Patriot or Traitor: Assessing Otto John's Motives for "Defecting" in 1954

By David A. Meier, Dickinson State University On December 4, 1950, Otto John was appointed president of the Bundesamt fr Verfassungsschutz. On July 20, 1954, after a ceremony in Berlin remembering the conspirators of 1944, he disappeared. He reappeared in East Berlin. Before his disappearance, Otto John headed the equivalent of the West German Central Intelligence Agency but focused internally overall rather than externally. After presiding over the review of tens of thousands of background checks, running his own agents in East Germany, investigating radical right and left wing internal threats to the West German state, a known micro-manager, Otto John was allegedly kidnaped or defected into Soviet hands. The stakes were immense. By the early 1950s, the BfV accumulated over 40,000 files. Otto John sat in the unique position of potentially knowing more about the key figures in the West German state than any other person at the time. Adenauer asked the Allied High Commission to inquire with Soviet authorities regarding the whereabouts of John.1 Uncertainty mixed with a bit of a panic. Klaus Tiedge, who in August 1985 became the first high level official within West Germanys counter-intelligence community to go over to the communists, wrote in his own memoirs, Der berlufer (1998), one word about Otto John: traitor.2 Complicating matters further, Otto John appears to have run his own agents in East Germany. Once selected to head the BfV, he traveled throughout West Germany often micromanaging the activities or regional offices of his agency. He would be regularly briefed about the intelligence activities of other West German agencies while also maintaining a working relationship with other intelligence agencies from West Germanys allies in NATO. Not many months before his defection, Otto John met with Allen Dulles, representing the CIA. His habit of micro-managing regional offices became a source of irritation as his experience did not lend itself to inspiring confidence or giving him the tools he needed to advise regional offices. He appeared to have a regular habit of drinking too much and making something of a spectacle of himself at prominent hotels downtown Cologne, Germany. The central question remained decades later: Why did Otto John go into East Berlin? Three possible scenarios were investigated: (1) he defected, (2) he was kidnapped, or (3) he went voluntarily. All three involved a review of Johns past. This article blends material from a variety of archival and secondary sources. Combined with documents released in 2008 and the research of the Forschungsbeirat fr Fragen der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands for 1952-1954 in Bundesarchiv (Koblenz) viewed last March -- were hoped to provide a bit more substance to the circumstances of Otto Johns decision to go into East Berlin. Throughout the entire Otto John affair, investigators across the spectrum assumed that in some sense Johns past had finally caught up with him. Otto John war-time contacts ranged from high ranking Nazis to links with the Allies as well as the German Resistance. Wounded on the Eastern Front in 1941, Otto Johns brother, Hans John, would be placed in hands of two SS doctors, Drs. Ferdinand Sauerbruch and Wolfgang Wohlgemuth. Inspired by Wohlgemuths apparent anti-Nazi stance and his medical assistance for his brother, Otto John came to view Wohlgemuth as an Edelcommunist or salon communist as someone who declared himself

in favor of Communism but never quite understood what it was all about. Although both Hans and Otto were involved in the resistance to Hitler, Hans John perished in the Nazi prison Pltzensee in April 1945.3 Called before the International Military Tribunal on June 8-9, 1948, John testified as to his involvement with the resistance to Hitler and his affiliation with it leading figures, including Klaus Bonhffer and Hans von Dohnanyi, and provided him with a viable cover story for his ride to Madrid (via Barcelona) aboard a Lufthansa machine on July 24, 1944.4 John counted among his contacts Dietrich Bonhffer, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, Adam von Trott zu Solz, Jakob Kaiser, and Generals Ludwig Beck, Ludwig Freiherr von Hammerstein, and Hans Oster. (Johns first link in this process was his boss at Lufthansa, Klaus Bonhffer, though not Klauss brother Dietrich.) John also coupled himself with Graf Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg while also acknowledging that this link came through Abwehr Captain Ludwig Gehre. Alluding to contacts with American authorities (which he indicated dated back to 1942), John presented himself as someone actively working to bring down the Nazi regime. (According to a British Special Intelligence Service officer in the British embassy in Lisbon, John had made contact with him in 1942 regarding possible British support for the German underground against Hitler.) Overall, the impression John leaves is clearly as one deeply implicated in the resistance and involved directly and or indirectly with almost every key figure.5 After the July 20, 1944, plot to kill Hitler, John took a flight to Madrid. Once in Madrid, John made his way to the Palace Hotel. A little later, Britains MI6 arranged for his transportation to Lisbon via Vigo. Though disguised as a Royal Air Force pilot, the Portuguese secret police found and arrested him. The Abwehr official charged with assassinating John, Fritz Cramer, tipped off British officials, who obtained Johns release and flew him to England. Once in Great Britain, he began working under Sefton Delmar in the Office of Political Warfare in preparing anti-Nazi propaganda. Later on, John would work with the British in screening former German generals as part of the denazification process. Nothing, however, linked John with British intelligence.6 As for Johns rise to high office, the government explanation began with the creation of the law regarding relations between the states and the BfV from September 27, 1950.7 Shortly thereafter, extensive talks began with the Allied Security Directors to find and place individuals in the new institutions leading positions. Largely out of frustration, Otto John became a favored candidate of the Allied High Commission in November 1950. In December 1950, John assumed his duties as director of the BfV.8 Officially, the background investigations of Otto John revealed nothing of significance. Similar investigation conducted through1952 did not add substantially to these materials.9 As for his alleged defection and return, Otto John returned from East Germany on December 12, 1955. His reappearance in the West was just as mysterious as his disappearance on July 20, 1954. Residing just outside Potsdam, John made know his desire to return to the West to the Danish journalist Henrik Bonde-Henriksen. Initially, John allegedly thought of seeking political asylum in England and/or Denmark. Denied these possibilities, John reconsidered a return to West Germany. Johns escape plan had little flare. As he made regular trips to Humbolt University to do research, John evaded his guards and got into BondeHenriksens waiting car. As the car approached the border, the East German guards allegedly recognized the driver and vehicle and waved the car through with John concealed in the floor in the back seat. Proceeding directly to Tempelhof airfield, John boarded a British plane and flew to Wahn airport near Cologne. Upon arrival, the Security Detachment of the Federal

