An Island of Stability

The Islamic Revolution of Iran and the Dutch opinion

Master Thesis by Mark Thiessen

Photo on cover: Centre for Research in Young People's Texts and Cultures, University of Winnipeg

During my stay in Iran as a trainee at the Dutch embassy, I have come to love the countrys warm people and their sophisticated manners. The complexity and depth of their culture grabs every stranger that has spent some time there. In Iran, nothing is as it seems. I would li e to than everyone who has played a part in the reali!ation of this thesis. The wonderful people I have met in Iran and at the Dutch embassy in Darrous, everyone bac home for putting up with the unstoppable flow of stories about the country, my friends and family, and most of all my parents, who have never stopped supporting me. "otasha aram to all# !ar" Thiessen "ay $%%&

Contents
Literature...................................................................................................................113. .4 Introduction.......................................................................................................................5 Chapter 1 Iran in the Twentieth Century........................................................................9 1.1 Iran before 1953.......................................................................................................9 1.2 Modernization and it con e!uence .....................................................................14 Chapter 2 "hiite #o$itica$ Ideo$o%y...............................................................................21 2.1 I $a& and the "tate' (ho&eini) predece or ......................................................21 2.2 (ho&eini* 19+2,19-1............................................................................................29 2.3 (ho&eini) ideo$o%y.............................................................................................3Chapter 3 ./n I $and of "tabi$ity)................................................................................44 Chapter 4 The #er ian 0ra&a.......................................................................................-+ Conc$u ion.......................................................................................................................12 The auru .........................................................................................................................11

'iterature...................................................................................................................(()

Introduction

*n his way, through his very own +,hite -evolution., to a moderni!ed and powerful Iran, "uhammad -e!a /ahlavi, Shah of Iran and 0ing of 0ings, envisioned his country being a +1reat 2ivili!ation. by the end of the twentieth century. Since the (34%s, when he started his program of moderni!ation, Iran had transformed from a bac ward rural society to a confident and lively nation of change5 a regional superpower on its way to the future, independent in its actions, though with powerful friends all over the world. In the ,est, Iran was seen to be an example for other third6world countries. A beacon of light in the troubled "iddle 7ast. 8ut somewhere around (39&, something went wrong. ,hen the banners of Islam too over the streets of Tehran in the final months of (39&, it seemed the world was ta en by surprise. Again, when Ayatollah 0homeini proclaimed the Islamic -epublic under his own rulership as velayat#e fa$ih, the ,est seemed astonished. Apparently, from the beginning the rise of the Iranian revolutionary movement and its leaders was misunderstood around the globe. The Shah had seemed to sit securely on his /eacoc Throne. *nly a year ago, he had spent :ew ;ears 7ve with /resident 2arter in Tehran, where he was lavished with praise.( Iran loo ed steadily on its way to becoming a developed and modern country, in a region that was nown for its instability. The process of liberali!ation was started in (34), when the Shah introduced his +,hite -evolution.. "eant to bring Iran firmly into the twenty6first century, the program consisted of all inds of reforms. These ranged from land reforms to the sale of state6owned businesses, and from electional reforms including womens suffrage to literacy programs.$ In the ,est the Iranian socioeconomic policies appeared to be a great success. /artly owing to its revenues from oil exports, the Iranian economy was booming. This was evident in the growth of the Iranian 1ross :ational /roduct, which rose from <=.= billion in (34(>(34$ to <4&.% billion in (399>(39&. The per capita income of Iranians multiplied tenfold between (349 and (399, from <$(% to <$.$$%.)
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Bowever, the Shahs reform policies were coupled with repression. In (3A9 SACA0 was created, which functioned as the Shahs secret police. Their methods of repression included the torture of dissidents. *ver the years a lot of Iranians were imprisoned for political reasons. Through SACA0, the Shah crushed the opposition. "oreover, the Shah didnt yet allow Iran to develop into a full liberal democracy. *n some occasions he even Duestioned whether this ,estern political system was suited for a nation li e Iran.= It was this mixture of change and repression that ultimately fuelled the Iranian people into the streets. 'i e every other revolution, the Iranian revolution was clouded by the fog of war and anyone who tried to predict the outcome was liable to be wrong. In the web of different interests and groups, during revolutionary times it is hard to see clearly where a certain situation is going. *f course, this was also the case in Iran. 7ven during the final days the Shah himself couldnt imagine Iran without monarchy. A The goal of this thesis will be threefold, amounting to the conclusion. Eirst, I will try to examine the Iranian -evolution and specifically the aspects that created the situation in which it could ta e place. ,hat made a broadly supported popular revolution possible in Iran at the end of the seventiesF :ext to this, we also need an understanding of the revolution itself, and the events that too place. Second, I will set out the ideology of Ayatollah 0homeini and ta e a loo at his life up till the revolution. 8efore reaching iconic status during the revolution, 0homeini had already traveled a long road of religious study and political involvement. It is important to understand his studies and thoughts, to understand the nature and outcome of the Iranian -evolution itself. The most important Duestions for this part will be what 0homeinis thoughts on different subGects were throughout his life, who were his biggest examples and what were his influences, and finally how all this evolved into his defining ideology which gave birth to the Islamic -epublic. Third, I will try to examine to what extent the Dutch mission in Tehran had nowledge of the developments in Iran. ,here they, for example, aware on time of the role played by Ayatollah 0homeini before and during the revolutionF In what way did their view of the situation change along the way, as the revolution became unstoppableF And did they have any idea of what was about to
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happen to the Shah and the changes about to ta e place in the Iranian political systemF In what way did they consider an Islamic -epublic ultimately ruled by velayat#e fa$ih, in the person of 0homeini, as an option for the future, when the revolution was still going onF "y choice for extensively trying to cover all three of these subGects was made after the study of literature and sources that I completed before writing this thesis. ,hen trying to understand the response of the Dutch mission, these subGects are all entwined. ,e should have sufficient nowledge ourselves about both the revolution and 0homeini, before we can see clearly in what manner the actions of the Dutch embassy should be regarded and Gudged. Then again, it is impossible to get an understanding of the revolution, without nowledge of Iranian recent history, and impossible to understand the revolution without nowing something about the life and ideology of 0homeini. In short, it is my opinion that there is a direct relation between these three subGects, which ma es it important to now more about all of them, to help understand the reaction of the Dutch mission and government. To answers these Duestions and to get a general picture of the Dutch embassy in Tehran before and during the revolution, I have spent a lot of time studying the archives of the Dutch "inistry of Eoreign Affairs in The Bague, where there is an extensive section on the subGect of Iran during this period. Bere, all the correspondence between The Bague and its embassies around the world regarding Iran is ept. *f course, the Dutch government through their embassies around the world ept a firm eye upon the situation in Iran and was gravely concerned for its oil interests in the region. Thus, developments in Iran were followed closely. Eor the other two parts, about the -evolution and 0homeini, I have made an extensive literary survey, to get an understanding of all the aspects regarding Irans recent history, and these two subGects in particular. This also meant researching broader Islamic philosophy and the history of Islam itself. 8efore answering the Duestions mentioned above, it is necessary to get an understanding of the Islamic revolution.4 Therefore, we have to ta e a close loo at the history of Iran during the twentieth century, to see how the revolution could have happened. In the first chapter of this thesis the road to revolution will be the main subGect.

Since the Iranian -evolution of (39&>(393 is commonly nown as the Islamic -evolution, this is the term I will use throughout this thesis from now on.

2hapter two will ta e us to the Islamic ideology of Ayatollah -uhollah 0homeini and his career as a dissident. Also, I will try to set out how he based the new political system of Iran on his own ideology of velayat#e fa$ih. In chapter three we will ta e a loo at the Islamic revolution itself. ,e will see how the small demonstrations snowballed into a broad popular revolt against the Shah and his regime. ,e will see what happened during the final months of (39& and first months of (393, when the revolutionary movement was able to topple the Shah, and we will ta e a loo at the first period after the abdication of the Shah and the rise to power of the Islamic revolutionary movement. In the fourth and final chapter I will present the outcome of my research regarding the Dutch embassy in Tehran and the way that the Dutch mission in Iran and other Dutch embassies around the world, have experienced the revolution, reported about it and evaluated it. Together with my study of the Islamic revolution, this will lead to the conclusion in the final pages of this thesis. In the course of reading a lot of Earsi or Arabic words will be used. These are explained in the thesaurus at the end of the thesis.

Chapter 1 Iran in the Twentieth Century

1.1 Iran before 1953

Prelude to revolution
-evolutions never happen without proper reasons, often embedded in society for multiple generations and waiting to come to surface, and these reasons always have their origins in the recent history of a country. To get an understanding of why the Iranian people rose massively to revolt against the Shah and his regime, it is necessary to ta e a loo at the /ahlavi rule of Iran throughout the twentieth century. To do this, I will shortly describe Irans history in the period leading up to the Islamic -evolution in this chapter. At the start of the twentieth century, Iran ?which was by then still called /ersia@ was a country where the process of moderni!ation on ,estern standards was still miles away. Technologically, the country lagged far behind the 7uropean nations. The dynasty of the HaGars was in control, and had been since the eighteenth century. They ruled a country that had no significant role on the world stage. This wea ness forced the HaGars to allow a range of foreign influences into Iran. Thus, already in the beginning of the twentieth century a lot of oil concessions were in the hands of the 8ritish and the -ussians. The dynasty needed the funds brought by the 7uropeans to pay for ,estern6 inspired reforms, often military, but also to ease their own hunger for luxury and excess. The actual governing of the country was largely in the hands of foreign mercenaries, who the HaGars paid a royal salary to ma e sure Iran was ruled well.9 Though the country was still largely bac ward, there had been some efforts to moderni!e Iran in the nineteenth century, starting with Amir 0abir, who was prime minister from (&=& till (&A(. Amir 0abir reali!ed the dangers of Irans wea position and the ensuing foreign influence to the countrys sovereignty. During his reign he forbade foreigners to hold land in Iran and halted all concessions. Be strengthened the military, and set out for all inds of other reforms, including educational and economic, and pushed for centrali!ation. Be was always cautious not to upset the religious
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establishment and gravely too in account Irans ancient structures. At the end of his short reign, the dynasty started to fear his growing influence and power base, which eventually led to his assassination.& After the death of Amir 0abir foreign influence in Iran once again increased. This led to a series of revolts at the end of the nineteenth century. In (&3( a protest arised against the recent concession to a 8ritish firm of the exclusive rights to the sale and import of tobacco. /ublic discontent, instigated by the political activist Iamal al6Din al6Afhgani, fuelled a fatwa by the leading ule)a. This led to a nationwide boycott of tobacco and the Shah had to cancel the concession. The Tobacco 8oycott showed the power of religious forces in mobili!ing discontent, which would become even more important later on.3 At the beginning of the twentieth century, when foreign influence was again on the rise, anti6western sentiments rose up again. To curb the influence of foreign nations and companies in Iran, the ule)a ?Islamic clergy@, intelligentsia and the powerful *a0aaris ?the ba!aar merchants@ forged a monstrous pact against the HaGar dynasty. They saw the foreign presence as a danger for the ancient Iranian religious and social traditions and pleaded for extended rights for the people. Einally, these feelings of discontent led to a massive organi!ed revolt in (3%A, which was to be nown as the Iranian 2onstitutional -evolution. Eor months, the country was paraly!ed by stri es and demonstrations. Jltimately, the HaGars had to succumb to the pressure. In (3%4 the first )a1les ?parliament@ was opened and in (3%9 the constitution, which was largely a copy of the 8elgian one, was drafted.(% ,ith the new constitution personal rights and liberties were guaranteed, the monarch had to as the )a1les for permission on all important subGects and all civilians had eDual rights before the law. Jnfortunately, this did not solve the existing problems or stopped new problems from rising. Though the ule)a had played an important role during the 2onstitutional -evolution, they were unhappy with the outcome. They had wanted the sharia to be the core of the new legal system, which eventually did not happen. Instead, parliament Duic ly started to seculari!e law and education. Though this
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led to a feeling of discontent among the ule)a, there was no form of organi!ed religious resistance, owing to their own divisions and their traditional reluctance to engage in politics, "oreover, the maGority of religious leaders was convinced that the new reforms were a necessary evil in their battle against foreign influence.(( They were about to find out that their reforms actually could not stop the growing pressures from abroad. Erom (3(% into the (3$%s foreign influence in Iran exploded. In (3(( the -ussians invaded the country and closed down the )a1les. During the course of the Eirst ,orld ,ar -ussian and 8ritish forces penetrated the country once again. Eollowing (3(& 8ritain tried to turn Iran into a 8ritish protectorate. Ironically, this only failed after Iran called in the Jnited States and the JSS- for help. This painfully showed Irans dependence on foreign powers and its lac of sovereignty. Iranians were no longer able to be in charge of their own country. ($ This was a problem that up till today is regarded as one of the biggest motors of resentment against the ,est in the Islamic world. The obvious power gap between Iran and the ,est resulted from time to time in anti6,estern outbrea s, which also had a crucial role, at least on the surface, during the Islamic -evolution. The Iranians were not soon to forget that foreign powers had treated their country li e a puppet in earlier times. The widespread popular dissatisfaction over their wea national government and international position finally led to a new change of power. In (3$( a small group of high6ran ing officials sei!ed power. /art of this group was a young officer named -e!a 0han. In (3$) he claimed power for himself and became prime minister. After this, he forced the HaGar monarch to abdicate and flee abroad. Einally, in (3$A, the last step was made. Be too the name /ahlavi, which means +8rave *ne., and named himself the new Shah. ,ith -e!a Shah, Iran finally had a strong leader sitting on the /eacoc Throne. "oreover, the new Shah had big plans for the future.() -e!a Shah was a supporter of what he called +moderni!ation from above.. 7ven in (3$A Iran had not changed much economically. The country still wasnt moderni!ed and government largely depended on foreign money for the execution of its policies. -e!a Shah sought to change this and envisioned to turn his country into a strong and
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independent power on the world stage. 8etween (3$A and (3)% his program for moderni!ation from above started. Taxes were used to construct railroads, the army was strengthened and moderni!ed using 8ritish standards, bureaucracy was extended and its efficiency improved, education was brought into the hands of the state and the power of the ule)a was contained through new legislation. The expansion of the army and the bureaucracy created new Gobs and made a new generation of Iranian youth dependent on the government and the state. Through the heavily centrali!ing policies of -e!a Shah in this period, urbani!ation finally started to ta e place. This in turn also created new Gobs and employment options in the urban areas, which propelled the growth of the cities. The policies of the Shah were strongly nationalist, aimed at getting the entire country under his control. Iran had a history of unrest at its frontier areas, which were inhabited by tribal people as well as larger minorities such as the 0urds and A!eris. As one of the first rulers of Iran, -e!a Shah succeeded in doing this, owing largely to the strong army he had created. ,ith his rise to power, foreign influence in Iran was temporarily halted and curbed. The Shah no longer wanted to be subordinated by foreign governments and, being a leader with a strong power base especially in the army, he was able to draw bac the influence of ,estern powers in Iran, though he never really succeeded in controlling the oil sector, which by that time had become very important.(= -e!a Shahs reign was also characteri!ed by repression. -ebellious groups in society were often brutally marginali!ed or even destroyed. Despite his ,estern6 inspired reforms, Iranian civilians new few liberties. In some way or other, everything was ultimately controlled by the state. "oreover, moderni!ation from above didnt solve all problems. :ew institutions were built on top of old rural foundations, and Irans social structures failed to reform themselves. -e!a Shahs reform policies can thus be typified as largely superficial. Differences between the small group of rich and westerni!ed upper classes and the poor segments of society grew larger and larger.(A Erom the end of the twenties onwards -e!a Shah felt strong enough to directly attac the traditionally powerful ule)a. This contributed to the already growing sentiment of alienation felt by the Iranian population. Islamic law and religious taxes were seculari!ed and brought under the control of the government in Tehran. This harsh process of seculari!ation from above was very rigorous and often violent. The regime
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didnt hesitate to loc up members of the clergy, or banish and even ill them. (4 These developments in Iran gave the Islamic world a new negative image of seculari!ation, which, as in 7gypt and Tur ey, was often forced from above. In general, -e!a Shah showed a lot of similarities with 0emal AtatKr , who had ruled Tur ey since (3$%. Their drive for moderni!ation, seculari!ing policies and their own personal histories had a lot in common. -e!a Shahs reign abruptly came to an end during the Second ,orld ,ar. Due to his pro61erman attitude the Shah was forced out of power by the 8ritish, who saw there oil supplies endangered, and replaced with his $A6year old son "ohammad -e!a /ahlavi. Bis lac of experience and power base made sure that the new Shah wasnt able to maintain complete control over the country, which contributed to the rise of old and new opposition groups. The ule)a regained their important role, and new political groups li e the communist Tudeh and the liberal :ational Eront of "ohammad "ossadeD were becoming increasingly influential.(9 The power change also provided the ,estern powers with a new opportunity to increase their hold on Iran. This time, mainly the J.S. and the Soviet Jnion were vying for interests in Iran. *nce again, strong anti6,estern sentiments rose. In (3A( the liberal "ohammad "ossadeD too hold of power, when he was elected prime minister by the )a1les. "ossadeDs policy of nationali!ation made him widely popular with the Iranians. Bis aim was to rid Iranian industry from ,estern interests and influence, who in his eyes were robbing the Iranian people of their valuable riches and raw materials. It was precisely this policy of nationali!ation that ensured "ossadeD of powerful enemies abroad. In (3A), the Shah was able through a 2.I.A.6bac ed coup to oust "ossadeD from power and retain a bigger role for himself. -emar ably, the coup was widely supported by the clergy, led by the politically very activist Ayatollah 0ashani, who were worried about the seculari!ing politics of the "ossadeD government. The coup returned power for the biggest part bac in the hands of the Shah.(& Thus, around (3AA a new situation had risen in which the Shah was once again the most powerful person in the country. After a turbulent period, in which the first
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/ahlavi Shah had tried to moderni!e the country and was deposed during ,orld ,ar II for his 1erman sympathies, another /ahlavi was once again on the throne. "ohammad -e!a had the same dreams and goals as his father had had, and even wanted to reali!e them by the same means. Iran had to become a modern nation, shaped by ,estern mold.

1.2 Modernization and its consequences

The White Revolution

As his father, "ohammad -e!a strongly believed in moderni!ation from above. Sometimes his methods seemed to be even more ruthless than his predecessors. Jnli e his father, the new Shah wasnt hesitant in welcoming foreign powers to Iran. Be made the J.S. a strategic partner and used foreign funds to finance his moderni!ation program. *ver the years the J.S. would supply Iran with loads of arms deliveries. (3 Bis program of moderni!ation6from6above too full swing after the start of the Shahs ,hite -evolution in (34), also nown as the Shah6/eople -evolution. "ohammad -e!a had a vision of Iran becoming a top6A world power by the end of the twentieth century. The ,hite -evolution was his first step towards reaching this goal. Its aim was to transform the traditional rural Iranian society into a modern one, based on ,estern standards. Another reason for the reforms of the ,hite -evolution was the Shahs dependence on the ,est, and the J.S. in particular. The Shah was under pressure from the 0ennedy administration to pursue a more liberal policy. 0ennedy insisted on social, economic and political reforms, some of which the Shah tried to enforce through his ,hite -evolution.$% Bis reforms had a wide range, and it is hard to put them in a specific ideological context. They were a mixture of socialist reforms to more liberal ones. The Shah established a form of state capitalism, with A6year plans and an emphasis on heavy industry. Be introduced increased profit sharing for the wor forces, which he hoped would lead to a more evenly distributed per capita income. *ther important reforms were his agricultural and land reforms, the introduction of a literacy corps and womens
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suffrage. These reforms were welcomed enthusiastically in the ,est and they seemed to confirm the image of the Shah as an enlightened ruler, who was placing his country firmly on the road to a modern and democratic future.$( Despite the image he had in the ,est, the Shah was never mysterious about the way he sought to transform his country. Bis emphasis on strong government and moderni!ation from above made sure he tried to rule by decree to avoid the )a1les, although this was technically unconstitutional. This symboli!ed his ambivalence towards ,estern culture. ,hereas he had great admiration for ,estern technology and geopolitics, he still had a passion for Iranian values and traditions. Be new that his countrys relative bac wardness and his drive for moderni!ation could be conflicting. Therefore, what Iran needed was an authoritarian leader who could moderni!e the nation from above, as his father had tried. The Shah made his point very clear in an interview with the Italian Gournalist *riana Eallaci5 43elieve )e, 2hen three $uarters of a nation doesnt "no2 ho2 to read or 2rite, you can provide for refor)s only *y the strictest authoritarianis) 5 other2ise you get no2here 'f ' hadnt *een harsh, ' 2ouldnt even have *een a*le to carry out agrarian refor) and )y 2hole refor) progra))e 2ould have stale)ated 6$$ The first aspect of the ,hite -evolution was a vast land reform program, aimed at tac ling the semi feudal Iranian system of land ownership. In the first phase of the land reform program, landlords who owned more than one village were forced to sell the rest of their holdings to peasants. They had a choice of eeping one specific village or the +eDuivalent. of one village. This resulted in a greater share of small landlords. These new landlords Duic ly began to invest in their new holdings, by buying new eDuipment and improving their land. A lot of ,estern eDuipment was bought and the farmers used ,estern techniDues to irrigate their lands, instead of the traditional Iranian techniDues they had used for centuries. The fact that a lot of Iranian agricultural land was not fit for these ,estern techniDues resulted in land no longer being cultivable after several years. Also, the use of heavy tractors for plowing destroyed parts of the fertile
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Armstrong, The 3attle for -od , $==. -obert 1raham, 'ran: The illusion of po2er ?'ondon, (39&@, A&.

