Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 43, No. 4, 2011 doi: 10.1111/j.1469-5812.2008.00482.

Desire, Democracy and Education

U T

_482

400..410

Department of Education, Learning and Philosophy, Aalborg University, Denmark

Abstract In recent years the concept of eros has found its way back into educational literature with the aim of integrating human desires into educational theories and counteracting a devaluation of emotional life. This paper holds the view that this integration is important because desire expresses a fundamental way of relating to the world. However, part of the literature on eros and education also rethematizes the concept of eros as an educational value in support of democracy. The paper argues that the binding together of eros and democracy is based on a one-sided description of eros, which is too hasty when we look at the plurality of lived desires. Keywords: Eros, desire, democracy, education, phenomenology

Introduction In recent years the concept of eros has found its way (back) into educational philosophy; often with reference to Platos image of the daimonic Eros in the Symposium (Garrison, 1997, 1999; Kelly, 1997; Burch, 1999, 2000). The retrieval of eros serves the overall purpose of integrating human desires into educational theories and counteracting a devaluation of emotional life. An important argument is that the concept of eros helps us improve our understanding of human subjectivity because it can revive a discourse of the emotional; namely, bring to light the human subject as emotionally tuned to the world. This discourse is relevant when we concretely discuss how we should organise educational situations. From the point of view of an emotional discourse it is, for instance, interesting to consider the role of passions in educational situations; e.g. in what ways do our desires support or interfere with stated educational aims. How should the teacher deal with the passionate aspects of the subject? Philosophical inquiry into the dynamics of desire can provide the teacher with a vocabulary which can be used to talk about and reect on emotional characteristics of the educational process. The descriptions of eros in Platos philosophy can be viewed as reections on desire understood as a passionate drive integrated into human action. Hence the concept of eros can direct attention to motivational aspects of human learning and education. We can turn to Plato with the questions: What are the motifs in
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passionate desireand how is desire expressed as a dynamic force within the relation to the other and to the world in general? The concept of eros provides a starting point for a discussion on these matters. An aim is to consider how the concept of eros informs us about human desire. This particular attention to Platos philosophy indicates one type of interest related to the retrieval of eros in educational philosophy. The overall aim is to further the discussion on human subjectivity by turning our attention to desire as a fundamental aspect in the way we live our lives. Another interest is to rethematize the concept of eros as an educational value in support of democracy. The main idea is that educators need to reawaken and nourish desires in order to regenerate the democratic culture. This idea, for instance, is present in Kerry Burchs Eros as the Educational Principle of Democracy, in which he writes: As an educational principle, eros can provide the vocabulary and symbolic value system that critical pedagogy needs to rejuvenate both the vocational identity of teachers and the hope of democratic renewal (Burch, 2000, p. 2). In this paper I want to draw attention to the retrieval of eros within educational studies and critically question the particular understanding of eros which Burch employs in the binding together of eros and democracy. On one hand this paper holds the view that it is important to revive a discourse of the emotional based on the concept of desirefor several reasons. First and foremost the concept of desire draws attention to passionate life and urges us to consider the signicance of passionate desire in human life with respect to both our motivations and our relations to others. We may ask: What does desire bring to our life? How does desire work as a dynamic force which binds us to the other and to the world? As an echo of Marcel Proust it can be argued that our desires like a musical chordcarry the fundamental notes on which our life is built.1 Proust imagines that if we take away one desire, then our lives as a whole would changejust as a melody would be transformed if it lacked one note. The concept of desire is to be understood here as an emotional eld in human existence dened by both a passionate longing to attach oneself to the world or more specically to particular elements in the world (the desired object) and a dynamic intense movement directed at realizing this attachment as a particular communication with the desired object. Desire in this broad sense expresses a horizon of meaning from which life takes a direction. It comes forth as concrete passions dened by a particular time and space since its origin is related to the experience of the desired object, but also spreads out as an emotional background or atmosphere underlying our motivations and actions more generally by setting an emotional tone for our experience of the world. Hence, we shouldnt ask: Where can we locate desire?, but rather we must state that desire is everywhere present. This statement also indicates the importance of philosophical inquiry into the experience of desire. We need thorough reection to understand how desire operates in order to discuss what it brings to our lives. This paper also holds the view that it is important to link philosophical reections on desire to educational studies. Educational practices shape or form our desires to work within certain cultural settings. Hence it is relevant to ask: What place does desire have in educational practices and what value is it given? Are we expected to deny our desires or does educational practice
