Neo-Ottomanism as Expression of Liberal Islam in the Foreign

Policy of Turkey in the 21st Century

Lecture at Casa Arabe, Madrid, February 26, 2008
Preface
In November of 2002 a very important shift has occurred in the political life of Turkey. A
moderate Islamic party called Adalet ve Kalkinma (or AK for short that signifies purity
and cleanliness in Turkish) came to power. As the result of the election victory Abdullah
Gul (the President of Turkey and a former leader of the banned Refah Party) became
Prime Minister. Meanwhile, the current Prime Minister Tayip Erdogan remained the
leader of the AKP and was involved in all executive decisions of the new government.
Tayip Erdogan, a former Refah mayor of Istanbul, was banned from taking political
office because he was earlier arrested and jailed for public reading a poem that was
deemed anti-Constitutional by the Kemalist establishment.

Since Europe itself has consolidated after the Maastricht Treaty into the post-national
state, the Europeanization dynamic in Turkey acquired three distinct interpretations. The
orthodox Kemalists (consistent nationalists) interpreted the verities of Kemalist vision as
reproduction and introduction into Turkish life of innovations generated by Europe.
European Romantics, i.e. Kemalists, which tend to hyperbolize the Great Leader’s legacy
and fix Ataturk’s ideas as some absolute, set as a goal the full membership in the EU in
1987. The third ideology, which came to be known as ‘Neo-Ottomanism’, articulates a
different paradigm, viz. that Turkey needs the European institutions not in order to join
the mythical Paradise of Europe, but enhance the country’s standing in the more natural
locus, i.e. Muslim world.

Introduction
The goal of this article is to explore the meaning(s) and geopolitical implications of the
Neo-Ottomanism as a particular expression the Islamic Liberalism.

One of the basic determinants of the Turkish foreign policy of the last 15 years was an
ambition to become a moderator and also a ‘curator’ or facilitator of interactions in the
adjacent regions, the Caucasus, the Balkans and the Middle East. By doing so, the
Turkish powers that be articulated their vision for Turkey playing the role that the
Ottoman Empire used to perform in the region. This new direction of Turkish foreign
policy contradicts the spirit of Ataturk, the Republic’s founder, who postulated that
Turkey should refrain from any Grand Designs in its foreign policy, but rather
concentrates its resources on the project of national development within the boundaries of
Anatolia. Ataturk indicated that the only Grand Design or vocation for Turkey is the
process of Europeanization.

1
But firstly, I would like to elucidate the impact of Kemalism and Cold War legacy on the
contemporary domestic and foreign policy in Turkey.

Ideological Contradictions of Kemalism

Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, there was a discord between the
membership in the Western ‘imperialist’ alliance and the Kemalist ideological
commitment to national liberation struggle and developmentalism, i.e. independence
from Western capital. In domestic political struggle this manifested in a contradiction in
the leftist Kemalist mentality: their statism and their strong dislike of common people
with conservative ideas gradually transformed them into defenders of the status quo.
They interpreted the Kemalist principle of revolutionism as going against people's
conservative values as they saw them obstacles to developmentalism. In the absence of
crucial links with people, they turned to the military as their solution and praised the role
of the military as a modernizer. Ironically, despite their anti-imperialist tone, they
borrowed the vocabulary of American modernization school and even translated some of
their work in Yon, an influential left-wing theoretical journal 1 The assumed role they
attributed to the military, namely, the military as a force of transformation, was also a role
that was sanctioned by the United States. The entire modernization discourse in the
United States, occasionally developed and defended by right-wing American
intellectuals, was based on the idea that for countries such as Turkey to develop, the
process had to be top-down in the face of conservative resistance to change. In other
words, in the modernization discourse, a discourse shared strongly by the Turkish
positivists, it was necessary to emancipate from the tradition in order to modernize.2

This contradictory view of populism and militarism also led to contradictory views on
foreign policy. Totally ignoring the role or at least acquiescence of the West in many
Third World coups, including those in Turkey, they maintained militarism and anti-
imperialism at the same time. Their anti-imperialist and socialist ideas became popular
among the leftists in the 1960s, in the context of the increasing tension between Turkey
and the United States on the Cyprus question. Interestingly the Cyprus question became a
test issue that demanded a separation of socialist internationalism and nationalism.