Criminal Police (BKA) in Bonn questioned John for several hours about his seventeen-month stint in the East.10 The BKA report presented five possible explanations for Johns return. First, John is basically a psychiatric case who crossed into East Berlin on an emotional impulse, which stemmed from a belief he was being frustrated in his job that was brought to a head by the July 20 celebration in Berlin in 1954, and who has now again impulsively sought escape, this time from the new situation in which he had embroiled himself. According to this theory, John acted out of desperation. Second, John is a true idealist who had become convinced that a dramatic gesture such as his crossing into the East Zone was the only means by which the Germans could be awakened to [the] realization that reunification is first of all a German problem which cannot be solved by rigid German adherence to the specific and conflicting interests of either the West or the East. This second theory constituted little more than a variation off the first. Third, John was simply kidnapped [sic] and taken to East Berlin. Once there he chose the best means of survival which was to seem to play the Soviets game by adopting their line (but without yielding up any information of value) until such time as he could engineer his escape again to the West. A more romantic and heroic suggestion, it fit the first impulses of West German investigators and, much later, the description offered by John himself. It did not, however, fit well with subsequent evidence and never had more than a few advocates. Fourth, John is a top-flight intelligence agent for the British (or for the Federal Republic as the case may be) who has now completed brilliantly a very tough assignment. Romantic and exciting, no solid evidence surfaced to make it stick. Fifth and finally, John is a top-flight Soviet agent whose return to the West marks [a] resumption of the outstanding career he has had as a Soviet agent since the day when he was a member of the Rote Kapelle. Equally romantic and exciting, only limited circumstantial evidence surfaced to make it believable. In sum, these theories reveal more about what the American embassy did not know than what it did know. The United States did not know if John had been a Soviet mole or a spy for the West.11 The Commentaries What information is available comes from a few select sources. Otto Johns memoirs, Zweimal kam ich heim (1969) and his quasi-autobiographical account of the July 20, 1944, Falsch und zu spt. Der 20. Juli 1944. Epilogue (1984), about the attempt on Hitlers life, were part of a conscious attempt to rehabilitate his own reputation.12 According to John, the British Secret Service intended for a British embassy vehicle to take John to Gibralter and then fly him on to London.13 Wolfgang Putlitz prepared himself for a career in the German Foreign Office by studying English at Oxford University in1924 and became a close friend of Klop Ustinov, a future German diplomat himself and the father of the famous actor.14 During the war, John and Putlitz both worked in Sefton Delmers radio broadcast Soldatensender Calais in 1944 from Woburn Abbey in England. After John assumed the post of president of the BfV, the American Counter Intelligence Corps intercepted at least one letter (dated March 22, 1953) from Putlitz to John. According to Vladimir Appolonovich Karpov, Putlitz initiated contact with John in 1951 after obtaining permission from the KGB. John himself had informed Keith Randall, Britains chief intelligence officer in West Germany, of Putlitzs several attempts to recruit him for the East.15

As for newly opened Soviet sources, three former insiders, David E. Murphy, Sergei Kondrashev, and George Bailey, were among the first to examine edited Russian intelligence reports on the John affair -- but not the actual file on Otto John. Soviet sources reported that John was spineless in his resistance to the influence of others, inconsistent in his actions, intemperate in his use of alcohol, and lacking discernment in his choice of friends. While there is no hard evidence of his working for the East as a spy, Soviet interest in John grew with Johns critical disposition towards the Adenauer government. Wolfgang Wohlgemuth and KGB officer Max Wonsig met to work out plans to manipulate John. Soviet officials did not expect to succeed. Johns close ties with the British during the Second World War also made them suspicious of a possible trap. Pitovranovs superiors, Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, KGB Chairman, and Alekssandr Semyonovich Paniushkin, controlling the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, would have been shocked at Johns expressed willingness to work with the Soviets. Pitovranov, however, considered the recruitment of John both inexpedient and unrealistic. We have taken the decision to persuade him not to return to West Germany and to make an open break with Adenauer that would be accompanied by a corresponding political declaration by him. Russian sources did not indicate that John had provided them with useful information or had spied for them -- a point at odds with Karpovs earlier statement.16 John Crosses in East Berlin Shortly after John crossed into East Berlin, the West Berlin police moved quickly on July 21, 1954, to collect statements from everyone connected with the John affair. Within a matter of a few weeks, police officials would interview roughly 800 individuals associated with either Otto John or Wolfgang Wohlgemuth. The results of this investigation were, in turn, forwarded to Hans Egidi, director of Public Security within the Federal Ministry of the Interior, by HansGeorg Urban, Vice President of the Police in Berlin.17 Lucie John Of the early statements, Lucie Johns on July 28, 1954, proved one of the most detailed. In contrast to her husband, Lucie seemed somewhat out-of-touch with the work done by her husband or even the circles in which he moved. Contrary to previous statements, she stood as a witness to the events leading to her husbands alleged abduction by Dr. Wohlgemuth. Lucie did not recall any visible security for her husband. Lucie first met Wolfgang Wohlgemuth in December 1953 when he visited their home in Cologne for dinner. On this occasion, Lucie learned of Wolfgangs role in caring for Ottos older brother, Hans, who had been severely wounded on the eastern front. Lame on one side and shot in the heart and lungs, Hanss situation had been desperate. However, Hanss involvement with the resistance resulted in his being shot by the Gestapo with seven others in the back of the head near the former Lehrter train station on April 23, 1945. Since that time, Wolfgang and Otto had been friends. 18 Wolfgang finally telephoned Lucie in Hohkeppel on June 11, 1954. Wolfgang apparently called the BfV in Cologne first and obtained the telephone number. Lucie politely asked if Wolfgang had an hour to share with her. Surprised to hear of Ottos trip to the United States, Wolfgang wanted to share his recent experiences with Lucie. At Wolfgangs request, Lucie had him picked up at the train station in Cologne and brought to Hohkeppel. Wolfgang

