Estrada v Desierto (March 2001) The indispensability of the peoples freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-evident.

The reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in decisionmaking by all members of society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus. In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides a framework in which the conflict necessary to the progress of a society can take place without destroying the society. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization:[71] this function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus curiae brief filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association which emphasized that the basis of the right of assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this means talk for all and by all. Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,[73] this Court similarly stressed that "... it should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers. Re Letter of Temporary Inability to Discharge His Duties o Petitioners resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people. Re Prejudicial Publicity o two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases: British approachthe problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat American approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc. People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,[128] later reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, et al: It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we now rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the

miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-togavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. x x x x x x x x x. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia: The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which it was deliberately linked by the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally and representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place. The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be eviscerated. Epilogue: Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If democracy has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to mans progress from the cave to civilization.

Estrada v Desierto (April 2001) Re Resigning under Duress o Three-part test for such duress:

1) whether one side involuntarily accepted the others terms; 2) whether circumstances permitted no other alternative; and 3) whether such circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite side. o Factors to be considered, under this test, are: (1) whether the employee was given some alternative to resignation; (2) whether the employee understood the nature of the choice he or she was given; (3) whether the employewe was given a reasonable time in which to choose; and (4) whether he or she was permitted to select the effective date of resignation. Re Prejudicial Publicity o Test we laid down in People v. Teehankee: Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out , a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lost their impartiality. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

Belgica v Executive Secretary Re Freedom to Access of Information o Petitioners invoke Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution: (p. 62, last paragraph) o Held: Court denies petitioners submissions Writ of mandamus lies if the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. It is essential that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required. P. 63-64 (Quotation from Valmonte case) What the Court denies is the preparation of the list requested by the petitioner; but this is not to say that that they are not allowed access to the documents already available and of public record which are related to these funds they are of course allowed but subject to the reasonable regulations imposed by the documents custodian or any valid statutory prohibition Court recognizes that the information being requested is a matter of public concern however, to ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and so as not to unduly hamper the equally protected interests of the government, it is constrained to deny the petitioners prayer, without prejudice to a proper

mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to pursue through a separate petition. Guingguing v CA In his stead was elected Thomas Jefferson, a man who once famously opined, Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter. Lingens v. Austria, European Court noted: Whilst the press must not overstep the bounds set, inter alia, for the protection of the reputation of others, it is nevertheless incumbent on it to impart information and ideas on political issues just as on those in other areas of public interest. Not only does the press have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also has the right to receive them. It cannot be helped if the commentary protected by the Bill of Rights is accompanied by excessive color or innuendo. Certainly, persons in possession of truthful facts are not obliged to present the same in bland fashion. These true facts may be utilized to convince the listener/reader against a particular position, or to even dissuade one against accepting the credibility of a public figure. Dry facts, by themselves, are hardly stirring. It is the commentary thereupon that usually animates the discourse which is encouraged by the Constitution as integral to the democratic way of life. This is replete in many components of our daily life, such as political addresses, televised debates, and even commercial advertisements. The guarantee of free speech was enacted to protect not only polite speech, but even expression in its most unsophisticated form.

Soliven v Makasiar (Gutierrez, J. concurring) United States v. Bustos: Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience." The Court pointed out that while defamation is not authorized, criticism is to be expected and should be borne for the common good. People v. Perfecto: No longer is there a Minister of the Crown own or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights with every other man." "no inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise should be characterized as libel." (Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 117 [1970]; See also the citations in Elizalde v. Gutierrez, supra). Mr. Justice Jackson in the American case of Beaurnhais v. Illinois: If one can claim to announce the judgment of legal history on any subject, it is that criminal libel laws are

consistent with the concept of ordered liberty only when applied with safeguards evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of expression. Ayer Production v Judge Capulong
This freedom includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. Gonzales v. Katigbak: Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. Their effect on the perception by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the pre cultural traits is considerable. Nor as pointed out in Burstyn v. Wilson (343 US 495 [19421) is the Importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform' (Ibid, 501). There is no clear dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If such a distinction were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right to free expression. A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute of a public character. Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern. Lagunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales (Moises Padilla story): Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person, no matter how public he or she may be. o The prevailing doctine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing of interest test". The principle "requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in given situation or type of situation" In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. taking into account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern." Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred to as a "public figure: o A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a