Background of Turkish Foreign Policy

The main sources of the Turkish foreign policy are the historical experience of the
Ottoman Empire (the tradition of the balance of power); the nationalist Kemalist
revolution and creation of the Turkish republic (hence, isolationism); Western orientation
expressed in the policy of Europeanisation and modernization; the suspicion of foreign
powers and interests (the Sevres syndrome). Pan-Turkism and pan-Turanism also served
as one of the ideological sources of the modern Turkish foreign doctrine with reference to
1
See Fahrettin Altun, “Kemalist Bir Modernleşme Yorunlu Olarak Yon Dergisi," Turkiye Arl1atzrmalarz
Literatir Dergisi, 2, no. 1 (2004): 574.
2
See the classic works of modernization school Walt Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth. a Non-
Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: University Press, 1961) and Daniel Lerner and David Riesman, The
Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

2
Azerbaijan and Central Asia, which surfaced in the pre-First World War years, but for
political reasons were officially suppressed by the Republican regime. Pan-Turkism is a
movement to unify the Eastern (Central Asia and Caucasus) and the Western (Anatolian)
Turks, and, following the Russian expansion in the Balkans under the banner of the Pan-
Slavism. Pan-Turanism arose as a romantic idea, to unify Turkic, Mongol and Finnish-
Ugorian peoples. It later served for a short time as a basis for the Turkish- Hungarian
collaboration during the first two decades of the 20ieth century to stem the Russian
expansion. These movements gained some influence among the Young Turks in the years
preceding the First World War. They found fiery proponents in the personality of Enver
Pasha and some of his followers. In the aftermath of the Peace treaties with Moscow of
1921 and 1925, these movements have been formally disbanded. Possession of the
Straits, which determines the Turkish geopolitical position on the East-West, the North –
South axes, greatly contributes to shaping of its foreign policy.

The Legacy of the Cold War

Following the Second World War Turkey found itself in the midst of a superpower
competition between the United States and Soviet Union. This time Turkey did not have
an option to stay neutral. Its choice was to side with the United States and become
integrated into the capitalist world economy. For American Cold War strategies, Turkey
was an indispensable fortress; for Turkey, alliance with the United States was vital due to
perceptions of Soviet expansionist desires as deeply rooted in the Turkish security
thinking during the long years of wars between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Turkey
was a significant part of the U.S. security strategies in Europe and the Middle East. Due
to its strategic location critical for Russian interests, Turkey had to be protected from the
Soviets and be ensured that it remained allied to the United States. In 1947, the Truman
Doctrine promised economic aid to Greece and Turkey. The Eisenhower administration
took concrete steps to realize this intention to build an alliance of the ‘Northern Tier’
countries.3 The U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wrote in his recommendations
of June 1, 1953 that in the Northern Tier “there is a vague desire to have a collective
security system. But no such system can be imposed from without. It should be designed
and grow from within out of sense of common destiny and common danger.”4 In other
words, in this region, only countries that embrace Western norms and values, would also
share the Euro-Atlantic preoccupations and threat perceptions. This dictum continues to
animate the broader American strategy in the expanded Middle East in the post-Cold War
period.

The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics

3
See Rouhholah Ramazani The Northern Tier: Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey (New Jersey: Van Nostrand
Company, 1966)p. 117. For a broader definition that includes states from Pakistan in the East to Libya in
the West. See George Haddad, Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Northern Tier (New
York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1965) p.7.
4
The text of the report is in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Middle East and the Near East; A
Documentary Record, 1914-1956 (Princeton: Van Nostrand Company, 1956) pp. 337-342. [Author’s
Italics.]

3
The 1960 coup ushered in a new era in Turkish politics marked by periodic military
interventions, legalized through the Internal Service Act of the Turkish armed forces.
However, the constitution that was prepared by the leftist academics hired by the junta
was the most democratic constitution ever enacted in Turkish history. The ensuing
environment of freedom of expression led to a surge in intellectual activities. In this
context, Turkish foreign policy came to be discussed with unprecedented heat,
particularly in the context of the Cyprus crisis. While demands for a military intervention
among the increasingly furious youth grew, the Inonu government faced the famous
Johnson letter in 1964, warning the government that in case the Soviets might exploit the
Cyprus issue to intervene, the United States and other members of NA TO would not be
obliged by their commitments to defend Turkey. The letter was shocking in both style and
content and in the ensuing crisis, the Inonu government conceded 1965 elections to the
rising star of liberal conservative politics, Suleyman Demirel. While Suleyman Demirel
believed in the importance of relations with the United States for economic development
of Turkey, he also pursued a multidimensional foreign policy. He considered the
improvement of relations with the Soviet Union critical for development and secured
highly lucrative Soviet credits to build key industrial facilities. Since Prime Minister
Demirel did not actively pursued military confrontation over the Cyprus, the line adopted
by the Army and nationalist military circles, he was deposed in the 1971 coup.

