Excerpts from:

United States Army in World War II The European Theater of Operations Logistical Support of the Armies Volume I: May !" #Septem$er !"" and United States Army in World War II The European Theater of Operations Logistical Support of the Armies Volume II: Septem$er !""# May !"% by Roland G. Ruppenthal, Center of Military History United States rmy !ol. ", pp. #$%&'(

)HE *U"+,&U- ". S)R",E,#%$/

)he tas0 of mo1in2 personnel and car2o inland in the United 3in2dom fell chiefly to the rail4ays. "n addition to the limited capacity of their rollin2 stoc0 the *ritish rail4ays suffered from other handicaps, such as limited head space and inade5uate tunnel clearances, 4hich impeded the free mo1ement of tan0s and other a404ard e5uipment. Colonel Ross, chief of transportation in the E)6, had reported after his first loo0 at U.3. facilities in #%$7, that the country 4as 8so cramped and small, the railroad e5uipment so tiny, the roads so small and croo0ed and methods so entirely different8 that a complete reorientation of operatin2 methods 4as re5uired. &Ltr' (oss to )en Wylie' *+ ,ul "*' ETO Adm - "A Transportation#)eneral./*y comparison 4ith the railroads of the United States the *ritish system 4as indeed in many 4ays a +illiputian one. .e1ertheless, it accomplished a prodi2ious feat althou2h dan2erously o1erburdened by the ti2htest control handled traffic approachin2 the cro4ded schedules of the .e4 9or0 sub4ays. :ith the first inau2uration of the 0olero build&up in the summer of #%$7 a 5uestion immediately arose as to the role of U.S. )ransportation Corps personnel in the U.3. or2ani;ation. )he *ritish desired that merican troop units should be absorbed into the existin2 system. Colonel Ross ob<ected to such complete inte2ration, and 5uic0ly established trained traffic control personnel in the *ritish rail transportation offices in the re2ional commands to learn the *ritish system of control. :ith continental operations in mind, 4hen U.S. )ransportation Corps units 4ould ha1e to operate their o4n lines of communications he felt it 4as his duty to de1elop an or2ani;ation capable of functionin2 independently. He therefore insisted that the )ransportation Corps in the E)6 be allo4ed full responsibilities in the transportation operations as rapidly as permitted by a1ailable personnel. t the same time he or2ani;ed a refresher course for transportation officers, referred to some as a 8deflation school,8 since it 4as suspected of ha1in2 been desi2ned as much to deflate any latent chau1inism 4hich U.S. officers mi2ht ha1e about U.S transportation facilities and procedures as to orient them in *ritish railroadin2 methods. &I. (oss' 1(oss of ETO'1 Army Transportation Journal' I 2April' !"%3' -*#-4./ )he de1elopment of a completely separate U.S. transportation system 4as hardly feasible, and E)6US a2reed 4ith *ritish officials to establish a <oint control. Under this arran2ement the merican traffic control system paralleled the *ritish, merican personnel 4or0in2 closely 4ith *ritish transportation officials and assumin2 a full share of responsibility in the control of mo1ements. *y early #%$/ merican traffic officers 4ere handlin2 all their o4n transportation in areas 4here U.S. troops 4ere preponderant, and merican Rail )ransportation 6fficers =R)6>s? became familiar fi2ures in the many stations alon2 the *ritish rail lines. Rail4ay operatin2 units mean4hile trained by performin2 s4itchin2 ser1ice at the depots and operatin2 for short distances on the main lines. merican units first too0 o1er the operation of s4itchyards at the schurch, Sudbury, and )hatcham depots in the fall of #%$7, and in .o1ember for the

