How far did luck play a part in Margaret Thatchers leadership election victory of 1975?

As is typical of history, Margaret Thatchers leadership election victory of 1975 has produced many differing views from historians on the extent of Margaret Thatchers good fortune in her ascent to power within the Conservative Party. The central focus of the debate is whether her election had mainly been due to luck- events that she had no real control over and had fallen her way, or whether, although some luck may have been involved, it had mainly been Thatchers own personal attributes and doing that allowed her to gain an unexpected majority over Ted Heath. Andrew Marr focuses predominately on ideological transitions within the Conservative Party. The general feeling conveyed in his chapter is that it was good fortune that had played the main part in her rise to power. Edward du Cann, and Keith Joseph, in his view, would have been worthier opponents more desirable to the Tory party, and it was their personal failings to stand for election that meant that Thatcher obtained votes by default; she had been the only reasonable candidate left standing, and thus obtained the votes necessary to win. Marr puts forward the idea that Thatcher essentially adopted the Josephite figure and had good fortune as she inherited a policy that he had laboriously created and promoted, and had only received a large amount votes purely due to her association with the increasingly attractive Josephism1. Marr over-focuses on Josephs political journey. Although true that Joseph first brought to attention the idea of free market economics prior to Thatcher and publicised it before her, this does not mean Thatcher necessarily directly adopted Josephs theory, took his place, and won, as simply as Marr appears to imply. The time period of the book encapsulates postwar Britain to the most recent decade - 60 years, - and therefore the account of Thatchers leadership election lacks concise detail and only skims the surface of the actualities of the event. Marrs decision to form the basis of his chapter on Josephs relations with the Conservative gives interesting insight into the shifting nature of the party, but causes focus to be lost on Thatcher- Marrs almost complete omission of describing Thatchers actions and her ideology, and instead portraying her as a product, or object, on which Josephism is based is flawed in that we are unable to interpret the extent to which Thatcher the person played a part in her success. He also sacrifices detail on other very relevant factors- for instance the response of the Heath camp and, as will be later discussed, the personal antagonism toward Heath that contributed to the success of Thatcher. Thus, Marrs lack of detail (and therefore omission of crucial factors) on the subject reduces the helpfulness of the source in contributing to the argument. Thatchers personal and political qualities had certainly been instrumental in her success, whatever the political events surrounding her. After all, Marrs assertion that Thatcher won mainly due to amassing Josephs popularity raises the question why it wasnt any ordinary MP that had won the election. Thatcher obviously had to distinguish herself in one way or another. John Charmley follows this line of argument, and focuses on the bravery of Thatcher- her decision to risk the consignment of her career to the scrapheap and to force a leadership contest had been extremely courageous2, and the manner in which she propagated her views allowed
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Marr, A History of Modern Britain p.358 Charmley, A History of Conservative Politics since 1830