In fact, the military in Turkey stepped in to protect a fragile secular democracy from
Islamist tendencies in 1960 and radical militancy in 1980.5 When the 12 September 1980
military coup took place, it enjoyed a high degree of popularity in the context of these
troubles. The United States supported both the coup and the economic team led by Turgut
Oza1 that implemented key liberalization reforms. Ozal swept the 1983 elections to
establish his decade-long political supremacy in which he continued to implement
economic reforms and also embarked upon a process of political liberalization. In this,
Ozal's primary goal was to secure American support in the context of perceived decrease
in Turkish geopolitical significance as the Cold War system rapidly crumbled. The late
President Turgut Ozal’s (prime minister, 1983-1989, president, 1989-1993) outstanding
political skills and active personal involvement in shaping Turkish foreign policy allowed
him to impose civilian control over this sphere.6 Hence Ozal saw that Turkey had to
redefine its traditional foreign policy to fit the requirements of this change and to seek a
new geopolitical role in the post-Soviet era through new initiatives such as the
establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation initiative and the revitalization of
Economic Cooperation Organization that linked Turkey to Iran, Pakistan and Central
Asian republics. Qzal's political tenure practically ended After his death in April of 1993,
Turkish politics again entered the phase of domestic turbulence, while Turkish Foreign
Ministry lost interest in pursuit of the dynamic policy vis-à-vis the Turkic republics, in
particular Azerbaijan.
5
It was said that the deposed Prime Minister Menderes has built more mosques than schools and restored
Arabic Ezan (the Muslim call to prayers) earlier translated into Turkish under the Kemalist program of
Turkification of the 1930s.George Haddad, op. cit., p.118. See also Stephen Kinzer’s comments on the role
of military in Turkey, op. cit., p.16.
6
See Stehen Kinzer, op. cit., p.14. Then Chief of Staff Necip Torumtay resigned in protest against Ozal’s
commitment to support the Allies’ military action against the Saddam regime in 1991. See for details
Nicole and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled (Woodstock: Overlook Press, 1997) pp.219-224;

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The end of the Cold War produced a double effect on the global or systemic level. Three
seminal events mould the contemporary Turkish foreign policy. They are the break-up of
the Soviet Union, the two Gulf Wars in the Middle East and new concerns related to
Turkish drive to enter the European Union. The Soviet threat affecting directly the
Western Europe disappeared, which has eliminated the need for the American nuclear
umbrella. This put into question the viability and raison d’etre of NATO on the Continent.
Since NATO had been created as the transatlantic alliance aimed at providing security for
the Western Europe during the Cold War. The function of Turkey as a part of the Northern
tier of NATO became a source of debate among European members of NATO. At the
same time, the collapse of the Communist bloc and the dissolution of the Soviet empire,
unleashed the submerged ethno-national conflicts, which have been frozen since the end
the First World War and its aftermath. The ghost of the Sevres treaty came to haunt the
Turkish foreign policy establishment again. Secessionist movements and the search for
self-determination by ethnic minorities proliferated in many parts of the world, including
Turkey itself. In the case of Turkish Republic the revived ethno-nationalism manifested in
the Kurdish search for a greater autonomy.

After the end of Cold War, when the Western security burdens were alleviated by the
collapse of the Soviet military power, Turkey had to reinvent itself and find a new role in
the Western security architecture. The support for the American-led coalition in the Gulf
War II assured that the Turkey’ geographical location would figure prominently in the
strategic calculations of American policy makers in the “New World Order”. The Arab-
Israeli Peace process opened prospects for normalization of relations with Israel, a
democratic state in possession of advanced military and civilian technology, which shares
a historical suspicion towards Arabs and possesses the strongest army in the Middle East.
The break-up of the Soviet Union in the end of 1991 also created unexpected foreign
policy possibilities for Turkey in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans. These
mentioned three regions were tied to Turkey by history, language, ethnicity and religion.
These newly independent states revived the sceptre of Pan-Turkic ambitions especially
among Turkish nationalists affiliated with the Milliyetci Hareket Party. But the drastic
change in the international environment engendered also new threats as well. Of
particular concern for Turkey were also the external conflicts in Middle East, the
Caucasus and in the South-eastern Europe. The more porous borders of Iran and
Afghanistan brought a threat to the Turkish secular regime. The inter-ethnic conflicts in
the Caucasus and Balkans produced instability in the Turkish neighbourhood, the arousal
of Kurdish ethno-nationalism created internal threat to the integrity of the Republic. More
activist Turkey was also perceived as expansionist (by Russia, Iran and Greece) in its
policy toward the Black Sea region and the Caspian basin.

