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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Marcus Arroyo, Federal Security Director for TSA at Newark Liberty
International Airport

Type: Interview

Date: October 24, 2003

Special Access Information: None

Team: 7

Prepared By: Lisa Sullivan

Participants (non-Commission): Marcus Arroyo and John Danner, Counsel for TSA

Participants (Commission): Sam Brinkley, John Raidt, and Lisa Sullivan

Location: TSA facilities at Newark Airport, Newark, New Jersey

Background

[U] On 9-11, Arroyo was the Security Division Manager for FAA's Eastern Region. He
took this position in 1989. In this position he oversaw 7 states and 64 airports. This
included 8 field offices and all (CASFO and CASFU) units. Newark was a CASFU that
reported to the N ew York CASFO at JFK Airport. During one period between 1989 and
1995, he went to Brussels and assumed an international role for the FAA (Title?).
However, he returned in 1995 and resumed his position as Division Manager for Eastern
Region. Arroyo is currently the Federal Security Director for Newark, appointed in July
of 2002. The civil aviation security incidents he has responded to included TWA 800,
Swiss Air, and Egypt Air.

The Security Vectors:

[U] Significant elevations of security measures were driven by Security Directives and
intelligence. As Arroyo received them, airports responded accordingly. It was the
responsibility of Washington to determine potential vulnerabilities. SEAs (special
emphasis assessments) focus deliberately on one target area. Throughout the period
leading up to 9-11, the annual work plan had a comprehensive (for CAT X airports)
inspection plan.

[U] SEAs were done at Newark prior to 9-11, particularly testing the checkpoints.
Clutter bags were sent through in the morning and the evening, peak and off-peak. The
airport has terminals A-C. Each has three "fingers" for a total of 9 checkpoints. The

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• smallest checkpoint has two lanes. Checkpoint 1 in terminal A has three lanes. The
terrorists went through this checkpoint.

[U] The Newark CAT X inspection occurred in January of 200 1. Any deficiencies that
arose from it were met and dealt with continuously. He doesn't have the 'records of
Newark's test results.

SEA (Security Emphasis Assessments) Testing

~ SEA testing including the following areas: 1) Screenin

~ ~2)CAPPSI: The
program of testing consisted of presenting themselves with baggage and a ticket, and
"deliberately pressing buttons" to trigger the selection process. 3) Positive Passenger.Bag
Match: I '4) Access and Perimeter
Control: They did SEAs on access, the airport perimeter, "107/14" doors, and AOA
challenges. 5) Small packages and cargo: They would see if the shipper called forpickup
and see if all the proper documentation to make pick up for cargo was provided.' Arroyo
said that Unabomber-type tactics were perceived as a threat. / Ramsi Yousef and the Blind
Sheik operatives were known to be working in the vicinity 1'f the airport. ...:,::'

~ Generally, the SEAs were systemwide. The focus w~s wherever the,:PAA had a

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presence, such as at Newark. Ultimately, the FAA would make a trip to Atlantic City and
Trenton Mercer to test those airports but Arroyo felt as though the lack ,c'f resources,
budgeting and personnel inhibited their testing abilities. / ....
:...

~ SEAs were derived from Washington threat information derived from intelligence
(that was not necessarily tailored to the individual airp1rt vulnera~,i1ities).

~ There was not much flexibility in the manner in/~hich th~,y:'tested the system. The
number of tests conducted at a checkpoint was rigid. Because of this rigidity, agents
would be recognized, and testing effectiveness decreased. InArroyo's view, it was a
futile effort to continue to do it in that method with ,$0 few resources, The response to
poor screening performance was remedial training ../The FAA incorporated more
procedures and returned to the checkpoint to help rhe screeners do their job better and get
them to search more thoroughly (which he referred to a~,:'t'onthe spot reinforcement
training"). I : :'/,/
~ As a consequence of the deficiencies founJ Cl:l,:~~iladelphiaAirport and with
Argenbright (the screening security company), Arfoyo's security managers focused on
background investigations and the required fivp-,year criminal history check. He felt that
the system was made more vulnerable by issu~~g:identification badges and giving access
to people that have not been fully vetted. ! :':'

