Epistemology, Praxeology, & Empiricism in the Social Sciences

Will Porter 2/3/2014

The primary task of epistemology is to construct a theory of knowledge that describes its nature and how it is attained.

Ludwig von Mises, the founder of the science of Praxeology and master of Austrian School economics, delved into matters which had implications reaching beyond mere economics. Praxeology, the study of the logical implications of human action, provides insight into other areas of philosophy and gives us a foundation for epistemology by distinguishing between that which can be known a priori and that which can be known only a posteriori. A priori here refers to something that is knowable prior to any particular experience, whereas a posteriori knowledge is only known posterior to, or after some specific experience or empirical observation. The ways in which we go about attaining knowledge are different for the two areas of truth. For example, the claim that nothing can be both red all over and green all over at the same time is something that can be known just by thinking about it. In the study of logic, this is known as the Law of Contradiction and states that nothing can simultaneously be itself and its opposite. It is an example of truth which is knowable prior to any given experience. Knowledge derived through observation and testing is known to be a posteriori. For example, the height of a building, the speed of a traveling bus, the weight of a stone. To discover the answers to these questions, it is necessary to go out and see for ourselves. A priori knowledge, once established, holds true at all times and in all places, like the propositions of logic, geometry and arithmetic. A posteriori truths, though, are hypothetical and tentative, meaning that its possible for a future observation to come along and refute them. In light of stronger evidence, new data, or innovations in measuring capabilities, empirical knowledge can potentially always be overturned with a better explanation.

Thus, knowledge may be divided into two distinct realms: a priori and a posteriori. This distinction will serve as the basis for a Dualist epistemology, I.E. one that demonstrates the fundamentally dual nature of knowledge as such. A priori knowledge is acquired through reasoning and reflecting on what is necessarily true. A necessary truth is one that couldnt possibly be otherwise, like the logical Law of Contradiction mentioned above.

One could not imagine a situation in which an object or entity could be both exclusively itself and exclusively its opposite. In this way, a priori truths are logically necessary. To dispute an a priori truth, one must do so on the grounds of logical validity, rather than through empirical observations. This is also true in basic mathematics. One would only demonstrate their own perplexity if they attempted to refute 2+2=4 with some new cutting-edge data. To avoid confusion, it should be noted that the building blocks of the concepts which we reflect on are initially attained empirically through the senses. However, once such concepts are understood, the possibility arises that they may be employed to discover and establish new propositions that are true a priori. Language and concepts themselves are first grasped by experience, only after this does it become possible to construct a proposition or truth-claim regardless of what type of truth it is. (This is in line with Aristotles Peripatetic dictum: Nihil in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu ["Nothing is in the intellect without first being in the senses"]. The a priori realm of knowledge was accounted for and the dictum was revised by the Rationalist philosopher Gottfried Leibniz, who added: nisi intellectus ipsi[except for the intellect itself] ). A posteriori knowledge has to do with the mechanical material world whose governing laws must be derived through empirical means. For instance, the laws of physics are discovered only through empirical study and observation of some given phenomenon. Such laws are structured on a basis of constantly-operating relations. Observational science assumes that there are constants, or factors that can be expressed in definite quantities and predicted based on past-observations. In this sense, these laws may be described as mechanical. The degree of constancy may vary for empirical laws, however. Constants in physics, for example, adhere to a strict regularity with essentially no possibility for deviation, whereas a study like biology may only find frequent regularities. Nevertheless, the basis for a posteriori natural science lies in induction, where general laws are derived from specific observations. The constancy of physical laws (especially) provides a background of stability for the empirical sciences (and every-day experience) to make successful predictions about the relations between causes and effects. With the a priori-a posteriori division in mind, another important distinction is commonly made in regard to analytic and synthetic propositions. An analytic claim is one that is purely a definition, such as All bachelors are unmarried. Even though this is logically true, in learning this one can only find out the definition of the word bachelor, this is purely a linguistic matter. A claim that yields nothing more than a definition is called a tautology. In contrast, a synthetic truth is one that tells us something new about reality. For example, the claim that Children prefer McDonalds to Burger King is not merely a part of the definition of children or McDonalds/Burger King, but tells us something which we couldnt discover by only examining the meaning of the terms themselves.

If a claim is only analytically true, it doesnt give us anything new to go on and serves as an intellectual dead-end for empirical discovery. If a claim is synthetically true, it tells us something relevant about reality as we experience it. In this chapter we will find out how certain knowledge can be synthetic (empirically meaningful), and, at the same time, a priori (knowable before any particular experience). In the course of our discussion, then, we will be referring to this type of synthetic a priori truth, rather than mere definitional claims. To understand how this kind of truth is possible, we must further distinguish our two branches of knowledge. These two realms may also be referred to as the Causal (a posteriori) and the Teleological (a priori). Any change in observable reality can be described as either a Causal phenomenon, a part of nature itself, or as a Teleological one, caused by some conscious entity that interferes in the natural course of events. (Note that I here refer to the term nature only to mean that which occurs in the absence of any changes created by a sentient-conscious entity. In no way does this imply that humans, as conscious beings, are unnatural, or somehow separate from the natural world that, in a way, produced them.)