When the Adalet ve Kalkinma (“Justice and Development”) party won the November
2002 general elections, the Erdogan’s party gained 365 seats in the parliament and was
supported by 35% of the voters. The party avoided the direct confrontation with the
United States and declared as its main goal entrance into the European Union. In fact, the

5
new Turkish government was able to convince the United States to pressurize the
European capitals and Brussels to expedite the process of Turkish integration into Europe
in exchange for its cooperation on Iraq. But this attempt failed to convince the European
leaders at the summit in Copenhagen and the decision was postponed until 2004.
Eventually, by the vote of Turkish parliament March 3rd, 2003, Turkey denied Americans
their deployment for the coming military campaign in Iraq. The disappointments with the
Western allies led Turkey to seek an alternative direction in its foreign and domestic
politics. Meanwhile the Russian vector of Turkish foreign policy began to dominate,
especially after the start of construction of the critical for Turkey the Blue Stream natural
gas project in 2002. However, the search for the Kizil Elma (or the Great Idea or the
Doctrine) of Turkish foreign policy by the new moderate Islamist government continued.
A substantial part of Turkish political elite, including senior members of AKP, were
convinced that in the post-Cold War era Turkey needs to return home, i.e. to fortify its
position in the Middle East, improve its historical links with the newly-independent
Turkic states and find the accommodation with its Russian neighbor. The Turkish
observer Kivanc Galip Over argues, “[Recent] events demonstrated that positions of
Turkey in the West will depend on the degree of Turkish influence in the East.” The
Eurasian future of Turkish foreign policy was confirmed by the high level trip to Russia
and the Turkic states undertaken by Erdogan after his electoral victory in the spring of
2003. The Kemalist establishment seconded this direction of Erdogan’s policy as was
obvious from the support by Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s former Foreign Affairs Chief Adviser
Tacan Ildem. But the critical input into the new thinking of AKP was made by the chief
foreign policy advisor Ambassador Ahmet Davutoglu. A former academic and thinker,
who devoted his career to the study of foundations of Islamic civilization and geopolitics,
Davutoglu published his book Stratejik Derinlik in 1993. In his book, Davutoglu
advanced a concept of the “strategic depth” to guide the foreign policy of Recep
Erdogan’s government. This concept is eponymous with the title of Davutoglu’s book.
The origins of this doctrine can be traced to Ozal’s neo Ottomanism, ‘the muliti-
dimensional’ foreign policy of the Erbakan’s government and Davutoglu’s innovative
approach to geopolitics. The main thesis of this doctrine is that the strategic depth is
predicated on geographical depth and historical depth. So Turkey, as a result of its
historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire, possesses a great geographical depth. According
to Davutoglu, “This geographical depth places Turkey right at the center of many
geopolitical areas of influence.“ The ”strategic depth” doctrine calls for an activist
engagement with all regional systems in the Turkey’s neighbourhood.

New Turkish Elite as the Carrier of the Neo-Ottomanist Ideology

The Strategic Depth Doctrine was embedded in the new discourse of the neo-Ottomanism
as its legitimizing ideology. Neo-Ottomanism is at the core of the AKP ‘problem-free’
foreign policy. But it would a gross oversimplification to attribute the watershed in
Turkish politics to specific personalities. This new trend, the neo-Ottomansim, is a
reflection of profound social transformation and the Zeitgeist of changing Turkish
society. Actually, it is the culmination of new ideological innovations that emerged during
the period of Turgut Ozal’s leadership. I would argue that the Neo-Ottomanism is the
ideology of new Turkish elite, which began to form in the Central Anatolia in the end of