Checkpoints

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~AITOYO was asked about the effectiveness ofcheckpoi~t::~cr~ening. Arroyo cited

the civil aviation incident on December 21, 1988 over Lockerbie.Scctland. Since then
much progress has been made. In 1999, checkpoint performance w~s,~'tCl
effectiveness. He attributes the poor results to an increasingly sophisticated testing
regime. The industry's response was that the FAA was not playing fair. Arroyo
supported the testin conducted b FAA securit because "no terrorist would 'ever be fair
about it."

jS811 Threat Image Projection (TlP) ready x-ray scanners were being deployed as a
response to the more sophisticated tests of the screening measures. He doesn't remember
if this system was deployed in Newark. on 9-11. After PAN AM 103, the use 0 f Thermo
Neutron Analysis equipment was broached. FAA had $144 mi1lion to deploy as much
equipment as they could. Venders competed for the contract. He didn't know which the
best vendor to contract was. Their proposals varied in price.

~ TIP ready x-rays came later in the deployment scheme. In 1996 they began work
on deploying CTX machines. In January of 1997, they got one in the United Terminal.
Linda Daschle (short term FAA Administrator) left the FAA right after that. Some time
after that, TIP-ready x-ray machines were being deployed. Arroyo felt that the machines
weren't ready for "prime time yet." The deployment diminished checkpoint effectiveness

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and took time to resolve, assuming that they were, in fact, installed and turned on. There
were bugs in the system .

Newark

[U] In the context of the airports Arroyo was overseeing, it was JFK that seemed the most
vulnerable to a terrorist attack. Newark wasn't neglected. There was a supervisor;a
secretary, and nine agents dedicated to testing Newark. Arroyo commented that it is
never enough. You can always do more with more resources. Newark received its fair
share. In genera], he characterized security for his airports as under-resourced. The FSM
at Newark on 9/11 was Russell White.

The Threat

~ The primary threat to civil aviation airports was thought to be car bombs. Hijacks
were always a possibility and a threat. There was a shortage of Federal Air Marshals.
Screening checkpoints always got attention for their poor performance rates. The need to
prevent potential hijackings was never compromised because of the need to address
another threat vector, according to Arroyo. Arroyo stated that the required testing was
always completed. Screener training was reviewed when there was a failure. He, at
times, would sit in on GSC training and some PSI (Principle Security Inspector)
personnel would come and monitor as well.

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[U] Arroyo was asked if the fines imposed for security failures were effective. Arroyo
said a number of fines were issued, and the "industry balked." FAA felt that it was their
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responsibility to monitor their screening contracts. "It was a struggle" to get the 'airlines
to monitor the performance of their own contracted security companies. Station
Managers were responsible for this at the airport.

CAPPS I

[U] Arroyo was referred to the initial intent of CAPPS I, which, in 1997, required that
CAPPS selectees were to be escorted to the checkpoint and their carry-on subject to
additional screening. As far as Commission staff can discern, the procedure was
terminated with the expiration of the SD dictating it. Arroyo was asked ifhe remembered
when they were no longer required to follow this procedure and he said he would look
into it, and get back to the Commission.

[U] Arroyo added that the procedure of escorting selectees and "dumping their carry-ons
at the gate" generated a lot of pushback from the ACLU (American Civil Liberties
Union) and the Justice Department. There was a greater emphasis on 100 percent
checked bag screening. The TWA 800 incident gave them the impetus to deploy the EDS
machines.

[U] Arroyo thought the rationale for the decision on CAPPS consequences was the
FAA's focus on combating the threat ofa bomb in a checked bag. "No one was prepared
for the suicide hijacker." Hijacking was always thought to involve negotiation, and was
dealt with in conflict resolution exercises. Guns were the weapon in the example he cited:
a hijacking of a Lufthansa flight out of Frankfurt by Ethiopians in 1992 brought to
Kenned y airport in which a gun was used.

