J Indian Philos (2011) 39:479501 DOI 10.

1007/s10781-011-9143-y

Can One Prove that Something Exists Beyond aiva Criticism of the Sautra Consciousness? A S ntika Inference of External Objects
Isabelle Ratie

Published online: 7 June 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

aiva philosoAbstract This article examines how the Kashmiri non-dualistic S phers Utpaladeva (tenth century) and Abhinavagupta (10th11th centuries) present and criticize a theory expounded by certain Buddhist philosophers, identied by the aiva authors as Sautra two S ntikas. According to this theory, no entity external to consciousness can ever be perceived since perceived objects are nothing but internal aspects (a ka ra) of consciousness. Nonetheless we must infer the existence of external entities so as to account for the fact that consciousness is aware of a variety of objects: just as a mirror takes on a variegated appearance only by reecting a multiplicity of objects that remain external to it, in the same way, phenomenal variety can be explained only by assuming the existence of various objects external to consciousness. In I svarapratyabhija ka rika s I, 5, 89 and their commentaries, Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta endeavour to criticize this theory, which challenges their own idealistic principles: according to them, the Sautra ntikas inference is neither legitimate nor even possible. The passage is particularly telling as regards a the strategy developed by Pratyabhijn philosophers with respect to their Buddhist opponents: they make use of certain arguments propounded by Dharmak rti in a defense of Vijn nava da in order to criticize the Sautra ntikas inference, but they also exploit this discussion to underline the superiority of their idealism over that of a the Vijn nava dins.

a a Keywords Utpaladeva Abhinavagupta Pratyabhijn Vijn nava da Sautra ntika Consciousness

(&) I. Ratie r Indologie und Zentralasien wissenschaften, Schillerstrae 6, 04109 Leipzig, Germany Institut fu e-mail: isabelle.ratie@gmail.com

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IntroductionWhy Prove (or Refute) Externalism? aiva philosophers, Utpaladeva This article is an attempt to understand how two S 1 and Abhinavagupta, have answered the question: can one prove that objects exist outside of consciousness? At rst sight though, this question hardly seems relevant: why should we undertake to prove (or refute) the existence of objects outside of consciousness? When perceiving an object, we experience the presence of an entity immediately acknowledged as distinct from our consciousness; objects of perception are apprehended as external to the subject who becomes aware of them. There are nonetheless circumstances in which we do not consider our awareness of objects as the genuine experience of an external reality: thus when dreaming, we are aware of objects apprehended as external to us, and yet, when we wake up, we judge that these objects were in fact various internal forms in which our consciousness was manifesting itself. Similarly, according to the a Buddhist Vijn nava dins, all perceived objects are mere aspects (a ka ra)2 that consciousness takes on, and since consciousness only manifests objects by manifesting itself in the form of objects, we can never have access to a reality that would be genuinely external: whatever we perceive is nothing but cona sciousness taking the form of a particular object of perception. The Vijn nava dins conclude from this that nothing exists independently of consciousness, and this conclusion appeals to Utpaladeva, since his main goal is to justify philo aiva scriptures, that sophically the idea, already dogmatically asserted in some S nothing exists apart from a single, omnipotent and all-encompassing conscious iva. Utpaladeva thus makes use of arguments already put forward by ness called S a some Vijn nava dins so as to refute various theories (whether Buddhist or Brahmanical) according to which perception is consciousnesss direct encounter with an external object;3 but he also has to confront another, more subtleand

1 Utpaladeva (. c. 925975) is the author of the IPK, on which he himself wrote two commentaries: a PV, a brilliant V:rtti and an almost entirely lost Viv:rti. Abhinavagupta (. c. 9751025) wrote the I PVV, which mostly comments on Utpaladevas synthesis of Utpaladevas auto-commentaries, and the I Viv:rti. The text of the IPV quoted here is that of the KSTS edition, but several manuscripts (and the Bha skar edition) are also quoted within brackets whenever an emendation is proposed (p.n.p. means the passage is not preserved in...). 2

On the distinction between theories according to which consciousness takes on aspects (sa ka rava da) and theories according to which it is devoid of aspects (nira ka rava da), see e.g. Hattori (1968, p. 98); on (2010a). a the Pratyabhijn philosophers position in this debate, see Ratie 3 (2010a). See Ratie

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less easily refutablekind of externalism4 that Abhinavagupta attributes to the Buddhist Sautra ntikas.5 According to this theory, although we can never have any direct access to external objects (because whatever we perceive ultimately amounts to an internal aspect of consciousness), we must nonetheless infer the existence of an external reality in order to account for the variety of consciousnesss aspects. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta consider that this inference of an external reality is neither legitimate nor even possible, and the present article examines their refutation of inferential externalism while evaluating the originality of their criticism: in what measure does it depart from the arguments a already formulated by the Vijn nava dins? aiva Presentation of the Sautra The S ntikas Thesis a The Sautra ntika portrayed by Utpaladeva shares with the Vijn nava dins the opinion that we cannot step outside of consciousness so as to experience external reality independently of consciousness, since we only experience what consciousness manifests:6 the external object remains in itself absolutely inaccessible to perBy externalism I mean any theory according to which consciousnesss objects are related (through a relation of identity or causality) to something considered as external to consciousness. The editors of this special issue of the journal rightly pointed out to me that the word yields a different meaning in some discussions related to analytical philosophy, ethics or semantics, and they fear that my use of this term here might lead to some confusion on the readers part. However, externalism is understood differently according to whether it is used in the context of analytical philosophy, ethics or semantics; and considered in its broadest sense (i.e. a sense that can be found in such various contexts as analytical philosophy, semantics, ethics, psychology, history and philosophy of art, etc.), the word can apply to any kind of theory that explains a given event as (at least partly) determined by external factors, however this determination (and externality) may be understood. It therefore seems to me that it offers the least unsatisfactory translation of the Sanskrit ba hya rthava da (the doctrine [according to which] the object is external) while enabling us to avoid some more seriously misleading terms such as realism (the opposition realism/idealism could hardly apply to Indian philosophy, since a number of Indian ideala isms, including that of the Pratyabhijn , consider the phenomenal world as perfectly real). 5 PVV, vol. I, p. 170: nanu sautra See e.g. I ntika h la dipratibimbam upayanti. But the Sau: sam : vidi n tra ntikas acknowledge that there is a reection (pratibimba) of [objects] such as blue, etc., in consciousness! Although the term Sautra ntika is often used by late doxographers and modern scholars to refer to one of the four representative schools of Indian Buddhism, little is known as regards the Sautra ntikas identity and beliefs. See Kritzer 2003a, b and Kritzer (2005, pp. XXVIXXX): the term seems to appear rst in abha the Abhidharmakos ca ra ideas into the Abhidhars : ya, and Vasubandhu seems to be inserting Yoga abha makos ntika (Kritzer 2005, p. XXVIII). Having shown that there is a s : ya under the guise of the Sautra close relation between Vasubandhus Sautra ntika ideas and the Yoga ca rabhu mi (Ibid., pp. XXVIIIXXIX), abha ntika Kritzer concludes (Ibid., p. XXX) that in the Abhidharmakos s : ya Vasubandhu uses the term Sautra to designate positions in the Yoga stiva da. [. . .] ca rabhu mi that he prefers to those of orthodox Sarva Vasubandhu [. . .] adjusts the traditional Sarva stiva din abhidharma so that it no longer conicts with the central theories of Yoga ca ra [. . .]. Attributing an opinion to a Sautra ntika may simply be Vasubandhus way of claiming that it is based on a more valid interpretation of su stiva din counterpart. The tra than its Sarva evolution of the meaning of the term between Vasubandhu and Dharmak rti (and his commentators) is still a obscure; however, by the time the Pratyabhijn philosophers were writing, the Sautra ntikas were considered a to hold a philosophical system of their own, and one that was opposed to the Yoga ca ra/Vijn nava da. On the aiva description of the Sautra sources of this S ntikas position, see below, fn. 10.
6 4

Cf. Arnold (2008), who considers that in fact, the expression epistemic idealism used for instance by a J. Dunne to qualify Dharmak rtis Vijn nava da (see e.g. Dunne 2004, p. 59 ff.) equally applies to the Sautra ntikas.

