary Christian fellowship groups. Some 67 percent favor display ofnativitysceues or menorahs on government ProPe percent approved prayers before athletic games; and 74 P opposed removing all references to God from oaths of pub $5 percent said they thought religion this same l i d e influence in American life, while 30 percent thought it fight amount, and 11 percent (roughly equal to the propo* say they are agnostic or atheist) thought it had too hei- also viewed more favorably the role of churches affairs. I~ the 1960s, 53 percent of Americans thought that c should not be involved in politics, while 40 percent thou amptable. By the mid-1990s, the proponions had reverse centthought that churches should speak out on political and issues, 43 percent thought they should not.''
~ ~ in poljtja. l @ The ~ activities ~ of the religious come and the sentiments of the public made religion a key ele &merim politics In 2000, the moderate Republican gov I(ansas, Bill Graves, referring to the religious conserva that in 1990 YOU talked about economic issues 90 pe time and some of their kinds of things 10 percent of the you're talking about their issues 50 percent of the time a ofissue 50 percent of the time!' Following the Christian tives and Republicans, Democrats and other groups mshe in the crusade for values, particularly "family values." '

Twenty-first C e n t u r y America

mot afford to ignore these things."19 ~ n they d e amount of space devoted to values and cultural issues in m s of the major pames increased dramatically (although ss than 10 percent of the total platforms), with he~~~~~,-+i~ rms of 1988 and 1996 devoting about twice as much space to issues as the Republican ones. And in 1999 A1 G~~~ declared With respect to g o v e m e n t support for religion, " ~ moment h ~ me for Washington to catch up with the rest of~merica,"'" shington was already beginning to catch up with ~ ~ gworld War n, the idea had become widely prevalent &ar nstitution required the total separation of government and n. Governments should not provide supporn of any sort for s groups or activities andshould not allow religious groups e public facilities. .Federal courts held that it was illegal to e God in public school ceremonies, to require prayer in ,-lass, 0 have Bible readings in school. Governmental agencies went derable lengths to avoid any form of engagement with es and religious organizations. The latter were, in effect, d from forms of participation in society and public life open t other p h t e organizations. e'*efigioussurge of the 1980s and 1990schallenged dris exclufreligion from public life, and Congress, the executive branch, t importantly, the coum began to respond positively. ~n an opinion outlawing state subsidies for the salaries of schoolteachers, the Supreme Court held that to be con1, government actions had to have a secular purpose, could dvance or inhibit religion, and could not create ccexcessive hmX" of government w i t h religion. wth the appointments deral bench by the Reagan and firstBush administrations, the courts began to become more tolerant of religion ic square. Signaling this shift, Chief sig ti^^ willjam

~~w~

WHO ARE WE! in 1985, "The wall of separation between ch Rehnquist and state is a metaphor based on bad history. It should be fr abandoned."" And slowly but surely the wal and breached if not abandoned. According to Kenneth analysis building on that of Joseph Kobylka, between 1943 of twenty-three supreme court cases invol 1980, church-state.issues were separationist in their outcome, eight accommoda~onist,a n d ' M ~ were mixed. Bemeen 1981 and hebalance shifted dramatically: out of a total of thhnythre the decisions were separationist in twelve, accommodationi and inone mixed." The issues that came U P wereho tested by religious and secular groups, the battles taldng P three fronts. government provide financial or F&~,to what extent ,pport to educadonal and charitable activities carried outb gious organizations? Many private groups, some religious, not, argued that churches and other religious orga*zatiO peculiarlysuited to cope with the problems of crime, drugs quency, teenage pregnancy, single-parent families preval ~ ~ inner cities. ~ ~es ~~ o n d i n i g 'these t o ~argumenal ~ . y congress passed and Clinton signed a welfare reform "charitable choice^^ provision that authorized states to con religious organizations to support welfare and community ,ntprograms. his option, howwer, was not extended bureaucratic resistance limited the fun social programs, acmally wentto religious organizations. As governor G~~~~~ W. ~~h actively promoted charitable choice an merit support for social services provided by religious Or including christian ministries to those in Texas pds faith-based organizations became a central theme of his Pres' ampaign, and in 1999 ~lGore endorsed this cause: "IfYou e president, the voices of faith-based organization will be int the policies set forth in my administration." "We must embrace fai&.based approaches that advance our share Americans," he told the Salvation Army." T~~ days after his inauguration, President Bush set 0 gram for federal support for religious groups perfomn

