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10 ideas for defense & diplomacy

10

ideas

for

defense

&

diplomacy

10 Ideas for Defense and Diplomacy Summer 2009 National Director Hilary Doe Chair of the

10 Ideas for Defense and Diplomacy

Summer 2009

National Director Hilary Doe

Chair of the Editorial Board Gracye Cheng

Director of Center for Defense and Diplomacy Reese Neader

Senior Fellows

Ayesha Siddiqui

Charsaree Clay

National Editorial Board Clayton Ferrara Frank Lin Fay Pappas Melanie Wright Yunwen Zhang

The Roosevelt Institute Campus Network A division of the Roosevelt Institute 2100 M St NW Suite 610 Washington, DC 20037

Copyright 2009 by the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute. All rights reserved. The opinions and statements expressed herein are the sole view of the authors and do not reflect the views of the national organization, its chapters, or affiliates.

10 ideas

for

defense

and

diplomacy

This series was made possible by the generosity of Mr. Stephan Loewentheil.

Table of Contents

P

Safe Water for Floating Communities: A Market-Based Approach John Cheng, Corinna Li, Julia Buzon, Jennifer Downing, Olga Musayev, Pooja Shethji, and Daniel Siegel

8

Pipeline to Safety: Resettling Iraqi Refugees Matt Alhonte

10

Extend US Commitments to Nuclear Non-Proliferation & Disarmament

12

Sam Klug

From Poppies to Red Gold: An Alternative Approach to Eradication Sonali Pillay

14

Protecting Community Food Security through Impact Studies Laurel Averett, Rainbo Hultman, Jesalyn Keziah, Sara Mishamandani, and Lauren Peterson

16

Reinvigorating Public Diplomacy Programs in Pakistan Vrutika Mody

18

A New Resolve: US-Pakistan Strategy v. the Taliban Talha Alvie and Justin Shrader

20

US-Sino Military Cooperation in Africa Bradford White

22

Investing in Diplomacy: An Association of US Middle Eastern Studies Nazir Harb

24

Empowering Kenya’s Youth: A Reconciliation Conference Sigrid von Wendel and Mansur Tokmouline

26

Bonus Excerpt: Accountability in PEPFAR Matthew Eldridge

28

p Letter from the Editor

Earlier this year, the Roosevelt Institute Campus Network adopted Think Impact, a model that re-emphasized our organization’s founding goals of looking to young people for ideas and action, twin forces necessary in the pursuit of change.

The ideas you will read about in this year’s first 10 Ideas series are the result of the ad- mirable creativity, hard work, and scholarship of Roosevelters. These publications—on Defense and Diplomacy, Economic Development, Education, Energy & the Environment, Equal Justice, and Health—are also a testament to these authors’ engagement with the world. In environments that can be insular, Roosevelters show a willingness to look out- wards, to think critically about problems on a local, state, and national level.

But, to this end, these publications should only serve as a starting point of a greater process. Roosevelters must be willing to act in the communities where these ideas can most effect positive change. For concepts that you find inspiring, we hope that you are motivated to leverage them for the benefit of your own campus, city or state, and that you seek out channels and movements through which to bring these ideas to fruition. And, in instances where you disagree, we hope that you are challenged to see how you might improve on or adapt an idea.

Gracye Cheng Chair of the National Editorial Board

Strategist’s Note P

A progressive vision of U.S. national security stresses the use of ‘smart power’ that addresses the linkages between security and development. Smart power implements a calculated balance between public diplomacy, sustainable devel- opment, multilateral engagement, and rapid military response.

Roosevelt students across the country have been engaged in a host of projects

that reflect these ideals. Yale is engaged in directing a youth conference in Kenya that promotes conflict transformation as well as working to assist “floating com- munities” in Southeast Asia. Schools like MIT and Denison University are working with local immigrant populations to encourage dialogue and integration. We are establishing new chapters that seek to expand our knowledge base and access to international resources: places like the School for International Training and the United States Air Force Academy. During the spring semester we co-hosted

a speaking series with the prestigious National Security Network, sending high

profile representatives to burgeoning progressive centers like the Universities of Virginia, Georgia, North Carolina, and Michigan. And the student pieces high- lighted in this journal reflect a nuanced approach to sustained engagement in overseas contingency operations.

The Defense & Diplomacy Policy Center will continue striving to convey the vi- sion of progressive security by sponsoring events, publishing student research, providing informational resources, and connecting passionate students with ca- reer opportunities.

It is not easy to work in the field of international relations as a student. Perhaps

more than any other policy area, there seems to be a strong feeling of dislocation between foreign policy research and formulation. But what is often lost by the American public in debates over geopolitics and international affairs is that we practice international relations every day. From consumer choices, such as fair trade and divestment, to community outreach through interfaith dialogue, peace- making, and conflict resolution, it is important to remember that we practice our beliefs on a daily basis. If you believe in strengthening the virtue of your nation or providing a hand in building hope for global prosperity, the power of transforma- tion is in your hands. And we are here to help you.

Reese Neader Lead Strategist for Defense and Diplomacy

Safe Water for Floating Communities:

a Market-Based Approach

John Cheng, Corinna Li, Julia Buzan, Jennifer Downing, Olga Musayev, Pooja Shethji, Daniel Siegel, Yale University

As a component of its River of Life project, Lien Aid, a Singaporean NGO, has constructed a water treatment plant that seeks to improve access to, and stimu- late the demand of, safe drinking water in rural Cambodia by employing a sus- tainable, market-based model.

The Chnouk Trou Commune of Kampong Chhnang Province, Cambodia is located on the Tonlé Sap, a lake supporting a population of 3 million. Lake water is by far the primary water source in this community, and inhabitants rely on visual clarity as an indicator of quality. Furthermore, private plants provide water of unproven quality at high prices, while public plants provide unsafe water at low prices.

Chnouk Trou Commune

Project target population: 8677

High racial heterogeneity, with large minor- ity Vietnamese and Cham communities.

High infant mortality rate and short life ex- pectancy.

30-50% of the residents buy water at least occasionally, but the highly polluted lake remains the primary source of water.

Over 90% of villagers surveyed expressed willingness to purchase treated water.

Analysis Overall, the project relies on a de- mand-based strategy for increasing water usage. Different product and pricing options are offered to entice consumers. There is price discrimi- nation based on purchase volume (there is a bulk discount) as well as season (to accommodate the com- munity’s income fluctuation between the wet and dry seasons). A delivery

option based on subscription con- tracts is also offered. The mean tar- get price of water is $0.10-0.15 USD per 20 L. Particular focus is put on a multi-prong so- cial marketing strategy, utilizing name branding, peer education and the incorporation of water and sanitation knowledge into school curriculum, and diffuse advertising – posters, radio programs, and public showcases led by a celebrity ambassador. Importantly, ethnic minorities are engaged in their own language and within their own cultural context.

Furthermore, the project employs a unique ownership, management and operational structure. To maximize marketing effect and prevent mutual cannibalization, all water plants in the community are consolidated under a single nonprofit management board. The primary stakeholders in the project are the NGO, local government, management board, local business consultants, and plant employees. The NGO provides initial mar- ket research and capital expenditure on plant, ensures transparency of management, and offers technical assistance when necessary. The local government aids NGO in market research and the selection of the management board drawn from local entrepre- neurs. The volunteer management board supervises day-to-day operations of all water plants in community. Local business consultants provide feedback and modification of marketing techniques based on local conditions on a voluntary basis. Finally, a commis-

sion system based on deliveries, incentivizes engagement and microentrepreneurship among plant employees.

At the regional and international levels, the project provides a model for improving inter- national security through addressing interethnic tension. By providing clean water to all residents and explicitly employing a diverse, ethno-inclusive approach, existing tension among the three ethnic groups, particularly between the Khmer and the Vietnamese, a legacy of military conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam, will be reduced.

Talking Points

Though the majority of the community can afford

safe drinking water, its low prevalence is due to the fact that existing water providers are poorly man- aged and their product quality is either unsafe or unproven. Second, inhabitants perceive safe water as a luxury rather than as a need.

Central points of organizational strategy:

Multilateral engagement: ensures incentivization of all affected groups.

Transparency: price clarity and organizational ac- countability as priorities.