arrived around 4:30 p.m. Leaving, Wolfgang indicated his intention to return in two weeks for another meeting with officials with Bayer.19 In Berlin on Saturday, July 17, 1954, Otto picked up Lucie and her aunt around 6:00 p.m. Otto seemed drunk. His eyes were half closed and his mouth half open. He gave the impression of being literally dead tired. However, Otto did not smell of alcohol. Lucie knew he enjoyed a drink now and again. But when he did, he generally remained a jovial and enjoyable person. At the Berlin office of the BfV, Otto allegedly intended to fire everyone and dissolve the office. To assist him, he brought Detlev von Platen from the Cologne office. Lucie also thought Otto expected to see Wolfgang Hoffer that same morning. Hoffer worked for the American Counter-Intelligence Corps (C.I.C.) until his mysterious suicide on July 23, 1954. However, Otto arrived in a normal state but appeared drunk and seriously unsteady after consuming three cups of black coffee and three bottles of Steinhger beer. Otto seemed in a comparable state that afternoon. However, Otto reportedly drank a great deal of coffee, a few shots of Schnaps, and a glass of wine.20 On the evening of July 15, 1954, Lucie and Otto John along with Wolfgang Hoffer and Prince Louis Ferdinand went to the Ritz restaurant on Ranke Street for a very pleasant dinner. Nearing 11:00 p.m., the group moved to the Maison de France, a club exclusively for members of the Allied forces. Hoffer got them in and they shared a bottle of champaign. Forty minutes later, Hoffer drove them back to the Schtzle. Things seemed normal.21 Lucie saw little of Otto on July 16. The pace slowed somewhat on July 17. Otto had several official visits in the morning, including a meeting with the governing mayor of Berlin, Lucie recalled. Guests began to arrive that afternoon, including the Parkinsons and Hoffer. Otto, Lucie, and their guests sat down to a dinner of red wine and duck. That evening, however, Otto telephoned Wolfgang Wohlgemuth. Clearly irritated that Wohlgemuth had not already taken care of the matter, Otto expected Wohlgemuth to provide Elisabeth Nehlsen with a death certificate for her late husband. When Lucie continued with her statement on July 30, she significantly altered her comments on the events of Saturday, July 17, 1954. While Lucie visited with her aunt, Otto returned to the hotel to relax. As best she could remember, Otto picked her up one hour later.22 On Sunday morning, July 18, Otto and Lucie drove about town. Lucie seemed preoccupied with the fear that they would inadvertently drive into the Soviet sector. Her grandparents had had a substantial estate in the East, more specifically, in Hubertushhe bei Storkow. A visit, Otto explained, would be out of the question. During their walk in a park, Otto talked about his experiences during the war, the resistance, and the people he had known. After dropping Lucie off at her aunts, Otto went on to his meeting with seven gentlemen representing the Allies slated for 12:30 p.m. After the meeting, Otto picked Lucie up and they returned to the hotel between 5:00-6:00 p.m. Later on, Otto expected Hoffer, who was taking the Parkinsons to the train station.23 Hoffer rolled in at 8:30 p.m. in his American-made vehicle. Everyone wanted to eat at the Maison de France. After the first course, their hunger grew faster than the restaurant service could satisfy so they sought a smaller, less congested establishment. Hoffer apologized for having even suggested the Maison de France. At the Gockel restaurant on Uhland Street, the conversation resumed. When Wohlgemuth was brought up, Otto said that Wohlgemuth complained about the feeling of being locked up in Berlin and that the only recourse he had was to drink. On this occasion, outside of a few beers, little alcohol had been consumed.24