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ception, because perception is the mere awareness of an aspect (a ka ra) that cona sciousness bears.7 Nonetheless, contrary to the Vijn nava dins, the Sautra ntika refuses to draw from this the conclusion that there is no such thing as an external reality. He points out that we are aware of a multiplicity of objects and that there a must be a cause for this phenomenal variety. The Vijn nava dins consider that this cause is a mechanism of residual traces similar to that which, left by previous experiences in a dreamers cognitive series, produces the variety of objects experienced in a dream;8 but the Sautra ntika argues that this cannot be the case, since either these impregnations (va sana ) are distinct from consciousness but then they a are external entities, so that the Vijn nava da is an externalism in disguise; or they are not distinct from consciousness, in which case their variety is inexplicable, so that they cannot account for consciousnesss variety of aspects.9 a The Sautra ntika depicted by the Pratyabhijn philosophers10 concludes from this that just as a mirror can bear a multiplicity of appearances by reecting a multiplicity that is external to it, in the same way, consciousness, which is in itself undifferentiated,11

7 8 9

Cf. Hattori (1968, p. 98). (2010a). See Ratie PK I, 5, 45 and their commentaries (quoted and translated in Ratie 2010a). See I

10 This description of the Sautra ntikas position apparently originates from Buddhist sources that Utpa aladeva and Abhinavagupta present as belonging to the Vijn nava da (such as Dharmak rtis works, and ankaranandanas (2010a), fn. 28 and 29), _ possibly S works, which Abhinavagupta often quotes: see Ratie but also from Brahmanical sources (such as the NM, which Abhinavagupta sometimes seems to para 2010a, fn. 66). Later Brahmanical doxographies present this phrase in these discussions: see e.g. Ratie theory as the core of the Sautra ntikas doctrine (see e.g. SDS, p. 19, which mentions the Sautra ntikas as the proponents of the inferability of the external object ba hya rtha numeyatva). 11 ama See IPV, vol. I, p. 165: iha bodhas ta vad abhinnah s tram eva hy asya parama rthah : , praka :, a praka s dhikam lam asya ru pam [Bha skar , J, S1: n lasya ru pam KSTS, L, P, S2, SOAS; p.n.p. D], : yadi *n aru eta. atha tatha atvam eva ah tarhi tad apraka s pam iti na praka s praka s sya ru pam, p tapraka s : katham : ah aru u sya t? atha pi kramikan lap ta dipraka s pam eva tasya ru pam, n la dya bha sas nyoham iti praka s : ah a eva, an sva pa dyavastha su na sya t. tasma t praka s s tram api na ru pa ntaram asya st ty abh: praka : uma inno bodhah ntika:] In this world, undoubtedly, consciousness is undifferentiated (abh: . [ The Sautra ama inna), for its real nature is nothing but pure manifestation (praka s tra). [For] if [consciousness] had blue as its form, [and if this form were] distinct from manifestation, then, since this form would not be manifestation, it would not be manifested! But if [one said, rather,] that the form of [consciousness] is simply the fact that it is manifest thus, [as blue], how could there be a manifestation of yellow[, and not only of blue]? And even if [one said that] the form of [consciousness] consists precisely in the successive manifestation of blue, yellow, etc., the manifestation [that can be formulated as] I am devoid of the manifestations of blue, etc. would not occur in such states as sleep, etc. As a consequence, manifestation ah a eva): it possesses no other form, however minute. is nothing but manifestation (praka s s : praka Consciousness is therefore undifferentiated. (Concerning the emendation above, the Bha skar edition bears the KSTS reading, but Bha skarakan tha obviously had the J and S1 reading; see Bha skar , vol. I, p. :: 210: asya bodhasya).

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must reect an external multiplicity:12 although external objects can never be perceived, they must be inferred in order to explain phenomenal variety.13 And just as, in the case of the mirror, there is a correspondence of forms between reected objects and

See IPK I, 5, 4: tattada kasmika bha so ba hyam payet / na hy abhinnasya bodhasya vi: ced anuma citra ntika objected that] the manifestation of this or that [particular object], bha sahetuta // If [a Sautra which is [apparently] devoid of any cause, must lead [us] to infer an external [objective reality], because consciousness, [in itself] undifferentiated, cannot be the cause of [its] various manifestations... Cf. IPV, vol. I, pp. 166167: tasya ca bhinnasya kada cin n la bha sata kada cit p ta bha sateti ye vicitra bha sa s tatra ka ran n nopapannam heta v abhinne ka ryabhedasya sam t, tasma t sa sa vici: atvam : hi yasma : bhava tran tmakalap ta diru pa a kasmikoja tapratyaks hyam nagatapratibimba : asiddhahetukah : san ba : vija a am svasvabha vasam dakam aucityavas n nijaru pasadr pabahutarabheda tmakam : pa :s : kramopanipatadru : ja na t sarvatha pr tam anuma payat ti sam vayate ba hya rthava d . And [consciousness,] : thagbhu : bha which is undifferentiated, cannot be the cause of the various manifestationsi.e., [it cannot be the cause] of the fact that it is sometimes manifestation of blue, sometimes manifestation of yellow, [etc.]; because when a cause is undifferentiated, there cannot be any difference in [its] effect. For this reason, the [manifestation] that is such and such[i.e.,] that consists in various [objects] such as blue, yellow, etc., [and] that is [apparently] devoid of cause[i.e., we] do not know any cause of it that would be established through perception leads to infer an external (ba hya) [objective reality]; [i.e., phenomenal variety leads to inferring the existence of an entity] which causes [the appearance of] its own nature in the form of a reection (pratibimba) within consciousness; [this entity] is similar to its own form [reected in consciousness]because it is appropriate [that a reected object should resemble its reection], it consists in many differences, the forms of which occur successively, [and] it is completely distinct from consciousness. Such is the hypothesis formulated by the externalist. Cf. the presentation of the 2010a, fn. 17). Sautra ntikas thesis in NM (K), p. 300 (see Ratie 13 asya See IPV, vol. I, p. 164: tatra praka s vicitrasya kramen ka ran tmakam; : a vicitrata : am : pratibimba tatpratibimbasaja t yam la diru pam hyam, tac ca yady apy anumeyam, tatha p dam lam : yat tad eva n : ba : n yam iti pratyaks dhyavasa ya d adhyavasa yapra n c ca prama n : en :a : itatva : asthiteh : pratyaks : avyapades : *bhavis ti [SOAS: bhavis skar , J, L, P, D, S1, S2] ba hya rthava dikathitam *idam : yat : yati KSTS, Bha : hetvantaram [conj.: iti hetvantaram KSTS, Bha skar , J, L, P, D, S1, SOAS: idam iti hetvantaram S2] an ayati. [Utpaladeva] is now presenting this other anum _kyama yama nam hyaru pam a s natvena dars : ba [possible] cause [for phenomenal variety] as an objectionnamely, an external [reality] (ba hya) that is inferred (anum yama na), [and] that is thus presented by the externalist: in that regard, the cause of the a) possesses a variety [appearing] in a certain order fact that the manifesting consciousness (praka s [although it is in itself] devoid of variety is a reection (pratibimba). The [reected] double of this reection is precisely the external [object] that has as its form blue, etc.; and although this [external object] is [only] an object of inference, it can nonetheless be called an object of perception, because of the determination (adhyavasa ya) as an object of perception [that takes the form] this is blue, and because the establishment of [perception as] a means of knowledge depends on this determination. The end of the passage is an allusion to the Buddhist theory according to which in order to become expressible (and therefore useful in the practical world), the raw sensation of a singular presence must be determined (adhyavasita), i.e., conceptually transformed (so as to be grasped as the perception of blue for instance) through a process of exclusion of all perceptions of what is not blue: only thus does perception become 2010b, fn. 7). Abhinavagupta strictly speaking a means of knowledge (see e.g. NBT : , pp. 8385, cf. Ratie PV, vol. I, p. 213: bauddhair apy adhyavasa alludes to this theory e.g. in I sasya ya peks  : am : praka pra ma n : yam : vadadbhir... And the Buddhists too, who say that the manifestation [that is perception] is a means of knowledge insofar as it depends on a determination (adhyavasa ntikas ya)... In the Sautra perspective, this theory implies that perception can rightly be said to be the perception of external objects (although in fact it presents nothing but an internal aspect of consciousness) because it is determined as such, and because without this determination, perception would be useless in the vyavaha ra.