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allow our desire to play a role in learning processes? And if so, what role is it set to play? Plato was aware of both the above perspectives. His discussions of eros are related to both reections on human subjectivity and to his ideas on education. In the Symposium the concept of eros is used to express an emotional phenomenon dened by a passionate longing for something and he marks the dynamic force of eros as the starting point for our learning about the world (Plato, 1997). In this sense it seems obvious to consider the concept of eros as a statement of human desire and to begin a dialogue on the experience of desire by turning to Plato. Also, when the aim is to reawaken a discourse of desire within educational philosophy, it seems obvious to look to Plato. Within Plato we nd an argument (and a starting point for further dialogue) against any paradigm unable or unwilling to acknowledge passionate life as a vital factor in educational practices. It is a vital factor not because we aim to place desire within these practices, but because it is already there. Education does not take place in a neutral room stripped of all desires, but what we learn, how we learn, how we engage in the classroom as an intersubjective space, is related to the individual desires surrounding educational practicesand our desires in turn are shaped by those educational practices. In other words: I want to argue that the concepts of desire and eros are helpful when we aim to further our understanding of human subjectivity in general, as the concepts contribute to a discourse of the emotional with special attention paid to passionate life. This particular attention can be linked to questions on motivation and learning as well as to questions on how we relate in the world with others. Both links are relevant when we discuss the organisation of educational situations. Education is aimed at initiating learning processes and hence it is relevant to discuss the character of learning and the motivation which is integrated in learning processes. Education is also aimed at educating the subject to take part in social life and hence it is relevant to consider the relations to others and the role of passions in this relation. From this particular perspective it would be relevant to discuss desire in relation to questions on ethics and the good life. How is desire present in what we see as the good life and the ethical relation to the other? From these perspectives, this paper is in accordance with the efforts of the abovementioned literature which aims at bringing desire and education together in a discussion on human subjectivity and also placing this discussion in relation to the way educational practices are organized in todays society. It is in agreement with Garrison when he writes: Our destiny is in our desires, yet what we seek to possess soon comes to possess us in thought, feeling and action. This is why the ancient Greeks made the education of eros, or passionate desire, the supreme aim of education (Garrison, 1997, p. xiii) and further: Ignoring the role of eros in education is the most serious gap in contemporary educational conversation. The gap may be closed by exploring the question: How should we educate the eros of our students? (Garrison, 1997, p. 126). Garrisons point is that the dominant thread of current Western liberal thought on education is based on a deep cultural dualism between the public and the private, the body versus the mind, rationality
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versus desire and hence the discussion on the role of desire has been silenced. By examining Platos concept of eros we can nd a voice and a language to commence this discussion again. This paper is also in accordance with Kelly when she writes: As desire refuses mind/body splits, its focus urges attention to embodiment and heightens the sense of psychic and social risk entailed in the work of pedagogy (Kelly, 1997, pp. 24f.). Kelly understands pedagogy as a creation of the public sphere which in turn is based on a formation of the individual subject participating in public life. This formation is linked to the whole of our subjective being and as such it also works in the region of our desire, for instance by determining what is desirable and how we are allowed to express our desires. From this perspective is seems necessary to explicitly discuss how our desires are educated and should be educated in light of a question concerning how we would like to live our lives with others. On the other hand, this paper also holds a critical view on the discussion on eros, democracy and education. Parts of the literature show a tendency to develop a positive coding of eros (as an expression of desire) in order to make the concept t with democratic values. Eros is for example repeatedly dened as the passionate search for wisdom and common good (Garrison, 1999, p. 10; Burch, 2000). But is this coding consistent with human desires? It seems necessary to question the way a positive coding of eros is viewed as an indication of our lived desires and consequently linked to democratic culture. Just as often as philosophy tells us of the commitment and passion in human desire, it also tells us of its more untrustworthy and deceitful aspects. These aspects become evident when our desires turn selsh in the quest for possession and consumption of the world. Based on this ambiguity we may ask: Can we be sure that eros, our desire, works in the name of democracy or at least in accordance with and in support of democracy? I want to argue that we still need to ask questions about the dynamic of our lived desires instead of taking this dynamic for granted. We need to turn answers into questions. In other words: My overall intention is to problematise the idea that we have a denite given understanding of human desire based on the concept of eros which again can be used to link desire and democracy. In order to make this argument I will, rstly, take a closer look at Burchs arguments to give a concrete example of a position within educational philosophy which points to eros as the necessary foundation in education for democracy (Burch, 2000). I will pay special attention to the way eros is identied as an indication of human desire. Secondly, I will discuss the lack of textual evidence for Burchs identication of eros. In this discussion I will turn to two mythological gures of Eros presented by Plato, namely the tyrannical Eros (the Republic) and the divine Eros (Phaedrus). Lastly, I will conclude that the concept of eros needs to be viewed in terms of experience. When we ask what is eros? we cannot solely look to mythological stories or commonalities in the use of the concept within philosophical texts, but we also need to look at our concrete and lived experiences of desire, as neither mythology nor the history of philosophy give us a clear-cut picture of eros which would be able to tell us once and for all whether our desires belongs to democracy or not.