first time operated a 82oods8 train on a *ritish main line, bet4een Sudbury and E22inton. &5istory of the T6' ETO' I' 7#+' "!8 Troop and Supply 0uildup' pp. # *' !#*"' *9 ./ Since distances 4ere short, no attempt 4as made to establish the normal sta2in2 system for troops arri1in2 in the United 3in2dom. *y careful schedulin2 of troop trains =up to se1enty per day? to meet con1oys, 4or0ed out in ad1ance by representati1es of the *ritish rail4ays, Mo1ement Control, and the 6ffice of the Chief of )ransportation, E)6US , troops could be marched directly from boatside to train and dispatched to their destinations to their destinations 4ithout delay. )he entire mo1ement had to be hi2hly synchroni;ed because passen2er cars 4ere in short supply, normal ci1ilian rail traffic had to be accommodated, and rail facilities at the ports 4ere limited. R)6>s at the port super1ised the transfer of troops from portside to trains, and others alon2 the route made arran2ements for refreshment halts. Supplies 4ere mo1ed under the same 2eneral system of control, 4ith re2ional transportation officers 4or0in2 in close collaboration 4ith *ritish Mo1ement Control. s 4ith troop mo1ements, the local R)6>s 4ere responsible for issuin2 the necessary shippin2 documents, notifications of departure, and so on. s indicated earlier, the *ritish rail4ays 4ere desperately short of locomoti1es, and in #%$7 arran2ed for the shipment of $(( en2ines =0no4n as *oleros? from the Unites States. these 7&@&(>s 4ere the e5ui1alent of the *ritish 8 usterity8 class en2ines. )hey had been desi2ned in co&operation 4ith the *ritish, the principal consideration bein2 simplicity of desi2n and construction and the necessary ru22edness to stand up under combat conditions, since they 4ere e1entually intended to be used on the Continent. )he first of these utility locomoti1es arri1ed 4ith ceremony befittin2 their importance at Cardiff, :ales, in .o1ember #%$7. )he pro2ram 4as later extended, based on an estimate that some nine hundred locomoti1es 4ould be needed on the Continent in the first six months of operation, and <oint stoc0&pilin2 of *oleros and usterities 4as be2un. "n #%$/ the merican&built en2ines be2an to arri1e at the rate of about fifty per month. &Memo' AA 6ofT :lng for 6ol ;. <. 5ausauer' + =ec "-' su$: Locomoti>es and :ort 0attalion (e?uirements for 0olero and (oundup' S5AE< )#" -+ 0oleroI ""./ Arei2ht car buildin2 pro2ram 4as also underta0en. +ar2e numbers of cars desi2ned for use on the continental rail4ays 4ere shipped 0noc0ed do4n to sa1e shippin2 space and 4ere assembled in En2land, principally at the Hainault Rail4ay Sheds and Sidin2, excellent shops constructed <ust before the 4ar at Chi24ell, Essex, a fe4 miles northeast of +ondon.&5istory of the T6' ETO' I' "!#% ./

!ol.", pp. /#B&#@ "mportant as motor transportation 4as to be in operation 61erlord, it 4as not expected to sustain the mountin2 1olume of supply mo1ements after the first fe4 4ee0s. Arom the be2innin2 the llies counted on the rail4ays a far more economical carrier o1er lon2 distancese1entually to bear the lar2er portion of the transportation burden. Restoration of the Arench rail lines too0 on added importance in 1ie4 of the anticipated shorta2e of truc0 transport. +ac0 of a final operational plan made it impossible for a lon2 time to prepare accurate estimates of materiel re5uirements. .e1ertheless, re5uisitions for special Class "! e5uipment had to be placed far enou2h in ad1ance to insure procurement and deli1ery in time for the operation. Supply planners found it necessary therefore to estimate needs on the basis of hypothetical operational plans, assumin2 a rail line of communications of a certain len2th and assumin2 certain scales of destruction.

". the meantime studies 4ere made to determine the exact condition of the Arench rail4ay net. )he lac0 of intelli2ence on European rail lines handicapped plannin2 at first. )his 4as remedied 4hen the *ritish turned o1er to E)6US en2ineers considerable information on the Arench rail4ays.&(ailroad (econstruction and 0ridging' 5ist. (pt *' 6orps of Engrs ETO' p. * ' ETO Adm./ En2ineer studies co1ered such matters as the state of trac0 maintenance, 2rades, carryin2 capacity, number, type and si;e of brid2es, the 0ind of 4ater and coal facilities, and the si;e of yards. Estimates of dama2e to the rail system 4ere considerably hi2her than for hi2h4ays. Aor plannin2 purposes it 4as assumed that C/ percent of the trac0 and all brid2es 4ould be destroyed. portion of this trac0a2e and brid2in2 4as expected to be sal1a2eable, but reconstruction of the lines 4as estimated to re5uire '' percent ne4 ties and rail and %( percent ne4 brid2in2. )hese estimates 4ere based on the enemy>s performance in the Mediterranean theater, 4here demolitions had been extensi1e. "n "taly the Germans had employed a tie&brea0in2 machine 4hich systematically tore ties from the roadbed and automatically dropped a char2e 4hich bro0e the rail at re2ular inter1als.&(ailroad (econstruction and 0ridging' 5ist. (pt *' 6orps of Engrs ETO' p. *-#*"' ETO Adm./ ,SEC en2ineers made all the detailed plans for rail4ay reconstruction as far south as Rennes, althou2h this in1ol1ed pro<ects, 4hich 4ere expected to re5uire almost three months to complete. (Map 9) Map !