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Twenty-first Century America 353 Nice, including the creation of a White &use ofice of ~ a i t h sed and Community Initiatives and centers in five cabinet a-ents to facilitate this program. Congress did not approve slation to implement it and, as a result, in December 2002, ~~~h sued a broad executive order prohibiting federal agencies from uding religious organizations from receiving funds for cornmurograms and social services. "The days of discriminating religious groups just because they are religious,3J~~~h "are coming to an end." His statement, according to the Erk T i m e r , was'."infnsed with references to faith and was built dtheidea that religion can and should occupy a place d private life."" e biggest step toward government support for religion, howwas the Supreme Court's 5-to-4 decision in J~~~2002 onzing Parents to use government-issued vouchers to pay for tion of their children in church-m sch001s. ne decision was hailed and denounced as the most important court decision on e-church relations in the forty years since it outlawed 01 Prayer. The general proposition that seemed to emerge from ~ d other decisions is that government may give aid to nizations and use them, like other private organizations, to on'ote accepted public and social purposes, provided it does not minate among religious groups. e second area of conflict and change concerned he use of ent Property or facilities, particularly s c h o o ~by , religious s or for religious purposes. In 1962 the Supreme court had ked compulso~ prayers in schools. This holding has not met 1 challenge, but efforts have been made to explore what activities might be permissible in government facilities. Fess passed the Equal Access Act, requiring to it the use of their facilities by religious groups on the same they did for secular groups. The Supreme Court's decision in upholding its constitutionality was followed by the proliferastudent religious clubs and prayer groups in the sou& 1995, the Clinton administration issued guidelines prog school officials from preventing students praying or religion at school. The Constitution, clinton said, "does

Twenty-first Century America

not require children to leave their religion at the schooIh0us

T~~ years later, Adam Meyerson repom, the administration

ent support for activities by religious organizations that useful social purposes. The creation in the %te H~~~~ of flice for Faith-Based and Charitable Initiatives was an unprece-

t in a way in which it had never been before.

fis

legacy" could be "his leadership in reducing th were more. concerned with the moral or economic problems h e country, 58 percent of Americans chose moral problems

cus on religion. h a poll taken immediately after heelecPercent of Americans said that "more religion is the best ~mengthenfamily values and moral behavior in ~ ~ ~ Percent =id they wanted the influence ofreligion in ~~~~i~~

t t 0 how they voted. Denominational membership has always laced to partisan choice. In the mid-twentieth century, main-

CS shifted toward

move in the Democratic direction, while non-~spanic the Republicans. Voting i n 2000 contimed

WHO ARE WE?

Twenty-first Centnry America

Tabk 12.1

eerlring these denominational differencs, however, W development involving differences in reIigiosity. Begin& 1970s, the differences between the two 'major parties Over and culhlral issues increased significantly. Bemeen 19y2 a as ~ ~ ~ Layman f fhasrshown, ~ delegates ~ to Demomatic who anended church weekly or more never a c e 40 percent and by 1992 had dropped below 30 Percent. cencdge of Democratic delegates who said refigion provi witha great deal of guidance in their lives never went centand in 1992 was 25 percent. The propomon delegates who regularly attended church, in contrast, r about 43 percenr in 1972 to 50 percent i n 1992, with 5 5 P the 1992 fist-time delegates falling in that category. T h of Republican delegates for whom religion provided a guidance went from 35 percent in 1976 to 44. percent i n 199 for first-time delegates. Democratic Pnml ac 49 short, consistendy had low levels of religious activity and while the religious involvement of Republican over two demdes. A new "Feat dim increased religion had emerged. "Religious conservatives from'mo major Christian traditions," Layman concludes, "but Par among evangelical Protestants, tend to support the R Party, while the Democratic party draws 1% support dispr of religious liberals in the major faithen ately from the and ~ecnlarists."~~ These tendencies became dramatically &dent amon 2000. Frequency of church attendance rivaled incom although not race, a s a predictor of voting behavior (see ~h~ differences between the more and less religiously existed wjthin denominations. T h e proportions votin among the following groups were:
More observant WThite mainline Protestants White evangelical Prorestants
0

Votes for President 2000

e differences coincided with growing differences between fie activists on culmral issues such as abortion, the ~~~~l ~ i ~ dmenb conmol, gay rights. Fifty-six percent of the 1996 lican and 27 percent of the Democratic delegates s ~ d vemment&odd do more to promote baditional values, pmYer was endorsed by 57 percent of the Republican 20 t of the Democratic delegates:9 th, the election also wimessed a totally new level of discusf their religious beliefs by candidates for national ~ i k ~ her =ends, too had been developing during the John E Kennedy had tried to separate his religious his political mle, saying he favored "a president whose are his own private affairs." Jimmy carter started Pattern, articulating and explaining his religious beliefs, s successors except for the first Bush. "Ever since the elecllmY '&ter i n 1976," Wilfred McClay noted in 2000, "he n the expression of religious sentimen6 by~mericanpolitders seems to have been steadily eroding, to fie extent that idential candidates in the current campaign have been od and Jesus Christ at a pace not seen since the days of Bryan." With the lone exception of Bill ~ ~ ~ Oo0 national candidates responded to what they saw as the interest i n and endorsenlent of refigion by serringfod and

WHO ARE WE?

