Sent: Friday, May 10, 2013 Subject: Form, Content, and Structural Realism

Dear Prof. Psillos, I have been reading a bit of Schlick lately, and happened upon a couple of interesting and highly relevant papers of yours while I was thinking about Schlick's views regarding form and content. And I am hoping you might be willing to answer a on this. In your !Is Structural "ealism Possible,! in discussing what you there call !the downward path,! you distinguish these three theses# $A% &e can know everything but the individuals...' or $(% &e can know everything but the individuals and their first order properties' or $)% &e can know everything but the individuals and their first order properties and their relations. &hen reading Schlick, however, I got the sense that his claims were more modest than any of these. this way, though# $D% &e can't have any knowledge $i.e., !by ac uaintance!% with the individuals...' or $(% &e can't have any knowledge $i.e., !by ac uaintance!% with the individuals or their first order properties' or $)% &e can't have any knowledge $i.e., !by ac uaintance!% with the individuals, their first order properties, or their relations. *aybe they could be put uestion or two

As you know, his goal was to throw out

uestions about inverted

spectra as !meaningless!# on his view all we could know about !your red! versus !my red! involved similarities+differences of behavioral responses. ,e was not what you would call an ,e .ust eliminativist--he insisted that there were contents.

denied that they were the sort of thing anybody could know anything about $other than, presumably, their structural properties%. (ut I don't see why such a structural realism needs to hold that all structural properties+relations either are or may be known. /ou argue that this position $which you refer to as '"S"$)%'% is indefensible for two reasons. 0irst, you note that it seems weird to deny that structural properties are all that may be known about the world. *y sense is that Schlick's response to that would largely involve denials that 'contents' $'raw feels' 'givens'% are the sort of things that can be known--or even be constituents in what is known. ,is view was that it is propositions $or sentences or facts% that can be known, and these contents have no role in those knowables on his view. 1hey are beetles in bo2es. I believe, too, that he would deny your ,e would claim that scientific predictions re uire contents.

insist, in fact, that what he calls contents play no role in scientific prediction. &e do 3 to neuron / and behavior 4 ensues# anything additional would be considered metaphysics $and hence, in his view, nonsense%. As I understand it, the second argument you bring against "S"$)% is that it must fail for the reasons all structural realisms must fail--inferences involving structural isomorphism aren't valid. 1hat Item ( has some specific bunch of formal properties can't be derived from the facts that $i% Item A has that bunch

and, $ii% A is !of! $or a pro.ection of% (.

Again, though, I mean, he

Schlick simply seems to ponens where you tollens.

believes that we all agree that, for e2ample, the e2perience of being lit on fire is different in a number of knowable ways from being tickled. it. 1o conclude, I am likely misunderstanding some aspects of your arguments here, but the !form-not-content! mantra as it appears in Schlick, seems to me to be more of a !5ook, we know a bunch of stuff, and we don't know anything about 'raw feels'--so it simply must be the case that 'raw feels' don't play any role in our knowledge.! Is that sort of common-sense argument something you reply to somewhere in your published work6 *any thanks for any help on this7 (est wishes, &alter ,orn *****************************************************************************
Sent: Friday, May 13, 2013 Subject: Form, Content, and Structural Realism

&e may not know !what it is like! for anybody

$including ourselves%, but we know a lot of other things about

Dear Walter Thanks for your note. Re Schlick. It seems that his views evolved between his General Theory of Knowled e and !orm and "ontent. In GTK he#s a structuralist of a sort$$what he says there does not %uite fit with the schema &'($$&"( as I )resented it in my )a)er.