6
the 1980s. This elite originates primarily from representatives of the conservative and
religious lower class, i.e. urban residents and rural population. As a result of upward
social mobility promoted by Ozal’s economic reform and migration to the major cities,
especially Istanbul, the rise of new entrepreneurial middle class was imminent. For
example, the population of Keysari, the stronghold of the Islamic Calvinists, has grown
ten times over fifty years from 65 thousands to six hundred thousands. The new elite as a
result of education and urbanization brought new (or rather the old conservative )
attitudes and ideas into political discourse. Their views widely diverged from the classical
Kemalism espoused by the Anakara’s establishment. The new elite’s ideology tinged
with the imperial nostalgia emphasizes the role of small business, laissez-faire economics
and the state nonintervention combined with the conservative values in Turkish society.
The Anatolian Tigers, a group of thriving religiously conservative businessmen,
popularized the ideology, which liberally uses quotations from the Quran and claims that
the Prophet blessed commerce and development in general. This movement, acquired the
sobriquet ‘Islamic Calvinism.’ (See Insight Turkey, July-September, 2005.) Adherents of
this ideology use the discourse of the Protestant ethics of the religious merit of work and
the necessity to save, blessings the worldly ascetism and advanced education. These
representatives of the lower middle class from the Central Anatolia formed their own
union Islamic entrepreneurs, MUSIAD, that propagates this religious connection between
Islam and the values of the free market. In fact, MUSIAD membership constitutes an
important, possibly crucial, support for AKP in local and national elections. An important
contribution to this ideological trend was made by Huner şencan, the author of a brochure
titled Homo Islamicus or A Muslim in Business Life. Other infliuential among the Turkish
Calvinists is the Nurculus or Fetullahcis, the followers of Said Nursi (1876-1960), who
admonished his adherents to study Western science, modern technology, without
abandoning the traditional Islamic values.

The Main Aspects of the Neo-Ottomanism

This ideology, while placing less emphasis on nationalism than the traditional Kemalist
doctrine, stresses the Muslim solidarity and the transnational concept of Ummah. The
national spirit can be described as pride of Turkish Muslim for its heritage and tradition
of craftsmanship and hard work. The Turkish people feels emboldened to lead other
Muslims nations on the path to the Western standard of living, representative democracy
and modernity. These broad concepts summarize the spirit of Neo-Ottomanism. The
politicians, represented by the inner circle of AKP, who embraced this ideology, have a
long-term global agenda. These politicians implement this program with zeal, dedication
and sophistication. None of these practitioners proclaim the slogans about the ‘restoration
of the Empire’ or ‘ the new great empire’ like their northern big neighbor. Erdogan and
Gul are extremely bright, sober-minded and agile politicians. The current Turkish
leadership realizes that in the immediate future, Turkey is incapable of projecting its
power in the whole Ottoman neighborhood. The mid-term goal is to earn domestic and
international legitimacy by joining the EU, tentative attempts to strengthen the D-8
(which includes that includes Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria,
Pakistan, and Turkey) and the leadership in the OIC. The Turkish leadership undertakes
efforts to become the arbiter and mediator of many regional conflicts in the Balkans

7
(Kosovo, Bosnia, etc.), the Caucasus (Chechnya, the Nagorno-Karabagh, South Ossetia,
Abkhazia and Ajaria), the Middle East (the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syrian-Israeli
negotiations) trough participation in inter-governmental organizations (OSCE, BSEO,
CEO) and membership in the North Atlantic Alliance as well as the UN-sponsored
Alliance of Civilizations. The participation in these structures allows Turkey a lot of
flexibility and prestige.

But the membership in the European Union remains the golden prize of all international
efforts by Turkey. The candidate status in the EU provides the international credibility to
Turkish foreign policy initiatives in all the above regions. The EU continues changing of
milestones for the membership and criticizing Turkey for numerous failures to satisfy all
Copenhagen criteria. In the meantime, this dynamic situation in reality suits both the
European Union and Turkey. As a full NATO member, Turkey carved out itself a niche as
a key go-between between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine and the West. In other
words, Turkey gradually becomes an assertive power on the periphery of the European
Union. In a foreseeable future Turkey will grow into an ascending power that combines
Islam with robust market economy. This power has a great potential to expand its sphere
of influence even without full membership in the EU.