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their reections, in the same way, to each phenomenon must correspond a distinct form outside of consciousness.14 The First Assault on the Sautra ntikas Inference: An Inferred Cause Must Have Been Previously Perceived Utpaladevas criticism begins thus: anuma tam...15 nam ana bha tapu rve naives :: No inference can be admitted as regards that which has never been manifested previously. The goal of an inference is to establish the existence of an unperceived object, and if we did perceive that object, we would have no need to infer it; however inference necessarily regards an object that has already been perceived. Thus in order to infer that there is a re on a mountain seen in the distance from the smoke oating above it, we must have had previous experiences of both smoke and re, because according to Dharmak rtis explanation of causality (which Utpaladeva adopts),16 the very notion of causality arises from ve perceptions and non-perceptions (pratyaks nup:a alambha): when we perceive re, smoke, imperceptible so far, is then perceived; when we do not perceive re, we do not perceive smoke either.17 Without this set of
14

am arpakam apeks See IPVV, vol. II, p. 89: vija na ntarvart n la dya ka rah d : sad:rs : ate pratibimbatva darpan ka ra) of blue, etc., that resides within consciousness requires : apratibimbavad. The aspect (a a) [to it], because it is a reection (pratsomething that projects [it] (arpaka) [and is] similar (sad:rs ibimba), just as a reection in a mirror [requires an external cause projecting it and similar to it]. On the term arpaka, cf. e.g. PV Pratyaks ntika doctrine : apariccheda 247bd, which formulates thus the Sautra (see Eltschinger 2009, p. 201): gra hyata m ja na ka ra rpan : viduh : / hetutvam eva yuktija : aks : amam // Those who are versed in reasoning consider that to be an object consists in being a cause capable of projecting (arpan ka ra) onto consciousness. : a) an aspect (a 15 IPK I, 5, 8a.
16 a This adoption (typical of the Pratyabhijn s strategy regarding Buddhist logic: cf. Torella 1992) aims at showing that Dharmak rtis explanation of causality makes sense only if consciousness is a unitary enduring subject (and not, as the Buddhists contend, a series of discrete momentary cognitions). See IPK apa I, 7, 4: pratyaks nupalambha na m m tina m / ka ryaka ran siddhihetutaikaprama t:rja // :a : tattadbhinna :s : ata Perceptions and non-perceptions (pratyaks nupalambha), which [respectively] concern [only] this or :a that aspect distinct [from the relation of cause and effect], are the cause of the establishment of the relation of cause and effect [only] thanks to the single unitary subject. 17

See e.g. HB, p. 4 (cf. Lasic 1999): idam asyopalambha upalabdhilaks ptam g anupalabdham : an : apra : pra ca upalabhyate, satsv apy anyes bha ve na bhavat ti yas tadbha ve bha vas tadabha vebha vas : u hetus : v asya pratyaks nupalambhasa dhanah ryaka ran vas tasya siddhih :a : ka : abha : . The relation of cause and effect [between A and B], that is, the presence [of B] when A is present, and the absence [of B] when A is absent, the establishment of which is made thanks to perception and non-perception (pratyaks nup:a alambha), is established thus: when there is a perception of A, B, for which the conditions of perception are fullled, [and] which was not perceived until then, is perceived; [whereas] even when some other causes [of B] are present, when A is absent, [B] is not present [either]. Abhinavagupta, following a number of Buddhist commentators, understands that the relation of cause and effect is established through a set of ve experiences comprising two perceptions and three non-perceptions (see e.g. IPVV, vol. II, p. 345: pratyaks nupalambhapacakam, ve perceptions and : advayam anupalambhatrayam : ceti pratyaks :a non-perceptionsthat is, two perceptions, and three non-perceptions), but other commentators have understood Dharmak rtis text differently (see Inami 1999).

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experiences, we could not consider smoke as a logical reason for inferring re as its cause; and accordingly, in order to infer an external object as the cause of this or that particular cognition, we need to perceive the external object in itself, independently of the objects cognitionbut precisely, such a perception is impossible: dhu ma gnyor anupalambha v agner upalambho dhu masya nupalambhognyupalambha d ukta d *anantaram eva [conj.: eva KSTS] dhu masyopalambha ity evam nupalambhatrayen ryaka ran : pratyaks : advayena : a ca sakrd eva ka : ata  vyavastha eveti pratyaks pyate. tatra py anupalambhopy anyopalambha : avya pa ra d *eva ka ran [corr.: eva ka ran KSTS] vyavastha pyate bha vas: ata : ata iddheh hyorthah : . na ca ba : pratyaks : a iti tena saha kasyacid api na 18 ka ryaka ran vasiddhir iti tasminn anumeye na ja nam ryahetuh : abha : ka :. The relation of cause and effect is immediately established thanks to two perceptions and three non-perceptions, thus: the two non-perceptions of smoke and re, the perception of re, the non-perception of smoke, and immediately after the [already] mentioned perception of re, the perception of smoke. Even if [causality is partly established through non-perceptions,] since even nonperception is [in fact] nothing but the perception of some other [entity], it is thanks to the sole activity of perception that causality is established, because of the establishment of the presence [of this or that entity]. And since the external object is not an object of perception, one cannot establish any causal relation between this [external object] and anything else; as a consequence, the cognition [of this or that object] is not the reason [consisting in] an effect (ka ryahetu) as regards this [external object] that must be inferred. One cannot infer from the experience of an effect the existence of a cause external to consciousness, because no causal relation can be established without having recourse to a set of experiences which, by denition, cannot involve an external object. Besides, the Sautra ntikas model of the mirror is inadequate, because in the case of the mirror, the reected object and its reection are not strictly speaking in a relation of cause and effect,19 but also, more importantly, because in the case of the mirror, we can perceive both the external object and its reection in the mirror, so that we can at least determine a relation of similarity (tulyata ) between the reected object and its reection; whereas we can never perceive the external object in itself. Determining any relation (be it of mere similarity) between

IPVV, vol. II, p. 160. IPVV, vol. II, pp. 158159: samarpyasamarpakata ca darpan lakr : agajayos tulyaka : taiva. tata eva na pa rama rthikah ryaka ran voyam api tu bimbapratibimbavyavaha rah : ka : abha : . Moreover, the mirror and the elephant [reected in it] become [respectively] that onto which [a form] is projected and that which projects [a form] exactly at the same time; for this very reason, it is not a real relation of cause and effect, [which implies the causes anteriority], but only the mundane experience of a reected object and its reection (bimbapratibimbavyavaha ra).
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an external object and a cognition is therefore perfectly impossible: the mirror model is irrelevant as regards consciousness.20 a So far the reasoning is very similar to that of the Vijn nava dins; thus the famous Dharmak rtian argument of the sahopalambhaniyama (the necessity of being a perceived together [for the object and its cognition])21 enables the Vijn nava dins to demonstrate that any attempt to infer an external object is vain, because the impossibility of experiencing the external object independently of cognition precludes the establishment of any relation (be it of causality or of mere similarity) between the external object and the cognition.22

The Sautra ntikas Riposte: The Argument of the Sense Organs The Sautra ntika then puts forward a new argument: nanu bhavatu pratyaks tenuma te tu kim ne sam ma nyato drs : ato drs :: : katheyam : sa :: :   vaks rthopalabdhyendriya numa ne?23 : yasi yatha Finelet us accept this speech [of yours] as regards an inference with respect to what has been apprehended through a direct perception (pratyaks ta). : ato drs ::  However, in the case of an [inference] with respect to what has been apprehended through a generality (sa ta), what will you sayfor in ma nyato drs :: sense organs (indriya) from the stance, in the case of the inference of the perception of their object? Indeed, we usually infer entities that have been previously perceived; but the Sautra ntika is here pointing out that this is not always the case. Thus Indian philosophers consider that our sense organs (indriya) are inferred whereas we never perceive them as such. This does not mean that we must infer the existence of our eyes, for instancefor we can observe these elements of our body (even though indirectly, in a mirror), touch them, etc. Nor does it mean that we should infer our

citam yama See IPVV, vol. II, p. 159: darpan d:rs tre; : apratibimbe hi bimbam apy upalabdham iti nis : sa iha tu bimbasya na ma pi na vagatam iti katham etattulyata bhavet? For in the case of the reection (pratibimba) in a mirror, the reected object (bimba) is also perceived; as a consequence, it is determined [as being a reected object] from the point of view of the mere resemblance [with the reection]; whereas in the case [of the external object and the cognition, we] do not grasp anything that would belong to the reected object (bimba). Therefore how could there be any similarity of this [imperceptible external object with the cognition]? 21 PVV, vol. II, p. 78, see Ratie 2010a): sahopalambhaniyama See PVin I, 54a (quoted in I d abhedo n lataddhiyoh : . Because of the necessity [for blue and the cognition of blue] to be perceived together, there is no difference between blue and the cognition of blue. 22 a For similar reasonings attributed to Vijn nava dins in Naiya yika and M ma m : saka texts, see Ratie (2010a, fn. 22). 23 IPV, vol. I, pp. 187188.