'public personage.' He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainment. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused upon him as a person. Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their tight to privacy. Three reasons were given, more or less indiscrimately, in the decisions" (1) that they had sought publicity and consented to it, and so could not complaint when they received it; that (2) their personalities and their affairs has already public, and could no longer be regarded as their own private business; and that (3) the press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have become legitimate matters of public interest. On one or another of these grounds, and sometimes all, it was held that there was no liability when they were given additional publicity, as to matters legitimately within the scope of the public interest they had aroused. The privilege of giving publicity to news, and other matters of public interest, was held to arise out of the desire and the right of the public to know what is going on in the world, and the freedom of the press and other agencies of information to tell it. "News" includes all events and items of information which are out of the ordinary hum-drum routine, and which have 'that indefinable quality of information which arouses public attention.' To a very great extent the press, with its experience or instinct as to what its readers will want, has succeeded in making its own definination of news, as a glance at any morning newspaper will sufficiently indicate. It includes homicide and othe crimes, arrests and police raides, suicides, marriages and divorces, accidents, a death from the use of narcotics, a woman with a rare disease, the birth of a child to a twelve year old girl, the reappearance of one supposed to have been murdered years ago, and undoubtedly many other similar matters of genuine, if more or less deplorable, popular appeal. The privilege of enlightening the public was not, however, limited, to the dissemination of news in the scene of current events. It extended also to information or education, or even entertainment and amusement, by books, articles, pictures, films and broadcasts concerning interesting phases of human activity in general, as well as the reproduction of the public scene in newsreels and travelogues. In determining where to draw the line, the courts were invited to exercise a species of censorship over what the public may be permitted to read; and they were understandably liberal in allowing the benefit of the doubt.

Fermin v People Diaz v People

Adonis v The Philippines

In Re Jurado

Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection. The public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges (and for that matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other. And the point of adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate interests is precisely found in the norm which requires those who, invoking freedom of speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof. The public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges (and for that matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other. And the point of adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate interests is precisely found in the norm which requires those who, invoking freedom of speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof.

As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it: ". . . A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society." Mr. Justice Malcolm: But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary.

In Re Macasaet

Sir William Blackstone, 19th Century English jurist: Every freeman has an
undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity the will of individuals is still left free: the abuse only of that free will is the object of legal punishment.

Judge Learned Hand had already observed that [t]he hand that rules the press, the radio, the screen, and the far-spread magazine, rules the country. He concluded that medias power was an unchangeable fact of life: Whether we like or not, we must learn to accept it. It [open justice principle] is justified on the ground that if the determination of justice cannot be hidden from the public, this will provide: (1) a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy, and (2) the maintenance of the publics confidence in the administration of justice Judicial independence is the backbone of democracy. It is essential not only to the preservation of our justice system, but of government as well. Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court has observed that judicial independence encompasses two distinct but elated concepts of independence - individual judicial independence = focuses on each particular judge and seeks to insure his or her ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law. - institutional judicial independence = independence of the judiciary as a branch of government and protects judges as a class; possible only when both concepts of independence are preserved - wherein public confidence in the competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority

Accordingly, it has been consistently held that, while freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of democracy, these freedoms are not absolute. For, if left unbridled, they have the tendency to be abused and can translate to licenses, which could lead to disorder and anarchy. In Re: Almacen: Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizen whom it is expected to serve. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall
be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.

Senator Ernesto Maceda: The ends of justice are not served by heckling nor by
crude insinuation or by irresponsible reporting. The house of democracy is never strengthened by those who choose to throw rocks under the cover of darkness and anonymity. The institutions of our liberty are never enriched by the irresponsible accusations of the uninformed. The bedrocks of our Republic are not reinforced by those who evade responsibility under the veil of freedom

Chaplinsky v New Hampshire Cohen v California MVRS v Islamic Dawah of the Philippines Roth v US Miller v California Gonzales v KalawKatigbak Pita v CA Reno v CA Ashcroft v ACLU Hannover v Germany

Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers