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(disambiguation). Hannibal, son of Hamilcar arca !"# $ % &'( $ ) *oman marble bust of Hannibal. )llegiance $arthaginian +mpire *ank ,eneral, commander-in-chief of the $arthaginian armies attles./ars 0econd 1unic War: attle of 2ake 3rasimene, attle of 3rebia, attle of $annae, attle of 4ama Hannibal (Punic Hanniba'al , Ba'al is my grace, or a5al has given me grace), son of Hamilcar arca (!"# $ % ca. &'( $,6&76!76(76"7687 short form Hannibal) /as a $arthaginian military commander and tactician, later also /orking in other professions, /ho is popularly credited as one of the finest commanders in history. He lived during a period of tension in the 9editerranean, /hen *ome (then the *oman *epublic) established its supremacy over other great po/ers such as $arthage, 9acedon, 0yracuse, and the 0eleucid empire. He is one of the best-known Carthaginian commanders. His most famous achievement was at the outbreak of the econd Punic !ar, when he marched an army, which included war ele"hants, from #beria over the Pyrenees and the $l"s into northern #taly . %uring his invasion of #taly, he defeated the &omans in a series of battles, including those at 'rebia, 'rasimene and Cannae. He maintained an army in #taly for more than a decade afterward, never losing a ma(or engagement, but could not force the &omans to acce"t his terms for "eace. $ &oman counter-invasion of $frica forced him to return to Carthage, where he was defeated in the Battle of )ama. )fter the /ar he successfully ran for the office of suffet. He enacted political and financial reforms to enable the payment of the /ar indemnity imposed by *ome. Ho/ever, his reforms /ere unpopular /ith members of the upper *oman class forcing Hannibal to go into e:ile. %uring his e*ile, he lived at the eleucid court, where he acted as military advisor to $ntiochus ### in his war against &ome . $fter $ntiochus ### met defeat and was forced to acce"t their terms, Hannibal fled again, making a sto" in $rmenia, where he worked as a "lanner for the new ca"ital. His flight ended in the court of ithynia /here he may have achieved an outstanding naval victory by means of biological /arfare and /as after/ards betrayed to the *omans. Hannibal is universally ranked as one of the greatest military commanders and tacticians in history . 6citation needed7 9ilitary historian 3heodore )yrault ;odge once famously called Hannibal the <father of strategy<,6=7 because his greatest enemy, &ome, came to ado"t elements of his military tactics in its own strategic arsenal. 3his praise has earned him a strong reputation in the modern /orld and he was regarded as a +gifted strategist+ by men like ,a"oleon Bona"arte and the %uke of !ellington . His life has been the basis for a number of films and documentaries. He has been attributed /ith the famous >uotation, <We /ill either find a /ay, or make one.< $ontents 6hide7 & ackground and early career ! 0econd 1unic War in ?taly (!&'%!@( $) !.& Averland Bourney to ?taly !.! attle of 3rebia !.( attle of 2ake 3rasimene !." attle of $annae !.8 0talemate !.= Hannibal5s retreat in ?taly ( $onclusion of 0econd 1unic War (!@(%!@& $) (.& *eturn to $arthage

(.! attle of 4ama " 2ater career ".& 1eacetime $arthage (!@@%&C= $) ".! +:ile and death (&C8%&'( $) 8 1ossible ,ravesite = 2egacy to the ancient /orld # 2egacy #.& 3D and film #.! $omics #.( 2iterature #." 3heatre and opera #.8 9ilitary history ' *eferences C Further reading in 1unic Wars &@ 0ee also

6edit7 ackground and early career Hannibal arca (<grace of aal<, aal being the patron god of $arthage, located in modern 3unisia) /as the son of Hamilcar arca and his ?berian /ife. arca /as not a family name, but it /as carried by his sons.6#7 Historians refer to the Hamilcar5s family as the arcids to avoid confusion /ith other $arthaginians of the same name. )fter $arthage5s defeat in the First 1unic War, Hamilcar set out to improve his family5s and $arthage5s fortunes. With that in mind and supported by ,ades, Hamilcar began the subBugation of the tribes of the ?berian 1eninsula. $arthage at the time /as in such a poor state that its navy /as unable to transport his army to ?beria (Hispania)E instead, Hamilcar had to march it to/ards the 1illars of Hercules and ferry it across the 0trait of ,ibraltar (present-day 9orocco). )ccording to 2ivy, Hannibal much later said that /hen he came upon his father and begged to go /ith him, Hamilcar agreed and demanded him to s/ear that as long as he lived he /ould never be a friend of *ome. Ather sources report that Hannibal told his father, <? s/ear so soon as age /ill permit...? /ill use fire and steel to arrest the destiny of *ome.<6'76=7 Hannibal5s father /ent about the con>uest of Hispania. When the father /as killed in battle, Hannibal5s brother-in-la/ Hasdrubal succeeded to his command of the army. Hasdrubal pursued a policy of consolidation of $arthage5s ?berian interests, even signing a treaty /ith *ome /hereby $arthage /ould not e:pand north of the +bre *iver, so long as *ome did not e:pand south of it. Fpon the assassination of Hasdrubal (!!& $), Hannibal /as proclaimed commander-in-chief by the army and confirmed in his appointment by the $arthaginian government. 3itus 2ivy, a *oman scholar, gives a depiction of the young $arthaginian: G Ho sooner had he arrived...the old soldiers fancied they sa/ Hamilcar in his youth given back to themE the same bright lookE the same fire in his eye, the same trick of countenance and features. Hever /as one and the same spirit more skillful to meet opposition, to obey, or to command...6C7 I )fter he assumed command, Hannibal spent t/o years consolidating his holdings and completing the con>uest of Hispania south of the +bro.6&@7 Ho/ever, *ome, fearing the gro/ing strength of Hannibal in ?beria, made an alliance /ith the city of 0aguntum /hich lay a considerable distance south of the *iver +bro and claimed the city as its protectorate. Hannibal perceived this as a breach of the treaty signed /ith Hasdrubal and so he laid siege to the city, /hich fell after eight months. *ome reacted to this apparent violation of the treaty and demanded Bustice from $arthage. ?n vie/ of Hannibal5s great popularity, the

$arthaginian government did not repudiate Hannibal5s actions, and the /ar he sought /as declared at the end of the year. Hannibal /as no/ determined to carry the /ar into the heart of ?taly by a rapid march through Hispania and southern ,aul.

6edit7 0econd 1unic War in ?taly (!&'%!@( $) 9ain article: 0econd 1unic War 6edit7 Averland Bourney to ?taly HannibalJs route of invasion given by the ;epartment of History, Fnited 0tates 9ilitary )cademy.Hasdrubal became $arthaginian commander in ?beria in !!C $, a post he /ould maintain for some eight years until !!& $. 0oon the *omans became a/are of a burgeoning alliance bet/een $arthage and the $elts of the 1o river valley in northern ?taly. 3he latter /ere amassing forces to invade ?taly, presumably /ith $arthaginian backing. 3hus, the *omans pre-emptively invaded the 1o region in !!8 $. y !!@ $, the *omans had anne:ed the area as ,allia $isalpina 6&&7. Hasdrubal /as assassinated around the same time (!!& $), bringing Hannibal to the fore. ?t seems that, having apparently dealt /ith the threat of a ,aulo-$arthaginian invasion of ?taly (and perhaps /ith the original $arthaginian commander killed), the *omans lulled themselves into a false sense of security. 3hus, Hannibal took the *omans by surprise a scant t/o years later in !&' $ by merely reviving and adapting the original ,aulo-$arthaginian invasion plan of his brother-in-la/ Hasdrubal. Hannibal departed He/ $arthage in late spring of !&' $6&!7 He fought his /ay through the northern tribes to the 1yrenees, subduing the tribes through clever mountain tactics and stubborn fighting. He left a detachment of &&,@@@ troops to garrison the ne/ly con>uered region. )t the 1yrenees, he released another &&,@@@ ?berian troops /ho sho/ed reluctance to leave their homeland. Hannibal reportedly entered ,aul /ith "@,@@@ foot soldiers and &!,@@@ horsemen.6&(7 Hannibal recogniKed that he still needed to cross the 1yrenees, the )lps, and many significant rivers. )dditionally, he /ould have to contend /ith opposition from the ,auls, /hose territory he passed through. 0tarting in the spring of !&' $, he easily fought his /ay through the northern tribes to the 1yrenees and, by conciliating the ,aulish chiefs along his passage, reached the *hLne *iver before the *omans could take any measures to bar his advance. )rriving at the *hLne in 0eptember, Hannibal5s army numbered (',@@@ infantry, ',@@@ cavalry, and (# /ar elephants.6&"7

Hannibal and his men crossing the )lps.)fter outmaneuvering the natives, /ho had tried to prevent his crossing, Hannibal evaded a *oman force marching from the 9editerranean coast by turning inland up the valley of the *hLne. His e:act route over the )lps has been the source of scholarly dispute ever since. (1olybius, the surviving ancient account closest in time to Hannibal5s campaign, reports that the route /as already debated.) 3he most influential modern theories favour either a march up the valley of the ;rLme and a crossing of the main range to the south of the modern high/ay over the $ol de 9ontgenevre or a march farther north up the valleys of the ?sere and )rc crossing the main range near the present $ol de 9ont $enis.6&87 y /hichever route, his passage over the )lps is one of the most celebrated achievements of any military force in ancient /arfare. Hannibal successfully crossed the mountains, despite numerous obstacles such as harsh climate and terrain, the guerrilla tactics of the native tribes, and the challenge of commanding an army diverse in race and language. He descended from the foothills and arrived into northern ?taly in the vicinity of modern 3urin, but accompanied by only half the forces he had started /ith, and only a fe/ elephants. From the start, he seems to have calculated that he /ould have to operate /ithout aid from Hispania. Historians like 0erge 2ancell >uestioned the reliability of the figures for the number of troops he had /hen he left Hispania.6&=7

6edit7 attle of 3rebia 9ain article: attle of 3rebia Hannibal5s perilous march brought him into the *oman territory and frustrated the attempts of the enemy to fight out the main issue on foreign ground. His sudden appearance among the ,auls of the 1o Dalley, moreover, enabled him to detach those tribes from their ne/ allegiance to the *omans before the latter could take steps to check the rebellion.

) diagram depicting the tactics used in the attle of 3rebbia1ublius $ornelius 0cipio, the consul /ho commanded the *oman force sent to intercept Hannibal, had not e:pected Hannibal to make an attempt to cross the )lps, since the *omans /ere prepared to fight the /ar in ?beria. With a small detachment still positioned in ,aul, 0cipio made an attempt to intercept Hannibal. 3hrough prompt decision and speedy movement, he succeeded in transporting his army to ?taly by sea, in time to meet Hannibal. Hannibal5s forces moved through the 1o Dalley and /ere engaged in a small confrontation at 3icinus. Here, Hannibal forced the *omans, by virtue of his superior cavalry, to evacuate the plain of 2ombardy.6&#7 While the victory /as minor, it encouraged the ,auls and 2igurians to Boin the $arthaginian cause, /hose troops bolstered his army back to "@,@@@ men. 0cipio /as severely inBured and retreated across the river 3rebia to camp at 1lacentia /ith his army intact.6&#7 3he other *oman consular army /as rushed to the 1o Dalley. +ven before ne/s of the defeat at 3icinus had reached *ome, the senate had ordered the consul 0empronius 2ongus to bring his army back from 0icily to meet 0cipio and face Hannibal. Hannibal, by skillful maneuvers, /as in position to head him off, for he lay on the direct road bet/een 1lacentia and )rminum, by /hich 0empronius /ould have to march in order to reinforce 0cipio. He then captured $lastidium, from /hich he dre/ large amounts of rations for his men. ut this gain /as not /ithout its loss, as 0empronius avoided Hannibal5s /atchfulness, slipped around his flank, and Boined his colleague in his camp near the 3rebbia *iver near 1lacentia. 3here, in ;ecember of the same year, Hannibal had an opportunity to sho/ his superior military skill at 3rebiaE after /earing do/n the e:cellent *oman infantry he cut it to pieces by a surprise attack from an ambush in the flank.

6edit7 attle of 2ake 3rasimene 9ain article: attle of 2ake 3rasimene Having secured his position in northern ?taly by this victory, Hannibal >uartered his troops for the /inter /ith the ,auls, /hose support for him abated. ?n the 0pring of !&# $, Hannibal decided to find a more reliable base of operations farther south. +:pecting Hannibal to carry on advancing to *ome, $naeus 0ervilius and ,aius Flaminius (the ne/ $onsuls of *ome) took their armies to block the +astern and Western routes Hannibal could use to get to *ome.

attle of 2ake 3rasimene, !&# $. From the ;epartment of History, Fnited 0tates 9ilitary )cademy3he only alternate route to central ?taly lay at the mouth of the )rno. 3his route /as practically one huge marsh, and happened to be overflo/ing more than usual during this particular season. Hannibal kne/ that this route /as full of difficulties, but it remained the surest and certainly the >uickest route to $entral ?taly. )s 1olybius claims, HannibalMs men marched for four days and three nights, Gthrough a route /hich /as under /aterI, suffering terribly from fatigue and enforced /ant of sleep. He crossed the )pennines (during /hich he lost his left eye because of conBunctivitis) and the seemingly impassable )rno /ithout opposition, but in the marshy lo/lands of the )rno, he lost a large part of his force, including, it /ould seem, his remaining elephants. )rriving in +truria in the spring of !&# $, Hannibal decided to lure the main *oman army, under Flaminius, into a pitched battle, by devastating under his very o/n eye the area he had been sent to protect. )s 1olybius tells us, Ghe 6Hannibal7 calculated that, if he passed the camp and made a descent into the

district beyond, Flaminius (partly for fear of popular reproach and partly of personal irritation) /ould be unable to endure /atching passively the devastation of the country but /ould spontaneously follo/ him . . . and give him opportunities for attack.I6&'7 )t the same time, Hannibal tried to break the allegiance of *omeMs allies, by proving that Flaminius /as po/erless to protect them. ;espite this, Hannibal found Flaminius still passively encamped at )rretium. Fnable to dra/ Flaminius into battle by mere devastation, Hannibal marched boldly around his opponentMs left flank and effectively cut Flaminius off from *ome (thus e:ecuting the first recorded turning movement in military history). )dvancing through the uplands of +truria, Hannibal provoked Flaminius to a hasty pursuit and, catching him in a defile on the shore of 2ake 3rasimenus, destroyed his army in the /aters or on the adBoining slopes /hile killing Flaminius as /ell (see attle of 2ake 3rasimene). He had no/ disposed of the only field force /hich could check his advance upon *ome, but, realiKing that /ithout siege engines he could not hope to take the capital, he preferred to e:ploit his victory by passing into central and southern ?taly and encouraging a general revolt against the sovereign po/er. )fter 2ake 3rasimeno, Hannibal stated, G? have not come to fight ?talians, but on behalf of the ?talians against *ome.I6&C7 3he *omans appointed Fabius 9a:imus as a dictator. ;eparting from *oman military traditions, Fabius adopted the Fabian strategy N named after him N of refusing open battle /ith his opponent /hile placing several *oman armies in HannibalMs vicinity to limit his movement.