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visual faculty, because this faculty is self-evident: to see is to know that one sees.24 But why is the eye ordinarily considered as the instrument thanks to which we can see? For an eye never sees itself seeing: although we can perceive our eyes, ears, nose, skin and tongue, their instrumentality in perception remains imperceptible to us. According to Buddhist as well as Brahmanical philosophers, this instrumentality must be inferred: in order to explain the fact that we are perceiving, we must assume the existence of some imperceptible entities (whether they are conceived as atoms or as rays, and whether they are thought to enter in contact with their object or not)25 residing inside what we ordinarily consider as our visual organs, and constituting the real instruments of perceptionthe real sense organs. However this inference does not establish the existence of an object that would have been directly (pratyaks : ato) perceived at some point in the past, since the indriya-s are by nature imperceptible: it only establishes the existence of an object apprehended in a general way (sa ma nyato). Thus, when witnessing various actions, we apprehend the invariable concomitance between these actions and the instruments thanks to which they are exerted; and from the generality or the universal (sa ma nya) of instrumentality (karan ) thus grasped, we become capable of : ata inferring the sense organsthat is, we assume by analogy26 that we possess some imperceptible instruments having a causal role in the act of perceiving.27 The Sautra ntika portrayed by Abhinavagupta thus explains: tena ca yady api vya ptir na g:rh ta , tatha pi ka ryavyatireken da citkataya : eti ka yad idam ka ryam n la bha sam vija nam tat tatha bhu tam adhikam hetum vina : : : : : : nopapadyata ity evam t sa ma nyamukhena py anvayah : niyamavato vyatireka : sidhyaty eva.28
24 This is the reason why I did not translate indriya as sense faculty or capacity; the indriya of sight is not the power of seeing (for that power is self-revealed). Eli Franco has rightly pointed out to me that the term organ might be misleading insofar as the indriya of sight for instance is more than what we usually consider as the visual organ (i.e., the visible body parts called eyes). But provided that one keeps in mind that etymologically, an organ is a bodily instrument, and that sense organs are not limited to the perceptible body parts called eye, ear, etc., it seems to me that this latter translation remains the least unsatisfactory, given that the indriya-s are the karan : a-s of perception (see e.g. NM, vol. I, p. 348, quoted below, fn. 27). 25 26 27

See Preisendanz (1989), particularly pp. 147149. See Nenniger (1994).

Cf. NM, vol. I, p. 348: sa tam _gisvaru ma nyato d:rs lepi lin pam apratyaks :: : tu yatra sam : bandhaka : am : abda rotra nityaparoks ma nyato vya ptigrahan d anum yate, yatha s dyupalabdhya s di karan : am eva sa :a : am. vadha indriya n m at ndriyatva n na kada cit pratyaks dikriya n m di:a : agamyatvam. atha ca cchedana :a : paras karan m rvakatvam anum yate. As rvakatvena vya ptigrahan c chabda dyupalabdhikriya n : karan : apu : apu :a :a for the [inferred object] that is apprehended through a generality (sa ta), it possesses an ma nyato dr :s :: inferential mark, [but] it is not directly perceived, [i.e.,] it is always imperceptible, even at the time of the relation [between the inferred object and its inferential mark; and it is] inferred from a generality (sa ma nyato) thanks to the apprehension of an invariable concomitancefor instance, an instrument (karan : a) such as the hearing organ [is inferred] thanks to the perception of words, etc. Because sense organs (indriya) are [themselves] beyond [the realm of] sense organs (at ndriya), [they] can never be directly apprehended. And yet, because there is an apprehension of the invariable concomitance of such actions as cutting with the fact of being preceded by instruments such as an axe for instance, the fact that actions such as sound perception must be preceded by some instruments, [i.e., sense organs,] is inferred. 28 IPVV, vol. II, p. 161.

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And even though the invariable concomitance [between the cognition] and this [external object] is not grasped through the [ve experiences that enable us to establish a causal relation,] nevertheless, [it is grasped] because of the absence of the effect [if the cause is absent] (ka ryavyatireka): the effect that is the cognition having the aspect blue, which [only exists] occasionally, cannot logically take place without a cause distinct [from the effect and] that is, like [the effect, occasional]. The positive concomitance (anvaya) is [therefore] perfectly established, albeit through a generality (sa ma nya) [and not through a direct perception], from the negative concomitance (vyatireka) that implies the necessity [just expounded]. When inferring that a hill is on re from the smoke seen above it, we identify the inferred re with previously witnessed res, whereas when inferring the existence of the instruments thanks to which we perceive, we do not identify the inferred cause with some particular entity perceived in the past: we assume the existence of this cause in a general way, as an entity only particularized by its being distinct from its effect (i.e., perception), because if we did not assume its existence, we could not account for the fact of perception. In the same way, we must account for the fact that consciousness is not eternally the consciousness of blue for instance: phenomenal variety exists, and since it is not caused by the nature of consciousness, which is in itself undifferentiated, we must assume the existence of an imperceptible cause conceived in a general way as distinct from the cognition of this or that object, i.e., the external object.

Utpaladevas Answer: In the Case of the Sense Organs, Causality is Directly Perceived Utpaladeva could reply by arguing, as Dharmak rti does, that there is another possible explanation for phenomenal varietynamely, the theory of impregnations (va sana ).29 However this argument would be irrelevant here, since the Saiva philosopher has already shown (in the guise of a Sautra ntika) that impregnations cannot cause consciousnesss diversity. Utpaladeva therefore makes the following answer:
29

See PVin I, 58d (cf. Krasser 2004, pp. 142143): ... ba hyasiddhih d vyatirekatah : sya : // The external [object] could be established through the absence [of a certain effect if a certain cause is absent] (vyatireka), and the auto-commentary ad loc. (p. 43): satsu samarthes naka rya nis : v anyes : u hetus : u ja : pattih : cid upa es ka ran ntaravaikalyam cayati. sa ba hyorthah d yady atra kas da navis bha vakr tam ryavy:a : su : sya :a : ka  non-arising atirekam ya t. When all the other causes capable [of producing a cognition] are present, the : na bru of the effect which is the cognition indicates that some other cause is missing; and this [missing cause] could a be the external object, if in this regard, somebody [i.e., a Vijn nava din] did not explain that the absence of this effect is due to the absence of the particular material cause [which is a particular impregnation]. PVV, vol. II, pp. 128129) and obviously considers it as a refutation Abhinavagupta quotes this passage (see I of the Sautra ntikas contention that the external object must be established through ka ryavyatireka. In the NM, a the Vijn nava din, who quotes this verse (see NM(K), p. 300), also shows that the Sautra ntikas theory is not compelling since the mechanism of residual traces can also account for phenomenal variety. See NM (K), syati. If [the p. 298: svacchatva lus va sana k:rtam j ja nasya ka : yam anyak:rtam iti cet, avidya : tad bhavi: opponent says] that because consciousness is [in itself] limpid, the fact that it is stained [by phenomenal a diversity] must be produced by something else, [we Vijn nava dins answer that] this can [also] be produced by the impregnations (va sana ) [produced by/responsible for] nescience.