Airst priority 4as 2i1en to the reconstruction of the yards at Cherbour2. -ort clearance facilities 4ere of first importance, and rail operations 4ere lo2ically based on Cherbour2 as a startin2 point, for that port 4as the only suitable point of entry for locomoti1es and rollin2 stoc0, and the only port capable of

handlin2 a404ard e5uipment. Rail lines restoration 4as to be completed only as far as +ison Dunction, a fe4 miles southeast of "si2ny, by , plus $#. *y , plus %( a total of only 7$' miles 4as scheduled to be in operation, consistin2 mainly of a trun0 line alon2 the route Cherbour2&+ison Dunction&Aolli2ny ,ol Rennes. &A=SE6 :lan' Anne@ 4 AEngrB' App. 6/ )he rail plan thus fitted into the 2eneral lo2istic scheme to de1elop the lines of communications south4ard to the Rennes depot areas, but it 4as a modest one considerin2 the si;e of the 61erlord lod2ment area and the e1entual course of operations. ,SEC en2ineers de1eloped plans to reconstruct roadbeds, cul1erts, and brid2es, reclaim sal1a2eable trac0 materials, relay trac0s, install yards and sidin2s, and rehabilitate or construct 4ater and coal supply facilities. :ith characteristic thorou2hness the Corps En2ineers made detailed studies of the 4or0 in1ol1ed in the repair of each brid2e, cul1ert, and spur, prepared bills materials listin2 e1ery need from roc0 crushers and concrete mixers to ties and spi0es. "n the $C&mile stretch from Cherbour2 to +ison Dunction alone the plan listed ei2hty brid2es 4hich mi2ht re5uire rebuildin2. "t 4a estimated that $C,'(( tons of construction material 4ould be needed for the reconstruction of the milea2e outlined abo1e. )his included steel brid2es brid2in2 and cul1erts, trac0 materials, and miscellaneous items such as cement, lumber, and pilin2, all phased to arri1e at certain ports or beaches in specific amounts, 4ithin daily tonna2e allocations.&Engr (pt *. pp. *%#*4/ )he troop units pro1ided for this mission totaled fi1e en2ineer 2eneral ser1ice re2iments, three en2ineer dump truc0 companies, and one en2ineer hea1y pontoon battalion. lthou2h a trainin2 pro2ram 4as 4or0ed out for the en2ineer 2eneral ser1ice re2iments to this 4or0, they had 1ery little experience in rail4ay reconstruction before the in1asion. )4o of the re2iments&//7d and /$Cth had attended the <oint U.S.&*ritish railroad brid2in2 school in the United 3in2dom. )hey 4ere the only units that recei1ed any measure of speciali;ed trainin2 for their continental mission. &Engr (pt *. pp. *7/ "n all the plannin2 for reconstruction of the continental rail4ays, the en2ineers maintained close liaison 4ith the )ransportation Corps, 4hich or2ani;ed the 7d Military Rail4ay Ser1ice to operate the lines. )he 7d MRS 4as commanded by *ri2. Gen. Clarence +. *urpee, 4ho had come into the ser1ice from the tlantic Coast +ine. "n the early sta2es of the operation the Rail4ay Ser1ice 4as to be limited primarily to reconnaissance of captured rail lines, and the Corps of En2ineers 4as to determine 4hat alterations in plans, if any, should be made in restoration of lines. )o operate the lines the 7d Military Rail4ay Ser1ice or2ani;ed rail4ay 2rand di1isions, intended to handle rou2hly the area of a base section. 2rand di1ision 4as normally capable of operatin2 from 7'( to $'( miles of rail4ay, dependin2 on the number of units assi2ned to it. Aor early operations, to , plus $#, the )ransportation Corps pro1ided one rail4ay 2rand di1ision, 4ith t4o rail4ay shop battalions and t4o rail4ay operatin2 battalions. &Military (ailCay Ser>ice' )en 0d (pr *-'pp. "' / .ot until after this period, ho4e1er, 4ould operation of the lines become extensi1e.