Intelligence

[U] When asked, Arroyo responded that he remembered Pat McDonnell's CD- ROM
presentation on intelligence. He was flattered he was asked to review it. He thought the
presentation was to produce something to share with the industry at a high level. It was a
good start as a way to drive the message home and certainly with the airport managers
(Susan Baer did not receive the briefing). He made it a point to share the information he
got from the presentation with people under him, because, as he said, "It sensitized my
workforce to the seriousness of the threat, to compliment whatever security efforts were
already in existence."

.¢On intelligence dissemination in general, Arroyo said "We wanted more but the
analysts had to protect sources," implying that he understood why the information he
received was not specific. Arroyo had former NYPD members on his staff, and he was
also working with a terrorist task force. He thought the Port Authority police had a good
intelligence system. He had a "comfort level" with law enforcement in his area. These
other sources led him to conclude that he was never at a "deficit" in terms of intelligence.
He agreed with the statement: "If it was to be had, he felt he was getting it."

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[U] There was talk, but no real specific information on Islamic fundamentalists. He went
to the trial of the Blind Sheik on the attempted Landmark bombings. After his conviction,
the Sheik said something about airports: "People would be coming," or something as
obscure. The statement was made in Arabic and translated. Arroyo passed the info on to
FAA Headquarters. The transcript of the statement was received through contacts.
Normally, he would not have gotten such a transcript. Because the statement was so
obscure and indirect, nothing came of it in terms of security precautions.

[U] Arroyo never took the posture that Newark was a "stop over" for terrorists. He
"hardened Kennedy," as well as all of his other airports, because he thought there was
nothing to prevent a terrorist from going through another airport. He wanted to maintain
uniformity of airport security. Other airports under his jurisdiction included JPK; Phil.;
Dulles; BWI; Pittsburgh; and National.

Other Suspicious Activities

[U] There was one event that really perplexed him. Down on Broadway Avenue, near the
Trade Center, there was a discovery of an obscure briefcase with test objects that the
industry used to conduct tests of screening checkpoints. Anyone could buy them from
the company the FAA used to produce the items. This discovery occurred in the May -
July time frame (what year?). Arroyo said it was never determined who the bag belonged
to; it might have been an attempt to see what the reaction of the LEO would be to finding
the briefcase. Upon hearing about the discovery, Arroyo sent an agent down there
wanting to know what it was all about. He's pretty sure he obtained digital pictures.
Arroyo realized that the manufacturer that made the test pieces did not put serial numbers
on the items.

[U] In another instance, two federal protective uniformed officers were eating lunch pre
9-11, when they observed two Middle Easterners taking pictures of the doors and the
garage doors of a federal building in lower Manhattan (2600 Federal Plaza). Upon
questioning the individuals, they said they wanted to send pictures of skyscrapers to their
friends and family in the Midwest. The officers confiscated the camera and let the
individuals go. Sometime later the film was developed and it was of the doors and
garages; the address the individuals had planned to send the pictures to was for an Arab
who worked at a chemical plant, Arroyo said.

[U] Arroyo recounted that the airports get their share of "number spotters" (people that
scout out the tail numbers of planes at airports as a hobby.) Some airports try to set areas
aside for these people.

[U] Arroyo was asked if there was a way to report suspicious activity at airports and on
aircraft. Arroyo mentioned Tony Affonte, a former airport official who was killed at the
WTC and had b~en involved in the Airport Law Enforcement Association. Arroyo said
Affonte as particularly vigilant and always shared word of suspicious activity and or
"anomalies" with him. He also added that he thought the Port Authority police were
pretty good. They took some shots after TWA 800; but they were vigilant. Reports were
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• sent up the chain of command.

appropriately disseminated.

LSB'!1
He thinks the report of suspicious activities was

Fort Hamilton shared their intelligence with Arroyo's office. An example of

intelligence the Fort would share with the FAA was the method by which weapons were
artfully concealed in a book.

[U] When asked how much latitude he felt he had to work outside of FAA standards
Arroyo said it was not permissible for him to create his own test for checkpoints.

Personnel- Credentialing

[U] Arroyo stated that he received reports when people were denied airport SIDA
credentials and would work with the FBI on this issue .