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... indriyam / a bha tam eva b ja der a bha sa d dhetuvastunah bha sah : // a : punar a bha sa d ba hyasya s t katham sya siddhir na py : cana / arthasya naiva tena 30 anuma natah : // [Before being inferred,] the sense organs have indeed been manifested through the manifestation of a real entity which is a cause, such as, for instance, a seed, [which is the cause of a sprout,] but the manifestation of an object external to manifestation could not occur in any way. Therefore there can be no establishment of this [external object]not even through an inference. When inferring the existence of our sense organs, we only infer a cause in general capable of explaining the fact that we perceive, and Abhinavagupta explains that this general feature of causality (ka ran ) by which the inferred object is : ata characterized is directly perceived: yate tatha ucyate tatra pi vikalpena yatha sorthah numeya iti sthitih : spr :s : . vik ca nendriya alpas kenacit *sam nives avis es a dina vis es a tmana dikam artham : : : : [Bha nives avis es a tmana KSTS, L; p.n.p. D] skar , J, P, S1, S2, SOAS: sam : : aty api tu kim sprs ran svabha vena, sa ca : cid upalabdheh : ka : am ity amuna 31  vah ka svabha ran ata laks an ah pratyaks agr h ta eva. : : : : : :  [To the Sautra ntikas objection, Utpaladeva] replies: even in that case [where we infer an object grasped through a generality (sa ta),] it is established ma nyato drs ::  through a concept that the inferred object must be such as any object grasped (vikalpa); but a concept does not grasp its objectsuch as the sense organs for instanceas having some particular nature comprising a particular conguration, etc.; rather, [it grasps it] as this nature [only]: it is some cause of perceptionand this nature, characterized by causality [only,] is indeed grasped through a direct perception (pratyaks : a). The latter statement is somewhat surprising: how can causality be directly perceived, as we perceive blue or yellow? According to the Buddhist logicians, we are aware of the causality of re with respect to smoke thanks to a series of perceptions and non-perceptions. However these experiences only produce the awareness that a particular re is the cause of the particular smoke seen above the mountain; so where does the general notion of causality come from? One could consider that it is inductively formed from the particular past experiences of the seed and sprout, of the threads and cloth, etc. a According to the Pratyabhijn philosophers though, this is not the way we acquire the sa ma nya of causality, because if this general notion were not rst known in some way, the process of generalization would remain impossible: the term cause would remain inextricably attached to the sole particular entities perceived by us.32
PK, 5, 8b-9. I PV, vol. I, p. 188. I 32 PVV, vol. II, p. 156 : anyathaikatra b abdah Cf. I je ka ran dau sam : as : sam : ketito na m:rtpin :d :a : ketito bhavet. If it were not the case, the word cause would be associated by convention to one [single entity such as] the seed: it could not be associated by convention to a lump of clay for instance[, although the latter is a cause with respect to the pot].
31 30

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The synthesis through which, gathering the various perceptions of re and smoke mentioned by Dharmak rti, we are capable of saying re is the cause of smoke is possible because each of these perceptions already contains in some way the notion of causality. Thus, according to Utpaladeva, any particular entity (svalaks : an : a) is in fact the singular combination of a multiplicity of elementary phenomena (a bha sa)33 which behave like generalities (sa ma nya yama na).34 This particular re seen here and now is therefore a unique synthesis of elementary phenomena: time, place, existence, re in general, which in turn can be analyzed into a series of general features, including the fact of being the cause of smoke. The Buddhists could object that this analysis is a conceptual activity posterior to perception; but according to Utpaladeva, the very fact that we are capable of such an analysis shows that these various elements are already present, albeit in an implicit form, in the pure sensation preceding the verbal analysis. As a consequence, these general aspectswhich include causalityare not a secondary and purely articial construction, contrary to what Dharmak rti claims: they are the ultimate elements of perception and any particular object of perception is made of their synthesis.35 This theory of perception enables Utpaladeva to state that causality in general has already been grasped in countless perceptions (as a component of perceived res, seeds, etc.),36 so that the sense organs too, although imperceptible as such, are nonetheless perceived in some way, insofar as they are inferred as a cause in general already perceived in innumerable everyday experiences.37 Abhinavagupta concludes: tasma t ka ran bha sasa ma nyam rvapratyaks krtam. tatas tatra yuktam : atva : pu : asv :  vikalpanam.38 Therefore [the subject] has appropriated the generality (sa ma nya) of the phenomenon causality through direct perception before [inferring the existence of the sense organs]; so in this case, the conceptual construction is correct. The Sautra ntika wrongly assumes that in the case of the sense organs, the inferred object has never been perceived (so that it is all right to infer an external object by
(2010b, fn. 36). See IPK II, 3, 7 and their commentaries, quoted and translated in Ratie 2010b, fn. 35). This verse is See IPK II, 3, 2cd and its commentaries (quoted and translated in Ratie explicitly mentioned by Abhinavagupta in his explanation of Utpaladevas criticism of the Sautra ntikas inference (in IPV, vol. I, pp. 188189).
34 35 36 33

See Torella (1992, pp. 332333); (2002, fn. 3, pp. 8990). es u See IPV, vol. I, pp. 189190: iti ka _kura iti prat ran bha so vis nyah ta eva b ja d an tau. :a : as : parig:rh yad yasya niyamam anuvidhattevyatiriktam ryam iti pratighat diru pasya hetut: tat tasya ka :am : m:rttika advanma trasya bha sa t. As a consequence, in the case of the cognition the sprout comes from the seed, es u the phenomenon of cause (ka ran bha sa) devoid of particularities (vis nya) has already been entirely :a : as grasped [in the form] that which invariably receives its restriction from [something] is the effect of that [thing], because in each pot, something that is merely [particularized as] possessing this [generality] of cause (hetutadvanma tra) is manifest in the form of clay, etc.

37

See Vr tti, p. 22: indriyam apy anum yate kim tram ja dya bha sa d a bha sitam eva. : cinma : nimittam : tac ca b  sense organs are inferred as a mere something (kimcinma Even the tra) that is a cause, and this has : necessarily been manifested [previously] thanks to the manifestation of the seed, etc. 38 IPVV, vol. II, p. 156.

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denition impossible to perceive): in fact, the object of the sense organs inference, causality in general, is already known through perception.

Is Utpaladeva Providing an Argument Against His Own Theory? This strategy is very risky though; for the argument could be used just as well in favour of the Sautra ntikas thesis. Thus according to Utpaladeva, the inference of the sense organs is valid, although nobody has ever perceived the indriya-s, because it regards a cause in general of perception, which is a component of countless perceived objects; but then why not consider that accordingly, the inference of the external object is valid, because it regards the cause in general of phenomenal diversity? Utpaladevas reasoning apparently legitimates the externalists inference instead of refuting it. PV, Utpaladeva and Although this problem is not clearly stated in the Vrtti or the I commenting on Utpaladevas Abhinavagupta were perfectly well aware of it. Thus, lost Vivr : ti, Abhinavagupta explains: yadi ta vad adhikam tram dhyate tat ka pila bhyupagatasam tra: hetuma : sa : vinma varyam iccha svabha va dhikam tmakam urar k:rtam eva ka ran : sam : vidais : ataya is sva tam tantryam meti siddham dhitam t. atha pi sam hyata vis : na : sa : sya : vidba :: : tadadhikam dhyate. tad anupapannam hyasya svapnepy ana : sa : , sam : vidba 39 bha tasya vikalpyatva yoga d anumeyata nupapanna yatah :. If, on the one hand, [the Sautra ntikas inference] establishes a mere cause (hetuma tra) that is [simply] distinct [from the other perceived causes of phenomenal variety,] then here is what [this inference] should establish: the varya) of consciousness, which is distinct from the nature that sovereignty (ais the followers of Kapila [the founder of Sa m : khya] attribute to pure consciousness (sam vinma tra ), [and] which consists in will (iccha )[i.e.,] what is : called freedom (sva tantrya) must necessarily be acknowledged as the cause [of phenomenal variety]. If, on the other hand, [the Sautra ntika says] that [his is inference] establishes [a cause] that is particularized (vis ta) by externality :: with respect to consciousness (sam vidba hyata ), [that is to say, a cause] which : is distinct from [consciousness]this is impossible; because that which is external to consciousness, [i.e.], that which has never been been manifested, even in a dream, cannot be inferred, since it cannot be conceptualized. There is an essential difference between the sense organs inference and the external objects inference. In the rst case, one infers, from the fact of visual perception for instance, a cause in general that is distinct from the other causes of perception (i.e. light and the perceived visual form).40 In the second case, however,
39 40

PVV, vol. II, p. 161. I See IPVV, vol. II, p. 155: indriya ses d:rs pen num yatepi tu sa ma nyena ::taprabh:rti na kenacid vi : aru :a dr s:taru pa loka dhikam ran :: : kim : cit ka : am iti. An [entity] such as the imperceptible entity that is a sense organ is not inferred in any particular form (vi ses pa); rather, [it is inferred] as a generality (sa ma nya), : aru in the form: it is some cause that is distinct from the perceived form and light.