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Iranian topsoil. Despite of these problems, ,estern imports were often subsidi!ed heavily by the government, with its preference for state of the art ,estern technology. $) A big segment of the Iranian landowners consisted of ule)a. *wing to the ,hite -evolution some of them lost a big part of their holdings, and this created great feelings of discontent against the regime. The ule)a were not very pleased with this revolutionary uprooting of the traditional Iranian agricultural system. They reGected the land reform bill on three grounds. The ule)a denied the claim that their system of land ownership was feudal, they rallied against the Shahs opinion that the new land reform represented progress, since in their minds it would only cause social and economic dislocation, and they attac ed the land reform program because it was unconstitutional and therefore illegal ?both conflicting Iranian and Islamic law@. The land reform program caused the traditional, and mainly religious, elite of Iran to regard the Shah as a negative force for change.$= *wing partly to the discontent of the rural elite, the subseDuent phases of the land reform program were less revolutionary, and aimed more at revising the older system than at dramatically changing it. This made sure that the old landowners that werent included in the first phase were able to hold on to their holdings, and fewer peasants were able to buy their own piece of land, which resulted in migration to the cities. The emphasis of the program shifted from eDual distribution of agricultural land, with a preference for small landownership, to big agribusiness6li e enterprises. This constituted a big shift in policy. These new farm corporations were run by specialists in the service of the Iranian government, and they were generally disli ed by the peasants that they employed, who were paid very badly in comparison to the specialists. A lot of poor peasants were especially hit hard. The government spent a lot of money on eDuipment for the corporation, but never seemed to be able to ma e the agribusiness industry profitable.$A The moderni!ation of Iran also meant a heavy emphasis on industry. A big program of investment in heavy industry was started in the (34%s and this was represented in a seDuence of Three and Eive ;ear Development /lans throughout the sixties and seventies. A bul of eDuipment for the construction of factories and the
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production of goods were imported from the ,est. 8y (39A the Shah was importing so much that ships carrying his imports had to wait for (4% days before they could unload their goods, and once they were unloaded there was no place to warehouse them. The Shah was able to buy these amounts of imports because of the spectacular rise in oil prices, which Duintupled from (39) to (39A. $4 The emphasis of the industrial program was on large proGects, li e the automobile industry. ,ith his preference for huge prestige proGects such as these, the Shah neglected small enterprises by regular people, who often had to turn to the ba!aar for credit. The *a0aaris in turn were threatened by the big American6style supermar ets that were built and the continuing import of ,estern consumption goods. In this way another traditionally very powerful segment of Iranian society was put under pressure by the ruler. The Shah willingly wanted to curb the powerful role the *a0aaris had in Iranian society, and also sought to crush their role as credit suppliers by strengthening the ban ing system.$9 The impact of the oil money was felt on different levels. Although it gave the Shah the opportunity to invest huge sums of money into the Iranian economy, the effects werent all positive. The money the Shah spent on weapons was outrageous, and with this in mind it isnt very strange that the ,est regarded him as an ally. The money that the ,est had to pay the Shah for oil almost invariably returned into their poc ets by his purchase of arms and other imports. In general, foreign investment in Iran was much smaller than the amount of foreign goods that were imported. The influx of oil money encouraged waste, corruption, inflation and inefficiency in the spending of government funds. 2orruption was becoming a big problem in Iran by the seventies. 8ecause of the huge sums that Iran received for its oil exports, there was no need for a stringent taxation policy. Taxation at the higher levels of society and in industry was ept at a low rate, in order to encourage multinationals to invest in Iran. Income tax was regressive and generally low, which contributed to a lac of eDual income distribution. ,ealth was concentrated at the higher echelons. The emphasis on the production of modern expensive consumer goods in combination with the uneDual income distribution meant that goods produced by the subsidi!ed heavy industry were only available for a
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-e!a 1hods, 'ran in the T2enthieth Century, (33. -e!a 1hods, 'ran in the T2enthieth Century, (336$%%.

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very small mar et of rich consumers. The needs of ordinary Iranians were neglected. Small businesses often found it hard to sustain themselves because of the above6 mentioned reluctance of supplying them with loans, the system of taxation and the import of foreign goods. Adding to this preferential policy for ,estern style industries and the income ineDuality was the high rate of unemployment and low wages. In the government6supported industries, foreigners filled a lot of the vacancies. ,estern employees with high wages were resented for their salaries. "oreover, Afghans were often hired for the more simple Gobs and these poor wor ers depressed wages even more. Small businessmen were unable to hire more personnel, because of their difficulties in finding credit. Thus, by the start of the revolution there was a huge difference in income between big segments of Iranian society. As the rich got significantly richer, the poor also profited from the influx of oil money into Iran, although not enough to get close to 7uropean standards or the standards of their own wealthy Iranian elite.$& The Shah used economic controls as a means of eeping people close to him and attaining their loyalty. The system under the Shah was very much li e a patronage system. ,hile the upper class was dependent on the Shah for receiving his favors concerning Gobs and permits, the middle class, for a big part, were also dependent on him. The salaried middle class in Iran by (399 consisted of around 4)%,%%% people, of whom A($,4=A were employed by the state. In this way the Shah secured loyalty of his people by attempting to associate Iranians economically to the state.$3 /olitically, the Iranians didnt have a lot to say. "oderni!ation was chec ed at the political area. In the early (34%s the Shah supported a new party, Iran :ovin, and, needless to say, this was the party that held power in the )a1les. Its leader was Amir Abbas Boveyda, who served as prime minister from (34A to (399. In effect, his tas was only to ma e sure that the Shahs will was carried out correctly. The Shah ruled by decree during this entire period. In (39A he decided to merge all political parties, including Iran :ovin, into the new Rasta"hi0 ?which meant resurgence@ party, providing Iran with a one6party system. This party was also to be headed by Boveyda. "embership of the -asta hi! part was reDuired for most Gobs in government or

21 29

0eddie, !odern 'ran, (A96(4) -e!a 1hods, 'ran in the T2enthieth Century, 9:;

11

education. This move to a one party system and the general feeling of being left out of politics was added to the resentment of the Iranian people during the seventies.)% Another form of control over his civilians was formed by the SACA0, the Shahs secret police. They were involved in the arrest, beatings and torture of dissidents and were responsible in general for most of the repression directed against the people. This internal security force was of very big importance to the Shah, which is underlined by the $.4A billion dollar he invested in SACA0 from (39) to (39&. Through its terrori!ing of the opposition, SACA0 was feared and especially hated and became a symbol of the dar er side of the Shahs reign for long after the revolution. Bis foreign allies often neglected this repression of the Iranian people through the Shahs secret police. Their loyal allegiance to the Shah, despite of his brutal repressive tactics, didnt improve their popularity among the population. In the eyes of the Iranian people, the ,estern countries were two6faced in their propagation of human rights. This added to the feelings of discontent and the aggressive anti6foreign stance of a significant part of the Iranians during and after the revolution)( Throughout the period of the ,hite -evolution there was also a move towards massive urbani!ation. 7specially in the last decade before the revolution, people started to move from the countryside to the cities. 8etween (34& and (39& urban population in Iran rose from )&L to =9L and the population of Tehran almost doubled in the same period. These new urban residents often found themselves living in poor conditions in the poorer Duarters on the edge of the city, and had trouble finding steady Gobs. ,ithin the cities a new division became apparent, with the richer classes moving away from the poorer segments. This is still visible in Tehran, with the upper class residing in the upper north of the city and the less fortunate in the southern parts. This also meant a split between traditional and more modern parts of the city, which in turn caused a lot of misunderstanding and resentment of the rich among the lower classes.)$ An important effect of the urbani!ation was its contribution to a feeling of alienation from the old world that was felt throughout Iranian society. ,ith the high pace of moderni!ation that the Shah had set for his country, a lot of Iranians found it difficult to adGust to the range of changes that they were forced to go through. They felt
3+ 31

0eddie, !odern 'ran, (44. -e!a 1hods, 'ran in the T2enthieth Century, 9:< 32 Armstrong, The 3attle for -od , $=A.

19

li e the roots of their existence were being pulled out from underneath them. 'i e 0aren Armstrong described very accurately, for Iranians +the familiar world had grown unfamiliar5 it was itself, and yet not itself, li e a close friend whose appearance and personality have been disfigured by illness.. The Iranians were caught between two very different worlds5 a traditional one, and a modern one. An important aspect of this feeling of alienation was the influx of ,estern influences into Iran, li e the ,estern model of education, the wide range of imports and the decadent ,estern6style behavior of the Iranian elite. The Iranian philosopher Ahmed Eardid with the term ghar*0adegi, which meant something li e +,est6toxication., put this dilemma into words. The foreign influences were thus seen as a disease poisoning Iranian culture, that they had to get rid of. As a reaction, a lot of people clinched to the old things they had still left, li e religion and the mosDue. The repression of religious political activity by the Shah thus also added to the uprooting of Iranian society. This cleared the ground for the rise of 0homeini in the sixties and seventies.)) Thus, in the Iran of (39& there were a lot of problems facing the country. There was widespread corruption, repression by the government, high inflation, a big dependence on oil money, an inefficient system of state capitalism, foreign influences that were perceived as hostile to Iranian culture, very little political rights for civilians, massive urbani!ation, huge income ineDualities, an elite that was showing extremely decadent behavior, traditionally powerful groups that felt threatened in their positions, and the uprooting of old traditional ways of living. All this added to a great feeling of discontent among a big part of Iranian society. These feelings ultimately led to the Islamic -evolution, but first of all to the rise of Ayatollah 0homeini. It was his ideology which was extremely well suited for canali!ing all the negative feelings that Iranians experienced in day to day life, and, whether the ,estern world noticed it or not, they floc ed to his message en masse.

33

Armstrong, The 3attle for -od, $=A6$=4.

2+

Chapter 2 Shiite Political Ideology

2.1 Isla and the !tate" #ho eini$s %redecessors

To fully understand the way the Islamic revolution too place and how the state evolved into the Islamic -epublic of Iran in the eighties, one has to ta e a loo at the thoughts of its founding father, ayatollah -uhollah 0homeini, who was also the spiritual leader of the Islamic -evolution and the inspirational force for a lot of Iranians during these years. In this chapter we will ta e a loo at his life, thoughts and ideology. ,hat exactly was this ideology, where did it come from, and when were his thoughts about Islamic government and the governance of the Islamic Gurist, velayat#e fa$ih, becoming clearF

&ntiquit' and earl' Isla

To find the roots of 0homeinis thoughts on politics and religion, we have to go bac to ancient history. The Islamic world has a strong sense of consciousness of its own past. There is no reluctance to go bac centuries in order to find a connection with the present. This also means that the Islamic world can be very sensitive when it comes to allusions to this past. Islamic rhetoric often uses historical examples as positive or negative precedents for the present, and these examples can have a very powerful influence on peoples behaviour. This too was the case in the Islamic -evolution of Iran.)= The Islamic philosophical tradition was heavily influenced by ancient 1ree philosophy. 0homeini too was inspired by the 1ree . Bis velayat#e fa$ih can be traced bac to /latos -epublic, where the writer pleas for a wise and virtuous leader to help the community reach a higher level.)A In the Islamic context, the leader is part of the clergy, whereas /latos leader is an enlightened philosopher. The Islamic tradition, inspired by 1ree philosophy, believes that the individual can only reach full potential in a society that strives for the highest common purpose. The leader of the community shouldnt only be the best and wisest of them allM he also has to be morally superior to
34 35

8ernard 'ewis, The crisis of 'sla): +oly 2ar and unholy terror ?'ondon, $%%)@ xviii6xxii. This goes bac to early Islamic literature, for example the wor of Al6Earabi. It is not clear whether 0homeini was directly influenced by /lato, or by his Islamic predecessors, although he does mention the 1ree /hilosopher in his wor s.

21

the rest. An important difference between the two is the fact that while with /lato the leader was only limited by obGective truth, in the Islamic case limitations can only come from the divine law, which is the sharia.)4 Although Islam has a lot of common elements with the 2hristian tradition, there are some important differences too. *ne of these is the separation of church and state. An idea of the separation of the worldly and the divine, li e we have seen coming up in 7uropean history, is not present in Islam. This difference dates bac to the birth of both religions, and the way they were founded and exported. 2hristianity started out as a religion of the lower classes, until after a few centuries the -oman emperor 2onstantine became a 2hristian. Thus, 2hristianity only found itself protected by a powerful worldly ruler after hundreds of years after its birth. ,ithin Islam, on the contrary, this lac of worldly protection was never the case, except for a couple of years after "ohammads vision of the archangel 1abriel. During his own lifetime, the prophet succeeded in creating not only a religious following, but also a worldly empire reaching across the Arab peninsula. "ohammad ruled his people as the highest religious as well as worldly authority. Be enacted and executed laws, was engaged in warfare, and ruled the newly conDuered Islamic territories as an empire. In this case the prophet wasnt a carpenter, but head of state5 the state of Islam. Bis successors, the caliphs, inherited the same position. In this respect, Islam has always been connected with politics, contrary to 2hristianity. 'ater on, 0homeini himself said5 +Islam is politics, or it is nothing..)9 0homeinis idea of velayat#e fa$ih thus can be seen in a tradition of combined political and religious authority over a community, the "uslim u))ah. Bis interpretation, though, wasnt shared or approved by all of the Shiite clergy.

(ineteenth centur'
In the nineteenth century it became painfully evident that the Islamic world was lagging far behind the ,est in all inds of respects. Technologically, the countries of the ,est were superior, and this gave them the opportunity to enforce their will upon the wea er Islamic nations and peoples. 2hristian nations had made a huge effort to reach the same technological level as their Islamic and 2hinese counterparts, eventually surpassing
3-

Canessa "artin, Creating an 'sla)ic %tate: .ho)eini and the !a"ing of a ,e2 'ran ?'ondon $%%%@ )=6)A. 32 'ewis, The crisis of 'sla), A69.

22

them and everyone else in the world somewhere around the eighteenth century. 2hange seemed to be stopped in the Islamic world during that same period. In the nineteenth century, the differences between the 2hristian and Islamic territories became so big that everywhere in the Islamic world the ,estern power was felt. In a reaction to this, the nineteenth century saw the first wave of Islamic thin ers who tried to modernise Islam, in a way to be able to fight bac ,estern imperialism. *ne of them was the before mentioned Iamal al6Din al6Afghani ?(&)&6(&3&@, leader of the Tobacco 8oycott. Al6Afghani saw the importance that innovation and originality had played in the rise of the ,est, and that the only way "uslims reacted to this was by trying to modernise their societies through imitation. Al6Afghani resented this lac of originality, and was convinced that "uslims would find success, if they only tried to modernise following their own ways. Be was afraid of the destruction of Islamic culture by means of modernisation along ,estern lines. Be wanted to find a rational, all encompassing Islam that hailed and promoted science and thus would help "uslims on their way to a more modern world. Al6Afghani and his followers were pan6 Islamic and very activist. Their goal was to convince their fellow believers of the necessity of change within Islam, in order to be able to successfully confront ,estern imperialism. Jnfortunately, the balance between ,estern scientific emphasis and Islamic religion and culture was very hard to find, and Al6Afghani lac ed a detailed program or ideology to ma e his efforts of reform wor . 0homeini borrowed the idea of a strong, modernised Islam that was capable in itself to repel foreign influences, from Al6Afghani.)& *ne of Al6Afghanis students was -ashid -ida ?(&4A6(3)A@. -ida saw the sharia as the guideline for human behaviour, and wanted to strictly follow its laws. Be also noted that the sharia, written in the seventh century, wasnt fit to cover all the areas and aspects of modern life. In this respect, -ida envisioned a role for a modernised version of the old idea of i1)a, which means consensus of the u))ah. The ruler or caliph, being a great spiritual and religious leader ?)u1tahid@ and having a perfect and independent nowledge of Islamic law ? i1tihad@, had to issue new laws to
31

Armstrong, The 3attle for -od, (A46(A&.

23

add to the areas that were not covered by the sharia, and had to ma e sure that these laws were followed by the u))ah. Eor this tas , he had to be assisted by the most learned ule)a. In this way there would finally be real Islamic government that would be capable of merging Islam with the modern world. These thoughts of the Sunnite -ida have influenced 0homeinis later wor s on velayat#e fa$ih, and -ida is even mentioned in 'sla)ic -overn)ent.)3 Another cleric that had profound influence on 0homeinis ideology was Shei Ea!lullah :uri ?(&=)6(3%3@. This /ersian )u1tahid and Iranian hero had a strong belief in constitutionalism, but only when according to the laws of Islam. In his mind, parliamentary legislation was illegitimate, because it undermined the sharia The sharia itself should function as the constitution. :uri was one of the first to see the dangers the new )a1les meant for the clergy in the beginning of the twentieth century. Ignoring the )a1les, he saw the )u1tahids as the legitimate substitutes of the Twelfth Imam=% on earth, and they were supposed to be the ones ma ing the laws that the community should live by. 8ecause of :uris continuing obGection against the )a1les, the constitution was altered during the end of his lifetime. There was to be a council of five ule)a that had the right to veto the legislation passed by the )a1les, when it contradicted the sharia. This was resembled by 0homeini with the 1uardian 2ouncil, and also with the position of fa$ih as highest source of authority. In his lifetime, :uri belonged to a minority of politically active and radical clerics. In this respect also, he was an example to 0homeini.=(

T)entieth *entur'
Apart from 0homeini, there were more twentieth century Islamic clerics who tried to reform Islam by its own traditions, to create an Islamic version of modernity. Islamic fundamentalism blossomed in the nineteen hundreds, especially following ,orld ,ar II. This can be explained by the fact that the "uslim world wasnt sufficiently
39 4+

"artin, Creating an 'sla)ic %tate, (%$6(%). The Twelft Imam is seen by Shiites as the saviour of the world. Be is supposed to be hidden, and Shiites await his return. 41 Armstrong, The 3attle for -od (34.

24

modernised in the period before ,,II. /olitically, religiously, socially and technologically it was lagging far behind the ,est. -eligious fundamentalism can be seen as a reaction against modern forces, and thus it can reach full potential in a society that first comes into touch with modernity. 0homeini and his twentieth century compatriots were a result of their traditional rural societies colliding with modern times. *ne of the most important Islamic fundamentalist thin ers of the twentieth century was Bassan Al68anna ?(3%46(3=3@. Al68anna was an 7gyptian teacher who had had religious schooling at an Islamic )adrassah. Be realised early on that the people were in a state of confusion owing to the beginning modernisation and the arrival of ,estern influences in their traditional societies. The ule)a werent able to help them because they didnt want to involve themselves in the changing world, creating a distance between them and the regular religious people. Al68anna wanted to ma e the u))ah strong again by ma ing it conscious of its own Islamic culture and identity. Be believed that Islam as an all6embracing ideology, integrated in all aspects of life, could revive the "uslim world, and return it to the powerful position it had had centuries ago. To help the u))ah reach this goal, he founded +The Society of the "uslim 8rothers. in (3$&, also nown as the "uslim 8rotherhood, or Gust the 8rotherhood. At his time of death the 8rotherhood had $%%% chapters in 7gypt, which represented some )%%.%%% to 4%%.%%% 8rothers and Sisters. Al68anna wanted to interpret and use the Huran by the standards of his own time. This led him to strongly believe in unity of Islamic nations, social eDuality and Gustice, a battle against illiteracy and poverty, and a final liberation of Islam out of the hands of foreign powers and influences. Although he didnt thin of his movement as violent and radical, and never meant it to be li e that, some groups within the 8rotherhood were extremely activist. At the end of Al68annas life the 8rotherhood became increasingly militant and was increasingly involved in attac s on 8ritish and Israeli targets, as well as in several plots for bringing down the government. 7ventually, 7gyptian government agents illed Al68anna in (3=3. =$ 7ven today the "uslim 8rotherhood is a very important factor in 7gyptian politics and society, with a strong hold on a significant number of 7gyptians through their networ s of health care, education, charity and religion.
42

Armstrong, The 3attle for -od, $(&6$$$.