On Monday, July 19, Lucie and Otto went into the city again. Otto got his hair cut at a place on Olivaer Square and then they walked along Konstanz Street to visit Lucies lawyer, Dr. Leonhard. There had been a few issues relating to her inheritance an old matter. The pair then drove down the Kurfrstendamm to Jacobis and other mens clothing stores but found nothing of interest. They were back at the hotel by noon.25 Visiting Seimens first, Lucie expected to be back by 3:00 p.m. to prepare for 5:00 p.m. ceremonies for victims of the July 20th plot. To her surprise, Siemens had prepared a dinner in her honor. She did not return to the hotel until 4:00 p.m. Otto had already left but left behind the official vehicle and chauffeur, von Wassow. Making matter worse, the driver was unfamiliar with the university where the ceremonies were being held. Dropped off at the wrong entrance, Lucie went on foot until she found Otto and her aunt, who were both looking for her. The keynote speaker, Federal President Theodor Heuss, made a strong impression on the audience. At about a quarter after six p.m., the ceremony ended.26 Later that evening, Lucies aunt, Lucie, and Otto made the rounds at a reception held by the Berlin Senate in the Haus Gerhus. Otto made a point of introducing Lucie to a number of his old friends from his days in the resistance. Otto had invited many of these same individuals to join them at the hotel. Even before their arrival at the Schtzle, a number of their old friends had already arrived, including General von Falkenhausen, Hans Dohnanyis widow, and Prince Louis Ferdinand. Lucie estimated twenty to thirty guests. The party continued through 2:00 a.m. Otto and Prince Louis closed the evening together over a final beer. Everyone knew that July 20, 1954, would be their Grokampftag (great struggle) given the extensive activities planned for the commemoration of victims of the July 20, 1944, plot to kill Hitler.27 On July 20, 1954, a Tuesday, everything seemed to change. Lucie, Otto, and Prince Louis Ferdinand road together to the church in Berlin-Dahlem. Arriving a bit later than planned, they barely fit into the space reserved for them in the first row. Otto was deeply moved by Plchaus sermon. Plchau served as chaplain to the prison where Ottos brother, Hans, had been tortured. When Lucie asked what bothered Otto in particular, he responded jetzt Schlu mit dem 20. Juli! meaning that it was time to put this chapter of history behind him. After the service, there came a moment of confusion in finding their car and driver. Once underway, Otto instructed the driver to get out at the next subway station and go home. The remaining trio returned to the hotel for a brief rest but not to go directly to the prison at Pltzensee, where many involved in the plot were brutally executed.28 Close to 11:00 a.m., the same trio headed out for the second event of the day. Heading towards Bendler Street, Otto wanted Lucie to keep an eye out for the office of British European Airways where they would need to go to pick up their tickets for their return flight to Cologne. Lucie and Otto planned to return on the 8:00 p.m. flight that Thursday, July 22. After arriving, Otto took Lucie on a tour of the house where he had last spoken with Claus von Stauffenberg. In the court yard, Stauffenberg had been shot and killed for his involvement in the July 20th plot. Konrad Adenauer and Theodor Heuss arrived from Pltzensee and the ceremony started shortly thereafter. As the ceremony ended, Otto noticed two individuals who had worked with the Gestapo and mentioned this to Lucie. Otto seemed visibly distressed. Otto conveyed his concerns to both Franz Josef Strau and Jakob Kaiser before moving on to the city hall in BerlinSchneberg.29 The twelve guests at their table in the city hall did not appeal to Lucie. Her statement moved quickly to that afternoon, dropping General von Falkenhausen off at the Kaiser Wilhelm

Memorial Church at 3:40 p.m., and picking up their airline tickets. Otto expected guests from Potsdam and Lucie had a 5:00 meeting with an engineer from Siemens named Mr. Herrmann. Ottos guests, the Hoettlers (Lucie did not know their names), were the parents of an American friend of his, Mr. Sichel, who worked closely with Allen Dulles. While Lucie rested in their room, Otto met with the couple for light conversation. As Lucie understood it, Otto thought the couple might give him a few insights into life in the East. When Otto came back to the room at about 5:50 p.m., Lucie and Mr. Herrmann were engaged in conversation and having coffee. Lucie noticed drops of sweat on Ottos forehead. When Lucie asked if he still had time, Otto said only that he had an 8:00 p.m. appointment. While Otto rested, Lucie and her guest went downstairs for more coffee and cake. When she returned to wake him at 7:45 p.m., however, Otto was already gone. The hotel owners wife saw Otto leave around 7:30 p.m. and then return. The gears in his official vehicle needed repair. A rental limousine was requested and Otto relaxed drinking a beer until it arrived. Lucie perceived no cause for alarm as Otto never interrupted her during business meetings of any sort. Lucie spent her evening with Prince Louis Ferdinand, his nephew, Prince Leiningen, and a Danish reporter (presumably Hendrik van Bergh).30 Approaching midnight, Lucie grew concerned. Close to 1:00 a.m., Lucie realized that Otto had left his room key behind on the suitcase. Within his suitcase, Lucie found Ottos papers, files, and appointment/address book. She also found his passport and family pictures which he normally carried on his person. (She did not, however, find his personal identity booklet.) She also discovered a note for Otto to telephone Wolfgang Hoffer between 11:0011:30 p.m. at the hotel by the Berlin Zoo. As Lucie assumed Otto had an official evening meeting, it made no sense that he would leave these materials behind in the hotel. At 1:30 a.m., Prince Louis and the reporter arrived at the hotel. Lucie quickly dressed to inquire with them about her husbands whereabouts. They had no idea of Ottos evening arrangements.31 Lucies patience wore thin by early the next morning so she spoke with Ottos secretary, Vera Schwarte, who was staying in the same hotel. Vera contacted Kurt Rheindorf at the Berlin Document Center. A professor of history, Rheindorf served as Ottos historical advisor. Arriving some twenty minutes later, Kurt encouraged Lucie to remain calm as Otto probably spent the night with a friend. It was too soon to contact the police. Lucie thought of Hoffer. When she called him, however, Hoffer said he had no idea of what had become of Otto but he would come over to the hotel. What about the couple from Potsdam? Perhaps this couple engineered Ottos kidnaping? Hoffer encouraged Lucie to inquire with the car rental agency. The driver might know more -- but he could not be found. At 12:00 a.m., Lucie phoned the office in Cologne and spoke with Detlev von Platen and Richard Gerken. They flew to Berlin that same evening. Beginning around 7:00 p.m., Lucie attempted to contact Berlins Police President, Johannes Stumm. Stumm could also not be reached, but she did finally get the vice president, Hans-Georg Urban.32 Gerken, von Platen, and two other officials arrived at 9:00 p.m. They wanted to hear the entire story for themselves. Finally, von Platen asked if she knew a Wolfgang Wohlgemuth? Pulling these threads together, Lucie saw in Wohlgemuth a solution. The two of them, Otto and Wolfgang, may have spent the evening drinking with Wolfgang talking about his many female conquests. Gerken and von Platen asked Lucie to call Wolfgangs office to inquire. Wolfgangs office assistant, A.W., indicated that the doctor was not in and she did not know when to expect his return. She first heard of A.W. back on July 11 when they found a note at their Hohkeppel