.LS81J He recalled an instance in which a Flight Standards person knew someone had
suspicious Middle Eastern affiliations. "He was suspicious of him so he reported it,"
Arroyo said. He remembers the reports were passed on to the FBI. In that case, the
evidence wasn't sufficient to fire him. FAA had a limited workforce in the geographic
area. It was built up at one point, and then pared down with budget cuts. Because he was
understaffed he would ask others to be the "ears and eyes" to assist the FAA security
inspectors.

• Hi Tech checkpoints

~] Commission staff asked why Newark had no high tech checkpoints whereas Dulles
had them on 9-11. Arroyo stated that ITS (International Total Security, Incorporated) was
the driver of the high tech checkpoint. It consisted of factors such as putting the cameras
in the right position, light illumination, best metal detectors, etc. ITS sold it as a security
product for the industry. Funding for Dulles came from MW AA. The Port Authority for
NYINJ was the lease holder. It was the decision of the individualleasee whether to put
the money up for ITS equipment.

[U] In fairness to FAA, whenever rules went to OMB, the discussion of how additional
rulemaking would affect ticket prices always took priority. Tom Kelly, the Security
Director of ATA prior to Susan Rork, once said (according to Arroyo), that OMB would
"Fight you like a junk yard dog," if you do anything to raise the ticket prices. In
summation, "if the government wants additional security measures, they should pay for
it" was the reigning attitude of the day. High tech checkpoints were a pilot program; it
had some grant money.

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~ Arroyo said that a 1992 memo went to the 700's indicating that knives were the
primary weapon of choice for hijackers.

FAA fines to air carriers - enforcement

[U] Arroyo said AT A would fight all settlements and negotiate them out. Administrative
Law judges had to settle the cases. Some judges weren't sophisticated enough to
understand what the FAA was trying to do. "A one hundred thousand dollar case might
settle for 10 thousand," Arroyo commented.

[U] If screeners failed a test, the screener was fired. "That wasn't the solution," Arroyo
thought, "the answer should have been to train you better." At times, the whole security
company was fired. Security contracts went to the lowest bidder.

•
Safety, Security, and Efficiency

[U] Flight standards had 350 employees for the eastern region, whereas there were only
72 employees for security. Security made up less than a quarter or the entire workforce.
There was no parity between safety and security. Arroyo stated that it was in the
industry's self interest to make sure the safety part was adhered to.

[U] Arroyo was asked how many air carriers "red teamed" their own checkpoints to
improve the effectiveness, and make sure they were getting their money's worth. Arroyo
said the carriers left that up to the FAA. Arroyo didn't remember any station managers
coming to him about doing their own testing. He said some Station Managers took such
initiative, as in Richmond, VA.

Summer of '01

[U] Arroyo was asked ifhe recalled the increased chatter about security threats leading
up to 9-11; the presentation made by FAA's office of Civil Aviation Security about
increased threat to civil aviation (McDonnell road show); the issuance of IC's
highlighting the increased threat; and the NIE stating that the threat to civil aviation
security had increased. Arroyo said he remembered the chatter, but that there was
nothing on hijacking with box cutters or knives, nothing to heighten the a1ert or to set the
magnetometers at a more sensitive level.

[U] He recalled that the aviation security level that summer was at "3 plus". The Port
• Authority had its own rating levels, which would explain why Baer had a different
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number. Arroyo said, "The Port Authority maintained it at four until they went broke. It
takes a lot of police to maintain that level." ACS-l, Irish Flynn, did not take them to
Level 4 after TWA 800.

[U] As for the FAA Information Circulars (ICs), Arroyo commented, "you could read
them in the USA Today." The SDs had more "punch."