'ctually* S. distin uished between knowled e by ac%uaintance and knowled e by descri)tion and denied that we have any knowled e by ac%uaintance of anythin . So in a sense* he is close to &'( but with the )roviso that #individuals# are the )henomenal contents of e+)erience &sense$data etc( and all else is descri)tive &that is* structural( knowled e. ,ut I did not have Schlick in mind when I was makin this classification* but mostly "arna). -ow* it is a ood %uestion whether Schlick was an eliminativist abt content as o))osed to structure. In an un)ublished )iece of mine &many year a o( I wrote the followin . /The thin is that Schlick wants to avoid content alto ether. Durin his )hiloso)hical career he shifted from the )osition that content )ertains to whatever one is directly ac%uainted with0the )henomenal content of e+)erience0and as such it is not the ob1ect of knowled e* &be it )rivate and sub1ective and fleetin and blurred(* to the view that content is totally ineffable and that all knowled e )ertains to the knowled e of contentless structures* or better of structures than can be filled with any content whatever. In fact* Schlick took the radical 2oincar3an line that there is no fact of the matter as to whether the )henomenal content of the sensations of two distinct )ersons is the same when they look at the same ob1ect from the same )oint of view. What matters is that they can make the very same discriminations* irres)ective of whether their contents are 4really5 the same. !or e+am)le* two )ersons would* ty)ically* assert that a )o))y and a tomato have the same colour and that a tomato and a cucumber have different colours* even thou h one mi ht have had an 4inverted s)ectrum5 vis$6$vis the other. So* the admission that beyond structure there is also content and that this content matters to science is very disturbin for Schlick./ I still think this is ri ht$$it#s less im)ortant* I think* whether he really wanted to eliminate content$$)erha)s not* iven his overall meta)hysical view of reality. ,ut the locus of ob1ectivity in content was really disturbin for him. I went on like this. /"ontent does not have to be )henomenal. 7ne may take it to be whatever distin uishes between two isomor)hic structures* vi8. an inter)retation of the domain of discourse and of the relations defined on it. -aturally* when we do science we want to know whether we talk about electroma netic fields* or of tem)erature fields9 of waves or of )articles and so on. 'nd we also want to distin uish between two or more sets of )henomena whose laws of behaviour have the same mathematical form. ,ut this can be done* Schlick says* without abandonin structuralism. !or what distin uishes* say* an electric force from an air molecule is that they have different structures. there is a number of

e%uations that one obeys but the other does not. "learly* Schlick adds* we have to use different symbols for the variables occurrin in common e%uations* but these don5t stand for different contents. they stand for different structures. That5s not a bad thou ht. What matters is that further structure can sufficiently distin uish between two isomor)hic inter)retations. "ontent )er se does not enter the )icture. :ven understood as difference of inter)retations* difference in 4content5 shows u) in difference in structure9 to be sure* in the structure of the individuals of the domain of discourse. If all discriminations that science can make )ertain to structure* then )erha)s the whole distinction between structure and content is otiose. I certainly think it5s ri ht to say that to say what an entity is is to show how this entity is structured. what )ro)erties it )ossesses* what relations it stands to other ob1ects etc. 'n e+haustive s)ecification of this set of )ro)erties and relations leaves nothin left out. 'ny talk of somethin else remainin unca)tured when this s)ecification is made is* I think* nonsense. Seen from this )ers)ective* Schlick5s mis ivin s a ainst irreducible content are not without 1ustification. -otice that his main o))onents when he advanced these views were all those )hiloso)hers &like ,er son and Scho)enhauer( who thou ht that only intuition can lead to real knowled e* that intuition re%uires some kind of direct ac%uaintance with the )henomenal content of the )erce)tion of an ob1ect &which is thereby bein known(* and that this ac%uaintance is distinct from* and su)erior to* the descri)tion of this ob1ect offered in and by ;scientific investi ation<. Would this make S. a structuralist= Still* however* one can ask the followin %uestion. is it really structure all$the$ way$down= Schlick would be willin to say yes. &'lthou h* he5s re)orted to have chan ed his views.( ,ut we are still left with the )roblem that bu ed "arna). >ore structure can distin uish between entity ' and entity ,* where there are some structural differences to be found. ,ut how could structure distin uish between two entities which 0from a structural )ers)ective0have e+actly the same formal structure= 7n Schlick5s account* an entity ' is introduced by means of an im)licit definition. ,etter* a term which* from a non$structural )oint of view* is taken to denote entity ' is defined im)licitly by its formal relations to other terms. ,ut* it5s an illusion to think that any s)ecific constant* i.e.* a name* has been thereby introduced. What has ha))ened is that* in effect* a new variable has been introduced. Where one uses the term ;electric field

