The battle between rationality and subjectivity in scientific

theory choice

Introduction
It is by far accepted in science the existence of theories, despite the differences in the interpretation
of the word's meaning, although most commonly referred to as the set of beliefs regarding our
reality (e.g. the New Oxford American Dictionary defines a theory as a “supposition or system of
ideas intended to explain something”). This paper will take for granted the existence of something,
even not quite specified, called theory and move on to examine instead what happens when
scientists are confronted with choosing among different theories, for the purpose of determining
where the truth lies in science.
Choosing a theory or another has great implications on the current conception of the world by the
scientist, as well as on the future possible developments of a certain scientific field. Therefore,
carefully selecting the first step of a determined scientific direction is a very heartfelt topic, both in
science and in philosophy of science.
Theory choice involves a decision on which, among different theories, can be considered more
“true” than another. Being a decision, it can be characterized as either rational/objective, or
subjective, or a mix of the two. Philosophers have for long time debated the character of this
decision, in order to determine its validity and its consequences. Additionally, philosophers have
been exploring theory choice both as a normative issue (i.e. confronted with two theories, which
one should we pick?) and as a historical issue (i.e. how have been theories chosen in the history of
science?).
This paper will outline the history of such debates in light of both “battlefields” (rational vs.
subjective and history of science vs. philosophy of science). Then, an author’s own intepretation
will be advanced. In the end, the open issues still to be resolved will be presented.

Rationality 101: Bacon

In the dawn of scientific method, Francis Bacon was a keen supporter of observationism. To him,
Nature would disclose its secrets and its truth only to the people who observed with no prejudice in
mind, with no particular bias to hamper their observations. Prejudice, manifesting itself in
traditions, culture and habits, produced expectations of our observations; those expectations
distorted the results of our observations, by interpreting them against our preconceived theories.
In this methodology, science was an objective discipline: with the proper mindset one could reveal
the truth of Nature and therefore, of life; Nature was there for all of those with a pure mind who
would have access to it and the truth was one and available for everybody with the right tools.
To Bacon, Aristotle's geocentric theory was the truth, since he was able to open his eyes and see that
the sun is revolving around the earth and not the other way round. Theory choice for Bacon was
more a matter of revelation, than choice.

A little bit of subjectivity in the picture: Popper

Karl Popper opposed Bacon's methodology: to him, “a pure mind is an empty mind” and no
observation could be done without preconceived notions. The very fact of observing something
would prove that we're explicitly choosing an observation object and we have expectations about it.
In Popper, we can see the first differentiation of two important areas: the context of discovery and
the context of justification. In the first one, the scientist would come up with a theory; in the second
one, the scientist would prove it right/wrong. According to Popper, the context of discovery was not
so much important as the one of justification: a famous example given by the philosopher is the
discovery of the structure of a benzene molecule in a dream of some scientist. The context of
justification is where Popper's main idea comes into play: theories should be falsifiable; an instance
or an observation that proves the theory wrong should be possible. For example, one could derive
the theory that all swans are white by observing some white swans in a lake: in that case, finding
anywhere else a black swan in the world would prove the theory wrong; the very idea of having an
observation that could prove the theory wrong makes the theory falsifiable.
In Popper's philosophy, theory choice works by gradual substitution of theories with better ones and
with the growth of knowledge: as soon a theory is falsified, it is substituted by another one who
hasn't been yet falsified. In case of more not yet falsified theories, the one that accounts for the
biggest number of observations should be considered the best one.

Subjectivity big time: Kuhn

Kuhn shifts the attention from the normative field, where Popper has been mostly focusing on, to
the historical development of science. In his The structure of scientific revolutions, he shows to the
reader that theory choices (or better, in his terms, paradigm shifts) occur as a “leap of faith” by
scientists, with no real objective criteria underneath them.
However, as a response to his critics, he explains more in detail the fact that he does indeed see
rational/objective criteria for theory choice, but their interpretation is highly subjective.

Rationality hits back: Lakatos

Kuhn's works turned the issue of theory choice, in the words of his own critics, to a “matter of mob
psychology”. Imre Lakatos, reflecting on Popper's and Kuhn's writings, produced an elaborate
methodology which tried to encompass both views and gain back the elements of rationality that
were missing in Kuhn. His methodology of scientific research programmes outlines a network of
theories, some more fundamental than others, that constitutes a scientific programme. Each
programme can grow, by acquiring new detailed theories that confirm the observations, or shrink,
according to falsifying observations. At one point in history, one programme overcomes the other,
because of its bigger capacity in explaining existing observations; there's no guarantee however that
the defeated programme won't “come back” to prove itself right.
In this context, choosing between scientific programmes is a rational endeavour, since it involves
observing whether a programme is growing (progressing) or not (degenerating).
History of science confirms this view and shows also how one can never be sure of which
programme will eventually succeed.

