TMP 3126

In: Advances in Sociology Research, Volume 6 ISBN: 978-1-60741-879-5
Editor: Jared A. Jaworski © 2009 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
Chapter 1
CHILDREN’S COGNITIVE CONSTRUCTIONS: FROM

RANDOM TRIALS TO STRUCTURES
Florence Mihaela Singer

University of Ploiesti, Romania
ABSTRACT
This chapter focuses on a specific type of the child’s mental activity: processing
structures. The practice of structuring starts in the first years of the child’s life, while
she/he explores the environment within categorical learning, and extends along cognitive
development through the organization of spontaneous and aggregate structures. The
dynamic infrastructure of mind—an inborn system of operational clusters—activates
mechanisms that make possible the specialization-modularization of the cognitive
system. Within these processes, trial-error procedures are shortcut through trial-error-
organize iterative constructions. The implications of this view refer to a teaching process
that meets the cognitive needs of children. Dynamic structural learning (DSL) is based on
two dimensions: developing dynamic conceptual structures within the curriculum, and
organizing the teaching practice in a way that generates dynamic structures of thinking.
The impact of this conceptual framework concerns to what extent DSL might be used on
a large scale. Previous experiments show that the DSL tasks are relatively easy
generalized in school practice, at least at the level of primary education.
Keywords: Cognition; Dynamic structure; Dynamic structural learning; Pattern; Structure;

Recursion
INTRODUCTION
What makes a young child move from crawling to walking, thus leaving a stable four-leg
position in favor of a quite unsecured two-leg posture? This question, beyond being a
rhetorical one, points to the amazing labor in which children engage in order to relate with the
world around them. Becoming mobile on their two legs brings a change of perspective that
enhances children’s range of exploration as well as their sense of control of their bodies (Cole
& Cole, 1996). Moreover, at about 12 months of age, when this usually happens, the child has
2 Florence Mihaela Singer
already possessed a behavioral mastery of the capacity of exploring the spatial layout (Piaget,
1976; Feldman, 2004). Still, children assume the risk of losing the mastery they get with
consistent effort, and to venture to new, even more complex and harder work for their bodies
and minds. Such an endeavor is prototypical for children’s development along their course
from birth to adulthood. While acquiring the knowledge of coordinating the body, they also
start exploring domain specific knowledge.
This chapter tries to explain how children actively construct their own abilities. It draws
attention to a system of operational clusters that constitute the dynamic infrastructure of mind
(DIM), which might be responsible for initiating cognitive development. Within this system,
children engage in a sophisticated labor of searching and processing structures. In the chapter,
a discussion about children’s propensities for constructing structures is followed by examples
of spontaneous structures identified within an empirical study. Then, the child’s labor is seen
in the context of developing new categories of aggregate conceptual structures. Further, a
taxonomy for classifying structures allows deeper analyses. The implications of the model
regard the use in school of a teaching strategy that puts emphasis on the innate operational
system and organizes this system in order to enhance domain specific learning and
understanding.
Before entering the details, a precaution to bear in mind draws attention to the limitations
of this research: any model is no more than an approximation of the complexity underlying
the part of the world it tries to capture. The child’s development allows a variety of
conceptual explanations, while a model in this domain can prove effective if its practical
application improves the quality of learning.
THE PERSPECTIVE OF DEVELOPMENT: BETWEEN CONSTRUCTION

AND INNATENESS
Mental “maps,” schemes, networked concepts, or a mental representation of an associated

set of perceptions, ideas, and/or physical or mental actions that can be performed on an
object, event, or phenomenon were seen by Piaget as cognitive structures built by the
developing child for understanding and responding to physical experiences within his or her
environment.
Piaget and subsequent researchers found evidence that children’s cognitive structures
increase in complexity with development, moving from a few innate reflexes such as sucking
and bubbling to highly complex mental activities. Piaget’s model is based on the belief that
human beings possess mental structures that assimilate external events, and convert them to
fit the characteristics of the already existing mental endowment. Along cognitive
development, new structures are developed, and existing schemata are more efficiently
organized to better adapt to the environment. These adaptive mental structures, which are
universal, provide patterns of change in behavior that organize the stages of development
(Piaget, 1954; 1972).
There is a large body of literature discussing Piaget’s stages. For the moment I will only
point to Feldman’s (2004) perspective, which identifies regularities in the variability of the
Piagetian cycles of development. Each stage is characterized by recurring cycles in which the
first part of the stage is an active construction phase which has the culminant point in what
Children’s Cognitive Constructions: From Random Trials to Structures 3
was called ‘‘taking of consciousness’’ (prise de conscience) of system as a whole, followed

by an active extension and elaboration phase (Piaget, 1970, 1972, 1976; Bringuier, 1980). To
have an example of how these phases organize thought and action in children, a quote from
Feldman (2004, p. 208–209) is provided below for the Concrete Operations stage. As
Feldman put it,
“the first half Concrete Operations stage (ages about 6–9) is an active construction
period, the second half (ages about 10–13) is a period of application of a substantially
completed structure as a whole system. There is a similar initial emphasis on the more
figurative motivation to craft the new structures to match those that operate in the child’s
context; also a focus on detail and close observation that is characteristic of the first phase of
this stage. The first half of Concrete Operations is marked by activity aimed at constructing
systems for understanding categories based on abstract properties like color, shape, size, and
the like and hierarchies that use appropriate superordinate and subordinate distinctions. For
example, given a bunch of different kinds of berries, children may be able to sort them based
on criteria such as the colors of the berries, or berries versus other round fruit. Logical
relations become available such as incremental sizes of objects arranged in proper sequence
(seriation), transitive relations across three or more examples (Macy is taller than Bill, Bill is
taller than Eloise, Macy is therefore taller than Eloise), reversible thought such as pouring
water from a tall, thin container to a shorter, wider one, then mentally doing the opposite,
appreciation of other perspectives, both spatial and psychological, and an increasingly
coherent system for using these and other concrete operational capabilities in increasingly
challenging situations”.
Development might be seen a a general explanation for changes in thought and action in
children. However, “How do children achieve new knowledge?” is a question that still
remains. For example, how do children understand conservation of matter at about five-six
years old and they do not do this at four? It is not realistic to suppose that between four and
five-six years, parents or caregivers teach the child about conservation. However this transfer
happens for all normal children.
Among the conditions of learning, there are some that are not depending on the context or
the educator; they are strongly linked to the learner. An important aspect was recently
revealed by cognitive psychology: not everything that a child knows was learned. There are
issues we grasp because of our biological heritage. Such a thing is language, stated Chomsky
(1965, 1980). Observing the astonishing pace at which children learn languages and the
similar steps they follow all across the world in achieving mother tongue, Chomsky argued
that language acquisition does not obey Piaget’s principles of cognitive development. Another
argument brought into debate was the fact that children make certain characteristic errors as
they learn their mother language, whereas other seemingly logical kinds of errors never occur
(and, according to Chomsky, should be attested if a purely general, rather than language-
specific, learning mechanism is being employed).
What is universal is not the general pattern of development across domains, but grammar,
Chomsky argued. While no child is born automatically able to speak a language, all are born
with a hard-wired powerful “language acquisition device” (LAD) in their brains which allows
them to process several languages very quickly in their early years. Without a propensity for
language, infants would be unable to learn such complete speech patterns in a natural human
environment where complete sentences are only the exception. Subsequent psychologists
have extended this thesis far beyond language. Chomsky position offered a strong example
for what Fodor called modularity (Fodor, 1983). Modularity represents a critical feature of the
cognitive architecture of mind. Instead of treating the mind as being an all-purpose computer
that deals in the same way with data ranging from visual signs to acoustic or tactile stimuli,
Chomsky and Fodor stated that the mind is composed of an array of specialized subsystems
(modules) with limited flows of inter-communication. Modular systems have some typical
properties: they are domain specific in the sense that they operate on, and have a
computational architecture that is unique to certain stimuli (i.e. different mechanisms
processes visual or acoustic inputs), they are cognitively impenetrable, fast, self-contained,
informationally encapsulated, and have shallow outputs (Fodor, 1983; 1994). This model
sharply contrasts with the idea that any piece of information in the mind could be accessed by
any other cognitive process (optical illusions, for example, cannot be "turned off" even when
they are known to be illusions). Before further exploring the modularity view, I bring into
discussion some more empirical research.
As Chomsky argued, when children are exposed to a language, their LAD’s makes
possible for them to set the parameters and deduce the grammatical principles, because these
are innate. Is language a unique privileged domain holding innate principles? Many recent
studies show that other domains might be susceptible to require inborn prerequisites, as well.
Thus, for example, infants as young as 3 months old discriminate a possible physical
event from an impossible one (Baillargeon, 1999; Baillargeon, Needham, and DeVos, 1992);
infants expect that a box can be stable when a hand releases it onto a platform, but not when
such platform is missing (Needham and Baillargeon, 1993); and 9-month-old infants react at
events that are physically consistent with their expectations (Schilling and Clifton, 1998).
Such experiments have been related to a sense of physics in infants (e.g. Spelke, 2003). Other
experiments have shown that infants and preschoolers are sensitive to different kinds of
mechanisms involved in initiating and governing the motions of animate and inanimate
objects (e.g. Baillargeon, 1986; Bullock, Gelman and Baillargeon 1982; Leslie, Xu,
Tremoulet, and Scholl, 1998; Massey and Gelman, 1988). Infants and preschool children
distinguish between examples of animate and inanimate objects, whether they appear in the
physical environment, or are represented using words, drawings, or 3D replicas (e.g. Gelman,
Spelke, and Meck, 1983; Gelman, Durgin, and Kaufman, 1995; Keil, 1998). By three years of
age, children have learned to recognize enough surface indices of animacy to identify
unfamiliar objects able to move by themselves. They already can use static surface
characteristics to distinguish, with a certain level of accuracy, the animate from the inanimate
(Gelman, 1990; Massey and Gelman, 1988). The capacity to identify differences between
animate and inanimate characteristics has been associated with a module for biology.
The perception of grouping and separating similar objects has been interpreted in relation
with the number sense. Wynn (1992), and Starkey (1992) showed that 5-month-old infants
seem able to compare two sets of up to three objects and to react when the result of putting
together or taking away of one object is falsified. These experiments were followed by many
replications and extensions. Starkey, Spelke, and Gelman (1990) have found that 6- to 12-
month old infants discriminate 2 vs 3 and 3 vs 4, but not bigger numbers of photographs or
drawings. Infants looked longer at the unexpected outcome in “putting together” or “taking
away” tasks with results up to 3 (e.g. Koechlin, Dehaene, and Mehler, 1998; Simon, Hespos,
and Rochat, 1995; Uller, Carey, Huntley-Fenner, and Klatt, 1999; Wynn, 1995). Using
infant’s gaze patterns, it was possible to show that babies as young as 5 months are able to
identify differences in numbers of objects up to three (Canfield and Smith, 1996). Infants
showed longer looking at arrays presenting the wrong number of objects, even when the
shapes, colors, and spatial location of the objects in both displays were new (Simon et al.,
1995; Koechlin et al., 1997). Experiments with older infants using different response systems
(manual search/ locomor choice) (Feigenson, Carey, and Houser, 2002; Van de Walle, Carey,
and Prevor, 2000) led to the same conclusion.
Summing up, empiric research suggests that children have propensities for various
domains of knowledge such as physics, biology, mathematics and language, without which
the learning would not be possible. These propensities might be seen as innate domain
specific capacities (Spelke, 2003; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; 1994). Modularity makes the case
for an extreme specialization of the cognitive system. However, a less strong hypothesis is
that an innate domain general mechanism gradually specializes within environmental
interactions. The next paragraphs bring arguments for this last position. A more detailed
presentation can be found in Singer (2009).
DIM: VIEWING THE MIND FROM A DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE

Young infants’ capacities for discriminating organic material or for small number
representation, or for orientation in the spatial layout, etc. were considered innate threads for
some privileged domains (Bransford, Brown, and Cocking, 2000). However, these
experiments reveal a dynamics that might be modeled through innate adaptive mechanisms
rather than through domain specific innate knowledge. The domains are too recent to shape
the mind, while arguments for an innate dynamics come from a large spectrum of cognitive
research.
Understanding how people learn, grow, and change needs a dynamic perspective. In the
next paragraphs, I discuss the following premises for the dynamic infrastructure of mind: the
dynamics of cognitive changes revealed by some studies on infants; the interactions among
the young infants and the experimental stimuli discussed by the neuroscientists; and the
mobility of very young children observed by researchers, educators, and parents as well.
There is considerable evidence for rapid and complex changes in visual processing during
early development (de Haan and Nelson, 1999; Nelson, 1999; 2001). A well-known result
obtained about infant perception is a preference for face-like patterns found in newborns
tested as early as nine minutes after birth (Goren, Sarty and Wu, 1975). This finding argues in
favor of an experience-independent mechanism that directs attention to face-like patterns
(Morton and Johnson, 1991). In these studies, brain activity of 6-month-old infants was found
to differentiate the processing of familiar faces and objects from novel faces and objects. It
was also found to differ for faces versus objects, regardless of familiarity. However, in a new
replication (Mondloch, Lewis, Budreau, Maurer, Dannemiller, and Stephens, 1999), the
preference for face-like patterns was not obtained at 6 and 12 weeks of age, but it was found
that 12-week-olds preferred a positive (nice, friendly) to a negative (ugly, unfriendly)-contrast
face. Other studies bring evidence for changes in perception of languages. For instance,
comparing English and Japanese babies, Kuhl, Williams, Lacerda, Stevens, and Lindblom
(1992) have shown that by the 6 months of age, these babies contrast syllables alike, but later
on they detect only the ones specific to their mother language. Measuring the reaction time of
2 months old American infants, Mehler and Christophe (1994, 1995) noticed that they react to
English utterances significantly faster than they do to French utterances. These findings
witness for the capability to learn very early in life (e.g. Eimas,Miller, and Jusczyk, 1987) and
raise the hypothesis of an innate processionality—a mechanism that selects the inputs to be
learned.
As we previously seen, the mind is no longer considered a "blank slate" at birth. Are the
innate capacities decisive for cognitive development? A large gamut of recent neuroscience
research tends to give a definite affirmative answer. However, the debate still goes on. Thus,
some researchers suggest that the observed infant’s categorization behaviors are linked to
both the categorization mechanisms internal to infants and the properties of the external
stimuli shown to them during the study. For example, although 6-month-old infants show
different patterns of brain activity (recorded using event-related potentials [ERPs]) to faces
versus objects, such differences may well result from differential experiences with these
classes of stimuli (de Haan and Nelson, 1999). From another area of research, Mareschal and
French (2000) argue that categorization is the product of an inextricable interaction between
the infant and its environment, and the computational characteristics of both subject and
environment must be considered in conjunction to explain the observed behaviors. Within this
relativist approach, Singer (2009) stresses that for infants the experiment itself is a learning
experience the influence of which could be neither avoided, nor controlled. Given the brain
plasticity at this age, an analogy with the uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics might
be seen as a plausible hypothesis: a measurement made at a specific moment would be
incorporated into the experiment, modifying its intrinsic parameters and, consequently,
affecting the results. Therefore, even when the variables seem to be very well controlled,
given the fact that we do not have yet a tool to measure brain processes at the speed that they
take place (Bruer, 1999), we should ponder the conclusions of these experiments with a
probabilistic reasoning.
Dynamic processes have been also recorded at the neural level. In the visual cortex, from
an approximately 2.5 x 108 synapses per 100 mm3 of gray matter at birth, there is a rapid
increase in the number of synaptic connections at around 2 months of age, which reaches a
peak at 8 to 10 months. Then there is a steady decline in synaptic density until it stabilizes at
around 3.5 x 108 synapses /100 mm3 at around age 10 years (Huttenlocher, 1990).
Last, but not least, although children are born with a limited capacity for motion, any
observer can notice the high frequency of movements of hands, legs, etc. of a newborn.
Newborns have many primitive reflexes, for example the ‘stepping reflex’: the pattern of leg
movements (steps) an infant makes when held upright. Present at birth, this reflex disappears
after a couple of months because of changes in leg weight (Thelen & Smith, 1994). The
underlying dynamics of infant motor development is better revealed by analyzing children in
context (Thelen & Smith, 1994; Rose & Fischer, in press). As a master of these observations,
Piaget describes in detail the reflexes typical for the sensory-motor stage of development. The
dynamics of motion across individual development – from crawling to walking – is about
increasing velocity. This is also a characteristic of the human species at a large scale: humans
are in a continuous competition to create tools that increase the speed of motion.
Several researchers use dynamic modeling to explain and simulate developmental
processes (e.g., Case, 1996; Fischer & Bidell, 2006; Fischer & Rose, 2001; van Geert, 1998).
Within this framework, cognitive development in both childhood and adulthood is analyzed
as a dynamic system in which a person’s activities in context vary and grow from the mutual
influence of multiple, specified factors interacting over time. That is, in the dynamic system
of cognitive development: multiple factors of differing importance contribute to cognitive
growth; moreover, these factors constantly interact with each other in complex ways, directly
and indirectly; the interactions take place in multiple contexts, from next-immediate to
historic-cultural, and these interactions in context unfold over multiple time scales, from
microscopic to macroscopic. These four key aspects of a dynamic system – multiple factors,
complex interactions, multilevel contexts, and multilevel time scales – work together to
generate changes that are complex, emergent, and self-organized (Yan & Fischer, 2002).
Dynamics seems to be a constant characteristic of the human mind and human species.
There is therefore legitimate to use the above considerations as arguments for a model that is
not domain-specific but operation-specific. This seems to better explain innate propensities
and their limits as well as cultural developments and their constraints. Mechanisms able to
capture influences that are not specified should be themselves very flexible, incorporating a
complex dynamics. Such mechanisms are involved in the dynamic infrastructure of mind
(DIM). The child’s explorations in the first years of life put DIM at work. The DIM acts as a
framework-process at both micro and macro levels of cognitive development. The result of
this process is the construction of structures.
More specific, DIM consists of a minimal set of operational clusters that underlie the
cognitive infrastructure of development. The roots of these operational clusters (called inner
operations) are innate and they allow young children to contact the world around them and to
think about it and about themselves. The inner operations allow infants to build classes of
objects based on similarity, and to develop the extensions of these classes to more abstract
categories.
Singer (2009) identified seven operational clusters as foundational. These have been
denominated based on their major component, as follows: associating, comparing, algebraic
operations (that include proto-quantitative operations), logical operations, topological
operations, iterating, and generating A short description of each category is given below.
The operational category generically called Associating includes operations described as
connecting two entities based on a one-to-one correspondence. From the first days of life,
one-to-one associations allow basic reflexes of stimulus-response type. Later, these have an
important contribution (although not exclusive) in the automaticity of processes that are part
of skill development. One-to-one mapping allows infants to match experiences and help them
to recognize familiar contexts and persons. For example, one-to-one associations manifest in
a 2–3-year-old child when she attaches to a person a single behavioral role, such as: ‘‘Ann is
mother’’; ‘‘Jane (her daughter) is child’’. At this age, objects or contexts are also uniquely
associated with specific roles, such as bed–sleep or dinner–eat (Fischer & Bidell, 2006). From
a more general perspective, matching one-to-one reflects at a functional level the physical
symmetry of the human body. The capacity of building one-to-one correspondences evolves
from its primitive form of one-to-one matching objects, to associating one-to-one various
representations. It also favors, through symmetry, building the roots of analogical reasoning.
The operational category generically called Comparing contains operations described as
connecting an entity to one or more others, based on a relationship. As an inner operation,
comparing allow infants to relate one specific object to others around them, in order to assess
their similarities and differences. This inner operation helps the child to discriminate between
mother and father; or to discriminate between one object and two similar objects (perceived
this time as gestalts, not as discrete components, as was emphasized in the previous cluster).
While Associating supposes a bilateral connection (of 1-to-1 type) as a representational task,
Comparing supposes network connections; while Associating emphasizes symmetry,
Comparing could emphasize asymmetry. These two coexist in the human body and,
considering the hypothesis of embodied cognition (e.g. Damasio, 2001; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff
& Nunez, 2000), they might coexist in the human thinking, too.
As inner operations in the algebraic cluster, the proto-quantitative operations or pre-
arithmetical operations refer to putting together, taking away, magnifying, reducing, adding,
splitting, combining, sharing, folding, and others that, quantitatively expressed, lead to
addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, squaring, etc. The proto-quantitative inner
operations draw on an appreciation of some aspects of the reality. They allow infants to
perceive the change in quantity through motion. The inner operations of this category assure a
sense of increasing and decreasing quantities. The more general category, Algebraic
operations includes actions that refer to combining quantities in a specific well-defined way
to get a result that is analyzed from a discrete quantitative perspective.
The category of Topological operations has a pervasive presence in the first years of life.
The topological operations allow to: identify boundaries, relate them with discrete
components, perceive objects globally, and cross the frontier between discrete and
continuous. The primitive topological property of mind allows infants to discriminate
numerosities when they are significantly different (Dehaene, Spelke, Pinel, Stanescu, and
Tsivkin, 1999) and allows them later to make numerical approximations with various degrees
of magnitude. That also leads to globally perceive continuous surfaces (Feigenson, Carey, and
Spelke, 2002 ). The topological endowment and the ability for iterating could be foundational
for the qualities that infants seem to infer for physical properties of objects, such as: cohesion,
continuity, and boundedness. It also has implications in some basic social relations regarding
a sense of neighboring, territorial ownership, and in grasping invariants at the change of
shape, or context.
In a broader perspective, the Algebraic operations assure processing discrete quantities
and emphasize a digital approach, while Topological operations allow processing continuity
and emphasize an analogical approach. Within these last two categories, the humans
conceptually perceive, assess, and combine the quantum behavior and the wave behavior of
matter; these two behaviors are parts of our physical and mental worlds, and thus the
algebraic and topological operations highlight the duality of matter and processes.
Logical operations refer to the capacity to use basic connectors: conjunction, disjunction,
negation, quantifiers as main composites for combining actions, or propositions. In the young
child’s mind, rudimentary elements of logic are present as inner operations. They consist in
relating two facts through conjunction or disjunction and perceiving the result of this relation
as a third fact. For example, when mother and father are coming, the child perceives that they
are coming together. Let us compare to the situation when mother and father appear
separately in space/time and the child is expected to see mother or father. Moreover, very
early in life the child is able to react to the “don’ts”. The primitive causality type of reasoning
in the format of “If p, then q” appears in the early years mostly in simple causal inferences,
associated to various conditioned reflexes. Logical operations play an important role in
language development, supporting the ‘‘scaffolding’’ (Vygotsky, 1934/1986) function of
language. This leads to building meta-systems of thought in which the logical operations play
the role of connection-agents.
Iterating is based on the recursive capacity of mind. Recursion is fundamental for