hideaway for Otto to call her at a number in Berlin. Given that Wolfgang had been in Hohkeppel the previous day, Lucie did not give it a second thought.33 Lucie did not know why Otto met with Wohlgemuth on the evening of July 20 without saying a thing to her about it. Otto would have known that she would have nothing against such a visit. She felt her relationship with her husband to be a strong one through to the present. His disappearance suggested something clearly out of the ordinary. The evidence against Wolfgang Wohlgemuth appeared to be mounting. Lucie was convinced that Wohlgemuths office assistant, U.G., had placed some drug in Ottos coffee to incapacitate him. U.G., openly jealous regarding Wohlgemuths new female friend, seemed determined to do whatever would endear her to Wolfgang. Lucie felt she was hiding something. Lucie did not see any way Otto would have so carelessly driven into the Soviet zone. In conversation with Claus von Dohnanyi on the evening of July 19, Claus suggested that Otto travel into the East to buy books -- where books were well known to be quite cheap. Otto made clear that he would have to be crazy to travel in the Soviet sector. In addition, when Otto had official business to attend to, he still kept Lucie generally informed.34 Albert Wilhelm Eberhard Radke Albert Radke, who offered his statement of July 30, 1954, had been with the BfV since the beginning. Officially transferred from the Ministry of the Interior in November 1950, Colonel Radke served under Reinhard Gehlen. At the request of the Ministry of the Interior, Gehlen had him transferred to the nascent BfV, which Radke helped build from the ground up. As he understood Johns rise to head the nascent BfV, West German and Allied authorities reviewed a number of candidates before finding one acceptable to the Allies. From the German side, Jakob Kaiser and Josef Mller -- according to Radke -- first recommended John as a candidate. Radke met John once and only briefly before 1945. Within Admiral Canariss Abwehr, Radke met John through Captain Ludwig Gehre, who would hang later for his involvement with the resistance. Radke himself did not belong to the resistance. However, Radkes close contact with individuals who were resulted in his incarceration by the Gestapo after July 20, 1944. Subsequently, Radke was assigned a regiment to command and in March 1945, wounded, landed in an American prisoner of war camp.35 Radke became truly acquainted with John only after he became the head of the BfV. Radkes extensive background in intelligence and Johns general lack of experience complicated matters. In several cases, John did not follow normal procedure and acted on his own. As far as Radke knew, John had never even consulted the BfVs agent files and, thus, no danger existed of his revealing the names of BfV or state-level agents. Additionally, the BfV could say with almost certainty that John had not taken any files with him into the East. The files which he had taken to Berlin had since been returned to Cologne. Radke knew John did not work at night and so the possibilities of copies having been made seemed remote. Radke never suspected that John had been engaged in anything subversive. As for Johns personal contacts with foreigners, Radke knew John had retained extensive ties with his former British friends and Allied intelligence officials. However, these ties were all oriented towards the West. Radke knew of only two exceptions.36 According to Radke, John directed his own undercover agent in the East. Radke learned of Johns undercover agent long after John had taken the initiative. As for the information

gathered from this agent, Radke had serious reservations about its reliability. Radke identified the second exception as Wolfgang zu Putlitz, whose relations with John he had been kept in the dark about until Johns disappearance. Putlitzs letters were handled by John and his secretary, Vera Schwarte, as Johns personal correspondence and only recently discovered among his personal papers. Through another BfV official, Rudolf Merz, Radke learned of Johns using Putlitz to develop contact with Fritz Heine, a member of the executive board of the Social Democratic Party in East Germany.37 In Radkes opinion, Johns behavior did not warrant the fear of his revealing state secrets or endangering the BfV. Furthermore, Johns marriage seemed sound as did his relationship with Lucie, his wife, and his step-daughter. John did not seek, as far as Radke knew, any form of extra-marital or erotic encounters. Radke could not conceive of John having turned traitor. Johns radio broadcasts did not sound like John but like typical East German anti-West propaganda. John never aired a pro-Soviet opinion when Radke had been present. On the other hand, Johns lack of experience in intelligence and as head of a major agency could account for his inclination to lose sight of reality. In one instance, Radke recalled how John accepted a particularly fantastic tale from one of their under cover agents. Rather than seek confirmation of the story, John simply accepted it at face value. Although Radke has been viewed as Reinhard Gehlens man responsible for keeping an eye on John, Radkes extensive experience in intelligence stands at odds with the superficial statement he gave to the police.38 Detlev von Platen Detlev von Platen began his career with the BfV on December 1, 1952. Von Platen flew to Berlin on July 15 at 7:30 a.m. from Cologne-Wahn with Otto and Lucie John. After arriving at Berlin-Tempelhof near 9:00 a.m., they proceeded to the hotel Schtzle in Berlin-Grnwald. Von Platen did not see Otto John again until 8:40 a.m. the following morning when they rode together to the Berlin office of the BfV. Nothing struck von Platen as unusual. His conversation with John centered on the business at hand, namely, the organization of the Berlin office. During their 11:00 a.m. visit to the Berlin Document Center, they met with John Mller, the director of the center, a Mr. Guggenheim, and Kurt Rheindorf. After the discussion, they arranged to meet back at the Schtzle for lunch at 1:30 p.m. which allowed John time to honor his 12:30 p.m. appointment with the governing mayor of Berlin, Walther Schreiber. 39 Beginning with lunch that afternoon, Johns behavior steadily worsened. Over lunch, the group light-heartedly reviewed an article by the Berlin Abendpost. According to the article, the BfV had been unduly influenced by the Allies. In contrast, John perceived in the Berlin Abendpost a clear attack on the BfV. As for alcohol consumption, von Platen reported only a few cocktails and little more. John left around 3:30 p.m. for a meeting with Berlins Senator for the Interior.40 Saturday, July 17, von Platen met John at the Berlin BfV office. John had too much to drink and continued to drink throughout the meeting. Not a social function, this meeting had been called to discuss the gathering of intelligence and deal with personnel questions in the Berlin office. After his fourth glass of beer (and an unspecified volume of coffee), John appeared drunk with his eyes glazed over and his hair stuck to his forehead. John did not seem able to follow the course of the conversation. Von Platen left the office at about 7:15 p.m. for the airport and departed at 8:00 p.m. for Cologne. Upon arrival he telephoned the Berlin office;