The realm of a posteriori, or empirical, knowledge can tell us about observable relations found in external reality. Physical laws, like gravity, operate on a constant basis of cause and effect, and so are referred to as being Causally-structured. Knowledge about physical and empirical laws is gained through experience and the inductive scientific method (hypothesis, test, affirm/falsify, revise, re-test). Future observations may also falsify conclusions derived from past observations because empirical knowledge is only hypothetically true. Cause and effect govern the events that take place in the external, material world. From Mises: It is impossible for the human mind to think of uncaused change. Man cannot help assuming that every change is caused by a preceding change and causes further change. ( Theory & History, pg. 177) The realm of a priori knowledge is concerned with the Teleologically-oriented, or the internal realm of concepts, thought, and the mind. These things are not observable, Causally-structured, or even tangible, and can only be understood when rational beings reflect on what is logically necessary to their own nature. Teleology is the branch of philosophy which deals with purpose. Purpose is demonstrated through the human act of choice-making, otherwise known as action. When a person makes a choice regarding his behavior, he shows that he values that course of action over his available alternatives. In regard to choice, then, humans engage in purposeful action, consciously making decisions to guide their own behavior.

(The term rational action is commonly used as synonymous with purposeful action, but rational in this sense simply means choice-making behavior. In common usage, rational refers to someone who makes relatively good choices, however in Praxeology; it simply means that someone makes choices at all.) The statement that humans act must be considered to be in the realm of a priori knowledge because it is true by necessity, and also tells us something beyond mere definitions. If one attempts to deny this claim, he must affirm it in the course of his denial by choosing to deny. Thus, he can be said to be engaged in action, thereby refuting his claim that humans dont act. This is known as a performative contradiction. When one demonstrates the validity of a claim through the very act of arguing, the claim becomes axiomatic. One cannot deny an axiom without thereby engaging in self-refutation. The Action Axiom provides a foundation for the science of Praxeology and many logical corollaries can be deduced from it. In basic terms, human action is comprised of means and ends. In the vocabulary of Ludwig von Mises, these are referred to as categories of action and are the logical implications of choice-making. (The term category can be used interchangeable with the term essential element.) No purposeful conduct could be detached from the means-ends framework. An actor has desires or goals; these are described as his ends. For means, an actor employs various skills, tools, and scarce resources to reach his ends. For example, if my end is to go to the library, I might choose to use a vehicle, various roads, and technical know-how all as means to help me get there. If one dwells on this insight, he will see that any conceivable action can be described in the terms of choice, means, and ends, thus making them essential elements (categories), of action.

The two realms of knowledge are distinct, but are also inextricably linked to one another. While thought is indeed conceptually separate from external reality, the Causal world could not be interacted with or understood without a purpose-driven (Teleological) entity there to observe it. Nothing about the Causal realm could ever be known if there werent a conscious, choice-making being there to experience it. At the same time, action requires a Causally-structured external reality for it to take place in. When we make choices and act on our preferences, we implement causes into the world to create effects. If the physical world didnt operate on constant causal laws, action would be near-impossible. We could never hope to predict the effects of our acts based on past experiences, and therefore achieving our ends would be incredibly difficult, or functionally undoable. In acting, human beings must assume a relative constancy in the causal relations which govern their environment.

From Hans Hoppe: In so understanding causality as a necessary presupposition of action, it is also immediately implied that its range of applicability must then be delineated a priori by that of the category of teleology. (Economic Science & The Austrian Method, pg. 32)

Since human action is Teleological in nature, it is not directed by the Causality that governs external reality. The concept of action is unique in that it does inflict cause and effect into the empirical world, yet it is guided by thought, which is not itself constrained by any constant Causal factors. Because there are no constant Causal-relationships to be observed in the realm of thought, in attaining knowledge about human action, we cannot do so by examining observable data alone. Where empirical science can assume a background of observable constant factors, the study of action cannot. This serves to delineate the range of applicability of empirical science or knowledge. Action is only learned about through a priori reasoning (reflection). Discovering anything beyond the concept of action must be considered the task of observational, a posteriori science. No other phenomena but action is guided by thought, and thus everything else falls to the realm of empirical knowledge, which assumes observable constant relationships from which general laws can be derived. Hoppe continues: Indeed, both categories are strictly exclusive and complementary. Action presupposes a causally structured observational reality, but the reality of action which we can understand as requiring such structure, is not itself causally structured. Instead, it is a reality that must be categorized teleologically, as purpose-directed, meaningful behavior. (Ibid.) [Emphasis mine] Teleological phenomena are not observable. If one attempts to observe an instance of human action, he will only see an entity behaving in some particular way. Nothing about choice, means, or ends will be made apparent. It is only by examining the conceptual nature of action that one can learn about what actually guides it; purpose, knowledge, and preferences. It is only because we ourselves are actors that we can contemplate the meaning of action, and nobody but an actor could have access to such information. It is only because we are actors that we can have this unique insight into what it means to act. Internalreflection, or understanding, is the only available means for discovery in the study of action. Any truth derived from such an exercise would have to be known prior to any specific experience. Moreover, since all experiences are necessarily those of choice-making actors, one couldnt engage in any empirical observation of action without already assuming the existence of purpose-guided action in the first place. Experience, like action, is also not itself observable. The only way somebody could understand the meaning of experience is by being an experiencer themselves. In the same way, the meaning of action is discovered only by reflecting on our own nature, reasoning on what it means to be a choice-making entity. Conversely, one could not learn much of anything new by merely reflecting on the nature of a stone, or a tree, because we are indeed not stones or trees. To discover the existence, and the specific nature of other sorts of non-acting entities, we must engage in the empirical scientific method.