survival because it allows automatize and economize knowledge and skills. Iterating is an
essential component in trial-and-error mechanisms.
Generating is described as an operational category the elements of which create new
entities, previously unknown, starting from entities already known. A special element in this
category is Grasping, which allow perceiving an entity or its essence instantaneously, without
proceeding discursively in space or time (i.e. by passing from one bit of information to
another). Iterating and Generating categories lead, in conjunction and separately, to create the
so-called emergence state in complex systems (e.g. Bar-Yam, 1997). They bring into the
cognitive mechanism an anticipatory capacity that, in principle, allows processing
information for which it was not originally designed. Iterating and Generating account for the
bootstrapping tendency of the human mind. These last two categories, aiming at developing
recursive processes on the one hand, and at building intrinsic motivation, on the other hand,
are the ‘‘motors’’ of learning.
The interplay of the DIM operations functions at a micro-level (for solving specific
problems), as well as at a macro-level of development. In this last case, its expression is a
whole preliminary labor (of which the child had no consciousness) of preparing a stage of
development (Piaget, 1976). The interplay of the DIM operations within the stages of
cognitive development is of a cyclical nature in two aspects. On the one hand, a phase is
initiated by the generating and iterating categories and is ended also by these two operations,
because they allow bootstrapping into a new phase; on the other hand, the process replicates
on higher levels of complexity and abstraction (Singer, 2007b). Within the DIM, each phase
in the process of growth creates conditions that specify and constrain the next phase.
Cyclically, along development, the cognitive system arrives at correlating the dynamic
mechanisms activated by the basic operations of its infrastructure.
These correlations are the moments of ‘‘taking of consciousness’’ in Piaget’s terms. As
Piaget remarked, ‘‘the transformation is slow. What is sudden is the final comprehension
when the structure is completed. Yes, and of course it presupposes a whole preliminary labor,
underneath, of which the child had no consciousness; but taking consciousness is sudden.
Suddenly he sees things in the external world in a whole new way. That’s what’s sudden –
not the construction, but the taking of consciousness’’ (Bringuier, 1980: 45, quoted by
Feldman, 2004).
The categories of operations identified as foundational nest and sustain the mind’s
development; with a metaphorical expression, they are the mold that allows and assures the
architecture of cognitive development. The other operations the mind processes result from
the basic categories through relating and combining them.
The operational categories contribute in specific ways – through their specific operations
– to create a network of formal properties that allow selecting the relevant inputs. Because of
this capacity, DIM acts as a domain general information-processing mechanism with multiple
components that concur to generate behaviors that respond adequately to environmental
stimuli. DIM allows specialization through its components and recruits specific mechanisms
(operation plus domain) to solve specific problems.
Premises for DIM as a domain general system come from a few sources. First, there exist
common brain mechanisms for some distinct processes. For example, studies on profoundly
deaf babies acquiring signed languages have found that they babble on their hands with the
same phonetic and syllabic linguistic organization as hearing babies babble vocally and
acquire signed languages on the same maturational timetable as spoken languages. This
suggests that common brain mechanism may govern the acquisition of signed and spoken
languages despite radical differences in modality (Petitto, 1993; Petitto, Zatorre, Gauna,
Nikelski, Dostie, and Evans, 2000). Second, cognitive models are implemented in distributed
brain areas. Thus, for example, a cognitive neuroscience imaging study of Petersen, Fox,
Posner, Mintun, and Raichle (1988) shows that for reading, the visual code has direct access
to output coding without mandatory phonological recoding. Semantic processing activates
frontal, rather than posterior temporal regions. The imaging results are consistent with a dual-
route cognitive model for reading comprehension (Bruer, 1997; 1999). While language is
located on the Broca’s area (in the frontal lobe) and Wernicke’s area (in the temporal lobe),
the inferior parietal lobe and the intraparietal sulcus participate in circuits devoted to
processing mathematics (Butterworth, 1999). Third, still, children develop in stages that are
universal, although there are asynchronies among individuals’ ages and across domains.
As described above, the DIM acts as a domain-general system of cognitive processing
mechanisms that organize the selection of the inputs to be processed by specific modules (in a
wide sense). This organization is shortly described below.
The DIM’s actions manifest at a macro-level, but also at the level of various inputs based
on functional specialization. At the beginning of development, the inner operations are less
differentiated. Through internal–external scaffolding, the DIM mechanisms allow domain
specificity as a consequence of functional specialization. However, functional specialization
does not mean that the system evolves linearly from general to modular. Although there is a
progressive modularization, this is not the only tendency in the system. Rather, a dual
dynamic modularity manifests in the sense that, on the one hand, the operational categories
specialize problem solving mechanisms; on the other hand, the operations are incorporated in
the information to which the cognitive system has access.
How does the DIM system prioritize its various possible operations over time? Iterating
and Generating have primordial roles in early childhood. In solving fundamental problems of
survival (e.g. satisfying hunger, satisfying sleeping need), children repeatedly experiment
with all the cognitive tools at hand and select action schemas that are effective for assuaging
the need. This persistence is of an iterative nature but the variety of strategies children use in
their goal oriented searches and experimentations derive from the generative capacity of the
mind. One-to-one associations allow testing various trials, which are later compared each
other, in order to select the ones that better fit the conditions and the purpose. The proto-
quantitative operations allow for a variety of degrees/levels of solving the problem (in our
examples, accepting that hunger was satisfied to a certain degree or that the sleeping time was
enough). The topological operations then help to extrapolate an intuition on the
places/contexts/situations that contributed to the solution (satisfy the state of hunger/ sleep),
narrowing the searches. Next trials will be guided by these intuitions. This process of
narrowing (through specialization) the input criteria culminates with the intervention of
logical operations, which allow combining actions and their conditioning. This brings more
precision and more coherence to coordinated decisions within the system.
The process of specialization-modularization is driven by the possibility of purposely
organizing representations of the external world, in other words, by the search of structures.
Might be this search rendered explicit through empiric data? The next sections provide
evidence for a natural tendency of the human mind for searching conceptual organizations,
showing some outcomes of these searches.
PATTERNING: A NATURAL TENDENCY

