(EDGAR) 3A2 PLDT, petitioner-defendant v CA & Sps Esteban, respondents-plaintiffs, GR 57079, 1989-09-29 FACTS: 1.

Sps Estebans jeep ran over a mound of earth & fell into an open trench, an excavation undertaken for PLDT installation. Esteban alleges that he failed to notice the open trench (uncovered) because of the creeping darkness & lack of warning lights/signs. Gloria sustained injuries on her arms, legs & face w/ permanent cheek scar. Antonio suffered cut lips. Jeep windshield shattered. 2. PLDT denied liability, contended that Spouses injuries were the result of their own negligence & that independent contractor Barte should be held responsible. 3. PLDT filed 3rd party complaint vs Barte, alleging that under terms of agreement, PLDT not answerable for any accident or injuries arising from negligence of Barte or its employees. 4. Barte claimed it was not aware/notified of the accident & that it complied with the terms by installing signs, barricades & red lights at night. CFI HELD: (1) PLDT ordered to pay Gloria 20K moral, 5K exemplary; Antonio 2K moral, 500 exemplary; legal interest + 3K atty fees. (2) Barte ordered to reimburse PLDT. CIV PRO: Both PLDT & Estebans (re amount of damages) appealed CA ORIG DECISION: CFI decision reversed; Estebans complaint dismissed; Estebans negligent. CIV PRO: Lotsa stuff about MRs & shit. CA HELD: Set aside its previous decision; affirmed CFI decision (PLDT/Barte liable) ISSUE: Is PLDT liable? SC HELD: No. (1) The accident which befell Estebans was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio & not imputable to negligent omission on the part of PLDT. Facts: (a) unexplained abrupt swerving of jeep; (b) jeep must have been running faster than 25kph else it could have braked; (c) Antonio knew of the location of accident mound. (2) The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to their injuries but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known to, hence appreciated and assumed by Estebans. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of PLDT. (3) The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. It is basic that Estebans cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm

and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. (4) Antonio had the LAST CLEAR CHANCE or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to PLDT. He had knowledge (passes daily) of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed them to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence. (5) Insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. Only the self-serving testimony of Antonio, unverified photo of portion of accident scene, no police report, no medical report. A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action must fail. SC DECISION: CA orig decision reinstated & affirmed => Estebans complaint dismissed.

Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs. Court of Appeals Facts A strong typhoon by the code name Gening buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte. After the typhoon had abated the deceased Isabel Lao ventured out of the house. Wading in waist-deep flood, the deceased was followed by Aida Bulong, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased. Suddenly, the deceased screamed and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a post. In another place on that fateful date, Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the National Power Corporation set out of an inspection. Finding the Office of the INELCO still closed, and seeing no lineman therein, he returned to the NPC Compound. Dr. Castro examined the body at about 8:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967. The skin was grayish or, in medical parlance, cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution . An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250,000 was instituted by the heirs of the deceased petitioner argues that it must be exonerated from liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous

events. Issue whether or not petitioner may be held liable for the deceaseds death Held While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victims death. It was through the intervention of petitioners negligence that death took place. x x x Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general public . . . considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be. The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victims death was solely due to a fortuitous event. When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission Martin Hatol Allied Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals G.R. 85868. October 13, 1989. Facts: Respondent Yujuico obtained a loan from the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) in the amount of (P500,000.00), payable on or before April 1, 1977 issuing a corresponding promissory note in favor of GENBANK. At the time respondent incurred the obligation, he was then a ranking officer of GENBANK and a member of the family owning the controlling interest in the said bank. On March 25, 1977, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued Resolution No. 675 forbidding GENBANK from doing business in the Philippines. This was followed by Resolution No. 677 ordering the liquidation of GENBANK. In a Memorandum of Agreement executed by and between Allied Banking Corp (ALLIED) and Aurellano as Liquidator of GENBANK, ALLIED acquired all the assets and assumed the liabilities of GENBANK. Upon failing to comply with the obligation ALLIED filed a complaint against respondent for the collection of a sum of money. Sometime in 1987, in the course of the proceedings, respondent sought to implead the Central Bank and Aurellano as third-party defendants. Respondent alleged

