Frontline vs.

Iran
DONT READ W/ NEXT TWO CARDS US-Iran nuclear deal fails
Too complicated Both sides agree that it wont work Internal issues BBC News, 2/17/14, (BBC News, 2/17/14, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east26236281)

Iran has begun formal talks with six world powers in Vienna to try to reach a comprehensive agreement to limit its controversial nuclear program The three-day meeting seeks to build on an interim deal signed in November that saw Iran curb uranium enrichment in return for partial sanctions relief. Both Iran and the US have downplayed hopes of a quick breakthrough. The world powers suspect Iran is seeking to develop nuclear weapons, something it vigorously denies. It insists that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only. 'Not optimistic' Having got to this point at all is progress. But there is little optimism on either side that the talks will succeed. Mutual suspicion
remains great and there is still a fundamental uncertainty as to what Iran really wants. Is it prepared to reduce its nuclear program to a minimum to lift sanctions, get its economy back on track and become a more "normal" player in world affairs? Or is it seeking to achieve a loosening of sanctions while retaining the status of a threshold nuclear state, ie one that has the capability to move towards developing a nuclear bomb reasonably quickly at a time of its own choosing? Several key problems must be resolved if there is to be a long-term deal. Pessimism pervades Iran nuclear deal talks The talks between representatives of Iran and the so-called P5+1 - the US, UK, France, China and Russia plus Germany - are being chaired by the EU's foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton. After dinner with Baroness Ashton on Monday, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said he believed a long-term agreement was possible. "If all sides enter the talks with the political will, we will be able to reach positive results. But it will take time," he was quoted as saying by the state news agency, Irna. Mr Zarif's remarks came after Iran's

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has final say in nuclear matters, was pessimistic about the prospects of a long-term deal. "What our foreign ministry and officials have started will continue and Iran will not violate its commitments... but this will not lead anywhere," he said in a speech in Tehran. He added: "I am not optimistic about the negotiations. It will not lead anywhere, but I am not opposed either." A senior US government official also played down expectations, saying it would be a "complicated, difficult and lengthy process". "It is probably as likely that we won't get an agreement as it is
that we will," the official told reporters in Vienna.

The internal link story is predicated off of the presumption that Ahmadinejad is pushing for closer Iran & Cuba relations and that they wont use these newly acquired nuclear weapons to inflict harm. Ahmadinejad is currently OUT of power. He has been succeeded by Hussan Rouhani. This whole internal link is utterly wrong. Ahmadinejad holds NO power currently and therefore the internal link story is completely gone. The Iranian government does not care about Ahmadinejads views anymore. Vote Neg right here on no internal link - Aff cant even access the impact ergo they cant solve. AND well no impact here:
.

[___] Even if war breaks out, it wont escalate empirically proven. Cook et al. 7 Steven A. Cook, Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at
the Council on Foreign Relations, former Research Fellow at the Brookings Institution and Soref

Research Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, holds an M.A. in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and both an M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania, et al., with Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, former Senior Advisor on Iran at the Department of State, former Fellow at the Washington Institute of Near East Policy, holds a Doctorate in Modern History from Oxford University, and Suzanne Maloney, Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, holds a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, 2007 (Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast, New York Times, June 28th, Available Online at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/28/opinion/28iht-edtakeyh.1.6383265.html, Accessed 08-102013) The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East .

Judge this is the same old scenario thats been plaguing the world with fear for the past decade. The risk of an Iran/Palestine conflict. We have been through this scenario multiple times- literally nothing has ever happened. Their impact card dates back to 08. Its been 6 years and NOTHING has happened. Their impact card reads Ahmadinejad openly threatened to wipe Israel off the face of the earth. Again, Ahmadinejad may be pushing for an Iran/Israel conflict but he holds NO political power anymore. His views do not accurately represent the views of the Iranian government.