The concept of action can be said to be the intermediary through which the Teleological meets the Causal, I.E. where thought meets external reality. It is the external implementation of our internal knowledge in a purposeful manner for the sake of transforming some aspect of the world to bring about a more preferable state of affairs. Action is completely unique in that it operates within the Causal realm of reality, and yet isnt itself guided Causally. Since the rest of physical reality can only be known about empirically, action is the only conceivable phenomenon that creates observable effects without itself being guided by Causal laws. This opens up the possibility for truths which can be known by inner-reflection alone, yet at the same time are empirically meaningful to external reality. It is because action marks the boundary between the mental (Teleological) and the physical (Causal) realms that contemplating its nature can provide universal a priori insights that concern observable reality (I.E. that are synthetic). Any other a priori truth is purely analytic and is empirically meaningless, and any other empiricallymeaningful truth can only be known through observation. Thus, it may be postulated with certainty that action is conceptually distinct from all other phenomena in that it can be learned about prior to any specific experience while still telling us something relevant to experience, or relevant to the world which is revealed to the mind via experience. The notion of a synthetic a priori truth now becomes viable, and indeed inescapable, once one begins to examine the nature of purposeful behavior. We could not undo the truth of these claims, since we implicitly demonstrate their validity in any attempt to deny them.

With the idea of human action elucidated, we will next explore the vital role that knowledge itself plays in action, as well as the role that language, proposition-making, and truth-validity play in knowledge. Knowledge is the product of a rational mind sorting out sensory data, merging it into integrated experience which allows a being to consciously navigate and understand his environment, utilizing means to reach ends and to sustain his own life. Without this kind of knowledge, purposeful action would be impossible. Before one engages in action he must first identify his current situation, determine a more preferable state of affairs, and finally discover how he might reach such a state through his behavior (I.E. discovering the proper causes/means to reap their desired effects/ends). Doing this involves filtering sense data through the rational mind to extract the relevant information about relationships and connections, or causes and effects (more on this below in regard to categories and the similarities of Praxeological and Kantian accounts of Epistemology). There is always the possibility that incorrect extractions may be made and certain causal chains may in fact not hold true. But nevertheless, knowledgeright or wrongis more than just sensory stimuli, but sensory stimuli interpreted in some way by a rational being, hopefully in a way that will yield information to help him attain an end, or goal.

The only way to formulate and express knowledge is by means of language, particularly by verbal or symbolic-textual truth-claims, commonly known as arguments. It is difficult to imagine rational thought totally detached from language, as language gives expressible form to concepts by attaching their meaning to signs, symbols, and sounds. A language-using entity essentially cannot escape the use of language in formulating their ideas; language is their primary faculty of expression of any knowledge, information, or concepts at all. Besides verbal-written language there are forms of gestural communication, but only insofar as such gestures can play the same role as words in effectively carrying the meaning of ideas or concepts can a truth-claim be expressed in this way. A truth-claim is a bit of knowledge which asserts or negates the existence of some facet of reality or some causal relationship. When two language-users reach a disagreement on a claim to truth, they engage in argumentative exchange in an attempt to resolve it. Both sides give their own account and each weighs the others claims against some standard of validity to reach a conclusion. Argumentation is the necessary result of our ability to identify things and distinguish ideas into a conceptual frameworkas is required in the course of any actionand to express these concepts using sound and symbol which other rational beings can understand as meaningful. If one tried to dispute the fact that truth is possible to attain and that language has meaning, he would find himself in a performative contradiction. His act of objecting would directly contradict the content of his objection. Even if he merely uttered or thought this to himself, he would still have to implement his conceptual framework of knowledge, expressed via meaning attached to language. Since the existence or ability of argumentation is argumentatively indisputable, we may deem argumentations existence as axiomatic. As well as being incontestable, an axiom is a truth which can serve as a sound starting-point to derive further truths from.