Many studies converge to the idea that there is a natural endowment for recursion and
recursive processes. Thus, recursion helps humans to develop indefinitely many phrases from
a limited list of words and sentences (Chomsky, 1972; 1980; Hauser, Chomsky and Finch,
2002). Similarly, from a set of a few digits, infinitely many natural numbers are generated
through the recursive procedure of adding 1 to the precedent number.
Within DIM, recursion manifests through the operational category of iterating. Iterating
appears very early in life through the perception of rhythm. For example, the experiments
made by Sansavini, Bertoncini, and Giovanelli (1997) showed that newborns discriminate the
rhythm of multi-syllabic stressed words. Recent research brings evidences that infants can
detect temporal regularities that occur periodically. Thus, Hannon and Johnson (2005)
showed that 7-month-olds can categorize unique rhythms on the basis of implied metrical
structure. This experiment is significant for the iterating category because although the
periodic temporal structure may play only a relatively minor role in patterns of speech, it is
fundamental to the temporal structure of music perception. Since every normal human being
is able to perceive music, we can infer that iterating category is pervasive.
A behavioral manifestation of iterating is imitation. Neo-Piagetians see mimicking as an
ability to overcome the actual skill level by manifesting a behavior analogous to the next,
more advanced, level (Fischer, 1980; 2008). Even if it is less consistent compared to the next
advanced level, mimicking ability stimulates the progress in learning in the early ages. Thus,
imitation acts as a primitive form of perceiving and developing patterns.
The above considerations are meant to show that infants and toddlers manifest a natural
ability for processing simple patterns of speech, motion, emotion, etc. Does this ability also
independently manifest at school age? Singer and Voica addressed some geometrical and
algebraic patterns for completion to a sample consisted of 3,837 students in 4th grade (10-11
years old, 51.1% boys and 48.9% girls, 41.7% from rural schools and 58.3% from urban
schools). The same sample was used for PIRLS (Progress in International Reading Literacy
Study), and it is about a statistically representative sample for Romanian population. Two of
the questions are presented in figure 1.
Question 10: In each case, fill in what you think better matches:
10.1
10.2
Figure 1. Geometrical patterns proposed for completion to a sample of 3,837 students

The geometrical patterns in figure 1 are based on two rules of variation: for the first one,
the upper parts of the pattern are increasing, while the bottom parts are decreasing by one
network square; for the second, the height of the rectangles is increasing by two squares,
while the length is decreasing by one square. In processing the data, any continuation made
by a child was analyzed and was included into a category, without considering that there are
“good” or “bad” completions of the series. Children used a variety of modalities to complete
these series. For example, some (25.7%) have chosen to repeat it identically (we called it
translation), some others (31.8%) developed the two dimensional pattern following the two
rules presented above. The categories of answers to these questions are summarized in
figures 2 and 3.
Most of the students tried to find a completion for those patterns (only about 3% did not
answer in each case). I will further analyze the completions. A vast majority of children (78%
for the first pattern, and 89% for the second) gave a meaningful continuation of the
sequences. Among these, 36% and respectively 18% of the students found the two-
dimensional variation and applied it persistently for developing the pattern (Figure 3). There
is about a total of 1361 and respectively 698 students (in absolute values) that were
spontaneously able to decode the structure of the patterns and to apply it for developing the
sequences. Other studies on patterning also identified a natural tendency to organize the
material in order to uncover structures (Singer & Voica, 2003; 2008a).
Figure 2. Statistical data for the items 10-2 and 10-3

Figure 3. A synthetic presentation of the answers given by students to questions: 10-1 and 10-2.
I will try to go deeper into the cognitive mechanisms involved by the successful
achievement of this task. As mentioned above, a vast majority of children made a meaningful
completion. However, there are different levels of complexity in children’s accomplishments,
confirmed by a series of interviews (Singer & Voica, 2003).
At the most elementary level, the student notices the shape of the given pattern. Some
children remain at this stage of understanding and propose developments that preserve an
approximate shape of the pattern. Perceiving the gestalt of the pattern allows a reasonable
outcome as answer to the task. This is the case of continuing with a constant or periodical
sequence (8.5% of the sample made this choice for the first item) or with a combination of
symmetry and translation. However, this solution means that only one of the available
cognitive tools has been used – the shape recognition. Perceiving the shape is not enough, it is
necessary to go deeper in understanding the nature of the pattern.
As the student explores the problem, the cognitive system tries to activate a filter for
decoding the pattern. The filter acts in order to make sense of the elements of the sequence. A
basic meaning of such an object is shape. Further, the background (i.e. the square network)
can offer some information, but it is not enough only to count the squares: it is necessary to
process also the alternation of the increasing and decreasing series. Therefore, two more
discrete steps are necessary: to separate the sequence in two sub-sequences and to express
them numerically (i.e. concerning the first pattern, for the upper parts: “1 small square”, “2
small squares”, “3 small squares”, …, and for the bottom parts: “5 small squares”, “4 small
squares”, “3 small squares”, …). These steps allow DIM to mobilize and to adapt cognitive
tools to the specific context of the problem.
The filter of processing selects the appropriate “language” to express the problem in
order to make it understandable to the solver. The identification of a filter leads to the
adaptive use of the already existing tools in the cognitive system (in this example, the tools
are shape recognition and counting), which are delivered by the students’ previous
knowledge.
When the filter is unclear, the superposition of the “languages” leads to a partial
understanding of the problem. In order to get a more accurate answer, after understanding the
semantics, the child needs to arrive at the syntax of the shape, which means at decoding the
intrinsic rules of the pattern. The passage from the semantics of the shape to its syntax
activates the recursiveness of the mind, allowing a continuation that follows in detail the
generative rule.
Because recursion is intrinsic to the human mind and is one of the most “trained”
operation of DIM, it might block the access to supplementary processing. A superficial
understanding of the pattern structure could generate “the illusion of linearity” (De Bock, Van
Dooren, Janssens & Verschaffel, 2002), which leads to a continuation that is based on
congruence, such as translation (as did 25.7% of the sample), or even symmetry (as did 2.1%
of the sample). Recursion is somehow embodied in translation, compared to the continuations
in which the student recognized only the general shape of the pattern: the translation is
generated by periodicity, which is the simplest type of recursion. Thus, the passage from
identifying a shape to a solution through translation can involuntarily happen, blocking
student’s access to a deeper analysis of the pattern features. In the case of symmetry, the
shape recognition is so strong that the child is able to reproduce the inversion of the image.
Concluding, when presented a representative sample with patterns, almost all 4 graders
were able to provide continuations. They did this without any kind of training, consequently
we can speak here about a natural tendency for patterning, i.e. for organizing the perceived
context in meaningful informational chunks. However, children can spontaneously do more
than that: about one third was able to advance from accessing the semantics of the given
patterns to decoding their syntax.
COGNITION IN ACTION: THE SEARCH OF STRUCTURES

The child processes (identifies, records, activates, organizes-reorganizes) structures
within categorical learning, while exploring the environment from the very early ages. The
search of structures is meant to optimize problem solving within environmental interaction. In
early childhood, children evolve from random movements to coordination (Piaget, 1976;
Fischer & Bidell, 2006) within explorations that are purpose oriented. The purpose seems to
be is in close connection with the idea of structuring.
Trial-error procedures are optimized over time through trial-error-organize procedures. In
time and with practice, mental organizations become structures – reproducible and adaptable
to variable contexts. The DIM operations are very sensitive to environment. This might
explain the positive results obtained by social interactionists who theorize that adults play an
important part in children's language acquisition. Studying parent-child interaction, they point
out that children do not have to deduce the principles of language from impoverished and
ungrammatical scraps of talk. Many studies of child directed speech have shown that speech
to young children is slow, clear, grammatical, and very repetitious, rather like traditional
language lessons (Yont, Snow, Vernon-Feagans, 2003). “Context matters!” exclaime Rose &
Fischer (in press) reviewing a large body of research on the use of dynamic systems in the
study of development.
The environment confronts the innate DIM and its categories of operations are self-
developing within this confrontation. In this process, the proto-operations diversify and
specialize while structuring mental representations. Conversely, DIM’s operations capture
environmental stimuli through inputs that specialize over time. This explains the acquisition
of cultural tools and tacit knowledge in individuals even if this acquisition is not the result of
an explicit teaching-learning process. In what follows in this article, conceptual and cognitive
structures will be used interchangeably: a conceptual structure (as product of human
knowledge) needs to be perceived by a human mind in order to be identified as such, while a
cognitive structure (an individual cognitive sub-mechanism) has to act on a specific
concept/content in order to manifest its existence. In a broad sense, a structure supposes
relations among its components that assure a behavior that is invariant across situations. This
invariance allows the cognitive system to recognize a structure and to match it with the
appropriate context. A structure can have as referential: a concept/ a procedure or an
interaction concept-procedure, a set of concepts/ procedures bound together.
For reasons of clarity, I operate with two theoretical categories of structures: spontaneous
structures, which are naturally activated in challenging contexts, and aggregate structures,
which are elaborated through (formal) learning activities around concepts or procedures that
are domain specific. Spontaneous structures reveal innate endowment, while aggregate
structures show learning acquisitions.
Types of Spontaneous Structures
Analyzing the data from a survey involving 209 students from grades 1 to 12 (i.e. 6-7 to
18-19 years old, among which 111 girls and 98 boys), Singer & Voica (2008a) found that,
when arguing about the infinity of a set and when comparing the cardinals of two infinite sets,
students inevitably arrive at emphasizing structures (structure) of those/ that set. They
concluded that students naturally search for structures in challenging learning contexts and
arrive at different perspectives on problem solving procedures depending on the structure they
found most preeminent within a task.
Based on students’ comments in interviews and questionnaires, Singer & Voica
(submitted) have identified four types of spontaneous intuitive conceptual structures. In the
following sections of the paper, these structures are presented from a broader view that
emphasizes their features beyond the context of specific tasks given to students (related to
discussions about infinity) in which they have been identified.
Algebraic-based structures. An a-structure (algebraic structure) appears as a means of