!ol ", pp. $/7&//

T5E LO)ISTI6 OUTLOO; ID ,UDE

)ruc0s handled nearly all transportation in the lod2ment in Dune and Duly. t the end of Duly nearly /(,((( tons of supplies 4ere bein2 cleared from the beaches and small ports e1ery day, mostly by the truc0 companies of the pro1isional Motor )ransport *ri2ade 4hich the d1ance Section had or2ani;ed <ust before , ,ay. Rail transportation played a ne2li2ible role in these months, althou2h not because of

any failure to rehabilitate the existin2 net4or0. )he delay in capturin2 and restorin2 Cherbour2 ruled out the plan to ha1e that port recei1e rail4ay e5uipment and rollin2 stoc0 by , ,ay plus 7', but reconnaissance of the main line runnin2 from Cherbour2 to Carentan and southeast4ard be2an a 4ee0 of the landin2s, sometimes under fire. )he #(''th En2ineerin2 -ort Construction and Repair Group be2an to rehabilitate the Carentan yards on #C Dune, shortly after the capture of the to4n. fe4 days later repair 4or0 4as underta0en at +ison Dunction to the southeast, and later at Cherbour2, 4here the destruction had been the 2reatest. *y the end of Duly four rail brid2es had been repaired and #7' miles of rails 4ere in operatin2 order, includin2 the double&trac0 line from Cherbour2 to +ison Dunction, and sin2le&trac0 branch lines from *arfleur and St. !aast and from St. Sau1eur&De&!icomte. )he first scheduled run bet4een Cherbour2 and Carentan 4as made on ## Duly by a train operated by the C7%th Rail4ay 6peratin2 *attalion, a unit sponsored by the .e4 9or0, .e4 Ha1en and Hartford Railroad. lthou2h the supply of rail e5uipment and construction materials 4as not entirely satisfactory, restoration of existin2 lines had pro2ressed as far as the tactical situation permitted. Until the end of Duly, ho4e1er, conditions in the lod2ment made the use of rail4ays uneconomical. ,istances 4ere short, and rail transportation 4ould ha1e in1ol1ed multiple handlin2 and initial hauls by truc0s in any e1ent. .o frei2ht of any conse5uence, therefore, 4as hauled by this means.

!ol ", pp.'$$&'/

T(ADS:O(TATIOD ID T5E :U(SUIT

t the end of Duly the main concern of the lo2istical planners had still been the threatenin2 deficit in port dischar2e capacity. )hat problem 4as no nearer solution in the first 4ee0 of u2ust. *ut the sudden expansion of the lod2ment area brou2ht 4ith an ine1itable shift in emphasis. Aor the next six 4ee0s transportation 4as the lo4est common denominator of supply operations, as the )ransportation Corps found it increasin2ly difficult to carry out the in<unction 4hich had become so familiar to all mo1ement orders: 8 )he )C 4ill furnish the necessary transportation.8 :ith the extension of the lines of communications the rail4ays at last be2an to play their intended role. )hey mo1ed only ne2li2ible tonna2es in Dune and Duly, in part because rail operations 4ere uneconomical o1er short distances, in part because Cherbour2, the terminus of the main line, 4as not yet recei1in2 supplies in 2reat 1olume. *ut the lo2istical planners al4ays intended, and in fact deemed it necessary, that the rail4ays bear the main burden of lon2&distance haulin2 and 4ith the deepenin2 of the lod2ment in u2ust the 4ay 4as finally opened for them to assume the tas0. Arance possessed a 2ood rail net4or0, totalin2 nearly 7B,'(( miles of sin2leand double&trac0 lines. Until #%/@ it had been di1ided into se1en bi2 systems =t4o of them state o4ned?. "n that year these 4ere combined into a sin2le national system 0no4n as the Societe Nationale des Chemines de Per Francais. )he denser concentration of lines 4as in the north and 4est, and -aris 4as the hub of the entire net4or0. "n physical characteristics and method of operation the Arench system 4as similar to others on the Continent. "n 2eneral, its e5uipment, includin2 rollin2 stoc0 and loadin2 unloadin2 facilities, 4as li2ht in 4ei2ht and small in capacity, and it relied hea1ily on manual labor. Rollin2 stoc0 built in the United States for use on the continental lines had to be specially desi2ned. &5istory of the T6' ETO' Vol V. *d M(S
Src' pp. #-. ETO Adm %+*/

lthou2h the 61erlord lo2istical planners did not expect to ha1e an elaborate rail net4or0 operatin2 on the Continent in the first fe4 months, they hoped to open at least one line main axis of ad1ance. -lans had

been made to rehabilitate a north&south line from Cherbour2 1ia +ison Dunction, St. +o, Aolli2ny, 1ranches, and ,ol to Rennes, 4here the first bi2 depot area 4as expected to be established. Arom there one line 4as to be opened south and 4est4ard to the 1icinity of Euiberon *ay, and a double&trac0 line east4ard from Rennes to +e Mans 4as to be constructed. (See Map 9)