Case Turn vs. Iran

Cuba and North Korea are engaging in weapons and ammunition trafficking
Williams October 13 (Carol J. Williams is a Los Angeles Times international affairs writer. Former foreign correspondent, 25 years covering Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. 10/18/13 North Korean ship carrying Cuban arms to be freed; two officers held www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-north-korea-panama-cuba-ship-weapons20131018,0,4019282.story#axzz2igbIPusF) A North Korean freighter seized in Panama for carrying contraband fighter jet engines and missile components from Cuba will be released soon and allowed to return home with most of its crew members,
Panamanian authorities have decided. The ship's captain and first officer, however, will remain in Panama pending a decision by United Nations inspectors on whether they should face charges of violating sanctions on weapons trade, Panamanian Foreign Minister Fernando Nunez Fabrega told journalists in Panama City. The other 33 crewmen onboard in July when the ship was intercepted off Panama's Atlantic coast probably were unaware that the ship was carrying prohibited cargo, Nunez said, according to a report in the South China Morning Post. All but the two top officers "appear to be ignorant of what was in the cargo," the Panamanian foreign minister said. Panamanian marines were conducting operations aimed at intercepting illicit drug shipments when they stopped the Chong Chon Gang as it approached the Panama Canal. The tramp steamer attempted to outrun the swift Panamanian patrol boats and sabotaged the ship's electrical system to disable its cranes. Once the ship was secured at port -- after the captain reportedly tried to cut his own throat -- investigators discovered the contraband weapons hidden in the ship's lower cargo holds beneath 200,000 sacks of sugar. The ship's manifest

said it was carrying only the sugar and 2,000

empty plastic sacks, according to a report by 38 North, a program of the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Cuban authorities dismissed the undeclared cargo as "obsolete" weapons parts being sent to North Korea for repair and return. The 38 North website report, however, said the ship was also carrying small arms, anti-tank ammunition, generators, batteries, night-vision equipment and other more contemporary arms and parts. It also reported that of 15 jet engines found on board, 10 were in "immaculate condition." "The shipment was without a doubt a violation of United Nations sanctions on North Korea," 38 North stated. Nunez said Panama was
waiting for the arrival of two North Korean officials who could take responsibility for the ship and that it and the 33 crewmen would be free to leave for North Korea as soon as final paperwork was concluded.

Cuba is a huge threat and North Korea has threatened to attack the United States before
Investors Business Daily July 13 [Panama Canal Missile Seizure Shows Cuba Remains A Threat,
Investors Business Daily, 7/16/13, http://news.investors.com/ibd -editorials/071613-663987-cubathreat-north-korean-weapons-smuggling-in-panama-shows.htm AD 1/21/14.)
National Security: Cuba, long derided in international policy circles as a basket case and no threat to the U.S., has been caught smuggling weapons of war to North Korea in blatant violation of U.N. sanctions. This is a wake-up call. Sharp-eyed Panamanian authorities, watching the North Korean freighter Chong Chon Gang since June, received intelligence it might be shipping illegal drugs, something it had been caught doing before. As the vessel lumbered into the Atlantic side of the Panama Canal from Cuba, Panamanian authorities cornered the 450-foot rust-bucket, battled a maniacally violent crew who slashed ship lines to make it hard to unload the ship, and then watched as the ship's captain tried to kill himself before having a heart attack. After subduing the crew, the Panamanians found no drugs buried beneath sloppily packed brown sugar, but did find defensive RSN-75 "Fan Song" fire-control radar equipment for SA-2 surface-to-air missiles. The discovery, and the crew's behavior, were signs of something big the North Koreans didn't want known weapons smuggling, a violation of both United Nations sanctions prohibiting all sales of weapons to North Korea and Panama's own laws governing the canal. "You cannot go around shipping undeclared weapons

of war through the Panama Canal," declared Panamanian President Ricardo Martinelli, a U.S. ally,

who tweeted a photo of the illegal shipment for the world to see. It's significant that the enabler of this violation of

international law was none other than Cuba, which has worked hard to convince the Obama administration to drop all travel and trade sanctions against it and which is currently negotiating a migration pact with the U.S. It's time to stop that right now, and sanction Cuba further. The brazen shipment of Russian-made weapons through Panama signaled that little has changed in Cuba a state sponsor of global terror that has in fact been trying to destroy the U.S. since 1962. "This is a serious and alarming incident that reminds us that the North Korean regime continues to pursue its nuclear and ballistic programs, and will stop at nothing in that pursuit," said House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. "It also illustrates that the Castro tyranny continues to aid and abet America's enemies and continues to pose a national security threat to the United States so long as the Castro apparatchik holds control over the island." It's also the work of a rogue state. And at just 90 miles away, one that is as chillingly close