Hannibal - 0ilver double shekel, c. !(@ $, 3he ritish 9useumHaving ravaged )pulia /ithout provoking Fabius to battle, Hannibal decided to march through 0amnium to $ampania, one of the richest and most fertile provinces of ?taly, hoping that the devastation /ould dra/ Fabius into battle. Fabius closely follo/ed HannibalMs path of destruction, yet still refused to let himself be dra/n, and thus remained on the defensive. 3his strategy /as unpopular /ith many *omans, /ho believed it /as a form of co/ardice.

Hannibal decided that it /ould be un/ise to /inter in the already devastated lo/lands of $ampania but Fabius had ensured that all the passes out of $ampania /ere blocked. 3o avoid this, Hannibal deceived the *omans into thinking that the $arthaginian )rmy /as going to escape through the /oods. )s the *omans moved off to/ards the /oods, Hannibal5s army occupied the pass, and his army made their /ay through the pass unopposed. Fabius /as /ithin striking distance but in this case his caution /orked against him. 0melling a stratagem (rightly), he stayed put. For the /inter, Hannibal found comfortable >uarters in the )pulian plain. What Hannibal achieved in e:tricating his army /as, as )drian ,olds/orthy puts it, <a classic of ancient generalship, finding its /ay into nearly every historical narrative of the /ar and being used by later military manuals<.6!@7 3his /as a severe blo/ to FabiusMs prestige, and soon after this, his period of po/er ended.

6edit7 attle of $annae ;estruction of the *oman army, courtesy of 3he ;epartment of History, Fnited 0tates 9ilitary )cademy.9ain article: attle of $annae ?n the spring of !&= $, Hannibal took the initiative and seiKed the large supply depot at $annae in the )pulian plain. y seiKing $annae, Hannibal had placed himself bet/een the *omans and their crucial source of supply.6!&7 Ance the *oman 0enate resumed their $onsular elections in !&=, they appointed ,aius 3erentius Darro and 2ucius )emilius 1aullus as $onsuls. ?n the meantime, the *omans, hoping to gain success through sheer strength in numbers, raised a ne/ army of unprecedented siKe, estimated by some to be as large as &@@,@@@ men.6!!7 3he *oman and )llied legions of the $onsuls, resolving to confront Hannibal, marched south/ard to )pulia. 3hey eventually found him on the left bank of the )ufidus *iver, and encamped si: miles a/ay. An this occasion, the t/o armies /ere combined into one, the $onsuls having to alternate their command on a daily basis. 3he $onsul Darro, /ho /as in command on the first day, /as a man of reckless and hubristic

nature, and /as determined to defeat Hannibal.6!!7 Hannibal capitaliKed on the eagerness of Darro and dre/ him into a trap by using an envelopment tactic /hich eliminated the *oman numerical advantage by shrinking the surface area /here combat could occur. Hannibal dre/ up his least reliable infantry in a semicircle in the center /ith the /ings composed of the ,allic and Humidian horse.6!!7 3he *oman legions forced their /ay through Hannibal5s /eak center, but the 2ibyan 9ercenaries in the /ings, s/ung around by the movement, menaced their flanks. 3he onslaught of Hannibal5s cavalry /as irresistible, and Hasdrubal (not Hasdrubal arca) /ho commanded the left, pushed in the *oman right and then s/ept across the rear and attacked Darro5s cavalry on the *oman left.6!!7 3hen he attacked the legions from behind. )s a result, the *oman army /as hemmed in /ith no means of escape. ;ue to these brilliant tactics, Hannibal, /ith much inferior numbers, managed to surround and destroy all but a small remainder of this force. ;epending upon the source, it is estimated that 8@,@@@-#@,@@@ *omans /ere killed or captured at $annae.6=7 )mong the dead /ere the *oman consul 2ucius )emilius 1aullus, as /ell as t/o consuls for the preceding year, t/o >uaestors, t/enty-nine out of the forty-eight military tribunes and an additional eighty senators (at a time /hen the *oman 0enate comprised no more than (@@ men, this constituted !8O%(@O of the governing body). 3his makes the attle of $annae one of the most catastrophic defeats in the history of )ncient *ome, and one of the bloodiest battles in all of human history (in terms of the number of lives lost /ithin a single day).6!!7 )fter $annae, the *omans /ere not as enthusiastic in challenging Hannibal in pitched battles, instead preferring to defeat him by attrition, relying on their advantages of supply and manpo/er. )s a result, Hannibal and *ome fought no more maBor battles in ?taly for the rest of the /ar.6!(7

Hannibal counting the rings of the *oman knights killed during the battle, statue by 0Pbastien 0lodKt, &#@", 2ouvre.3he effect on morale of this victory meant that many parts of ?taly Boined Hannibal5s cause.6!"7 )s 1olybius notes, <Ho/ much more serious /as the defeat of $annae, than those /hich preceded it can be seen by the behavior of *omeMs alliesE before that fateful day, their loyalty remained unshaken, no/ it began to /aver for the simple reason that they despaired of *oman 1o/er.<6!87 ;uring that same year, the ,reek cities in 0icily /ere induced to revolt against *oman political control, /hile the 9acedonian king, 1hilip D, pledged his support to Hannibal % thus initiating the First 9acedonian War against *ome. Hannibal also secured an alliance /ith ne/ly appointed Qing Hieronymus of 0yracuse. ?t is often argued that if Hannibal had received proper material reinforcements from $arthage he might have succeeded /ith a direct attack upon *ome. For the present he had to content himself /ith subduing the fortresses /hich still held out against him, and the only other notable event of !&= $ /as the defection of certain ?talian territories, including $apua, the second largest city of ?taly, /hich Hannibal made his ne/ base. Ho/ever, only a fe/ of the ?talian city-states /hich he had e:pected to gain as allies consented to Boin him.