interrelating the components of a system according to its algebraic properties. Characteristic
for an a-structure is the transfer of operations between the sets through one-to-one
correspondences. An a-structure operates with the decomposition of the elements of a set in
their constituent parts. This decomposition uncovers functional transfer between two sets.
From this perspective, they are activated in any process that supposes input-output.
An algebraic structure is responsible with the identification and separation of constants
and variables; it also deals with the variation of quantities within an input-output process. In a
broad sense, such a structure allows understanding/representing simple mechanisms that keep
performing the same operation while varying the inputs. For example, understanding that if 1
kilo of apples costs 2 euro, then 3 kilos of the same quality will cost 6 euro, 4 kilos will cost 8
euro, etc. Moreover, a-structures help to overcome the constraints of subitizing and to
combine this numerical restriction by adding constants and variables through a composition-
decomposition process and in-out mechanisms. At least two reasons concur to activate a-
structures within DIM. First, the DIM mechanisms specialize while processing various inputs,
therefore the system should be able to detect in-out procedures and to construct the
knowledge of using them; second, DIM is meant to act economically, therefore to automatize
processes, and the in-out procedure of function type is the simplest mechanism of
automatizing in this case.
Evolutionary accounts might sustain this position. According to Pinker (1997), evolution
has designed various semi-independent mechanisms in our brains to perform simple tasks in
highly effective ways. Along Pleistocene, observing repetitive patterns of animals’ tracks and
noticing the differences within the variable environment was a survival condition. Those who
were having the capacity to select invariants from the environment and to differentiate them
from the features that were varying at random had a bigger chance to survive. Thus, being
able to quickly understand patterns of danger or patterns of sources for food became essential
for better adaptation. This might be extrapolated in the capacity of differentiating constants
and variables and the idea that the result of an in-out process depends in specific ways on the
input data. This capacity is algebraic in nature (in a very broad sense).
Geonic-based structures. When asked to compare infinite sets, some students intuitively
appeal to the number line, even if the task does not mention it at all. The representation of
numerical sets on the number line and the identification of their geometric properties that are
relevant for a given task grants a g-structure ("geonic structure") to the sets of numbers. A g-
structure is a means to interrelate the components of a system, which highlight graphical,
visual, iconic properties.
Characteristic for a g-structure is the use of congruence as a way to show the cardinal
equivalency of some infinite sets. Congruence might intuitively appear as superposition
through a slide. G-structures suppose a transfer between arithmetic and geometry, during
which the initial configuration is mentally modified. G-structures also suppose a holistic
vision of the set, which is transferred through representation. The g-structures become active
within the transfer algebra-geometry, facilitated by the number line (or by the system of
Cartesian coordinates), when the problem context allows for a geometrical representation.
G-structures refer to the recourse to an iconic element that can be described and
understood through its conversion in a representational system. These structures are called
“geonic” and not simply “iconic” because they abstract the properties of physical objects into
some “ideal” representations and, based on these representations, logical constructions allow
to study in depth new other deduced properties. G-structures allow the use of notational
schemes for clarifying and simplifying descriptions of situations, contexts, actions (for
example the use of maps, or graphic organizers in order to facilitate information processing).
Karmiloff-Smith’s metaphor (1992) of the child as notator uncovers the development of this
type of structure. It also seems to have relevant components in the prehistory of humans, as it
contributes to space orientation, which was very important for survival.
Fractal-type structures. Sometimes students identify structures that are of a fractal type.
Intuitively, a fractal is a configuration that self-generates through homothety. For example, to
argue the infinity of the set of rational numbers between 2 and 3, Alice (grade 6) highlights a
tree configuration:
Interviewer: Is the set of rational numbers between 2 and 3 infinite?
Alice: Yes!
Interviewer: Why? Look, I have the smallest number and the biggest… why should this
be an infinite set?
Alice: Well, yes, could be 2.1; 2.11 … I mean 2 point … 111 and so on …
Interviewer: And you say they are infinitely many…
Alice: Perhaps they are not quite infinitely many, because finally we still get to
number 3, but they can be said as a sequence … it might be … number 2.1.,
it might be 2.11 to 2.19, and so on … number 2.11 might be 2.111 and
2.119 and so on…
Figure 4. The structure identified by Alice (grade 6) to argue that the rational numbers between 2 and 3
are infinitely many.
We notice that, even if Alice does not have a clear idea about an infinite set (“perhaps
they are not quite infinitely many”), she shows however a spatial-rhythmic perception (Singer
& Voica, 2008b) about infinity (“ and so on … and so on…”). Alice’s argument is based on a
tree-type graph (see Figure 4).
When, in order to describe the elements of a set, a procedure is sequentially repeated at
different scales, the set was granted an f-structure ("fractal-type structure"). A f-structure is
seen as a general means to organize a system which highlights the sequential generating of its
subcomponents by repetition at different scales. Because a f-structure works with different
scales, it has a local character. A f-structure is in the same time self-generated in a sequential
mode, through the application of a rule. This is why a f-structure endows the system (or its
subsystems) with an organization that is local and dynamic.
Fractal-structures are based on the scale change. We have seen (in Alice’s
representation) that the set of decimal numbers can activate such a structure.
Chomsky changed our perception of language: while communicating, we are not
producing linear strings of sounds/words interrupted by small gaps of silence; we are actually
building “tree structures” that bear syntactic and semantic complexities. Linguistic structures
are among the fractal structures. For example, the analysis of the sentence “The young child
evolves from random trials to organized structures.” emphasizes changes of scales, as it
shown in figure 5.
Chomsky could apply mathematics rules to generate grammar because both domains
seem to have a common original mechanism. For Chomsky, the study of language
concentrates on the investigation of the structures of syntax, an investigation which is almost
logical-mathematical. The task to uncover the set of rules or principles that could account for
all of the grammatical sentences of the language involved the painstaking identification of
underlying syntactical processes and the search for counter-examples – in an effort to
delineate the nature of the formal system that underlay all the languages spoken by human
beings.
In his initial explanation, Chomsky posited the existence of two levels of language: an
underlying deep structure, which governs the fundamental syntactic relations among such
components as noun phrases and verb phrases; and a set of surface structures which were
generated by transformations of elements in the deep structure. The surface transformations
(for example, from affirmative statements in passive or interrogative ones) yield the sentences
which individuals actually utter and comprehend.
Figure 5. A tree representation for the syntax of the sentence “The young child evolves from random
trials to organized structures.”
Figure 6. “Seeing” the fractal structure of the number line. Reproduced from Singer & Voica
(submitted).
The underlying mechanisms might be similar to some extent for generating numbers or
words. Chomsky’s enterprise proved prolific because, as this paper argues, a common
dynamic mechanism has initiated both language acquisition and numerical processing.
Transformational grammars might be seen as similar with successive lens “put” on the
number line (figure 6). Both types are intrinsic to human mind and are built by a DIM that
develops domain specific mechanisms within the environment interactions.
In general, the recursive processes based on scale change seem to activate a fractal-type
structure. Non-linguistic fractal structures include also important examples, such as
understanding the transformation between measure systems. These structures seem to be also
specific for the way in which we understand the numerical systems: the numeric magnitude
orders of base ten (units, tens, hundreds, etc.), as well as of other bases, are defined through
grouping (or dividing) other groups. Such structures also work for division in base 10. When
dividing two integers, for example, 37 and 8, we recursively use the grouping and the division
of a unit in ten units of the next lower order of magnitude. Thus, when divide 37 by 8 one
gets 4 and a remainder 5. In order to continue the division, we transform the 5 remained units
into 50 tenths. The 50 tenths divided by 8 gives 6 and remainder 2. The 2 remained tenths
should be transformed into 20 hundredths. The 20 hundredths divided by 8 gives 2 and
remainder 4. The 4 remained hundredths should be transformed into 40 thousandths. One
finally gets 37:8 = 4,625 doing three changes of scale along the process. The difficulty the
students encounter when they learn the division algorithm might be given by the passage
among different numerical scales while internalizing a fractal-structure.
Beyond mathematics, it seems that the permanence of syntax is even larger. The
embodied metaphors theory (Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) extends the syntax
properties to the human conceptual systems. For Lakoff and Johnson, language is embodied,
which means that its structure reflects our bodily experience, and our bodily experience
creates concepts that are then abstracted into syntactic categories. They have concluded that
grammar is shared (to some degree) by all humans for the simple reason that we all share
roughly the same bodily experience. Moreover, the core of our conceptual systems is directly
grounded in perception, body movement, and experience, which integrate both the physical
and social context.
A fractal type structure might be also identified when analyzing skill development along
ages, in macrodevelopment, or along training, in microdevelopment (Granott, 2002) The DIM
unity in variability along phases of cognitive development could account for the fractal model
of the developing mind (e.g. Fischer & Rose,1994, 2001; Fischer, Yan, & Stuart, 2003). Such
a model become consistent as an example can be offered: the DIM’s operations are the
elements that assure the indefinite repeatability of the basic fractal structure of skills
development. Within DIM, the specific operations of a class share, as representatives, the
property that defines the class. That means that they have similar functioning mode, whatever
the level of abstraction involved would be. They can be seen as the nuclei that pattern the
repeatability in variability (Commons, Trudeau, Stein, Richards, & Krause, 1998) of the
phases of the developmental stages. As Feldman put it, the child acts as ‘‘to bring greater
internal coherence to each of the stages, as well as to suggest that there are similar rhythms to
the way in which each stage is encountered, engaged, constructed, and elaborated. Within
each stage there are increasingly large numbers of elements that become coordinated,
culminating in a highly complex set of accomplishments organized into relatively large
functioning units’’ (Feldman, 2004: 185). Within the web of skills (Fischer & Rose, 2001),
the human development supposes acquisitions that are based on periodical changes of scale.
Density-type structures. When comparing infinite sets, students frequently referred in