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the cause inferred is not conceived as a cause in general, since it is particularized (vi sis ntika does not claim to infer just any cause, but : :ta) by externality: the Sautra rather, a cause that possesses the singular property of being external to consciousness. Admittedly, any inferred cause is thus subjected to some kind of particularization: we infer the existence of the seed that causes a sprout as being distinct from the other causes contributing to its production, such as water or earthor the clay that causes a pot, as being distinct from the potters stick or wheel;41 or the sense organ causing perception, as being distinct from the perceived form or light. In the case of the external object though, the Sautra ntika does not infer from the cognition bearing differentiated aspects (sa ka ra) a cause in general that would simply be distinct from a pure consciousness devoid of aspects (nira ka ra); for if that were the case, he would infer the sole freedom (sva tantrya) of consciousness as the cause of phenomenal variety (thus agreeing with the a Pratyabhijn philosophers main thesis),42 since this creative spontaneity at the heart of any conscious state is distinct from the passive, undifferentiated manifestation that the Sautra ntika describes as the normal state of consciousness.43 But the Sautra ntika refuses to identify the cause to be inferred with consciousnesss spontaneity: he wants to infer a cause distinct from consciousness itself. This additional particularization44 dooms the Sautra ntikas inference to failure, because one cannot picture an entity distinct from consciousness, even through the wildest act of imagination (even in a dream, says Abhinavagupta): the objects of our concepts are general features that have been extracted from some previous perception, but there can be no perception of what is by nature absolutely alien to consciousnessso that there can be no concept of the external

41 PVV, vol. II, p. 155:tatra mr Cf. I _kurah je bhavan, : jjalayoh : sam : nihitayor abhavann an : , sa hi sati b dan jahetukas tadadhikamr :d : acakrayoh : sator asan ghat :ah : , sati m:rtpin :d : e bhavan, tadadhikab : tpin :d : ahetuka cayo ja iti kramen nupalambhajo nis yate. In this regard, the certainty produced by the per: a pratyaks :a ceptions and non-perceptions (pratyaks nupalambha) arises progressively in the form when earth and :a water are present, the sprout does not exist; for [only] when the seed [too] exists does the [sprout] exist; when the [potters] stick and wheel are present, the pot does not exist; [for only] when the clay lump [too] exists does the [pot] exist. [Therefore the sprout] has as its cause the seed, which is distinct from [earth and water]; [and] the [pot] has as its cause the clay lump, which is distinct from [the potters stick and wheel]. 42 (2010a). On this thesis, see e.g. Ratie 43 Abhinavagupta points out here that insofar as the Sautra ntika considers that consciousness is in itself undifferentiated, he agrees with certain Brahmanical conceptions of consciousness (such as the Sa m :khyas) presenting it as the passive and undifferentiated mirror of an ontologically independent reality. PK I, 5, 11 (cf. e.g. Alper 1987; Torella 2002, Utpaladeva refutes this conception in a famous verse: see I 2007, fn. 59, pp. 339340), which shows that consciousness, far from passively p.118; and Ratie a) is the very reecting its objects, actively becomes aware of itself, and that this dynamic grasp (vimars essence of manifestation. 44 es See IPVV, vol. II, p. 165: ka the ba tan _ kayitavyam. ran sa ma nyap:rs hyata tmakam ntaram : ata :: : vis : an :a : : es [If we follow the Sautra ntikas reasoning,] another particularity (vis ntara), namely, externality : an :a (ba hyata ), must be cut on the back of the generality of causality!

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PV, Abhinavagupta, after explaining how the sense organs object. Thus in the I can be inferred, adds: a bha sa d ba hyah bha saru pah bha sata iti vipratis : punar ana : , sa ca : iddham. 45 ana . bha se ca na sti vikalparu pasya numa nasya vya pa rah : However, an [entity] external to manifestation consists in a non-manifestation (ana bha sa), and it is absolutely impossible that it may be manifest! And there is no inferential activity[since] an inference has as its nature a concept (vikalpa)as regards a non-manifestation.

The Ambiguity of the Concept of Externality (ba hyata ) PVV, he Nevertheless Utpaladevas opponent refuses to concede defeat, and in the I formulates a new objection: gra ma d darpan d g:rha d deha t sam d ba hyam iti *ba hyata sa ma nyam :a : vedana 46 [conj.: ba sa ma nyam KSTS] ekam, tac ca gr ha d ba hyam iti prat hyatah tau :  ba ca samarpakam siddham. tatas *darpan a d iva hyam [conj.: dar : : : pan diba hyam d api setsyati kramika bha savaicitrya d :a : KSTS] sam : vedana 47 dhetoh . : It is one [and the same] generality of externality (ba hyata sa ma nya) [that is present in these various cognitions:] [this is] external (ba hya) to the village, to the mirror, to the house, to the body, to consciousness; and this [generality of externality] is established in the [mere] experience [this is] external to the house. And as a consequence, just as [one can establish the existence of something] external to the mirror [and] projecting [its particular form] onto it, one can also establish [the existence of something external] to consciousness, for the reason that is the diversity of successive phenomena [experienced by any conscious being]. The Sautra ntika is arguing that according to Utpaladevas own theory of perception, conceptualizing the external object is no problem at all: just as we perceive causality (ka ran ) as a general feature present in countless perceptions, in the : ata same way, we must perceive the general feature of externality (ba hyata ) in our everyday experienceswhen seeing a pot outside a house for instance; Utpaladeva must acknowledge that just like causality, externality is part of our perceptual

45 46

PV, vol. I, p. 190. I

Cf. the long marginal annotation in the SOAS manuscript of the IPV (folio 119, upper right corner) which quotes this sentence (cf. also fn. 248 in the KSTS edition of the IPV, vol. I, p. 190, almost identical to this marginal annotation): gra ma d darpan d g:rha t sam d ba hyam iti :a : vedana ba hyata sa ma nyam ekam : ... 47 IPVV, vol. II, p. 165.