In the meantime, military attempted to thwart the re-election of AKP in the spring of
2007 through mechanism of so-called ‘e-coup d’etat’, by posting a warning on Turkish
Army’s website about the internal threat to the Republic from ‘Islamists.’ The political
and economic deprivation of Kurdish population in southeastern provinces of Turkey
gained a more positive attention of the Turkish government and some concerted efforts
were made to alleviate these problems. While, during the recent 2007 elections AKP
attracted almost 50% of Turkish Kurdish voters in the South East, the generals cast a
suspicious eye on Erdogan’s conciliatory stance towards the Kurds. The military and
nationalist political circles pressurized Erdogan to pursue the policy of retaliation and
reprisals against PKK, based in Kandil Mountains of Iraq and its Turkish supporters in
the frontier area. The possibility of military incursion in Northern Iraq (Kurdistan) will
certainly negatively affect Turkey’s prospects of entering the European Union soon.
Recently France, one of the leading powers in the European Union, put Turkey on the
spot. As France’s Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner stated in Istanbul on November 3,
2003: "I warn them not to cross the border... I want to avoid a destabilization inside a
destabilized country." Kouchner warned that an incursion "will blow up the whole area
inside Turkey and inside Iraq", adding: "This is very risky... a little incident can start
everything."7

Foreign Policy Initiatives under the AKP

One of important goals of the Erdogan’s government is to preclude further intervention of

the United States in the Middle Eastern affairs. In particular Turkey objects along with
European Union countries to the American “Greater Middle East Initiative.” In order to
accomplish this Turkey calls upon her neighbors to undertake political and economic
reforms themselves. Foreign Minister Gul warned Arab countries in an interview with an
7
Kurdish Observer online, November 3, 2007; available at http://www.kurdistanobserver.com/.

8
London Arab-language daily Al-Hayat said,” "If we don't take the reins ... and prefer to
cover up and ignore them (our problems), then others [the United States] will try to solve
them their way and interfere in our affairs."48 He criticized potential American approach
to solving problems in the region:”…And this interference will take place in the wrong
way because they don't understand our sensitivities, our habits, our cultures and our
social structure."

In particular Turkey extended new diplomatic efforts in bringing peaceful resolution to

the Syrian-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. Turkish leadership calls upon Turkey
has undertaken bold steps to mediate regional conflicts in the Middle East. The new
Turkish government demonstrated its willingness to reconcile with the Muslim world. In
particular, the Erdogan government took an activist approach in its relations with Turkish
neighbors to the east (Iran) and south (Iraq, Syria), while the bi-lateral relations with
Israel entered a cooler period. The war in Iraq served as a political moment for Turkish
new foreign policy. Turkish commentator observed,” "Iraq is becoming a unifying factor
in the region. Turkish diplomacy is trying to mobilize public opinion in the region now.
This gives Turkey the opportunity to play the role of a regional power."

The Iraq War

The first important test of Turkish dynamism, inspired by the new spirit in Turkish
foreign policy, was crisis in Iraq in the winter of 2003. The possibility of war in Iraq and
its dismemberment raised a scepter of creation of an independent Kurdish state in
Northern Iraq and separatist demands among the Turkish Kurds. Turkey pursued all
avenues to prevent this occurrence.

The Turkish activism in the post-war Iraq brought Turks on a collision course with U.S.
interests. In particular, the contention erupted about the fate of Mosul and Kirkuk
province. These two provinces in the northern Iraq are predominantly populated by
Kurds. The crux of this issue is the presence of major Iraqi oil fields of Mosul and Kirkuk
provinces, which could potentially provide an economic foundation for a Kurdish
autonomous entity

Relations with Syria

After coming to power, the AKP initiated diplomatic offensive to reach new
understanding with Syrian government, among other Arab countries.62 Over the last two
years the relations between the two countries drastically improved. The two countries
signed a significant number of bi-lateral agreements in the Sixth Turkish –Syrian
Protocol, which covers economic sphere, duty-free trade, tourism and educational
exchange in Ankara in July of 2003. 63 In December 2003 Turkish parliamentary
delegation visited Syria to re-start bi-lateral dialogue on the contentious issue of Hatay
province and terrorism.64 This exchange was followed by a state visit by President
Bashar Assad in January of 2004. In was the first visit to Turkey by Syrian head of state
in 57 years.