Entrepreneurship: effort made to use plant op- erations as means of bolstering entrepreneurial mindset and capacity of community.

Next Steps Going forward, important measures will be undertak- en at the local and interna- tional level. At the local level, there will be continu- ous modification of mar- keting techniques based on local conditions. The effectiveness of the collec- tive management model will also be assessed. For the purposes of both com- munity welfare and project replicability, the long-term financial sustainability of

the water plants must be demonstrated. As a solution to the possible capital shortage, a mechanism to allow in- terested parties to invest in the plants will be developed. Finally, provided the previous measures prove successful, an attainable middle-term goal is the replication of this man- agement and marketing model in other floating communities in Cambodia and around the world.

The most important long-term aspect of the business model is that it provides a sustain- able and replicable solution to the water problem in other developing areas.

Sources

“Hygiene Promotion.” IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre. 3 Feb. 2009 <http://www.irc.nl/page/7903>. Kar, Kamal, and Robert Chambers. “Handbook on Community-led Total Sanitation” Community-led Total Sanitation. 2008. Institute of Develop ment Studies. 16 Feb. 2009 <http://www.communityledtotalsanitation.org/sites/communityledtotalsanitation.org/files/cltshandbook.pdf>. Lockwood, Harold. “Scaling Up Community Management of Rural Water Supply.” IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre Thematic Over view Paper (2004). 24 Mar. 2009 <http://www.irc.nl/redir/content/download/9525/141513/file/ScalingUp_CM.pdf> . Millar, Micheline. “Clean Water for Tonle Sap’s Poor.” ADF Making an Impact -- Cambodia. Asian Development Bank. 17 Feb. 2009 < <http://www.

adb.org/Documents/Periodicals/Impact/CAM/200802.asp>.

“Rural Water and Sanitation Supply.” Water and Sanitation Program. 16 Feb. 2009 <http://www.wsp.org/index.cfm?page=page_disp&pid=1570>. “Southeast Asia.” Global Water Partnership. 16 Feb. 2009 < http://www.gwpforum.org/servlet/PSP?iNodeID=132>. “Tapping into the Private Sector?” WaterAid International briefing note No.7 (2005). 13 Dec. 2008

<http://www.wateraid.org/documents/plugin_documents/private_sector_briefing_note_final_7new.pdf>.

“Tapping the Market -- Private Sector Engagement in Rural Water Supply in the Mekong Region. (Water and Sanitation Program field notes).” Water and Sanitation Program East Asia and the Pacific (2004). 20 Mar. 2009 < http://www.wsp.org/publications/eap_Mekong.pdf>. “Tapping the Rural Water Market in Cambodia.” Id21 Rural Development communicating development research. 21 Feb. 2009 <http://www.id21.

orgrural/r4ds1g1.html>.

“The Right to Water.” WaterAid International. 15 Dec. 2008 <http://www.wateraid.org/international/what_we_do/policy_and_research/the_right_to_ water/default.asp>.

Pipeline to Safety:

Resettling Iraqi Refugees

Matt Alhonte, City University of New York

The federal government should create a pipeline program that helps direct Iraqi refugees resettled under the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program into language instruction jobs.

Many Iraqis who helped U.S. forces found themselves targets of insurgents. Last year, America opened its doors to its overseas allies. However, the transition has been diffi- cult for many of them, particularly when it comes to employment. Even highly educated Iraqis have a hard time in the U.S. labor market, as most American employers do not recognize Iraqi credentials. At the same time, the U.S. government faces a critical short- age of Arabic speakers, both in operational capacities and as language instructors. These problems appear tailor-made to solve one another.

The shortage of Arabic translators in government is a critical national secu- rity issue. However, the sensitivity of these positions means that the man- agement at the respective agencies are reluctant to recruit recent immi- grants, even ones who have worked with U.S. forces in the past. Whether these concerns are grounded or not, the tension is likely to still exist. In addition, the best long-term strategy to insure our diplomatic, intelligence

and military apparatuses are well- stocked with Arabic-speakers is to systematize their training. This would be best accomplished by an investment in con- necting the people who want to learn Arabic with those who want to teach it, as well as some training on formal language instruction.

Key Facts

Six hundred Iraqis who worked US forces or subcontractors have been resettled since the SIV program began in 2008, with provisions for 5000 more to be is- sued every year until 2012.

Student interest is also massive, with en- rollment in Arabic courses in universities increasing by more than 125% between 2002 and 2006 according to the Modern Language Institute.

This would involve relatively little spending on the government’s part. Enrollment in Ara- bic courses in universities has increased by more than 125% between 2002 and 2006. The bottleneck is with personnel, not funds. There is no shortage of students willing to pay for Arabic instruction. There are simply not enough qualified instructors to teach all of the interested students. Arabic was not commonly taught outside of large universities until very recently. Programs have been expanded, and many universities started teach- ing Arabic when they had not before. The post-9/11 surge in demand has overwhelmed both, resulting in overcrowded classes, students unable to register, or more commonly both. The number of instructors is also unlikely to increase on its own soon. While Arabic has become a popular language to learn, few students take it long enough to become instructors themselves, when compared to other foreign language programs.

While the jobs themselves will be provided by the educational market itself, the state could facilitate this with teaching training that addresses the particular needs of the Iraqi refugees. Simply speaking a language does not qualify one to teach it. However, it is certainly easier to train a native Arabic-speaker to be a decent language instructor than to train an existing instructor fluent Arabic.

Idea Origin This idea was suggested by an Iraqi refugee who I met last fall. He was employed as part of a high school maintenance staff, though he was the head engineer of a water treat- ment plant in Iraq. He expressed interest in training U.S. soldiers to speak Arabic. He suggested that many Iraqis refugees were having similar issues finding employment, and that they would likely enjoy the opportunity to be language instructors.

Stakeholders The federal government would be the best body to handle this, presumably either through the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, or the Department of Education. It is, how-

ever, very easy to imagine individual agencies which have their own edu- cational facilities tapping the pool of Iraqis to meet their own translation instruction needs ahead of the larger government effort. For example, the

Department of Defense’s Defense Language Institute, or the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute, which train cur- rent soldiers and diplomats respectively, would both benefit from adopting this policy on their own terms.

Talking Points

Native speakers are the bottleneck pre- venting the Arabic language market from reaching equilibrium.

Next Steps The next step would be cataloguing which institutes need additional Arabic instructors the most, using metrics such as overcrowded classrooms and over-tally requests. Prior- ity would be given to institutions that have the funding readily available but desperately require instructors, as well as institutions with well-established programs for bringing their foreign language students into government work such as Monterey Institute of Inter- national Studies. Afterwards, a curriculum should be drawn up, addressing the specific needs of Iraqi immigrants. Then, bureaucratic channels should be established that inform current and future Iraqi refugees about language instruction opportunities.

Sources

1. Huang, Carol. “Why the Pool of Arabic Speakers is Still a Puddle.” May 17, 2007.http://www.csmonitor. com/2007/0517/p13s01-legn.html (accessed April 10th 2009).

2. Redden, Elizabeth. “Hype vs. Reality in Arabic Enrollment Boom” November 29, 2007 .http://www.inside highered.com/news/2007/11/29/arabic (accessed April 10th 2009).

3. Sebti, Bassam. “Iraqi Dreams Lost in America” February 28, 2008.http://www.thelistproject.org/ blog/2008/02/iraqi-dreams-lost-in-america.html (accessed April 10th 2009).

4. Masis, Julie. “Jobs in mind, students look for classes in Arabic.” May 6, 2007.http://www.boston.com/news/ education/higher/articles/2007/05/06/jobs_in_mind_students_look_for_classes_in_arabic/ (accessed 4/30/09).

Extend U.S. Commitments to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Sam Klug, Columbia University

The US should commit itself to strengthening nuclear nonproliferation treaties by pressuring other nuclear weapons states to sign these treaties and by reducing the US’s own arsenal.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, the only multilateral nuclear treaty signed by the U.S., established the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which monitors the nuclear activities of each signatory state, and expresses the twin goals of global disarma- ment and non-proliferation. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), signed in 1991, calls for verification of all U.S. and Russian nuclear sites. The Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions of 2002 requires the U.S. and Russia to reduce their nuclear stock- piles to between 1,700 and 2,200 weapons by the end of 2012. The ratification of these treaties demonstrates that U.S. policymakers consider nuclear arms control to be criti- cal to national interests. The positive reception of recent overtures by the current U.S. administration to Russia regarding the extension of START I, which

expires on December 5, 2009, im- plies that further non-proliferation efforts are politically feasible.

