Synthese (2008) 163:175185 DOI 10.

1007/s11229-007-9196-3

Meta-epistemology and the varieties of epistemic innitism

Scott F. Aikin

Received: 26 July 2006 / Accepted: 12 May 2007 / Published online: 27 June 2007 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Abstract I will assume here the defenses of epistemic innitism are adequate and inquire as to the variety standpoints within the view. I will argue that innitism has three varieties depending on the strength of demandingness of the innitist requirement and the purity of its conception of epistemic justication, each of which I will term strong pure, strong impure, and weak impure innitisms. Further, I will argue that impure innitisms have the dialectical advantage. Keywords Epistemology Innitism Foundationalism Regress problem

Epistemic Innitism is an underdeveloped view. On the old epistemic regress problem, innitism is the view that one can solve the problem by giving (or having) reasons on to innity. Its prima facie implausibility surely explains this lack of developmentso few have been willing to go to the mat for the thesis. Some have recently defended innitism against both the initial implausibility problem and actual arguments against itnotably, Peter Klein (1998, 1999, 2003), Jeremy Fantl (2003), and myself (2005). I will proceed here as though these defenses are adequate for the time being and inquire as to the variety standpoints within the view. I will argue that innitism has at least three varieties depending on the strength of demandingness of the innitist requirement and the purity of its conception of epistemic justication, each of which I will term strong pure, strong impure, and weak impure innitisms. Further, I will argue that impure innitisms have the dialectical advantage. Before proceeding with innitism, some theoretical apparatus must be assembled. Two distinctions are necessary. The rst is between pure and impure meta-epistemic theories. Pure meta-epistemic theories are commitments to the exclusivity of one source or formal structure of justication. So pure foundationalism, for example, is the commitment to basic beliefs

S. F. Aikin (B ) Philosophy, Vanderbilt University, 111 Furman Hall, Nashville, TN 37212, USA e-mail: scott.f.aikin@vanderbilt.edu

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being the source of all epistemic justication.1 Pure coherentism is the view that coherence (of the right kind) is the only source.2 Impure epistemic theories are more ecumenicalthere may be more than one formal structure for justication. Some impure foundationalisms, for example, allow both basic beliefs and perhaps systematic coherence to be sources for justication.3 Impure coherentisms, too, may allow for basic beliefs to function alongside coherent sets of beliefs.4 In fact, with some impure theories, the distinction between foundationalist versions and coherentist versions seems more a matter of emphasis than a real theoretical difference.5 The dialectical factor counting in the favor of pure epistemic theories is that the regress problem is a powerful tool to motivate a theory, since the classical version of the problem generally yields at most ve or six possible solutions (skepticism, foundationalism, coherentism, externalism, basic unjustied beliefs, and innitism). The purist then knocks off the relevant challenges and then proceeds to elaborate her own view. The case for the purists view is made, then, on the basis of the hexalemma (for six choices) where ve of the choices are either refuted or reasonably presumed out of bounds. It makes for neat scholarly work. The dialectical situation for those defending an impure epistemic theory is that the history of exchanges between purists has yielded some very good arguments against pretty much every view. Some of these arguments proceed from prima facie cases of knowledge to showing how competitors cannot countenance the cases, but the favored theory can. So foundationalists hold out their hands, coherentists hold out interpretations and explanations. What impure theorists do with the piecemeal of intuitive cases of knowledge is cobble together a systematic view of knowledge that allows a variety of sources of justication. With some things, only basic beliefs can do the work, and with other things, only epistemic relations between beliefs can do the work. As such, the impure theorist has fewer bullets to bite dialectically, and she proceeds in a fashion of systematically saving the appearances. The second distinction is between the strong and weak demandingness of a meta-epistemic view. Justication trees (J-trees) are an easy way to present this difference. A J-tree for some subject Ss belief that p is a graphic representation of the justifying reasons S has for p. So if S believes that p on the basis of q and r, and S believes q on the basis of s and r on t, Ss J-tree for p would have two branches, with q and r as nodes on one level and s and t on nodes at a lower level:
p / q / s \ r \ t

We could ask further question about s and t, and depending on which epistemic theory is right, S may in the end have a basic belief (one for which no more beliefs are necessary) or some epistemic relation of coherence with the right set of beliefs as the justiers. From the earlier distinction between pure and impure theories, a pure foundationalism is the view that
1 See, for example, Moser (1984, 1989) and Feldman (2003). 2 See, for example, Davidson (1986). 3 For example, Audi (2001). 4 BonJour, even as a coherentist about empirical knowledge, was still a foundationalist about a priori

knowledge (1985).
5 Which is solvable by Susan Haacks term foundherentism (1993).