they mentioned that John had departed for the Schtzle roughly ten minutes after he had left for the airport.41 Informed of Johns disappearance on July 20, von Platen, accompanied by Kurt Rheindorf and Richard Gerken, flew back to Berlin in a British machine. Upon arrival, von Platen went to the Schtzle where he met with Lucie John, Wolfgang Hoffer (introduced as Herr Engels), and Professor Meckendorf, who revealed Engels to be an American C.I.C. officer to von Platen. Gerken, von Platen, Rheindorf, and Hoffer went to Wohlgemuths clinic and received the by then well-known answers to their questions. As for Hoffers telephone call on July 20, he had intended only to say his farewells before Johns departure. With what facts they had, they then informed the Berlin and Cologne offices of the BfV. On July 22, Gerken and von Platen went to the police where they were joined by Hoffer and the American contact person for the Berlin (Land) office of the BfV, a Mr. Rankin. The following evening, July 23, Gerken and von Platen, flew back to Cologne.42 Kurt Rheindorf Kurt Rheindorf met John during his years as a student. In 1951, John offered him a job as historical advisor to the BfV in matters relating to National Socialism and comparable movements. Rheindorf had gathered some experience when he assisted the Minister of the Interior investigate the Socialist Reich Party and helped the state court in Munich during the Huppenkothen Process. Rheindorf did not hold the position of civil servant in the BfV but as an independent contractor. Since May 1954, Rheindorf had been in the Berlin Document Center doing research for the Ministry of the Interior in preparing for the Friedrich Naumann and Otto Strasser cases. Rheindorf had requested a visit by Otto John to the Document Center in order to better acquaint him with its new director. Rheindorf did not know of Johns trip to Berlin until von Platen informed him of Johns expected arrival in Berlin on July 15. John came to the Center on July 16 around 11:30 a.m. Rheindorf could scarcely comprehend why he had not been invited to this meeting given his own extensive knowledge of the holdings of the Center. Rheindorf did, however, have a lunch appointment with John for 1:30 p.m. at the Schtzle. Although John arrived a bit late, Rheindorf had time to alert John to an article in the Berlin Abendpost in which Gerhard Schrder, the Minister of the Interior, allegedly criticized the Document Center for being heavily influenced by the Allies. Rheindorf interpreted the article as directed against John. Red-faced, John asked his American guests what they understood of the situation. They understood the focal point to be the director of the Center, Dr. Mueller, and Mr. Guggenheim. John thought Schrders comments had been directed against the American High Commissioner.43 Rheindorf did not meet with John again until July 19. John invited him to a 1:00 p.m. lunch at the Schtzle. Alone with John before sitting down, Rheindorf outlined the nature of his research into the Naumann and Strasser cases. Jokingly, Rheindorf mentioned that Johns name had not come up yet. John asked Rheindorf about possible documentation on Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz (Organisation Gehlen/Amt Blank), Theodor Oberlnder (conservative member of the Bundestag), and Viktor-Emanuel Preusker (Minister for Construction). In this context, John commented: Everyone talks about the Communists when in fact the Nazis have already found their way into the government again. At the table, John talked of his desire to visit Berlin more often and of a coming appointment in Berlin with the Allies on July 27. Once their meals