Key Facts

The NPT recognizes five nuclear weapons states (U.S., UK, France, China, and Russia) and makes a distinction between the rights of these states and those of all other states.

India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel are the “unrecognized” nuclear weapons states, as they have all successfully created nuclear programs outside the NPT.

The U.S. and Russia both currently have between 3,000 and 3,500 operationally de- ployed strategic nuclear warheads; no other country has more than 350.

China is the only one of the five recognized nuclear weapons states still building nuclear weapons.

The cost of this proposal to the U.S. is minimal. With mechanisms in place and resources devoted to dismantling our nuclear weap- ons, furthering this policy would only project the cost of our cur- rent policy (a minute proportion of the Defense Department’s budget) into the future. In the long term, this proposal would reduce the annual cost of maintaining such a large nuclear arsenal and keeping so many weapons on high alert.

Security benefits of further disarmament to the United States lie in the strength such a policy would give to the NPT and its mission of disarmament and non-proliferation. By re- newing their commitment to Article VI of the NPT (outlining the goal of disarmament), the five nuclear-weapon states would demonstrate the importance of full compliance and ex- pose states, such as Iran, that are not in compliance with Articles II and III, which govern non-proliferation. Any action taken against a rogue state after some form of disarmament by the five recognized nuclear-weapon states would benefit from broader international support, and thus could have more wide-reaching effects than the narrow sanctions on individuals currently levied against Iran.

Recommendations

• The U.S. should attempt to turn both of its bilateral treaties with Russia into mul- tilateral treaties that include all recognized nuclear-weapon states.

• The U.S. must include the unrecognized nuclear-weapon states in START I and

the Moscow Treaty, making disclosure of their nuclear programs a pre-requisite for joining negotiations.

• Working with Russia to extend the Moscow Treaty beyond 2012, the U.S. should set a short-term target of reducing arsenals to 1,000 weapons by 2016.

• A long-term agreement with Russia that sets a goal of reducing stockpiles to no more than 500 weapons should constitute the U.S.’s final goal.

• The United States should seek to include all other nuclear-weapon states in a

new provision of the Moscow Treaty that, outside of the NPT, calls for countries not to expand their arsenals under any circumstances.

Talking Points

Increased confidence in Israel’s accounting for of its nuclear weapons would reduce temptation for other Middle Eastern countries, all of whom act under the assumption that Israel possesses nucle- ar weapons, to seek their own nuclear arsenals.

Because current nuclear threats to the U.S. most

likely come from rogue states or terrorist groups,

a large stockpile of nuclear weapons is no longer

a strategic deterrent.

Even at the height of the Cold War, “it was widely agreed that 400-500 weapons on target would assuredly destroy the Soviet Union’s vast eco- nomic and military potential.”

Next Steps Regular monitoring by the IAEA to verify that all coun- tries that have signed these treaties are living up to their commitments would be nec- essary. Regular meetings among all nuclear weapons states to reaffirm their com- mitments to these treaties and to discuss the potential for further cutbacks would help to validate the princi- ples of non-proliferation and disarmament internationally.

Sources

“The Logic of Zero.” U.S. Department of State, “Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.” 31 July 1991. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. <http://www.dod.mil/acq/acic/treaties/start1/text.htm#top>. U.S. Department of State, “Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.” 24 May 2002. Federation of American Scientists. <http://www.fas.org/nuke/ control/sort/index.html>. U.S. Department of State, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” 1 July 1968. U.S. Department of State. <http://www.state.gov/www/

global/arms/treaties/npt1.html>.

Shultz, George P., William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. “Toward a Nuclear-Free World.” The Wall Street Journal Online. 15 Jan 2008

<http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB120036422673589947.html>.

“U.S. Nuclear Stockpile.” Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters. <http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/ nuclearstockpile.html>. Laalder, Ivo, and Jan Lodal. “The Logic of Zero.” Foreign Affairs. November/December 2008 <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64608/ivo- daalder-and-jan-lodal/the-logic-of-zero>. “Just How Low Can You Go?” The Economist Online. 27 Mar 2008 <http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_

id=10926586>.

“Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” International Atomic Energy Agency. 15 Sep 2008 <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/

report/2008/iran_iaea_gov-2008-59_081119.htm>.

From Poppies to Red Gold:

An Alternative Approach to Eradication

Sonali Pillay, Columbia University

Substituting saffron for poppies should be pursued as part of a US strategy to re- duce the Afghanistan drug trade, reduce funding for insurgents and the Taliban, and stabilize the region.

According to Richard Holbrooke, the $800 million the U.S. spends per year on counter- narcotics is “wasteful and ineffective.” In 2005 the Afghan Eradication Force (AEF) was created with the help of United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the U.S. State Department. These eradicators have been ambushed by Taliban forces and tar- geted by suicide bombers. Furthermore, eradication does not address the reasons why poppy growing has become so widespread: farmers depend upon poppies because they

are a high-value, low-risk crop with established trade routes. Farmers are also indebted to predatory moneylend-

ers who claim a percent- age of their next harvest; thus they cannot surrender their crop without default- ing on loans.

Key Facts

Afghanistan produces 93% of the world’s opiates.

The opium trade provides Taliban and insurgent groups between $100 million and $400 million per year.

The UN and NATO believe insurgents get roughly 60% of their annual income from drugs.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has said that the Taliban made about £50 million from opium in 2007.

Opium poppies and saffron yield $5,200 and up to $8,000 per hectare respectively.

80% of personnel at the Ministry of Interior ben- efit from the drug trade and 100,000 members of the Afghan government benefit directly from drug trade, whether it be from transportation fees, bribes or profits.

When the western Af- ghanistan Agricultural Ad- ministration introduced saffron in a pilot program, a 40-hectare plot yielded 320 kilograms of saffron, and farmers filed hundreds of applications for saffron corms.

As one of the most expen- sive spices in the world, saf-

fron has been nicknamed “red gold.” Saffron has a farmgate value of up to $8,000, making it perhaps the only crop that competes with the poppy, which yields $5, 200 per hectare. Saffron is a high-profit, low-risk crop suitable to climatic conditions in Western Afghanistan, which borders Iran; Iran has a long history of growing the best saffron in the world. In fact, saffron harvests in the Herat province, bordering Iran, have set the international record for most productive yield.

To make this crop substitution feasible, donor nations must provide funding for corms (saffron seeds) to farmers in order to avoid artificial price inflation, packaging supplies for distribution, storage facilities so that farmers can avoid price fluctuations in any given year, machinery with which farmers can conduct International Organization for Standard-

ization (ISO) testing to ensure their product’s viability on the international market, and basic, secure transportation to markets. These services and inputs should be provided to capitalist cooperatives that allow farmers to have access to goods that would otherwise be too expensive for them to access. The capitalist cooperatives should be provided with an endowment with which than can create microfinance schemes tailored to Islamic banking. In addition, organizations such as the International Center for Agricultural Re- search in Dry Areas (ICARDA) should train Afghans on proper farming techniques for saffron in order to produce a successful, profitable crop.

Talking Points

Saffron is a high-profit, low-risk crop based on the crocus flower, the highest quality of which is produced in Iran and Afghanistan. It is perhaps the only viable crop that competes with the poppy for economic returns.

Afghan saffron can replace embargoed Iranian saffron in Western markets.

To circumvent government corruption, aid to farmers should be provided through private, capitalist cooperatives oper- ated on a financially sustainable basis.

Cooperatives should concentrate on maximizing economies of scale, providing inputs, stockpiling facilities, ISO standard quality testing, securing access to markets, and providing secondary microfinance.

Next Steps As the Obama Administration re- views U.S. policy toward Afghani- stan and Pakistan, it should directly address failed at- tempts to restrict A f g h a n i s t a n ’s drug trade and corresponding income for the Taliban and other insurgent groups.

Congress should be engaged in this initiative to ensure that this strategic change is fully implemented and sufficiently funded. The DEA should work with ICARDA to ensure that saffron farming cooperatives are properly established and secure, with all the necessary inputs and adequate funding in order to run their own microfinancing schemes. Donor agencies can also provide exper- tise on microfinance and management skills to the cooperative managers.