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all J-trees have only basic beliefs at their bottom nodes. Pure coherentism is that all nal nodes bear epistemic relations of coherence with the relevant beliefs. Strong epistemic theories run that all J-trees must have at least one branch end with the relevant epistemic type of belief. These beliefs are necessary for any J-tree. Weak epistemic theories hold that some J-trees have at least one branch end with the relevant type of belief. Strong epistemic foundationalism is the view that every J-tree has at least one basic belief. Weak epistemic foundationalism is the view that there are J-trees with some basic beliefs. Basic beliefs yield justication for weak theories, but they are not necessary for all J-trees. There are four possibilities for combination for these meta-epistemic theories, then. Let us use foundationalism as the exemplar: Strong pure foundationalismbasic beliefs are the only source of justication, and all J-trees have only basic beliefs as their terminating nodes. Weak pure foundationalismbasic beliefs are the only source for justication, and some J-trees have basic beliefs as their terminating nodes. Strong impure foundationalismbasic beliefs are not the only source of justication, but all J-trees have at least one basic belief as a terminating node. Weak impure foundationalism basic beliefs are not the only source of justication, but there are at least some J-trees with basic beliefs as terminating nodes. Clearly weak pure foundationalism is not a real possibility, since some of the J-trees with basic beliefs (because of the exclusivity of basic beliefs yielding justication, on the purity commitment) will in fact be all of the J-trees. This, then, yields a strong pure foundationalism. So all pure meta-epistemic theories are strong. But impure meta-epistemic theories may either be weak or strong. Strong impure foundationalism is the view that though there may be other sources of justication, basic beliefs are still necessary for any J-tree. Basic beliefs are not exclusive of justication, but are necessary. This distinction is particularly useful in light of the structural arguments foundationalists make against coherentists. For example, Paul Moser (1984) argues that coherentism cannot independently solve the regress problem, since assessments of coherence cannot themselves be based on coherence. Intuitive or basic beliefs are necessary. This argument may be correct, but it only is a case for strong foundationalism (as the requirement that basic beliefs must play a role in all J-trees), but it does not necessarily count against an impure coherentist commitment to coherence being a source of justication. As such, Mosers arguments clearly count against pure coherentisms, but they cannot yet clear the eld. Finally, weak impure foundationalism is the view that there are not only other sources of justication, but there may even be J-trees without any basic beliefs as their terminating nodes. Basic beliefs are productive of, but they are neither exclusive nor necessary for justication. On these three combinations of strengths of demandingness and exclusivity of metaepistemic theories, three correlate possibilities arise for epistemic innitism: Strong pure epistemic innitismall branches on J-trees are innitely extended. There are no other sources of justication other than innite chains of inference. Strong impure epistemic infitinitismat least one branch on every J-tree must be innitely extended. There other sources of justication, but innitely extended chains of inference are necessary for any J-tree. Weak impure epistemic innitismInnite chains of inference are productive of justication, but they are not necessary for all J-trees. Peter Kleins innitism, outlined in Human Knowledge and the Innite Regress of Reasons (1999), is a pure epistemic theory, as he holds innitisms central thesis is the structure