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world, so that we can rightly infer the existence of an object particularized by its externality to consciousness.48 Abhinavagupta thus sums up the answer given by Utpaladeva to this objection in his lost Vivr : ti: nedam hyatvam ma c ca sam c caikam. sam d : ba : ghat :asya gra : vedana : vedana ba hy asam vedanaru pam , na tu g r ha d ba hyam ag r haru pam. evam sati hi hyam : : : : : : ah g:rhaikades kut ya dir g r ha ntarvarty api ca ghat a dir g r haba hyah sya t; na : : : : : : caivam. g:rhasam tam hyam t, na tadvad eva : nik:rs :: : ca yadvad ba : g:rha avyavaha sam t tasya mu rtasya sam dides ryatva bha va t. tatah : vedana : nikars :a : abdasa abdasa *s edam sa dhyam ekam mya-[conj.: s ma nya- KSTS]49 ma tren : : : pratibha ti.50 The externality (ba hyatva) of the pot is not one [whether it be considered] with respect to the village or with respect to consciousness; for that which is external to consciousness consists in that which is not consciousness (asam pa), whereas that which is external to the house does not : vedanaru consist in that which is not a house! For if that were the case, a particular element of the housesuch as a wall for instanceor a pot for example, although it is situated inside the house, should be external to the house, [since they are not the house itself]; and it is not so. And whereas that which is
48 Cf. fn. 248 in the KSTS edition of the IPV, vol. I, p. 190 (reproducing a text similar to the marginal yate, yatha annotation mentioned above, fn. 46): tatha ca tra pu rvavyavastha sphut :am eva d:rs es caks divis ren ja dyanubhava t [conj.: yatha va b ja dyanubhava t KSTS; yatha b ja dya: ura : apariha : a *b nubhava t SOAS] ka ran sa ma nyam [conj.: ka ran ma nyam KSTS, SOAS] anubhu tam evoktam, tatha : ata : asa es ar s d ba hyatvam api sa ma nyena nubhu tam eva, ja navis ra d g:rha d gra ma der va ba hyasya nubhava : en :a es ba hyatva nanubhavoktau va caks der api ka ran nanubhu tapu rvatva n na sya d anuma nam : ura : avis : asya : tat katham ntikas] discourse: And in the same way [as numa nasya vya pa ra ity uktih : na : . This is [the Sautra in the case of the sense organs], in this case [too], one sees very obviously that [externality] is already established: just as[, in the case of the sense organs inference, Utpaladeva] has said that the generality of causality (ka ran sa ma nya) has been experienced without taking into account the particularities of the : ata organ of vision, etc., through the experience of the seed and [other perceived causes], exactly in the same way, [in the case of the external objects inference,] externality (ba hyatva) too is indeed experienced as a generality (sa ma nya) thanks to the experience of [this or that particular object that is] external to the body, the house or the village; alternatively, if [Utpaladeva] answers that there is no experience of externality thanks to a particular cognition, [then,] since the particular cause that is the organ of vision for instance has not been previously experienced either, there cannot be any inference [of the sense organs either]; therefore why wouldnt the inference apply [in the case of the external object as well as in the case of the sense organs]? 49 PV (vol. I, p. 190) quoted below. One could rather consider that it is the Cf. the parallel passage in the I text of the two editions of the IPV that is corrupted. However all the consulted IPV manuscripts (J, L, P, S1, S2, SOAS; p.n.p. D) bear the KSTS and Bha skar reading; and the context seems to require this abdasa conjecture, since s ma nya would make sense if Abhinavagupta said that the generality of externality (ba hyata sa ma nya) is a generality that is only verbal; but he states that this generality of externality abdasa appears to have a unity only thanks to something else. Besides, s mya is found elsewhere in the PVV, e.g. vol. III, p. 194: nanu tatra ghat abdasa I _kura n dau s myama tram :a : . [An objector:] But in abdasa the case [that you are invoking,] there is only a verbal similarity (s mya) between the pot and the sprout for instance, [which are both called effects, but are different insofar as the rst is the product of a conscious intention]. Cf. also PV Prama ga n : asiddhipariccheda 12, quoted below. Admittedly, Digna abdasa deals with s ma nya, but in a different context (see Pind 1991). 50 IPVV, vol. II, p. 165.

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external to the house is next to (sam ta) the house, it is absolutely not the : nikrs ::  to consciousness, because of the case as regards that which is [external] impossibility for [consciousness]which is devoid of any material form (mu rta)of having any spatial relation whatsoever such as proximity (sam : nikars : a). Therefore this [externality] that must be established appears to abdasa be one only thanks to a verbal similarity (s mya). PV (although in a condensed form, and The same argument is found in the I without the objection to which it responds): gra magr d astu yad ba hyam ma diru pam : ha : tad agra : nocyate pratyekam : va ta _ga tam [J, L, P, S1, : nu pakut der ba hyatvaprasan d api tu *tatsam :yatula : nikr :s :: S2, SOAS : sam tam KSTS: tatsam skar ; p.n.p. D].51 : nikr :s :: : nikat :am : Bha When one acknowledges that something is external to the village or the house, one does not mean that this [thing] consists in that which is not the village or the [house]; for [if it were the case,] there would follow respectively the externality of the graden and the river [with respect to the village, whereas in fact they are in the village,] or of the wall and a beam in the roof structure, [whereas in fact they are in the house], etc. Rather, [we say that something is external to the house or the village when we mean] that it is next to it (sannikr ta). :s :: Utpaladevas answer to the Sautra ntikas last objection consists in pointing out the fundamental ambiguity of the term externality. Thus when we talk about an object external to consciousness, we mean an object the nature of which is not consciousnessin this case, externality means non-identity: an object is said to be external to consciousness if it is considered as alien to consciousness; whereas when we say the pot is external to the house, we do not mean that the pot is not the house (just as when we say that the pot is inside the house, we do not mean that the pot has the house as its nature): in this case, we dont have in mind a pure and simple otherness, but a spatial relation of proximityand such a relation cannot apply to consciousness, since consciousness is not a material form, a body situated in space. abdasa So it is a mere verbal similarity or homonymy (s mya) that enables us to talk about an object external to consciousness, and, as Abhinavagupta species,52 not a vastusa mya, a similarity regarding the real entities denoted by the word: while the generality externality that we experience is a certain relation between two entities that are both manifest as spatially determined, the externality mentioned by the Sautra ntika is a pure otherness between two radically different entities, one of which is absolutely unmanifest, whereas the other is the manifesting consciousness itselfand we never experience such a relation.

51 52

PV, vol. I, p. 190. I See IPV, vol. I, p. 190, quoted below.

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a a What Differentiates the Pratyabhijn s Criticism from the Vijn nava dins? abdasa This notion of s rti, who states (albeit mya is probably borrowed from Dharmak in a very different context)53 that an inference is invalid if it rests on a reason that only abdasa has a verbal similarity (s mya) with something that could be a valid reason, whereas the real entities (vastu) designated by the same expression are different: abdasa vastubhede prasiddhasya s mya d abhedinah numitih : / na yukta : 54 pa d udravya d iva huta s ane // n :: The inference of [something] well known is not right [when it occurs] on account of [something else] that [seems to have] no difference [with a valid abdasa reason] due to a [mere] verbal similarity (s mya), whereas [in fact] there is a difference as regards the real entities (vastu) [designated by the same words]for instance, [the inference] of re on account of [the presence of] a white substance [is not right, since smoke and snow, while being both called white substances, are different]. a And that the Pratyabhijn philosophers are alluding here to Dharmak rtis notion of sabdasa mya seems to be conrmed by the way Abhinavagupta concludes the PV: whole discussion in the I abdasa tasma d gra maba hyam a bha saba hyam iti ca s myama tram etan na vastusa myam. evam bha t ti manyante tes m api ta vad : ye vikalpe vastu na :a anuma navikalpo na ba hya upapannah bhis tu papa ditam adhyavasa yasya py : . asma a bha sama navis ntitve ca vasa yasyeti su tre. tena numa navi: ayatvam : bhra ena yady ana kalpa to n tmana pi praka s vis la dir arthas tan na numita eva sya t. :: ah ama atha ta eva, tarhi pra vis g iva rthopraka s d iti nya yena praka s tras:: : sya vabha va eva, na ba hyah hye sa dhye yat kim n n yate, tad : . tena ba : cit prama : am a aba hyata m eva pratyuta *sa dhayati [Bha skar , J: prasa dhayati KSTS, L, P, S1, S2, SOAS; p.n.p. D], iti viruddham eva.55 Therefore [the expressions] external to the village and external to maniabdasa festation only have a verbal similarity (s mya) [and] not a similarity as regards the real entities (vastusa mya); thus, even for those who consider that no real entity (vastu) is manifest in a concept, in any case, the concept [established through an] inference cannot concern [something] that is external [to consciousness]. As for us, we have [already] demonstrated in verse [I, 3, 5, which begins with] and if determination were erroneous..., that even determination (adhyavasa ya) has an object that is being manifest. As a consequence, if an object such as blue, etc., is not pervaded by the manifesting a), even in the form of a concept [established through consciousness (praka s an] inference, then it cannot be inferred at all. But if [the opponent replies] that [this external object to be inferred] is indeed pervaded [by the manifesting
53 54 55