9
 New Activism in Foreign Policy Towards Iran

The Erdogan administration also attempted to open a new era in Turkish-Iranian

relations. In July 2004 Prime Minister Erdogan visited Teheran and signed agreement
about deliveries of Iranian gas to Europe through the Turkish territory. In response to
American diplomatic warnings, the Turkish Prime Minister said,” "Just as all other
countries in the world develop relations with their neighbors, so too will Turkey develop
its relations with its neighbors. And it is determined about this."70 In broad reference to
the Strategic Depth doctrine he added at press conference in Teheran,” "Before we came
to power, we promised that we would develop relations with our neighbors and included
this in our action plan. We did not make any discrimination among our neighbors. The
regional peace will be set up in this way. Just like how all the worlds' countries develop
relations with their neighbors, Turkey will also develop its relations with its neighbors. It
is determined about this."

Mediation of Regional Conflicts

Israeli-Syrian track.

The AK Party government gave a new impetus to Turkish efforts to mediate conflict
between Syria and Israel. During the first summit in January 2004 between Erdogan and
Bashar Assad Israel used the good offices of Prime Minster Erdogan to pass a message to
the Syrian leader. Prime Minster Erdogan personally got involved in the diplomatic
effort. After the Bashar Assad’s visit he met Israeli ambassador to Ankara Pnhas Avivi
and relayed that ”, "Syrian President Bashar Assad said he is serious in his intention to
renew peace talks with Israel, and intends taking all the necessary steps to reach a peace
agreement in the Middle East." Furthermore, Israel itself might be very interested in
Turkey intercession with Syria. With reference to am emerging reality in the post-Saddam
Middle East, a former Israeli Prime Minister Bejnamin Netaniahu commented on
prospects of the Syrian track:” "I think there is the opportunity today to explore possible
contacts with Syria.”

Israeli-Palestinian track

When the AK party came to power in Ankara the attitude toward the plight of
Palestinians in the West bank and Gaza became a prominent factor in Turkish foreign
policy and this inevitably affected Turkish-Israeli ties. Initially Prime Minister Erdogan
delayed his visit to Israel for indefinite period in the spring of 2003. Foreign Minister
Abdullah Gul suggested upgrading diplomatic relations with the Palestinian Authority to
an ambassadorial level. But a drastic deterioration of relations occurred in May of 2004
as a result of extreme Israeli military actions in Gaza which numerous civilian deaths.
Erdogan expressed open criticism of the Israeli policies and he called Israel a 'terrorist'
state. He also temporarily recalled the Ankara ambassador in Israel to express his protest.
However, both economic and military cooperation between Turkey and Israel continues.
Turkey and Israel signed a multi-million water deal for 20 years. Turkey has bought
US$3 billion worth of Israeli weapons since 1996. In May of 2004 contract to build three

10
natural gas-based power plants by Turkish companies worth $800 million was signed by
Prime Minister Erdogan.

The Turks’ anger was provoked by rising tension with Kurds along the Iraqi-Turkish
border and by the debate in the American Congress about the Turkish genocide of the
Armenians in 1915
Turkish youths attacked Kurdish shops. These events reanimate the Sevres Syndrome.8
So, if Turkey feels the need to set up a solid buffer zone along its border with northern
Iraq to contain the Kurds and swoop in with troops when it sees fit, there is little the
United States can do to stop it.
The same argument was taking place in Turkey following the 1991 Gulf War, when the
Iraqi Kurds were granted autonomy. Soon enough, Turkey in 1995 sent 35,000 troops into
northern Iraq to crush Kurdish rebels and squash Iraqi Kurdish aspirations for
independence. The same episode is repeating itself today, as Iraqi Kurdistan has made
strides in attracting foreign investment and extending its autonomy since the 2003 U.S.
invasion of Iraq. Turkey opposed the invasion by refusing U.S. access to Turkish military
bases, and now is threatening to set up roadblocks along the U.S. military's logistics chain
into Iraq and upset Washington's relations with the Kurds.

The current diplomatic impasse with the United States is another indicator of profound
tectonic shift in Turkish foreign policy. Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey's
neighborhood -- and its relationship with Washington -- has drastically changed. Attempts
to become a Central Asian or European power have failed, and the Turks are looking in
different directions for opportunities. The Iraq war has proven that U.S. and Turkish
security concerns are no longer in lockstep, leading Turkey to re-evaluate its alliance with
the United States.