25

-oughly around the same time a similar movement was started in Shiite Iran. "oGtaba :avvab Safavi ?(3$=6(3A4@ was the founder of the (edayeen#e 'sla), a movement that would have a significant role in Iranian politics and the future revolutionary movements, within his own lifetime and after. Bis movement had a profound influence on the Islamic character of the revolution and 0homeini himself felt committed to Safavis ideology. "oreover, a lot of Iranian politicians and statesmen of post6revolutionary times up till now, have a past within the (edayeen6movement. In Iran, Safavi was one of the founders of the idea of an Islamic state and Islamic form of government.=) Safavi radicalised at an early stage in his life, and ventured his rage against the secularist policies of the Shah. Be regarded Iranian clerics who discarded a form of Islamic government guided by the sharia as apostates of Islam. Safavi was extremely activist and militant, with an extremely fundamentalist ideology. This became very clear in (3=A, when he tried to assassinate the highly influential Ahmad 0asravi. 0asravi was a former cleric turned secularist Gudge, who now pleaded for a drastic reformation of Islam. Although Safavis attempt on his life failed, some of his supporters succeeded in illing 0asravi the following year. After being imprisoned for a short period, Safavi decided to found the (edayeen#e 'sla) in (3=4.== Safavis primary goal was to force bac the process of seculari!ation that was started by the Shah, and to bring bac Islamic values and law as the highest authority, where he believed they belonged. Bis ideology was strictly doctrinarian and stripped of all non6Islamic influences. The state should be moulded precisely as stipulated in holy Islamic scripture. In effect, this meant a return to seventh century Arab tradition. Safavi strongly resisted any ind of foreign influence. In this case too, resistance could be violent, as he felt legitimated to defend Islamic culture. Safavi believed that the Islamic state should be responsible for the supplying of basic needs for its citi!ens, and for social eDuality and Gustice. To achieve these goals, the raising of the Islamic taxes of 0a"at ?income tax@, "hara1 ?land tax@, and 1a0iyeh ?tax for non6"uslims@ should be

43

Sohrab 8ehdad, NJtopia of Assasins5 :avvab Safavi and the Eadaian6e 7slam in /rerevolutionary Iran in -amin Iahanbegloo 'ran: 3et2een Tradition and !odernity ?*xford $%%=@, 9(. 44 8ehdad, NJtopia of Assasins, 9A.

2-

sufficient. Eurthermore, he counted on the voluntary contributions of sincere "uslims to their society.=A The (edayeen#e 'sla) found protection in the hands of Ayatollah 0ashani, one of the most important Iranian clerics. 0ashani loved to get involved in national political issues, which at that time was a very rare Duality among the ule)a, who preferred to distance themselves from meddling in political issues. In the fifties the (edayeen became increasingly radical and committed a string of violent attac s on, in their eyes, anti6Islamic targets. In (3A( they succeeded in assassinating the Iranian /rime "inister -a!mari, who tried to obstruct the nationali!ation of the oil industry. After a new brief encounter with the Iranian penitentiary system, Safavi had some contacts with the Shah regime for a while. The Shah had come to power again after the coupe against "ossadeD, which was helped by a broad revolt of the clergy led by Ayatollah 0ashani. After a short while, Safavi again became disillusioned with the new government and started a campaign of resistance with his (edayeen. Since his recent rise to power, though, the Shah had become increasingly powerful, and was able to repress the groups in society that tried to oppose him. In (3A4 the leaders of the (edayeen, including the )$6year old Safavi, were arrested and executed. This meant the end of the (edayeen as an organised society.=4 The movement enGoyed some popularity among the poor lower classes of Iran, and would continue to have an influence on important revolutionary groups. "oreover, as one of the first organised movements it had expressed a vibrant desire in Iranian society to return and hold on to old Islamic traditions and values. This desire would later on strongly influence the Islamic character of the Islamic revolution. =9 "any of Safavis followers would later unite in 0homeinis +eyatha#ye !otalefeh#ye 'sla)i, which continued the militant tradition of the (edayeen in the sixties and seventies.=& Erom the fifties on, there were more Iranians who tried to reconcile political Islam with modernity. In this period, communism was an ideology that enGoyed a lot of support among people who wanted to find an alternative for ,estern 7uropean or
45

Ali -ahnema O Earhad :omani, N2ompeting Shii Subsystems in 2ontemporary Iran in Saeed -ahnema O Sohrab 8ehdad, 'ran =fter the Revolution: Crisis of an 'sla)ic %tate ?'ondon (33A@, &%6&$. 48ehdad, NJtopia of Assasins, 996&(. 42 8ehdad, NJtopia of Assasins, 9(69$. 41 -ahnema O :omani, N2ompeting Shii Subsystems in 2ontemporary Iran, &$6&).

22

American capitalism. The most important Iranian who tried to merge Islam with socialism and managed to create a large support for his ideas, was Ali Shariati ?(3))6 (399@. Shariati is seen as the ideological father of the Islamic revolution.=3 Shariati was an intellectual who was strongly influenced by and had good nowledge of ,estern ideas. Be was a layman and received his nowledge of Islam through years of self6study. 8ecause Shariati was his own teacher, he developed a uniDue interpretation of the holy Islamic scriptures. In Islam, Shariati saw the possibility to solve the worldwide problem of ineDuality between the classes. Bis thoughts relied on ,estern thin ers li e "arx, Coltaire and Sartre. Bis ideology became a mixture of 7uropean socialism and Shiite Islam.A% Shariati regarded Imam Ali as the perfect ruler A(, and the society that was ruled by him should be seen as an example for the world to follow. It was the true Islamic society, as meant by the holy boo s. ,hen the right path of Islam was ta en, it would ma e sure that class and power structures would transform themselves. This would help improve the economic, social and political position of the )osta0afin ?dispossessed@ against the )osta"*erin ?possessors@. The Islamic state would thus help achieve to reach a solution to the problem of class conflict that would finally result in social eDuality and Gustice. This notion of class struggle between the )osta0afin and )osta"*erin was heavily influenced by "arxist ideology. 'ater on, 0homeini used Shariatis terminology of )osta0afin and )osta"*erin in his speeches and texts, to point out the differences between the poor and rich in Iran and create a division between his supporters and the regime. Shariati was strongly anti6imperialist, and thus against foreign influences in Iran, he had a believe in free will of the individual and collective responsibility of the community to combat suppression and inGustice. Be believed in the priority of moral values against materialism, in involvement of citi!ens in politics and activism, and together with al this he put a heavy emphasis on revolution and revolutionary Gustice. "oreover, he was anti6capitalist and thought that democracy and capitalism fundamentally excluded each other. Be was against exploitation and private property, and wanted to force eDual income distribution from state6level and thought that Islam could play an important part in this process. Be also saw that Islam should be
49 5+

Ali -ahnema, =n 'sla)ic Utopian: = Political 3iography of =li %hariati ?'onden (33&@, ix. -ahnema O :omani, N2ompeting Shii Subsystems in 2omtemporary Iran, 9=. 51 Imam Ali was the son6in6law of the prophet "uhammad and the first Shiite Imam.

21

purified, and needed a return to its roots and basic principles. Shariati envisioned an Islamic reformation, li e the 2hristian one in the sixteenth century. Cery important was his idea about the role of Islam in politics. Be wanted Islam to be actively involved in politics and despised the traditional political inactivity that the clergy had displayed for centuries. In his eyes, the silence of the ule)a was an indirect approval of all the social inGustice in Iran.A$ In the sixties and seventies Shariati succeeded in influencing an entire generation of young Iranian "uslims, and created a huge base of support. Although after the revolution his ideology was to be seen as a deviation of Islam by the new rulers, his ideas were partly incorporated by 0homeini in his own ideology. After the death of 0homeini Shariati was in fact rehabilitated and his Islamic ideology again rose in importance, also with the political elite. A lot of the youth he had influenced in the seventies had reached the higher echelons of Iranian society and returned to the teachings of their old master.A)

2.2 #ho eini+ 19,2-19.1

/outh
-uhollah "usavi 0homeini was born on the $& th of August (3%$, in the small town of 0homein, $%% ilometres southwest of Tehran. Bis father was a local religious leader, and was illed when little -uhollah was only six months old. 7arly on in his long career as a student, 0homeini showed that he possessed a more than average intelligence. Bis life can be split into two parts. The first being his time of training and study for becoming a )u1tahid, which was up till the beginning of the (34%s. And the second, starting with his political activities and eventual banishment to IraD in the beginning of the sixties, to the revolution and his years as supreme leader. ,ith his new ideas concerning the Islamic state and his activist engagement in politics, he would change his own country, the Islamic u))ah, and the rest of the world indefinitely. A=
52 53

-ahnema O :omani, N2ompeting Shii Subsystems in 2ontemporary Iran, 9A694. -ahnema O :omani, N2ompeting Shii Subsystems in 2ontemporary Iran, 9&. 54 Earhang -aGaee, 'sla)ic >alues and World >ie2: .ho)eyni on !an, the %tate and 'nternational Politics, >olu)e ?''' ?8oston (3&)@, $A.

29

8ecause of his fathers early death, 0homeini was raised by his mother and aunt. In his younger years he freDuented a couple of religious schools, before his individual teaching by local clergy started. 8y the time he was sixteen, both his mother and aunt had passed away. 0homeini remained in his hometown for some time, and was being ta en care of by other members of his family. *nly at the age of nineteen did he leave 0homein to pursue his education in Ara , an important religious town. AA This was where he first met Shei Abd al60arim Bairi ;a!di. Bairi was an important )ar1a#e ta$lid5 a cleric of the highest ran , meaning source of imitation. At any given time in Iran, there were only several )ara1e. Bairi was to become 0homeinis most important mentor in the coming sixteen years. Be was renowned for his great nowledge of Islam, but also for his fundamental reGection of clerical engagement in politics. ,hile it was normal for an Iranian cleric in the first half of the twentieth century not to involve himself with political activities, Bairi was one of the staunchest supporters of political inactivity for ule)a. 7ven during the turbulent years of the 2onstitutional -evolution and the rise of -e!a Shah, Bairi managed to stay out of the most pressing political subGects. A4 0homeinis stay in Ara wouldnt last very long. Bis teacher Bairi invited him in (3$( to Goin him in moving to Hum. In the nineteenth century, Hum was one of the most important seminaries in Iran, but by the time 0homeini arrived it had lost most of its significance. It was only after the arrival of Bairi and other important ule)a in the twenties, that Hum started to regain its importance as a religious town and as a centre for Islamic studies. Hum was patroni!ed by -e!a Shah, as a means for him to exert control over the ule)a, so they didnt involve themselves with his policies. This made sure Hum would remain a Duiet and obedient clerical town during his reign, only to become one of the hot spots of resistance during his sons. :ext to Bairi there were more prominent clerics in Hum with whom 0homeini conducted his studies, among whom were the activist Ayatollah 0ashani, "uhammad 0hansari and a prominent teacher of mystical philosophy, called "ir!a "ohammed Ali Shahabadi.A9

55 5-

"artin, Creating an 'sla)ic %tate, $3. 7rvand Abrahamian, .ho)einis): 8ssays on the 'sla)ic Repu*lic ?'onden (33)@, 469. 52 Abrahamian, .ho)einis), 9.

3+

0Irfan
In Hum, 0homeini studied the usual religious Islamic subGects li e usul ?first principles of Islam@, fi$h ?Gustice@, "hara1 ?Islamic taxation@ and logic, which Bairi taught him in person. :ext to these subGects, 0homeini made an extensive study of Islamic mystical philosophy ?7irfan@ and ethics ?a"hla$@, under the guardianship of Shahabadi. At the remar ably early age of )=, 0homeini received his 7i1a0a, his nomination as )u1tahid, in (3)4. Shahabadi and the study of 7irfan would have a significant impact on the intellectual development of young 0homeini. The goal of the mystical philosophy of Nirfan is to unite the individual with the divine. Its foundation is the idea that everything created was derived from the *ne, the eternal truth or the divine. At the beginning of the nineteenth century 7irfan could count on a growing amount of popularity within Islam, which can be explained as a reaction to the beginning influx of foreign influences from the ,est. 7'rfan always had ind of a doubtful reputation in the Islamic world, because its teachings of divine transcendence could bring the individual dangerously close to the prophet. It could also be subGect to suspicion of the state, because the study of 7irfan could lead to the reGection of all earthly authority and the rise of the individual above the community. 0homeini studied the subGect of 7irfan under Shahabadi. Shahabadi didnt only have a reputation of being a respected teacher, but was also nown to be a politically activist cleric. Be wanted to educate the regular people, and through this way tried to spread the teachings of Al6Afghani. Erom the forties onwards 0homeini started to teach 7irfan too, next to his classes on ethics. Bis 7irfan classes soon became very popular among the students of the seminary. A& 8ecause 7irfan ma es it possible for the individual to become at one with the divine, it offers the opportunity to a person to rise above the rest of the community. The gnostic sees ta2heed, the unity of all things, in everything. A person with nowledge of this is seen as a perfect being. In this respect this person stands as close to the prophet as is possible, though the prophet is still a few steps up on the ladder. Accordingly, the gnostic can reach a level of perfect nowledge and Gudgment, which gives him the right to act exactly as he sees fit and effectively places him above all earthly authority. Such a person is on the same level as the caliphs, who are the successors of the prophet on
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"artin, Creating an 'sla)ic %tate, )).

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earth. This provides him with the right to interpret the laws of the Huran and Islamic laws in general. In fact, it is thought that there can actually be no discrepancies between his interpretation and the intended meaning of the texts. In this way, a person with perfect nowledge of 7irfan receives direct authority from 1od, and can be seen as a successor of the prophet and as a source of perfect Islamic nowledge. This part of the theory of 7irfan very strongly influenced 0homeini during the writing of 'sla)ic -overn)ent and in his later role as supreme leader.A3 0homeini describes his thoughts about 7irfan and the role for the perfect being in his boo &ight of -uidance. In it, he tries to reconcile the theory with Shiite tradition. Be tries to set out the path a person has to follow in order to become a perfect being. The path constitutes four spiritual +travels. a person has to ma e, and only he who has completed them all can call himself perfect. Important in this respect is the conDuering of the ego and by way of this the receiving of absolute nowledge of the self. Apart from this, a great nowledge of ethics, which 0homeini taught himself, and moral superiority are very important. *nly the one who has reached these goals can truly be the leader of the community. 0homeini would reach this stage himself when he became the supreme leader and absolute authority of Iran in his role as fa$ih.4%

The ule a in 1u
As stated before, the Iranian clergy had a tradition of political inactivity and thus for the biggest part played no significant role in politics. A very good example of a traditional cleric wary of mingling with politics was 0homeinis former teacher in Hum, the )ar1a#e ta$lid Bairi. Bairi was nown for his fundamental reGection of involvement in politics, which at the time was the common opinion among the biggest part of the ule)a. ,hen Bairi died in (3)9, the void he left behind as the most important cleric in Hum was gradually filled by Ayatollah "ohammad Bussain 8oruGerdi. 8oruGerdi was a man of big stature who enGoyed a lot of respect in the country, and had fairly good relations with the court of the Shah. This went to the extent that in the forties 8oruGerdi had an oral agreement with "ohammed -e!a, in which he had promised to support the monarchy and to try to silence his politically more active colleagues. The Shah in turn promised to ease the process of seculari!ation that his father had started. 4( In the forties,
59 -+

"artin, Creating an 'sla)ic %tate, )4. "artin Creating an 'sla)ic %tate, )&6=(. -1 ,hich led, among other things, to the lifting of the ban on wearing an Islamic headscarf for women.

32

8oruGerdi was seen as Irans highest and most important )ar1a, in fact as the highest among all the active )ara1e in Iran. This was an honor that hadnt been granted to a single person since the nineteenth century. 8oruGerdi was the very picture of a conservative, unworldly cleric that tried to maintain the status Duo between religion and politics, while at the same time trying hard to escape involvement in politics. In the minds of someone li e 0homeini, the ruling ayatollahs, through there fundamental reGection of involvement in politics, actually made the ule)a part of the /ahlavi regime and with their silence they approved of the inGustices that were common in Iran during the time of the /ahlavis.4$ That by now 8oruGerdi was seen as a ind of pope of Shiism was extraordinary, because it conflicted with the Shiite tradition of striving for i1tihad ?consensus@. "ost of the time, there were several )ara1e active, who would try to find a common view on religious issues. In the time of 8oruGerdi, religious power increasingly fell in the hands of one person, Gust li e it would in later days when 0homeini was supreme leader in the Islamic -epublic.4) The relationship between 0homeini and 8oruGerdi started off very well. 8oruGerdi saw in 0homeini a talented and very capable cleric, and 0homeini regarded 8oruGerdi as a very gifted teacher. Jnder 8oruGerdis leadership Hum became increasingly important as a religious place, and more gradually evolved into becoming the spiritual centre of the Shiite world. Be also created a ind of Islamic propaganda movement, for spreading his message. This movement traveled town and country to educate the people, something that 8oruGerdi thought of as crucial for the conservation of Islamic culture. Be regretted the impotence of Islamic nations on the international level and blamed this on the big divisions that pulled the u))ah apart. Jp until his death 0homeini viewed these same divisions as the reason for the wea ness of the Islamic states.4= Although in general 0homeini obeyed 8oruGerdis orders to stay out of politics, he published his first political wor in (3=). In .ashf al#=srar ?Secrets -evealed@, he was very critical of the seculari!ation supported by -e!a Shah and people li e Ahmad 0asravi. After this however, 0homeini returned to Duietism for some time. It would

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Abrahamian, .ho)einis),. &63. "artin, Creating an 'sla)ic %tate, =3. -4 "artin, Creating an 'sla)ic %tate, A$.

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ta e twenty years, up to the sixties, before he would really actively involve himself in Iranian politics.4A After some time, the relationship between 0homeini and 8oruGerdi deteriorated, because 0homeini had increasing problems with his views about political inactivity. In the forties 0homeini had a relatively low position in the clerical system, which meant that he couldnt really authoritatively express himself on political subGects. In this respect he had a long way to go. At the same time, he increasingly expected 8oruGerdi to assume a political role. In this, 0homeini was an exception. Apart from a couple of clerics, the maGority still obeyed the strict order of 8oruGerdi not to get involved in politics, despite the ever more authoritarian style of government that the Shah displayed.44 *ne of the most prominent clerics, who didnt follow the line of 8oruGerdi, was Ayatollah Abdul6Hasem 0ashani. Be became the most important politically involved cleric in Iran. 0ashani at first was a big opponent of the Shahs regime and actively supported "ossadeDs government and the (edayeen#e 8sla). During ,orld ,ar, 0ashani was captured by the 8ritish because of his alleged pro61erman sympathies. In (3=3 he was exiled when a member of the (edayeen made an attempt on the Shahs life. In both cases, he received a heros welcome on his return. 0ashani was strongly anti6 imperialist. Be changed his opinion about "ossadeD owing to the latters seculari!ing policies. This made him support the American bac ed coup against "ossadeD in (3A), but in this period the J.S. didnt have the bad reputation in Iran that it would have several years later. The J.S. actually had a fairly good standing with the Iranians and was commonly seen as an ally, in contradiction to what the Iranians thought about the 8ritish and the -ussians. These were blamed for decades of imperialist involvement in their countries welfare. ,hen the J.S.6bac ed coup didnt wor out the way that 0ashani had wanted, since the Shah had no intention of sharing power with and loosening control over religious groups, he turned against the regime and the Americans. A sort of myth was created, that dismissed any involvement or complicity of the Iranian people and clergy with the revolt against "ossadeD and blamed it all on the Shah and the Americans. In this view, the Americans had neglected the will of the Iranian people for their own benefit. Some time after the coup he accurately described
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Abrahamnian, .ho)einis), 3. "artin, Creating an 'sla)ic %tate, A).

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the general feeling of discontent among Iranians about the role of the Americans5 +Eor the hundreds of millions of dollars that the American colonialist imperialists will gain in oil, the oppressed nation will lose all hope of liberty and will have a negative opinion about all the ,estern world.. Erom this moment on, the Jnited States too were seen as a negative foreign influence in Iran. This was the start of a process of resentment against the J.S. that resulted in massive anti6American demonstrations and the branding of the J.S. as The 1reat Satan.49 8ecause of his active engagement in politics, 0ashani was an example to 0homeini. 'ater on, he would recite an anecdote about 0ashani when he wanted to stress the importance of religious involvement in politics. ,hen 0ashani was being brought to prison for one of his political activities and was as ed by reporters why he ept involving himself in politics, his answer was5 6You asses, if ' should not *e in politics, 2ho should@6 This typified 0ashanis belief in political involvement for the clergy, which was one of their responsibilities in his view. 0homeini absolutely agreed with these words.4& Jp until 8oruGerdis death in (34(, 0homeini would remain Duiet on the political stage, though he already new that his ambitions ultimately lay in the political arena. In the sixties he would leave the road of political Duietism, and would never return to it.

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Armstrong, The 3attle for -od, $)%6$)( Amir B. Eerdows, N0homeini and Eadayans Society and /olitics in 'nternational Aournal of !iddle 8ast Studies, vol (A, no. $ ?mei (3&)@, $=A.

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2.3 #ho eini$s ideolo2'

#ashf$al-&srar
0homeini only started to be politically involved from the sixties onwards, but had touched upon the relation between religion and state and critici!ed the Shah in some of his writings before. ,hen loo ing at 0homeinis view of the Islamic state around the time of the revolution, it is important to reali!e that his view of this subGect changed several times during his lifetime. The first time he wrote about the subGect was in .ashf al#=srar ?Secrets -evealed@, which was publici!ed in (3=)6==. The boo was written in response to the seculari!ation policies of -e!a Shah and people li e Ahmad 0asravi. It was also an answer to the critical stance that the press had ta en towards the ule)a, brandishing them as a reactionary force in the years before. 0homeini accused the press of undermining Islam and thereby damaging Irans base for independence. 43 In this boo we can see 0homeini thin about different forms of government in general, and specifically the Islamic state. ,ith the Islamic State, we mean a form of government that is shaped by Islamic values and which is subGect to the laws of Islam ?for example the sharia@. 8y the time of .ashf al#=srar, 0homeini still regards the monarchy as a legitimate form of state, but only if Islam and Islamic values are at its core. In the boo he states to have no intention of rising up against the monarchy and even that a +good monarch. can count on his dedication. Also, he writes that no cleric was ever Gustified to the right of ruling the country. Be sees an important role for the clergy in politics, though, and as s the monarch to seat more clerics in the )a1les to ma e sure that the laws of the state dont contradict the laws of Islam. 9% 8ecause of the existence of the u))ah, which is thought to be +one. under the guidance of 1ods substitute on earth, the caliph, and which is not dividable in separate groups, the concept of a state as it is understood in the ,est is in fact alien to Islam. In .ashfal#=srar, though, 0homeini says that a state is desirable, because of the need of the people for a government that ensures their welfare, public order, and of course the protection of Islam. In this state, he envisions a role for the ule)a to help a regime, no matter how bad it is considered, solve the severe problems a country is facing.
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"artin, Creating an 'sla)ic %tate, (%=. Abrahamian, .ho)einis), $%.

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2ollaboration with an evil regime, in the specific case of trouble arising in the country, is allowed, but should nevertheless never be desirable.9( 0homeini had one big problem with the constitutional system. In this system with elected representatives, the issue of legislation would be dependent on the will of the people. This conflicted with the idea that all authority should and could only come from 1od, which in effect made legislation by the people illegitimate. Also, he thought that such a system was not as fit for Iran as it was for the ,est. Adding to this, he thought that by copying too much of the ,estern system of government, all the social ills of the ,est would be imported into Iran too. Be also saw the danger of the system being abused by one strong ruler, as he had seen happen in 7urope during the thirties. To be sure that nothing of this ind would happen, all legislation should be brought under the supervision of the clergy, and thus guided by the laws of Islam. At one point in .ashf al#=srar, he even disputes the idea that sharia only encompasses some parts of life. This was 0homeini at his most radical.9$ In .ashf al#=srar, 0homeini seems to be already thin ing about the merits of a purely Islamic state, although he is clearly Gust in a phase of shaping his thoughts and is nowhere near to a complete image of Islamic government. Be pleas for a system that is under the supervision of important clerics. The sharia is seen as the ey to a government of Gustice and the only Gustifiable rule is the rule of 1od, which together brings 0homeini very close to propagating a theocracy. The state should be made responsible to the laws of Islam and be under the control of the ule)a, although in this form they wouldnt have full governmental powers. 1overnment would still be in the hands of regular people. The ule)a that would have a part in this religious control mechanism should be properly educated in Islamic law.9) -emar ably, in .ashf al#=srar, 0homeini shows some common grounds with his nemesis the Shah. Be is a strong supporter of a powerful centrali!ed state and even regards the state that -e!a Shah had created as an example. Be sees a strong army as an important factor, Gust li e the Shah did. Adding to this, the state should have a close relation to Islam and should be capable of curbing foreign influences. In this, his opinion differs from the Shahs. "oreover, the army should be based upon Islamic
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"artin, Creating an 'sla)ic %tate, (%A. "artin, Creating an 'sla)ic %tate, (%4. 23 "artin, Creating an 'sla)ic %tate, (%&.

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principles, for it should also have a role in propagating and spreading Islam. A healthy treasury and flourishing economy should be brought about by Islamic taxation, of which some taxes are obligatory and some voluntary. "oney should primarily be spent on poverty reduction, to help the poor and bring about social Gustice. The rest should be spent on the army, governance, and maintenance of the infrastructure.9= During the time 0homeini wrote .ashf al#=srar, it was clear that he was already thin ing about the relationship between politics and Islam, although he didnt yet get involved in politics himself. Some of the early ideas in .ashf al#=srar would disappear in his later wor s, but others remained5 whether in their original or adapted version. Some of the ideas he had while writing .ashf al#=srar would even be used after the -evolution when the Islamic -epublic too shape.

3ela'at-e 4aqih
0homeinis most important wor is 'sla)ic -overn)ent. This was released in (39%, eight years before the revolution, when he was living in IraD. It consists of a series of lectures 0homeini gave during his exile, combined in one boo . Erom it, three important ideas can be derived. Eirst, the idea that monarchy is inherently conflicting with Islam. Second, legislative authority and government should, in the absence of the prophet and i)a)s, exclusively belong to the fu$aha ?singular5 fa$ih@, which means the Islamic Gurists. Third, the idea that Islam is in a struggle to survive, because of corrupting influences li e materialism, individualism, imperialism, 2hristendom and Pionism.9A The goal of Islamic government was to show the existence of a legitimate base for the fulfillment of executive powers by the ule)a within Islamic law. Also, it was a shout out to the ule)a, telling them not to remain in the bac ground but to actively involve themselves in the politic spheres of Iran.94 ,hile the concept of velayat#e fa$ih, which literally means governance of the 1urisprudent, in itself wasnt entirely new, it used to confine itself mostly to the things that were dealt with in the sharia. 0homeini wanted to extend the range of influence of the Islamic Gurists, to ma e sure that his authority would contain all aspects of life. This
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"artin, Creating an 'sla)ic %tate, ((%. 0eddie, !odern 'ran, (3$6(3). 2"artin, Creating an 'sla)ic %tate, ((A.

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would be a clear rupture with traditional Shiite thought. Bere, all executive and legislative authority lay in the hands of the hidden Twelfth Imam. During his absence, no ruler could ma e a claim for actual legitimate power. 8ecause of the need of the Shiite community for guidance in the form of for example legislation, Gurisdiction and all other areas of the sharia, these tas s were delegated to the ule)a, whose authority was derived from their extensive nowledge of Islamic scripture. The faithful community should follow the examples set by the ule)a, who were seen as the guides of society. This guiding role of the clergy should not be confused with legitimate authority, as this couldnt exist without the return of the Twelfth Imam. The clerics were guardians of the Islamic laws, waiting for the Twelfth Imam to reclaim his authority. The ule)a were not considered to be infallible, so their wor ings and verdicts should be based on consensus. Thus, the ule)a were hesitant to reach for full political authority. In their eyes, this conflicted with Islamic scripture. These thoughts put the clergy in the position not to involve themselves in Iranian politics and government, although there always were some of them that too a more activist stance. Although in .ashf al#=srar 0homeini still accepts the monarchy as a form of state, in Islamic government he has clearly shifted his opinion and tries to explain on the basis of Islamic scripture that a state, in the absence of the Twelfth Imam, can only legitimately be ruled by Islamic Gurists from within the clergy. The ule)a are the guardians of all the tas s of the Imam during his absence, including his governmental duties. 7ven things that are not attended to by the sharia, should be under the control of the ule)a and should be subGect to their interpretation of them through Islamic teachings. 8ecause an individual living in a society ruled by a corrupted regime, i.e. non6Islamic, cannot reach full potential, he calls upon the u))ah to rise up against these regimes and stresses the need for +political revolution.. It is only under Islamic rule that Islam can be protected and the "uslim community can blossom.99 In an Islamic state private property should be recogni!ed and protected. 0homeini sees dictatorships and monarchies as forms of state that are directed at the threatening of private property. Islam on the contrary, regards private property as a gift from 1od. This means no other being has the right to rob another of his possessions. 8ecause 0homeini sees people as selfish and greedy by nature, he stresses the need for
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Ayatollah -uhollah 0homeini, 'sla)ic -overn)ent: -overnance of 1urisprudent ?Bonolulu, $%%A@ ()6 (=.

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a state to protect private property. *f course, the Islamic state is most fit for this Gob. This respect for private property meant, according to 0homeini, that even the prophet or the imams had no right to dispossess a person if this wasnt allowed or sanctioned by Islamic laws.9& In 'sla)ic -overn)ent 0homeini pleads strongly against constitutionalism, which he thin s of as a foreign product that isnt suited for a non6,estern country li e Iran. "oreover, he sees the conception of sovereignty as something that can be derived only from the people as a fundamental misunderstanding. In Islam, sovereignty can only come from 1od, and this ma es him the only power to legitimately ma e new laws. The prophet, the imams and, in the case of 0homeini, the ule)a, are the only ones who can function as his representatives. The sharia can be seen as an Islamic constitution. The existence of an Islamic state is legitimated because it is the only means of implementing sharia law into society, and thus effectuating 1ods constitution. According to 0homeini it is the sharia which ma es sure that human beings can lead a righteous existence and he sees it as a social system that includes al spheres of human life. The sharia isnt bound to the specific time and place where it was written, but instead is suitable for all times and places and is open to interpretation by the clergy. It can be said that, in the absence of 1od, the sharia is the ruler. The fu$aha, or Islamic Gurists, are in this absence the only ones to interpret the sharia and they derive this important position from their extensive nowledge of Islam. *f course, there are different levels of ule)a, and only the ones in the higher echelons can function as a fa$ih in this way. Bis interpretation of the sharia should lead to its execution in the same manner, and thus the fa$ih also has executive powers. 0homeini doesnt consider this as a dictatorship or tyranny by the ule)a, because the fu$aha are subGect to the sharia, Gust as in the ,est a government is subGect to the constitution. Be considers this rule by the sharia and the Islamic Gurists as completely legitimate, because, although there is no constitution that was directly approved by the people, every "uslim automatically accepts the sharia as the word of 1od and the ultimate power. ,ith this, the pure fact of being a "uslim legitimates the rule of an Islamic state in a place where the maGority of the people is Islamic.93 &%
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In Islamic 1overnment, 0homeini also presents the Islamic state as the means for resolving social inGustices. The Islamic state is a defender of the poor and deprived, in contradiction to the monarchy, which aims at collecting as much power and wealth in the higher ran s of society as possible. In his boo , he describes the +wronged and deprived. as being victims of +the tyranny of aggressive rulers. and also +a handful of exploiters and foreigners who dominate with the force of arms.. It is +the duty of the ulema and of all "oslems ?..@ to put an end to this inGustice and to see to bring happiness to millions of peoples through destroying and eliminating the unGust governments and through establishing a sincere and active "oslem government.. 0homeini is clearly pointing his finger accusingly at the regime of the Shah and foreign nations, in defense of the poor.&( Erom the seventies onwards 0homeini increasingly uses Shariatis words )osta0afin ?oppressed@ and )osta"*erin ?oppressors@. 0homeini regards society as consisting of these two classes, based on economic assumptions, who are fighting each other in an eternal struggle. This view is clearly influenced by the Islamic socialism of Shariati, and ofcourse "arxs class struggle. The upper class, the )osta"*erin, is seen as corrupt and tries to hold its position by oppressing the lower classes. They are anti6Islamic and supporters of the /ahlavi monarchy and the imperialists from the ,est. The )osta0afin on the contrary, had alway fought for a Gust and Islamic form of government. It was the ule)as duty to lead the )osta0afin in the battle against the oppressors and show them the path to their liberation. This clear element of class struggle was a strong part of 0homeinis ideology, and also returns in 'sla)ic -overn)ent. The Islamic State would create a society free of inGustice, poverty, ineDuality, social conflict, crime and corruption.&$ An important issue in 'sla)ic -overn)ent is the Duestion who is suited to rule the country in the position of fa$ih. 1eneral Dualities li e intelligence and governmental capabilities are of course very important. The two most important Dualities, though, are nowledge of Islamic law and a feel for Gustice. The fa$ih should be the one with the greatest nowledge of Islamic law. As a Gust ruler he has to ma e sure that the rights of "uslims are being guarded and that the taxes will be reasonable and fair. 2ollected

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0homeini, 'sla)ic -overn)ent, (A. Abrahamian, .ho)einis), =96=3.

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taxes should be used to promote social eDuality and to protect Islam, which can also mean a reliance on a strong army.&) ,hat remains, is the Duestion whether power should be concentrated in the hands of one fa$ih or delegated to several fu$aha. 0homeini says he prefers a system with one fa$ih at the top, but only if this is a person who can meet all the criteria for a Gust ruler. ,hen this is the case, it is even the duty of this person to fulfill this role. The concept of one cleric at the top of the governmental power structure was a revolutionary idea in the Shiite world, in the time of 'sla)ic -overn)ent. The culture of consensus in fact didnt really allow one cleric to have more power than the other high6ran ing ule)a. Jsually, there were several ule)a in Iran at the same time who could claim the title of )ar1a or )u1tahid and who were regarded as the top of the clergy. 0homeini, though, sees the concept of velayat#e fa$ih specifically as a continuation of the system of government under the prophet or imams, where power rested in the hands of one person only. Although the fa$ih didnt have the same spiritual position as the prophet or imams ?which in effect means that he is not infallible@, according to 0homeini he is on the same level authority6wise. 0homeini thin s that the fa$ih could even be given the title imam, but specifically to indicate his position as supreme leader and guide. 'ater, Iranians would refer to him as Imam 0homeini.&= 0homeinis thoughts in 'sla)ic -overn)ent are also pan6Islamic. Be regards nationalism as an imperialist doctrine that was designed to divide the Islamic world. Islamic nations should cooperate to throw off the imperialist yo e. The Islamic state does not tolerate economical and ideological influences from abroad and wants to ma e sure that the "uslim world can further develop itself through Islamic tradition.&A 'sla)ic -overn)ent is 0homeinis most important wor . In the light of the revolution and the eventual founding of the Islamic -epublic of Iran, it is important to remember that 'sla)ic -overn)ent was written years earlier. The concept of velayat#e fa$ih was not a new thing, when 0homeini too the title of supreme leader after the revolution. Bis plans for an Islamic republic were clear from the moment these lectures, which are put together in 'sla)ic -overn)ent, were given. Bis emphasis on a Gurisprudent as ultimate authority is already made in this boo . Be outlines the exact
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0homeini, 'sla)ic -overn)ent, ((6(). "artin, Creating an 'sla)ic %tate, ($%. 15 0homeini, 'sla)ic -overn)ent, A=.

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way that he thin s taxes should be raised, and in what amount. Be stipulates what to do with the taxes, and explains these things can be derived from the Islamic Boly Scriptures. Bis rhetoric in Islamic 1overnment is also very clear, and later became the rhetoric of the revolution. Bis emphasis on the battle between oppressed and oppressors, between the outside world and Iran, and between Islam and the ,est was the same in 'sla)ic -overn)ent as it was during and after the revolution. These were all points that described exactly how a big segment of Iranian society was feeling at the time5 alienated, cheated and wronged. If people in Iran, who complained afterwards of the hiGac ing of the revolution by religious reactionaries, and people in the ,est, who were surprised by the founding of an Islamic republic under the guidance of a cleric, had read Islamic 1overnment somewhere before (39&, the surprise probably would have been a lot less stunning.

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Chapter 3 An Island of Stability

:ow that we have an understanding of Irans history from the late nineteenth century onwards and a picture of Iran in the seventies, at the brin of the revolution, we can start loo ing at the revolution itself. In this chapter I will give a detailed overview of incidents during the revolution. ,e will also ta e a loo at the reaction of the people and the regime to these incidents, and will try to understand the outcome of the revolution. 8efore loo ing at the revolutionary years of (39& and (393 we will first ta e a short loo at the period before that, and the creation of a religious revolutionary movement in Iran.

Prelude to revolution
After the death of 8oruGerdi a gap opened up in the Shiite power structures. The search for a new )ar1a had begun. Although his students actively wanted to help him spread his message, at first 0homeini had no interest in claiming candidacy for )ar1a. Among his students in Hum, 0homeini had created a base of support. The lessons that he taught in his )adrassah were very popular and his students venerated him. They praised his piety, virtue, strength and strong character. These students would be the first 0homeini supporters, and it can be said that the building of his support and movement started with them, in the holy city of Hum. Erom the early sixties on, 0homeini would gradually expand to greater Iran and his support would grow steadily. &4 Bis fame increased substantially after the revolt of Iune (34). In the years before, 0homeini had started to venomously critici!e the regime in his lectures and sermons. These were directed first at the, in his eyes, dramatic reforms that the ,hite -evolution sought to push through. At the start of the sixties the Shah was at the height of his power, which effectively meant that almost nobody dared to critici!e his policies. The general fear for the power of the Shah didnt scare 0homeini, though, and from (34$ onwards he started to attac the Shah from his pulpit. Be thought he had come close enough to 1od, to start involving himself actively in politics. Bis critiDue was aimed against the atrocities the regime committed, as well as the ,hite -evolution,
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Martin* Creating an Islamic State, 5-.

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general inGustice, suppression of opposition, the closing down of the )a1les, and the support for America and Israel. In his attac , there was a strong concentration on the position of the poor in Iran. Shortly after 0homeini started critici!ing the Shah, retaliatory actions too place. In "arch (34) 0homeinis )adrassah was attac ed by SACA0 and a couple of his students were illed. 0homeini himself was arrested and incarcerated.&9 Erom the moment 0homeini was released from his imprisonment, he wouldnt be stopped anymore. Immediately, he began aggressively critici!ing the Shah and his regime. This time he said the Shah was waging a war against Islam. ,hy else would SACA0 tear up a copy of the Huran during their attac on his )adrassahF ,hy else would they ill Islamic students and arrests this many ule)aF The Shah had become a danger to Islam. During the holy day of Ashura on the ) rd of Iune (34), the most important Shiite holiday, commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Bussayn at the battle of 0arbala, 0homeini addressed a huge crowd and launched a powerful verbal attac on the Shah. The following morning he was arrested again. This time his arrest led to a massive nationwide protest, in all the big cities of Iran. 2ommon people and clergy marched hand in hand during these demonstrations. SACA0 was ordered to shoot at the crowds and tan s were employed to disperse them. It too days before SACA0 was able to Duell the resistance. ,hen they succeeded on the (( th of Iune, hundreds of protesters had been illed.&& After being released for the second time, 0homeini once again started his sermons directed against the Shah. In *ctober (34= he pushed it too far. In this month a law was passed that gave American military personnel and their relatives immunity from prosecution for acts that they had committed in Iran. 0homeini connected this to the granting of a $% million dollar loan that the Shah had received from the J.S., to speed up his process of moderni!ation. Eor 0homeini, this meant that the Shah had sold Iran to the highest bidder. Irans dignity was at sta e here. This was the occasion that led to the famous speech that directly triggered his exile from Iran. In this speech he said that this new law placed the Iranian people on a level that was lower than that of an American dog. Be explained this by saying that when an Iranian car hit an American dog, the Iranian driver would be prosecuted. 8ut when an American coo would run
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over and ill the Shah himself, nobody would have the right to punish him. According to 0homeini, this was the point where people should start as ing themselves5 +Are we to be trampled underfoot by the boots of America simply because we are a wea nation and have no dollarsF. Bis speech was recorded by his supporters and the tapes were spread throughout the country. In :ovember 0homeini was arrested again. This time, he wasnt imprisoned in Iran, but put in a car and deported to Tur ey. Bis exile had started.&3 In this period 0homeinis fame too flight. Be was the first cleric who dared to oppose the regime openly in this manner. Stri ingly, his popularity grew so rapidly not because of his religious activities, but because of his increasing involvement in politics. Bis support grew so significantly that in the sixties, for the first time, it could be seen as a movement. Students still provided the base of his support, but *a0aaris, the small shop eepers and craftsmen, also became an important part of his movement. This was a very religious segment of society, and traditionally very powerful because the ba!aars had become the centre of the Iranian economy over the centuries. This group felt threatened by the Shahs ,hite -evolution, and feared that life as they new it would come to an end. The *a0aaris felt that they had a strong sense of Gustice and saw the Shahs regime as inherently unGust. They also felt threatened by the seculari!ation the Shah wanted to push through. ,ithin this group, social and religious networ s were very important, and a big deal of social life was concentrated around the mosDue. This powerful group supplied 0homeini with an already organised support with a big reach in Iranian society.3% Erom (34$ onwards, 0homeini and his students realised the need for creating a broad base of support for their movement. Be started teaching common people and his message was recorded on tapes, flyers and posters that were distributed all over the country. 1roups of around $% people were invited to his house, with which he would exchange opinions and information. These sessions made 0homeini famous and he was nown for the fact of always ta ing an interest in what people had to say. Be tried to ma e clear which actions were of value to Islam, and which were not. After some time, other clerics were involved in this process and thus he created a movement in which the people involved were ept at the same level ideologically. Bis networ expanded very
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fast and used very modern technology by the use of mass media li e cassette tapes, radio and telephone. "embers were recruited in three areas5 in the mosDue, on the wor floor and in the families. The movement was characteri!ed by its good organi!ation, willingness for action, internal coherence and was overall fairly well off. 3( According to Abrahamian, +0homeinism. as a popular movement was mainly middle class, and mobilised the masses by the use of radical rhetoric against the internal and external enemies ?the Shah and the ,est@. Be says the attac on the establishment never went so far as to Duestion the concept of private property and that it avoided issues that could cost it the support of the middle class. -hetorical elements were more important than substance and program, and its aims were confined to reform or dispose of cultural institutions, rather than upsetting the whole system of production and distribution.3$ 0homeini indeed li ed to use rhetoric and was not afraid to mould his speeches to the crowd of the day. This led to a general lac of nowledge of his political views, including his views on velayat#e fa$ih, outside the core of his movement. This does not mean, however, that his message only consisted of rhetorical statements, and that it had no ideology. As we saw before, 0homeinis views on society and the state were outlined in his earlier wor s and speeches. Although he changed his mind on numerous subGects over the years, their core was always to be found in Islam and they all had a general goal, which was the founding of an Islamic state. This should have been nown to all his admirers and critics by the time the revolution ic ed off in (39&.