In the same way that one cannot claim with any logical coherence that one does not act, one also could not argue that one cannot argue. It therefore becomes equally impossible for one to deny that he knows the meaning of truth-validity, because contained in his very act of denial he demonstrates his possession of such knowledge. To dispute any claim in the course of argument, a person must make use of a truth claim to support his own position, or to undercut the position of his opponent. The meaning of truthvalidity must already be known if one is to make a case for, or against, anything at all. The propositions made during an argument are verified or refuted on the basis of the (a priori) laws of logic. Such laws serve as the basic standard for all truth claims. Implied in the meaning of truth-validity are the logical laws of Existence (something exists), Identity (A is A, or things that exist have particular properties that distinguish them from all other existing things), and Contradiction, (A cannot be exclusively A and Non-A at the same time).

When we say something is true, we mean most fundamentally that it is in accord with the basic laws of logic. Additional empirical data may be required to verify a particular claim, but if any claim is at variance with the laws of logic, it can be immediately rejected as false. These logical laws may be said, then, to be implied in the very concept of argumentation, which is a particular subset of action. This is consistent with the notion that only action and its logical corollaries can yield any meaningful a priori truths. Argument is the special class of action where actors formulate claims to truth and attempt to justify their validity on the grounds of, at the very least, the three logical laws just mentioned above. This act of justification has significant ethical implications, but as the topic at hand is a theory of knowledge, this must be saved for a later discussion. In attempting to claim truth to a proposition in the course of an argument, an actor demonstrates, or at least assumes, that there is some objectivelyascertainable standard of truth. If each person could have his own truth, it would be meaningless to argue over the validity of any proposition. Arguments are only meaningful at all when the participants realize that claims to knowledge must be consistent with some basic standard of verifiability, not based in their own subjective whims. Since nothing whatsoever could be said or claimed without argumentation, it must be considered to be a particularly unique type of action, where knowledge can be expressed, and the validity of such knowledge can be disputed on the grounds of some rigorous and objective standard; the basic tenets of logic. In arguing anything at all, one cannot conceivably avoid assuming that existence exists, existence is more than just one homogenous object or entity, and that in regard to the inherent diversity of things, objects/entities cannot exhibit 100% of one property and 100% of another mutually-exclusive property at once, I.E. that contradiction cannot occur in reality. No matter how hard one tried, any argument would implicitly assume the validity of these three laws. Argumentation, like action, clearly assumes the existence of knowledge, and one may additionally say that knowledge plays a role as an action-category. Truth-validity determination is an essential element of how choice-making is guided, regardless of whether or not our determinations turn out to be right or wrong. Were it not for our capacity to distinguish between truth and falsehood to some extent, we would be unable to tie our own shoes, unable to formulate arguments, nor could we engage in any choice-making behavior at all. We may conclude here that the ultimate role of human knowledge is to make (successful) action possible. Similar to means and ends, knowledge is a category of action because no specific action could be conceived of that didnt contain knowledge as a necessary ingredient. Furthermore, because knowledge is subject to validity-verification, it serves an active or positive function in choice-making. Means and ends are neutral categories in that all that can be done with them is to fill them with the particular content of a given action. Knowledge, on the other hand, is true or false, right or wrong, correct or incorrect, and determining its validity is an essential part of making choices and acting on them.

Knowledge is only useful insofar as it can provide actors with causally-effective means to achieve their ends. When one acts on incorrect knowledge about the effectiveness of a means, the likelihood that he will actually achieve his end severely diminishes. An actors means, ends, and preferences are all determined based on what they know about their own values as well as the current situation they find themselves in. Restated, the task of epistemology has traditionally been to inquire on the nature of knowledge. From the preceding discussion we have shown how mans fundamental nature as a choice-maker gives knowledge its real function. We use knowledge to navigate between truth and falsehood for the sake of enabling effective action to take place. One may also formulate knowledge into a truth-claim expressed by language, and such a claim is verified or refuted primarily on the grounds of unavoidable logical axioms, and if necessary, empirical evidence as well. Epistemology also asks whether there is more than one type of knowledge, and if so, distinguishing where one ends and the other begins. We have discovered how, aside from analytic truths which can yield no information beyond definitions, human action is the only area of study that can be known about in an a priori manner. This further illustrates an epistemological Dualism, as a priori knowledge about action is fundamentally distinct from all other synthetic knowledge about observable reality. With the concept of action at hand, the age-old Empiricist-Skeptic charge that this Dualism leads to an epistemic Idealism can now be successfully addressed. Idealism in this context simply claims that the objects of physical existence are somehow dependent on, or created by, the mind. Depending on ones interpretation, the Traditional Rationalists, like Gottfried Leibniz and Immanuel Kant, seemed to imply that external reality conforms to our knowledge, rather than the other way around. This would entail some sort of Idealism, where thought either creates or distorts reality. In contrast to the David Humeian Empiricist-Skeptic model of the mirror-like mind, where all knowledge comes purely from sensory information, the Rationalist model was one of an active mind which met reality with its own structure of a priori knowledge. This mental structure was referred to by Immanuel Kant as the categories of thought. An example that Kant gave of such a category would be the Principle of Causality. Kant thought, and correctly so, that the general existence of cause and effect was not something to be observed through the senses, but rather understood prior to any specific observation as being necessary to experience-observation itself. As quoted from Mises above, the human mind cannot imagine an observable change that was not the effect of some prior cause. The Rationalist accounts for Causality by deeming it part of the logical structure of the human mind, rather than something to be seen, heard, or felt. For Kant and Mises, then, the human mind cannot avoid experiencing reality in any other way but as structured by cause and effect.