vector<* one has 1ust said that this term stands for whatever entities satisfy a set of a+ioms and there is no way in which such introduction im)lies uni%ueness. In fact* the o))osite is true. To see this one merely needs to see that iven any ?$? ma))in of the domain of discourse into itself* there are innumerable entities which satisfy the same a+ioms. Which one is bein desi nated by the term ;electric field vector< is left obscure. We should want to )ick one* but structure alone cannot )ick any in )articular. This is 1ust a re$a))earance of "arna)5s )roblem* at a different level. "arna) thou ht* correctly* that some relation$e+tensions should be natural* what he called ;founded<. Schlick is faced with the same difficulty. some entities &)ro)erties( must be natural0even when they are introduced structurally0and it is those entities which should be taken to be the values of the )redicate$variables in order for the theory to describe the structure of a certain domain. Schlick is )erfectly aware of this ob1ection. 's he )uts it. ;,efore this %uestion is answered our formal system will not be connected with reality* it will not be a science* but only a )ossible frame for one< &).?@A(. ,ut his answer is rather sur)risin . In effect* it is that uni%ueness and naturalness can be ot by means of e+)licit definitions. Schlick correctly )oints out that the inter)retation of the formal system matters to science and that it is u) to the scientists to s)ecify it. Be is also correct in )ointin out that the inter)retation is done0at least )artly0by observation. 7f course* the whole )oint0 which Schlick ne lects0is that althou h observation connects the structure with e+)erience* and hence it ives it em)irical content* it does not0and cannot0fully determine the theoretical content of the structure. what the )redicate variables of the lan ua e of theory ran e over. Russell* who advocated a similar view with Schlick* saw that clearly. The relation between observations and theoretical structures is one$to$ many* not one$one. What5s sur)risin is that Schlick oes for e+)licit definitions in order to )in down the theoretical inter)retation of the theoretical variables. What makes a certain si n refer to one theoretical entity rather than another0and hence what makes the si n a term and not a variable$in$dis uise0is that* ultimately* the si n is introduced by means of definitions of the form. ;the %uantity so$and$so has the value so$and$so iff under such circumstances such a fact is observed<. 's he remarks. ;This is sim)ly the definition of the %uantity. it is the way in which the si n denotin the %uantity is connected with reality< &).?@A(. This is not the )lace to reca)itulate the inade%uacies of