Revolution
During the years after 0homeinis exile to :aGaf, the Shah increased the level of repression. Be also tried to reinforce his control over the religious authorities by creating stricter supervision over the ule)a and the )adrassahs. This led to a decline in activity on the side of the opposition. Although from time to time there were still some forms of protest, li e the (39A demonstrations to mar the anniversary of 0homeinis arrest, they never reached the scale of the big (34) outburst and didnt have a sustaining character. In these years, the Shahs regime seemed to become more tyrannical than ever before. *pposition leaders and members were arrested and put in Gail, where they
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were often brutally tortured. Some died during these torture sessions, others were ept in Gail or executed. 8y (399, though, there seemed to be a relaxation of the repression on behalf of the regime. There were several reasons for this. Due to a report of Amnesty International about the horrific state of the Iranian prison system, ,estern media had pic ed up on the dar er side of the Shahs regime. There was some attention in the ,est for the violation of human rights in Iran. Also, the new president of the Jnited States, Iimmy 2arter, put a heavy emphasis on human rights in his foreign policy. 2arter implied that countries guilty of human rights violations could be cut off American aid and arms supplies. Another possible reason could be the fact that the Shah was suffering from illness during this time of his life. Be was ill with cancer and appeared to be ma ing preparations for a succession by his son or wife.3) Although he showed no sign of really enforcing his human rights policy, 2arters statement could have had some influence on the Shah, as well as on the Iranian opposition, who were becoming more activist after his inauguration. In early (399, they started spreading open letters and petitions. 8y this time, the active opposition mainly consisted of liberal or leftist intelligentsia, as well as some small radical guerrilla groups. The Shah had had success in Duelling the religious resistance in the years before. The protest of the intelligentsia had its pea in *ctober (399, when around 4% Iranian writers and poets recited their wor to huge groups of Iranians at the 1oethe Institute in Tehran. In this session they clearly displayed and vented their hostility to the regime, and despite this there was no interference from SACA0. So it seemed that the Shah had ta en a new more relaxed stance about peaceful opposition. This relaxation that had been going on throughout (399 wouldnt last very long. Already a month after the 1oethe Institute protest a number of nown dissidents were arrested. *n :ovember ), one of the most important incidents of the coming revolution too place. 0homeinis son "ustafa died in IraD. The mysterious circumstances under which he died, almost immediately fuelled rumours about the involvement of SACA0. In fact, now it is widely accepted that SACA0 was involved in his death. 0homeini remained silent after the incident, but in Iran there was a wave of protest in several cities. /rotesters were attac ed by the police. During these days, /resident 2arter visited the Shah in Iran on :ew ;ears 7ve, calling Iran +an island of stability in a turbulent corner of the world..
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The death of "ustafa 0homeini can be seen as one of the direct incentives of the revolution, although there still was no organised and massive revolt against the Shah by :ovember (399.3= The fact that the regime once again strengthened their methods of repression could be a direct result of the Shahs visit to Iimmy 2arter in ,ashington in *ctober (399. Bere, they discussed some important subGects, li e economy, arms deliveries and the 2old ,ar6 but there was no discussion on the topic of human rights violations in Iran. It is li ely that the Shah perceived the threats 2arter had made as purely rhetorical, and saw that he had nothing to fear from the JS. 2arter had no intention of ma ing an example of Iran.3A The real ic off for the Islamic -evolution in Iran happened on Ianuary &, (39&. *n this day the regime committed a mista e that would prove to be fatal, and showed their miscalculation of the strength of the religious opposition in Iran. In the semi6government controlled newspaper 8ttelaat an article about 0homeini was published, in which he was publicly humiliated and called +an adventurer, without faith, and tied to the centres of colonialism.. 0homeini was accused of a dissolute lifestyle and of being a 8ritish spy, who was even paid by the 8ritish. This publication led to an immediate reaction in Hum, where four thousand students held a protest at his former )adrassah, demanding it be opened again. *ther demands were a return to the (3%4 constitution, freedom of speech, the release of political prisoners and the return of 0homeini to Iran. ,hen the police arrived at the scene, with instructions to shoot at the mob, they did exactly that. It would be the most violent clash between the opposition and police forces since (34). ,hen the police opened fire at the demonstrators, seventy of them were illed ?although regime numbers say only ten were illed@. ,ith this act of the police, mass outrage was felt against the authorities by millions of Iranians. This was the spar that started the fire.34 :ow, a cycle of demonstrations was started, that resembled the Shiite cycle of mourning. In the Shia, forty days after a persons death a traditional mourning ceremony is to be held. In the case of the revolution, this meant new demonstrations every forty days after the last one. This religious mourning cycle had enormous revolutionary potential as it fuelled the outrage of the people again and again. In this way, the
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demonstrations grabbed momentum. It would give the demonstrators time to thin through and prepare their actions, and all of them new exactly when they would ta e place. So, after a cry from 0homeini for further action, forty days after the massacre in Hum, there were demonstrations against the regime in all cities of Iran. In most of the places the Eebruary (& demonstrations were peaceful, but in Tabri! they soon became violent. -ioting bro e out and the police needed two days to restore order. In these two days between twelve ?official claim@ and over a hundred people ?opposition claims@ were illed.39 The forty6day cycle, a good example of political use of Shiite tradition, continued the next month on "arch )%. Demonstrators too to the streets of Iranian cities to mourn the victims of the Tabri! riots. *nce again, the police shot at the mobs. In ;a!d, a hundred people were illed when the police opened fire at the protesters. These victims were honoured forty days later on "ay &. All over the countries new protests were being held and it seemed they were getting bigger with each new cycle. :ext to the significant number of casualties, the police was Gailing a lot of protesters. The Iranian prisons were pac ed with opposition members and ordinary demonstrators, who were not being treated very gently. All this led to the demonstrations becoming more and more vigorous and the people more fanatical. During the demonstrations they carried anti6Shah banners and the protests had a strong Shiite character. 2asualties were seen as shaheed, or martyr, and the mobs carried and shouted Shiite slogans while marching through the streets. Eor a lot of protesters, the revolution was seen as a means of spiritual purification. The already strong religious character of the revolution helped to give meaning to it, especially for the poor and uneducated. It was also an outlet for the mass of uneducated rural youngsters and unemployed that had moved to the cities in recent years.3& :ext to the religious 0homeini supporters, there were more groups involved in the incidents. Iranian students filled a big part of the ran s. Students had been active in the opposition for a long time. 8ecause of the growing number of students in Iran, there was a big revolutionary potential at the universities. A lot of the students were originally from rural areas. Among the student population a lot of resentment was felt against the Shah, because of his control over the universities, poor educational, academic and
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housing conditions, and of course the usual political reasons. At first, student protest was primarily confined to the campuses, but extended outwards once the popular opposition broadened and became more activist in (3996(39&. 8ecause they had a lot of experience with demonstrations at the universities, students would become a very important factor during the revolution. Among the students, all inds of groups could be found. There were "arxists, liberals, leftists and religious groups. During the revolution, they all marched together.33 *ther big contributors to the revolutionary movement were members of the illegal Tudeh party and "ossadeDs former party, the :ational Eront. The Tudeh was an Iranian "arxist>communist party, which was banned in (3=3. "embers of the party were being prosecuted and they had to go underground to survive. During the revolution, the Tudeh was revived and enGoyed support among the Iranian wor ers. The :ational Eront had virtually ceased to exist in the (39%s, but was revived in (399 when the Iranian politicians 8a htiar, Eorouhar and SanGabi wrote an open letter of protest to the Shah. The progressive :ational Eront would continue to play a role in the revolution and afterward, but this role was severely overrated by the ,est. Then there were two small guerrilla groups whose influence should not be underestimated. Eirst, there was the (edaiyan#e .hal$, not to be confused with Safavis (edayeen, which was a combination of three smaller leftist guerrilla groups that had merged in (39%. This group had conducted a guerrilla war in the mountains of :orthern 1ilan in the early seventies, which had some success, but was soon crushed by the Shah. Almost all members were illed during s irmishes or executed. Their exploits showed, though, that the Shah was not invulnerable. After this, the group was able to revive itself and their guerrilla tactics were of some importance during the revolution. Second, there were the !o1ahedin#e .hal$, who were largely inspired by Ali Shariatis ideology. They too were very activist and occasionally violent, which resulted in their prosecution by the police and SACA0. The !o1ahedin were bigger than the (edaiyan, and continued to play an important role after the revolution, when they were engaged in a power struggle with 0homeinis supporters. 8ecause of their smaller numbers, the !o1ahedin lost this struggle, and were declared illegal by 0homeini. They are still active in :orthern IraD, and in a lot of ,estern countries, where they try to present
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themselves as the Iranian opposition, but have a dubious reputation and are on the 7.J. list of terrorist organi!ations.(%% The forty6day cycle temporarily came to an end in Iune (39&. The government started to see the danger of the mass demonstrations and tried to calm the mood with a couple of concessions. The Shah banned pornographic movies, dismissed the hated head of SACA0 1eneral :asseri, instructed royal family members to dismiss their business connections and ended his price6control restrictions. This seemed to be wor ing when the next date on the forty6day cycle, Iune (9, passed Duietly. This was in part because of a call for calm from several religious leaders, li e Ayatollah Shariatmadari, the senior Shiite leader in Iran. The calm wouldnt last very long. After the death of a prominent cleric in a car accident, riots bro e out in "ashad on Iuly $$. In fights with the police and troops over forty people were illed. This led to mourning ceremonies in several Iranian cities seven days after the clerics death, and in Tehran, Hum, Tabri! and Isfahan serious rioting bro e out. After (% days of violence, martial law was declared. The incidents were snowballing and the revolution seemed more and more unstoppable.(%( 8y the end of Iuly, after the outbrea of new riots, the Shah promised more reforms. The most dramatic of these was his promise of free elections being held in the following year. Adding to this, he promised the people more political liberties, even +as much as democratic 7uropean nations.. Although 0homeini and his staunchest supporters could not be pleased by these words Q how could they when the Shah was promising democrati!ation on ,estern standardsF Q a big part of the, more liberal, opposition reacted optimistic, although they remained suspicious. The demonstrations once again seemed to become Duieter, although the religious opposition sei!ed opportunities during the holy month of -amadan for acts of violence against the police and some smaller demonstrations in which a lot of civilians were illed when police and troops reacted with force. These protests where in big cities li e Shira! and Isfahan, but during the days between the end of Iune and half August, they failed to set up big -amadan protests in Tehran. 8y this time, though, the core of the revolutionary

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movement was very clearly made up of religious Islamists and less radical Iranian "uslims.(%$ So Gust when the demonstrations were becoming smaller and confined to angry Iranian "uslims, something happened that once again infuriated Iranians of all ran s and colours. *n August (3, a movie theatre called -ex, in the city of Abadan, was burned down after an arson attac . /eople inside failed to escape the flames, because the doors were closed, and hundreds of people died inside the theatre. Immediately, Iranians lin ed this act of violence to the regime and especially to SACA0, although there was no proof of its involvement. It seems unli ely that the Shah could have been involved in the ordering of such an incident, Gust when matters seemed to have calmed down. In (3&%, a trial of one of the accused pointed towards the involvement of a religious fundamentalist group, who attac ed the cinema because of its lin with ,estern decadence. :evertheless, the people blamed the illing of four hundred civilians during the fire in -ex cinema on the authorities, and this inflamed the situation in Iran once again.(%) (%= The following days mass protests too place, with twenty thousand or more people in "ashad and fifty thousand in Hum by government count. The mobs were chanting angry slogans li e +burn the Shah. in Abadan. 8y the end of August, eleven cities were placed under martial law. The government reacted with more promises and some reforms. The prime minister was replaced by Sharif67mami, who was thought to be more agreeable to the Islamists. The regime returned to using the Islamic calendar, casinos were closed and press freedoms were promised. This mar ed a change in the reporting of incidents by newspapers. ,ords li e +hooligans. to describe the protesters disappeared and the demonstrations were reported more obGectively than before. The reforms and events led up to a huge protest on September = in Tehran, the last day of -amadan. Eor the first time, the regime had permitted religious demonstrations that were scheduled for this day, which could mean that police forces would react more mildly if the demonstrations would remain peaceful. This gave an opportunity to a lot of Iranians who at first were afraid to participate in the dangerous demonstrations, to Goin in. Several religious gatherings in Iran combined into an enormous crowd of between
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two hundred and five hundred thousand people, carrying pictures of 0homeini and anti6 Shah banners. Although the military had orders not to intervene, they were clearly visible along the road of the demonstration. In the demonstration, Islamists wal ed side by side with liberals, leftists and more moderate believers. /rotesters put flowers into the barrels of soldiers guns. The demonstration on the last day of -amadan continued peacefully, and was a huge success.(%A Although during the September = march, the regime had purposely reacted peacefully, without a shot being fired, this new stance was not to be continued. The Shah coupled his reforms and concessions with repression. The new mass protest brought up a different ind of problem for the Shah, because of the involvement of the middle classes. If he lost the support of the middle classes, he would be in real danger. Bis reaction would be one of force, and repression became worse than ever. Three days after the -amadan march, martial law was declared. This happened early in the morning, so protesters who too to the streets the next day werent aware of it. *n that day, September &, between A%% and 3%% people were illed during a big but peaceful protest at Ialeh SDuare in Tehran. After the police had opened fire on the mobs when they refused to disperse, the people were enraged and erected barricades on which soldiers opened fire from their tan s. The Ialeh SDuare massacre would be remembered as +8lac Eriday.. This would be a defining day for the Shah and the revolution. The Shah lost the last bits of support he still enGoyed from the middle classes. /resident 2arter called the Shah on September (% to assure him once again of his support, which confirmed the picture Iranians already had of +The 1reat Satan.. In Iran, the Shahs position was getting wea er every day. Erom now on, the revolution was unstoppable.(%4 The Ialeh SDuare massacre meant the entry of the wor ing classes, both salaried and industrial, and the middle classes, led by the progressive :ational Eront, into the protest movement. There seemed to be no more means of accommodating the different groups within Iranian society with the regime, as they had given up hope of real concessions after the recently stepped up repression, despite the promises and reforms the Shah had already made to his people. The repression and anger that was felt by the wor ers and middle classes drove them into the arms of 0homeini, whatever the personal views they had of him. In the meantime, 0homeini had been forced to leave
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IraD and had moved to /aris in *ctober. This allowed him more opportunities to spread his message through telephone and cassettes, as the IraDi6control over him had now ended. "oreover, 0homeini had vast access to worldwide media coverage in /aris, where he enGoyed the attention of the 7uropean Gournalists. The appearance of new popular groups in the opposition movement gave a new impetus to the revolution, as the wor ers went on mass stri es in the late summer and fall of (39&. These stri es would cripple the countrys economy and last up until the end of the revolution. "aGor stri es in the oil and petrochemical industries in September were followed by stri es of government employees, and in *ctober the output of oil barrels had fallen to $&L of its former level. Although the government tried to stop the stri es by promising large wage increases, they found the different groups involved in the opposition, liberal, leftist and religious, unmoveable. Stri es expanded to all areas of life and by :ovember public services were virtually inexistent, and oil production had almost ceased. An attempt to return to more censorship was followed by press stri es. ,hile the stri es had crippled the regime both economically and governmentally, guerrilla groups li e the (edaiyan and !o1ahedeen switched to open attac s on government targets. During (39&, these movements had become significantly bigger and they felt powerful enough to directly attac the regime. They targeted Iranian officials and military and police leaders, and their presence was felt during demonstrations. Than s to the press stri es, these groups and also 0homeinis supporters were able to reach a big audience through their own newspapers and pamphlets, which helped to spread revolutionary fervour. (%9 In /aris, 0homeini refused to ta e serious any attempt at concession by the regime. Be was visited by :ational Eront leader SanGabi, and their tal s resulted in a combined statement where they stressed the importance of both democracy and Islam as basic principles for an Iranian state. This in fact conflicted with 0homeinis opinion that democracy was an import from the ,est and not suitable for the Islamic world. 'ater, he would refuse to put the word democracy into the name and constitution of the Islamic republic. 0homeinis tone in /aris was less radical than in his earlier wor s on government. Be indicated that he did not want to rule directly and his statements actually convinced secularists that there was a fair chance of 0homeini supporting their
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rule after the revolution was over. The way 0homeini expressed himself on several issues regarding government during this period was largely because of the advice of some of his ,estern educated advisers li e future president 8ani Sadr and future foreign minister ;a!di. A lot of ,esterners and Iranians in the revolutionary movement, without nowledge of 0homeinis ideology in earlier wor s, thus came to regard him as someone not inherently opposed to democracy. The 0homeini6SanGabi visit was seen as proof of the possibility of a midway solution between religion and democracy when the revolution was over.(%& ,hile the stri es were paralysing the country, there had been no big demonstrations since 8lac Eriday for two months. This changed in early :ovember, when students clashed with police forces as they tried to leave the campus of Tehran Jniversity. In the event, students were illed and the next day, :ovember A, students attac ed several buildings in Tehran including one at the 8ritish embassy compound. The rioters created scenes of destruction all through Tehran, and the security forces where surprised and overwhelmed with the new strea of violence. The ease with which the students went on a rampage through the city encouraged tal of a set up by elements within the regime. 'etting the students have their way, they would force the Shah into ta ing firm action. If this was the case, they succeeded. The Shah reacted in force, dismissing the prime minister and appointing a military government in his place. "eanwhile, the army moved into Tehran and other Iranian cities, where they violently struc down every form of protest. Stri ers were threatened with death if they ept refusing to start wor ing again. At the same time, the Shah expressed sympathy with the protesters on national television. Be apologised for the repression his people had felt through the years, and promised to transform the country into a constitutional monarchy. This was felt by Iranians as a sign of wea ness on the Shahs behalf, and his message wasnt ta en seriously. The coupling of new repression and concessions, a tactic used often during the revolution by the regime, led to encouragement for the protesters to continue and at the same time was giving them new reasons to do exactly so. The Shah was caught between genuine care for the well being of his citi!ens, as well as the need for him to Duell the resistance with extreme repression. -eports indicate that he wasnt willing to accept measures that in his eyes were too violent. ,hile some of
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his closest officials urged him to step up the repression absolutely, he ept refusing this and called to +do the impossible to avoid bloodshed.. *f course, this didnt necessarily mean that he would stop the already harsh way of dealing with protests and the opposition. ,hile the revolution was getting older, each month seemed to bring more casualties. This can be seen as a sign of bigger demonstrations on the one hand, and a continuing if not worsening violent reaction of police and armed forces on the other hand.(%3 After he had realised that repression was not wor ing and actually seemed to be propelling more protesters into the streets, the Shah tried to find other ways to calm the situation. 8y December, he was still convinced he could remain in power as constitutional monarch, if he could offer reconciliation to his people. Be started loo ing for a new prime minister among the liberal opposition. "eanwhile, the regime was loo ing frightfully at the upcoming event of Ashura, the holiest day in the Shia. 0homeinis statements from /aris fuelled the enormous revolutionary potential of this day of remembrance for the battle at 0arbala. Be called upon the Iranian people to demonstrate against the regime, instead of the usual passion plays and processions in honour of Imam Busain. The days before Ashura brought peaceful demonstrations of hundreds of thousands of Iranians in cities al through the country. *n the day of Ashura itself an enormous peaceful protest too place in Tehran, with two million people wal ing through the city streets for eight hours, with green, red and blac flags representing the colours of the Shia. During these days, there was no violent reaction from the military. This changed again some days after Ashura, when there were new clashes between the revolutionaries and armed forces. The Shah had trouble finding a suitable prime minister, because there were few people who still wanted to be involved in his regime. Jltimately, he appointed the nown liberal Shahpour 8a htiar to form a new government. :ew promises were made about dismantling SACA0, releasing prisoners and ma ing changes in economic and foreign policy. 0homeini ept refusing to tal with any Iranian government, when the Shah was still in Iran. Thus, the new government and its promises couldnt stop new protests from ta ing place. These continued through December and Ianuary, with more victims of clashes with security forces. Einally, on the (4th of Ianuary, 8a htiar negotiated the departure of the royal
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family including the Shah. Be left to visit his friend Sadat in 7gypt, and never returned to Iran again. 8a htiar tried to hold on to his office, but, despite new promises and concessions to the religious opposition, didnt succeed. The people were longing for the return of 0homeini, but their leader still refused to do business with a government that had been appointed by the Shah. Jltimately, 8a htiar was forced to allow 0homeini to return. *n Eebruary (, he arrived on an Air Erance plane, welcomed by enormous crowds of his supporters. Erom the moment he had arrived, the 8a htiar government was virtually meaningless, and was not recognised by 0homeini or the maGority of the people. After a year of violence and protests, the uncrowned leader of the Iranian revolution had arrived in Tehran victoriously. ((% The Islamic revolution of Iran became stronger with each new dramatic event that too place, and went out of control pretty early during the process. /robably owing to the relaxation of repression in (399, the first spar s of protest found their way to the outside. During that year, most of the protests were confined to the intelligentsia, and the religious groups werent involved until the death of 0homeinis son "ustafa in :ovember, which would prove an important and usable event for the revolutionaries later on. 8y the end of (399, though, there was still no substantial organi!ed revolutionary movement, except for several small ones concentrated in different segments of society, with no cooperation among them. At the same time, the regime stepped up the repression again by the end of the year, after the Shahs meeting with 2arter in ,ashington. It is possible that this new form of repression gave an impulse to the unrest, because people felt that something that they had been given was ta en away again. In Ianuary (39&, a crucial event in the revolution too place. The reactions against the anti60homeini article in 8ttelaat were furious. The very violent response of the police to the demonstrations and the ensuing death of several protesters triggered the =% day Shiite cycle of mourning, which would prove to be tremendously important for the revolutionary movement. 8y this stage of the revolution, the active revolutionary movement mainly consisted of religious groups, and most importantly the supporters of 0homeini. They would stage new demonstrations every =% days after the last one, to mourn its victims. These events hugely propelled the revolution, as every new victim on
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Armstrong, The 3attle for -od, )%96)%&.

