ROE vs.

WADE 410 US 113

FACTS: This is an appeal of the decision of a US District Court in Texas, which granted the declaratory relief prayed for by the plaintiff who challenged the constitutionality of the Texas Criminal abortion laws; but denied issuing an injunction against enforcement of such statutes.

1. Normal L McCorvey (pseudonym - Jane Roe) was pregnant and unmarried, yet she was unable to receive a legal abortion in Texas by a licensed physician because her life was not threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy and she was unable to travel somewhere else to have a legal abortion. 2. She filed a suit against the defendant, District Attorney Henry Wade questioning Texas State Laws, which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the mothers life. 3. She argues that said laws are unconstitutionally vague and that they abridge her right of personal privacy as guaranteed and protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 4. Later, she amended her complaint as to represent or sue on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated; thereby becoming a class suit. 5. James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, alleged that statues were vague and uncertain, for he had been previously arrested for violations of the Texas abortion statute. 6. He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions, and he claimed that for many cases he, as a physician, was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196 7. John and Mary Doe were a childless couple. Mary was suffering from "neural-chemical" and physician advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition improved 8. She discontinued using birth control pills because of her condition but if she should become pregnant, she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent, licensed physician under safe, clinical conditions. 9. The actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court. 10. Roe and Dr. Hallford had standing, the Does do not. 11. The District Court held that the "fundamental right of single women and married persons to choose whether to have children is protected by the Ninth Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment," and that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face because they were both unconstitutionally vague and constituted an overbroad infringement of the plaintiffs' Ninth Amendment rights. 12. Court dismissed the Does' complaint, declared the abortion statutes void, and dismissed the application for injunctive relief. Issue. Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the appellant to terminate her pregnancy embodied in the concept of personal liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause, in the personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, or among the rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment? Held. The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation. The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively recent vintage, deriving from statutory changes generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th century. At common law abortion performed before quickening (the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero) was not an indictable offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly established common law crime even when it

destroyed a quick fetus. Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal abortion laws. The first is that the laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has been taken seriously by neither courts nor commentators. The second reason is that the abortion procedure is hazardous, therefore the States concern is to protect pregnant women. However, modern medical techniques have altered the situation, with abortions being relatively safe particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is the States interest is in protecting the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion. For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant womans attending physician, and may not be criminalized by statute. For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State may regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health based upon the States interest in promoting the health of the mother. For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where necessary for the preservation of the mothers life, based upon the States interest in the potential of the potential life of the unborn child. Dissent. Justice Rehnquist. The right to an abortion is not universally accepted, and the right to privacy is thus not inherently involved in this case.

Discussion. The Court finds that an abortion statute that forbids all abortions except in the case of a life saving procedure on behalf of the mother is unconstitutional based upon the right to privacy. However, it does allow for regulation and proscription of abortion when the statute is narrowly tailored to uphold a compelling state interest, such as the health of the mother or the viable fetus. The court declined to address the question of when life begins. Note: Guys babaguhin ko pa to bukas, inaantok lang ako I m so sorry magprint ako bigyan ko kayo before consti loveyou peeps mwahugsz