her to collect support within the Conservative ranks. Though there are two issues with Charmleys account- his book is devoted to Conservative Politics, and it encompasses the history of the party since 1830. From these two issues two problems arise- the nature of the book means that Charmley re-tells the events from a very broad perspective, thus sacrificing detail that is is crucial to the evaluation, and the fact that it deals exclusively with Conservative politics means that Charmley may have too much of a closed vision on relations in the tory party, thus omitting certain flaws within the Tory party. His omission of Ted Heaths campaign and the downfalls of Thatchers opponents (du Cann is not even mentioned) means that the source is difficult to utilise effectively in order to accurately assess all factors that contributed to her election victory. Charmleys assertions of this distinguishable courageousness and determination are soundly evidenced by her defiant statement after hearing of Josephs decision to not stand for election: If youre not going to stand, I will, become somebody who represents our viewpoint has to stand.3 The quotation shows she had clearly been a woman that was willing to represent an ideology. Though courage can hardly ever be the chief reason for any success, and what must be explored is whether the primary basis Thatcher was elected on was on her representation of ideology. Richard Vinen and Hugo Young both refute the idea that Thatcher was elected due to ideology and image, and instead argue that the prevalent factor central to Thatchers success was the personal feeling toward Heath through the Conservative party. Both argue that du Cann and Joseph had both been integral to her success, but not just, as Marr implies, because of their increased popularity transgressing onto Thatcher as a result of their failure to stand. The duo, and other backbenchers, represented the resentment to Heath at the time, and it was this resentment that effectively publicised Thatcher and allowed her to gain votes. Vinen notes that du Cann had been bitter toward Heath and had played a vital role in swinging support behind Thatcher and triggering the challenge to Heath. George Gardiner was said to have loathed Heath and was willing to deploy all his dark arts in support of Margaret Thatcher. 4 Airey Neave, however, perhaps best epitomises the Conservative Partys personal, rather than ideological, battle. He had had a moderate, mainstream view of the Conservative Party and had certainly been unThatcherite. Though, argued by Vinen, the fact that he had been willing to back any candidate in order to eject Heath highlights the extent of the dissatisfaction toward Heath, and thus Thatchers luck in obtaining the support of Neave, and other backbenchers support (hence the election commonly being named the backbenchers, or peasants, revolt). The general consensus among each of the historians is that many of Heaths party had had enough, and a replacement was needed. The fact that pro-Thatcher Charmley states that it was the fact that Thatcher was not Ted5 that had attracted votes to her solidifies this argument. Thus, we can make the assumption based on these points and the collective agreement between historians, that had there not been so much antipathy toward Heath at the time of the election, it is unknown whether Thatcher would have been victorious and most probably unlikely too. Not only was Thatcher lucky enough to experience the polarisation of Heath at the time, but as Young argues the chief agent of her leadership victory had been Edward Heath himself6, purely due his collection of errors and ignorance. His decision to move Thatcher to the Department of Environment allowed her image to flourish, but above all, Young argues that his underestimation of Thatcher, blindness to see the his
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Vinen, Thatchers Britain Vinen, Thatchers Britain 5 Charmley, A History of Conservative Politics since 1830 6 Young, One of Us

partys dissatisfaction toward him, and disorganisation of his party campaign that were the most crucial factors in Thatchers success. Sure of victory against Thatcher, the pro-Heath camp was bound to their great leader, everyone too loyal to dare stand against him. William Whitelaw would almost definitely have won were it not for his blindness to not stand in the first ballot- by the time he entered in the second Thatcher had amassed enough momentum to see her through. Youngs points are all valid, but over-emphasis on Heaths failure is largely unnecessary- a failing leader can never be the sole reason for a change in leadership, it can only be a factor contributing to it. Consequently, Youngs detailed account of Heath sheds hardly any light on Thatchers progression and therefore complicates evaluation between the differing factors. Vinen manages to present a different idea, and in part reflects Charmleys assertions of her political competence. One of the main pieces of evidence that showed Thatcher disguising her radical free-market beliefs is her housing policy. Heaths proposal that would prevent anyone from paying interest of more than 9.5% on their mortgage would to a free-market economist been absurd7, and was bound to worsen the financial problems of the government. Thatcher, well aware of this and doubtful of the effectiveness of the policies, defended the proposals staunchly anyway. This act of political bravery, Charmley argues, was massively beneficial to her image- not only did it display her political competence, but also strengthened her figure within the Conservative party, and thus could be said that it was this increased profile that had helped her gain votes in the election. Her reference to Chancellor Dennis Healy as cheap8, inspired excitement within her own party and would only further endear her. Her cautious break from Heathism also highlights her intelligence as a politicianhad she set about on the radical front from the offset, it is likely that the largely moderate Conservative party would have distrusted her ideology. Thus it could too be interpreted that her personal political methods provided the main reason for her electoral success, as had it not been for her enhanced image, there would be no differentiation between herself and other candidates, and would otherwise suffered the same fate as Howe, or any other minor candidate. Thus this crucial act of political capability distinguished her from other candidates and was acted as the key factor in her success. The books of Richard Vinen and Hugo Young, unlike the other sources, do explicitly focus on the time period of Thatcher, and therefore produce detailed accounts of the election. This is on the whole a very positive attribute for historical analysis and highlights their utility, as we are allowed a much greater insight into the reasons for Thatchers success, in comparison to the skimming Marr and Charmley. However, their similar claims of Thatcher winning due to a personal rather than ideological Conservative battle may be as a result of them looking too closely at the events, failing to see a bigger picture. Both historians give very detailed accounts of the resentment toward Heath, but Youngs particular over-analysis of this conflict, and of Josephs political background leads to an omission of the personal political rise of Thatcher; he largely fails to mention what personally she had managed to do to create her rise, and this is a crucial flaw in the source, for it is obvious that her own political attributes distinguished her from other candidates and were vital in her rise to powerwhy hadnt Howe or John Peyton won instead? Vinen predominately focuses on Josephs political past and the collective ire toward Heath for Thatchers success, though through also specially highlighting the personal achievements of Thatcher as politician Vinen enables the evaluation and comparison of Thatchers fortune and skill.
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Vinen, Thatchers Britain Vinen, Thatchers Britain