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of justicatory reasons is innite and non-repeating (1999, 297). Klein proceeds precicely from the dialectical position of the hexalemma and eliminates foundationalism, coherentism, unjustied foundations, and reliablism in order to motivate his view.6 Kleins case against the alternatives proceeds from two intuitive principles of good reasoning: the Principle of Avoiding Circularity, and the Principle of Avoiding Arbitrariness. Together, they amount to the requirement that subjects must have reasons as a whole that are non-circular and that subjects must for each reason individually have reasons they can give in its favor. Kleins argument is that these requirements as conditions for rational believing stand as exclusive requirements in favor of innitism, because the alternatives clearly run afoul of one or two of them and innitism runs afoul of neither. So he concludes: The innitist is claiming that a normatively acceptable set of reasons must be innitely long and non-repeating if we are to avoid the pitfalls of foundationalism (arbitrariness) and coherentism (begging the question) (1998, 222). Jeremy Fantls argument for innitism in Modest Innitism (2003) is also exclusivist, and is as such, a strong pure theory. Fantl similarly introduces two requirements for a theory of justication: that the theory account for justication coming in degrees and that complete justication (or justication simpliciter, full justication, or justication of the highest degree) makes sense. Fantl then proceeds to show that neither foundationalism nor coherentism can live up to these requirements. Foundationalism fails because the traditional version of the view seems to make all basic beliefs justied in virtue of their truth, which makes them all fully justied, and as such, justication does not admit of degrees.7 Alternately, if foundationalism allows incompletely justied beliefs to serve as basic, then foundationalism cannot explain the possibility of complete justication. Coherentism fails because it is not, at least on internalist requirements, capable of yielding complete justication (2003, 541). That is, if the justication for some Ss belief that p was ps coherence with the most coherent, comprehensive, and explanatory group of beliefs, then surely the belief that p belongs would improve the justication for p. But on the one hand, for a set of beliefs to satisfy these requirements, it may turn out that there must be an innite number of them. And on the other hand, surely the belief that a proposition coheres with that set must itself be justied, and that one also, for complete justication. As such, for coherentism to meet the completeness requirement, it must be a tacit innitism (2003, 546). My own version of innitism in Who Is Afraid of Epistemologys Regress Problem? (2005) is an impure version of the view, as I describe the innitism I defend as consistent with modest epistemic foundationalism (2005, 191). I introduce the foundationalist conception of justication in order to answer the question as to how innitism itself can eliminate arbitrary but innite chains of modus ponens inferences from the class of justiers. The challenge is formulated as what I call the modus ponens reductio (MPR) of innitism. My strategy is to concede that beliefs based on (some acceptable set of) non-doxastic states are innocent until proven guilty (200), and show how innite chains must be supplemented by non-doxastic support. The non-doxastic support for these inferential chains counts as prima facie evidence that they are correct (as opposed to the arbitrary ones). My view is clearly ecumenical enough to qualify as impure, but it is unclear whether it is strong or weak, given the contents of the essay. However, it is clear, from how I solve the arbitrariness problem with the MPR (by requiring basic beliefs in every J-tree), my view is certainly a strong impure founda6 Note that Klein does not eliminate skepticism for the argument. Kleins take on the matter is that the old Agrippan-Pyrrhonean skepticism of the ve modes is consistent with epistemic innitism namely that there are cases where we do not meet the innitist requirement. See Kleins development of the view in 2003. 7 The argument is more detailed that this, and I will address it more fully below.