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Eros as the Educational Principle of Democracy When Burch argues that eros can provide the vocabulary to rejuvenate the hope of democratic renewal, he writes from within an American context, but his points can be generalized since he investigates the relation of eros and democracy from a general point of view. A link between eros and democracy naturally requires an understanding of the conceptual meanings of both terms, but I will primarily focus on eros (as does Burch). His main argument is that an absence of eros within education practice undermines democratic culture since a devaluation of our desires leads to apathy and individualism. The presence of eros, in contrast, leads to engaged learning and community identity. Burch describes two classrooms which are meant to capture the qualities of eros: one in which eros is absent and one in which eros is present. In regard to the classroom without eros, he writes, there is no sharing of oneself with others, learning is an individual affair lacking enthusiasm, people are guarded and cautious, and there is no sense of community. The classroom with eros is in comparison based on dialogue as people actively and passionately listen to each other. They partake in each others learning processes and form a classroom culture based on equality (Burch, 2000, p. 179f.). Burch writes: At a broad level, eros refers to a kind of intersubjective vitality; a kind of social climate generated when trust and sharing and participation through dialogue transforms academic work into a fully awake yet contentious enterprise (Burch, 2000, p. 180). Burch views eros as the passionate and dynamic force behind engagement and dialogue; and it is from this view that he argues that eros belongs to democracy. Alternatively, he sees the absence of eros as an obstacle to furthering the democratic project through education. In relation to the current educational landscape, Burch nds the absence of eros in dominant strands of the liberal paradigm of education. He argues that liberal epistemology is unable to see eros as a relevant educational category since desires are suppressed in the intention to place education in an emotionally neutral space. In other words: he argues that this paradigm limits the register of the emotional. As a consequence educators are expected to deny the value of eros, of desires and passions, and sanctify test scores and instrumental knowledge. Burch argues that this leads to a fundamental crisis in education for democracy since the absence of eros means that individualism reigns, and any sense of community is replaced by the slogan everyone for him- or herself. No educational theory of citizenship, participation and common good can arise from this point of viewand we are left with a thin or perverted sense of democracy. Following Burch we may talk of a vicious circle: Education for democracy requires our desires, but at the same time educators are expected to deny desires. According to Burch, the solution to this crisis is the revaluation of eros as an organizing principle of education. However, a difculty appears which is linked to the identication of eros. Burch writes: Few would deny that the experience of eros is what enables education to occur: in a sense, eros is the radical of the educational moment, the square root of its power (Burch, 2000, p. 2). To agree with this (or disagree) we need an answer to the question: what is the experience
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of eros? This question is all-important if the task is to promote eros as an educational principle. What is Eros? It is in no way a simple question. First and foremost we need to acknowledge eros as a concept based in Greek mythology. This means that Eros is a mythological gure along the lines of Zeus and Aphrodite. In philosophy, however, the concept works on two levels, since there is a principal distinction between the mythological Eros and human eros. The key is that the mythological stories can be used to identify eros as a concrete force or drive in human lives. Plato, for instance, uses mythological stories of Eros to describe a passionate drive in human life. In this sense eros is often taken to mean love or desire since such a translation brings us from mythology to human experience. Burch places himself in line with this idea. He answers the question what is eros? by carrying out a genealogy by looking at different textual representations of eros through history. He pays attention to texts by Plato, Augustin, Rousseau, Marcuse and feminist writers and discusses the ways the mythological gure of Eros has been used to represent human desires. If wein shortfocus exclusively on his reading of Plato he refers mainly to the Symposium in order to bring forth eros as the creative power which propels the quest for knowledge and search for meaning. In Burchs own terms: Eros is magnetized towards the vision of imagined good (Burch, 2000, p. 20). He links this to the cave allegory in the Republic and takes eros to signify the philosophers drive towards truth, beauty and good. It is through the drive of eros that the philosopher begins the movement out of the cave, away from a world