Subjectivity all the way: Feyerabend

The latest writings on the topic at hand are by Paul Feyerabend. His view on the normative aspect
of theory choice is totally demeaning: no real progress can be made with a methodology that limits
the scientist's activities when approaching and working with reality and that deprives scientists from
their human component.
To Feyerabend, anarchism rules and history of science confirms it.

A look at the issues

Throughout this long historical debate, philosophers have put forward arguments related a number
of elements related with theory choice. In order to discuss about the current topic, an overview of
these elements is necessary, to identify connections and influences among them, as well as their
current status of development throughout the various philosophical positions.
Theory-ladeness of observation
One of the main arguments against rationality in theory choice is that observations are influenced
by our own prior theories and beliefs. Differently from Bacon’s prejudice, these beliefs and theories
can’t be ultimately separated, isolated and eliminated from our mental processes, since they’re
either born naturally with us or they’re product of our own personal history and development. In
other words, we might not know it, be we’re naturally biased. The extent of the bias is and has been
debated as one of the central issues in theory choice.
Algorithms of choice
Once theories are put forward, the other step of the process is actually choosing them, or more
specifically executing a certain algorithm of choice. For Popper, the algorithm was accepting the
theory with the bigger number of observations explained. For others, the algorithm involved
comparison and ranking theories according to a certain set of criteria.
Criteria of choice
The criteria according to which theories are evaluated and subsequently chosen one over the other is
another central issue. Kuhn, for example, admits that such criteria might exist, but their
interpretation is subjective so they don’t play in favour of the rational interpretation of theory
choice.
Progress
And finally, when a pattern comes out of all the theory choices made over the years, a fundamental
question is: what does this pattern look like? Is there progress? What is progress?

Discussion
“Rational” = “agreed upon”?
One of the first elements that strike my attention in the whole debate is the use of the word
“rational”. It is my belief that the meaning of the word “rational” in the discussion on theory choice
is most often assumed to be “agreed upon by a significant number of fellow scientists/researchers”.
In fact, there is no definite proof of the existence of an abstract “rational” truth, but rather a truth
that many people practicing the same profession hold to be true. A person not belonging to that
same group might perceive and assign a different meaning to that word, and consequently
characterize a certain process or behavior or choice as “rational” or “not rational” in different cases
as a member of the scientific community.
I attribute this linguistic misunderstanding to the accumulated knowledge of past history of science.
Current scientists are both voluntarily and involuntarily accepting the influence of “rational”
concepts related to their discipline (e.g. the scientific method, the use of experiments as validating
proof, etc.). In the same way that recent cognitive science is uncovering the rationality of processes
and behaviors that have seemed for a long time irrational, I claim that behaviors and processes
considered at many times as rational are a result of that labeling only through the collective
agreement of a significant amount of scientists and related members of the scientific community.
Another proof of that is the interpretation post hoc of past history of science: many of the theories
advanced and supported in the past centuries might appear highly irrational to the modern scientist,
but they were for sure considered rational at the time of their discovery or creation.