tortious interference by the Central Bank with the affairs of GENBANK, he was prevented from performing his obligation. RTC denied the 3rd Party Complaint. CA reversed. Issue: (a) Is there a proper ground to admit the third-party complaint?; and (b) assuming that there is, has the cause of action under the third-party complaint prescribed? Held: After going through the records of this case, this Court finds that the third party plaintiffs claim is premised not only on what was alleged as the tortious interference by the third-party defendants with the affairs of GENBANK. More importantly, attention should have been focused on the fact that this allegation is wedded to a decision rendered by the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC. We quote the pertinent portion of the affirmed decision, to wit: Based on the foregoing facts, the Court finds the liquidation of GBTC which merely adopted the bid of the Lucio Tan group as the liquidation plan of GBTC, as plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and therefore the same must be annulled and set aside. Whether or not this Court agrees with the petitioners assertion that the claim does not arise out of the same transaction on which the plaintiffs claim is based, it cannot be denied that the third-partys claim (although arising out of another or different contract or transaction) is connected with plaintiffs claim. There can be no question in this case that the action for damages instituted by private respondent arising from the quasi-delict or alleged tortious interference should be filed within (4) years from the day the cause of action accrued. Thus, while technically the third party complaint in this case may be admitted as above discussed, however, since the cause of action accrued on March 25, 1980 when the Monetary Board ordered the General Bank to desist from doing business in the Philippines while the third party complaint was filed only on June 17, 1987, consequently, the action has prescribed. The third party complaint should not be admitted. SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE vs. CA -angiereen medina G.R. No. 126389 July 10, 1998 Facts: This is a complaint for damages based on culpa aquilana. On October 11, 1989, powerful typhoon Saling hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of Southeastern Colleges building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents Dimaanos house.

Private respondent alleged that the damage to their house rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in others houses. An ocular inspection of the destroyed building was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official. It is stated in the result of such investigation that the most likely reason for the dislodging of the roofings structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the said trusses to the roof beams. Thus, the fourth floor of subject school building was declared as a structural hazard. Lower court awarded damages. CA affirmed but reduced damages. Issue: WON the damage of the PRs house resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the school buildings roof ripped off was due to fortuitous event? Held: NO. It is a rule that in order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned. An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences. When a person's negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event. When the effect is found to be partly the result of the participation of manwhether it be from active intervention, or neglect, or failure to actthe whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. However, Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of petitioners school building after the typhoon. As the term imparts, an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing. What is visual to the eye through is not always reflective of the real cause behind. Petitioners obtained a permit from the city building official before the construction of its building. Having obtained both building permit and certificate of occupancy is prima facie evidence of the regular and proper construction of subject school building. When part of its roof needed repairs of the damage inflicted by typhoon Saling, the city engineer gave the go-signal for such repairs without any deviation from the original design. It subsequently authorized the use of the entire fourth floor

of the same building. These only prove that subject building suffers from no structural defect. Petitioner presented its vice president for finance and administration who testified that an annual maintenance inspection and repair of subject school building were regularly undertaken. Petitioner was even willing to present its maintenance supervisor to attest to the extent of such regular inspection but private respondents agreed to dispense with his testimony and simply stipulated that it would be corroborative of the vice presidents narration. Besides, no complaint regarding any defect on the same structure has ever been lodged before his office prior to the institution of the case at bench. It is a matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common occurrences in this country. If subject school buildings roofing was not firmly anchored to its trusses, obviously, it could not have withstood long years and several typhoons even stronger than Saling. Petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon Saling was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents house.

Philippine Bank of Commerce v CA (Lipana) - Rey

269 SCRA 695 (March 14, 1997) Facts: Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two separate current accounts with the Pasig Branch of PBCom in connection with its business of selling appliances. From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, Romeo Lipana, RMCs GM, claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totaling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds to RMCs account with PBCom. It turned out, that these deposits were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to the PBCom account of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas. Irene Yabut would accomplish two copies of the deposit slip, an original and a duplicate. The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number. On the duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank. PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad, would validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip. The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number written thereon and make it appear to be RMC's account number. She made her company believe that the amounts she deposited were being credited to its

account when, in fact, they were being deposited in the account of her husband. During the entire period, PBCom had been regularly furnishing RMC with monthly statements showing its current account balances. Unfortunately, it was never the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these monthly statements reposing complete trust and confidence to PBCom and to his secretary. Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from petitioner bank the return of its money. Issue: Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of RMC. Held: In the case at bench, there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by the private respondent (plaintiff in the trial court) RMC in the amount of P304,979.74. It is in ascribing fault or negligence which caused the damage where the parties point to each other as the culprit. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. Picart v. Smith, provides the test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case which may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. Applying the above test, it appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate, as testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself. Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. This was exemplified in the testimony of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and now its Vice-President, to the effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the incident, he never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures. It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, as insisted by the petitioners

MANILAELECTRICCOMPANYv.REMOQUILLOKM (Teststodetermineproximatecause) Facts: Efren Magno repaired the media agua said to be in a leaking condition at Penalozas house, which is located just below the window of the third story of the latters house. Magno received from his son a galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking media agua. While turning around and in doingso,thelower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of MERALCO, causing his death by electrocution.