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tionalism in the requirement of basic beliefs. With regard to innitism, I lean toward strong innitism, since even for connecting appearances with beliefs about the external world, I require innite inferential series (201). But this requirement is one that only extends to fallible external world beliefs. It still, on my account, is an open question as to whether there can be beliefs completely justied by non-doxastic contents only, which would yield a weak impure innitism. It is clear, given the arguments both Klein and Fantl have against innitisms meta-epistemic competitors in favor of pure innitism, the dialectical burden is on the impure innitist to answer their challenges. That is, if the impure theory allows in sources of justication that Klein and Fantl have shown inconsistent with innitism, then it is incumbent on the impure innitist to show how the alternatives are in fact consistent with innitism. What follows is a sketch of such a defense. Kleins argument against foundationalism is that it either runs afoul of the arbitrariness requirement or it is in fact innitist. If a belief B is taken to be foundational, it must be so on the basis of some property F of B. But what makes Bs having F a reason for it to be a basic belief? How is F related, say, to Bs truth? Either the foundationalist answers the question (and the regress continues, which means that foundationalism is on the road to innitism) or no answers are coming (and the basic belief, from the perspective of the reasoner, is an arbitrary foundation). For responsible reasoners, the meta-justication is invoked in order to avoid the appearance of arbitrariness for it is designed to show why the nal beliefs are likely true (1999, 304). The point of Kleins dilemma here is that foundationalism as a meta-epistemic theory cannot solve the structural problem of the regress. Basic beliefs are held as basic with reasons or without, and the former is a de facto failure to end the regress of reasons, and the latter is a de jure failure to end the regress. It should be noted that Kleins dilemma, as formulated, does not presume that a subject must be justied in her assessments of her current justication, since the regress is not regarding whether the subject is justied in taking B to be justied but regarding whether F is a reason for holding B. That is, F (or Bs having F) stands as a reason for B, and so a further question can be asked as to how F in fact justies B. So the dilemma is not dependent on some version of the JJ principle, but is a rst order question about Bs justication. A foundationalist response to Kleins dilemma is that surely being able to explain the connection between Bs property F and Bs truth is requisite for Bs justication, but that explanation itself is not a continuation of the regress of jusitification. Take the old introspective belief held by some subject, S: (H) I have a headache. I take it that some S would be justied in holding H if she did so on the basis of feeling headachy. So F for H would be the basing relation between H and the subjects awareness of her non-doxastic state. It seems right that if S has got the conceptual tools to formulate H and for it to be a belief held by a responsible human adult, our subject should be able to answer further questions about H and F. But this ability is a condition for H being basic for S; it itself does not comprise reasons for H. If asked, how do you know that you have a headache?, S would probably respond that she feels it. Or, in classic Ducassian fashion, she would simply repeat H (Ducasse 1944, 339). Kleins default is to interpret this as either arbitrary or perhaps circular reasoning. But on this reading of F, restating H is appropriate, because with the restatement S is elliptically stating something along the lines of: (HF) I believe I have a headache on the basis of the fact that I have a headache.

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On the Ducassian model, restating the belief on the challenge is a stand-in for articulating the fact with which one is acquainted that comprises the belief. But more can be said, especially if one is a good (or even passable) foundationalist. One strategy would be to turn the tables on the Kleinian skeptic-innitist and ask on the basis of what anyone would challenge H and perhaps explain that these attitudes have default status, or explain that headaches are precisely the kind of things that if you feel like youve got one, youve got one. But regardless of what S says in her defense, these reasons may be indicative of how she is a responsive and capable reasoner, but they are not justiers for H. S can explain why H is a basic belief for her in showing that she is a capable reasoner, but showing that she knows what she is doing when she avows H is not a justication for H in the sense that it would serve as a set of reasons for H. Rather, they are abilities S must be able to display for her to hold any kind of belief with the semantic contents of Hshe must know something about how headaches feel and how one might get them, have some tacit familiarity with the default status of rst person psychological statements, etc. Being able to answer questions about H and F is clearly a condition for S to be justied in holding H and answering them may in fact improve Hs epistemic status, but this does not mean that they are justiers for H. Ss independent justication for H should be just her being aware of her headache.8 A necessary condition for her to be justied in holding H (perhaps conditions for her to formulate H at all) would be that she is able to responsively regard her non-doxastic psychological states.9 She can demonstrate that ability by answering questions correctly, but for H to be justied for her, she must not only be able to answer these questions, she must have that antecedent awareness of her headache. Showing that she can recognize a headache or that she can defend some sense of priviledged access does not justify S in believing H, because without the antecedent awareness of the headache S would not be justied in H. So Klein is right that the meta-regress begins a new regress for justication, but it does not begin the original regress anew. As such, if this distinction between the doxastic conditions for being justied and the nondoxastic justiers is right, then Kleins meta-regress argument may show the unavoidability of innitism, but it does not by necessity eliminate foundationalism. Fantls argument against foundationalism is that the foundationalist takes basic beliefs to be either self-justifying or in need of a meta-justication. He terms the rst option traditional foundationalism and the second meta-justicatory foundationalism. The traditional foundationalist, on the one hand, faces a dilemma: either basic beliefs are fully justied or not. If they are, then foundationalism cannot explain how justication admits of degrees. If basic beliefs are not all fully justied (for example, the belief about the number of speckles on a hen. . . as they reach 20 or so, our condence would surely drop below complete condence), then they must be justied by something other than themselves. Otherwise, they would all have the same justication (2003, 544). Meta-justicatory foundationalists, on the other hand, cannot satisfy the completeness requirement without becoming de facto innitists (2003, 546). That is, if no belief B can be completely justied without some feature F, then one will be in a better position to hold the belief if one had a reason to hold that B had F. Of course, one would be in a much better position if that belief itself were completely justied, which requires another reason, which itself should be completely justied. . . and so on.
8 See Andrew Clings criticism of Klein on similar grounds: Foundationalism implies that some beliefs can