In the same way that Praxeology uses the term category to mean an essential element, the Traditional Rationalist notion of categories also consists of truths that are necessary ingredients for understanding anything attained through the senses. Along with Causality, Kant deemed Time and Space as categories of thought as well. Because the nature of observational data is simply that of light photons, sound waves, etc., no part of it is inherently logical or conceptual in any way. And since the concepts of Causality, Time, and Space are nowhere to be observed in this hurricane of sense data, Kant claimed that the meaning of these concepts must be found in the logical structure of human thought instead. Kants categories are concepts which allowed the mind to structure sense data into something rationally understandable. In other words, a rational being does not merely utilize sensory data alone. His mind is conceptually structured to grasp sense data on the basis of the categories of thought. Contained in this is the very meaning of rationality itself, a faculty of understanding which goes beyond mere sensuous stimulation. The essential Rationalist claim was that the human mind must meet observational reality with its own toolbox. Kant referred to this as our Manifold of Apperception, where the mind processes perceptual input through the categories of thought, resulting in unified conceptual understanding. In order to render the plethora of data we are always bombarded with into something vaguely coherent, Kant thought the mind must, from the outset, order our experience as Causal, Temporal, and Spatial. The Empiricist-Skeptic would object that if such an a priori structure of thought was in place, independent of or prior to experience, how could it be said to have any relevance to external reality? If the Rationalists were correct, the Skeptics charged, this would mean that the human mind would have to create our reality, or that the mind distorts reality, or that its just a miraculous coincidence that this structure of thought could help us in navigating or understanding real physical reality in any meaningful way. In short, the Empiricist-Skeptic claimed that the only way for the Rationalist to proceed was adopt an Epistemological Idealism, which clearly has some strange and seemingly-incorrect implications.

However, in light of Praxeological theory, we can further elaborate on the notion of an active mind as being that of the Praxeological actor. With this idea, we can now answer the Skeptics skepticism. As shown above, action, unlike all other phenomena, is unique in that it simultaneously has a foot in both the Teleological realm of thought and the Causal realm of reality. The categories of action, like Means, Ends, Knowledge, and Causality, are unavoidably true once the meaning of action is formulated and expressed. Rather than being free-floating figments of the mind with no foundation in reality, the categories of thought are merely the logical implications of the existence of action.

From this we can now see that Kant's Idealistic categories of thought become, for us, the Praxeological categories of action. Action is guided by thought, so many of Kants insights regarding the categories still apply here. But the fundamental difference is that the Praxeological account puts vital emphasis on the notion of purposeful behavior. The traditional Rationalists focused more exclusively on the nature of reason and human thought, where Praxeology gives rational thought its function in action, rooting it in the concrete reality which action must navigate. Time, Space, and Causality are all concepts to be understood as directly implied in the means-ends framework of human action. An end is accomplished only temporally-after some means are employed; creating an effect from a cause, and this all must take place in some physical environment, understood by any actor-observer to be spatially-structured. Navigation through space is a fundamental aspect to any conceivable action. Even if reaching ones end didnt involve much actual bodily movement, all action at least assumes that an actor physically exists somewhere in space to even make it possible that he interact with any thing, object, or entity (which themselves must have definite form and take up definite space). Time, Space, Causality, as well as the aforementioned three Logical Laws are all synthetic a priori truths which are logically deduced from the concept of human action. All actors must assume in every action that existence exists, existence has identity, existence cant/doesnt contradict, existence is structured spatially, temporally, and causally. Mises, like Kant, referred to these unique truths as laws of thought as well as categories. But the categories must also fundamentally reflect reality and the way things truly are, as action itself takes place in precisely this reality. Action is the conscious-directing or adjustment of a physical body through space and time. Thus, the Rationalists are correct in claiming that certain truths can be known a priori, but it is only the concept of action that can ground the meaning of these truths to empirical reality and give them any concrete synthetic significance. Since action is guided by thought, yet also inflicts change into the external world, the categories of action arent only laws of thought, but laws of reality as well. (This serves to reconcile the small quarrel between Ludwig von Mises and Murray N. Rothbard. The latter maintained that Praxeology furnished existential laws, whereas Mises claimed they were Epistemological laws. This reconciliation opens the possibility for an action-based theory of Metaphysics, but that will, along with ethics, have to wait.) Action takes place in a definite, scarce world. If it is to be successful in any instance, we not only require a capacity for knowledge in general, but particular a priori knowledge about existence as well; knowledge that cannot itself be derived from experience. Knowing what it means to act, by virtue of being an actor, gives one implicit understanding of the a priori categories of action. While they may not be, and often arent, explicitly understood, once these truths are stated they cannot be meaningfully denied. In this sense they are not self-evident, but rather logically incontestable after they have been formulated into a truth-claim and expressed in the course of an argument.