to our shores as it is warm and friendly to North Korea. And yet the relationship is nothing new. Cuba and
North Korea are the world's only two remaining totalitarian communist states. The New York Times initially suggested the two tyrannies' relations had gotten closer in recent years as a result of U.S. sanctions. In reality, the nations' tight ties go back to the first days of Fidel Castro's regime in 1959. Cuban-American writer Humberto Fontova posted photos of Castro and North Korea's dictators, dating from 1960, on Babalublog.com. And when Chile's military freed that country from the communist regime of Salvador Allende in 1973, General Augusto Pinochet's first diplomatic move was to cut ties with Cuba and North Korea. Why? Both had infiltrated the country with tens of thousands of "advisers" working in tandem with the Castro-controlled Allende regime. Although it's unknown why North Korea, a major weapons exporter, is importing weapons from Cuba right now, defense analysts speculate that the weapons may be making their way back to Pyongyang for an upgrade and return to Cuba.

That would be

worrisome given that North Korea has said it means to strike the U.S. on its own home turf. What better launching pad could it ask for than Cuba?
Two weeks ago, North Korea's military commander visited Cuba to a red-carpet welcome. The visit raises questions as to what the two discussed and, given the threat we see now, whether U.S. intelligence was aware of it. Whatever this is about, it's a threat to the U.S. that requires far

harder sanctions from both the U.S. and the United Nations. Are the scales off the Obama administration's
eyes?

Opening ties with Cuba risk the possibility of another Cuban missile crisis
CNN July 13 (Mariano Castillo. Catherine E. Shoichet and Patrick Oppmann, for CNN. Cuba: 'Obsolete' weapons on ship were going to North Korea for repair July 17, 2013 http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/16/world/panama-north-korean-ship/ AD 1/21/14.) In the United States, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, R-Florida, described this week's incident as "serious and

alarming" and a "wake-up call" for the Obama administration to avoid normalizing U.S. relations with Cuba. Some analysts described the situation as a troubling sign that North Korea
could be supplying Cuba with weapons. "This is a country which is just 90 miles away from American shores," Forbes.com columnist Gordon Chang told CNN's "Erin Burnett: OutFront." "Now, if they can smuggle missile radar into Cuba, you know, God [who] knows what else they can put there. We do not need a replay of the Cuban missile crisis, this time with the North Koreans' fingers on the triggers instead of the Soviets."

We must work to prevent North Korea from being able to more easily acquiring weapons
CNN July 13 (Mariano Castillo. Catherine E. Shoichet and Patrick Oppmann, for CNN. Cuba: 'Obsolete' weapons on ship were going to North Korea for repair July 17, 2013 http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/16/world/panama-north-korean-ship/ AD 1/21/14.)

This isn't the first time North Korea has been linked to shipping suspected of transporting weapons materials. In 2011, the U.S. Navy tried -- and failed -- to gain permission to board a ship in the South China Sea suspected of carrying illicit weapons technology to Myanmar, the Pentagon said. The Belize-flagged MV Light was believed to have been manned by a North Korean crew, the Pentagon said. Under U.S. Navy surveillance, the vessel eventually turned around and headed to North Korea. In 2007, the Pentagon confirmed that several shipments of suspected weapons technology had left North Korea destined for Syria. The Pentagon said some of the material was believed to have been high-grade metals that could be used to build missiles or solid-fuel rockets. CNN reported in 2011 that an unpublished U.N. report claimed North Korea was trading banned weapons technology with several countries, including Iran.

A high risk of an attackthe risk only increases exponentiallymultiple warrants

Pry 12 [19 December 2012, Peter Vincent Pry, executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security, and
served on the Congressional EMP Commission, the House Armed Services Committee, and the CIA. PRY: North Korea EMP attack could destroy U.S. now, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/dec/19/north -korea-emp-attack-could-destroy-usnow/?page=all, AZhang]