be justied independently of propositional support, not that there are propositions for which propositional support is in some absolute sense unavailable (2004, 107). 9 Daniel Howard-Snyder makes a similar distinction between, on the one hand, a basic belief being justied for S and S believing the premises of a meta-justicatory argument and, on the other hand, the justication of Ss basic belief being derived from Ss meta-justicatory argument (2005, 21).

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Fantls argument that innitism is a consequence of meta-justicatory foundationalism is posited on the same confusion behind Kleins meta-justicatory argumentnamely taking a subjects ability to answer challenges to and questions about a basic belief for a continuation of reasons supporting the belief. Take, again, some subjects belief that she has a headache (H). She could not be in any better position to assess its truth than when she focuses her attention on how her head feels. Her relative ability to answer questions about that privileged position does not amount to an argument for H, but rather is evidence that she know what she is doing when she avows it. Again, a subjects ability to answer meta-challenges to basic beliefs is necessary for their being justied for S as a reasonable and responsible believer, but they do not constitute reasons for the beliefthey are abilities that make up Ss knowing what she is doing when she holds the belief. The consequence, then, is that though challenges to Ss belief that H as basic and Ss defenses may go on to innity, these do not undermine Hs status as basic, since they are not arguments constitutive of the epistemic relation between Ss belief and her non-doxastic state. So Fantl, like Klein, confuses the possibility of separate chains of argument being possible with continuing the original chain. Regarding cases like a subject believing that she has a headache, Fantl concedes that further reasons are not necessary for such a proposition to be justied to a very high degree, nor are further reasons necessary for the proposition to justied to a sufcient degree to count as knowledge. However, these propositions cannot be fully justied for this subject because: I also recognize that there are many difculties with introspection. . ., including difculties that make fallibility in introspection a somewhat plausible consequence. Given this, its hard to see why, if you can have as an adequate reason that, how and why introspection works, and in particular, that it worked well in this instance, the degree to which I have a headache is justied for you wouldnt increase (2003, 561). As such, Fantl holds, in the end, that in light of a reasonable fallibilism about introspection (and other sources of informationrational insight and ordinary perception), no human can ever have complete justication, because all of the worries about whatever source of information can never be completely settled. Only innite inquiry could do that. So foundationalism, if it allows basic beliefs to be less than completely justied, cannot show how complete justication is possible. First note that Fantl has conceded that there can be other sources of justication, though they do not by themselves yield complete justication.10 It seems that this should have been his main argumentfallible (or at least purportedly fallible) sources of justication cannot yield complete justication. But putting things this way trivializes the argument, because it is precisely this constraint on a theory of justication that most fallibilist theorists have been trying to do without. Fallibilist theories of justication are designed precisely to make due without the concept of complete justication, because of its either unattainability or its incoherence.11 Fantl, here, argues that innitism is still preferable even in if complete justication is incoherent, because it still makes sense of the thought that for any degree of justication yielded by a fallible source, there is a higher degree which is attainable with further reasons
10 In this respect, the classication of Fantl as a pure innitist may be strained, since he is willing to coun-

tenance other sources of justication. (Thanks to one of my reviewers for this point.) However, given that Fantls requirements are still that innite chains of inferential support are the only sources of justication sufcient for complete justication, the view is exclusive with regards to that element of justication. And again, Fantls concession here is hypothetically dependent on his dialectical opponent allowing basic beliefs to be incompletely justied. Fantl here does not categorically endorse the commitment. 11 Take, for example, Peirces argument that certainty is not something that can be rationally attained, because reasons are always tentative and open for challenge (Peirce 19311935, CP 5.214).

