Reconciling Protection and Impartiality: A Critical Analysis of the Responsibility to Protect

Since its inception in 2005, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) initiative has seen its fair share of proponents and critics. The mechanism aimed to fundamentally change pre-existing norms on humanitarian intervention by shifting discourse from the right of sovereign states to intervene in humanitarian disasters to the responsibility of both states and the international community to protect citizens. This fundamental shift reflects the change from state-centric conceptions of security that form the classical tradition of international relations theory to a security regime which incorporates the human security principles that have been emerging within the field. While the R2P mechanism was lauded as a means to institutionalize the longstanding norms on humanitarian intervention (Evans 2009: 7), it also received a significant amount of criticism for being difficult to implement and control (Hamilton 2006: 294). Albeit the initial qualms, it has arguably become both the centerpiece and defining structural mechanism of the modern human security regime. For a mechanism that has come to hold such a central role in the human security regime, the use of its intervention component has been extremely sparse. Its invocation was considered by France in response to the government of Myanmar failing to protect its citizens from humanitarian disaster after Cyclone Nargis in 2008 (Daalder and Stares), and arguably used by the Russian Federation as a means to justify their conflict with Georgia over the failure of the Georgian government to protect the minorities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Evans 2008: 53). However, neither France nor Russia were able to gain much support in the international community to legitimize multilateral invocation of the mechanism. Yet, when it has been used in cases like Kenya in 2007, Cte dIvoire in 2010 and Libya in 2011,

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it has come up with a considerable amount of problems. Moreover, while it has been endlessly discussed as a means to approach the crisis in Syria, its invocation has yet to occur. This essay will critically analyze the Responsibility to Protect as the contemporary human security regime. First, its centrality in the modern human security regime will be contextualized and early attempts to utilize the mechanism will be assessed. Then, using the cases of the interventions in Cte dIvoire and Libya, its viability as a means to operationalize existing human security norms of intervention will be explored. Finally, using the case of the failure of the international community to act in Syria, its implementability will be analyzed. Throughout this analysis, it will be argued that the Responsibility to Protect has fulfilled its role in reordering international human security norms from the conception of the right of states to intervene to the responsibility of states to protect not just their own citizens, but all human beings. However, it will be argued that the intervention component of the mechanism has still not been able to reconcile with the inherent contradiction between the international communitys responsibility to protect and the taboo that is associated with enacting regime change. As highlighted in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, the international community established that Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (2005: 30). More importantly, the document also recognized that the international community is prepared to take collective action...through Chapter VII...should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations (ibid). As Welsh and Thielking and MacFarlane highlight, this reconciled the fundamental contradiction between the institutionalized norms of state sovereignty and human

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rights (2002: 490). It finally deconstructed the notion that both states and individual rights were inalienable. With this new doctrine, the individuals rights to being protected from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity clearly superseded the rights of states to maintain territorial integrity and political independence (U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4). This was a fundamental shift in the previously ambiguous contradiction and, at least on paper, should have provided considerable impetus for the international community to intervene in states where human rights violations were occurring. While the principle established through R2P was a considerable achievement, its operational value fell short. While it may have reconciled the responsibilitysovereignty contradiction, it provided no clarity on the contentious issue ofprotection becoming regime change. This, combined with the fact that the non-intervention component, or the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means (United Nations General Assembly 2005: 30) was nothing new for the international community, leaves the R2P mechanism lacking any credible implementability. This was highlighted in some of the early attempts to utilize the Responsibility to Protect as the framework for international reaction to crises. In the case of the political violence in the aftermath of the Kenyan general election in 2007, the Responsibility to Protect was called on but the peaceful mechanisms to resolve conflict were deemed sufficient and intervention was not necessary as a power sharing agreement was struck between the two conflicting political parties . While working within the framework of R2P may have provided some momentum to the efforts of those seeking negotiations, negotiations would still have been sought without the R2P framework (International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect 2012). With numerous regional bodies such as the African Union and the East African Community, as well as other

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international forums such as the Elders (which coincidentally was formed mere months before the crisis in Kenya) operating to provide peaceful mechanisms for conflict resolution, the R2P did not necessarily provide any unique operational value other than the guiding principle of the importance of protecting civilians (Kofi Annan Foundation 2009: 3). Moreover, in the event that the case in Kenya had not lead to an agreement on the sharing on power, civilians could not have been protected without necessarily forcing regime change in the country. Beyond Kenya, the case of Cte dIvoire in 2010 showcased the chronic problem with R2P trying to reconcile the United Nations commitment to both protecting civilians and protecting state sovereignty. Once again, with the case in Cte dIvoire, the added dimension of regime change complicated the decision making process. As election results were disputed, having international presence in the country protecting civilians necessarily meant that they were protecting against certain forces. As such, it was necessarily the case that the peace keeping forces had to engage aggressors (in this case the forces of Laurent Gbagbo) and the decision makers had to pick sides. This was immediately labelled as the international community enacting regime change (Mbeki 2011). The fact that the R2P principle had established that protecting civilians would supersede upholding state sovereignty did not matter in this case because there was widespread disagreement on which regime held state sovereignty. As such, the United Nations Security Council, supported by regional organizations such as ECOWAS and the African Union, was almost forced to go ahead and actually declare one of the conflicting sides (the Outtara regime) as the legitimately elected government of the country in order to ensure that United Nations peace keepers were aware of who they are fighting against (S/RES/1962). As the election results were somewhat questionable, this was a significant turning point because the