6edit7 0talemate 3he /ar in ?taly settled into a strategic stalemate. 3he *omans utiliKed the attritional strategies Fabius had taught them, and /hich, they finally realiKed, /ere the only feasible means of defeating Hannibal.6!=7 ?ndeed, Fabius received the surname <$unctator< because of his policy of attrition.6!#7 3he *omans deprived Hannibal of a large-scale battle and instead, assaulted his /eakening army /ith multiple smaller armies in an attempt to both /eary him and create unrest in his troops.6=7 For the ne:t fe/ years, Hannibal /as forced to sustain a scorched earth policy and obtain local provisions for protracted and ineffectual operations throughout 0outhern ?taly. His immediate obBectives /ere reduced to minor operations /hich centered mainly round the cities of $ampania. )s the forces detached his lieutenants /ere generally unable to hold their o/n, and neither his home government nor his ne/ ally 1hilip D of 9acedon helped to make good his losses, his position in southern ?taly became increasingly difficult and his chance of ultimately con>uering *ome gre/ ever more remote. Hannibal still /on a number of notable victories: completely destroying t/o *oman armies in !&! $, and at one point, killing t/o $onsuls (/hich included the famed 9arcus $laudius 9arcellus) in a battle in !@' $. Hevertheless, /ithout the resources his allies could contribute, or reinforcements from $arthage, Hannibal could not make further significant gains. 3hus, inade>uately supported by his ?talian allies,

abandoned by his government (either because of Bealousy or simply because $arthage /as overstretched) , and unable to match *omeMs resources, Hannibal slo/ly began losing ground. Hannibal continued defeating the *omans /henever he could bring them into battle, yet he /as never able to complete another decisive victory that produced a lasting strategic effect. $arthaginian political /ill /as embodied in the ruling oligarchy. While there /as a $arthaginian 0enate, the real po/er in $arthage /as /ith the inner <$ouncil of (@ Hobles< and the board of Budges from ruling families kno/n as the <Hundred and Four.< 3hese t/o bodies consisted of the /ealthy, commercial families of $arthage. 3/o political factions operated in $arthage: the /ar party, also kno/n as the < arcids< (HannibalMs family name) and the peace party led by Hanno the ,reat. Hanno had been instrumental in denying HannibalMs re>uested reinforcement follo/ing the battle at $annae. Hannibal had started the /ar /ithout the full backing of $arthaginian oligarchy. His attack of 0aguntum had presented the oligarchy /ith a choice of /ar /ith *ome or loss of prestige in ?beria. 3he oligarchy and not Hannibal controlled the strategic resources of $arthage. Hannibal constantly sought reinforcement from either ?beria or Horth )frica. HannibalMs troops lost in combat /ere replaced /ith less /ell-trained and motivated mercenaries from ?taly or ,aul. 3he commercial interests of the $arthaginian oligarchy dictated the reinforcement of ?beria rather than Hannibal throughout the duration of the campaign.

6edit7 Hannibal5s retreat in ?taly ?n !&! $ Hannibal captured 3arentum but he failed to obtain control of the harbour. 3he tide /as slo/ly turning against him, and in favor of *ome. 3he *omans mounted t/o sieges of $apua, /hich fell in !&& $, and the *omans completed their con>uest of 0yracuse and destruction of a $arthaginian army in 0icily. 0hortly thereafter, the *omans pacified 0icily and entered into an alliance /ith the )etolian 2eague to counter 1hillip D. 1hilip, /ho attempted to e:ploit *ome5s preoccupation in ?taly to con>uer ?llyria, no/ found himself under attack from several sides at once and /as >uickly subdued by *ome and her ,reek allies. 9ean/hile, Hannibal had defeated Fulvius at Herdonea in )pulia, but lost 3arentum in the follo/ing year. ?n !&@ $ Hannibal again proved his superiority in tactics by inflicting a severe defeat at Herdoniac (modern Ardona) in )pulia upon a proconsular army, and in !@' $ destroyed a *oman force engaged in the siege of 2ocri +piKephyri. ut /ith the loss of 3arentum in !@C $ and the gradual recon>uest by the *omans of 0amnium and 2ucania, his hold on south ?taly /as almost lost. ?n !@# $ he succeeded in making his /ay again into )pulia, /here he /aited to concert measures for a combined march upon *ome /ith his brother Hasdrubal arca. An hearing, ho/ever, of his brother5s defeat and death at the 9etaurus he retired into ruttium, /here he maintained himself for the ensuing years. 3he combination of these events marked the end to Hannibal5s success in ?taly. With the failure of his brother 9ago arca in 2iguria (!@8 $-!@( $) and of his o/n negotiations /ith 1hilip of 9acedon, the last hope of recovering his ascendancy in ?taly /as lost. ?n !@( $, after nearly fifteen years of fighting in ?taly, and /ith the military fortunes of $arthage rapidly declining, Hannibal /as recalled to $arthage to direct the defense of his native country against a *oman invasion under 0cipio )fricanus.

0cipio )fricanus. 6edit7 $onclusion of 0econd 1unic War (!@(%!@& $) 6edit7 *eturn to $arthage ?n !@( $, Hannibal /as recalled from ?taly by the /ar party at $arthage. )fter leaving a record of his e:pedition engraved in 1unic and ,reek upon bronKen tablets in the temple of Juno at $rotona, he sailed back to )frica.6!'7 His arrival immediately restored the predominance of the /ar party, /ho placed him in command of a combined force of )frican levies and his mercenaries from ?taly. ?n !@! $, Hannibal met 0cipio in a fruitless peace conference. ;espite mutual admiration, negotiations floundered due to *oman

allegations of <1unic Faith,< referring to the breach of protocols /hich ended the First 1unic War by the $arthaginian attack on 0aguntum, and a $arthaginan attack on a stranded *oman fleet. What had happened /as that 0cipio and $arthage had /orked out a peace plan, /hich /as approved by *ome. 3he terms of the treaty /ere >uite modest, but the /ar had been long for the *omans. $arthage could keep its )frican territory but /ould lose its overseas empire, a fait-accompli. 9asinissa (Humidia) /as to be independent. )lso, $arthage /as to reduce its fleet and pay a /ar indemnity. ut $arthage then made a terrible blunder. ?ts long-suffering citiKens had captured a stranded *oman fleet in the ,ulf of 3unes and stripped it of supplies, an action /hich aggravated the faltering negotiations. 9ean/hile Hannibal, recalled from ?taly by the $arthaginian senate, had returned /ith his army. Fortified by both Hannibal and the supplies, the $arthaginians rebuffed the treaty and *oman protests. 3he decisive battle at 4ama soon follo/ed, and it removed Hannibal5s air of invincibility.

6edit7 attle of 4ama 9ain article: attle of 4ama Fnlike most battles of the 0econd 1unic War, at 4ama the *omans had superiority in cavalry and the $arthaginians had superiority in infantry. 3his *oman cavalry superiority /as due to the betrayal of 9asinissa, /ho had earlier assisted $arthage in ?beria, but changed sides in !@= $ /ith the promise of land and due to his personal conflicts /ith 0ypha:, a $arthaginian ally. 3his betrayal gave 0cipio )fricanus an advantage that had previously been possessed by the $arthaginians. )lthough the aging Hannibal /as suffering from mental e:haustion and deteriorating health after years of campaigning in ?taly, the $arthaginians still had the advantage in numbers and /ere boosted by the presence of '@ /ar elephants.

+ngraving of the attle of 4ama by $ornelis $ort, &8=#. Hote that the elephants sho/n are )sian ones rather than the very small Horth )frican ones used by $arthage.3he *oman cavalry /on an early victory by s/iftly routing the $arthaginian horse, and standard *oman tactics for limiting the effectiveness of the $arthaginian /ar elephants /ere effective. Ho/ever, the battle remained closely fought. )t one point it seemed that Hannibal /as on the verge of victory, but 0cipio /as able to rally his men, and his cavalry, having routed the $arthaginian horse, attacked Hannibal5s rear. 3his t/o-pronged attack caused the $arthaginian formation to disintegrate and collapse. With their foremost general defeated, the $arthaginians had no choice but to accept defeat and surrender to *ome. $arthage lost appro:imately !@,@@@ troops /ith an additional &8,@@@ /ounded. ?n contrast, the *omans suffered only &,8@@ casualties. 3he battle resulted in a loss of respect for Hannibal by his fello/ $arthaginians. ?t marked the last maBor battle of the 0econd 1unic War, /ith *ome the victor. 3he conditions of defeat /ere such that $arthage could no longer battle for 9editerranean supremacy.