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the side of the protesters added to the widespread outrage felt in all parts of Iranian society. Thus, the demonstrations got bigger and bigger, and more groups got involved. 8y the summer of (39&, the =% day cycle came to an end, after the regime made some concessions and promises. Things calmed down temporarily, but exploded again in Iuly after the death of a prominent cleric in "ashad and the following protests. :ow, the most important phase of the revolution started, as more and more Iranians felt the urge to Goin the demonstrations. August (39& was the brea ing point for the Shahs regime. After the fire in -ex Theatre, the demonstrations became nationwide events, supported by a very big part of the Iranian population. In retrospect, it seems clear that when the big demonstrations of Iuly and August were followed by the mass stri es, the regime had lost any chance of survival. The Shah tried to halt the revolution by means of concession, repression and promises, but had lost control completely. The demonstrations never stopped after this point, and events snowballed into even bigger ones. Already in September, it should have been clear to all that the Shah would not remain in power for very long.

59

Chapter ! The Persian "ra#a

In this chapter we will ta e a loo at the understanding the -oyal :etherlands 7mbassy in Tehran and the Dutch "inistry of Eoreign Affairs had of the situation in Iran during the revolution. *ur obGective will be twofold. Eirst, to see whether their evaluation of the events that were happening in Iran before and during the revolution was accurate. Second, whether the picture they had of 0homeini and their assessment of his role in the revolution and his ideology was right, and if they considered him a liable option as a political factor for the future.

The (etherlands and Iran before the revolution

In the years before the revolution the Dutch government had fairly good relations with the Shah, and the embassy in Tehran had a positive picture of his regime, although they were aware of some of its more authoritarian sides. This was not very peculiar, since the relations of most of the ,estern nations, Gust li e the Soviets and their allies, with the Shah were well. In these days, the Shah was a well6seen guest on all international occasions. -elations between the two countries were put to the test in (39=, when the Iranian embassy in the Dutch city of ,assenaar was temporarily occupied by Iranian students, as a sign of protest against the Shah. This caused some frustrations with the Iranians, who felt that this action could have been prevented by the Dutch. The Iranian regime was unsatisfied with the slow process of Gudgment of the students in Bolland, and for a short while withdrew its ambassador from the :etherlands. Their relations were normali!ed after a visit to Tehran of the Dutch minister of Eoreign Affairs, "r. "ax van der Stoel, in Iuly (39=, where he was personally received by the Shah.((( Dutch6Irano relations were primarily of an economic ind. 8ecause of the boom of the Iranian economy in the early nineteen6seventies and Irans leading position in the oil mar et, there was ample opportunity for trade and investment from ,estern
111

"essage from the Direction Africa and "iddle 7ast ?DA"@ to the embassy in Tehran on September A (399, Archives of the "inistry of Eoreign Affairs ?A"EA@, 2ode 3, inv. nr. ($3(.

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countries. This wea ened from (399 on, as the Iranian economy slowed down and experienced some problems. In (39A, the leaving Iranian ambassador to the :etherlands, mr. Ear!anegan, noted that the relations between both countries at that time were well, and this could be used to extend and intensify the economic cooperation between the two.(($ This resulted in a partnership later that year, for +economic and technical cooperation..(() :ew problems arrived in (399 when Iranians were angered about a conference of human rights organi!ation Amnesty International in Amsterdam. ,ith the conference, Amnesty wanted to raise attention for the situation of political prisoners in Iran. *n the (&th of Ianuary, Amnesty had reDuested minister Can der Stoel for a contribution of his ministry to the conference to +express your interest for these problems..((= Although Can der Stoel answered that he saw no need to send a representative of the Dutch government, the Iranians expressed their anger by threatening with a boycott of Dutch products, if the Dutch government did not ta e any steps to prevent the conference. The Iranians couldnt imagine that such a conference could be held without permission +from above., which for them meant that the Dutch had actively approved of it. The Dutch tried to explain that in a country li e the :etherlands, organi!ations didnt need approval from the government for the organi!ing of gatherings. In the end, no boycott was effectuated and the Iranians were somewhat satisfied with the Dutch explanation. ((A
((4

This shows again that the Shahs regime

actually had no idea of or no interest in the wor ings of the ,estern democracies. Although the Shah was seen as an enlightened monarch helping his country towards the democratic path, this should have been a clear sign that there were significant differences of opinion on how a state should function in relation to its citi!ens. Some elements in Dutch society were definitely aware of these differences, and different groups were trying to expand this awareness to a more general level. During the seventies a discussion in the :etherlands too place on the subGect of human rights
112 113

"emorandum to the minister on (9th of Ianuary (39A, A"EA, 2ode 3, inv. nr. ($3(. "essage about +ministerial Goint commission for economic and technical cooperation., A"EA, 2ode 3, inv. nr. ($3(. 114 'etter of Amnesty International to the minister on (&th of Ianuary (399, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A. 115 'etter of the minister to Amnesty International on )rd of Eebruary (399, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A. 11"essage of the Dutch ambassador 'avalette to the ministry of Eoreign Affairs ?"EA@ on 3th of Eebruary (399, A"EA, 2ode 3, inv. nr. ($3(.

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abuses in Iran. These violations were brought to the attention of the Dutch by organi!ations li e Amnesty International and also Iranian students, li e the ones who occupied the embassy in (39=. In "ay (39A, there was a protest of Iranian students in front of the Dutch parliament in The Bague, where they held banners with and chanted anti6Shah slogans. The ministry of Eoreign Affairs tried to ban the demonstration because they feared it would Geopardi!e relations with Iran, but was overruled by the ministry of Iustice.((9 In Ianuary (394, Iranian students went on a hunger stri e in Amsterdam to support eleven Iranians, who were convicted as terrorists in Iran and sentenced to death.((& This led to Duestions in parliament about these +terrorists. and the overall human rights situations in Iran and to a communiDuR of the Iranian embassy about the convictions.((3 After a ministerial inDuiry to the embassy in Tehran about the arrests and convictions, ambassador -enardel de 'avalette answered that the convicted had committed murders and had made confessions. About the overall situation of human rights in Iran and rumours about torture of prisoners, he stated that he did not now about this for lac of information of persons concerned, but that +the security service over here has a name of a less good6natured ind when it comes to their actions, next to their reputation of effectiveness in the performing of their tas s.. This must have been a very political way of saying that there were in fact violations of human rights in Iran, especially by the security service, which must have meant SACA0. ,e have read about this +effectiveness. in earlier chapters.
($%

This issue somewhat damaged Dutch6

Irano relations, as the Dutch parliament was attac ed in Iranian papers and accused of +wanton interference in the internal affairs of Iran. and +ignorance about the real conditions prevailing in the country. by the Iranian parliament. ($( 8etween (39A and (39& the ministry of Eoreign Affairs would receive increasingly more letters of civilians, stressing their concern for the violation of human rights in Iran and due to cases li e the before mentioned, there was a rising awareness of the situation in Iran. In the years leading up to the revolution there was some coverage of small incidents, mostly by terrorist groups. It is also clear that the overall situation on human
112 111

"essage of "EA to the embassy in Tehran on 3th of "ay (39A, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A. "essage of the minister to the embassy in Tehran on 3th of Eebruary (394, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A. 119 /ress communiDuR of the Iranian embassy on 3th of Ianuary (394, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A. 12+ Answer of ambassador 'avalette to the minister on (%th of Ianuary (394, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A. 121 Ambassador 'avalette to "EA on $3th of Ianuary (394, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A.

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rights was being watched, although this usually was because of reDuests from civilians or organi!ations, protests by Iranian students in the :etherlands and Duestions raised in parliament. The embassy often ac nowledged that the situation in Iran wasnt perfect, but seemed to have a habit of downplaying the problems. :ext to this, the Dutch also seemed to thin that the situation was improving. There was never any mentioning of a general feeling of unrest in Iran. Incidents were always blamed on small groups, with no coherence or support among the population. Sources were in maGority government6 related, either the Iranian government through contacts or newspapers, or other governments through their embassies in Iran. Seeing this, the Iranian parliament probably had a point in saying that the Dutch were ignorant about +the real conditions prevailing in the country..

5e can ride it out

,hen the incidents that snowballed into the revolution started in :ovember (399, the Dutch mission in Tehran had no real perception of the frustrations of a great deal of the Iranian people. The amount of messages sent between the ministry and the embassy in the period of "ay (399 and :ovember (399 was extremely low. This amount started going up again after the death of "ustafa 0homeini in :ovember. The first report of unrest is made on the $3th of :ovember by "r. Schneider of the Dutch embassy in Tehran. Be writes about a series of student protests in Tehran on :ovember (A and (4, which thousands of people should have attended. *ne of his contacts had signalled an increasing cooperation between religious and leftist groups over the last wee s, which he determines as Islamic6"arxist. Be also mentions the gatherings of groups of young people in Tehran during the Islamic festival of sacrifice, which could indicate that the opposition didnt consist of only "arxists, but also orthodox "uslims. In the message, there is no mentioning of the death of "ustafa 0homeini, which was the main incentive for the protests. "r. Schneider, though, seems to have been accurate very soon about the religious nature of the protest, although he doesnt seem to notice their significance and relation to 0homeini.($$ *n the (4th of Ianuary, an article from the Iranian newspaper 0ayhan was sent to the ministry, which headed +Hom protest condemns return to stone age.. This obviously
122

"essage of Schneider to "EA on $3th of :ovember (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A.

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biased article about a largely staged pro6government protest seemed to be ta en very seriously by the mission. 7specially in the city of Hum, there was not a lot of support for the Shah. ,hether these protests were staged is not sure but seems li ely, and the coverage by 0ayhan shouldnt be ta en too seriously. :evertheless, the embassy seems to have believed its general message.($) 8y the end of Ianuary, ambassador 2ampagne expresses his opinion on recent student protests in a letter to the ministry. Be does agree with his 8ritish colleague that +the turbulence and violence was much bigger in previous years.. Still, 2ampagne writes that the number and magnitude of the protests had made an impression on the regime. "oreover, he has started to see a shift in importance from students to religious groups and reports on an incident in Hum with orthodox "uslims, where several were illed. According to the ambassador, though, the general human rights situation in Iran had improved during the last year, which gave more opportunity for protest. This fits perfectly in the general thesis that when a people are being given more space for expressing their feelings, they usually will. In the light of the recent improvements in the human rights situation, 2ampagne says that +well6 informed and experienced diplomatic observers thin a crac down is unli ely, and that was also the opinion on a recent meeting of the ambassadors of the nine ?7.2.6 countries@.. Stri ingly, in the month of Ianuary, there was no mentioning of the article in 8ttelaat on the &th, which directly led to the protests that 2ampagne reports about. The same thing happened earlier with the :ovember protests, where the death of 0homeinis son, which was the direct incentive for action, was not mentioned by the embassy.($= *n the $3th 2ampagne exchanges his view of the recent measures that the regime had ta en to contain the resistance5 +,hether this is the way to contain the powers of the red and blac reaction is doubtful. Eor the time being, Iran has to cope with the tensions that a too fast transition from undeveloped to a developed country bring about..($A The second sentence is probably very right. ,e have seen in chapter one that moderni!ation and especially the sort of moderni!ation from above that the Shah desired had its conseDuences for the country. In his message, though, 2ampagne seems to be saying that the tensions were mere transitional problems that would be

123 124

0ayhan6article sent to "EA on (4th of Ianuary (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A. "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on )%th of Ianuary (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A. 125 "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on $3th of Ianuary (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A.

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overcome in time. If this is the case, he was underestimating the magnitude of the tensions. There were also reports about the two meetings of 2arter and the Shah. The first meeting in ,ashington, was reported about on $) rd of :ovember (399, by the Dutch embassy in ,ashington, were "r. Tamenoms 8a er specifically states that the subGect of human rights was not discussed, and 2arter had said that there was a clear improvement in Iran on this item. ($4 This was repeated by 2ampagne after 2arters trip to Tehran in December, where again the subGect of human rights was no issue. Be also stresses the very close relations between the Shah and the American president, and thin s that the visits will +contribute somewhat to a diversion of the internal critiDue on the regime..($9
($&

2arters message also must have strengthened the opinion of

2ampagne that the human rights situation in Iran was indeed improving. The next mentioning of unrest is reported in April. These are related to the protests of Eebruary (& in Tabri!, where police needed two days to restore order. These were also the first in the seDuence of riots attributed to the =%6day cycle, following =% days after the Ianuary & riots. 2ampagne recogni!es this religious proponent of the protests, writing that they were meant to mourn the victims of the earlier demonstrations in the beginning of Ianuary. Be doesnt specifically mention the =%6day cycle. According to his source at the American embassy, +the Shah is, because of the series of events in Hum and Tabri! and the unrest among students, in doubt whether to increase liberali!ation or to step up repression again. "y contact thin s it is not unli ely the Shah will pursue the last option.. This conflicts with 2ampagnes earlier opinion that a crac down wasnt li ely.($3 Another interesting report was sent to the ministry in "ay, from the Dutch embassy in 'ondon. This spea s of a conversation with Tatham, of the "iddle 7ast Department in the Eoreign *ffice, who says the unrest started in the summer of (399, when the +conventional opposition consisting of leftist middle class groups was encouraged to express their frustration by the loosening of repression by the regime. There was a great disappointment, that the promised N1reat Society, could not be
12-

"essage of Tamenoms 8a er to "EA on $)rd of :ovember (399, A"EA, 3((.$( CII, folder nr. ==). 122 "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on (&th of Ianuary (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A. 121 "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on &th of Ianuary (39&, A"EA, 3((.$( CII, folder nr. ==). 129 "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on ($th of April (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A.

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fulfilled after the economic problems in (394.. This is somewhat in line with 2ampagneNs earlier remar s about the problems of transition that moderni!ation imposed. Tatham also cites that +there is a growing importance in the opposition for religious groups, and that the Shah had been unwise in the past to frustrate these groups.. The overall opinion in the Eoreign *ffice, though, was that the Shahs authority wasnt in danger and that he could +ride it out.. ()% *n the )(st of "ay, 2ampagne reports about a visit of the royal family to "ashad, where they attended the tomb of Imam -e!a and met with some religious leaders. This was obviously a signal of the royal family to the clerics who they, in the words of Tatham, had +frustrated. in the past. According to 2ampagne, this succeeded and led to a positive reaction of the Iranian clergy, which appeased tensions between the religious groups and the Shah. ()( The same opinion about the "ashad visit is stressed in a letter of "r. Schneider, who doesnt seem to have any reason to thin that the unrest of the previous months was a sign of future trouble.()$ This symbolic visit of the royal family to the holy city of "ashad probably did have some effect on their relations with some of the ule)a, but definitely did not mean a real appeasement of the two groups. 7specially the more radical ule)a surrounding the very powerful 0homeini were not influenced by gestures li e these. Again, 2ampagne and Schneider do not seem to realise the depth of the tensions between the Shah and the people, in this case the religious groups. :o Duic visit to a holy city could have solved these in itself. 0homeini is mentioned for the first time on the $) rd of "ay (39&, in a letter from "r. Tamenoms 8a er of the Dutch embassy in ,ashington to the ministry of Eoreign Affairs. It is important to notice that the +discovery. of 0homeini actually came from ,ashington, rather than from the mission in Tehran. If they had any nowledge of him at the embassy, they didnt thin it important enough to report it to The Bague up until "ay. 8a er writes about a conversation with his source "yles 1reen, acting director for Iran on the State Department, where 1reen stresses the involvement of religious groups in the incidents. 1reen sees the religious groups as the core of the opposition, and says they enGoy support among the lower middle classes and students, who are reacting against the recent economic problems. Tamenoms 8a er mentions
13+

"essage from the Dutch embassy in 'ondon to "EA on (9th of "ay (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A. 131 "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on )(st of "ay (39&, A"EA, 3((.$( CII, folder nr. ==). 132 "essage of Schneider to "EA on )(st of "ay (39&, A"EA, 2ode 3, inv. nr. ($).

--

0homeini for the first time as +an important figure in the bac ground., who +from his place of exile in IraD, where he was sent after the Iranian riots of (34), is sending a wave of messages recorded on cassette tapes into Iran, where they find a big audience, despite of their unsophisticated character.. According to 1reen, the religious leaders wanted their traditional influential positions restored, and thus desired limiting the Shahs powers.()) This first mentioning of 0homeini is somewhat late, especially as the unrest started first with the murder of his son "ustafa, and then again in Ianuary when he was attac ed by the newspaper 7ttelaat. Eurthermore, nothing is said about 0homeinis message or ideology, apart from its +unsophisticated character., which leaves a lot of room for interpretation. :evertheless, reports of new protests and unrest are increasingly being sent to The Bague. *n the $Ath of "ay, 2ampagne reports to the ministry about new riots, especially in Hum. Be also critici!es the coverage in foreign media, who, in his eyes, create an exaggerated picture of the events in Iran. Be says that this +raises Duestions with businessmen, who are starting to thin that a trip to Iran is irresponsible. ,e were approached with issues li e this by telex, and responded that under the current conditions there is no reason not to travel to Iran.. 2ampagne still doesnt see any real danger for the Shah, and says that +the Shah, bac ed by the army, can certainly control the situation..()= 'oo ing bac , the coverage in foreign media was certainly not exaggerated. It is more li ely that 2ampagne was still not seeing the situation as it really was5 very dangerous and bound to explode. This explosion would finally happen in the summer. During these following summer months, when ambassador 2ampagne had ta en leave, there were no significant reports from the embassy about the situation in Iran, except from Schneider on the (=th of Iune. Be describes some recent statements from the Shah about the internal troubles. The Shah says that these are a conseDuence of his Duest for liberali!ation, which he will continue pursuing. These problems would continue for about two years, according to the Shah, and could only be stopped by a higher pace of reforms. This higher pace of reforms actually meant some concessions to the liberal opposition. Schneider sees this as an attempt by the Shah to include certain good willing forces within the opposition in the political process. This was an accurate
133 134

"essage of Tamenoms 8a er to "EA on $)rd of "ay (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A. "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on $Ath of "ay (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A.

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evaluation on the part of Schneider. Be also says that there are indications that moderate oppositionists would support the Shahs plans. Be was probably also right about this, but by the time of these concessions, the liberals were not the most powerful and dangerous force in the opposition. ()A As said before, these promises and concessions the Shah made did help for a short while, but already by the end of Iuly and during -amadan new riots and protests bro e out, instigated once again by religious groups. -egarding these -amadan protests, "r. Bamer of the Dutch embassy writes about the +stereotypical pattern of religious meetings in a mosDue or the house of a cleric, after which the stirred6up believers ta e to the streets en masse, while chanting Nunpatriotic slogans and set fire to party bureaus, ban s and communal buildings.. Be stresses that the influence of the clergy on the regular people is very big. Be also reports protests throughout the entire country. This evaluation of the -amadan protest is very correct, and the first accurate mentioning of the religious character of the protests. Bamer seems to have understood the way these protests too shape, and in his message he underlines the important role of religious holidays and the clergy. Bis letter to the ministry in The Bague was dated August (4 (39&, already & months after these +stereotypical patterns. were first started.()4 ,hen 2ampagne had returned to Tehran and sent his first report to The Bague on the $$nd of August, there was a drastic change in tone about the seriousness of the events. 8efore his leave, the ambassador had no doubts about the capability of the Shah to control the situation and downplayed the events. 8y now, he seemed to be changing his opinion. This can be seen immediately in the title of his first report, which was titled +To a crisis situation in IranF. The title in itself suggests that doubts are beginning to rise at the embassy5 is the situation more dangerous after allF 2ampagne describes a +long hot summer., which he himself couldnt have experienced since he was on leave, and writes about the death of =%% people in the -ex Theatre in Abadan. -egarding the Abadan fire, he doesnt specify possible suspects, but instead blames it on overall +terror.. ,hether he means government terror or terror of oppositional groups is not clear, but as we have seen in the previous chapter, the Abadan6drama isnt really solved up till today. In short, 2ampagne says that +the audacity of the terror has no limits
135 13-

"essage of Schneider to "EA on (=th of Iune (39&, A"EA, 3((.$( CII, folder nr. ==). "essage of Bamer to "EA on (4th of August (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A.