Sources

BBC News Online. “Envoy Damns US Afghan Drug Effort.” Published 3/21/09. Viewed 3/24/09.

http://news.

bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7957237.stm

Anderson, Jon Lee. The New Yorker: “The Taliban’s Opium War.” Published July 9, 2007. http://www.newy

orker.com/reporting/2007/07/09/070709fa_fact_anderson

Anderson, Jon Lee. The New Yorker: “The Taliban’s Opium War.” Published July 9, 2007. http://www.newy

orker.com/reporting/2007/07/09/070709fa_fact_anderson

Governor Muhammad Ghulab Mangal of Helmand. News Hours with Jim Lehrer. Aired 3/18/09 Goodhand, Jonathan. “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peace building in Afghanistan.” Brigadier General John Nicholson. News Hour with Jim Lehrer. Aired 3/18/09. The Independent. “The Big Question: Why is Opium Production rising in Afghanistan, and can it be stopped?” Goodhand, Jonathan. “Corrupting or Consolidating the Peace? The Drugs Economy and Post-conflict Peace building in Afghanistan.” Research in Alternative Livelihoods (RALF). Research in Production and Marketing of Saffron as Alternative to Opium Poppy Cultivation ICARDA. Saffron Manual for Afghanistan. T. V. Padma. “Dropping the Poppy Habit.”

Protecting Community Food Security through Impact Studies

Laurel Averett, Rainbo Hultman, Jesalyn Keziah, Sara Mishamandani, Lauren Peterson, University of North Carolina

Impact studies executed prior to new construction in Durham, NC should include provisions that address the food security of the affected community as defined by USDA guidelines.

After two years of deliberation, the Durham Town Council decided to widen Alston Av- enue in order to alleviate traffic in downtown Durham. This construction will result in the elimination of Los Primos, the primary grocery store for most residents in the area. This will reduce competition for the second-closest grocery store in the area, a Food Lion, simultaneously endangering the access to and affordability of nutritious food for many.

This situation demonstrates food insecu- rity escalated by construction, reflecting the need to protect Durham’s food supply. Moreover, it shows a national food securi- ty crisis as grocery stores resist opening in urban areas due to perceptions of crime, economic hardship and lack of transporta- tion. Therefore, closing an urban grocery store eliminates a valuable economic asset that is unlikely to return. In addition, food-

poor areas (i.e. areas that lack adequate access to affordable, nutritious, and culturally appropriate food) have a higher risk of diet-related diseases such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease. Due to its impact on every facet of community life, food security is drawing attention from community activists and local governments in urban areas such as Oakland, Detroit, and Dallas. 1,2 However, most approaches focus on enhancing a community’s food security by attracting new busi- nesses, creating urban agriculture initiatives, and expanding food stamp programs. Mean- while, there are no policies aimed at protecting the food security of a community from construction-related threats such as those that are closing Los Primos in Durham.

Key Facts

Downtown Durham is losing one of its two grocery stores, raising its food insecurity index from 3 to 5.

11.4 % of Durham lives below the pov- erty line.

37.9% of single-mother households in Durham live below the poverty line.

Studies have shown that urban areas may be underserved by groceries by as much as 25%. 1 This vacuum is not readily filled by new businesses due to difficulty implementing the typical supermarket business model in space- restricted inner cities, compounded by perceptions of crime. This not only decreases accessibility to stores, but it drives up prices due to lack of competition. Since the average cost of the USDA’s Thrifty Food Plan (TFP, the most cost-effective way to fulfill nutritional needs) would use 34% of the monthly income of someone living at the poverty line, 4, 5 high food prices in urban areas are unsustainable. In Durham, NC, where 11% of residents live at or below the poverty line, community food security is a critical problem. 6

Children affect-

ed by nutritional deficiencies can have impaired cognitive development. 7 Studies have

Food insecurity has profound effects on all facets of community life.

found that food security-related poor nutrition can lead to diet-related diseases such as diabetes, heart disease, and obesity. 8, 9 Indeed, the food-insecure are twice as likely to be obese as the food secure. 10 Such health problems can burden inner-city econo- mies through added health care costs and reduced work efficiency. Also, a 2002 study showed that vitamin deficiencies increase violent behavior by as much as 25%, which can exacerbate crime, already a problem in urban areas. 11

A study performed last fall by Ramses consulting that developed a heuristic to analyze

potential threats to food security concluded that the current food security threat level

due to availability and affordability in the neighborhood was a 3 on a 1-5 threat index (with 5 being the least food secure). 12 This meant that there existed one or more stores carrying

at or above the national average of number of items listed on the TFP. However, the elimi-

nation of the Los Primos grocery store would elevate the threat index to a 5, indicating

that both affordability and availability of items on the TFP are threatened due to distance

to and lack of competition with the remaining local grocer. Our analysis suggests that by

performing a food security impact assessment prior to future construction projects, such dramatic increases in food insecurity can be avoided.

Next Steps We propose that the Durham county commissioners execute Community Food Security Impact Assessments (CFSIAs) prior to construction and development projects as one aspect of a comprehensive food security initiative. We propose that the Durham city commissioner consider including a food security provision in future impact studies for construction and development projects as one part of a comprehensive food security plan. Considerations of food security would fit well into the previously established en- vironmental justice goal that seeks to limit adverse affects on low-income and minority groups. A CFSIA could be modeled after common environmental impact assessments, 13 which are conducted in environmentally-sensitive areas prior to development project approval. Likewise, a CFSIA would be performed prior to development in food security- sensitive areas, and would involve three main steps: 1. Establish baseline food security of the area; 2. Predict impact of development on food security; 3. Make recommendations, including possible mitigating actions. To measure the local food security, the USDA food security assessment toolkit 3 should be used. Further, we advise that data on food secu- rity be gathered annually and included in models developed for transportation.

Sources

1. Pothukuchi K (2005) Attracting Supermarkets to Inner-City Neighborhoods: Economic Development Outside the Box. Economic Development Quarterly 19:232.

2. Pothukuchi K (2004) Community Food Assessment: A First Step in Planning for Community Food Security. J. Plann. Educat. Res. 23:356-377.

3. Cohen B (2002) Community Food Security Assessment toolkit, (Economic Research Service U).

4. Anonymous (2008) Food Security in the United States, (Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion U).

5. Anonymous (2009) USDA Food Plans: The Cost of Food, (Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion U).

6. Anonymous (2006) Income Characteristics, 2000 Census Samples (Durham), (Development OoEaW).

7. Anonymous (2001) Nutrition and Cognitive Development (University of Mississippi), (Institute NFSM).

8. Stamler J (1982) Diet and Coronary Heart Disease. Biometrics 38:95-114.

9. Seligman HK, Bindman AB, Vittinghoff E, Kanaya AM, & Kushel MB (2007) Food Insecurity is Associated with Diabetes Mellitus: Reuslts from the National Health Examination and Nutrition Examination Survey. Journal of General Internal Medicine 22(7):1018-1023.

10. Adams EJ, Grummer-Strawn L, & Chavez G (2003) Food Insecurity is Associated with Increased Risk of Obesity in California Women. Journal of Nutrition 133:1070-1074.

11. Gesch CB, Hammond SM, Hampson SE, Eves A, & Crowder MJ (2002) Influence of supplementary vitamins, minerals, and essential fatty acids on the antisocial behavior of young adult prisoners. The British Journal of Psychiatry 181:22-28.

12. Morgan S, Gager P, Johnson D, Wenzel K, & Miller A (2008) A Comprehensive Analysis of Potential Threats to Food Security Using Durham as a Heuristic. (The Univeristy of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill).

13. Anonymous (1997) Guidelines for Conducting Environmental Impact Assessment, (Authority NRC).

Reinvigorating Public Diplomacy Programs in Pakistan

Vrutika Mody, Middlebury College

The U.S. State Department should invest funds and personnel skills to improve public diplomacy programs in Pakistan, specifically addressed at Pakistan’s middle class. Namely, initiate interaction between low-level Pakistani and U.S. officials and increase American education opportunities for Pakistani youth.