Turkey no longer is a weak economic power and is not as reliant on the United States for
its security. Turkey's rapid economic growth and its strong military tradition are creating
the conditions for Ankara to pull itself out of its post-World War I insularity and extend
itself in the region once again. As a result, Turkey's foreign policy no longer needs to tie
itself to the United States, and Ankara can afford to make bold moves concerning issues
-- whether those issues relate to the Kurds, Armenians or Greeks -- without losing too
much sleep over any follow-on damage to its relationship with the United States. If the
United States is going to act as the destabilizing force in the region through creating a
major upheaval in Iraq, Turkey must at the very least attempt to take control of the
situations within its old sphere of influence.

But this does not mean Turkey can make a clean break from the United States either, at
least not any time in the near future. Turkey's growth is still fragile and needs more time
to become consolidated. Turkey also faces resistance in every direction that it pushes,
from Greece in the Balkans, Iran, Iraq and Syria in the Middle East and Russia in the
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This takes us back to a pivotal point in Turkish history: the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, which sealed the
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. At that time, the victorious European powers drew up a treaty to
dismember the Ottoman Empire by ceding territory to Greece (including the key northern shore of the
Dardanelles), giving Armenia more territory than it could manage and creating the conditions for an
independent Kurdish state.

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Caucasus. Turkey's current position puts it into a geopolitical context where Iran is rising
to Turkey's southeast and a resurgent Russia is bearing down on the Caucasus and even
hinting at returning its naval fleet to the Mediterranean. In the near term, a major power is
needed in Iraq to keep the Iranians at bay, and the Turks would prefer that the Americans
do the heavy lifting on this since Iraq already is in disarray. Meanwhile, Turkey will
move forward with its grand strategy of keeping Iraqi Kurdistan in check. U.S. authorities
have agreed to share intelligence about positions of Kurdish rebels with Turkey, possibly
enabling the Turkish military to carry out limited assaults.

"The United States has declared the PKK as the common enemy. The struggle against this
enemy will be maintained until it is eliminated," Erdogan told lawmakers in Parliament
Tuesday.

Conclusion
Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan in his political vision is a true revolutionary who
intends to rollback the Kemalist order that dominated Turkey for seventy years. In fact,
the social and recently constitutional reforms unleashed by him earned him the title of the
“silent revolutionary.” Turkish popular press incidentally dubbed him the Fatih after
Turkey became an official candidate for membership in the European Union in 2004. His
main political goal is to gradually remove secularism or (as Turks call it Laiklik or
laicism) from the political agenda. But his program of revolution is to be achieved
through constitutional reform, rather than other means. After the AKP victory, Erdogan
made a claim the party of the government is ‘conservative democratic’ party. But earlier
on, he made number of widely quoted remarks about the secular order in Turkey. I will
quote just two of them: “Democracy is just a tram, but Islam is our destination. And “I
will make them [Turkish public] to swallow the bitter pill of {Islam].” The theme social
and ideological revolution is reflected in the Erdogan’s choice for Republic’s president
and a close political ally Abdullah Gul. In his speech Gul highlighted the AKP
government's economic and political reforms and referred to them as a "silent
revolution." He concluded that that the ‘silent revolution’ in Turkey is not finished. In
addition, he noted the stabilization of Turkish markets and praised the far-sighted
approach to Turkish economic reform. With regard to foreign policy, he said that Turkey
is pursuing a multi-dimensional approach based on problem solving and the goal of
European Union membership remains a high priority.

On tactical level, Recep Erdogan needs to appease the generals in order to remain in his
seat and quiet the popular wave of nationalism and anti-Americanism that gripped the
Turkish citizens The muscle flexing and putting the mantle of the Ottoman arbiter is a
part of larger tectonic change in Turkish foreign policy and the part-and-parcel of the new
role Turkey desires to assume in the Middle East. The incursion will precipitate might

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serve as a new challenge to the United States’s policy in the Middle East by its less and
less reliable ally. Upgrading of relations with Iran, which has a pariah status among
Western powers and the decision to build a major gas pipeline in the face of American
opposition , is indicative of this new spirit Turkey, seeks patronage over the Iraqi
Kurdistan in the long run. The American diplomacy continues to pursue its policy of
engagement with Turkey but at the same time is aware that current political of Turkey is
at logger-heads with long-term interests of the United States.
Turkey is pursuing the role of regional linchpin and attempts to replace the United States
as the main mediator in all major conflicts in the area: Israeli-Arab conflict, Israeli-Syrian
conflicts and Iran-Israeli confrontation over the Iranian nuclear program. The big
questions remains whether Turkey has wherewithal to fulfill this grandiose vision.

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