See Krasser (1999). n PV Prama : asiddhipariccheda 12. PV, vol. I, pp. 190191. I

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consciousness], then, according to the principle [formulated by Utpaladeva in verse I, 5, 2, which begins with] the object would remain devoid of mania), just as before..., [since] its nature is necessarily nothing festation (praka s but the manifesting consciousness, it is not an external [object]! Therefore whichever means of knowledge [we may] use as regards the external [object] that [we are] trying to establish, on the contrary, it is the non-externality (aba hyata ) [of this object with respect to consciousness] that this [means of knowledge] establishes; it is therefore necessarily contradicted [as soon as it applies to the external object]. Abhinavagupta rst notices that because there is only a verbal similarity between the externality that we can witness and externality with respect to consciousness, even for those who consider that no real entity is manifest in a conceptthat is, aivasthe Sautra even for Dharmak rtis followers, and not only for the S ntikas inference cannot be valid, since Dharmak rti himself acknowledges that an inferabdasa ence is invalid if it rests on a mere s mya. However, in the same passage, Abhinavagupta also underlines a crucial differ aiva epistemologies56 namely, the fact that ence between Dharmak rtian and S the Saivas refuse the Buddhist logicians dichotomy between perception understood as the immediate revelation of a singular real entity (vastu) and concepts understood as the articial construction of a generality: according to Utpaladeva, the general feature that a concept makes known is also a real entity present in any immediate perceptionand conversely, at the very moment of conceptualization, this general feature must be immediately manifested in some way.57 As a consequence, in the a Pratyabhijn system, whatever is external to consciousness not only cannot be proved to exist, but cannot be thought about at all, even in a purely abstract and conceptual way, because whenever we try to think about an external object, as Abhinavagupta remarks here, this object is bound to be pervaded by the consciousness that manifests it.

56 a evoktas tvaya Cf. Bha skar , vol. I, p. 234: nanu bauddhair vikalpasya vastvasam tu tenaiva : spars sarvam dhyata iti kim etad ? But the Buddhists state that a concept has absolutely no immediate : sa a) with a real entity (vastu), whereas you [consider that] everything is established relationship (sam : spars through this [immediate relationship with a real entity]what about this [difference]? 57 See IPK I, 3, 5 (to which Abhinavagupta alludes in the passage just quoted): bhra ntitve ca vasa yasya na jad tha d vis d n na rthasthitis tatah :a : ayasthitih : / tatoja : ye nijollekhanis :: : // And if determination were an illusion (bhra nti), this [illusion], which would be insentient (jad : a) [with respect to the object], could not produce the establishment of the object; [and] if [the Buddhist opponent replies that determination] is sentient, [since according to him, it is sentient only as regards itself and its representation (ullekha)], it is conned to itself and its representation, [so that] it cannot [either] lead to the establishment of the object. To sum up, according to Abhinavagupta, Utpaladeva is targeting the Buddhist logicians notion of determination (adhyavasa ya, i.e., the conceptual thought that determines the ineffable content of a perception as being this or that); and his goal is to show that determination cannot be a mere error and yet enable us to deal with objects in our mundane experiences: the establishment of the object, [i.e.,] the power of transforming [an object] into an object for mundane activity (vis panam : ayasya vyavastha : vyavaha IPV, vol. I, p. 103) implies that the object is somehow being ryatvasam danasa marthyam, : pa manifested not only when it is perceived, but also at the very moment of its conceptualization, and this manifestation cannot be reduced to an illusory phenomenon.

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Abhinavaguptas nal remarks thus suggest that because in Dharmak rtis system, ultimately, concepts never concern a real entity, Dharmak rti cannot really make sense of the distinction (to which he nonetheless has recourse) between abdasa s mya and vastusa mya:58 while this entire discussion is intertwined with Dharmak rtian concepts that Utpaladeva appropriates, Abhinavaguptas conclusion aiva system can fully explain why it is impossible even to form hints that only the S aiva system can give its full the concept of an external reality, because only the S meaning to the Dharmak rtian distinction between a verbal and a genuine similarity.

ConclusionWhat Does Utpaladevas Refutation Prove? When refuting the Sautra ntikas contention that external objects can be inferred, Utpaladeva obviously borrows much from Dharmak rtis conceptual arsenal: the argument according to which any ka ryahetu inference must rest on a set of perabceptions belongs to the Buddhist logician; so does the distinction between s dasa mya and vastusa mya with which Utpaladeva eventually defeats his opponent. But Utpaladeva also presents his system as the only one capable of challenging the Sautra ntikas argument that some inferences (such as that of the sense organs) do a not rest on any perception. Not only does the Pratyabhijn system justify this type of sa t a inference thanks to its theory of perception; it also explains why ma nyato drs ::  cannot be proved to exist through such an inference, by demonexternal objects strating the impossibility not only of perceiving, but also of conceptualizing any external reality: the Sautra ntika can talk about the external object thanks to a verbal similarity, but his words remain inexorably empty, because he is incapable of actually forming such a concept. And Abhinavagupta points out that this a impossibility can be justied only in the Pratyabhijn system: Dharmak rti, who considers all conceptual thought as purely articial, paradoxically leaves open the possibility for a speculative externalism that concedes the impossibility of perceiving the external object but claims to build its concept; in contrast, according to Utpaladeva, any conceptualized object must somehow be manifest to the consciousness that conceptualizes it, so that speculation is limited by an impassable boundary: the impossibility to even think about an object external to thought. Abhinavagupta concludes that whatever the means chosen to demonstrate the existence of the external object, it can only establish the objects non-externality (aba hyata ), because all means of knowledge, be they perception or inference, must
58 One could suspect that Abhinavagupta is being unfair here, since Dharmak rti does account for some kind of link between the objects of (some) concepts and real singular entities (see Katsura 1991, p. 143 and Tillemans forthcoming on this causal approach of apoha according to which concepts are causally conditioned by residual traces left by some direct perceptions of singulars), and causal efciency (artabdasa hakriya ) could be considered as the basis of the s mya/vastusa mya distinction: one could argue that in Dharmak rtis system, a concept rests on a vastusa mya only when the various particulars subsumed within it have the same arthakriya (whereas re and snow, although both conceptualized as white substances, do not have the same efciency). Nevertheless, according to Dharmak rtis principles, the vastusa mya which supposedly legitimates the use of a concept is also the ctitious product of a process of mental exclusion, since real entities, being absolutely singular, cannot have anything in common (even a similar efciency), so that ultimately, all similarities seem bound to be merely verbal.

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transform their object into an object for consciousness. But what does this nonexternality mean? Admittedly, Utpaladeva seems to achieve much less than he hopes to: instead of proving that there are no external objects, he only proves that one cannot prove the existence of external objects. And yet, obviously he does not consider that his reasoning might lead to some kind of scepticism: he does not merely conclude that we cannot know whether there is something outside of consciousness, but rather, that nothing is external to consciousness. One might suspect that he is thus confusing (consciously or not) a mere epistemological restriction with an ontological negation. But one might also consider that Utpaladeva does not even envisage scepticism as an option, because scepticism would still entail the spatial representation of consciousness, the inadequacy of which he has pointed out: stating that we do not know whether there is something outside of consciousness or not would still amount to postulating some kind of empty space outside of consciousness that might be lled (or not) with some external entities. From this point of view, one of the most interesting aspects of Utpaladevas strategy in this discussion is the fact that he claims to demonstrate that there is nothing outside of consciousness not merely by pointing out the impossibility of knowing what is external to consciousness, but rather, by questioning the very meaning of the distinction between externality and internality with respect to consciousness.
Acknowledgement I would like to thank Alexis Sanderson, who kindly invited me to read the IPV in Oxford in 2005 and to whose vast erudition the following pages owe so much; Alex Watson, who attended some of these readings, for then pointing out a problem that this article attempts to solve; Tom Tillemans, for sharing some unpublished works of his on apoha; the organizers of the 14th World Sanskrit Conference, where I presented an earlier version of this paper, and the editors of this special issue, Shoryu Katsura, Mark Siderits and Kiyotaka Yoshimizu, who read this paper with great care and made many helpful suggestions. I am also very much indebted to Raffaele Torella, whose remarkable a works on the Pratyabhijn system have been a constant help in understanding Utpaladeva and Abhinavaguptas texts, and to Vincent Eltschinger, whose friendly and attentive reading of this paper led to many improvements. Mistakes, of course, are mine.

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