North Korea now has an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of delivering a nuclear weapon to the United States, as demonstrated by their successful launch and orbiting of a satellite on Dec. 12. Certain poorly informed pundits among the chattering classes reassure us that North Korea is still years away from being able to miniaturize warheads for missile delivery, and from developing sufficiently
accurate missiles to pose a serious nuclear threat to the United States. Philip Yun, director of San Franciscos Ploughshares Fund, a nuclear disarmament group, reportedly said, The real threat from the launch was an overreaction that would lead to more defe nse spending on unnecessary systems. The sky is not falling. We shouldnt be panicked. In fact, North Korea is a mortal

nuclear threat to the United States right now. North Korea has already successfully tested and developed nuclear weapons. It has also already miniaturized nuclear weapons for ballistic missile delivery and has armed missiles with nuclear warheads. In 2011, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. General Ronald Burgess, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that North Korea has weaponized its nuclear devices into warheads for ballistic missiles. North Korea
has labored for years and starved its people so it could develop an intercontinental missile capable of reaching the United States. Why? Because they have a special kind of nuclear weapon that could destroy the United States with a single

blow. In summer 2004, a delegation of Russian generals warned the Congressional Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Commission that secrets had leaked to North Korea for a decisive new nuclear weapon a Super-EMP warhead. Any nuclear weapon detonated above an altitude of 30 kilometers will generate an electromagnetic pulse that will destroy electronics and could collapse the electric power grid and other critical infrastructures communications, transportation, banking and finance, food and water that sustain modern civilization and the lives of 300 million Americans. All could be destroyed by a single nuclear weapon making an EMP attack. A Super-EMP attack on the United States would cause much more and much deeper damage than a primitive nuclear weapon, and so would increase confidence that the catastrophic consequences will be irreversible. Such an attack would inflict maximum damage and be optimum for realizing a world without America. Both North Korean nuclear tests look suspiciously like a Super-EMP weapon. A Super-EMP warhead would have a low yield, like the North Korean device, because it is not designed to create a big explosion, but to convert its energy into gamma rays, that generate the EMP effect. Reportedly South Korean military intelligence concluded, independent of the EMP Commission, that Russian scientists are in North Korea helping develop a Super-EMP warhead. In 2012, a military commentator for the Peoples Republic of China stated that North Korea has Super-EMP nuclear warheads. A Super-EMP warhead would not weigh much, and could
probably be delivered by North Koreas ICBM. The mi ssile does not have to be accurate, as the EMP field is so large that detonating anywhere over the United States would have catastrophic consequences. The warhead does not even need a re-entry vehicle, as an

EMP attack entails detonating the warhead at high-altitude, above the atmosphere. So,

as of Dec. 12, North Koreas successful orbit of a satellite demonstrates its ability to make an EMP attack against the United States right now. The Congressional EMP Commission estimates that, given the nations current unpreparedness, within one year of an EMP attack, two-thirds of the U.S. population 200 million Americans would probably perish from starvation, disease and societal collapse. Thus,
North Korea now has an Assured Destruction capability against the United States. The consequences of this development are so extremely grave that U.S. and global security have, in effect, gone over the strategic cliff into free-fall. Where we will land, into what kind of future, is as yet unknown. Nevertheless, some very bad developments are foreseeable. Iran will

certainly be inspired by North Koreas example to persist in the development of its own nuclear weapon and ICBM programs to pose a mortal threat to the United States. Indeed, North Korea and Iran have been collaborating all along. If North Korea and Iran both acquire the capability to threaten America with EMP genocide, this will destroy the foundations of the existing world order, which has since 1945 halted the cycle of world wars and sustained the global advancement of freedom. North Korea and Iran being armed with Assured Destruction capability changes the whole strategic calculus of risk for the United States in upholding its superpower role, and will erode the confidence of U.S. allies perhaps to the point where
they will need to develop their own nuclear weapons. Most alarming, we are fast moving to a place where, for the first time in history, failed little states like North Korea and Iran, that cannot even feed their own people, will have power in their hands to blackmail or destroy the largest and most successful societies on Earth. North Korea and Iran perceive themselves to be at war

with the United States, and are desperate, highly unpredictable characters. When the mob is at the gates of their dictators, will they want to take America with them down into darkness?

And North Korea nuclear use destroys the global environment and economy risks extinction
Hayes & Hamel-Green, 10 *Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development,
AND ** Executive Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development act Victoria University (1/5/10, Executive Dean at Victoria, The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf) The international community is increasingly aware that cooperative diplomacy is the most productive way to tackle the multiple, interconnected global challenges facing humanity, not least of which is the increasing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Korea and Northeast Asia are instances where risks of nuclear proliferation and

actual nuclear use arguably have increased in recent years. This negative trend is a product of continued US
nuclear threat projection against the DPRK as part of a general program of coercive diplomacy in this region, North Koreas nuclear weapons programme, the breakdown in the Chinese-hosted Six Party Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration, regional concerns over Chinas increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) about whether US extended deterrence (nuclear umbrella) afforded under bilateral security treaties c an be relied upon for protection. The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the

North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are
well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a

limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the
catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would

lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westbergs view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also followThe period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hungerTo make matters even worse, such

amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earths protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the
nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear firstuse, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated

impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority
consideration from the international community.