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(perhaps eliminating pressing defeaters). But, again, Fantls point holds fallibilists to standards they reject, since the point of fallibilist theories is to nd legitimate stopping places in these exchanges with the full awareness that they can continue endlessly. If that is the case, Fantl is wrong that innitism is preferable to foundationalism, because his innitism is only different in emphasis from modest foundationalisms. Further, fallibilism is not necessarily motivated by the thought that complete justication is incoherent or unattainable, but rather it is motivated by the thought that complete justication is not necessary for knowledge. The standard we should hold theories of justication to is that in the service of being adequate to analyze knowledge. So if complete justication is not necessary for knowledge, then it is an excessive requirement for theories of justication. A nal point is that Fantls argument that traditional foundationalism, if it requires that basic beliefs are completely justied, cannot countenance degrees of justication clearly misses its target. Fantls dilemma for basic beliefs is that either they are all fully or not all fully justied. He holds that the consequence of holding that all basic beliefs are fully justied is that one cannot then explain how justication comes in degrees. But surely this is not correct. Fantl requires that foundationalists address the degree requirement only with basic beliefs: This is on the initial assumption that foundationalism can only satisfy the requirements by specifying the way the foundational reasons should be treated (2003, 545). But many traditional foundationalists explain degrees of justication by appealing to weaker than deductive inferential support yielded by basic beliefs. So, C.I. Lewiss pragmatic foundationalism had certainties as terminating judgments, but their epistemic support for the superstructure of the rest of human knowledge was probabilistic (1946). Timothy McGrew, a modern-day Lewisian, has subjects basic beliefs justied by their indexical relation to the subjects non-doxastic psychological states, but beliefs about the world and so on are abductively justied (1995). One, in fact, does not have to go any further than Descartes himself, the paradigmatic traditional foundationalist, who held that one may nevertheless err in making non-deductive inferences from clear and distinct perceptions, because we are not omniscient (Descartes 1984, CSM II 5455; AT VII 7879). Traditional foundationalism can answer Fantls two requirements, and as such, it is still a viable meta-epistemic theory. I propose, then, that an updating of the dialectical situation within innitism is necessary. Klein and Fantls arguments for the exclusivity of innitism with regard to the structure of reasons fail with foundationalism. There may be other arguments against foundationalism that succeed on innitist grounds, but none are yet on the table. This, however, does not mean that innitism is wrong, but that the proponents of the pure versions of the view must either develop new arguments or turn ecumenical with impure versions of the view. There is a dialectical consideration that further distinguishes pure and impure inntitisms in what I earlier (2005) termed the modus ponens reductio. This objection to innitism amounts to the argument that innite chains of reasons are, when considered as mere relations between beliefs, arbitrary. The thought was captured early by Max Deutscher: Could it be one vast delusion system? Is a man reasonable in holding one belief merely because he holds another whose propositional content is suitably related to the rst, even if he holds the second on account of a third which is suitably related to the second, and so on? Might not a man just dream up a system and be ingenious enough to always extend his story in logical fashion? How can the mere continuous extension of a belief system guarantee the rationality of the members of the system? (1973, 6) We can make good on this worry by formulating the following way of extending reasongiving in Deutschers purely logical fashion. Let the following beliefs stand in the support relation such that B1 is supported by B2, and B2 by B3, and so on.