6edit7 2ater career 6edit7 1eacetime $arthage (!@@%&C= $) Hannibal /as still only "( and soon sho/ed that he could be a statesman as /ell as a soldier. Follo/ing the conclusion of a peace that left $arthage stripped of its formerly mighty empire, Hannibal prepared to take a back seat for a time. Ho/ever, the blatant corruption of the oligarchy gave Hannibal a chance to re-emerge and he /as elected as suffet, or chief magistrate. 3he office had become rather insignificant, but Hannibal restored its po/er and authority. 3he oligarchy, al/ays Bealous of him, had even charged him /ith having betrayed the interests of his country /hile in ?taly, for neglecting to take *ome /hen he might have done so. 0o effectively did Hannibal reform abuses that the heavy tribute imposed by *ome could be paid by installments /ithout additional and e:traordinary ta:ation. He also reformed the Hundred and Four, stipulating that its membership be chosen by direct election rather than co-option. He also used citiKen support to change the term of office in the Hundred and Four from life to a year /ith a term limit of t/o years.

6edit7 +:ile and death (&C8%&'( $) Fourteen years after the victory of 4ama, the *omans, alarmed by $arthage5s rene/ed prosperity, demanded Hannibal5s surrender. Hannibal thereupon /ent into voluntary e:ile. First he Bourneyed to 3yre, the mother-city of $arthage, and then to +phesus, /here he /as honorably received by )ntiochus ??? of 0yria, /ho /as preparing for /ar /ith *ome. Hannibal soon sa/ that the king5s army /as no match for the *omans. He advised him to e>uip a fleet and land a body of troops in the south of ?taly, offering to take command himself. ut he could not make much impression on )ntiochus, /ho listened to his courtiers and /ould not entrust Hannibal /ith any important office. )ccording to $icero, /hile at the court of )ntiochus, Hannibal attended a lecture by 1hormio, a philosopher, that ranged through many topics. When 1hormio finished a discourse on the duties of a general, Hannibal /as asked his opinion. He replied: <? have seen during my life many an old foolE but this one beats them all.< )nother story about Hannibal in e:ile gives a strange slant to his supposed 1unic perfidy. )ntiochus ??? sho/ed off a vast and /ell-armed formation to Hannibal and asked him if they /ould be enough for the *oman *epublic, to /hich Hannibal replied, <Res, enough for the *omans, ho/ever greedy they may be.< ?t should be noted that in this situation Hannibal had not been given command of the army, but )ntiochus himself had developed the battle plan and /as subse>uently defeated. ?n &C= $ he /as placed in command of a 1hoenician fleet but /as defeated in a battle off the +urymedon *iver. )ccording to 0trabo and 1lutarch, Hannibal also received hospitality at the )rmenian court of )rta:ias ? /here he planned and supervised the building of the ne/ royal capital )rta:ata. From the court of )ntiochus, /ho seemed prepared to surrender him to the *omans, Hannibal fled to $rete, but he soon /ent back to )sia 9inor and sought refuge /ith 1rusias ? of ithynia, /ho /as engaged in /arfare /ith *ome5s ally, Qing +umenes ?? of 1ergamum. Hannibal /ent on to serve 1rusias in this /ar. ?n one of the victories he gained over +umenes at sea, it is said that he used one of the first e:amples of biological /arfare - he thre/ cauldrons of snakes into the enemy vessels. Hannibal also visited 3yreE the home of his forefathers. Ho/ever the *omans /ere determined to hunt him do/n, and they insisted on his surrender. 1rusias agreed to give him up, but Hannibal /as determined not to fall into his enemies5 hands. )t 2ibyssa on the eastern shore of the 0ea of 9armora, he took poison, /hich, it /as said, he had long carried about /ith him in a ring. 3he precise year of his death is a matter of controversy. ?f, as 2ivy seems to imply, it /as &'( $, he died in the same year as 0cipio )fricanus, at the age of si:ty four.

6edit7 1ossible ,ravesite ?n modern-day 3urkey (ruins near ;iliskelesi, 0outh of ,ebKe, =@km +ast of ?stanbul), an interesting curiosity is to be found in an industrial estate on a small hill beneath some cypress trees. *eputed to be Hannibal5s grave, it /as magnificently restored by +mperor 0eptimius 0everus ().;. &C(-!&&), but it is no/ Bust a pile of stones. +:cavations /ere carried out in &C@= by Wiegand, but he /as skeptical of the site. 6!C7

6edit7 2egacy to the ancient /orld 2ong after his death, his name continued to carry a portent of great or imminent danger /ithin the *oman *epublic. ?t /as /ritten that he taught the *omans, /ho claimed to be fierce descendants of 9ars, the meaning of fear. For generations, *oman housekeepers /ould tell their children brutal tales of Hannibal /hen they misbehaved. ?n fact, Hannibal became such a figure of terror, that /henever disaster struck, the *oman 0enators /ould e:claim <Hannibal ad portas< (GHannibal is at the ,atesSI) to e:press their fear or an:iety. 3his famous 2atin phrase evolved into a common e:pression that is often still used /hen a client arrives through the door or /hen one is faced /ith calamity.6(@7 3his illustrates the psychological impact Hannibal5s presence in ?taly had on *oman $ulture. ) grudging admiration for Hannibal is evident in the /orks of *oman historians such as 2ivy and Juvenal. 3he *omans even built statues of the $arthaginian in the very streets of *ome to advertise their defeat of such a /orthy adversary.6(&7 ?t is plausible to suggest that Hannibal engendered the greatest fear *ome had