Conclusively, each historian puts forward a differing argument for the extent to which Margaret Thatcher was fortunate. However, the provenance of the sources must be properly evaluated and analysed in order to get a clear idea of their utility and relevance to the argument. Marrs statement that Thatcher had primarily been fortunate in Josephs failure to stand, as it allowed her to inherit the Josephite philosophy and thus gain votes from the Josephite section of the party, is refuted through Charmleys assertion and Vinens evidence of Thatchers brave, and (importantly) conscious decision to stand up and represent Josephism. Thus the flawed and very basic nature of Marrs argument is highlighted, owing to the broad encompassment of history in his book, and this broadness heavily detracts from its utility. Charmleys line of argument that Thatchers extreme political courage and bravery had been the crucial part of her success is contrasted by Vinen, who states that despite her political tact she had been fortunate due to the pervading will to oust Heath that had been most influential in her success. In stating that it had been a personal rather than ideological battle Young takes the same viewpoint as Viven, and cites Heaths various failings and desire for transition the main factors contributing to Thatchers success. The vital point of differentiation between the two sources is however their point of focus- Young and Vinens books explicit focus on the time period of Thatcher allows for a far more relevant, and detailed insight, and provides more information than that of Charmleys more broad and general outlook (although his book devoted to Conservative politics does give some reassurance on its relevance). Vinen, and Young in particular, arguably look at the events too closely: by focusing too much on the failings of Heath they fail to properly give emphasis to the personal qualities of Thatcher, an aspect crucial in the argument. However it is Young and Vinens intrinsic relevance to the events of the time that highlight their utility. From their highly detailed accounts we are able to evaluate and compare the points made with other assessments of Thatchers leadership election. Thatcher had undoubtedly displayed bravery in deciding to stand, and her defence of the housing policy was certainly an aspect that aided her popularity. However, as all sources assert, Thatcher had had brilliant fortune that had been instrumental to her success; everything had seemed to fall into place. Du Cann and Joseph were figures far more popular than Thatcher, and it was only their failure to stand that allowed Thatcher to enter the running. The most significant factor of good fortune, however, centred on Heath. All the historians concede that Thatcher had not been elected because of her policy or image, but rather because she had been somebody other than the begrudged Heath. His blindness to this displeasure, gross underestimation of Thatcher, and refusal to release any of his MPs from the bonds of his loyalty only made his position more precarious, and allowed Thatcher to amass more votes than him. As Young notes, nobody in or outside of the party has argued that in any other circumstance than the one Heath contrived would she have won, and this perhaps best epitomises that, despite the essential political courage and competence that differentiated her from other candidates, it had been good fortune that played the most crucial part in her leadership success; without the very large slice of luck that she had received, it is highly unlikely she would have become party leader.

Thomas Smith