Twenty-first C e n t u r y America

faith in America's public life. As a people, we need to reaffir faith and renew h e dedication of our nation and ourselves and God's p~rpose."'~ by the other candidates were notable h ~h~

of themselves as a religious and a christian people,

T H E GLOBAL RESURGENCE OF RELIGION*

candidates for the Republican nomination went on 'ha

over faith as a source of human ~h~ ninesaw increasing confidence that science would d e h o n e n. Mankind, it was widely believed, was moving intoa new

would ask himself "What would Jesus do?"" this firstelection with a Jewish candidate for nation candidates thus shifted from "God talk" to "Chri

In the Public arena, refigion gave way to ideology. people,

social movements were defined by their identification one of the major secular ideologies: liberalism, socialism,

rtions of this section are taken from my essay 'q-he ~ ~ lpactor i in ~ i Poli~a,"Swiss Institute of International Studies, universiry ,,f zuri*, 24

WHO ARE WE?

Twenty-first Century America movement, and a religiously defined political party won an election agovernmentin 2002. N e w s concept of kdia as a set-

alignments and conflicts, and provided n ~ o d e l s ~ ~ organize their p~litics and economies. ,irt,,,,, In the last quarter of the twentieth cenmry, however, the was reversed. An almost global resurgence mTVad gion got under way, manifest in almost every Part world-CePt in western Europe. Elsewhere in countries theworld, religious political movements gained suPPorters.

and took control of the government. B ~ ~ -

majority of the global population, are in the midst of a The resurgence is most strongly affecting comnniSt cou&es of Eastern Europe, Central Asia, caucasus, as well as Latin America, the Middle East, Ah-ic

Pam ofthe world. These conflicts often havepoli+ical or ecor i in disputes ~ ~ over territory or resources, po1itidans,

rly acute i n conact zones such as B ~ ~K-~, ~ ; ~C h , ehya, and the rest of India and Pakistan, N ~ beland, & ~ he ~ sub-Saharan Africa, and parts o f ~ i a : ~ ~ following e

MILITANT ISLAM VS. AMERICA

WHO ARE WE?

created by Gorbachev with an unmistakably new

Twenty-first C e n t u r y America

smggles between pro- and anti-communists in erican unions in the 1930s and 1940s. President ~~~~~i refer-

differences, however, exist between the

was but
'la

branch or an agent O f the U.S.n'8

cOntemPorq Islamist movements. First, a single major srate

well describe America's new Islamic enemies:

hatit is desirable and necessary that the internal harm0 be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destc authority of our state be broke*?'

m Christians fought against Muslim rule. ~

governmen* in Iran and Sudan, militant non-~slamist L i b ) , and Muslim terrorist organiza~ons, most

WHO ARE. WE?

Twenty-first Century America

in the 19gOs and 1990s, to the "war on terrorism" after Septe 11 to a full-scale conventional war against Iraq in 2003. This e

erica as their If that is a fate Americans avoid, alternative is to accept it and to take the measures necesRecent

suggests that America is likely to be involved in

Muslims see as a war on Islam.

unfavorablen view of America in Turkey and Lebanon. I n

an rnfavorable view of the United States."

part horn American support for Israel. It also has deeper

WHO ARE WE?

Twenty-first C e n t u r y America
I n this new phase, three broad concepts exist of America in on to the rest of the world. Americans can embrace the world,

ideal would be an open society with open borders, encouraging national ethnic, racial, and cultural identities, dual citizenship,

make the war a "real" war. identity and reasonably high levels of national unity.

be multiethnic, multiracial, multiculnual. Diversity is a

war in ~ r a was q part ofthe war on terrorism and belonge Iraq posed serious threats to American security and the a tion was respon&mg efficiently and economically. Critics a effect that the war belonged in Box B: Iraq had not b e r i c a , posed no serious threat to America or its vital i n

eliminated communism as the overriding factor shaping Reserves), while American soldiers were being M e d a1

policy goals without having to confront the charge that those )mpromised national security and hence to promote nation
IMPERIAL, AND/OR NATIONAL?

WHO ARE WE?