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Security Council set a precedent that it could declare a certain regime as that which held sovereignty. While the Security Councils actions were not unilateral in the sense that regional bodies such as ECOWAS and the African Union also declared the Outtara regime as legitimate, it did allow the Security Council to continue what was effectively an intervention against the Gbagbo regime while having the support of the state from Outtara. In this case, the Security Council and its members had extreme difficulty in agreeing on the interpretation of their own mandate. One of the biggest problems that surfaced with the mission in Cte dIvoire was not regarding the extent to which civilians should be protected but rather the means with which to determine who is the enemy, who is the perpetrator of humanitarian violations, and how to go about pursuing the violations committed by the government which invited the United Nations mission itself. Moreover, as Bellamy and Williams suggest, in cases like this, peacekeepers will have to make difficult judgements about how to balance potentially contradictory aspects of their mandate (838). Regardless of the political maneuverings and debates that go on in New York or Geneva, if individual peace keepers on the ground, often coming from a wide range of nationalities with differing interests, cannot unequivocally interpret their mission, then the entire concept on which their intervention is based is left critically flawed. While the case in Cte dIvoire was labelled an intervention that was welcomed by the host country, the case of Libya is entirely unprecedented because the Council showed that it will not be inhibited as a matter of principle from authorizing enforcement for protection purposes by the absence of host state consent (Bellamy and Williams 2011: 825). It could be argued that the case of Libya shows that the international community can come together and actually act upon the priorities that were set through the 2005 World Summit by valuing protection of civilians

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over protection of state sovereignty. Yet, by introducing the conundrum of the mandate being protection of civilians compared to regime change, the case of Libya cements the inability of the R2P framework to be an impartial means with which to prevent human rights violations. At the very core of the issue lies the question If the Qaddafi regime is the root cause of conflict...then does not the decided solution present itself as regime change? (ubuku 2013: 43). This case provides a stark example of international norms conflicting even with the prioritization of protection over sovereignty. Even though it is taboo for particular countries or the international community as a whole to explicitly go about changing the regime in sovereign states, this is exactly what the Responsibility to Protect framework implies is necessary. In most cases 1 where the Responsibility to Protect needs to be invoked, the monopoly on violence is either not being held by the legitimate government or the legitimate government is exercising its monopoly on violence to violate the human rights of its citizens. In the case of the former, the legitimate government could invite the international community to come in and the issue would be simpler to deal with. However, in the case of the latter, the only way to effectively protect citizens, especially in the long term, would be to remove the threat. As the threat is the regime in charge, protection would necessarily imply regime change. The specific circumstances with the case of Libya led countries like the Russian Federation and China to allow the intervention to occur by abstaining instead of vetoing the United Nations Security Council resolution. In particular, the support for intervention from a variety of regional bodies as well as the viciousness with which Col. Qaddafi attacked the

1 A notable

exception would be a case like that of Myanmar where the governments lack of action was a cause of the humanitarian disaster. In this case, forcefully intervening to provide aid would not necessarily mean a regime change is necessary. Page 6 of 12

protesting Lihyan citizens was what ultimately pressured China and Russia to abstain from vetoing resolution 1973 (Sar 2012: 338). However, even after all this happened and these countries effectively agreed to allow the intervention, the fact that both Russia and China felt betrayed by the wilful interpretation and expanded application of the mandate which was provided by the resolution is a serious roadblock to any future invocation of the Responsibility to Protect (Anishchuk 2011). This highlights two critical problems with the entire concept. First, the mere fact that two states in the international system can have such power over the invocation of this seemingly universal concept showcases the reality of individual states interests continuing to dictate the means with which protection is authorized. Considering both Russia and China are consistently criticized for their own humanitarian records it becomes difficult to legitimize their importance in the decision making process for the Responsibility to Protect against similar humanitarian violations. Second, the fact that a mandate for intervention can be created and then subsequently be so differently interpreted by those that authorized it delegitimizes the effectiveness of the Responsibility to Protect. That being said, a significant factor as to where the confusion arises can be attributed back to the original contradiction between protecting civilians impartially and enacting regime change. As mentioned previously, a significant reason for the roadblock being imposed by the Russian Federation and China on invoking R2P with the case in Syria may be their experiences with the framework in the case of Libya. Nonetheless, the Syrian example can provide valuable insight into the viability of the framework as it is a crisis that has received unprecedented media coverage as a humanitarian disaster but has not seen any physical intervention from the international community. Two major factors highlight the case of Syria with reference to R2P.