This turns the whole debate on whether theory choice is in a scale between rationality and
subjectivity into a debate on whether theory choice is in a scale between common agreement and
agreement with just one person. Lakatos’ methodology is a good example of that debate: to him,
however, the perspective is on two sets of theories (research programmes) that contend each other,
until one prevails (even if temporarily) on the other. But what is this victory if not the significant
outnumbering by supporters of the first research programme over the supporters of the other one?
Or, in other words, doesn’t the shift in choice happen when most scientists agree on one of the
options?
The process of theory choice in history of science
If seen under this assumption, history of science becomes a series of shifts in the opinions of
scientists communities, to support one theory or the other, according to the extent to which that
theory fits with their views.
Imagine a theory that is put forward, regardless of the way it’s born. There will be an initial
individual of group of scientists supporting it, according to the way the theory “fits” them: either
through “subjective” appeal, or through more “rational” methods (e.g. experiments, etc.). What this
initial differentiation determines is simply what will be the initial degree of support to that theory. If
the theory fits their creators for its “rational” characteristics, then a wider community of scientists
will most probably accept it, since “rational” characteristics are very commonly agreed upon in the
scientific community. On the contrary, if it will have more “subjective” (i.e. uncommon)
characteristics, then it will probably appeal to a smaller group.
Neither of the two sets of characteristics however can predict if that theory will survive or not in the
progress of science. History of science shows us that theories with both sets of characteristics have
advanced in the centuries, lived on the scientists’ scrutiny or been rejected shortly after creation. No
conclusive evidence can show a connection between the type of theory choice (rational or
subjective – or better, agreed upon or not commonly agreed upon) and its current status as “valid
explanation of reality”.
Normative theory choice
What all this doesn’t tell us is: if theory choice is a matter of “mob psychology”, how are scientists
supposed to make decisions that distinguish between a valid theory that is an explanation for reality
and another one that isn’t?
I believe there are two issues at stake: individuality and free will.
Individuality is simply the fact that two individuals are different in their perception of reality. As
such, it is impossible to formulate a theory choice algorithm that will yield the same results for any
two individuals within or out of the scientific community. Or, in other words, “There is no neutral
algorithm for theory-choice, no systematic decision procedure which, properly applied, must lead
each individual in the group to the same decision.” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 200).
Secondly, even if there were such algorithms, the underlying assumption would be that each one of
us would be willing and able to use them properly and by them achieving the “right choice”.
However, I believe that that choice is conditioned by the existence of free will, which is something
yet to be proven conclusively. Genetic dispositions, as well as environmental factors contribute to
the mix of elements that enter the decision of a person for on theory or another. Recent discoveries
in the human genome proof how certain behaviors and processes are hard-wired in our DNA and
not a result of our own self-generated brain activity. Also, the context of our personal development
has a strong influence on who we are and therefore what decisions we make. A highly educated
Western scholar in philosophy of science might have different interpretations and therefore make
different choices using the same algorithms and/or criteria, than somebody brought up, for example,
as a Tibetan monk.
What this all amounts to is the impossibility of determining a “norm” for theory choice, but rather
determining its boundaries and exposing its root causes. We know more about what we’re likely to
choose rather than what we should choose. We know more about why we make those choices,
rather than having a significant degree of control over them.
As Feyerabend wrote, “anything goes” (1975, p. 28): there’s no method or criteria or algorithm that
can be successfully applied to choose between a theory and another one. I would modify it into
“anything goes, within the constraints set on us and on the world at large by nature itself”: we can
choose anything, but we know that the choice is influenced by the constraints within us and outside
of us.
Truth and progress
One last issue is the one of truth and progress of science. If all I wrote above is true, where does
truth lie in science? Are our “conditioned” choices bringing us to the truth? Is there real progress in
the patterns of theories and scientific paradigms in history? Are we getting closer to the truth and to
a valid explanation of reality as it is?
I believe that patterns in theory choice reflect a pattern of evolution. The way theory choice impacts
our lives reflects the degree to which we make use of those theories: when we choose for theories
that can validly depict reality, not only we try to explain reality but we also try to predict it; when
our predictions turn true and we benefit from their success, then the theory is described as accurate
and we mark it as proven. Whenever instead we realize that a theory is delivering wrong predictions
and therefore negative consequences occur, we discard it and label it as wrong.
Usefulness and survival of theories reflects survival and development of our species: if we’re
choosing accurate theories, we develop on them accordingly. Theories about aerodynamics allow us
to benefit from airplanes, theories about human biology allow us to live longer and healthier lives;
and so forth. Progress in science proceeds together with progress of our human species. More than
that, the development of mankind is the proof that those theories are workable explanations of
reality and the fact we’re using them to our benefit is a proof that they fit the reality that’s out there
and that we try to understand.

Conclusions
In the previous chapters, I have tried to outline the developments on the issue of theory choice in
science. From Bacon to Feyerabend, philosophers have been giving different explanations of how
theories are chosen and how should they be chosen. Nowadays, the rational positions of Bacon are
overcome by a large part of scholars, whereas the rational elements in Popper and Lakatos still hold
true in many cases. On the other hand, subjective elements are hardly proved wrong and the battle
looks more favourable for them at this point of time.
Then, I introduced some issues that I think lay before the debate between rationality and
subjectivity. First of all, the interpretation of the terms in the discussion (rational = agreed upon?),
then the elements of individuality and free will in normative theory choice.
Within this framework of explanation of theory choice, there are still some open issues to be
answered: how does linguistics affect philosophy of science and its terminology? What is the
impact of modern genetic research into the workings of our brain processes and how does that
impact theory choice? The debate on these questions is still open and, perhaps, even more important
than the central question of this paper.

References
Popper, Science: problems, aims, responsibilities, 1963
Kuhn, Objectivity, value judgement and theory choice, 1973
Kuhn, The structure of scientific revolutions, 1970
Lakatos, The methodology of scientific research programmes, 1977
Feyerabend, Against method, 1975