Post 9-11, negative civilian opinion towards U.S. behavior has developed due to three rea-

sons : 1) popular belief the U.S. is solely concerned with its own interests in the region, 2) U.S. favorable and asymmetrical relationship with India, underscored by the 2008 U.S.-In- dia Civilian Nuclear Deal, and 3) U.S. government emphasis on Pakistan’s military capabili- ties, sidelining economic and development assistance. Pakistani newspapers have strong- ly critized American negligence in killing civilians, “American drones in Pakistan between January 14 2006 and April

8 2009 kill[ed] 14 wanted al-Qaeda leaders, perishing [sic] 687 innocent Pakistan civilians. The successful per- centage of the U.S. predator strikes thus comes to not more than six percent.”

Key Facts

In a June 2005 PEW opinion poll, only 23% of Pak- istanis expressed a favorable view of the United States. This was the lowest percentage rating of any country surveyed. In June 2007, favorable rat- ings declined to 15%.

Public diplomacy programs account for 4% of State Department’s budget. The US spends equal amounts as Britain and France, despite being 5 times larger with deeper global involvement. Pub- lic diplomacy officers (2,500 in 1991) have been re- duced by half. 49% of the U.S. Embassy’s Informa- tion Resource Center (IRCs) on American culture and policies is not open to the public or is open by appointment only.

The precarious security situ- ation in the region discour- ages American foreign direct investment. However, in- creased face-time between American and Pakistani local officials and students outside

the realm of government is critical. Encouraging coop- erative ventures will educate Pakistanis of U.S. policy and result in candid conversation about policy improvements. Economic cooperation will counter Pakistani resentment of US FDI and development programs in neighboring India.

Next Steps

U.S. state and local representatives should offer city/town planning guidance to Pakistani officials:

• Civically-engaged Americans on city councils and school boards cooperate with Pakistani city officials on issues of local governance (i.e. sewage systems, public safety, primary education, environment protection). Local U.S. officials will recog- nize particular infrastructure, cultural and economic needs of Pakistan encouraging domestic led reform instead of enforcing ‘Americanization.’

• Invite Pakistani delegations to observe successful small U.S. towns and cities.

Direct interactions will provide Pakistan with state-building knowledge. Interac- tions will also create opportunities for state-to-Pakistan trade and educational ven- tures.

The State Department’s Civilian Response Corps offers a blueprint in which volunteer diplomats, public health officials, engineers, and economists are deployed in a crisis zone within 48-72 hours. However, the goals of a Pakistan-oriented civilian corps should in- clude multiple interactions over time and incentives offered to Americans (i.e. trade op- portunities).

U.S. policy should emphasize educational exchanges between U.S. and Pakistani stu- dents:

• Relaxing Bush adminstration’s strict quotas on foreign students from Islamic coun- tries.

• U.S. embassy in Pakistan should provide financial support for small batches of

local Pakistani students to attend certified American schools (i.e. Karachi American School, Lahore American School).

• The embassy should also strenghten the ‘American Studies’ department in local

Pakistani universities. Incentives to choose this major could include internship op- portunities with U.S. businesses.

Talking Points

Pakistani Muslims responded to polls by agreeing “the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were not about democracy. [Instead], they were about re- moving certain threats to the United States.”

Increasing rates of anti-American sentiment in Paki- stan challenge the effectiveness of U.S military and economic policy in the region. The US will need to continue aggressive strikes to attack al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas. How- ever, these tactics will be futile if America’s pres- ence itself is rejected by the Pakistani population, especially the country’s nascent middle class.

These policies will provide Pakistani youth with oppor- tunities to learn about U.S. politics, history, society, and culture in an academic set- ting. Pakistanis from a young age will have a stake in im- proving U.S.-Pakistan rela- tions. The practical benefits for them will include higher - education opportunities and richer career prospects. The State Department’s Youth Exchange and Study (YES)

program provides 300 slots for Muslim youth to spend one year in American high schools. However, because funding has been redirected to other programs, contact with youth is often lost and students are not provided with tan-

gible skills or job opportunities for use after graduation.

Sources

Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. Hearing: Global Polling Data on Opinion of American Policies, Values and People. 110th Congress, 1st session. Mar. 14 2007. http://mountainrunner.us/files/sfrc/Time_to_Get_Back_in_the_Game_LIVE.pdf Hussain, Touqir. “U.S Pakistan-Engagement Special Report. The War on Terrorism and Beyond” U.S Institute for Peace. August 2005. USC Center of Public Diplomacy, Allerton Mir, Amir. “60 drone hits kill 14 al-Qaeda men, 687 civilians.” The International News. 10 Apr. 2009.

http://thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=21440

Kerry, John F. “US Public Diplomacy – Time to Get Back in the Game.” Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. Feb. 13, 2009.

A New Resolve:

US – Pakistan Strategy v. the Taliban

Talha Alvie and Justin Shrader, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

As Taliban influence spreads in Pakistan, the United States must refocus its ef- forts toward a joint endeavor, providing the Pakistani military with adequate means to combat the militancy and promoting socio-economic development in the country’s troubled northwestern regions.

After the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, many Taliban fled to Pakistan’s autonomous Fed- erally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and continued to carry out attacks on NATO forces. Much of the aid Pakistan received to stop the attacks was diverted to other proj- ects, such as boosting the military on the Indian border. Meanwhile, the Taliban were able to spread to neighboring areas, and by April 2009, had reached districts just 100 km away from the capital Islamabad.

The U.S. must push for Pakistan to take military action in the Swat Valley and must give the Pakistani military the weapons, equipment, and logis- tical support appropriate for such action. Instead of providing loosely monitored money as it has in the past, the United States should sup- ply up-to-date hardware to increase the effectiveness of the Pakistan mili- tary and minimize civilian casualties. The Pakistan Frontier Corps, a criti- cal element in anti-militancy efforts, suffers from a lack of communication systems, modern equipment, and training. All of these can be provided by the U.S., without the concern for misuse that arises with money.

Key Facts

Pakistan has received $6 billion in military aid since 2001 to combat terrorism, much of which has been misspent.

Pakistan receives only $75 million per year in development aid.

The Taliban have invaded districts sur- rounding their stronghold in the Swat valley, despite a deal with the federal government implementing Sharia (Islamic) law in Swat in exchange for peace.

The government, though hesitant to re- spond, has launched a military operation in the Buner and Lower Dir districts.

The U.S. military should also increase intelligence-sharing with Pakistan, an endeavor made easier with new pro-U.S. commanders in Pakistani intelligence agency. U.S. drones can be used to relay information about Taliban activity to Pakistani commanders on the ground. Unilateral drone strikes by the U.S. strain relations but, if necessary, they should be coordinated with Pakistani commanders to maximize their effectiveness.

Extremism in Pakistan must be viewed through a socio-economic lens. Pakistan’s north- west remains largely underdeveloped and would benefit from basic infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, and running water. Extremist ideologies spread easily among de- spondent and marginalized populations, and the U.S. should begin to invest more in these areas to help increase economic opportunities. Special emphasis must be placed

on training and equipping civilian law enforcement agencies so that security can become self-sustaining.

Analysis

• Military action against the Taliban stronghold in Swat will further reduce the ca- pabilities of the Taliban.

• A more supportive approach by the U.S. will increase the capacity of the Paki- stani military to combat extremism.

• Providing appropriate weapons, equipment, and information instead of money will prevent misuse of military aid.

• A coordinated effort will also serve as a trust building exercise between the two countries.

• Most of the Taliban’s recruits have been poor, jobless young men. Combining an

economic aspect to the solution will harm support for the Taliban and isolate them from the rest of the population.

Talking Points

The United States should urge Pakistan to take military action in the Swat Valley.

The U.S. Must support Pakistan’s opera- tions by providing the tools needed to combat militancy.

The U.S. must also refocus its efforts in the region as whole and increase economic investment and development to stem the spread of extremist ideologies.

Next Steps Military action must be taken in Swat as soon as possible. In the meantime, however, the U.S. military should better coordinate with its Pakistani counterparts on drone attacks and through intelligence-sharing in order to reduce further damage to inter- governmental relations and to main- tain support in Pakistan.