to/ards an enemy. Hevertheless, they grimly refused to admit the possibility of defeat and reBected all overtures for peace, and they even refused to accept the ransom of prisoners after $annae.6(!7 ;uring the /ar there are no reports of revolutions among the *oman citiKens, no factions /ith the 0enate desiring peace, no pro-$arthaginian *oman turncoats, no coups or dictatorships.6((76("7 *oman aristocrats throughout the /ar ferociously competed /ith each other for positions of command to fight against *ome5s most dangerous enemy. Hannibal5s military genius /as not enough to really disturb the *oman political process and the collective political and military genius of the *oman people. )s 2aKenby states, <?t says volumes, too, for their political maturity and respect for constitutional forms that the complicated machinery of government continued to function even amidst disaster--there are fe/ states in the ancient /orld in /hich a general /ho had lost a battle like $annae /ould have dared to remain, let alone /ould have continued to be treated respectfully as head of state.<6(87 )ccording to the historian 3itus 2ivy Hannibal5s military genius /as feared among the *omans and during Hannibal5s march against *ome in !&& $6(=7 <a messenger /ho had travelled from Fregellae for a day and a night /ithout stopping created great alarm in *ome, and the e:citement /as increased by people running about the $ity /ith /ildly e:aggerated accounts of the ne/s he had brought. 3he /ailing cry of the matrons /as heard every/here, not only in private houses but even in the temples. Here they knelt and s/ept the temple-floors /ith their dishevelled hair and lifted up their hands to heaven in piteous entreaty to the gods that they /ould deliver the $ity of *ome out of the hands of the enemy and preserve its mothers and children from inBury and outrage.<6(#7 ?n the 0enate the ne/s /ere <received /ith varying feelings as men5s temperaments differed,<6('7 so it /as decided to keep $apua under siege, but send &8,@@@ infantry and &,@@@ cavalry as reinforcements to *ome.6('7. )ccording to 2ivy, the land occupied by Hannibal5s army outside *ome in !&& $ /as sold at the very time of its occupation and for the same price.6(C7 3his may not be true but as 2aKenby states, <could /ell be, e:emplifying as it does not only the supreme confidence felt by the *omans in ultimate victory, but also the /ay in /hich something like normal life continued.6"@7. )fter $annae the *omans sho/ed a considerable steadfastness in adversity. )n undeniable proof of *ome5s confidence is demonstrated by the fact that after the $annae disaster she /as left virtually defenseless, but the 0enate still chose not to /ithdra/ a single garrison from an overseas province to strengthen the city. ?n fact, they /ere reinforced and the campaigns there maintained until victory /as securedE beginning first in 0icily under direction of $laudius 9arcellus, and later Hispania under 0cipio )fricanus.6"&76"!7 )lthough the long-term conse>uences of Hannibal5s /ar are debatable, this /ar /as undeniably *ome5s <finest hour<.6"(76""7 9ost of the sources available to historians about Hannibal are from *omans. 3hey considered him the greatest enemy *ome had ever faced. 2ivy gives us the idea that he /as e:tremely cruel. +ven $icero, /hen he talked of *ome and her t/o great enemies, spoke of the <honorable< 1yrrhus and the <cruel< Hannibal. Ret a different picture is sometimes revealed. When Hannibal5s successes had brought about the death of t/o *oman consuls, he vainly searched for the body of ,aius Flaminius on the shores of 2ake 3rasimene, held ceremonial rituals in recognition of 2ucius )emilius 1aullus, and sent 9arcellus5 ashes back to his family in *ome. )ny bias attributed to 1olybius, ho/ever, is more troublesome, since he /as clearly sympathetic to/ards Hannibal. Hevertheless, 1olybius spent a long period as a hostage in ?taly and relied heavily on *oman sources, so there remains the possibility that he /as reproducing elements of *oman propaganda.

6edit7 2egacy 3he material of legend: in <0no/-storm: Hannibal and his )rmy $rossing the )lps<, J.9.W. 3urner envelopes HannibalMs crossing of the )lps in *omantic atmosphereHannibal5s name is also commonplace in later art and popular culture, an obBective measure of his foreign influence on Western history. 2ike other military leaders, Hannibal5s victories against superior forces in an ultimately losing cause /on him enduring fame that outlasted his native country /ithin Horth )frica. His crossing of the )lps remains

one of the most monumental military feats of ancient /arfare6"87 and has since captured the imagination of the /orld (romanticiKed by several art/orks).

6edit7 3D and film Rear Film Ather notes !@@' Hannibal the $on>ueror Fpcoming 9otion 1icture starring Din ;iesel !@@= Hannibal - *ome5s Worst Hightmare 3D film, starring )le:ander 0iddig !@@8 Hannibal vs. *ome in Hational ,eographic $hannel !@@" 3he 1hantom of the Apera 3he beginning Apera being rehearsed is one about Hannibal so titled Hannibal !@@8 3he 3rue 0tory of Hannibal ritish documentary !@@& Hannibal: 3he 9an Who Hated *ome ritish documentary &CC# 3he ,reat attles of Hannibal ritish documentary &CC= ,ulliverMs 3ravels ,ulliver summons Hannibal from a magic mirror. &C=@ )nnibale ?talian 9otion 1icture starring Dictor 9ature &C88 Jupiter5s ;arling ritish 9otion 1icture starring Ho/ard Qeel &C(C 0cipio )fricanus - the ;efeat of Hannibal (0cipione l5africano) ?talian 9otion 1icture &C&" $abiria ?talian 0ilent film

6edit7 $omics Hannibal makes the usual neat and appropriate speech prior to killing himself. Hannibal crossing the )lps. Hannibal5s Do/. Hannibal /hilst even yet a child s/ears eternal hatred to the *omans.

6edit7 2iterature Hovel unless other/ise noted: /ritten &(@'-!&, ;ante5s ;ivine $omedy, poem, ?nferno TTT?.C#-&(!, &&8-&!" ( attle of 4ama) and 1aradiso D? &#!=, ,ulliver5s 3ravels, satirical /ork &'=!, ,ustave Flaubert5s 0alammbL, set in $arthage at the time of Hamilcar arca. Hannibal appears as a child. &CC=, +lisabeth $raft, ) 0py for Hannibal: ) Hovel of $arthage, @C&@&88((T *oss 2eckie, $arthage trilogy, source of the !@@' film (&CC=, Hannibal: ) Hovel, ?0 H @-'C8!=-""(-C E &CCC, 0cipio, a Hovel, ?0 H @-("C-&&!('-T E $arthage, !@@@, ?0 H @-'=!"&-C""-&) !@@8, 3erry 9c$arthy, 3he 0/ord of Hannibal, ?0 H @-""=-=&8&#-T !@@=, ;avid )nthony ;urham, 1ride of $arthage: ) Hovel of Hannibal, ?0 H @-('8-#!!"C-" !@@=, )ngela *ender, Forged y 2ightning: ) Hovel of Hannibal and 0cipio, ?0 H &-"&&=-'@@!-! 6edit7 3heatre and opera ?n Hector erlioK5s &'8' opera 2es 3royens, he appears in a vision to ;ido Bust before she dies. ?n )ndre/ 2loyd Webber5s &C'= musical 3he 1hantom of the Apera, the Apera 1opulaire is in rehearsal for an opera about Hannibal. 6edit7 9ilitary history

Hannibal is usually ranked among the best military strategists and tacticians. )ccording to )ppian, several years after the 0econd 1unic War, Hannibal /as a political advisor in the 0eleucid Qingdom and 0cipio /as sent there on a diplomatic mission from *ome. G ?t is said that at one of their meetings in the gymnasium 0cipio and Hannibal had a conversation on the subBect of generalship, in the presence of a number of bystanders, and that 0cipio asked Hannibal /hom he considered the greatest general, to /hich the latter replied, <)le:ander of 9acedonia.< 3o this 0cipio assented since he also yielded the first place to )le:ander. 3hen he asked Hannibal /hom he placed ne:t, and he replied, <1yrrhus of +pirus,< because he considered boldness the first >ualification of a generalE <for it /ould not be possible,< he said, <to find t/o kings more enterprising than these.< 0cipio /as rather nettled by this, but nevertheless he asked Hannibal to /hom he /ould give the third place, e:pecting that at least the third /ould be assigned to himE but Hannibal replied, <3o myselfE for /hen ? /as a young man ? con>uered Hispania and crossed the )lps /ith an army, the first after Hercules. ? invaded ?taly and struck terror into all of you, laid /aste "@@ of your to/ns, and often put your city in e:treme peril, all this time receiving neither money nor reinforcements from $arthage.< )s 0cipio sa/ that he /as likely to prolong his self-laudation he said, laughing, <Where /ould you place yourself, Hannibal, if you had not been defeated by meU< Hannibal, no/ perceiving his Bealousy, replied, <?n that case ? should have put myself before )le:ander.< 3hus Hannibal continued his self-laudation, but flattered 0cipio in a delicate manner by suggesting that he had con>uered one /ho /as the superior of )le:ander. )t the end of this conversation Hannibal invited 0cipio to be his guest, and 0cipio replied that he /ould be so gladly if Hannibal /ere not living /ith )ntiochus, /ho /as held in suspicion by the *omans. 3hus did they, in a manner /orthy of great commanders, cast aside their enmity at the end of their /ars.6"=76"7 I Hannibal5s e:ploits (especially his victory at $annae) continue to be studied in military academies all over the /orld.