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First, following the general theme of this argument, is the reconcilability of the protection vs. regime change. While the case of Libya presented a significantly more binary option between the regime of Muammar Qaddafi and the Transitional National Council, Syria is wrought with a multitude of different parties, none of which has yet to unequivocally claim legitimacy as an opposition regime (Nuruzzaman 2013: 60). If it was not clear until the case of Libya, it has especially become apparent now that an intervention with any mandate, whether through the R2P or not, will lead to a regime change. As such, it becomes significantly more difficult for even staunch supporters of intervention like the United States and France to effectively lobby for intervention in Syria when there a clearly favourable endgame is not in sight in terms of a new regime. As such, the question of Who has the responsibility to protect whom under what conditions and toward what end? (Mamdani 2009: 276). With the possibility of an Al-Qaeda backed fundamentalist islamist government replacing the relatively more secular government of President Assad, the case for intervention against the Assad regime becomes increasingly weak. Second, the case of Syria exposes the reality of the international communitys prioritization of security-based norms vs humanitarian based norms. While it was suggested earlier that prioritization has shifted towards a more human security based focus, the case of Syria highlights that, in fact, the traditions of physical security based international relations have not escaped modern regimes. The fact that momentum in favour of intervention was significantly increased after the possibility of the use of chemical weapons in Syria suggests that the international community is still significantly more concerned about norms related to warfare and physical security compared to norms such as the Responsibility to Protect which are focussed on

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human security. Even though mass atrocities were allegedly committed by the Assad regime before any discussion of chemical weapon use occurred, the serious potential for intervention only occurred after the chemical weapons were encountered. This further delegitimizes that any muscle that the Responsibility to Protect framework had gained over the course of its existence in becoming a universally applicable system. Moreover, it also delegitimizes the entire human security regime as it suggests that the international community is still preoccupied by the classical conceptions of physical security as a priority. As the right to humanitarian intervention becomes the obligation to protect civilians numerous contradictions continue to exist within this framework of the human security regime. While the global acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect seemed to indicate that a move was occurring away from importance being given to physical security-related norms to human security related norms, recent humanitarian crises seem to indicate otherwise. This essay has highlighted the inherent problems of reconciliation between the norms surrounding the responsibility of the international community to protect civilians from humanitarian disaster and and at the same time remaining impartial and not engaging in regime change. From the case of the Kenyan election dispute which was arguably resolved through the peaceful mechanisms of the responsibility to protect we can see that these mechanisms did not provide anything that did not already exist either institutionally or through accepted norms. The case of Cte dIvoire showed the continued importance of existing regimes accepting international intervention and the extent to which members of the Security Council were willing to go to receive that invitation. The case of Libya, while setting a precedent as the only case where the R2P doctrine was used in its full glory, without the invitation to intervene showed that it is likely a unique exception to the

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consistently hesitant international community. With the inconsistencies in the interpretation of the mandate and the continued clash between protection and impartiality, the Libyan case has become a reminder for Russia and China to continue blocking any meaningful efforts to allow intervention. Finally, with the case of Syria we have seen the realities of the international system exposed as western countries seem to implicitly recognize regime change as part and parcel of any intervention as well as the realities of international prioritization of physical rather than human security related norms. Looking ahead, the future may seem bleak for both the R2P and the human security regime as a whole.

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Works Cited Anishchuk, A. (2011) Russia, China urge adherence to Libya resolutions Reuters <http:// www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/16/libya-russia-china-idAFLDE75F13V20110616> Bellamy, A. J. and P. D. Williams (2011) The new politics of protection? Cte dIvoire, Libya and the responsibility to protect International Affairs, 87(4). p. 825-850 ubuku, A. (2013) The Responsibility to Protect: Libya and the Problem of Transnational Solidarity Journal of Human Rights, 12 p. 4058 Daalder, I. and P. Stares (2008) Saving Burma's people: The UN's responsibility to protect Los Angeles Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/13/opinion/13iht-edaalder. 1.12841976.html?_r=2&> Evans, G. (2008) Russia in Georgia: Not a Case of The Responsibility to Protect New Perspectives Quarterly 25(4) p. 53-55 Evans, G. (2009) The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All Irish Studies in International Affairs, 20 p. 7-13 Hamilton, R. J. (2006) The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine but What of Implementation? Harvard Human Rights Journal, 19 p. 289-297 International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (2012) Crisis in Kenya: Report <http:// www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-kenya> Kofi Annan Foundation (2009) The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation: One Year Later Overview of Events <http://kofiannanfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Microsoft %20Word%20-%20Overview%20of%20events%20note_0.pdf> Mamdani, Mahmood. (2009) Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror New York: Pantheon Books Mbeki, T. (2011) What the World Got Wrong in Cte D'Ivoire Foreign Policy <http:// www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/29/what_the_world_got_wrong_in_cote_d_ ivoire> Nuruzzaman, M. (2013) The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine: Revived in Libya, Buried in Syria Insight Turkey 15(2) p. 57-66

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Sari, B. (2012) The responsibility to protect after Libya: humanitarian prevention as customary international law Brooklyn journal of international law 38(1) p. 304-344 Welsh, J., C. Thielking and N. MacFarlane (2002) The Responsibility to Protect, International Journal p. 489-512 United Nations (1945) Charter of the United Nations UNTS XVI United Nations General Assembly (2005) 2005 World Summit Outcome : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly A/RES/60/1

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