Frontline vs. Soft Power

US Shouldnt engage w/ Soft Power

Soft Power Down

American soft power in decline Neu 13 (Richard Neu- B.S. in economics, California Institute of Technology; Ph.D. in economics, Harvard University;
M.A. in economics, Harvard University U.S. 'Soft Power' Abroad Is Losing Its Punch http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/02/us-soft-power-abroad-is-losing-its-punch.html

The way America flexes it economic muscle around the world is changing dramaticallyand not necessarily for the better. In 1997, facing a wave of sovereign debt defaults, the International Monetary Fund asked its member states
to pledge lines of credit to support Fund rescue efforts. The United States and other nations did as asked. In 2009, the United States responded again to a call for expanded credit lines. When the Fund sought yet another expansion of these credit lines last April, 39 countries, including China, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, India, and Saudi Arabia, stepped up. Even cash-strapped Italy and Spain pledged support. But the United States was conspicuously absent. A pledge from the United States requires congressional authorization. In the midst of last spring's contentious debate over U.S. government deficits and debts, support for an international body was a political nonstarter. Where the United States had previously demonstrated international leadership, other countriessome of them America's rivals for international influence now make the running. This is a small example of what may be a troubling trend:

America's fiscal predicament and the seeming inability of its political system to resolve these matters may be taking a toll on the instruments of U.S. soft power and on the country's ability to shape international developments in ways that serve American interests. The most potent instrument of U.S. soft power is probably the simple size of the U.S. economy. As the biggest economy in the world, America has a lot to say about how the world works. But the economics
profession is beginning to understand that high levels of public debt can slow economic growth, especially when gross general government debt rises above 85 or 90 percent of GDP.The

United States crossed that threshold in 2009, and the negative effects are probably mostly out in the future. These will come at a bad time. The U.S. share of global economic output has been falling since 1999by nearly 5 percentage points as of 2011. As America's GDP share declined, so did its share of world trade, which may reduce U.S. influence in setting the rules for international trade.And it's not just the debt itself that may be slowing GDP growth. Economists at Stanford and the University of Chicago have demonstrated that uncertainty about economic policy on the rise as a
result of political squabbling over U.S. fiscal policytypically foreshadows slower economic growth.

Soft Power Doesnt Solve

1. Soft power in Latin America is resilient no risk of collapse. Duddy and Mora 13 Patrick Duddy, Visiting Senior Lecturer at Duke University, served as
U.S. ambassador to Venezuela from 2007 until 2010, and Frank O. Mora, incoming director of the Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University, served as deputy assistant secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere from 2009 to 2013, 2013 (Latin America: Is U.S. influence waning?, Miami Herald, May 1st, Available Online at http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/01/3375160/latin-america-is-usinfluence.html#storylink=cpy, Accessed 05-20-2013) Finally, one should not underestimate the resiliency of U.S. soft power in the region . The power of national reputation , popular culture , values and institutions continues to contribute to U.S. influence in ways that are difficult to measure and impossible to quantify. Example: Despite 14 years of strident anti-American rhetoric during the Chvez government, tens of thousand of Venezuelans apply for U.S. nonimmigrant visas every year, including many thousands of Chvez loyalists. Does this mean we can feel comfortable relegating U.S. relations with the hemisphere to the second or third tier of our international concerns? Certainly not. We have real and proliferating interests in the region. As the president and his team head to Mexico and Costa Rica, it is important to recognize the importance of our ties to the region. We have many individual national partners in the Americas. We dont need a new template for relations with the hemisphere as a whole or another grand U.S.-Latin America strategy. A greater commitment to work more intensely with the individual countries on the issues most relevant to them would be appropriate. The United States still has the economic and cultural heft in the region to play a fundamental role and to advance its own interests.