U.S.#0UILT WO(L= WA( I LO6OMOTIVES at the roundhouse in Cher our!.

t the time of the brea0out at the end of Duly rail lines had been rehabilitated as far as tactical pro2ress permitted. )he main double&trac0 line from Cherbour2 to +ison Dunction 4as in operation, a fe4 branch lines in the Cotentin had been restored, and construction 4as about to start on t4o lar2e marshalin2 yards south of Cherbour2 in anticipation of the hea1y shipments from that port.&5istory of the T6'ETO' Vol. IV,ul#
Sep ""8Sec. IV' pp. */

Rail4ay operatin2 units had been scheduled to enter the Continent 1ia Cherbour2 4ithin the first three 4ee0s of the landin2s. *ecause of the delays in openin2 the port, ho4e1er, the first units 4ere brou2ht in across the beaches. )hey consisted mainly of the three operatin2 battalions and t4o shop battalions 4hich operated the existin2 lines under the direction of the C(Cth rail4ay Grand ,i1ision. )he mo1ement of e5uipment 4as li0e4ise delayed, and the first rollin2 stoc0, a 4or0 train consistin2 of a 7'&ton diesel en2ine and ten flatcars, 4as mounted on hea1y trailers, ferried across the Channel on an +S), and brou2ht in across the beaches in Duly. )he mo1ement of rollin2 stoc0 to Cherbour2 by train ferry, seatrain, and +S) did not 2et under 4ay until the end of the month. the seatrains Texas and Lakehurst brou2ht in the first hea1y e5uipment, includin2 diesel and steam locomoti1es, tan0 and box cars, truc0s, and bulldo;ers. E1en then the condition of the port 4as such that the ships could not be berthed, and the hea1y e5uipment had to be transferred to bar2es, transported to the 5uay, and then hoisted to the 5uayside trac0s by cra4ler cranes. lar2e portion of the rollin2 stoc0 4as e1entually ferried across the Channel in +S)>s 4hich had been fitted 4ith rails.

)OD=OLA (OLLID) OUT O< AD LST' speciall" e#uipped to carr" rollin! stock$ Cher our!$ %ul" &9''

)he first important demand for deli1eries by rail resulted directly from the )hird rmies for4ard lun2e at the be2innin2 of u2ust. Rail transportation suddenly became economical and essential, for the lon2 hauls to the army area immediately placed a hea1y strain on motor transport. "n anticipation of the need for rail facilities one en2ineer 2eneral ser1ice re2iment 4as 4ithdra4n from Cherbour2 and put to 4or0 on the line runnin2 south from St. +o immediately after the brea0out from 1ranches.&A=SE6 Deptune :lan' -= Apr !""'Anne@ ":Transportation' ETO Adm -77/ :ithin a fe4 days it 4as apparent from the speed of the ad1ance that extraordinary efforts 4ould be re5uired to pro1ide rail facilities in support of the army, and additional en2ineer re2iments 4ere therefore assi2ned to restore the lines south and east of Aolli2ny. )he reconstruction of dama2ed rail lines could hardly 0eep pace 4ith the ad1ance of the combat forces. .e1ertheless, e1ery effort 4as made to meet a re5uest made by the )hird rmy on #7 u2ust to open a line to +e Mans, 4here the army 4anted deli1ery of approximately 7',((( tons of ammunition and -6+, 4ithin the next three days. )he decision of / u2ust by 4hich the main effort 4as directed east4ard rather than into *rittany made it desirable to de1elop other lines in addition to the one already planned. *ut much of the parallel line farther north, 4hich ranfrom !ire east4ard to r2entan and beyond, 4as still in enemy hands. )he line runnin2 south4ard to Rennes and then east4ard could not be restored to operation 5uic0ly because of time&consumin2 brid2in2 <obs at both -ontaubault, on the Selune Ri1er south of 1ranches,and +a1al. Aortunately the condition of secondary lines made it possible to select an alternate route for temporary use pendin2 the reconstruction of the main lines.&5istory of the T6' ETO Vol. IV. Sec. IV' pp *# -/ )he temporary route ran east4ard from 1ranches to St. Hilaire&du&Harcouet, south Aou2eres, east to Mayenne and then south to <oin the main line at +a Chapelle. )he reconstruction of e1en this route re5uired se1eral ma<or brid2in2 pro<ects, the lar2est one at St. Hilaire,&(ailroad (econstruction and 0ridging' 5ist (pt *' 6orps of Engrs ETO' pp. %7#%+/ and be2innin2 on #7 u2ust elements of ele1en en2ineer 2eneral ser1ice re2iments 4ere assi2ned to 4or0 on it.&A=SE6 Operating 5istory' p 4!/ 6n #C u2ust, after many delays, the first of a scheduled thirty&t4o trains bearin2 supplies for the )hird rmy arri1ed at +e Mans.