of illusions and ignorance. At the end of his genealogical analyses Burch writes: the various accounts of eros and democracy surveyed in this inquiry, supports the claim that their metaphoric inventories are strikingly similar. I have traced their patterns of signication: dynamic, transformational, non-hierarchical, dialogical, communal, critical, each containing dimensions of incompletion and future-directedness (Burch, 2000, p. 193). These qualities are what makes Burch link eros and democracy and argue that eros should function as the organizing educational principle of democracy. However, there is a problem with his conclusion since there is attentiveness to only one side of eros. If we, for instance, look to Platos Republic, the ninth book, we will nd an image of Eros as a tyrant, who rules according to his own pleasures and hence ignores any form of reason (Plato, 1997). In Socrates words the tyrannical Eros is selsh, greedy and does not care about the common good. His eyes are focused solely on his own satisfaction. He demands more and more and is never satised. In this sense human eros has to do with the quest for power and possession rather than wisdom and ethics. In relation to Platos metaphysics: Eros holds us back in an earthly world of illusions by making us focus on the possession of material things. Hence eros stands in the way of achieving true insight related to the world of Forms. Eros also stands in the way of meaningful interpersonal relations since the other is subsumed in greedy and mindless consummation. In this sense, eros is not only an unnecessary drive, but also a destructive force. If this image is
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taken to identify human desires, then Burchs conclusion cannot be maintained; rather our desires stand forward as destructive and hierarchical: the sign of a tyrant. In his book titled ErosThe Myth of Ancient Greek Sexuality Thornton interprets literature from ancient Greece focusing on the representation of eros and he reaches a different conclusion from that of Burch (Thornton, 1997). He shows us how Eros is depicted by the use of certain metaphors: eros as insanity, eros as fever and re. These metaphors have in common that they link eros to the destruction of both mind and society. Eros is seen as the suspension of reason and morality. It is a natural force to fear and to control. However, Thornton tells us that the literature also recognizes creative aspects in eros linking eros to abundance and pregnancy. Hence, technologies such as reason and cultural institutions (like education) were seen as necessary to control the otherwise violent forces. This control was meant to turn Eros to the use of something productive and good. However, it is a misconception that eros was seen only as a principle in support of dialogue, wisdom and harmony. To illustrate the point further we can look to another mythological representation of Eros in Platos philosophy: the divine Eros in Phaedrus (Plato, 1997). The rst two speeches in Phaedrusthe speech of Lysias and the rst speech by Socrates bring forth an understanding of eros which is in accordance with the image of the tyrannical Eros in the Republic. Both speeches portray human eros as insanity, namely a state in which the lover is a slave to his passions; hereby dismissing any reason. In this sense eros leads to bad judgment and destructive behaviour towards others. The two speeches generally talk of eros as a miserable condition. However, in Socrates second speechintended to correct the false stories in his rst speech he begins his argument by stating that Eros is a God or something divine (Plato, 1997, p. 521). He describes Eros as the son of Aphrodite and an unknown God. He hereby concludes that eros per denitionas a Godcannot be bad, but, on the contrary, eros must bring something good to the world of humans. In his speech Socrates determines human eros as a productive dynamic force. He begins by saying that eros is mania (madness), but of a divine character. This character is of importance, since it means that eros does not bring us to insanity, but eros is an expression of divine inspiration which can direct us to the highest form of happiness and wisdom. In order to clarify the dynamics of eros Socrates uses two analogies in his speech: the analogy of the chariot and the analogy of the winged soul. He tells us that the human soul can be compared to a union of two horses and a charioteer. One horse is good and the other bad; making the job of the charioteer necessary, but difcult. The two horses illustrate how the human soul is torn in different directions. The good horse expresses reason and self-control and it is easily controlled by the charioteer. The bad horse is focused on embodied pleasures and is hard to control. Socrates links this image to another analogy illustrating the immortality of the soul. He tells us that the soul originally had wings. Due to these wings the soul exists in an eternal world high above the earthly world. However, at one point the soul loses its wings and falls down towards the earthly world. In this fall the soul is encapsulated in a mortal body and most people forget about the real nature of the eternal world.