arrived, John reflected on his role in the various war trials, in particular, the Krupp, Wilhelmstrasse (trial of the diplomats), and Manstein processes. Rheindorf knew, however, that John wanted to cloak the true nature of his involvement in these trials in his response to public criticisms of his support for the prosecution. Rheindorf did not hesitate to correct Johns interpretation of his own personal history. Rheindorf reminded John of his, Rheindorfs, presence in the trial chamber and of his access to the trial protocols. On this subject, the conversation stopped and moved on to other issues.44 During lunch, Vera Schwarte presented John with an envelope filled with press clippings on the German resistance and on the continuing Bundestag debate over the BfV. John quickly handed them back with the remark: Not so important. When she reminded him of his Thursday appointments in Cologne, he was clearly irritated and told her to reschedule them for Friday. John volunteered to re-book his flight for Thursday evening. As for Rheindorf, he hoped John would take an interest in the translation of John W. Wheeler-Bennetts book dealing in part with the German resistance. Contrary to Johns initial expressions of interest, John was not moved at all by the projected German translation. When John departed after their lunch, Rheindorf never saw him again.45 On the morning after Johns disappearance, Vera Schwarte phoned Rheindorf by 6:45 a.m. and requested that he come over to the Schtzle. He arrived about an hour later near 7:30 a.m. Trying to calm Lucie, Rheindorf suggested that John probably lost account of the time and fell asleep with some old friends. Lucie asked if Rheindorf knew Hoffer, whom she understood to be a journalist and long time friend of Ottos. Lucie went through a series of names she thought might prove helpful. The only name Rheindorf would remember was Mllenmeister. A short time later, Hoffer showed up at the hotel and Rheindorf learned of his true vocation. Hoffer volunteered to look into the matter. He knew of three individuals in his office who had gone drinking with John at a place called Glocke or Gockel at Uhland Street 47. There was also the matter of Johns meeting with the Hoettlers at 7:30 p.m. Rheindorf knew their son-inlaw, Mr. Sichel, worked with American intelligence, and that their meeting with John had been arranged by a man named Kallenbach, but nothing more. At this point in time, Rheindorf and Hoffer agreed on engaging the officials of the C.I.C. first before involving West German agencies. John may have been robbed, beaten, and left in some ditch or canal. By 1:00 p.m., the consensus moved towards notifying the Berlin police.46 Gerken and von Platen arrived that evening from Cologne. Rheindorf picked up von Platen at Tempelhof while Gerken, having flown in a British plane, had landed elsewhere (presumably Tegel). Before returning to the Schtzle, Gerken checked the private home of an Englishman in Berlin, who claimed to know nothing of the events at hand. Back at the hotel, Hoffer informed Rheindorf and the others that C.I.C. agents had apprehended the taxi-chauffeur, who had picked John up at the hotel. Hoffer wanted the man placed on a lie detector and asked if anyone wanted to take part in the questioning. Rheindorf rejected the suggestion altogether. Rheindorf saw no cause to question the drivers story.47 In the meantime, Lucie called Wohlgemuths clinic the results of which have already been mentioned. Gerken, von Platen, Rheindorf, and Hoffer prepared to go over to the clinic. Gerken had his own reservations about taking Hoffer given his job with the C.I.C. Rheindorf saw this as absurd given that the C.I.C. constituted a friendly intelligence service. Even so, Hoffer made several telephone calls without divulging the nature of the conversations. When

they arrived at the clinic, a vehicle with Swedish markings was parked out front. The vehicle took off just as they arrived.48 Although Rheindorf and Hoffer did not actually go into the clinic, Gerken and von Platen did. Roughly thirty minutes later, they returned to the car and reported on their conversation with the office assistant. Gerken also had the letter which Wohlgemuth had left behind. With this evidence in hand, Gerken telephoned the BfV in Cologne. Hoffer feared the worst and seemed intent on leaving. If John had defected as Hoffer speculated, then Lucie John also knew that John had voluntarily defected. Hoffer continued with this line of reasoning even further. Lucie had been an actress and was perhaps even now putting those skills to use. Asked if John had financial problems or any irregularity in his financial affairs, Rheindorf and von Platen said no. Hoffer seemed determined to remain by his convictions irrespective of Rheindorfs statements to the contrary. Rheindorf was not ready to accept that John could have defected of his own free will.49 Kurt Rheindorf - Otto John Correspondence, 1950-1954 The extensive correspondence between Rheindorf and John reveals a clear friendship between the two men. As a historian and researcher at the Berlin Document Center, Kurt Rheindorf searched for evidence among the materials left behind by Hitlers party and government for answers to questions put to him by various West German government agencies, including the BfV, Otto John, and the West German courts. Rheindorf also traveled whenever necessary to consult the other archival holdings. For example, Rheindorf investigated the backgrounds of individuals leading radical-right wing political movements such as the Socialist Reich Party. In particular, Rheindorf had apparently been directed by John to review the files regarding the activities of the Red Orchestra (often referred to only as the R.K. for Rote Kapelle in his letters) and those involved in the July 20, 1944, plot to kill Hitler. While the letters themselves give away little of the results of Rheindorfs final report, which John received in March 1951, Rheindorf found it necessary to remind John that no restrictions had been placed upon him, Rheindorf, obligating him to preserve the confidentiality of these materials. Given that Rheindorf was not a civil servant, he retained his right to publish the results of his research if he so desired. What motivated this concern remains unclear. Johns personal interest in the German Resistance would have been well-known to Rheindorf. Nevertheless, their correspondence does not include a clear indication of what John hoped Rheindorf would find until May 24, 1951.50 Rheindorfs letter of May 24, 1951, made reference to an SS figure by the name of Martin Sandberger. Sandberger testified after the war on November 19, 1945, regarding the fate of anti-Nazi Germans held in the Berlin Moabit and Charlottenburg (suburb of Berlin) prisons as well as in the cells of the Gestapo on the Prinz Albrecht Street. These prisoners included most of the leading figures of the German Resistance. At Moabit, Sandberger recalled a number of names including Johns brother, Hans Otto. In February 1945, these prisoners were moved to Dachau via Buchenwald and Flossenburg. Fearing these men would fall into the hands of the Americans, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Heinrich Himmlers right hand man, ordered their execution. Marched into the hills for execution on the morning of April 4, 1945, these 100 men were saved by the timely arrival of American troops coming out of Italy. The documents did not, however, necessarily reveal the presence of Johns brother among the survivors.51