Hannibal5s celebrated feat in crossing the )lps /ith /ar elephants passed into +uropean legend: a fresco detail, ca. &8&@, $apitoline 9useums, *ome3he author of the &C&& +ncyclopVdia ritannica article praises Hannibal in these /ords: )s to the transcendent military genius of Hannibal there cannot be t/o opinions. 3he man /ho for fifteen years could hold his ground in a hostile country against several po/erful armies and a succession of able generals must have been a commander and a tactician of supreme capacity. ?n the use of strategies and ambuscades he certainly surpassed all other generals of anti>uity. Wonderful as his achievements /ere, /e must marvel the more /hen /e take into account the grudging support he received from $arthage. )s his veterans melted a/ay, he had to organiKe fresh levies on the spot. We never hear of a mutiny in his army, composed though it /as of Horth )fricans, ?berians and ,auls. )gain, all /e kno/ of him comes for the most part from hostile sources. 3he *omans feared and hated him so much that they could not do him Bustice. 2ivy speaks of his great >ualities, but he adds that his vices /ere e>ually great, among /hich he singles out his more than 1unic perfidy and an inhuman cruelty. For the first there /ould seem to be no further Bustification than that he /as consummately skillful in the use of ambuscades. For the latter there is, /e believe, no more ground than that at certain crises he acted in the general spirit of ancient /arfare. 0ometimes he contrasts most favorably /ith his enemy. Ho such brutality stains his name as that perpetrated by $laudius Hero on the van>uished Hasdrubal. 1olybius merely says that he /as accused of cruelty by the *omans and of avarice by the $arthaginians. He had indeed bitter enemies, and his life /as one continuous struggle against destiny. For steadfastness of purpose, for organiKing capacity and a mastery of military science he has perhaps never had an e>ual.6(7

+ven his *oman chroniclers ackno/ledged his supreme military leadership, /riting that, <he never re>uired others to do /hat he could and /ould not do himself<.6"#7 )ccording to 1olybius !(, &(, p. "!(: <?t is a remarkable and very cogent proof of Hannibal5s having been by nature a real leader and far superior to anyone else in statesmanship, that though he spent seventeen years in the field, passed through so many barbarous countries, and employed to aid him in desperate and e:traordinary enterprises numbers of men of different nations and languages, no one ever dreamt of conspiring against him, nor /as he ever deserted by those /ho had once Boined him or submitted to him.< )lfred ,raf von 0chlieffen5s eponymously-titled <0chlieffen 1lan< /as developed from his military studies, /ith particularly heavy emphasis on Hannibal5s envelopment techni>ue he employed to surround and victoriously destroy the *oman army at $annae.6"'76"C7 ,eorge 0. 1atton believed that he /as a reincarnation of Hannibal as /ell as many other people including a *oman legionary and a Hapoleonic soldier.68@768&7 Horman 0ch/arKkopf, the commander of the $oalition Forces in the ,ulf War, claimed that <3he technology of /ar may change, the sophistication of /eapons certainly changes. ut those same principles of /ar that applied to the days of Hannibal apply today.<68!7 )ccording to the military historian, 3heodore )yrault ;odge, G Hannibal e:celled as a tactician. Ho battle in history is a finer sample of tactics than $annae. ut he /as yet greater in logistics and strategy. Ho captain ever marched to and fro among so many armies of troops superior to his o/n numbers and material as fearlessly and skillfully as he. Ho man ever held his o/n so long or so ably against such odds. $onstantly overmatched by better soldiers, led by generals al/ays respectable, often of great ability, he yet defied all their efforts to drive him from ?taly, for half a generation. +:cepting in the case of )le:ander, and some fe/ isolated instances, all /ars up to the 0econd 1unic War, had been decided largely, if not entirely, by battle-tactics. 0trategic ability had been comprehended only on a minor scale. )rmies had marched to/ards each other, had fought in parallel order, and the con>ueror had imposed terms on his opponent. )ny variation from this rule consisted in ambuscades or other stratagems. 3hat /ar could be /aged by avoiding in lieu of seeking battleE that the results of a victory could be earned by attacks upon the enemyMs communications, by flank-maneuvers, by seiKing positions from /hich safely to threaten him in case he moved, and by other devices of strategy, /as not understood . . .6Ho/ever7 For the first time in the history of /ar, /e see t/o contending generals avoiding each other, occupying impregnable camps on heights, marching about each other5s flanks to seiKe cities or supplies in their rear, harassing each other /ith small-/ar, and rarely venturing on a battle /hich might prove a fatal disasterNall /ith a /ell-conceived purpose of placing his opponent at a strategic disadvantage. . .3hat it did so /as due to the teaching of Hannibal.6=7 I

6edit7 *eferences W Hannibal5s date of death is most commonly given as &'( $, but there is a possibility it could have taken place in &'! $. W 9icrosoft +ncarta N Hannibal (general) W a b H)HH? )2 (<grace of aal<) &C&& +ncyclopVdia ritannica W a b 9ary 9acgregor. <3he ;eath of Hannibal<, 3he 0tory of *ome. *etrieved on !@@=-@#-@8. W $hurch, )lfred J., 3he 0tory of $arthage, p. !=C W a b c d e )yrault ;odge, 3heodore (&CC8). Hannibal: ) History of the )rt of War )mong the $arthagonians and *omans ;o/n to the attle of 1ydna, &=' $. ;a $apo 1ress. W Will ;urant, $aesar and $hrist, 0imon and 0chuster, He/ Rork &C"", pp "8 W *everse 0pins 1atton, the 0econd $oming of Hannibal. W 6&7 3he History of *ome: Dol ???, by 2ivy W ;odge, 3heodore )yrault, Hannibal: ) History of the )rt of War )mong the $arthaginians and *omans ;o/n to the attle of 1ydna, &=' .$, p. &"( W Fagan, ,arret ,. <3he History of )ncient *ome<. 2ecture &(: <3he 0econd 1unic War<. 3eaching $ompany, <,reat $ourses< series. W 2ancel, 0erge, Hannibal, p. !!8 W 1revas, John, Hannibal $rosses the )lps: 3he ?nvasion of ?taly and the 0econd 1unic War, p. '=