This gives us a very Realistic epistemology, rather than an untenable Idealist one that either assumes a mere coincidence in the structure of thought matching reality, or that reality is created by such a structure. Thought guides action and action makes observable changes in reality, any logical implications of action must be seen to not only reflect the logical structure of thought, but also general truths about empirical existence. Now that we understand the why and the how of the action categories as legitimate synthetic a priori truths, we can further contemplate the nature of action and figure out the what in deriving a list of such categories. We have already established the categories of Knowledge, Existence, Identity, Contradiction, Causality, Space, and Time, but this list must also include Choice, Means/Ends, Cost/Price, Profit/Loss, and Value/Preference. All of these concepts, or categories, begin to mark the a priori limits of what can be known about action without having to delve into empirical observation. In fact, no empirical observation could ever conceivably disprove or refute these things. To do so would be to engage in action and to affirm the truth of the categories just listed. To walk the reader through this, we can see that in the very act of observation (and any act at all) one would have to devise an End which they Value. One aims to accomplish this End by employing some number of Means. In doing so, one must also make a Choice and set something else aside, thereby incurring a Cost of a foregone opportunity. From the Costs incurred by choosing one course of action over another, the Price of each opportunity emerges in respect to the persons set of Preferences. If the actor accomplishes his End and satisfies his Preference, he can be said to have Profited (not in the strictly monetary sense, but in the general sense of fulfilling ones own desires). If not, he takes a Loss. Also, implied in the categories of Means and Ends are the categories of both Time and Causality. An actor reaches an End only when he inflicts a Cause into the world to create an Effect. Since a Cause must come before its subsequent Effect, this must be assumed to happen over some given period of Time. All of this choice-making behavior is guided by the actors Knowledge about himself, his values and preferences, and the world around him. Finally, all of this must imply an Existence made up of Space and various entities with their own Identity which cannot be Contradictory. It is possible that there are additional logical consequences of action, and so our list may not be totally exhaustive, but this conceptual structure of action categories constitutes what must be possible to be known a priori, I.E. what knowledge may be extrapolated from reflecting on our very nature as actors. Any particular action imaginable can be expressed or described in terms of each of the categories above, including the act of attempting to deny their validity. Again, these are not merely tautologies or definitional claims but offer a plethora of meaningful information about reality. As will be shown below, the discoveries furnished by Praxeology are applicable to various branches of science, beyond the realm of Rationalist philosophy.

Because we are rational, acting beings, we can reflect on the nature of such rational action and apply our reflective findings to other rational-acting entities; other people. A priori knowledge is possible concerning human action because we, being human, have the capacity to reflect on human nature. It has often been disputed whether there truly is a human nature, or universal properties applicable to all people, but the universal nature of human action just may be precisely those properties. It would seem to follow from this that any science involving the study of human behavior would have to be in accord with this universal nature. Praxeology, in its explanation of action, lends credence to the notion of a human nature. Of course, it must be said, studies such as human biology and bio-chemistry are empirical sciences. As such, not all knowledge related to human beings is a priori or reflective, that would be absurd. But determining the conceptual nature of thought and human action is a unique a priori, or apodictic, discipline. Apodictic refers to something that is immediately and demonstrably true; an axiomatic truth that cannot be meaningfully denied. This word sufficiently captures the status of the logicallycertain existence of human action and all of its necessary implications.

The Empiricists & Social Science

There are schools of thought that actively seek to refute the existence of such synthetic a priori truths as the Action Axiom. Primarily during the late 19th through the 20th century, the German Empiricist and Logical Positivist academic circles were prominent voices that objected to the notion that anyone could deduce a corpus of epistemological philosophy purely through a priori axioms. Such a philosophical foundation would establish the potential legitimacy of science conducted on the basis of a priori truth, rather than by observation alone. It was, in fact, discovered by Ludwig von Mises that the study of economics could only deal with the logical implications of human action. Working on somewhat conventional assumptions of his Austrian forebears, Mises revised economic method to fit into the framework of Praxeology. Contrary to the popular fashion of his time (and ours), Mises concluded that economics was necessarily a study of action, and could not be based in the traditional Baconian scientific method. In economics, observations can only be interpreted with the help of Praxeology. Action is only understood when seen through the categories of means, ends, etc.