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anymore.. Be signals the hiGac ing of the opposition by extremely orthodox "uslims, who have forced the more moderate ones to ta e their side. Iust li e Bamer, he sees that the protests start in the mosDues and then ta e to the streets, and that after =% days the victims of each protest are being mourned with new ones. The forty6day cycle actually had come to an end by Iune, ma ing this statement by the ambassador redundant. Eor the first time too, 2ampagne mentions 0homeinis role in the revolution5 there was +sharp agitation by the mullahs, led by the exiled fanatical leader of the Iranian Shiites 0homeini, who has a big influence in Iran and wants nothing less than getting rid of the Shah.. 2ampagne describes the protest movement as consisting of small shop eepers, students, youth and lower civil servants, and says that up till then the wor ing classes had stayed out of the riots. Be ends the report with a stri ing anecdote5 +It is sure that the position of the Shah has wea ened. At the festivities in the palace for the $A th anniversary of the revolt I saw a concerned loo ing, emaciated man, surrounded by a thousand yes6men, who concealed for him the reality of the things going on in the country.. This report of August $$ is a very important one. There is a clear voice of despair in it, and for the first time assesses the situation close to how it really was. This ma es the report a very interesting one. 7specially the desperate tone of the ambassador ma es it dramatic. Einally, the embassy had reali!ed that they were dealing with nothing less than a revolution.()9

*o %lete brea6do)n
This new reali!ation must have been fuelled even more by the wave of protests continuing in late summer. 8y August, the situation in Iran was out of control. Although there was a growing consciousness of the seriousness of the events, outsiders sometimes still saw ways out of the danger for the Shah. There was no real tal of a religious coup or abdication of the Shah. This can be seen in different reports from Dutch embassies all over the world. A message from the Dutch embassy in /aris to the ministry in The Bague confirms this picture. A conversation with the vice6president of the 'evant department on the Huai d*rsay is described, in which he says that the magnitude of disasters li e the one in Abadan, helped by the coverage in the media, has wrongly called up the image that the country is in a pre6revolutionary stage. This is a very bold
132

"essage of 2ampagne to "EA on $$nd of August (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A.

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statement, for the revolution by this time was almost at its pea . ()& Than fully, the reports of the Dutch embassy in Tehran were becoming increasingly accurate since the report from 2ampagne after his return to Iran in late August. *n the &th and 3th of September, 2ampagne reports about the declaration of martial law, which he calls, in the light of recent clashes, +inevitable.. Be says that the recent concessions of the Shah had only strengthened the opposition in their opinion that his position was wea ening, and had led to more actions. Be even thought of a new role for the military, saying that +the erosion of power has reached a dangerous stage, in which it is not impossible to thin that the military will ta e fate in their own hands when the government will continue to hesitate.. 2ampagne also realises that the gap between the clergy and the government has widened, and that their relation is beyond saving. ()3
(=%

The position of

the army was a very popular issue in the reports and messages from the Dutch embassy. Erom August onwards, there was increasing fear of involvement of the army. Although the army never really too faith in its own hands during the revolution, the threat of this happening was of course very real. At this point 2ampagne seems to thin that the army is the only resolve left for the Shah. In his message of the $)rd of September, titled +Iran Huo Cadis., 2ampagne spea s of several oppositional groups who see the abdication of the Shah as the only solution for the situation. Again, the tone of his letter is more desperate. Although after the declaration of martial law things had calmed down, he says that the overall opinion is that the trouble will start again when it will be lifted. *n the other hand, he writes that +there are "iddle 7ast experts who say that Nthe logical course of events doesnt always show the expected pattern of development in this part of the world.. This shows that there is a sense of uncertainty about where things are going. The title of the message, +Duo vadis., ma es this very clear. It also shows that the religious oppositionists werent the only ones using religious rhetoric.(=( In *ctober, Schneider reports that the Shah has promised that Iranian dissidents living abroad are free to return to Iran without ris of prosecution, as long as they respect the constitution and respect the independence, integrity and freedom of Iran. This would allow a return of 0homeini, although Schneider doubts that the religious
131 139

"essage of the embassy in /aris to "EA on $)rd of August (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A. "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on &th of September (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A. 14+ "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on 3th of September (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A. 141 "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on $)rd of September (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A.

2+

leader will return to Iran. 0homeini indeed didnt return to Iran until after the departure of the Shah. ,hat would have happened if he did is open for speculation, but it probably wouldnt have helped his position, which at this point was very strong.(=$ This would show again with the mass stri es of *ctober, which show the widening of his support among Iranians, of which 2ampagne reports on the (%th5 +Jp until now, it was seen as a plus for the position of the government and regime that the wor ing classes didnt manifest themselves in the demonstrations.?..@ :ow however, a dangerous situation is also developing there, with probably serious conseDuences for the economical and financial stability of the country.. Be expresses his worries for the coming Ashura and the opening of the universities.(=) "eanwhile, there seems to be some room for improvement in the eyes of other 7uropean Iran experts. *n the $=, Tamenoms 8a er of the 'ondon embassy describes another conversation with his contact at the Eoreign *ffice, Tatham. Be thin s that the situation in Iran is better than in the wee s before. Be says the role of 0homeini will diminish with his transfer from IraD to /aris. 2ontact between the leader and his followers will go down, and some of his supporters are blaming him for the fact that he moved to a non6"uslim country. The departure of 0homeini would be good for other religious groups, who will get the chance to ta e a more moderate stance now the ayatollah cant control them anymore. That Tatham was absolutely wrong about this would show in the coming wee s, in which 0homeini would become the symbol of the revolution ever more.(== Benry /recht, the contact at the State Department of the Dutch embassy in ,ashington, says that there is a growing reali!ation among the opposition that continuation on the road of violence carries the ris of developments getting completely out of hand. They would be more and more willing to loo for a )odus vivendi with the government.(=A The reports on these two conversations show that experts in ,estern government service are still seeing Q or are they hopingF Q liable opportunities for the situation to resolve itself. In this period, we can see an increasing number of reports on Iran. These are not only coming from the embassy in Tehran, but also from the Dutch embassies in
142 143

"essage of Schneider to "EA on =th of *ctober (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A. "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on (%th of *ctober (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A. 144 "essage of Tamenoms 8a er to "EA on $)th of *ctober (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A. 145 "essage of the embassy in ,ashington to "EA on $Ath of *ctober (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A.

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'ondon, /aris and ,ashington. Again on the $3th, 2ampagne sends two letters to the ministry in The Bague. In the first, he mentions the recent statements of support from 2arter and 8ritish /rime "inister 2allaghan to the Shah. -umours on the streets are, according to the ambassador, that these had the opposite effect, as they seemed to underline the already strong idea that the Shah is a puppet of the ,est. Be also notices a growing xenophobia in Iran, especially against the J.S., the J.0. and other ,estern countries, which has already led to some incidents where foreigners have been attac ed. In the second letter, 2ampagne reports about the recent riots and unrest. Be writes that there is a new wave of demonstrations in Iran, with a new role for violent underground guerrilla organi!ations. There are heavy clashes in Tehran between students and police. Be says the already tense situation is intensified by stri es throughout the entire country, of which he had already expressed his fear in previous messages. 2ampagne also stresses the opinion of his 7uropean colleagues in Iran, with whom he is in regular contact5 +Several colleagues ?..@ thin that the situation is currently heading for the worst at a rapid pace, and seems to be reaching a dramatic low, where the sei!ure of power by a military regime seems almost inevitable, ending all attempts at liberali!ation. ?..@ :othing is pointing at positive a development.. ,e can see that a military ta eover is still considered a very plausible option. Seeing that there is never a real mention of a ta eover by 0homeini or his supporters, the ambassador must have thought a military coup more li ely to occur. According to him, religious leader 0homeini refuses any compromise and wants nothing less than the substitution of the current monarchy for an Islamic republic. This is the first time 2ampagne mentions the creation of an Islamic republic, although he doesnt explain what is meant by it, or what the chances are that this form of state will be a realistic alternative for the future. At this point, a military coup is seen as the biggest danger for the Shah and the overall situation.(=4 As we have seen before, the military government was instituted on the 4 th of :ovember. A summary of the Shahs speech in which he informs the people of this, was sent to the ministry in The Bague by the embassy. It sums up some points of this speech. In the speech, the Shah actually Gustifies the recent stri es in Iran, and promises that the combination of financial and political corruption will not repeat itself. Be says
14-

"essage of 2ampagne to "EA on $3th of *ctober (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A.

22

that free election will be held and that he has heard the +message of your ?the Iranian people, i.e.@ revolution, and guarantee that your sacrifices will be honoured.. The Shah ends his speech with a call for cooperation and dialogue between all different groups. The speech is a clear attempt by the Shah to normali!e relations and perhaps to try to create more support among the less radical opposition groups.(=9 The embassy in ,ashington describes a conversation with "ar Iohnson, acting officer for Iran with the State Department, about the same speech and the institution of the military regime. Iohnson says the institution of the military regime has had a positive influence on the situation in the country. The speech of the Shah had been received Duite well, and would hopefully contribute to the restoration of peace in Iran. Be notes that the monarchy still enGoys support among big parts of Iranian society, in the countryside as well as in cities. Be says that cooperation from 0homeini is not to be expected, and calls the ayatollah +adamant and obdurate.. Iohnson notes that while 0homeini had succeeded in gathering a large support, he lac s any ind of political base, and thus is not a real alternative for the current regime in Tehran. The overall tone of Iohnsons opinion on Iran is positive. Be thin s that the future is depending on the Shahs actions.(=& The same optimism seems to be rising in /aris, where the Dutch embassy reports that +they seem to be more optimistic on the Huai now, with regard to the survival chances of the regime. (=3 Iohnson once again repeats his optimistic statements some days later, of which the embassy in ,ashington writes to The Bague. According to Iohnson, +the military regime has apparently succeeded to restore order and peace in the country.. This would create an opportunity for the Shah to set up a national government to substitute the military one. Iohnson is certain that the :ational Eront and especially 0homeini at some point had to realise that their only chance lay in participating in a civil government.(A% In Tehran, the Dutch embassy also seems to become a bit more positive, but they are still afraid and uncertain of what the coming period will bring. Schneider writes that he is especially worried about the coming
142

Summary of the Shahs speech sent to "EA on 4th of :ovember (39&, A"EA, 3((.$( CII, folder nr. ==). 141 "essage of the embassy in ,ashington to "EA on 9th of :ovember (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A. 149 "essage of the embassy in /aris to "EA on (=th of :ovember (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A. 15+ "essage of the embassy in ,ashington to "EA on (9th of :ovember (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A.

23

Ashura, which could prove to be a brea ing point. (A( This positivism must have come from the relative calm that was brought by the military regime, after the first days of its institution. Also, the speech of the Shah could have had a positive influence on the opinion of the embassy and the different sources, who could have thought that this attempt to normali!e tendencies could have a reasonable chance of succeeding. In reality, though, there was no more stopping the revolution, and the relative calm would very soon come to a Duic end again with the days before and during Ashura. The Ashura protests and their violent aftermath drastically changed the hopeful positive tone, also in ,ashington. In a message from the embassy in ,ashington regarding a conversation, which was sent before Ashura, with 2arl 2lement, des officer for Iran on the State Department, all hope seems to be lost. 2lement says that the situation in Iran is very alarming, and if the protests continue on this scale, the Shah has no other option than leave. 2lement thin s that in that case he will be succeeded by a military dictatorship, and doesnt see an Islamic republic as a long6term option. (A$ 2ampagne also reports on the peaceful Ashura demonstrations in Tehran, and seems impressed. Be writes with astonishment about the capability of the religious leaders to rally huge masses of over $ million people, and their ability to control these masses. This time, he Duestions the loyalty of the army in the light of such massive popular support against the Shah, and wonders when the Shah will get the picture. This is somewhat contradicting his earlier thoughts that the army would sooner or later ta e faith in its own hands, for example with a coup. About 0homeini, he says5 +0homeini is more a symbol for people to gather around in this time of resistance, than the true leader of tomorrow.. This reflects that both 2lement and 2ampagne still dont see 0homeini as a viable option for future government.(A) "eanwhile in ,ashington, "ar Iohnson still remains positive. The embassy reports that Iohnson +thin s that the disciplined course of recent events could be the beginning of a period of relative Duiet, in which tal s between the military government and the opposition could lead to some results.. Iohnson thin s that the Shah +is still li e a father figure for a big part of the population., and wonders how long 0homeini could maintain himself if he was to return to the country5 +*bGectively, the monarchy still has
151 152

"essage of Schneider to "EA on $9th of :ovember (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A. "essage of the embassy in ,ashington to "EA on 4th of December (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4. 153 "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on ($th of December (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4.

24

a fairly good chance of surviving the storm.. This proves that even at the State Department, opinions could vary greatly, li e those of Iohnson and 2lement. The positivism of Iohnson in the light of all the events can be called somewhat naive.(A= In 'ondon there is a more realistic opinion. Tatham, as interviewed by "r. Eac from the Dutch embassy, was surprised that the Shah survived the month leading up to Ashura. Tatham sees three important elements in the current situation5 the army, the :ational Eront, and +a broad mass of opposition against the Shah led by 0homeini.. Tatham has some problems seeing 0homeini as a head of state. At best, he could function as +a conscience of the nation, li e 1andhi in the first years after Indias independence.. Tatham was actually very close with this thought. 0homeini would indeed function as a sort of national and religious conscience, although he would have more power than Tatham probably could have envisioned. "oreover, Tatham was not a fan of the religious leader and his supporters5 +A rise to power of this fanatical, strongly religious group can only be feared.. Tatham concludes by saying that the general opinion at his office was that +the Shah is not even going to pull through as a constitutional monarch.. ,hen we compare this evaluation and prediction of Tatham to those of Iohnson, and to a lesser extent 2lement, in ,ashington, there is a huge difference. :eedless to say, Tatham was a lot closer to the truth than his American counterparts.(AA "eanwhile, concerns about the well being of foreigners in Iran were at a high point. Already on the 4th of :ovember, the Dutch embassy had made an evaluation of evacuation options and concluded that the evacuation of the one hundred thousand people of ,estern origin was impossible.(A4 In December, the situation worsened, and some foreigners where being threatened or attac ed. Some received threatening letters in Erench, 1erman or 7nglish. These were delivered to houses or put underneath the windshields of cars with diplomatic license plates. The most famous of these was the 2ursed ;on y6letter, which was delivered all over Tehran to foreigners cars and houses, with the following text5 +*, cursed ;on y, Alhtough you now well about Shahs "onar ism and his general massacre but while all liberal people condemn this executioner you and your domned president support him. This is the reason that all the
154

"essage of the embassy in ,ashington to "EA on 4th of December (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4. 155 "essage of Eac to "EA on $$nd of December (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4. 15"essage of 2ampagne to "EA on 4th of :ovember (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CII, folder nr. ==A.

25

Iranian people hate you. Down with Imperialism, down with !ionism, down with commonism. Civa Islam#. 2ampagne reported this last letter to The Bague with some amusement, although his worries were absolutely clear.(A9 8y the end of December, American employees of oil companies were being shot in Ahwa!, and 2ampagne stresses his worries about the fate of the Dutch in Iran, as well as the oil production. (A& *n the $9th, he writes that the production of oil has come to a near standstill, as a result of these terrorist actions and stri es.(A3 Then on the $3th, he again reports about heavy clashes between police and protesters, and writes that +total brea down is coming in fast..(4% 'oo ing bac , the fear of 2ampagne was absolutely legitimate, but no Dutch nationals were harmed during the revolution. In Ianuary (393, a dramatic increase in reports from embassies all over the world on the subGect of Iran can be seen. The embassy in Tehran is now reporting almost daily to The Bague. As the situation is heading towards a climax, the tone of the writings is one of pu!!lement and uncertainty. *n the Ath of Ianuary, Dutch minister Can der 0laauw of Eoreign Affairs issues an order for the immediate availability of aircraft for possible evacuation in the following wee .(4( Tamenoms 8a er of the embassy in ,ashington cites a conversation with 1ary Sic , Iran expert for the :ational Security 2ouncil. Sic says that5 +The situation is on a nifes edge.. Although Sic is sure that within a short time very important changes will ta e place in Iran, he also says that no one could ma e a decent prediction for the future. In his eyes, there are three options that are worth considering. Eirst, that the 8a htiar government would succeed. Be adds that this will only wor if the Shah leaves the country. Second, that 0homeini will return after the Shahs departure and will ta e over power. Third, that the Shah will somehow again strengthen his bond with the army, and create some ind of military regency council. It is clear that Sic thin s the role of the Shah is over. *n the contrary, he considers 0homeini +a force to be rec oned with., and doesnt see him losing his authority in the short run.(4$ This is one of the first times that 0homeini is mentioned as an option for future leadership of the country. It is also

152 151

"essage of 2ampagne to "EA on 4th of December (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4. "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on $=th of December (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4. 159 "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on $9th of December (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4. 1-+ "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on $3th of December (39&, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4. 1-1 "essage of Can der 0laauw on Ath of Ianuary (393, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4. 1-2 "essage of Tamenoms 8a er to "EA on Ath of Ianuary (393, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4.

2-

clear that there is a growing sense of uncertainty about what exactly this future will bring. In a letter about the appointment of the 8a htiar government, ambassador 2ampagne gives it a A%6A% chance of survival, depending on whether the Shah leaves the country. 8y now, everyone seems to have given up the Shah. (4) The day after his last message, 2ampagne writes about a recent power struggle within the opposition and says that there is +great division.. -eligious leaders are having big differences of opinion, especially Shariatmadari and 0homeini. The :ational Eront is also said to have bro en with 0homeini, or the other way around. The ambassador eagerly Duotes from newspaper articles. After a 4$6day stri e, this must have been a source he had really been missing. :ewspapers also write about the low level of popular support that the :ational Eront enGoys. This may have come as a surprise, since a lot of ,estern countries thought the :ational Eront to be the most legitimate option for the future, and envisioned an important role for it in the forming of a new government. 2ampagne also writes again about strong rumours that a military coup is on its way. ,ith this in mind, he thin s that +the most important Duestion is when the Shah will leave and how the army will respond.. 2ampagne still sees a military coup as the best possibility now the Shahs position has wea ened severely. (4= "ar Iohnson also fears the moment when the military and the religious groups will clash, as cited in a message from Tamenoms 8a er to The Bague.(4A 8etween the 3th and the (Ath messages with evaluation and information about Iran are sent to The Bague by the embassies in "oscow, 8russels, DGedda, Ierusalem, ,ashington, /aris and 8onn. The worlds eye has turned to Iran.(44 *n the (4th, 2ampagne reports on the ((6point program of the 8a htiar government, which includes the abolishment of SACA0, release and rehabilitation of political prisoners, free elections, the departure of +non6essential. foreigners from Iran, complete individual and social freedom and freedom of speech, support for the +/alestinian nation. and an oil boycott of Israel. The ((6point program is full of concessions to the opposition, and a new attempt to get closer to each other.(49

1-3 1-4

"essage of 2ampagne to "EA on 3th of Ianuary (393, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4. "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on (%th of Ianuary (393, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4. 1-5 "essage of Tamenoms 8a er to "EA on ((th of Ianuary (393, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4. 1-"essages from the embassies in "oscow, 8russels, DGedda, Ierusalem, ,ashington, /aris and 8onn to "EA from 3th to (Ath of Ianuary (393, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4. 1-2 "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on (4th of Ianuary (393, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4.

22

The day after that, the Shah leaves. This couldnt have come as a surprise, as we can see that realism about the wea and impossible position of the Shah had grown over the past few wee s. 2ampagne writes that +the departure of the Shah has led to euphoria and celebrations in the city, comparable to our experiences in (3=A., when Bolland was liberated by allied forces. Be reports that 0homeini still refuses any cooperation with +le gouvernment usurpateur., and that cooperation with the government is considered an offence. In this letter, 2ampagne is as ing a lot of Duestions, instead of giving information. This shows the uncertainty of the situation and the inability to ma e a clear assessment of the balance of power in revolutionary Iran. Be wonders about the power struggle about to brea lose. Be wonders when 0homeini will return and what the chances of the 8a htiar government are. Be is worried about the stance of the army, and is not sure what to expect of them. Be concludes the letter with the announcement that foreigners are increasingly being targeted by Iranians, and that there is a growing sense of xenophobia.(4& In another report of the same day, 2ampagne writes that 0homeini has announced the formation of a "uslim revolutionary council, to supervise and organi!e free elections and form an Islamic national government. This is the first time 2ampagne mentions anything about 0homeinis future plans for the Iranian state. Bis information was derived from a press statement of 0homeini from /aris.(43 An interesting message is sent from the embassy in ,ashington, in which Benry /recht of the State Department is said to have admitted that the Americans have had some contact with 0homeini, as well as with the other opposition groups, already. /recht says not to be optimistic about 0homeinis susceptibility to the America views. According to him, the situation in Iran is +fluid and completely unpredictable.. It seems that the political and diplomatic worlds are completely in the dar regarding Irans future.(9% The same picture is painted of the 8ritish Eoreign *ffice by the embassy in 'ondon.(9( Schneider reports from Tehran to The Bague on the $(st of Ianuary, writing about the attention in newspapers for the mass demonstrations of the past days. According to him, these demonstrations have given a mandate for the formation of an Islamic republic. Be doesnt specify what he means by this, and seems to have
1-1 1-9

"essage of 2ampagne to "EA on (9th of Ianuary (393, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4. "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on (9th of Ianuary (393, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4. 12+ "essage of Tammenoms 8a er to "EA on (&th of Ianuary (393, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4. 121 "essage of Eac to "EA on (3th of Ianuary (393, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4.