Sources

United States Government Accountability Office. “Combating Terrorism: Increased Oversight and Account ability Needed over Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Funds.” June 2008. Johnson, Thomas; Mason, Chris. “No Sign until the Burst of Fire,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4, p. 41-47. Khan, M. Ilyas. “Doubts Remain as Sharia Bill Signed,” BBC. April 15, 2009. “Pakistan Launches Taleban Strikes,” BBC. April 28, 2009. “US Aid ‘Diverted’ in Pakistan.” BBC. December 27, 2007. Paracha, Abdul Sami. “Buner Falls into the Hands of Swat Taliban,” Dawn (Pakistan). April 22, 2009. Oxford Analytica: Global Strategic Analysis. “PAKISTAN: Corps is Ill-Equipped for ‘War on Terror’.” December 11, 2007. Perlez, Jane. “Pakistani Military Names Spy Agency Chief,” The New York Times. September 30, 2008. Johnson, Thomas; Mason, Chris. “No Sign until the Burst of Fire,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4, p. 41-47. Abbas, Hassan. “From FATA to the NWFP: The Taliban Spread their Grip in Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel. Vol. 1, Issue 10. September 2008.

U.S.-Sino Military Cooperation in Africa

Bradford Waldie, United States Air Force Academy

The U.S. and China both have vital interests in the stability and development of African nations; training of African Peacekeeping forces provides an ideal overlapping interest for the simultaneous improvement of African States as well as U.S.-Sino relations.

Now is the time for cooperation. For the U.S., China and Africa, a mutually beneficial op-

portunity for collaboration exists in the potential for military cooperation on the African continent. All parties involved have security, economic, and political interests tied to African stability and have declared their willingness to pursue security as a prerequisite to attaining that desired stability. Through combining the strengths of America’s military experience with China’s growth and development competence, the burden of undertak- ing substantial security develop-

ment becomes more manageable for all involved. Joint operations in states such as Rwanda and Li- beria, and dialogue through mul- tinational regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOW- AS) can provide a platform for the development of professional, well equipped African militaries with the ability to support peace- keeping roles and stabilize central governments. Cooperative devel- opment would aid the ability of African states to increase peace- keeping operations and improve the relationship between the U.S. and Chinese militaries.

Key Facts

In October 2007, the U.S. established the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) with

a

focus on sustaining African security; since

that time China has deployed over 1,400 mili- tary, police and observers as peacekeepers

in

Africa.

The U.S. and China have both committed

Navy vessels to fight pirates in the waters off the Horn of Africa.

In

the past decade the percentage of Official

Development Assistance funds controlled by the Pentagon has increased from 3.5% to 22%, while the amount of Chinese foreign aid devoted to activities in Africa rose to 44%.

Recent events in Liberia have shown the value of establishing security as a fundamental component of stability. In 2003, at the end of the Second Liberian Civil War, the U.S., UN, regional African Coalitions intervened in Liberia, and committed themselves towards modernizing the Liberian Army as a tool to develop a strong central government. While the U.S. worked with the military, U.N. forces trained Liberian police, providing an ex- ample of how international actors can collaborate to improve security.

Analysis The monetary investment required to train and equip African military forces would be substantial, but with pledges from both the U.S. and China to increase aid to Africa, find- ing the funding is feasible. Liberia serves as an example for the potential price tag on mili-

tary training. The U.S. contributed $162 million bilaterally and $179 million through UNMIL in 2008 to that nation’s rebuilding efforts. The current U.S. administration plans to double foreign assistance to Africa from $25 billion in 2008 to $50 billion by 2012. Additionally, China’s current assistance funding to Africa is estimated at a modest $1-2 billion per year, but Beijing has vowed earlier this year to increase aid to African Nations. The U.S. State Department should engage the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in bilateral talks to en- sure that sufficient funds are allocated by both nations to support African military training missions, and equipment purchases. Added security will usher in increased wiliness by private companies to make substantial investments in Africa, bringing the financial capital needed to promote long term growth.

Talking Points

Despite a lack of China’s transparency in many African initiatives, Beijing has openly stated its support for cooperat- ing and training African military forces.

Engaging the Chinese military as part- ners in efforts to train African forces adds much needed manpower and re- sources to U.S. efforts.

Many African nations, such as Liberia, present more options for improving U.S.-China cooperation than hot button issues that negotiate the parameters of Chinese sovereignty such as North Ko- rea or Taiwan.

Sources

Next Steps Coordinating training missions and funding within the U.S. government as well as with Beijing will prove to be the greatest challenge to implement- ing this policy. The first step would be to work through U.S. established State Department organizations such as the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program and the Africa Contingency Operations Train- ing and Assistance (ACOTA) Program in identifying Chinese counterparts to work with in planning out training operations that would lead to the in- creased capability of African nations.

Bacon, Ken. “Huffington Post Reshaping the U.S. Military Policy in Africa.” http://www.refugeesinternational. org/press-room/oped/huffington-post-reshaping-us-military-policy-africa. China View. “Chinese president vows to increase aid to Africa.” http://news.xinhuanet.com/eng

lish/2009-02/13/content_10810653.htm.

“China’s African Policy.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/

eng/zxxx/t230615.htm.

Dietzman, Roy. Interview by author. USAFA, CO, April, 13, 2009. Lapierre, Daniel. “Liberia’s President Johnson-Sirleaf, U.S. General Ward Attend Historic Activation of Liberian Military Unit.” United States African Command. http://www.africom.mil/ getArticle.asp?art=2011. Lum, Thomas et al. “China’s Foreign Aid Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.” Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40361.pdf Swan, James and Thomas J Christensen. “China’s Involvement in Africa.” http://foreign.senate.gov/testimo

ny/2008/SwanTestimony080604a.pdf.

“The Obama-Biden Plan.” http://origin.barackobama.com/issues/foreign_policy/#onafrica. Vause, John. “Reports: China Sending Ships to Fight Pirates in Africa.” Cable News Network. http://www.cnn.

com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/12/17/china.pirates/index.html

Investing In Diplomacy:

An Association of US Middle Eastern Studies

Nazir Harb, Princeton University

Investing in diplomacy means investing in language training. The establishment of a National Association of U.S. Middle Eastern Studies would facilitate en- hanced Middle Eastern language training and area expertise, and would dem- onstrate the U.S.’s commitment to approaching the region in a culturally appro- priate manner.

The NSA—in charge of Signals Intelligence—is overwhelmed with information that needs to be sifted through by speakers of Arabic, Farsi, Dari, Pashto, Kurdish, and others. The bar has been raised from the Cold War standard of a minimum of level 2 fluency (out of 5, where 5 is believed to be attainable only by native speakers) to 4 and 5 by most agencies and departments under the Bush administration. However, there is a significant discrep- ancy between what is now required and what is being done to cultivate such levels of proficiency among Americans. There is only one government-backed title VI Language Resource Center in the entire country focused on Middle Eastern languages, which has only been around since 2002.

In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis and amidst Cold War tensions, President Kennedy, in 1961, enacted the Alliance for Progress, a program that allotted funds to address illit- eracy and poor education, as well as promote and aid economic integra- tion, growth of the market economy, technical training, and Peace Corps programs. Post 9/11, we have yet to see developments that even begin to approximate these efforts. While current international education funds exceed those of the 1960s in number, 1960s funds surpass current appro- priations by far in real dollar value.

Key Facts

Arabic language education is up 25% in colleges and universities since 9/11—re- flecting the difference between 3500 and 4200 students.

Since 9/11, less than 40 U.S. undergradu- ate degrees in Arabic language on aver- age are granted per year.

The U.S. State Department has 54 em- ployees who demonstrate some level of skill in Arabic—eight are willing to partici- pate in media debates or discussions in Arabic on Arab television or radio.

Analysis The U.S. government, in accordance with Title VI of the Higher Education Act of 1958, needs to establish a National Association of U.S. Middle Eastern Studies Programs (NAUMESP). This federally and internationally funded NAUMESP will: 1) represent the serious domestic and foreign policy reforms required to improve the U.S. image abroad, 2) enhance cross-cultural understanding, 3) create more and higher-quality critical lan- guage specialists, 4) provide a training institute for U.S. educators seeking to create Mid- dle Eastern and Islamic studies programs at their schools, and 5) serve as a consultative body that advises the State Department upon request.

This initiative requires a tentative annual budget of $63 million from Congress. NAUMESP will work with partner nations of the Middle East to build matching exchange programs for U.S. students to study abroad in the Middle East. Funds will be provided by the U.S. federal government and matched by the government of the host nation.