e+)licit definitions as a method to introduce theoretical terms. The main )oint is that )ure structuralism is disavowed. Schlick yields* too. Givin content to0in the sense of inter)retin 0a structure is necessary for knowin what this structure is a structure of and why it is not the structure of somethin else. :+)licit definitions in virtue of an observational lan ua e aim to do )recisely this. to ive content to an em)ty structure. ' combination of e+)licit and im)licit definitions* if it worked* would uarantee uni%ueness. !or amon the many entities &or se%uences thereof( which are im)licitly defined* i.e.* defined by means of their )laces in a structure* e+)licit definitions )ick one and only one as that which is the inter)retation of the structure. ,ut this would be an overkill. :+)licit definitions alone would suffice. If ;electric field vector< is defined as a))lyin to the one and only entity which under such$and$such e+)erimental conditions )roduces such$and$ such characteristic res)onse* then this sim)ly is what the electric field is. Its )lace in a structure may ive us more information about its formal relations with other &e+)licitly defined( entities* but it5s not constitutive of its nature. To )ursue the ma) meta)hor further* if 4Condon5 is defined as the ;one and only city with a full$si8ed ,i ,en<* then knowin its )lace on the ma) of the DK is useful for findin how it relates to Civer)ool* but as a )iece of information is secondary* if not su)erfluous* for knowin what Condon is and for reco nisin whether one is in Condon or not. Schlick thinks he has an ace u) his sleeve. When observation* he says* )ins down a structure* it does that by addin further structure* not content. Bow can that be= Remember here that Schlick takes content to be* ultimately* sensory &or )henomenal( content. Be5s then ri ht to note that two observers can make the very same discriminations between )erceived thin s* even thou h their sensory contents mi ht be different. That5s merely a re)etition of 2oincar35s )oint* which we saw earlier. Still* structure does need to be filled with some content* but what really matters is how the contents of observations are related to each other and not what they are. Whether I really see red and you really see reen when we look at a tomato* what matters is that we will both assert that the colour of tomato is the same as that of a )o))y and different from the colour of a cucumber. I think this is dead ri ht. Eet* surely* it does not answer the )roblem at hand. The issue is not whether the content of the electric field vector is a certain )henomenal state. Schlick is certainly ri ht in sayin that he who masters >a+well5s e%uations knows as much about electricity as someone

who suffers an electric shock. Rather* the issue is what the term 4electric field vector5 stands for. If the claim is that it stands for whatever )ro)erty is characterised by >a+well5s e%uations* then which amon the many )ro)erties$in$e+tension &i.e.* classes( which satisfy these e%uations does it stand for= "arna)5s )roblem cro)s u) a ain. unless the claim is accom)anied by the assertion that this )ro)erty is 4natural5* it is trivial and uninformative. It is trivial because there is bound to be some such )ro)erty$in$ e+tension in the domain. 'nd it is uninformative because it does not tell which )ro)erty amon the many with same structure is bein characterised by >a+well5s e%uations. So* althou h I see the force of the claim that to know about the intensity of the electric field is to master >a+well5s e%uations* in order for this claim to avoid triviality and to be informative* it needs to be su))lemented. !or he who masters >a+well5s e%uations does not talk about electricity and hence does not describe electricity unless a( he inter)rets the entities bein related by >a+well5s e%uations as electric and ma netic field vectors9 b( he is at least committed to the view that the entities &or )ro)erties( denoted by these terms are natural kinds and c( he takes them to be causally connected with observable electrical )henomena* the ways of causal links bein described by the literally understood theory./ In li ht of this* I still think that S. fall#s )rey to the -ewman )roblem0as does "arna)5s attem)t in the 'ufbau. ,esides* I think you are not %uite correct when you say that /Be would insist* in fact* that what he calls contents )lay no role in scientific )rediction/. In his &?FGH( he wanted to make it clear that )rediction re%uires at least some inter)retation of theories. Bere is what I wrote in a )ublished )iece of mind. /In his &?FGH(* he came back to this view and called it the eometrisation of )hysics. /by disre ardin the meanin of the symbols we can chan e the conce)ts into variables* and the result is a system of )ro)ositional functions which re)resent the )ure structure of science* leavin out its content* se)aratin it alto ether from reality &?FGH* ).GGI(/. Seen in this structuralist li ht* the )redicate letters and other constants that feature in the a+ioms should really be taken to be genuine variables. What matters is not the meanin of these non$lo ical constants* but rather the deductive0hence structural0 relations amon them. Scientific theories are then )resented as lo ical structures* lo ical im)lication bein the eneratin relation. The hy)othetical )art comes in when

we ask how* if at all* this system relates to the world. Schlick5s answer is that when one )resents a theory* one makes a hy)othetical claim. if there are entities in the world which satisfy the a+ioms of the theory* then the theory describes these entities &cf. ?FGH* ).GGI$?(.Bowever* I a ree with you that for Schlick #content# should not be )henomenal content. Bere a ain* he seems to have chan ed his mind durin the )rotocol sentences debate. I ho)e all this hel)s. Stathis