Twenty-first Century America hat distinguishes America from those societies. b e r i c a cannot ecome the world and still be America. other peoples cannot come American and still be themselves. America is different, at difference is defined in large part by its A ~ ~ Icul- ~ and its religiosity. The alternative to cosmopoliclnism ~erialismis nationalism devoted to the preservation and enhance. mentof those qualities that have defined America since ie fouodkg. ~ Religiosity ~ distinguishesAmerica from most other western sociAmericans are also overwhelmingly christian, which stin~ishesthem from most non-Western peoples, ~ h ~ ireli,. Osin/leadsAmericans to see the world in t e r n of good and evil to much greater extent than others do. The leaders of other societies find this religiositynot only extraordinary but also exasperatB for the deep moralism it engenders in the consideration of cal, economic, and social issues. and nationalism have gone hand in hand in the listory of St As Adrian Hastings has shown, the former often defined content of the latter: "Every ethnicity is shaped by O n just as it is by language. . . . F E ~ christianity ~ ~ has ~ national fornation.""The connection bemeen and nalism was alive and well at the end of the twentieth century, Ose that are more religious tend to be more UweY of fo3-one countries found that those societies in which ": People gave a uhi&" rating to the importance of ~~d in their were also those in which more people were proud,, of eir country (see Figure 12.1)> comnies, individuals who are more religious also tend to nationalist. A 1983 survey of fifteen, mo+ E ~ ~ that "in every counhy surveyed, those who said the,, were religious are less likely to be proud oftheir country.n on average, difference is 11 percent.& Most European peoples rank low in lief i n God and their pride in country. h e r i c a and Poland close to the top on both dimensions, Catholicism ssential to Irish and Polish national idel,tity. ~ ~ j ~ tantism is tend to America's. Americans are overwheJmingly tted to both God and mutry, and for Americans dley are In a world in which religion shapes the allegiances, rhe

the idea of an h e r i c a n empire and the we of b e r i a POwe according to American values. reshape the *heimperial impulse was thus fueled by beliefs in the supre of h e r i c a n power and the universality of American America,spower, it was argued, far exceeded that of otherindivid nations and groupings of nations, and hence America had responsibility to create order and confront evil throughout world. ~ ~to the universalist ~ belief, ~ the people ~ of Other d so i do eties have basically the same values as Americans, or if have them, they want to have them, or if they do not them, hey misjudge what is good for their society, and have he responsibility to persuade them or to induce the a embrace the universal values that America espouses. In b e r i m loses its identity as a nation and becomes the donun ,,ponent of a supranational empire. assumption nor the universalist ass the don accurately reflects the state of the e a r l ~ - t v J e n t y - ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ world. ~merica is the only superpower, but there are Other powers: ~ ~ Germany, i ~ ~ France, i ~ Russia, , China, Japan at a level, and Brazil, India, Nigeria, Iran, South Africa, Indonesia their regions. ~ m e r i c a cannot achieve any significant goal the cooperation of at least some of these co world ~h~ culture, values, traditions, and institutionsof othersode also often notcompatible with reconfiguringthose societiff in , f b e r i c a n values. Their peoples normally feel deeply co to their indigenous cultures, traditions, and institutions, an efforts to change them by outsidem from alie fiercely mres. ~n addition, whatever the goals of U.S. elites, the Ameri ranked the promodon of demonay ab public has as a low-priority foreign policy -goal. In accordance with '<the P dox of democracy,"the introduction of democracy in other so also often stimulates and provides access to power for an as nationalistic pop&* movements in La forces, and fundamentalistmovements in Muslim countries. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ and ~ ~ imperialism l i t attempt a ~ ito ~ reduce m or inate the social, political, and cultural differences bemeen societies. A national approach would recognize and

WHO ARE WE?

Pride t i and ~ thelrnpormnce ~ ~ l of God

NOTES

Chapter 1. The Crisis of National Identity

1. L-a Research Co. survey of 1,WO adults, 3 October 2001, reportedin USA T * , 19-21 October 2001, p. 1. 2.NmErk Em, 23 September 2001, p. B6. 3. Rachel Newman, "The Day the World Changed, I Did T O O , " N ~ 1~&,

1990-1991 World Values survey, R O W ~ngleha* ~ ~ and Marit' Carballo" Latin America Eist) ( h d ls 'l-here a ConfucianCulture?):A GlobalAnalysis of CrossCulmral Ditferen,..s; ps: polirical Srienrc and Politid, 30 (March 1997), p.

heantagonisms of people on every continent, it allimces, again turn to religion to find their not be surprising if ~~~~i~ national identity and their national p 1 e . Significant elements of American elites are favorably disposed to America becoming a cosmopolitan society. Other elites wish it to ass,me an imperial role. T h e overwhelming hulk of the American

remains ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Imperial? o~ l i t a National? in ? ~ T h e choi~ ~ e r i c m make s will shape their future as a nation and the