[U] Arroyo was asked about the Federal Register changes to FARs 107 and 108 that
came out the summer of 2001. Arroyo says the staffing was not increased in response.
"You do what ever you can do." Spending on his part was completely off the charts; he
was "spending every penny" he got - he felt as though he couldn't ramp it up anymore.
The FAA Administrator had already gone into a reserve fund to pay for increases in ACS.
Arroyo alerted the airport community and worked with the airport police. Kennedy and
Newark were doing extra ramp patrols. (Two Newark officers were killed responding to
the WTC.) There was a lot of donated time. Flight standards received criticism because
it was a "9-5 operation" whereas that was not the case for FAA security in the Eastern
Region. He "stepped up where we could." He found vagrants sleeping, the homeless
walking on the ramp. He would personally ride around surveying the airports.
Consequently, cargo theft statistics went down as a beneficial byproduct of the increased
vigilance.

9-11

[U] On the morning of 9-11, Arroyo was in the office on the second floor of his building.
He received the report of a plane hitting the World Trade Center. He thought
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immediately of a general aviation flight. He went up to the 5 floor where the command
center (in the FAA building at JFK). The monitors were all on. Initially, he was shocked
by what they were viewing. Within minutes he saw the second plane hit and he
"instinctively knew it was terrorism." He wanted to know if they were coming from his
airports. He opened up the "net," and all of the key managers assembled at the New
York Center. He started organizing the data. The key managers of his department were
stranded at a convention in Canada.

[U] All of the screening checkpoints started collecting data. When he received an
indication that one of the flights had left Newark, he started pulling the information
together for an incident report. He "wanted to know the magnetometer specs and
everything else." He said he got "pretty good information pretty fast" on technical
questions.

Arroyo's testing of the magnetometers on 9-11:

[U]An employee he sent to Home Depot came back with every box cutter she could buy.
He tested them at the brand new magnetometer in the lobby of the FAA building.

[U] As Regional Administrator, he had to meet with citizens who complained about the
noise of overhead flights in congested communities. Some people in these communities
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were quote upset and presented a serious threat to the FAA. The regional. office's security
was improved because of this threat. (Few lobbies of federal buildings had metal
detectors before 9-11, now they all do).

~ CHIA manufactured state of the art metal detectors. He did not want to create a
panic at the airport, so he conducted his own test of the metal detector capabilities in his
own lobby. Personally, he went through the metal detector. Many of the box cutters he
tested "looked like magic markers," he said.l

[U] Staff has asked TSA for copies of the Command Center at the Eastern Region's email
messages and digital pictures about Arroyo's box cutter test. :'

• Operations Center

[U] Arroyo thought on 9-11 that the news reports were the best source of information,
He had each CASFO manager up on the net. The primary net consisted of the national
leadership including Monte Belger and Jane Garvey, etc. The Secondary andTertiary
nets were up, and he also had a private net talking directly to the CASFOs. /,:/

[UJ Arroyo worked closely with Mark Randol, the CASFO Manager for Dulle,s{~nd Nora
Zola his New York CASFO manager at that time. "",/..'
.....
i .'

The National Net

, ,

[U] Arroyo thinks that the FAA had a good system to connect everyone, For instance, the
net works in a way that it dials all of your numbers on record until you finally pick up
(cell phone, home phone, office desk phone). Reports are made in short bursts. Everyone

•
has to identify themselves. It is orderly. No one dropped.off, but you went on mute
unless you had something important to say. Everyone.knew who to listen to; who would
have important information to report. He remef!tb,~rs"giving a lot of information over the
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net. The tactical net was also running; that was probably not recorded, he thought. ATC
was a big player on the net. The Regional Administrator's office was feeding them. They
were there around the clock. Arroyo believed that the primary Net was recorded but the
tactical net was not.

[U] When the planes came down, he did not think of reverse screening. There was so
much going on in the immediate area, in response to the WTC disaster, etc, that he could
not have organized a search of deplaning passengers or their planes ifhe wanted to.

[U] He never heard that five Middle Easterners fled an airport that day, after all the
flights were grounded.

AFTER ACTION

[U] Arroyo said that an after action report was completed but it took Newark longer to
get that done. Russell and Nora did it and forwarded it to Washington. He does not
remember seeing it.

[U] When asked whey terrorists chose Newark and Dulles, Arroyo responded that
"Terrorists were operating in this area. This could have happened anywhere. It is a
tragedy they wanted to hit the Trade Center. Their plot was a well executed plan. They
wanted fully fueled aircrafts. So why fly from anywhere else?"