The trial court ruled in favor of Magnos heirs (Remoquillo was the guardian of the heirs of Magno), whichwasaffirmedbytheCourtofAppeals. Issue:WhetherornotMERALCOisliable.NO Ruling: The death of Magno was primarily causedbyhisownnegligenceandinsomemeasurebythetooclose proximity of the media agua to the electricwireofMERALCObyreasonoftheviolationoftheoriginal permitgivenbythecityandthesubsequentapprovalofsaidillegalconstructionofthemediaagua. Ontheuninsulatedwires Contrary to the findings of the trial court, there is a distance of 7 feet and 2 inches of thewirefrom the side of the house of Penaloza. Penaloza also did not follow the terms of the permit for the constructionofhismediaagua.TheuninsulatedwiresoftheMERALCOisnotnegligenceonthelatters part since the claim of the company andreasonsgivenbyitfornotinsulatingsaidwireswereunrefuted. The 3 feetdistanceofthewiresfromthehouseisconsideredsufficientlysafebythetechnicalmenofthe city. OnthenegligenceofMagno Being called by Penaloza to repair the media agua, it is to be presumed that due to his age and experience, he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had training and experience for the job. He could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurkinginthem. Where it is shown that the death ofthedeceasedwasprimarilycausedbyhisownnegligence, defendant cannot be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence. The principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire (which was theremotecause)butrather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized sheet without precaution(theprimarycause). A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior and remote cause and the injury, a distinct, successive unrelated and efficient cause of theinjury,eventhoughsuchinjurywouldnothavehappened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. If an independent negligent act or

defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defectivecondition,suchactorconditionistheproximatecaus

IlocosNorteElectricCompanyvs.CourtofAppeals

Facts AstrongtyphoonbythecodenameGeningbuffetedtheprovinceofIlocosNorte.Afterthetyphoon hadabatedthedeceasedIsabelLaoventuredoutofthehouse.Wadinginwaistdeepflood,the deceasedwasfollowedbyAidaBulong,andbyLindaAlonzoEstavillo.AidaandLindawalkedsideby sideatadistanceofbetween5and6metersbehindthedeceased.Suddenly,thedeceasedscreamed andquicklysankintothewater.Thetwogirlsattemptedtohelp,butfeardissuadedthemfromdoingso becauseonthespotwherethedeceasedsanktheysawanelectricwiredanglingfromapost.

Inanotherplaceonthatfatefuldate,EngineerAntonioJuan,PowerPlantEngineeroftheNational PowerCorporationsetoutofaninspection.FindingtheOfficeoftheINELCOstillclosed,andseeing nolinemantherein,hereturnedtotheNPCCompound.

Dr.Castroexaminedthebodyatabout8:00A.M.onJune29,1967.Theskinwasgrayishor,in medicalparlance,cyanotic,whichindicateddeathbyelectrocution .AnactionfordamagesintheaggregateamountofP250,000wasinstitutedbytheheirsofthe deceased

petitionerarguesthatitmustbeexoneratedfromliabilitysincetyphoonsandfloodsarefortuitousevents.

Issue whetherornotpetitionermaybeheldliableforthedeceasedsdeath

Held

WhileitistruethattyphoonsandfloodsareconsideredActsofGodforwhichnopersonmaybeheld responsible,itwasnotsaideventualitywhichdirectlycausedthevictimsdeath.Itwasthroughthe interventionofpetitionersnegligencethatdeathtookplace.xxxIndeed,underthecircumstancesof thecase,petitionerwasnegligentinseeingtoitthatnoharmisdonetothegeneralpublic... consideringthatelectricityisanagency,subtleanddeadly,themeasureofcarerequiredofelectric companiesmustbecommensuratewithorproportionatetothedanger.Thedutyofexercisingthishigh degreeofdiligenceandcareextendstoeveryplacewherepersonshavearighttobe.Thenegligenceof petitionerhavingbeenshown,itmaynotnowabsolveitselffromliabilitybyarguingthatthevictims deathwassolelyduetoafortuitousevent.WhenanactofGodcombinesorconcurswiththe negligenceofthedefendanttoproduceaninjury,thedefendantisliableiftheinjurywouldnothave resultedbutforhisownnegligentconductoromission