21

borrowed the phrase from newspaper articles that say the same thing. In these newspapers a lot of attention is given to the coming +"uslim revolution., led by 0homeini, and references to the demonstrations as a +mammoth referendum. on the future of Iran. *ther newspapers specifically warn for the hiGac ing of the revolution by religious fanatics. /ress freedom is at a pea during these days, and the embassy clearly ma es good use of it.(9$ "oreover, the uncertainty of the future led to more speculation. *n the $)rd, 2ampagne writes about the possibility of a clash between the army and 0homeinis supporters, if the religious leader would return to Iran. That he will return very soon seems clear to the ambassador. The thing he is still not sure of is how the army would respond.(9) Then, on the )(st of Ianuary, 2ampagne sends a message to The Bague titled +Iran on the eve of 0homeinis return.. Be says that the ambassadors of the nine 7.2.6 countries are +holding their breath, waiting for the new act in this /ersian drama.. Be wonders what 0homeini will do when he has returned to Iran. ,ill he immediately appoint a new government, with the support of the peopleF ,ill he cooperate with the 8a htiar government, under pressure of his more moderate compatriotsF Still, 2ampagne is mainly as ing Duestions.(9= Be reports the return of 0homeini on the = th of Eebruary, and in this message he only cites some of 0homeinis Duotes. 0homeini clearly denounces the 8a htiar government and refuses to spea to them. 0homeini again announces the formation of a revolutionary council, which should supervise elections and the setting up of a new government. 2ampagne says that 0homeini repeatedly contradicts himself and that his message is +not very accurate.. (9A 0homeini then gives the authority to set up a new government to "ehdi 8a!argan, of which 2ampagne reports on the 4th. This government should lead the country towards a referendum in which the people can put the idea of an Islamic republic to a vote. 2ampagne also says that 0homeini, who according to the ambassador now thin s he is the absolute religious authority in Iran, has explained that the government of 8a!argan is one formed and held by Islamic canonical law. Be writes that 8a htiar has responded to the idea of an Islamic republic, saying that +it is incomprehensible to me, and I have not seen this in any boo .. About 0homeinis role in the revolutionary council,
122 123

"essage of Schneider to "EA on $(st of Ianuary (393, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4. "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on $)rd of Ianuary (393, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4. 124 "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on )(st of Ianuary (393, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4. 125 "essage of 2ampagne to "EA on =rd of Eebruary (393, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4.

29

2ampagne writes something very important. Be says that +the relation between 0homeini and the revolutionary council is unclear. Eor so far as his theoretical wor vilayat6i fDih and the Shiite tradition s etch his opinion, it is li ely that he regards himself as Nan advisor with compelling authority. -ight now, there is no reason to believe that he aspires to become head of state. It is thus probable that the revolutionary council will function as a sort of head of state.. This is the first time 2ampagne, or anyone else for that matter, mentions 0homeinis wor on velayat#e fa$ih. Although he doesnt say a lot about his nowledge of the subGect, it loo s li e he has come to now at least the basics. ,hether he has read the text himself is doubtful. It is more li ely that he has found out about it through conversation or other sources. Islamic 1overnment wasnt in full circulation by this time, and certainly not in 7nglish. The fact that he mentions the boo this late, and with previous letters obviously showing that he was oblivious about 0homeinis religious, let alone political views, suggests that he might have found out about it Duite recently. :evertheless, the mentioning of velayat#e fa$ih is an important moment. This meant that the picture of Irans future should now become clearer to the involved. (94 The messages and reports send from the embassy in Tehran to the ministry in The Bague, give a clear picture of the way the Dutch mission in Iran experienced the events of the Islamic revolution. During the first months of (39&, when the revolution had started, there is no real concern for the position of the Shah, and the embassy downplays the events. It is only after the summer that ambassador 2ampagne realises these are no ordinary protests of angry radicals. Erom August onwards, there is an increasing voice of despair in the messages sent to The Bague, sometimes interrupted by a note of positivism when the situation seems to have calmed down a little. In December, it seems clear to the embassy staff writing to the ministry, that the Shah has no real chances left. They are waiting for his abdication. 0homeini is first mentioned by the end of "ay. This is strange, since the two main events leading that triggered the first incidents that led to the revolution, where related to 0homeini. Eirst, there was the murder of his son "ustafa in :ovember (399, and second, the slanderous newspaper article in 8ttelaat in Ianuary (39&. The incidents
12-

"essage of 2ampagne to "EA on 4th of Eebruary (393, A"EA, 3((.)( CIII, folder nr. ==4.

1+

following these events were reported about without the mentioning of the religious leader. Although 0homeini wasnt mentioned, it seems highly unli ely that there was no nowledge of him at the Dutch embassy. They probably deemed him too Bis ideology wasnt mentioned very often too. There are some remar s about an Islamic republic in the second half of (39&, but nowhere does anyone explain what is meant or understood by that idea. It also seems that 0homeini is not ta en seriously as an alternative for future government. In (393, 0homeini is mentioned more and more, and by this time he is increasingly seen as a liable option for government, or at least for the formation of one. ,e can see that by this time his thoughts on the Islamic republic come up more often, but still there is no real explanation of its meaning. 2ampagne mentions velayat#e fa$ih for the first time in Eebruary (393, which shows that by then he did have some nowledge about the ideas of 0homeini. Some excerpts of 'sla)ic -overn)ent were sent by the Dutch embassy in Ierusalem to The Bague, which they had received from the Israeli government. These excerpts in 7nglish led to some consternation at the ministry, as they were in part about the destruction of Israel and ,estern imperialism. They showed 0homeini at his most radical. These excerpts are the first proof that someone at an embassy or ministry had actually read parts of 'sla)ic -overn)ent himself.(99 It can be said that the Dutch embassy in Tehran was late. 'ate in assessing the danger of the events and late in realising the importance of 0homeini and his ideology. The real Duestion is if they can be blamed for that. All over the world, the situation in Iran was unclear. ,e can see this in the different reports coming in from 'ondon, ,ashington and /aris, as well as the ones from Tehran. During a revolution, it is hard to see what exactly is happening. The outcome of these times of turbulence is mostly unpredictable. The world in (39& and (393 did not have the benefit of hindsight. unimportant at first.

122

"essage of the embassy in Ierusalem to "EA on (=th of Eebruary (393, A"EA, 3((.)( IS, folder nr. ==9.

11

Conclusion

In the previous chapters we have ta en a loo at the history of Iran in the twentieth century, leading up to the Islamic revolution, the ideology of 0homeini and how it evolved over the years, the revolution itself and the way the Dutch embassy in Tehran has experienced the turbulent revolutionary period. In this conclusion, we will ta e a brief loo at our findings and try to answer the Duestions that we posed in the introduction. In the first half of the twentieth century, Iran was fighting against its bac ward position and its unimportant role on the world stage. The Tobacco 8oycott and the 2onstitutional revolution showed the already powerful position religious groups had in Iran around (3%%. This was a sign of the capability of the clergy to gather support among the Iranian masses. The wea dynasty of the HaGars was substituted for the rule of the strong -e!a Shah. Jnder his leadership, the real uprooting of traditional Iranian society began. ,ith his moderni!ation from above, he tried to force Iran into becoming a modern nation, shaped by ,estern mould. Be tried to do this by ruthless governance. The battle between the /ahlavis and the ule)a had by then started. Through strictly seculari!ing policies, -e!a Shah tried to change the traditional Iranian society, in which the role of the clergy was everywhere. ,hen he was succeeded by his son "ohammad -e!a, Iran was standing at a turning point in its history. The power of the Shah after the Second ,orld ,ar was a lot smaller than in the years before. This gave the chance to all inds of oppositional groups to flourish. There were religious radical groups li e that of :avvab Safavi, and there were more mainstream opposition groups li e the liberal :ational Eront of "ohammad "ossadeD. It was only after the coup that ousted "ossadeD, through a pact between the Shah, religious groups and the 2.I.A., that the Shah regained the power that his father had had. :ow, he could start fulfilling the dream that he and his father shared5 changing Iran into a developed, modern and powerful country. The ,hite -evolution would be his way of realising all this. Through authoritarian government, the Shah started a similar program of moderni!ation from above. Jnli e his father though, he became a close ally of ,estern powers, specifically

12

the Jnited States. ,ith some help of the J.S., but mostly with the help of the amounts of oil money flowing into Iran, the ,hite -evolution was started in (34) and was still going on when the revolution started. The ,hite -evolution was one of the most important catalysers of unrest in Iran, and probably indirectly led to the revolution at the end of the seventies. ,hat was the impact of itF Although the ,hite -evolution 6 or was it the oil money Q succeeded in raising the standard of Iranian life and in dramatically raising the 1:/, there were a lot of very negative side effects. The authoritarian way of government encouraged corruption, the Shah had created a terrible secret police that repressed his people, he had upset the traditional power and importance of Islam and the divisions between poor and rich were never as big in Iranian society before. 8y (39&, there was high inflation, affecting the poorest segments the people the most. The Shah was dependent on oil money for his big proGects and arms purchases. These big proGects had failed ma ing Iran into a profitable industrial country. The form of state capitalism that the Shah had introduced was highly inefficient. Iranian culture was uprooted by foreign influences, the disappearing of traditional Iranian ways of living, urbani!ation, huge income eDualities and the repression of traditionally powerful groups li e the *a0aaris and the ule)a. All these things were strongly felt by the Iranian population. This great feeling of discontent ultimately led to the Islamic -evolution and gave ground to the activist and fanatical ideology of religious leaders li e 0homeini, who saw his support growing steadily during the sixties and seventies. 0homeini was the first of a new generation of politically activist clerics in Iran. During the time he was a student and his first years in Hum as a )u1tahid, the Iranian clergy was still opposed to involvement in politics. This tradition would be confronted from time to time by clerics li e 0ashani and :uri, but the greater part of the ule)a thought they had no role in politics. 0homeini very consciously chose a political course, after his speeches in (34). ,ith this, he became the voice of the religious opposition against the regime of the Shah. Bis movement consisted mainly of students, but gradually expanded to traditionally religious groups li e the *a0aaris. Bis message was spread through the traditional networ s of Iranian society5 the mosDue, the family and the ba!aar. After his exile, his supporters spread wave of cassette tapes, pamphlets and

13

lectures. 8y the time the revolution bro e loose, they had created a movement that had supporters all over Iran. Bis ideology should have been clear by the late seventies. 8y this time he had written 'sla)ic -overn)ent, in which he clearly describes the way a state should function according to him. The basics for the future Islamic republic were set out in this wor . It was an activist wor , with rhetoric suited for a revolution. Bis message of the oppression of the poor spo e to millions of Iranians, as did his emphasis on the traditional Islamic values of Iran. In a fast changing world, this was something the people could hold on to. :evertheless, it is comprehensible that outside his circle of followers there was no great nowledge about his thoughts and ideas. In Iran, he didnt play a real factor until (399, when the frustration found an outlet. 7ven up till the end of the revolution, a lot of Iranians, including supporters, didnt have a real idea of what 0homeini wanted. In the ,est, the same thing was true. During his years in /aris 0homeini, assisted by some of his ,estern educated advisors, had succeeded in creating a less radical image for himself. Be never really laid down his plans, and from time to time even let it seem that he was interested in a mixture of religion and democracy for the future Iran. It too months after the revolution for 0homeini to really become clear about what he had in mind. ,hat he probably had in mind all the time, was the Islamic republic as it too shape after (393, and as he had written about in his most important wor 'sla)ic -overn)ent. The -oyal :etherlands 7mbassy in Tehran was sitting at the front row when the revolution too place. :evertheless it was hard for them to get a clear picture of what was happening. ,e can see this from the start of the events in (399. The unrest and protests started in :ovember, after the death of "ustafa 0homeini in IraD. Although the embassy reports about protests, they do not name the reason for these. Again in Ianuary, they fail to name the direct incentive for the big protests that started the =%6day cycle, which was the article in 8ttelaat about 0homeini. These two incidents that started the revolution, were both significantly related to 0homeini. Thus, it is strange that he isnt mentioned once. "oreover, the unrest is downplayed by the embassy, saying that it had been worse in years before and blaming it on a too fast transition to modern times. Incidents continue to be reported, without mention of the Shiite =%6day cycle of

14

mourning. 0homeini is first mentioned in a message from the embassy in ,ashington by the end of "ay (39&, but still very brief. It ta es until August before the situation is assessed in all its seriousness by the embassy. In "ay and Iune the ambassador expresses his frustration with media coverage, which in his mind pictures things out of proportion. Then, in August, he ta es a more dramatic tone and wonders if a crisis situation is coming up. 8y this time, the revolution was indeed at a brea ing point. It is strange though, that it too so long for the embassy to realise that the protests were not ordinary and inherently very dangerous. Erom this time on, it is clear that the embassy is very worried about the situation, and that they see increasingly less perspective for the Shah. ,e can clearly see that the situation is becoming more and more unclear for the embassy. In the reports to The Bague there are often more Duestions as ed than answered, and there is a lot of speculation about the future. 2ontrary to the period before August, every little incident is followed closely and reported about. ,e can also see a rise in reports about Iran from other embassies, especially in ,ashington, 'ondon and /aris. It is stri ing that these reports, based on government sources, are often contradicting or ma e different evaluations of the situation. This shows the difficulty ,estern nations had with understanding the events in Iran during the revolution. Still, the Dutch embassy in Iran was fairly Duic with assessing the danger of the situation in Iran. ,here they were having very big doubts about the future of the Shah already in August, this realisation came a lot slower in other countries. 0homeini was being increasingly reported about from *ctober to Ianuary. ,e can see that while time passes, the embassy attributes more importance to him. Eirst, 0homeini is seen as an important figure residing abroad. Then he moves to being the leader of the opposition, but no real alternative for future power. At the end, in Ianuary, he is being seen as a force to be rec oned with, even when thin ing about the future government of Iran. Still, there doesnt seem to be a real nowledge of who 0homeini is and what he stands for. The subGect of an Islamic republic is touched upon a couple of times, but never really is there explained what is meant or understood by it. >elayat#e fa$ih is mentioned for the first time by the ambassador himself, in Eebruary (393. Again, there is no real explanation of what it means. *n the whole, the mention about 0homeinis ideology, his plans for the future and his wor , is very little.

15

It is very probable that the nowledge of the person 0homeini and what he stood for was small. The Duestion is whether we can consciously blame this on the embassy. As we have seen, there were wide ranging opinions about the revolution, when it was still happening, between different people in different countries. During a revolution, when everything is clouded with the fog of war, it is very hard to predict an outcome or ma e an assessment of the situation. 7vents follow up on each other in a rapid pace. A big spectrum of groups is involved, and all have a different opinion about how the future should be. Eurthermore, the embassy was greatly dependent on government sources for its information. In the first place, Iranian government sources5 either government controlled newspapers or people within the government. And in the second place, government sources of other, mostly ,estern, nations5 either embassies or people from foreign government offices. ,e can see that after the lifting of the newspaper stri e in Ianuary (393, the information in the messages to The Bague becomes much more diverse and realistic. The lifting of the ban and the disappearing of censorship helped the embassy a lot. Eurthermore, 0homeini was a mystery for a big part of the Iranian people, let alone the ,estern world. Be didnt really spea a lot about the ideas he vented in Islamic government, about how an Islamic republic should be created. During his stay in /aris, when he grabbed the attention of the ,estern media, a different picture of him was portrayed than later. This picture was deliberately created by his closest advisors, to try to create a positive image of 0homeini in the ,est. Thus, he seemed much more moderate by the time he returned to Iran, than he really was. ,e should as ourselves the Duestion5 can we accuse the Dutch embassy of ignorance when big parts of the Iranian population had no real idea of 0homeinis plans for the future, or of the ideology that he set out in Islamic 1overnmentF The Iranian revolution was a brea ing point in the world history. It was the defining moment for the Islam in the twentieth century, and fuelled the Islamic confidence that has since then only grown. Eor the ,est, it must have been hard to understand the importance of it. The Islamic revolution was a reGection of a ,estern way of living and of ,estern standards and values, which were seen as universal. It was a change of paradigm, and it is always hard to notice this at the time of change itself. ,e can Gudge the events with the benefit of hindsight, which is especially helpful when it comes to

1-

evaluating revolutions. It too a lot more than fifty years for people to understand the Erench revolution, another change of paradigm. ,ith this in mind, who are we to blame people living in the clouds of the smo e, of a lac of understandingF

12

Thesaurus
="hla$ 3a0aari (a$ih (u$aha (edayin#e 'sla) (edayin#e .al$ (i$h '1a0a '1)a '1tihad 7'rfan Aa0iyeh of .halifa .hara1 !adrassah !a1les !ar1a !ar1a#e ta$lid !osta"*erin !osta0afin !u1ahedin#e .al$ 8thics 3a0aar )erchant 'sla)ic Aurisprudent Plural for (a$ih 'ranian 'sla)ic resistance group, founded *y ,avva* %afavi Underground 'ranian co))unist resistance group Aurisprudence =ppoint)ent to the religious ran" of )u1tahid 'sla)ic teaching of consensus 'nterpretation of 'sla)ic holy scripture 'sla)ic )ystical philosophy Tax for non#)usli)s, 2hich is a part of the 'sla)ic syste) taxation caliph BpluralC, %unnitic leader of the u))ah land tax, 2hich is a part of the 'sla)ic syste) of taxation and is also used to define the overall syste) of 'sla)ic taxation 'sla)ic school 'ranian parlia)ent %hort for )ar1a#e ta$lid %hiite cleric of the highest ran", )eaning source of i)itation Dppressors, the rich Dppressed, the poor Undergrond 'sla)ic resistance group

11

!u1tahid %=>=. %haria Ta2hid Tudeh Ule)a U))ah Usul >elayat#e fa$ih Ea"at

%hiite cleric of high ran" The %hahs secret police 'sla)ic religious la2 The unity of all things 'ranian co))unist party 'sla)ic clergy The glo*al )usli) co))unity Teachings of the first principles of 'sla) -overn)ent *y the 1urisprudent 'nco)e tax, 2hich is a part of the 'sla)ic syste) of taxation

19

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7rvand Abrahamian, .ho)einis): 8ssays on the 'sla)ic Repu*lic ?'ondon, (33)@ Ali ". Ansari, The !yth of the White Revolution: !oha))ad Re0a %hah, 7!oderni0ation and the consolidation of po2er in !iddle 8astern %tudies, vol. )9, nr. ) ?Iuly $%%(@ 0aren Armstrong, The 3attle for -od: a +istory of (unda)entalis) ?:ew ;or , $%%%@ "anochehr DorraG, (ro) Earathustra to .ho)eini: Populis) and /issent in 'ran ?'ondon, (33%@ Amir B. Eerdows, N0homeini and Eadayans Society and /olitics in 'nternational Aournal of !iddle 8ast Studies, vol (A, no. $ ?"ay (3&)@ -obert 1raham, 'ran: The illusion of po2er ?'ondon, (39&@ -amin Iahanbegloo, 'ran: 3et2een Tradition and !odernity ?*xford, $%%=@ :i i -. 0eddie, Roots of Revolution: an interpretive history of )odern 'ran ?;ale, (3&(@ :i i -. 0eddie, !odern 'ran: Roots and Results of Revolution ?;ale, $%%)@ Ayatollah -uhollah 0homeini, 'sla)ic -overn)ent: -overnance of 1urisprudent ?Bonolulu, $%%A@ 2harles 0ur!man, The Unthin"a*le Revolution in 'ran ?2ambridge, $%%=@ 8ernard 'ewis, The crisis of 'sla): +oly 2ar and unholy terror ?'ondon, $%%)@

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Canessa "artin, Creating an 'sla)ic %tate: .ho)eini and the !a"ing of a ,e2 'ran ?'ondon, $%%%@ Ali -ahnema, =n 'sla)ic Utopian: = Political 3iography of =li %hariati ?'ondon, (33&@ Saeed -ahnema O Sohrab 8ehdad, 'ran =fter the Revolution: Crisis of an 'sla)ic %tate ?'ondon, (33A@ Earhang -aGaee, 'sla)ic >alues and World >ie2: .ho)eyni on !an, the %tate and 'nternational Politics, >olu)e ?''' ?8oston, (3&)@ ". -e!a 1hods, 'ran in the T2enthieth Century: a political history ?'ondon, (3&3@ "ichael D. -ichards, Revolutions in World +istory ?:ew ;or , $%%=@

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