interviews and questionnaires to the density of sets, seen as a degree of piling up the elements
of the set. Thus, for example, when asked which numbers are more: integers or fractions,
some students notice that the natural numbers are “rarer”, while the set of rational numbers is
more “crowded”. The idea of piling up, crowdedness, the step of succession, or density seen
as an intuitive measure of the set – how ”crowded” the set is – grants a d-structure ("density-
based structure") to a set of numbers.
A d-structure is seen as a means to interrelate the components of a system which
emphasizes its local topological properties (concerning vicinity, approximation, border). In
general, the endowment of a set with a d-structure favors extrapolations from local to global.
In this way, topological structures in a wider sense are emphasized, i.e. structures that
conserve their properties when changing the shape. Density-based structures have a dual
nature. On the one hand, in the construction of a d-structure the topological perception is
activated, because the child evokes density/ jam/ accumulation of the elements of a set. On the
other hand, d-structures appear especially in a discrete context, in which the students appeal to
the processional recursive perception. This is why a d-structure endows the system (or its
subsystems) with an organization that is local and static: the child triggers the description
around a vicinity of an element of the set.
The phenomena of convergence, limit, or, more generally, the recursive processes in
which the scale is preserved suppose the activation of a d-structure. Thus, the fact that the
students have a local topological perception (expressed through understanding the density
properties) can be used (and it is actually) in the design of the functional graphs at the
‘endpoints’ of the definition intervals, before the in-depth study of calculus. D-structures are
also typical for statistical methods: we extrapolate conclusions having a local character
(obtained on a sample) to an entire population.
From a larger perspective, d-structures allow perceiving and analyzing vicinities, the
crowdedness within a species or social group.
In conclusion, the spontaneous structures mobilized by children in the challenging

context of infinite sets tasks are the following: d-structures, which are local and static, f-
structures that are local and dynamic, a-structures that are global and static, and g-structures,
which are global and dynamic. Summing up the features of the identified spontaneous
structures, we find: a- and g-structures are global, underlying the representational properties
of the mind through functional-procedural and notational properties; d- and f-structures are
local, being generated by the category of topological operations; f- and g-structures are
dynamic because they trigger transformations within which some parameters are changed,
thus emphasizing the invariance of some others, which are relevant as invariants; and d- and
a-structures are static because they suppose identification and analysis – procedures that are
static in nature – and the variables and invariants do not interfere in these cases with the
nature of those structures, they being only means of producing them.
Therefore, the criteria that differentiate these structures involve space and time. Because
the human mind is constrained by the continuum space-time, this might be interpreted as
evidence that the structures with which children spontaneously endow infinite sets are
actually propensities of their minds. As we have seen, these propensities bring specific
threads to knowledge development. Grammar, computer science, metric system, all seem to
evolve from some basic structures the human mind is able to mobilize in challenging
contexts.
Up to now, the four types of spontaneous structures identified in an empirical study about
infinite sets seem to be independent. I do not exclude the possibility to be some other basic
structures, which might be revealed in other empirical studies. I can infer at least, that the
DIM specializes procedures which generate spontaneous cognitive structures. The
development of these structures is driven by environment and is constrained by the neural
endowment.
Aggregate Structures and Knowledge Construction
The DIM mechanisms capture internal constraints and thus develop embodied
knowledge. They capture external constraints as well and thus develop adaptive knowledge.
Part of the embodied knowledge is the recorded propensity of infants and toddlers for the
domains of knowledge. Internal constraints and external stimuli coexist and action in
conjunction on the cognitive system and there is an interference between embodied
knowledge and adaptive knowledge. Adaptive knowledge learning results from interactions.
The human mind searches for structures in order to represent reality. There are inborn
mechanisms that capture environmental stimuli and subsequently build mental basic
structures. There is not a demarcation on the passage from spontaneous to aggregate
structures. The aggregate structures combine the spontaneous ones around a concept. They
are used to better describe domain specific structures acquired through learning. Searching for
structures mechanisms try to find and fit a module, in other words, to tune the relationship
between the module and its function. When this harmonization is made, a conceptual
structure, which is in the existed knowledge but external to the individual, becomes a
cognitive structure, which is internalized by the individual. The modules re-describe the
world through the part of the internalized structures that become stable.
The construction of aggregate structures is the “clock” that engages developmental

transformations. The DIM model raises some new explanations about asynchronies in
development and the apparition of new knowledge out of the existing one. According to
Piaget, horizontal décalage begins with an assumption of general synchrony across domains
and explains asynchrony in terms of objects’ resistance to people’s activities. A series of
studies on cognition uncovers various asynchronies within the stages of cognitive
development. Thus, for example, three-or-four-year olds begin to conserve simple number
and continuous quantity transformations well before the stage of concrete operations emerges
at six or seven (Carey and Gelman, 1991; Feldman, 2004). The ladder metaphor is no longer
valid: children do not develop in stages that evolve linearly across domains and individuals,
so as climbing the stairs. Fischer and his team at Harvard propose a more complex metaphor:
the web of skills. Although skills develop according to a standard sequence of levels, children
vary substantially in the developmental pathways they take, and each individual child varies
greatly in skill levels across domains (Vallotton & Fischer, 2008).
Within the mind’s trials to organize the internal world, the operations search for content,
in an attempt to “make sense” of the external world. The intuitive theories the child develops
early in life (e.g. Karmiloff-Simith, 1992) suppose a rudimentary processing of a reality that
proves to be more complex than the basic operations allow for an “unschooled mind”
(Gardner, 1991). When the underlying complexity is too high to be deciphered – as in the
case of misconceptions –, the core set of operations fabricates an embodied “self-explanation”
that is based on the available information to the cognitive system.
In the same line of arguments, as we are endowed with mental operations that are
searching for a content to become functional and from this interaction the operations evolve,
the increase of the operatorial combinatorics of mind has a decisive contribution to various
mind changes, including the ones of a developmental type (for example, understanding
conservation of matter). On the other hand, because the operations are embodied in various
contents, they create rigid entities, which are difficult to change. This could be an explanation
within the model for the resistance of early intuitive theories of mind. The efficiency of brain
functioning makes a person to tend to develop new structures on “the routes” already used.
The degree of stability depends upon the training – ad-hoc training environmentally driven, or
educational formal training. Moreover, these intuitive theories are reflecting a common sense
of the embodied cognition: “the Earth is flat”, for example, comes from the everyday
perception of not climbing a hill every morning. Therefore the misconception of flatness of
the Earth has strong reasons to be preserved and to change the mind in this case it a difficult
educational enterprise.
From an educational perspective, to change various robust intuitive theories of mind,
some of which prove to be quite wrong, an external intervention is needed to undermine the
intricacies operations-content. This is efficient – that is new codes and procedures are
internalized – only when a secondary intuition becomes active. According to Fischbein
(1987), intuitive knowledge is a self-explanatory cognition; it is a type of immediate,
coercive, self-evident cognition, which leads to generalizations going beyond the known data,
while secondary intuitions were defined as “those that are acquired, not through natural
experience, but through some educational interventions”, when formal knowledge becomes
immediate, obvious, and accompanied by confidence (Fischbein, 1987, p. 202), in other
words, they become beliefs, self explanatory conceptions. The construction of a secondary
intuition in domain specific learning is a challenging application of this model.
Classifying Aggregate Structures
School learning could highlight the natural propensity of the mind for processing
structures, thus making conceptual learning more efficient. To see how this is possible, I will
start by presenting a three-dimensional reference system used to describe an aggregate
structure acquired through domain specific learning (Singer, 1995; 2001b, 2004). The
dimensions taken into account are:
(a) a discrete component representing the “nuclei” or the fixed, stable elements of the
structure; these might be concepts, notions, procedures – content elements around
which the structure develops;
(b) a contiguous component that can be “visualized” as a network; more specifically, this
refers to the relationships among the concepts, notions, procedures involved – they
actually make a set of objects to become a structure;
(c) a kinematical component representing potential associations beyond the network that
might be generated in problem solving situations within a domain or cross domains –
it describes the degree of mobility of a structure.
This reference system allows classifying structures according to their mobility. Thus, the
following types of aggregate structures might be differentiated as distinct theoretical entities:
rigid structures, flexible structures and dynamic structures (Singer, 2004).
Rigid aggregate structures. The evolvement of a rigid structure is a frequent phenomenon