Talking Points

The Defense Department and the Ameri- can Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages published a report stating that foreign languages form “a core academic subject” in national security.

The Bush administration planned on add- ing 600 Arabic speakers to its staff by 2008—with less than 1% of the nation’s students involved in Arabic language pro- grams, this was impossible.

University of California at Santa Barbara surveys indicate that an average student of Arabic language requires 2200 hours of instruction to reach a “relative” level of fluency, placing Arabic among the most difficult languages in the world in which to achieve proficiency.

Next Steps The NAUMESP will work toward achieving the goals of transforma- tional diplomacy as indicated by the State Department, as it would func- tion in partnership with the Middle East, rather than in a relationship of paternalism. The State Department should immediately begin to imple- ment this plan starting with 100 par- ticipants with the intention of fully executing this policy recommenda- tion within 18 months.

The U.S. economic recession in addi- tion to the sharp decrease of support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, signify that the Obama administration must act swiftly in allaying fears and

restoring hope for prosperity and peace. With less than 1% of American students studying Arabic currently and less than 40 Arabic majors awarded per year, significant measures need to be taken. NAUMESP is one of these critical measures.

Sources

http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/democracy/homelandsecurity/Whitman4report.htm

http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/1493

Ibid Title VI (1958) acknowledges that foreign language training tied closely to matters of defense as well as the quality of our education system. Title VI also allows Congress to appropriate funds to language centers and area studies associated with public research institutions and later was expanded to encompass support for outreach activities and for businesses as well as government-sponsored grant programming, such as the In ternational Education Program Service. IEPS is responsible for programs such as the Institute for Interna tional Public Policy and the Undergraduate International Studies and Foreign Language Program. It would seem that many of the kinds of needed organizations are present, but a major restructuring is in order if these programs are to prove effective. (http://www.campus-watch.org/article/id/1062, http://www.ed.gov/ about/offices/list/ope/iegps/index.html). http://nmelrc.org/ http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ope/iegps/history.html Ibid This number is based on the amount of money allotted for Russian language studies in the US during the Cold War—it is adjusted for current prices and subject to Congressional review.

Empowering Kenya’s Youth:

A Reconciliation Conference

Sigrid von Wendel and Mansur Tokmouline, Yale University

The following is an outline of a conference developed jointly by Roosevelt at Yale and our partner NGO in Kenya. The original idea for a reconciliation conference was developed in consultation with Kenyan students at Yale in the Spring of

2008.

Violence stemming from post-election ethnic tensions in 2008 in Kenya led to the deaths

of 800 people and the displacement of several hundred thousand. By some accounts,

Kenyan youth were involved in 90% of the post election fighting. In other words, the Ke- nyan youth were not just affected by the ethnic violence, they were the ethnic violence. This outbreak of fighting has motivated the Center for Security and Foreign Policy of the Roosevelt Institution at Yale to partner with a Kenyan NGO in Nairobi to create a Reconciliation and Empow- erment Conference. The

Conference aims to reduce

ethnic tensions and foster

a unified Kenyan identity

amongst its teenage par-

ticipants. It will accomplish

its objective by bringing the

youth together and engag- ing them in conversations about issues they are con- fronted with in their daily lives. The conference will address issues common to all Kenyans, not individual ethnic groups. Through this technique, the partici- pants will unite in realizing a common Kenyan identity and begin to address issues that face the nation as a whole.

Key Facts

The methods used in this conference are endorsed by some of the world’s leading experts on conflict

resolution.

The initial conference will host a diverse group of teenagers from Nairobi Province in Kenya. If the first pilot conference is successful, plans will be laid for a much bigger and truly national conference to be held one year’s time from the initial date.

43% of Kenya’s population is under age 14; only 37 other countries have a greater proportion of their population under 14.

Approximately 1,200 women were raped by youth gangs in the post-election violence, and public health officials estimated that “85 percent of males who carry out gang rape will ultimately succumb to AIDS.”

Main Activities and Topics Students break up into small groups and discuss the following topics: Urban Sprawl, Em- ployer Bias, Drug Use, Agriculture/Trade, Youth Empowerment, and the Justice System. Each group is given a specific scenario on one of these topics and will be asked to answer

the included questions. Discussions will be lead by a conference facilitator such that they center around resolutions to the issue assigned without delving into tribal identification.

In this manner, the Kenyan youth will avoid tribal or ethnic conflicts and unite around a

common goal, namely solving the problem posed to them.

One Example: Drug Use John is 19 years old. As a child, he lived on the streets of Nairobi after his parents died and he no longer had family to live with. When he was 11, John began smoking cigarettes and later developed an addiction to drugs. Not fully aware of the consequences of his substance use, John became more and more addicted and started doing deals for local dealers in exchange for drugs until he was arrested by authorities. After his arrest, John was assigned a probation officer with whom he regularly met with to monitor his drug use. John’s state improved greatly; because of his young age, instead of being impris- oned, John was taken out of his troubled neighborhood and lived in a probation hostel in which he learned about the consequences of drug use and how to overcome his young addiction. After a year of rehabilitation, John was reunited with a distant family member located by his probation officer and is now drug-free and working at a local store. While John eventually overcame his drug problem, he was undoubtedly hindered by his early addiction and illegal activities that prevented him from going to school and developing healthy relationships. In addition, there are many young adults and children addicted to drugs who have not been helped in the way that John has been.

• How could John’s drug addition have been avoided in the first place?

• Who is responsible for John’s drug addition?

• What was the most successful part of John’s rehabilitation (i.e. not going to prison, probation officer, probation home, moving out his old neighborhood) ?

As we can see in this example, the conference will avoid confronting ethnic and tribal issues head-on. It will concentrate its efforts on giving Kenyan youth an opportunity to agree on something and solve some sort of problem together. More importantly, the fo- cus on drug use as a national issue, not just a personal one, will instill a sense of patriotism in the participants. The ultimate aim is to steer Kenyan youth toward a shared identity and shared goals and away from divisive differences and conflicts.

Conclusion and Post Conference Each of the smaller groups will present to the entire conference and share a summary of their discussion and possible resolutions to their assigned issue. Finally, it is crucial that the conference end on a note of unity so that students remember their experiences and go back to their schools with a hopefully new and progressive perspective.

The organizers of the conference will also develop post conference activities to encour- age continuation of progress made at the conference. Theses activities might involve par- ticipants establishing student groups at their schools to continue discussion on various Kenyan issues or participants being paired up with a pen pal from the conference to stay in touch and continue dialogue with. It is our hope that this first batch of students will go back to their communities with a greater sense of Kenyan identity and fewer antagonisms against groups considered “others.” If we can develop those two qualities in the next generation of Kenyans, then this East African country will not ever have to endure ethnic violence of the kind it saw last year.

Sources

http://www.kimmediagroup.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=332&Itemid=671

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/10/country_facts/main3352035.shtml

http://www.soschildrensvillages.org.uk/charity-news/1-000-new-hiv-infections-blamed-on-kenya-unrest.htm

Accountability in PEPFAR

Matthew Eldridge, Virginia Tech

The following is an excerpt of a longer article. To view the content in full, including the author’s final recommendations for PEPFAR systems, please visit rooseveltcampusnetwork.org

Independent Criticisms of Current Accountability Mechanisms

Much of the existing commentary on PEPFAR accountability comes in the form of criti- cisms from independent sources either as NGO issued reports or academic papers. While the topics discussed by independent entities regarding PEPFAR and current U.S. government efforts to combat global health issues is extensive, there are only a few no- table publications which have addressed the accountable dispersion of funds.

Congressional Oversight One of the primary ways in which PEPFAR is ‘held accountable’ is its reports to Con- gress. As demonstrated by the 2007 report and others before it however, OGAC has provided very limited guarantees that the funding is actually being distributed in an ac- countable manner. Increased congressional oversight appears a necessary action and several pieces of legislation are currently proposing as much (and are discussed further below) but some caution against overdoing congressional oversight.

Some take issue in that for example that “for PEPFAR, achieving its globally-set program- matic targets and its accountability to Congress take precedence over any other feature” threatening accountability to other stakeholders. So while one might be encouraged to view PEPFAR’s congressional oversight as a strength (safeguarding the interests of the taxpayers who fund it) it may also be seen as a negative if PEPFAR becomes too focused on accountability to Congress and ignores accountability to recipients.