[U] Arroyo said he does not recall hearing of other plots that were in the offing as of
9-11.

[U] Arroyo wanted to mention that vulnerability assessments were done at Newark with
the FBI. Newark got a lot of unique attention from theF AA technical center because of
its proximity to New York City. Oftentimes, Rand D was tested there. Arroyo felt it
was beneficial for his agents to get the exposure.

[U] Newark had a good K-9 unit. He said the Port authority was reluctant to participate
in K-9 until after TWA 800. Eventually, it became cost prohibitive and not effective to
continue the program.

Flight Standards/Safety Security overlap

[U] Arroyo said that aviation security tabletop exercises were conducted prior to 9-11. A
hij ack drill had not been simulated in a long time. Airlines were reluctant to donate an
aircraft.

[U] Commonly, they responded to disorderly passengers and bomb threats. The Flight
standards department dealt with air rage. Arroyo cited an instance in which a stock broker
from Connecticut defecated on the food cart of an international flight.

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[U] To support the cases of flight crews and the pilots in such instances, the FAA met
with U.S. Attorneys who agreed they would prosecute the cases and support the flight
crews.

Recommendations

[U] Arroyo would like to level out the passenger flows. The industry would fight that.
Arroyo went on to say that there are times during the day that the airport IS virtually
empty of travelers. Other times, you can't get in the door. He would like to spread out
the flow, thereby wait times would be shortened and security scrutiny per passenger
increased. "Someone needs to recognize at a high level that this airport is complex. There
is a lot of energy wasted on reconfiguring smaller airports," Arroyo said. Continental
Airlines just spent millions remodeling and expanding its terminal at Newark, and has
reported increased efficiency of 25 percent (the TSA model at Newark).

Profiling

[U] Newark does not train screeners to profile passengers because, "of the level of
intrusion," it requires. Arroyo said, "Unless you walk .around with two inch platform
shoes, you won't get that level of discrimination. The El Al (Tel Aviv Airport) operation
knows its passengers, so it can get away with it." With respect to the trusted traveler
feature, there is always a risk no matter what, but not everyone needs the same scrutiny.

[U] Arroyo cited a case at JFK in which an emotionally disturbed person went to the
ticket counter and showed his or her gun. Somehow, the person managed to board the
airplane and held a gun to the copilot's head. The pilots escaped out the window. After
six hours of negotiation, the situation was resolved. He's not sure if a more restrictive
checkpoint could have prevented that from happening.

[U] He wants the visible presence of a LEO at every checkpoint, but the budget can't
afford it. The notion of TSA as a law enforcement agency got push back because of
overtime costs. Without the presence of LEO's, Arroyo feels the checkpoint lacks the
visible deterrent.

[U] Arroyo agreed that security procedures need to vary in pattern so an individual can't
tell which lane you are going to go to, be it a high scrutiny lane or not.

[U] Arroyo thinks that Immigration and Customs should be tied into the IT systems of
aviation security.

Security as disruption

[U] Arroyo said that the air carriers know that a 747 with 350 passengers requires a
certain number of security agents at the checkpoint and they know what time the average
passenger will arrive at the airport for the scheduled flight. The carriers have this
information in hand, yet they criticize the amount of time it takes passengers to get
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through security. It is simple math that if you have three 737s boarding and the
checkpoint has two lanes, there will be a bottleneck and a delay. The airport cannot
physically put in more lanes.

[U] Passengers need to be smarter with what they pack. Some carriers will tum it around
and say "you can bring whatever you want to bring on the flight," as a customer service
boost to their sales. If passengers use more discretion, then the process will go faster.

[U] Arroyo recommends that the Commission look into the five pilot checkpoint
. screening pro grams in effect now at chosen airports around the country.

What is the real metric of success for Newark at the screener checkpoint?

[U] Arroyo says 100 percent is the proper goal. We have to work toward 100 percent
resolution. Screeners have to say, I don't know what this is and open up the bag.
"Recognize and resolve" needs to be the mantra of screeners.

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