To the idea of apodictic, or absolute, truth, the Empiricist-Positivist objects that the only two possible kinds of truth are analytic definitions (tautologies) and tentative empirical hypotheses. This essentially states that we cant be certain about anything and introduces skepticism on the human capacity for attaining genuine knowledge. These academics claimed that the realm of a priori knowledge was exclusively comprised of mere linguistic conventions, representing only arbitrary transformation rules of various symbols (language and/or mathematics).

Although the Empiricist-Positivist accepted that there is indeed a dichotomy between the realms of a priori and a posteriori knowledge, they postulated that nothing from the former realm could give us any new or meaningful information. To them, a priori truths were virtually free of content in relation to the reality of the world as it exists.

Concerning the above claim, one must ask, what kind of truth is that? According to EmpiricismPositivism, it is either a tautological definition that tells us nothing new, or only a hypothesis, in which case, why should one accept it? Before verifying such a hypothesis, scientists would have to go around testing every proposition to make sure it was in accord with the distinction of knowledge just outlined above. If we apply the Empiricist-Positivist logic to its own fundamental epistemological claim, it is self-refuting. If their claim about knowledge is to be truly meaningful, it would have to be precisely the kind of synthetic a priori truth that they seek to deny existence to. But that is not all; there is a second critique which must be addressed in regard to this school of thought. Sociologists and economists employing a purely empirical method are essentially mimicking the physical sciences, like chemistry or physics. A tentative hypothesis is posited and empirical observation and experimentation are used to affirm or invalidate the proposed theory. Ignoring the obvious objection that there is no sociological or economic laboratory where variables can be steadily controlled, there is an even more fundamental error associated with the attempt to apply the empirical method to economics, or any study concerning human action. This error is best illustrated when we analyze the basic assumptions that the empirical method must make. Without such assumptions, empirical science would be either impossible or meaningless. With these assumptions, it soon becomes apparent that no strictly empirical method could ever yield fruitful discovery in the study of action.

If one were to conduct consecutive experiments with the goal of refuting or confirming a given hypothetical theory in the course of observation, it seems one could not hold to the Empiricist idea that all meaningful knowledge must be empirically-attained. As thoroughly demonstrated above, the Principle of Causality is only knowable from the non-observable implications of action. Causes and effects, as Hume famously noted, are nowhere to be seen in observation. But while Hume thought this meant that Causality didnt itself exist, it seems more to imply that Causality is only known about through non-empirical means.

If reality werent causally-structured, it wouldnt make sense to say that a past observation could be either confirmed or falsified by any future observation.

For example, if observing Experiment A at time T1 is to have any relationship whatsoever with observations made during Experiment B at time T2, what must be true for this relationship to exist? What is to bind these observations to one another, so to speak, and allow a scientist to apply information gathered about past events when making predictions about the future? In other words, why is it not simply that at T1 we see one thing happen and at T2 we see another? Why should there ever be a problem? Why is it true that T2s results could falsify or confirm the results from T1? Without the use of any a priori knowledge about Causality, this question could not be coherently answered. Any set of observations would have to be seen as simply logically incommensurable with any other set and no hypothesis could ever be tested. But it would seem quite ridiculous to deny the acute success of the observational sciences. The astonishing advances in technology and scientific understanding over the 20th century alone clearly demonstrate the practical validity of assuming the existence of a causally-structured reality. The assumption made by Empiricists that physical reality operates on constant and stable relations over time is not justified under the Empiricist framework of knowledge. Because of this stability, it allows scientists to make successful and accurate predictions about empirical events based in what we know from past observation. To use the empirical method in the first place, the Principle of Causality is already assumed to be valid. Contrary to Empiricist doctrine, then, Causality decisively must be taken to be a meaningful synthetic a priori statement. No empirical science could be done without this basic, non-observable assumption of cause and effect. Do not, however, mistake any of the above claims as attempts to render the scientific method illegitimate or invalid, quite the contrary. Rather, the question concerns the parameters of applicability for the scientific method. Where the Empiricists physical science ends, Praxeological social science begins. The traditional scientific method may still prove useful for us here, but the implications of Praxeology must be taken as our primary methodological tool. Data in the social sciences can only be interpreted on the basis of a theory, and so theoretical insights are required. It is this that Praxeology provides. (To quickly address the objection that Quantum Physics somehow disproves the idea of a stablystructured reality, one can only answer that as far as human action and (macro-scale) scientific predictions are concerned, the principles that apply to the macro-scale are the only relevant ones. Quantum Physics may tell us something is mysterious or seemingly-contradictory in the must minute fabric of reality, but so long as human action and science take place on the level of the macro, we have no reason to assume that Causality is invalid, at least on this scale. For all intents and purposes, Causal laws are functionally-constant. Quantum Physics could not refute the fact that there is a significant degree of stability in the world that we act in, and that we implement and observe definite causes to reap [and study] their effects.)