)he first ma<or mo1ements of car2o 1ia rail 4ere carried out under somethin2 less than ideal conditions. Most of the route restored to operation thus far 4as sin2le trac0, and there 4as 1irtually no si2nal systam. Since t4o&4ay traffic on sin2le&trac0 lines prohibited it 4as not lon2 before con2estion de1eloped bet4een 1ranches and +e Mans. Mean4hile the ine1itable shorta2e of empty frei2ht cars de1eloped at the loadin2 points in the base areas. )he difficulties at +e Mans 4ere a22ra1aated by the se1ere dama2e to the yards. Here 4as a -ointed example of the effect 4hich llied air bombardment could ha1e on llied 2round operations,for the bi2 terminal at +e Mans had been almost completely demolished by air raids. 6ne roundhouse 4as completely destroyed, the other badly dama2ed, and the machine shop about t4o&thirds demolished. "n addition there 4ere the usual torn&up trac0s and dama2ed locomoti1es. +ac0 of tools and e5uipment necessitated a hi2h de2ree of impro1isation. "n the abscence of a si2nal system, for example, fla22in2 of trains durin2 dar0ness 4as at first accomplished lar2ely 4ith flashli2hts, ci2arette li2hters, and e1en li2hted ci2arettes. *lac0smiths immediately 4ent to 4or0 fashionin2 badly needed hand tools. Mean4hile, Arench rail4ay 4or0man 2radually be2an to appear 4ith tools and missin2 parts from repair and maintenance machinery 4hich had been hidden from the enemy. "n some instances the men made use of spare parts that had been brou2ht to Arance by the mericans durin2 :orld :ar ".
&5istory of the T6' ETO' Vol. IV' Sec. IV' pg. +/

)he condition of the +e Mans rail yards 4as typical of the destruction 4hich the llied air forces had inflicted on all important rail centers, <unctions, and cho0e points in their efforts to isolate and pre1ent enemy reinforcement of the lod2ement area. Aolli2ny had also extensi1e destruction, and its yards 4ere a mass of burned cars and t4isted steel. Enemy destruction of rail lines, in contrast, 4as not extensi1e, and rehabilitation 4as much simpler than expected. "n the demolition of brid2es the enemy 4as more methodical, althou2h e1en there the amount of dama2e 4as only about half as 2reat as expected. &I$id..Src .V' p 78 <inal (eport of the 6hief Engineer' ETO' !"*#"%' O6M5/ Enemy&inflicted dama2e to e5uipment 4as also less than expected, and much rollin2 stoc0 4as captured and put to use. .e1ertheless, the shorta2e of frei2ht cars soon became a serious limitin2 factor because of the delay in mo1in2e5uipment to the Continent and because of the losses resultin2 from llied bombin2 of marshalin2 yards and locomoti1es. ,estruction by the llied air forces in fact threatened to ha1e a more disastrous effect on the llied lo2istic capabilities than on the enemy>s operations. *e2innin2 late in Dune supply and transportation officials repeatedly as0ed that rail4ay brid2es, tunnels, and 1iaducts, 4hose repair entailed lar2e expenditures of of effort, be spared in the hope that the enemy 4ould not destroy them in retreat. t about the time the first trains entered +e Mans the llies completed their en1elopment of the enemy forces in the Aalaise area, ma0in2 it possible to be2in4or0 on the northern line east4ard 1ia r2entan, +ai2le, and ,reux. Reconstructionof that line as prticularly important in 1ie4 of the necessity of supportin2 an additional army o1er extended lines of communications, and the pro<ext 4as 2i1en a hi2h priority. )he openin2 of the main route east of Rennes still a4aited the reconstruction of a rail brid2e at +a1al. )his 4as completed at the end of the month. Mean4hile reconnaissance parties had pushed from +e Mans to examine the lines farther east. s could be expected, they found therail4ays bet4een Chartres and -aris hea1ily dama2ed for the llied air forces had made special efforts to cut enemy lines of communications alon2 the Seinne. 6nce a2ain, ho4e1er, by circuitous routin2 it 4as possible to push a line east4ard beyond Chartres. 6n /( u2ust the first merican&operated train arri1ed at the *atti2nolles 9ards in -aris, only four days after the surrender of the city. )he openin2 of this line did not immediately permit hea1y shihpments to the Arench capital, ho4e1er, and aside from en2ineer supplies, hospital trains, and ci1il affairs relief, little tonna2e actually 4ent for4ard.&Memo' MaE EdCard ). WeFFel for 6ol 6al>in L. Whittle' 4 Sep ""/ Most of the brid2es had been destroyed, and the -aris yards, 4hich had only limited capacity at the time, pro1ided only a narro4 funnel for the supplies re5uired beyond the Seine. *y the end of the month the northern as 4ell as the southern line 4as open to rail traffic, and ,ruex and Chartres