in learning. For example, it is known that children learning English as a second language say,
at some point, “I runned down the street” instead of “I ran”, extending the regular form of the
past tense to irregular verbs. We can consider that a rigid mental structure has led to this
effect. Other examples are offered by the misleading learning of some skills such as playing
an instrument or by the robust presence of misconceptions. Youngsters come to believe, for
example, that one feels warm when wearing a sweater because the sweater itself generates
warmth. The misconceived theories can be thought of as powerful engravings (Gardner,
1999) that have been incised upon the mind-brain of the child during the early years of life.
The facts learned in school may seem to obscure these engravings; however, frequently, the
initial erroneous engraving remains largely unaffected (Gardner, 1983, 1999). In these cases,
the mind has generated rigid structures.
A rigid aggregate structure is characterized by: (a) oversized, very stable nuclei, (b) a
poorly developed network, sometimes totally lacking, and (c) associations that function in the
area of the recognition of a standard situation and its reproduction. The phenomenon emerges
frequently in learning classical geometry. As a result, a student recognizes the isosceles or
right-angled triangle only if the given triangle is in a certain position; any other position is
perceived as a new learning element that requires a new nucleus in the structure. Such rigid
mental configurations often become fixations. On the positive side, a rigid structure is needed
for the practice of a skill or for the learning of algorithms. Beyond its positive role in assuring
the stability of the acquired knowledge, a rigid structure is usually responsible for the
emergence of typical errors. Such a structure develops because of two kinds of errors in
teaching. One error occurs when isolated information is taught without highlighting its
connection with previously learned information or when insufficient time is given to

internalization processes needed to create a network. A second error occurs when excessive
focus is placed on the already-taught information. This, too, hinders the development of a
network. Some of the “drill and practice” procedures that developed out of a behaviorist
approach can be responsible for this result. A mental structure has a regenerative tendency to
organize itself, tendency that can be blocked only by the second above-mentioned constraint.
In fact, such tendency explains the progress in learning even with the most inappropriate
teaching.
Flexible aggregate structures. A more adaptive structure to a variable learning

environment is a flexible structure. If each object we came across during an ordinary walk
were new, then we would either give up all attempts to proceed, or we would stop every time
to clear up each of those new objects, consequently there would be no advance. Even during
the most unusual trips, the things we perceive as new are not numerous. Thus, usually, we do
not pay much attention to what we come across unless it is something really new to us, or it
causes new problems (such as a tree fallen during the night, an acquaintance unusually
dressed, something that raises our interest, etc.). A similar phenomenon happens while
reading a book in our field of interest: we are less interested in what we already know; we
only stop and ponder on new elements. The flexible structures activated in our minds
acknowledge and allow us to integrate the new into a coherent whole.
A flexible structure is characterized by: (a) stable nuclei, (b) a developed network, and by
(c) associations based on recognizing invariant elements in various environments. A flexible
structure allows problem solving through analogy and inductive or deductive inferences when
the context is relatively familiar. Such a structure might enter into relations with other
structures, ensuring a coherence of the reaction. A flexible structure is activated when solving
problems that are based on “short distance” transfer, such as applying algorithms, identifying
particular cases, and, possibly, using analogical reasoning.
Dynamic aggregate structures. Some of us are able to rapidly see or discover connections
among things that look to be not connected at a first sight; they can transfer mental tools
developed in a certain context to analyze or solve a problem in a completely different context.
Some of us can identify patterns where many of us see only disparate things. From a
cognitive perspective, these persons have activated and mobilized dynamic mental structures
that enable them to optimally respond to the situation. What specifically characterizes such a
structure?
A dynamic structure implies: (a) flexible nuclei that are or could become structures in
their turn; (b) complex networks with ramifications and hierarchies; and (c) dynamic
associations that facilitate quick mobilization of the structure through the discovery of critical
paths. These associations stimulate the self-development of the structure, highlight underlying
relations among different structures, and give rise to links between various structures within
the cognitive system.
A dynamic structure can also behave as either flexible or rigid, depending on the task to
be solved. While the flexible structures are mostly adaptive, the dynamic ones are mostly
creative.
In Figure 7 there are representational schemes for the three types of structures. The
schemes highlight the 3 dimensions used to emphasize the differences among those types:
(nuclei, network, potential associations beyond the network). Thus, while in a rigid structure
the nuclei are very developed, in a flexible structure they diminish in favor of the network.
This process continues for a dynamic structure, in which the connections become the most
important part, capable to engage new nuclei and to extend beyond the existing structure.
Figure 7. Schematic representations for different types of structures
I assume that while flexible structures are responsible for efficient learning in knowledge
domains such as social sciences, dynamic structures facilitates the efficient learning of
domains such as mathematics or languages, which are internally structured through complex
networks of concepts and procedures in a hierarchical manner.
IMPACT: FOCUSING ON STRUCTURES IN ORDER TO CHALLENGE AN