W 2ancel, 0erge, Hannibal, p. =@ W 9ontgenevre: 1eter $onnolly, Hannibal and the +nemies of *ome (&C#')E (e:tensive summary)E $ol de la 3raversette: ,avin de eer, )lps and +lephants and Hapoleon ???E 9ont $enis: ;enis 1roctor, Hannibal5s 9arch in History. Ather theories include the $ol du $lapier (0erge 2ancel, Hannibal (&CC8) and the $ol du 1etit 0aint ernard ( arthold Hiebuhr). W 0. 2ancel, Hannibal (&CC8E +nglish translation &CCC) page =@. W a b ;odge, 3heodore. Hannibal. $ambridge 9assachusetts: ;e $apo 1ress, &'C& ?0 H @-(@=-'&(=!-C W 2iddell Hart, asil, 0trategy, He/ Rork $ity, He/ Rork, 1enguin ,roup, &C=# W F0)W$ $omparing 0trategies of the !nd 1unic War by James 1arker. Die/ as H392 W ,olds/orthy, )drian Q. 3he *oman )rmy at War &@@ $ - ); !@@, He/ Rork W ?nternet )ncient History 0ourcebook. W a b c d e $ottrell, 2eonard, +nemy of *ome, +vans ros, &C=8, ?0 H @-!(#-""(!@-& W 1revas, John, Hannibal $rosses the )lps, p. :v W $haplin, Jane ;unbar, 2ivy5s +:emplary History, p. == W 1olybius, 3he Histories of 1olybius, ! Dols., trans. +velyn 0. 0huckburgh (2ondon: 9acmillan, &''C), ?. !="-!#8. W 1revas, John, Hannibal $rosses the )lps: 3he ?nvasion of ?taly and the 0econd 1unic War, p. !@@ W 1liny, tr. by 9ary eagon, 3he +lder 1liny on the Human )nimal, p (=& W 2ivy, 3he War /ith Hannibal, !'."= W http:../ikimapia.org.XyY"@#'!(8(Z:Y!C""&(C=ZKY&=ZvY! $oordinates: "@["=58=<H !C[!=5!C<+ W )lan +mrich, 1ractical 2atin W Holland, *ome and her +nemies ' W 2ivy, 3he War With Hannibal !!.=& W 2aKenby, Hannibal5s War !(#-' W ,olds/orthy, 3he Fall of $arthage (&8 W J. F. 2aKenby, 3he Hannibalic War, !8" W 2ivy, 3he War With Hannibal !=.# http:..mcadams.posc.mu.edu.t:t.ah.2ivy.2ivy!=.html W 2ivy, 3he War With Hannibal !=.C http:..mcadams.posc.mu.edu.t:t.ah.2ivy.2ivy!=.html W a b 2ivy, 3he War With Hannibal !=.' http:..mcadams.posc.mu.edu.t:t.ah.2ivy.2ivy!=.html W 2ivy, 3he War /ith Hannibal, !=.&& W J.F. 2aKenby, 3he Hannibalic War, p. !8" W agnall, 3he 1unic Wars !@( W 2aKenby, Hannibal5s War !(8 W 2aKenby Hannibal5s War !8" W ,olds/orthy 3he Fall of $arthage (==-#) W Hannibal, $arthaginian general, 3he $olumbia +ncyclopedia W )ppian, History of the 0yrian Wars, \&@ and \&& at 2ivius.org W Hannibal at $arpeHoctem.tv W ;aly, ,regory, $annae: 3he +:perience of attle in the 0econd 1unic War, p. : W $ottrell, 2eonard, Hannibal: +nemy of *ome, p. &(" W <)ny man /ho thinks he is the reincarnation of Hannibal or some such isn5t >uite possessed of all his buttons<, >uoted by ;5+ste, $arlo, in 1atton: ) ,enius For War, p. '&8 W Hirshson, 0tanley, ,eneral 1atton: ) 0oldier5s 2ife, p. &=( W $arlton, James, 3he 9ilitary ]uotation ook, He/ Rork $ity, He/ Rork, 3homas ;unne ooks, !@@!

6edit7 Further reading in 1unic Wars ickerman, +lias J. <HannibalMs $ovenant<, )merican Journal of 1hilology, Dol. #(, Ho. &. (&C8!), pp. &% !(. radford, +, Hannibal, 2ondon, 9acmillan 2ondon 2td., &C'& $aven, ., 1unic Wars, 2ondon, ,eorge Werdenfeld and Hicholson 2td., &C'@ $ottrell, 2eonard, Hannibal: +nemy of *ome, ;a $apo 1ress, &CC!, ?0 H @-(@=-'@"C'-@ ;aly, ,regory, $annae: 3he +:perience of attle in the 0econd 1unic War, 2ondon.He/ Rork, *outledge,

!@@!, ?0 H @-"&8-(!#"(-& ;elbr^ck, Hans, Warfare in )nti>uity, &C!@, ?0 H @-'@(!-C&CC-T Hoyos, ;e:ter: Hannibal5s ;ynasty: 1o/er and 1olitics in the Western 9editerranean, !"#%&'( .$. (*outledge: 2ondon Z He/ Rork, !@@(E paperback edition /ith maps, !@@8) - has much discussion of strategy and /arfare. Hoyos, ;e:ter, Hannibal: *ome5s ,reatest +nemy, ristol 1hoeni: 1ress, !@@8, ?0 H &-C@"=#8-"=-' (hbk) ?0 H &-C@"=#8-"#-= (pbk) 2amb, Harold, Hannibal: Ane 9an )gainst *ome, &C8C. 2ancel, 0erge, Hannibal, lack/ell 1ublishing, &CCC, ?0 H @=(&!&'"'( 2ivy, and ;e 0elincourt, )ubery, 3he War /ith Hannibal: ooks TT?-TTT of the History of *ome from its Foundation, 1enguin $lassics, *eprint edition, July (@, &C=8, ?0 H @-&"-@""&"8-T (pbk)(also 6!7) 1revas, John, Hannibal $rosses the )lps: 3he ?nvasion of ?taly and the 0econd 1unic War, !@@&, ?0 H @(@='&@#@@, >uestions /hich route he took 3albert, *ichard J.)., ed., )tlas of $lassical History, *outledge, 2ondon.He/ Rork, &C'8, ?0 H @-"&8@("=(-C Rardley, J.$. (translator) Z Hoyos, ;. (introduction, notes, maps and appendi: on Hannibal5s march over the )lps): 2ivy: Hannibal5s War: ooks !& to (@ (A:ford World5s $lassics: A:ford Fniv. 1ress, FQ Z F0), !@@=). 3his article incorporates te:t from the +ncyclopVdia ritannica +leventh +dition, a publication no/ in the public domain.

6edit7 0ee also

3imeline of Hannibal5s life (!"# $-c. &'( $)6hide7

9ilitary history Famous military commanders 6hide7v _ d _ eHotable $arthaginians )d Herbal _ 0aint )urelius _ $arthalo _ ;ido _ Hamilcar (;repanum) _ Hamilcar arca _ Hannibal arca _ Hannibal ,isco _ Hannibal 9onomachus _ Hannibal the *hodian _ Hanno the +lder _ Hanno the ,reat _ Hanno the Havigator _ Hanno, son of omilcar _ Hasdrubal arca _ Hasdrubal ,isco _ Hasdrubal the Fair _ Hasdrubal, commander of the service corps _ Himilco the Havigator _ 9ago (agricultural /riter) _ 9ago arca _ 9aharbal _ 0aints 1erpetua and Felicitas _ 0ophonisba 1ersondata H)9+ Hannibal arca )23+*H)3?D+ H)9+0 Hannibal (common referent)E H`nnibal arca (alternate form) 0HA*3 ;+0$*?13?AH 1unic military commander and a politician ;)3+ AF ?*3H !"# $ 12)$+ AF ?*3H $arthage (no/ 3unis, 3unisia) ;)3+ AF ;+)3H ca. &'( $ 12)$+ AF ;+)3H 2ibyssa (no/ ,ebKe, 3urkey) *etrieved from <http:..en./ikipedia.org./iki.Hannibal<