2. Decline of overall U.S. soft power is inevitable economic downturn. Neu 13 C. Richard Neu, Senior Economist at the RAND Corporation, holds a Ph.D. in
Economics from Harvard University, 2013 (U.S. 'Soft Power' Abroad Is Losing Its Punch, The RAND Blog, February 8th, Available Online at http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/02/us-soft-powerabroad-is-losing-its-punch.html, Accessed 05-27-2013) The way America flexes it economic muscle around the world is changing dramatically and not necessarily for the better. In 1997, facing a wave of sovereign debt defaults, the International Monetary Fund asked its member states to pledge lines of credit to support Fund rescue efforts. The United States and other nations did as asked. In 2009, the United States responded again to a call for expanded credit lines. When the Fund sought yet another expansion of these credit lines last April, 39 countries, including China, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, India, and Saudi Arabia, stepped up. Even cash-strapped Italy and Spain pledged support. But the United States was conspicuously absent. A pledge from the United States requires congressional authorization. In the midst of last spring's contentious debate over U.S. government deficits and debts, support for an international body was a political nonstarter.

Where the United States had previously demonstrated international leadership, other countriessome of them America's rivals for international influencenow make the running. This is a small example of what may be a troubling trend: America's fiscal predicament and the seeming inability of its political system to resolve these matters may be taking a toll on the instruments of U.S. soft power and on the country's ability to shape international developments in ways that serve American interests. The most potent instrument of U.S. soft power is probably the simple size of the U.S. economy . As the biggest economy in the world, America has a lot to say about how the world works. But the economics profession is beginning to understand that high levels of public debt can slow economic growth, especially when gross general government debt rises above 85 or 90 percent of GDP. The United States crossed that threshold in 2009, and the negative effects are probably mostly out in the future. These will come at a bad time. The U.S. share of global economic output has been falling since 1999by nearly 5 percentage points as of 2011. As America's GDP share declined, so did its share of world trade, which may reduce U.S. influence in setting the rules for international trade. And it's not just the debt itself that may be slowing GDP growth. Economists at Stanford and the University of Chicago have demonstrated that uncertainty about economic policyon the rise as a result of political squabbling over U.S. fiscal policytypically foreshadows slower economic growth. Investors may be growing skittish about U.S. government debt levels and the disordered state of U.S. fiscal policymaking. From the beginning of 2002, when U.S. government debt was at its most recent minimum as a share of GDP, to the end of 2012, the dollar lost 25 percent of its value, in price-adjusted terms, against a basket of the currencies of major trading partners. This may have been because investors fear that the only way out of the current debt problems will be future inflation. The dollar has also given up a bit of its dominance as the preferred currency for international reserves among advanced economies. And the renminbi appears to have replaced the dollar as the reference currency for most of East Asia. (The good news is that in recent years U.S. banks have increased their share of deposits from foreigners, mostly at the expense of banks in London.) More troubling for the future is that private domestic investmentthe fuel for future economic growthshows a strong negative correlation with government debt levels over several business cycles dating back to the late 1950s. Continuing high debt does not bode well in this regard. But perhaps the worst consequences of U.S. debt are actions not taken. U.S. international leadership has been based, in part, on contributionspolitical and financial to major institutions and initiativesInternational Monetary Fund, World Bank, General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (and later World Trade Organization), NATO, North America Free Trade Agreement, the Marshall Plan, and so on. These served U.S. interests and made the world better. But what have we done lately? The Doha round of trade negotiations has stalled. Ditto efforts at coordinated international action on climate change. Countries of the Arab Spring need rebuilding. Little progress is apparent on the Transpacific Partnership, a proposed new freetrade area. And warnings from the U.S. treasury secretary to his European counterparts about the dangers of failing to resolve the fiscal crisis in the eurozone met with public rebukes: Get

your own house in order before you lecture us. Have U.S. fiscal problems undermined America's self confidence and external credibility to the extent that it can no longer lead? And what about unmet needs at homehealthcare costs, a foundering public education system, deteriorating infrastructure, and increasing inequality? A strained fiscal situation that limits resources for action and absorbs so much political energy cannot be helping with any of these matters. But without progress on such things, what becomes of the social cohesion necessary for unified action abroad or the moral authority to lead other nations by example? America's fiscal predicament is serious . The problem has become obvious in the last few years, but it has been building for decades, largely the result of promises of extensive social benefits without a corresponding willingness to pay for them. Putting U.S. government financing on a sustainable path will require painful adjustments over a number of yearsincreased government revenue and painful reductions in government outlays, almost certainly including outlays for defense and international affairs. During the necessary period of fiscal adjustment and constrained government resources, U.S. international influence may decline yet further . But there is no alternative to getting on with the task. The world has not yet found an acceptable substitute for U.S. leadership.