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Now, what happens when eros inspires the human soul? In the Republic and the rst two speeches in Phaedrus eros is understood as an unnecessary force that deects us from wisdom. In this sense eros expresses the movement of the bad horse. Through eros we come to dwell in the pleasures of the embodied world. In Socrates second speech, however, eros works as an inspiration which at rst moves the bad horsethe focus is pleasurehowever, through an inspired experience of embodied beauty the soul is directed at real Beauty in its eternal Form. Eros generally expresses the state of the lover who is captivated by the beauty of the loved one. At rst this state of mind is characterized by an intense desire for embodied beauty. In terms of the analogy the bad undisciplined horse uses all its strength to attach the soul to the loved one. Socrates describes how the charioteer and the good horse struggle against the intense desire, but in the end they have to give in. This movement brings the soul close to the loved one. Here is the turning point of the story. Rather than desire bringing an end to self-control and reason by blindly indulging in the pleasures of the embodied world, Socrates describes how eros opens up the memory of the eternal world. Socrates says that through the inspired sight of the others beauty the charioteer all of a sudden remembers the nature of real Beauty. Hence the mania of eros results in bringing us to the highest form of wisdom. This means that the experience of eros supports the good horse (reason) in the search for wisdom. From this perspective Socrates also describes eros as the state in which the soul grows back its wings. Following the ideas in Phaedrus this paper has focused on two different mythological images of eros. They can be illustrated the following way:2

In general Plato sees eros as an important dynamic aspect in the life of the embodied person. He emphasises that we do not choose eros, but eros moves us and works as passionate attachment to the world around us. What differs in the two images is the character of the attachment. The tyrannical Eros is a sign of a blind and unreasonable force linked to pleasure, whereas the divine Eros brings us to insights in the sense that it inspires and propels a general search for wisdom.
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The two mythological stories also contain different educational points. With the tyrannical Eros we nd an argument for the containment of our desires, namely an education directed at denying desire any place in social life. With the divine Eros, however, desire works as an element which propels learning processes by realizing insights in the world. From this perspective education would benet from an organization around desire. The purpose of this paper is not to speak for or against either of the two images. The insight I wish to take from Plato is that we are set in motion by desire, but there is no guarantee as to where desire may take us. With Plato we can undermine any idea of an a priori logic of desire and this point opens up an understanding of the diversity of desire. Our desires can take on different forms which can be destructive or productive in relation to the way we build our lives with others. I bring forth this reading also to illustrate the lack of textual evidence to Burchs conclusions. Burch himself writes that we should be aware of the danger that eros could become a convenient signier for everything good, true and beautiful, but he does not seem to fully listen to his own words. He takes the ambiguity out of eros when he attends only to textual passages which are in support of his project: to rethematize eros along more positive lines. For instance, he comments on Platos Republic, but only the part on the cave allegory, not the part about the tyrannical eros. His project is thus easily accomplished since he lls the concept with whatever content he chooses. He ends up treating eros only as a symbolic value system. As a consequence he loses the connection to our lived desires and we risk ending up nding nothing but an empty promise. More importantly we risk overlooking the destructive aspects of lived desires. Further Perspectives The argument expressed above can be summed up by saying that Burchs positive coding of eros is too hasty. Textual evidence cannot give him the conrmation that he is looking for. I will argue that rather than promoting eros as an educational value in support of democracy we need rst to return to the question: what is the dynamic of our lived desires? In other words: we need to implement a phenomenology of desire in which we reect on the experiences of desire. I point to phenomenology because it is orientated toward philosophical reection on our pre-reective lived experience. Phenomenology provides a philosophical reective method to grasp ourselves while living and experiencing the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, 1962, 1974). This entails a critique of deductive use of theories to understand a given practice or phenomenon. This also means that we cannot take the concept of eros as a pre-given description of the experience of desire, but we need to confront the concept with the plurality of lived experience. Ursula Kelly has stated: While it strikes me as necessary to reclaim eros [in educational philosophy], it is necessary to claim it cautiously. Such caution demands, minimally, that we ask continuously of ourselves what the sources of our passions and desires are, what effects our passions and desires have on others, and in what ways are passions and desires might interface with desiring others in