4ere for the moment at least to become the important railheads for the Airst and )hird rmies respecti1ely. )he 1olume of traffic to these points 4as not initially lar2e, ho4e1er. *et4een 7$ u2ust and 7 September only se1enty trains 4ith sli2htly more than /(,((( tons 4ere dispatched from +e Mans to Chartres, and at the latter date the daily mo1ements to Chartres 4ere operatin2 ',((( tons. )he sudden need to rebuild the rail4ays in u2ust had made it necessary to au2ment the 4or0 force employed in reconstruction and to reor2ani;e the 4or0 of the ,SEC en2ineers. Until mid& u2ust the Rail4ay ,i1ision of the ,SEC En2ineer Section directly handled all reconnaissance, plannin2, material procurement, and pro<ect assi2nment to 1arious en2ineer units. "n order to relie1e this di1ision of some of the details three pro1isional en2ineer 2roups, desi2nated as , *, and C, 4ere acti1ated late in u2ust 4ith the sole mission of rail4ay reconstruction. Each 2roup included an experienced en2ineer 2eneral ser1ice re2iment as a nucleus, plus additional re2iments and other detachments. )4o 2roups 4ere immediately 2i1en the tas0 of openin2 the rail4ays behind the t4o armiesF the third 4as initially pFaced in support of the other t4o and later assi2ned to support the ."nth rmy. "n this 4ay close en2ineer support in rail4ay reconstruction 4as pro1ided for each army, 4hile the d1ance Section continued to exercise o1er&all direction of the reconstruction.&A=SE6 Operations 5istory' p VII' )en (d Study **' pp %-#%"/ t the end of u2ust more than #@,((( men, includin2',((( prisoners of 4ar, 4ere en2a2ed in rail reconstruction pro<ects.&<inal (eport of the 6hief Engineer' ETO/ ,espite the addition of limitted rail transport to Chartres and ,reux the rapid extension of the lines of communicationsin the first days of September continued to outdistance the transportation resources. "t 4as not immediately possible to mo1e lar2e tonna2es across the Seine by rail because of dama2e to the brid2es and lines in that area. 6n the southern ed2e of -aris the brid2e at Du1isy&susr&6r2e, a 1ital lin0 connectin2 the area 4est of -aris 4ith the rail net to the east, 4as a ma<or reconstruction pro<ect.&(ailrosd (econstruction and 0ridging 5ist (pt * 6orps of Engrs ETO' p47/ 6nly t4o or three trains per day mo1ed for4ard from Chartres at first, and only small tonna2es could be for4arded east4ard throu2h the narro4 bottlenec0 of -aris be2innin2 on $ September.&5istory of the T6' ETO' Vol. IV' Sec. IV' p** and Sec V' p-/ s lon2 as the extension of rail operations attempted to match the speed of the pursuit operatin2 units had to fore2o many of the facilities normal to railroadin2 and adopt ma0eshift arran2ements, particular in connection 4ith si2nalin2. 6perations often resembled those of a third&class )ooner1ille )rolley more than model railroadin2. Under those conditions the 2host of Casey Dones shado4ed many an en2ineer on the for4ard runs, as it did on ' September at Maintenon, northeast of Chartres, 4here a blac0ed&out trainload of hi2h&octane 2as roared around a do4n2rade cur1e and crashed into another train, sendin2 flamin2 Derricans into the ni2ht.&1=estination 0erlin1 Army Transportation Journal, =e Marco, !"- / *eyond the Seine the entire rail4ay picture 4as considerably bri2hter. Aor one thin2, a much more extensi1e net4or0 existed to the northeast, includin2 many of the main lines of the Arench system, and it had been 0ept in much better repair. More important, the rail4ays in that area 4ere not as badly dama2e. llied planes had not attac0ed them as persistently, particularly in recent months, as they had the lines in the 61erlord +od2ment area, and the enemy had had e1en less opportunity to destroy them in the rapid retreat to the German border. East of -aris the rail4ays therefore offered e1ery prospect of bein2 restored to operation 5uic0ly and of bein2 able to handle a lar2e 1olume of traffic. "n order to ma0e the best possible use of this net4or0 4hile the throu2h lines alon2 the Seine 4ere bein2 restored, lo2istical planners decided to continue the mo1ement of as much tonna2e as possible by truc0 to the Seine and to transfer supplies to the ral4ays, 4hich could then carry them for4ard to the army areas. )ransfer points 4ere e1entually established <ust outside -aris, 4here the car2oes of the Red *all con1oys trnsferred to the rail4ays for mo1ement to the armies to the armies.&5istory of the T6' ETO' Vol. IV' Sec. IV' p * 8 )en 0d (pt **' p. %-/ t the railheads anothertrnsfer of supplies 4as necessary, this time to army