3. Soft power is useless empirically proven. Lacey 13 Jim Lacey, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Marine Corps War College, holds a
Ph.D. in Military History from Leeds University, 2013 (Soft Power, Smart Power, National Review Online, April 22nd, Available Online at http://www.nationalreview.com/article/346131/soft-power-smart-power, Accessed 05-272013) During World War II, Stalins advisers encouraged him to seek the favor of the pope. He famously replied: How many divisions does the pope have? Decades later, the Soviets came to realize that papal power was not something to cavalierly disregard. Many, in fact, claim that Pope John Paul IIs moral authority was decisive in breaking the Soviet hold on Poland and propelling the Evil Empire toward its final demise. It was, therefore, a true example of the clout of soft power. Of course, one can maintain that view only by discounting the massive U.S. and NATO military forces that kept Soviet hard power in check for decades. A few years back, a number of policymakers, jumping on a popular academic trend given its greatest voice by Joseph Nye, began espousing a theory of soft power. In this new and shiny vision, America could wield its greatest global influence through the power of its example. The world would just look at how good we were, and how great it was to be an American, and clamor to follow us. Somehow these visionaries neglected to notice that Europes almost total unilateral disarmament had failed to translate into influence on the global stage. Rather, it had done the opposite. In a remarkably short time, European opinions on any matter of consequence ceased to matter. Worse, a large segment of the world took a good look at the American example and was repelled. Some of these people launched the 9/11 attack. At some point, it became clear that those holding a world vision that included returning to eighth-century barbarism were not finding our example attractive. Our deep-thinking strategists realized they needed a new answer. What they came up with was even more seductive than soft power. In the future, America would prosper through the employment of smart power. One wonders if our policymakers had been willfully employing dumb power for the previous two centuries. In any

case, smart-power advocates claimed that a new policy nirvana was attainable, if only we could find the right mix of soft and hard power. Well, soft power and smart power were fascinating intellectual exercises that led nowhere . Iran is still building nuclear weapons, North Korea is threatening to nuke U.S. cities, and China is becoming militarily more aggressive. It turns out that power is what it has always been the ability to influence and control others and deploying it requires, as it always has, hard instruments . Without superior military power and the economic strength that underpins it, the U.S. would have no more ability to influence global events than Costa Rica . When President Obama made the strategic decision to pivot toward Asia, he did not follow up by sending dance troupes to China, or opening more cultural centers across the Pacifics great expanse. Rather, he ordered the U.S. military to begin shifting assets into the region, so as to show the seriousness of our intent. If North Korea is dissuaded from the ultimate act of stupidity, it will have a lot more to do with our maintenance of ready military forces in the region than with any desire the North Korean regime has for a continuing flow of Hollywood movies. By now every serious strategist and policymaker understands that if the United States is going to continue influencing global events it requires hard power a military second to none. That is what makes a new report from the well-respected Stockholm International Peace Research Institute troubling. According to SIPRI, in 2012, Chinas real military spending increased by nearly 8 percent, while Russias increased by a whopping 16 percent. Worse, SIPRI expects both nations to increase spending by even greater percentages this year. The United States, on the other hand, decreased real spending by 6 percent last year, with much larger cuts on the way. After a decade of war, much of our military equipment is simply worn out and in need of immediate replacement. Moreover, technologys rapid advance continues, threatening much of our current weapons inventory with obsolescence. As much as the utopians (soft-power believers) want to deny it, American power is weakening even as the world becomes progressively less stable and more dangerous. In a world where too many states are led by men who still believe Maos dictum that Power comes from the barrel of a gun, weakness is dangerous. Weakness is also a choice. The United States, despite our current economic woes, can easily afford the cost of recapitalizing and maintaining our military. We are not even close to spending levels that would lead one to worry about imperial overstretch. Rather, our long-term security is being eaten up so as to fund entitlement overstretch. I suppose that one day, if left unchecked, the welfare state will absorb so much spending that the only military we can afford will be a shadow of what has protected us for the past seven decades. Soft power will then cease to be one option among many and, instead, become our only choice. We will become as relevant to the rest of the world as Europe . I wonder how many people realize just how different their daily lives will become if that day arrives. For a long time, American hard power has cast a protective shield around the liberal world order. It will not be pretty when that is gone.