The social sciences involve the study of human action and human actors. In the realm of human action, there are no constantly-operating, time-indifferent causes. While action takes place in a Causallystructured reality, action itself is guided not by Causal laws, but by subjective motivations, purposes, and evaluations. These desires are always in flux; changing and evolving as each of an actors ends are realized and produced anew. They are not at all constant. One may change his mind at any given moment for any given reason. From Ludwig von Mises, empirical prediction is impossible regarding human action because: there are only variables and no constants. It is pointless to talk of variables when there are no invariables. (Theory & History, pg. 12 [Emphasis mine]) In the study of physics (our favorite example), one can use equations and mathematics to represent constant factors and phenomena which operate indifferently to time. The trajectory of a falling rock will be subject to all of the physical laws and constants that a falling tree will. The trajectory of an acting human being, based on ever-changing knowledge and subjective valuation is, however, a categorically different matter. Since all action is guided by knowledge, and since future knowledge can never be known with certainty in the present moment, (if it were, it would no longer be future knowledge, but now knowledge) no systematic scientific predictions about future action can be made. To observe past behavior, guided by past knowledge, and project this into the future as a prediction would be to ignore the fact that all future action will be guided by knowledge which the actor has not yet attained, knowledge which no predictor could ever guess. If one could consistently and accurately predict what he will know, but does not yet know, then he would necessarily already know it; this of course is a logical impossibility. Clearly, future knowledge is unknown until the moment that we attain it (at which point the future becomes the present). It would, in fact, be absurd to claim the ability to predict future states of knowledge, as the entire purpose of empirical science is to learn from the future outcome of an experiment. If one could accurately predict future states of knowledge, he could also predict the outcome of experiments, thereby defeating the point of the experiment in the first place; to learn what was not before understood. Therefore, it is demonstrably true that knowledge and action are based in causes that are ultimately unknowable, rendering human action scientifically unpredictable. All that can be known is that subjective preferences guide action, and no legitimate predictions may be made about an actors future subjective evaluations. However, while accurate empirical prediction is not tenable, we actually can say that some predictions are inherently untenable. Any prediction that is at variance with the a priori truths derived from action can be said to be systematically flawed. For instance, one could not reasonably predict that an actor will not employ the first unit of a given set of homogenous goods toward his currently most-valued end (and the second to his second-most valued end, and so on).

This is known as (part of) the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility, but all that must be understood here is that this law is derived, a priori, directly from the Action Axiom. This axiom, then, serves to constrain the range and scope of legitimate prediction in the study of action.

With the above in mind, it becomes quite clear why strictly empirical science has no place in a discipline like economics. The modern mainstream orthodoxy must constantly make all sorts of impossible predictions using statistics, or econometrics. The empirically-oriented economists are using an altogether incorrect and inappropriate method, treating acting human beings like mechanical particles or molecules. Human behavior and action cannot be stuffed into a mathematical formula to crank out any kind of reliable prediction, no matter how sophisticated the equations and regressions are. One who takes data about the past and lumps it into a statistical aggregate can only yield a historical account of past economic relations. Never can one use such aggregates to predict future economic phenomena. Attempting to do so would be akin to Ptolemaic astronomy trying to force math and science to fit the incorrect notion of an Earth-centric universe. Such an exercise can only result in overlycomplicated falsehoods that serve to muddy the waters for rational inquiry.

Conclusion
Human action must be examined with tools which are attained through reflective contemplation of our own nature as choice-makers. Only its logical ramifications can provide information useful for social science. While the action-categories dont allow for specific predictions, they do allow us to fruitfully analyze all action to attain scientific insights as well as more fundamental insights about the nature of human knowledge. Action is an altogether unique concept, and therefore yields a unique type of truth in its implications. Epistemological Dualism allows one to distinguish between the two areas of knowledge and/or science. Economics, history, sociology, and the like, all involve human action as their primary subject matter, and so require a different method than that of the physical sciences. The fundamental distinctions made by Rationalist philosophy have carved the way for an action-based epistemology; one that recognizes the fundamental difference between a priori-Teleological and a posteriori-Causal knowledge. This provides a rock-solid edifice, from which an entire science of market exchange (economics or catalactics) can be derived.

In closing, Praxeology offers more than just epistemological truth, but truth regarding the nature of the social sciences and economic methodology. No longer is economics a discipline which aims to employ the methods of the physicist, but one that has its own toolbox to deal with its own unique set of considerations.

With the conceptual framework of action established, one may proceed into the realm of economic science well-equipped. Economic relations are now understood to be relations between actors with means and ends, knowledge and preferences. It is action which ultimately grounds our theory of knowledge, and it is action as well that grounds economic theory. The age-old quarrel between the Rationalist and the Empiricist framework of knowledge can now finally be laid to rest. Whether for physical or social science, one cannot avoid the necessity of employing meaningful a priori knowledge. Rationalism, as espoused by Immanuel Kant, Ludwig von Mises, and Hans Hoppe, has validated the reality of reason, and the human capacity to grasp genuine existential truths; truths concerning the marvels of the rational mind and the universe that surrounds us.