transportation. :hile thiss entailed additional handlin2 of supplies, it promised to effect 2reat sa1in2s in the use of motor transport. "n the meantime ,SEC en2ineers had set about ma0in2 the necessary repairs to the rail lines extendin2 east4ard. "n the Airst rmy area En2ineer Group 5uic0ly opened a line from -aris northeast throu2h Soissons, +aon, Hirson, and 1ia secondary lines to Charleroi and e1entually to .amur and +ie2e. Aarther south Group C opened a route to the )hird rmy from Du1isy to Sommesous, 4here a transfer point 4ad established, and then on to Commercy and )oul. &The Tird Army' utiliFing personnel from the4+ th Traffic
(egulating )roup' Cho Cere e@perienced in railCay operations' plus <rench personnel and e?uipment' ?uicGly organiFed a (ailCay =i>ision of its oCn and tooG the initiati>e in opening and operating this line to e@pidite the mo>ement of $adly needed supplies Chich it had laid doCn in the >icinity of :aris. The line made the first deli>eries to Sommesous on 7 Septem$er' * A 6p Transportation Sec ,nl' * Sep ""8 TUSA AA(' II' )#"' *9#**/ n

additionalline 4as then opened from +aon =on the northern line? 1ia Reims east4ard to !erdun and Conflans. +ater in the month a better route 4as opened still farther north in support of the Airst rmy, runnin2 and northeast from-aris to Compie2ne, St. Euentin, adn 1ia Cambrai to Mons and then to .amur and +ie2e.A=SE6 Operations 5istory' p7!8 5istory of the TV' ETO' Vol. IV' Sec. IV' p. *%./ "n all this 4or0 the mericans made extensi1e use of captured materials.

*y mid&September up4ards of /,$(( miles of trac0 had been rehabilitated and more than forty brid2es had been rebuilt. .early all of this 4or0 4as accomplished after the brea0out from St. +o.&A=SE6 Operations 5istory/ *y the end of the month rail lines had been opened east4ard as far as +ie2e in the north and !erdun and )oul in the south, and brid2e reconstruction 4as in pro2ress at all three places. )he rehabilitation of the rail4ay had therefore proceeded far beyond 4hat had been planned by that date.

)his pro2ress 4as reflected in the increasin2 tonna2es for4arded by rail. s of # u2ust cumulati1e rail shipments had totaled only one million ton&miles. month later the total had risen to #7,'((,(((, and by mid&September shipments 4ere a1era2in2 nearly 7,(((,((( ton&miles per day. *e2innin2 4ith the first driblet of supplies for4arded 1ia rail east of -aris on $ September, the daily tonna2es handled beyond the Seine by the middle of the month a1era2ed ',((( tons and continued to rise.&5istory of the T6' ETO' Vol. IV'
sec. IV' p**' and 6harts and *./

)hou2h the rail4ays thus assumed a 2reater and 2reater portion of line&of&communications haulin2, the burden on motor transportation 4as not immediately relie1ed, for re5uirements in the for4ard areas 4ere also increasin2. )he demands of the armies consistently absorbed all a1ailable lift, and transportation resources 4ere to fall short of needs for some time to come. "n mid&September bottlenec0s in the -aris area and shota2es of rollin2 stoc0 still constituted serious limitin2 factors, and the rail4ays 4ere only be2innin2 to come into their o4n as the principal lon2&distance carriers.