OVER-LEARNING PHENOMENON
Dynamic Structural Learning
The school system has proved that basic skills such as reading and writing are relatively
easy automatized in young children (and relatively more difficult in adults). Within the DIM
paradigm the challenge is to automatize operatorial schemes in order to optimize cognitive
processes. Experiments made in school settings seem to converge on the idea that systematic
practice of the operational categories listed above in a range of controlled variability could
have an effect on the transfer of some of their components to the ‘‘background’’ of conscious
thinking (Singer, 1995, 2001a, 2003), that is, they become elements of automatic processes.
A longitudinal study (Singer, 1995) has emphasized the building of dynamic structures
through the Dynamic Structural Learning (DSL) in mathematics. The DSL supposes a two
folded methodology: highlighting dynamic conceptual structures within the curriculum, and
organizing the teaching practice in such a way that it generate dynamic structures of thinking.
I will present an example of such a structure that offers a generative schema of training in
early numeracy and algebra in primary grades. I first describe the conceptual structure, and
then I present on short a strategy of implementation. A more detailed discussion on this
example can be found in Singer (2007a).
This example regards ways of highlighting the connections between numbers and
operations in primary school. The chain-concept is the sequence of natural numbers. The use
of sequence for in-depth learning becomes relevant for reasons connected to an important
component of DIM – the Iterating category. As an inner operation, iterating accounts for the
recursive property of mind. The role of recursion was underlined especially for language (e.g.
Chomsky, 1980). Chomsky defines the faculty of language in a narrow sense as being the
abstract linguistic computational system (narrow syntax) that generates internal
representations and maps them into the sensory-motor interface by the formal semantic
system. While the internal architecture of language supports many debates, there is an
agreement that a core property of the faculty of language in a narrow sense is recursion,
attributed to narrow syntax; this takes a finite set of elements (words, sentences) and yields an
array of discrete expressions (Hauser et al., 2002), which could be considered potentially
infinite. The embodied metaphors theory (Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) extends
the syntax properties to other human conceptual systems. Going further on this line of
research, recursion appears to be a general property, not specifically of language, but of
human thinking (and, through this, implicitly of language). It comes from here that the
emphasis put on recursive properties of domain specific concepts can enhance domain
specific learning.
I will bring evidence for this assumption using an example from mathematics. The
sequence of natural numbers might be seen as an integrating concept for numbers and
mathematical operations. To be more specific, I consider the sequence of even numbers. An
increasing sequence of even numbers (e.g. 0, 2 , 4 , 6 , …) contains a synthesis of addition
(e.g. 2 = 0+2, 4 = 2+2, 6 = 4+2, etc.) and multiplication (e.g. 2 = 2x1, 4 = 2+2=2x2, 6
=2+2+2=3x2, etc.), while a decreasing sequence of even numbers (e.g. 12 , 10 , 8 , 6 , 4 , 2 ,
0) contains a synthesis of subtraction (e.g. 8 = 10 – 2, 6 = 8 – 2) and division (e.g. 10 is 5
times 2, then 10:5 = 2). Thus, the sequence of natural even numbers appears as an integrating
concept of all four arithmetical operations (Singer, 2003; 2007a). Moreover, each number in
the sequence can be generated by any of the four arithmetical operations, and each operation,
in turn, can be derived from another one using appropriate numbers in the sequence.
Figure 8. A scheme for a dynamic mental structure: connecting natural numbers and operations
(Reproduced from Singer, 2007a)
The ensemble of these relations among numbers and operations constitutes a dynamic
conceptual structure. Figure 8 gives a representation that highlights the explicit and potential
relations among the components of this structure. The representational scheme in figure 2 is a
prototype; the same construction is implied in other sequences: that of odd numbers, or in the
sequence generated by counting “by threes”, “by fours”, “by tens”, etc.”, starting from 0, or
starting from any other “point” – a natural number on the number line. Practically, this
scheme allows the extrapolation to any kind of sequence of natural numbers.
The dynamics of the mental structure generated by internalizing this scheme requires
special attributes of mobility: relating a nucleus within the structure to any of the other nuclei
(each natural number can be generated from other numbers by using a certain operator from
the scheme); focusing the whole structure on a given task in order to set new information in
as many nuclei of the structure as possible (for example, grasping that multiplication is a
repeated addition and using this further in problem solving); linking the structure to another
one nearby or at distance (for example, internalizing a similar pattern for learning decimal
numbers and operations with decimal numbers); re-constructing the structure starting from
any of its nuclei (for example starting from multiplication and highlighting the connection
with division and using the schema to process division in various particular cases); giving
freedom to each nucleus of the structure so that it might multiply or it might migrate into
another structure (for example mobilizing the structural passage from repeated addition to
repeated multiplication, in order to grasp the powers of natural numbers and, consequently, to
have a logical referential for the priority rules in computing); reorganizing the structure
according to a certain working hypothesis while performing a creative task (for example
identifying the 100th term in a series); transferring the structure from one level of abstraction
to another (for example using the same pattern for understanding algebraic multiplication
with rational coefficients).
Implications for the Teaching Practice
The following section is focused on describing how such a dynamic aggregate structure
can be internalized by children. The tasks meant to lead to the internalization of the schema
presented above were developed from two perspectives: processing in the frame of the
sequence (identifying the rule involved in a specific pattern, adding new terms in a sequence,
applying a given rule when the starting term is known, etc.), and strengthening on operational
characteristic of each element of the sequence. Thus, for example each number in the
sequence was compared with the elements in the neighborhood (e.g. in the sequence 4, 6, 8,
10, 12, one gets 8 starting from its neighbors by adding 2 to 6 or by subtracting 2 from 10),
and with the elements that are situated at a longer distance on the number line (e.g. one gets 8
by multiplying 4 by 2 – or by making 4 jumps 2 steps long). Moreover, each element of the
sequence was systematically related to concrete objects (underlying conservation) and to
mental processing (with or without imagery support).
This alternation between concrete and abstract becomes necessary when we take into
account the dynamic skill theory (Fischer and Bidell, 2006). Within this theory, to build new
skills or to change old ones to fit a new task, people must move their skill backward to a low
level in order then to gradually construct a higher-level skill. Without this process of
regression and reconstruction, skills remain stuck in old formats: students perform at a higher
level, but that is adapted to a prior situation, not to the new one that is required (Fischer,
2008; Yan, & Fischer, 2002).
A similar strategy was used for other categories of tasks, involving comparison,
composing and decomposing numbers, word-problem solving, analyzing and transforming
word-problems. The results have shown that students become aware of the relevant data in
problem solving, as part of an over-learning phenomenon.
These strategies are part of a broader study. A 4-year longitudinal study of teaching and
learning mathematics in primary school was design to check the hypothesis that DSL might
engage an over-learning phenomenon (Singer, 2004; Singer & Moscovici, 2008). The
experimental program tracked cohorts of children from grade 1 to grade 4 (aged 6-7 to 10-11
years). In total, 232 children in nine experimental classes were involved. The teachers
received detailed descriptions of the tasks that they were going to offer to students, and the
teaching periods were followed by discussions, on a once weekly base. The students were
tested 15 times per year and their teachers interviewed at the end of each semester.
In a very short presentation, the following training procedures were used across the
school year:
1. Systematic training of transfers: from operating with animate and inanimate objects
to abstract thinking and coming back; from thinking aloud to “thinking in mind” and
vice-versa. Successive steps – from “drama”- role playing, to graphical
representations, from formal representations (using letters for variables) to mental
computing – were systematically practiced while varying the informational content.
2. Randomized training of the developed capacities, which was realized by means of
mental games.
3. Structured training of specific competences, which aimed at assimilating the
invariants. This was targeted by constantly resorting to models and diagrams.
The dynamic aggregate structures activated through DSL could shorten the pathways to
conceptual understanding by developing generative connections beyond the learned concept.
In this context, stability is seen as a feature of the dynamics of knowledge.
The impact of this conceptual framework concerns to what extent DSL might be used on
a large scale. Previous experiments show that the DSL tasks can relatively easy be
generalized in school practice, at least at the level of primary education. Teachers familiar
with some inquiry-based techniques easily adapt to the SDL strategy and provide innovations
convergent with the theory.
Because this review does not offer enough space for details, it is important to stress that
DSL does not promote a unique technique of training. The diversity of human minds calls for
diverse strategies for facilitating learning. The classroom practice showed that teachers
introduce ad-hoc innovations in the practical approach to tune students’ participation in
learning. For example, the classroom management involves the decision of selecting certain
students to carry on specific activities. Within the format of the tasks (which belong to the
systematic, randomized, or structured phase), some learning activities become very familiar
for the majority of students, while some new activities are added in each lesson. The teacher
orchestrates the distribution of the learning activities among the students in the class so that
all children are involved but each child participates at his/her level of competence,
confidence, and rate of acquisition. The distribution of the activities allow remedial teaching
within each task format because low achievers learn from their classmates while keeping the
rhythm of some collective activities and they manifest publicly when they are confident with
their own achievements. What becomes visible after a few months of practice is that children
advance gradually and naturally to a maximum of individual potential within a social learning
context. I assume that an important contribution to such social learning is the activation of the
recursive capacity of mind, stimulated by the rhythm of variation in repeatability. The use of
patterns allows stressing on connections and emphasizes invariants in the variability of math
domains, with effect in the development of the capacity of transfer. This might have
important consequences in the quality of learning.
FOR A BETTER LEARNING: CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH

Any type of learning engenders mental representations that are more or less structured.
Within the experimental program presented above, some lessons have been learned: At first
contacts with a new domain, the focus should be on grasping and internalization within an
immersive learning environment that lead to the practice of newly generated mental structures
in simple situations. Initially, the mental configuration generated through learning is unstable;
any new information can perturb it. Effective learning occurs if the new information connects
with the old one and completes it to an extended configuration, i.e., if it produces contiguous
connections, which generate acquisition of knowledge and skills with certain stability.
However—and this is the critical point for training the mobility—if information transmission
deepens the stability of the configuration, it becomes a negative factor.
Classical training, excessively relying on memory for learning, prematurely strengthens
the stability of a mental structure. Within DSL, when certain stability is shown across tasks,
the focus moves on the training of the mental structures already in place so that they might
become mobile in three directions: able to multiply (reproduce) on higher levels of
abstraction, able to integrate in new structures having the same nature or different natures,
and able to mobilize with great precision for solving new tasks. These are meant to transform
the already existed structures into the instruments of a new, more complex, learning. In this
process, the dynamic mental structures confront the external requirements that are identified
as being known or unknown; in the second case, finding a solution implies creativity. As far
as the domain is assimilated, the newly developed aggregate structures extend and grow while
being refined and re-connected to each other in increasingly complex structures.
A correct building up of an abstraction (which is a target of mathematics learning)
supposes automatized access to fundamental basic elements of that abstraction—a kind of
proto-history of abstracting as a dynamic process. The dynamics of building abstraction
shows pitfalls, gaps, and discontinuities, as far as spurts, jumps and smooth transitions.
Studies focused on the way skills are developed in children and adults show discontinuity,
rather than a simple cumulative or progressive process. Even with optimal support, the pattern
of individual evolution of a skill shows a non-linear progressive variation (Yan & Fischer,
2002). Because of this variation that is natural across tasks and individuals, the training
should offer a variation of tasks that are mirroring the skill development and cover a range of
variation around the hypothetical optimal level at a certain moment. In order to optimize the
process of mastering specific competence, it is necessary to systematically reinforce the skills
at lower levels and, equally, to practice tasks belonging to higher levels. An adequate dosage
of basic tasks (easy-to-solve or/and manipulative) in conjunction with anticipatory tasks
(requiring higher order thinking skills) challenges the knowledge development and thus
contributes to the emergence of an over-learning phenomenon.
The application of the DSL on a larger age span might confirm (or infirm) the results of
the experiments already done. In both cases, the outcome will be a deeper insight into the
human mind’s capacity to structure knowledge.
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In: Advances in Sociology Research, Volume 6 ISBN: 978-1-60741-879-5

Editor: Jared A. Jaworski © 2009 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

CHILDREN’S COGNITIVE CONSTRUCTIONS: FROM

Florence Mihaela Singer

Keywords: Cognition; Dynamic structure; Dynamic structural learning; Pattern; Structure;

THE PERSPECTIVE OF DEVELOPMENT: BETWEEN CONSTRUCTION

Mental “maps,” schemes, networked concepts, or a mental representation of an associated

was called ‘‘taking of consciousness’’ (prise de conscience) of system as a whole, followed

DIM: VIEWING THE MIND FROM A DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE

Iterating is based on the recursive capacity of mind. Recursion is fundamental for

PATTERNING: A NATURAL TENDENCY

Figure 1. Geometrical patterns proposed for completion to a sample of 3,837 students

Figure 2. Statistical data for the items 10-2 and 10-3

COGNITION IN ACTION: THE SEARCH OF STRUCTURES

Types of Spontaneous Structures

Algebraic-based structures. An a-structure (algebraic structure) appears as a means of

Interviewer: Is the set of rational numbers between 2 and 3 infinite?

Density-type structures. When comparing infinite sets, students frequently referred in

In conclusion, the spontaneous structures mobilized by children in the challenging

Aggregate Structures and Knowledge Construction

The construction of aggregate structures is the “clock” that engages developmental

Classifying Aggregate Structures

Rigid aggregate structures. The evolvement of a rigid structure is a frequent phenomenon

connection with previously learned information or when insufficient time is given to

Flexible aggregate structures. A more adaptive structure to a variable learning

Figure 7. Schematic representations for different types of structures

IMPACT: FOCUSING ON STRUCTURES IN ORDER TO CHALLENGE AN

Dynamic Structural Learning

Implications for the Teaching Practice

FOR A BETTER LEARNING: CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH

J. Parziale (eds.), Microdevelopment: Transition Processes in Development and Learning

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