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productive and unproductive ways (Kelly, 1997, p. 129f). Kelly seems to be right, when her caution brings her to questions, rather than answers. What is important is that these questions must be viewed in terms of experience in order to regain the connection between the concept and the lived world. Phenomenological reections on concrete experiences of desire will show us that the expressions of desire are more nuanced or ambivalent than an either-or perspective (either dialogue or violence) would provide. It is not as simple as choosing between the daimonic Eros in the Symposium, the divine Eros in Phaedrus and the tyrannical Eros in the Republic. A philosophical task must be to understand the different forms of expressions in desire. This paper in no way holds the view that philosophers of education should forget about the link between desire and education, on the contrary: the thematic of desire is worth pursuing for several reasons. By paying attention to desire we can continue a discussion on human subjectivity based on a discourse of the emotional. Educational theories and practices are in general grounded in ideas about human subjectivityregardless of whether these ideas are explicitly or implicitly expressed and whether they are coherent or not. There is always some sort of (image(s) of a) subject at play in relation to the ways we have chosen to organize educational practices. Reections on desire can challenge positions which place education in an emotionally neutral space and evaluate education only from the point of view of formalized and instrumental knowledge. The subject of education has to be seen also in the light of its desires and passions. Reections on desire thus support the aim to rehabilitate a focus on passions in educational studies, as described earlier in this paper. Reections on desire can nuance the perspective on human involvement in the world by pointing to a dimension in life, which is not based on instrumental meaning and reasoning, but on an emotional tuning. The relation of education and desire also brings attention to the cultural formation of desire. Reections on lived desire bring forth a plurality of expressions of desire and surpass the thought of a predetermined logic in the expression of desire. This opens up a discussion on the cultural organization of desire through educational practice. Hence, reections on desire urge us to ask about the place of desire in educational practicesand look at the consequences concerning the way we organize this place. Garrison asks: how should we educate the eros of our students? A discussion based on this question means that we can explicitly evaluate the organization of desire within a specic culture. These perspectives bring us to the following questions: How are our desires present within current educational practices? How do our desires interfere with or support educational purposes, and just as important: how does the educational (cultural) formation of the subject interfere with or support our desires? The questions are not posed here to be answered, but to make a point. They tell us that desire is an important educational theme, but at the same time this paper has argued that it too hasty and problematic to look to certain historical representations of eros as an account of human desire. Educational philosophy need to use the concept of eros to continually asks questions about desire rather than nding clear-cut answers which end all further discussion.
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Notes
1. Notre moindre dsir, bien quunique comme un accord, admet en lui les notes fondamentales sur lesquelles toute notre vie est construite (Marcel Proust, 1954, p. 626). 2. This illustration is inspired by Dominique Grisoni (1982).

References
Burch, K. (1999) Eros as the Educational Principle of Democracy (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academics Press, Studies in Philosophy and Education). Burch, K. (2000) Eros as the Educational Principle of Democracy (NewYork, Peter Lang Publishers). Garrison, J. (1997) Dewey and Eros:Wisdom and Desire in the Art of Teaching (New York, Teachers College Press). Garrison, J. (1999) Walt Whitman and John Dewey on Democracy and Eros (Copenhagen, Research project: Voksenuddannelse, folkeoplysning og demokrati, workpaper 12). Grisoni, D. (1982) Onomatopoeia of Desire, in: P. Botsman (ed.), Theoretical Strategies (Sydney, Local Consumption Publications), pp. 161189. Kelly, U. A. (1997) Schooling Desire. Literacy, Cultural Politics and Pedagogy (New York, Routledge). Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945) Phnomnologie de la Perception (Paris, Gallimard). Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962) Phenomenology of Perception (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul). Merleau-Ponty, M. (1974) The Primacy of Perception and its Philosophical Consequences, in: J. ONeill (ed.), Phenomenology,Language and Perception.Selected essays of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (London, Heinemann Educational Books Ltd). Plato (1997) Complete Works (Indianapolis, IN, Hackett Publishing Company). Proust, M. (1954) la recherche du temps perdu IIII (Paris, Gallimard). Thornton, B. S. (1997) Eros. The Myth of Ancient Greek Sexuality (Boulder, CO, Westview Press).

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