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B1: p B2: q & (q p) B3: r & (r (q & (q p))) B4: . . . . We can see clearly that if B2 is justied, it entails B1, so B1 is justied so long as B2 is. And B2 is justied by B3, and B3 by B4, and so on. So long as modus ponens is truth preservative and epistemic justication follows what are intuitively truth indicative inferences (these are at least plausible assumptions), p, on the innitist thesis, is justied. But now note that if we change p to not-p, we get the following set of beliefs: B1 : p B2 : q & (q p) B3 : r (r (q & (q p) B4 : . . . . The problem is that on the innitist theory, we have no rational way of telling the difference between one justifying set of beliefs that is conducive of truth and one that is not. Innitist justication, precisely because it is dened exclusively in terms of relations between beliefs, looses its moorings with truth. Epistemic justication that does so loses the name.12 But here the issue can be resolved by a question as to whether the sets of beliefs (B1. . .Bn) and (B1 . . . Bn ), if they are unadjudicable between their claims on the truth of p and p, are the only necessary components for a justicatory story. If they cannot be rationally adjudicated by their own contents and inferential relations, then ex hypothesi, there must be some other feature that is necessary. Insofar as any J-tree will be subject to the same structural issue (which is necessary, given the syntax of J-trees), only beliefs not in need of J-trees can play the role of rationally adjudicating the two sets claims on truth. There, if there are innitely iterating branches of reasons, must also be terminating nodes on those branches, too. So, the difference between the two sets can be captured between the cognitive situation for some subject between B2 and B2 : B2 : q & (q p) B2 : q & (q p) Both simplify to: B2a: q p B2 a: q p Given that J-trees are supposed to be snapshots of a subjects beliefs, and that a condition for belief is understanding, any subject caught in this dilemma must be capable of understanding the difference between these two conditionals. One may ask our subject, When q, not p? Are you sure? A subjects understanding of the propositions may, it seems, provide immediate justication for accepting one conditional over another, say in cases of their relation being relations like the following: Analytic (or logical) entailment: If Sams a bachelor, then hes male. If something is blue, its colored. If something has properties F and G, it has property F.
12 Versions of this argument and a simpler form that I call the modus ponens reductio and the simplication reductio, respectively (2005) have been made by: Deutscher (1973, 6), Pollock (1974, 2829), Oakley (1976, 227228), Cornman (1977, 290), Foley (1978, 313), Post (1980, 3235; and 1987, 8891), Moser (1985, 67), and Cling (2004, 110).

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Synthetic a priori support: If Sally is elderly, Sally is old. If something is a physical object, that thing has spatial properties. Morally or practically intuitive connections: If you promised to take out the trash, you should. If someones elderly, you shouldnt torture her for fun. If someone gives you something, ceteris paribus you should express gratitude. Experiential connections: If you hold your hand up in front of your face with your eyes open and in good light, youll be appeared to your-hand-in-front-of-your-face-ly. If you drink a lot of beer, youll feel light headed (at least). Simply change all the above conditionals so that their consequents are negated, and we can tell the difference epistemically between B2a and B2 a when they are formulated as such. We may need further arguments to x the consequent as justied, but we can tell the difference between and even assign justicatory status to one or the other conditional depending on our understanding and experience relevant to these propositions. If the foundationalist thesis is broadly right that understanding, moral sense, and experience provide at least a prima facie epistemic difference between propositions, we have a way of rationally adjudicating the two competing sets. The conclusion, then, is that impure innitism is dialectically preferable, since the subjects considering these series of inferentially related beliefs have a means of deciding for themselves which story is right. And that means has nothing to do with beliefs that are inferentially justied, but those that are immediately so. As a consequence, then, if impure foundationalism is true, then at least strong foundationalism is true, since no series of inferences can have evidence it is not arbitrary unless it has non-inferential support from a subjects intuitions or experiential states. The consequence, then, is that impure innitism has a dialectical advantage over impure innitism, because it can address the challenge of the modus ponens reductio. What seems to follow, also, is that a strong impure foundationalism is necessary for the solution, but there may be other features of the justication for choosing B2 over B2 above that relies on some other epistemic property of the beliefs I have not addressed hereperhaps its coherence with other beliefs on the matter. However, regardless of this matter, which must be tabled for our purposes here, it is clear that defensible versions of epistemic innitism must be articulated as impure theories of justication.

References
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