Transparency in Supply Change Management System (SCMS) The SCMS is a PEPFAR implementing partner and is funded by PEPFAR to “strengthen or establish secure, reliable, cost-effective and sustainable supply chains to meet the care and treatment needs of people living with or affected by HIV and AIDS.” SCMS works closely with clients to “reduce the price of essential medicines” through “[planning] future procurement, pooling orders to buy in bulk, establishing long-term contracts with manufacturers and purchasing generic alternatives whenever possible.”

A 2006 statement by the Ecumenical Pharmaceutical Network (EPN) found growing con- cerns with the operation and management of SCMS – particularly with regard to trans- parency. The EPN statement even alleged that the “SCMS contract has the potential to undermine, rather than increase, long-run and sustainable local capacity for managing supplies; lacks avenues for civil society participation; and will increase the brain-drain which is debilitating Africa’s health care systems.”

When specifically addressing transparency and accountability concerns, the EPN state- ment noted that SCMS suffers from the “lack of involvement of key stakeholders in target countries” and the “lack of transparency in sharing any clear strategy…that there are inter- national plans for establishing long-term capacity and sustainability at the local level.” In short, the EPN and the Center for Health and Gender Equity which issued a supporting statement were concerned with the lack of transparency and accountability resulting from the closed nature of the decision-making system adopted by SCMS.

Streamlining Accountability

The phrase “streamlining” or creating “uniform” policies with regards to anything related to international development funding must be viewed cautiously as on-the-ground cir- cumstances often differ so widely that applying the same cookie-cutter strategy every- where can prove disastrous. Yet, on the other hand, there are benefits to creating some clear standards in terms of accountability because mismanagement of funds has negative effects universally and using a variety of guidelines or mechanisms for accountability creates disunity, confusion, and allows the system to break down. Other programs have subscribed to the belief of adopting uniform or at least similar accountability expecta- tions: “Funding provided to community groups in Uganda by the Global Fund…did not have similar accountability requirements, and Global Fund grants were suspended in

2005 due to concerns that the money had been misused.” As PEPFAR accountability

requirements are unclear, it is impossible to comment as to whether they are currently streamlined or at least similar or if instead they vary widely between projects.

Collecting and Publicly Disclosing Data Transparency is essential to monitor how well PEPFAR adheres to accountability mecha- nisms. Unfortunately, OGAC has repeatedly failed to make information regarding fund- ing decisions public. Furthermore, OGAC has even failed to publicly establish the guide- lines used when making those funding decisions.

One report drew a sharp contrast between the transparency of PEPFAR and that of the Global Fund: “accountability requires publicly disclosing collected data and working with governments to strengthen national monitoring and evaluation systems” to this goal, “PEPFAR has the most comprehensive financial data capture system but does not pub- licly share most data” rendering independent outside evaluation difficult. On the other hand “the Global Fund publicly discloses the largest share of its financial data” and as a result it gains high marks on its financial transparency.

Financial accountability is clearly an area where public disclosure of data is lacking for PEPFAR. However, OGAC is very open when it comes to releasing figures relating to substantive accountability in terms of clinics opened, medicine distributed, new indi- viduals placed on drug-treatment programs, etc. Yet some outside sources are even criticizing this data as being unclear and misleading. Take for example the claim that in

2006 PEPFAR reached 822,000 individuals with treatment. These individuals are bro-

ken down into two categories: upstream and downstream treatment support.

The first category – “upstream systems-strengthening” – “includes those supported through contributions to national, regional, and local activities such as training, labora-

tory support, monitoring and evaluation, logistics and distribution systems, protocol and curriculum development.” On the other hand “downstream site-specific” support “refers to…instances where [PEPFAR] is providing all or part of the necessary components for quality services at the point at which services are delivered.” The 293,700 people listed as receiving upstream support are receiving “no more than systems-strengthening sup- port from the United States.”

Even among the 528,300 people receiving downstream support, it is not clear how many are receiving “all” and how many are receiving “part” of their treatment support from PEPFAR. It is possible given this ambiguity that the vast majority are receiving only 10% of their funding needs for treatment from PEPFAR. While the figures may likely show that PEPFAR is playing a significantly larger role, the PEPFAR report gives no evidence to back up this assertion and observers are left to make their own conclusions. Some critics have argued that “since the goal of treating 2 million people in the 15 focus countries by 2008 was designed to significantly increase access to treatment, PEPFAR should be re- sponsible for the full costs of treatment for 2 million people.” Furthermore, the PEPFAR report gives no explanation as to the process which was used to generate these figures. The methodology used to arrive at these figures is a complete mystery and throws into question their very validity.

While it is a stretch to claim that these figures are intentionally misleading and used merely to allay congressional concerns and guarantee more support and funding, these discrepancies and vagueness’ do certainly demonstrate a poor grasp of substantive ac- countability. Better documentation and representation of these figures – broken down into specific categories for instance – might generate more confidence in them.

Current Congressional Legislation

The sheer size of PEPFAR’s funding allocations and the vague and poorly defined ac- countability mechanisms currently in place have encouraged legislators to propose two identical bills aimed at improving transparency and accountability in PEPFAR. The two pieces of legislation – one in the House and the other in the Senate – outline a method to improve accountability within PEFAR so that it is held congressionally and publicly accountable in a transparent manner.

The senate bill S. 2584 was proposed by Sen. Clinton of New York on January 31, 2008 and was read twice before being referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Simi- larly the corresponding house bill, H.R. 5485, was proposed by Rep. Miller of North Caro- lina on February 25, 2008 and was also referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. The Act, labeled the PEPFAR Accountability and Transparency Act, seeks to amend the Global AIDS Act which created PEPFAR by adding on to the end certain measures de- signed to promote accountability and transparency within PEPFAR. The Act authorizes the Global AIDS Coordinator to use funds provided by the Global AIDS Act to:

(1) Improve the coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, quality, and accessibility of services provided under this Act; (2) Establish the cost-effectiveness of program models;

(3) Assess the population-level impact of programs implemented, including the impact of programs on women, children, and other at-risk or vulnerable populations; (4) Ensure the transparency and accountability of services provided under this Act; (5) Disseminate and promote the utilization of evaluation findings, lessons, and best practices in the implementation of the programs receiving financial assistance under this Act; (6) Encourage and evaluate innovative service models and strategies to op- timize the delivery of care, treatment, and prevention programs financed by the United States Government; and (7) Strengthen ongoing program monitoring and enhance program quality through routine program evaluations, such as midterm and final program evaluations.

The Act sets a deadline of 90 days after its enactment for the Coordinator to submit a report detailing the funds used for “monitoring, operations research, and impact evalu- ation research during the 5-year period ending on September 30, 2008.” This report will be followed by another which the Global AIDS Coordinator should submit no later than 1 year after the Act’s enactment which will detail his plans for using funds regarding the aforementioned areas of monitoring, operations research, and impact evaluation re- search for the next 5 years. Additionally, the Act provides a long list of possible research priorities for the Coordinator to investigate such as “ensuring a safe blood supply” and “promoting the most effective models for scaling up care and treatment access.”

S. 2584 and H.R. 5485 request that the Coordinator consult with other government agen- cies including NIH, USAID, and the CDC while drafting this 5 year strategic plan. Impor- tant for transparency, the Act also would require that OGAC holds “a public meeting at which the public may present its views on the current needs and gaps in program moni-

toring, operations re eventually pub search, and impact evaluation research” followed by

a period where OGAC collects and lishes public comments. Following the completion of

the strategic plan it will be presented for comment to Congress as well as to the public through a meeting and through publication online.

This legislation currently being considered within the Committees on Foreign Relations is

a positive step because it introduces needed accountability mechanisms into the Global

AIDS Act which should have been included to begin with. In her introduction of the bill on the floor of the Senate, Sen. Clinton said that she was presenting a bill “that will in- crease our ability to research and identify the most effective interventions in combating

global AIDS.” She also suggested that as Congress had demonstrated commitment to PEPFAR by reauthorizing and increasing its funding, Congress should likewise “maximize [its] investment in programs that have been found effective in preventing infections and delivering care to as many people as possible.”

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