Wont Cause Bad Stuff

US decline will not spark wars. MacDonald & Parent 11Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at
University of Miami *Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment, International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 744]

Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese
GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two. 91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be Americas superior and the United States wants no peer competi tors. In his words, *N+o amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia. 92

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is
likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some

might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of ones reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions . In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the AngloAmerican transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors:
both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. 94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a moderate decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two. 95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness. 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could

reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul. 97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict. 98 Moreover, Washingtons support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order. 99 A

policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory. 100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes. 101

The only comprehensive study proves no transition impact. MacDonald & Parent 11Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at
University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment, International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 744] In this article, we

question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main
arguments. First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great

peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 6183 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations.
powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great

powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a states rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take.
How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great

powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from
being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great

powers. Of

the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position. Pg. 9-10

Latent power sustains hegemony Wohlforth 7 Olin Fellow in International Security Studies at Yale University [William,
Unipolar Stability: The Rules of Power Analysis, A Tilted Balance, Vol. 29 (1), Spring+ US military forces are stretched thin, its budget and trade deficits are high, and the country continues to finance its profligate ways by borrowing from abroadnotably from the Chinese government. These developments have prompted many analysts to warn that the United States suffers from imperial overstretch. And if US power is overstretched now, the argument goes, unipolarity can hardly be sustainable for long. The problem with this argument is that it fails to distinguish between actual and latent power. One must be careful to take into account both the level of resources that can be mobilized and the degree to which a government actually tries to mobilize them. And how much a government asks of its public is partly a function of the severity of the challenges that it faces. Indeed, one can never know for sure what a state is capable of until it has been seriously challenged . Yale historian Paul Kennedy coined the term imperial overstretch to describe the situation in which a states
actual and latent capabilities cannot possibly match its foreign policy commitments. This situation should be contrasted with what might be termed self-inflicted overstretcha situation in

which a state lacks the sufficient resources to meet its current foreign policy commitments in the short term, but has untapped latent power and readily available policy choices that it can use to draw on this power. This is arguably the situation that the United States is in today. But the US government has not attempted to extract more resources from its
population to meet its foreign policy commitments. Instead, it has moved strongly in the opposite direction by slashing personal and corporate tax rates. Although it is fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and claims to be fighting a global war on terrorism, the United States is not acting like a country under intense international pressure. Aside from the volunteer servicemen and women and their families, US citizens have not been asked to make sacrifices for the sake of national prosperity and security. The

country could clearly devote a greater proportion of its economy to military spending: today it spends only about 4 percent of its GDP on the military, as compared to 7 to 14 percent during the peak years of the Cold War. It could also spend its military budget more efficiently, shifting resources from
expensive weapons systems to boots on the ground. Even more radically, it could reinstitute military conscription, shifting resources from pay and benefits to training and equipping more soldiers. On the economic front, it could raise taxes in a number of ways, notably on fossil fuels, to put its fiscal house back in order. No one knows for sure what would happen if a US president undertook such drastic measures, but there is nothing in economics, political science, or history to suggest that such policies would be any less likely to succeed than China is to continue to grow rapidly for decades. Most of those who study US politics would argue that the likelihood and potential success of such power-generating policies depends on public support, which is a function of the publics perception of a threat. And as unnerving as terrorism is, there

is nothing like the threat of another hostile power rising up in opposition to the United States for mobilizing public support. With latent power in the picture, it becomes clear that unipolarity might have more built-in self-reinforcing mechanisms than many analysts realize. It is often noted that the rise of a peer competitor to the United States might be thwarted by the counterbalancing actions of neighboring powers. For example, Chinas rise might push India and Japan closer to the United Statesindeed, this has already happened to some extent. There is also the strong possibility that a peer rival that comes to be seen as a threat would create strong incentives for the United States to end its self-inflicted overstretch and tap potentially large wellsprings of latent power.

Solvency
1111Okay so first of all, the plan text mandates that the Helms-Burton Act be repealed- There are 5 other laws that still effectively enact the embargo. They cant solve
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