Johns interest in Rheindorfs research is clearer. John may have harbored several possible hopes. Could his brother have survived the war? Was Hans Otto a member of the Red Orchestra? Did Wohlgemuth have special knowledge of Johns brothers fate? As a point of pure speculation, were Hans Otto associated with the Red Orchestra and if he survived the war, Hans could have exerted considerable pressure on John. Perhaps the news which Wohlgemuth conveyed to Otto John in early 1954 dealt with Johns brother? If so, what lengths would John have gone to regain contact with him? On a more sinister note, Johns hope that Hans had survived the war, would have been sufficient to manipulate John in various ways. Whether Hans joined the Red Orchestra or not, Hans could have been used as a tool for extracting concessions from Otto John. If Rheindorf suspected Hans had been a member of the Red Orchestra, it would make complete sense that John would not want that information released to the public. No matter which theory proves more attractive, the bottom line remained the same: Johns continued interest in his brothers fate (and possible survival) represented a clear weakness.52 Vera Schwarte Vera served Admiral Canaris for nine years as his secretary. Prior to that, Vera worked for four years in the Foreign Office. Placed under arrest after the July 20, 1944, plot, Vera remained in custody until April 14, 1945. Kidnaped by the Russians in the American sector in September 1945, she remained in Russian hands for roughly two months before being released. Until leaving Berlin in December 1950, Vera felt that she had been under constant observation by Soviet authorities. As for Otto John, she first met him in Cologne and did not recall him as being connected with the resistance to the best of her knowledge. She was finally offered a job in Bonn by Graf Schwerin in the newly created BfV. In her statement of August 5, 1954, Vera turned immediately to the events of July 20, 1954. As Johns secretary, she had been privy to Johns personal and professional activities. As for the events in Berlin, John planned his travel to Berlin three months earlier for the purpose of visiting (perhaps accurately inspecting) the local office of the BfV and the Land office as well. His plans were interrupted by his trip to the United States on June 18, 1954. After his return from the United States, John received his invitation to take part in the ceremonies commemorating the participants in the July 29, 1944, plot to kill Hitler. Shortly before his departure, Johns American contact officer, a Mr. Hughes, asked John to contact Allied representatives in Berlin. As far as Vera knew, these men had come from Stuttgart (the location of the American Counter Intelligence Corps). Vera also expected John would also be meeting with Josef Mller, Kurt Rheindorf, and the Hoettlers, whose son-in-law, a Mr. Sichel, John had met in America. Additionally, Vera knew of Johns private correspondence with Wohlgemuth and Elisabeth Nehlsen. These letters were kept in the office safe. John had spoken to Vera of Wohlgemuth in 1954. John described him to Vera as an Edelkommunist and somewhat crazy but a good doctor nonetheless.53 After John and von Platen flew to Berlin on July 15, Vera accepted an American offer to fly her at their cost to Berlin on July 19 to allow her to take part in the same commemoration ceremonies. Vera walked into the Schtzle around 3:00 p.m. that afternoon. Over coffee, Vera, John, and Kurt Rheindorf discussed press clippings Vera had brought with her for John. As the conversation drifted to travel plans, John asked Vera to book his flight back to Cologne for July 22 as his meeting with the Americans had taken more time than he expected. John had

planned to be back in Berlin again on July 27 and in Munich on July 30.54 During the first round of ceremonies, Vera noticed a clear change in Johns mood during the ceremony. Vera caught up with the Johns again during the reception organized by the Berlin Senate in Gerhus in Berlin-Grnwald. The Johns left the reception around 10:00 p.m. for the Schtzle hotel. The party back at the hotel lasted through 2:00 a.m. Vera also remembered three other items of possible interest. First, John asked Annedore Leber to help him get tickets for an event associated with the up-coming Social Democratic Party convention. Second, John mentioned his conversation with Federal President Theodor Heuss about recruiting a particular candidate for the BfV. Third and finally, John spoke of a garden in Berlin where allegedly writings from the war years by the resistance were buried.55 Vera described John as closed. His style of office management was impersonal, unconventional, and unbureaucratic. He refused to allow co-workers to refer to him as Herr President and always found time to help his old friends. John would not allow his co-workers extended contact with him. Vera knew John could not hold his alcohol and often finished his drinks quickly. Although John never appeared drunk during official meetings, he most certainly did occasionally appear under the influence of alcohol. In such circumstances, John reverted to a more child-like state, for example, yodeling during an office party. In his relationship with Lucie, John seemed quite happy. Vera knew of no instance where John had been unfaithful or demonstrated any homosexual inclinations.56 Searching Otto Johns Office Safe Vera Schwarte no doubt raised expectations of what authorities would find in Otto Johns office safe. However, it was not opened until August 10, 1954, or almost three weeks after Johns disappearance. The official purpose behind opening the safe had been to return important office documents to proper circulation. The list of documents gave some indication of Otto Johns personal involvement in BfV activities as well as an indication of the nature of its responsibilities. A number of folders were devoted to correspondence. There were specific files for the Schleicher case, the Nauman Circle, conversations with Kurt Rheindorf, and materials for the Berlin office. One folder contained unresolved official matters. These included specific cases under investigation by the BfV, records of conversations, and special events. In addition, there were folders dealing with the Blank office (Dienststelle Blank) as well as reports on discussions with the Chancellory, the Ministry of the Interior, the Criminal Police, Ministry of Justice, intelligence officials of the British, Americans, and French, as well as with the directors of the Land level offices for the protection of the constitution. Another folder included notes from a cooperative effort between the Foreign Office in Bonn and events in Yugoslavia. Other folders included the key terms Holland and Switzerland. Another folder held materials from a meeting between the Ministry of the Interior and Allied Security Directors. As these documents suggested, the interests of the BfV extended well beyond the borders of the Federal Republic of Germany. 57 A Reactionary Right Long before the creation of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, all three Western Allies actively worked to eliminate reactionary groups, including, the Bavarian Homeland and Royalist Party in the American zone, Heinrich Leuchtgen's National Democratic

Party in the American and French zones, and the German Conservative Party-German Right Party in the British zone. Generally, undesirable political groups were either prohibited, purged of politically unacceptable personalities, forced out of existence, or fused with existing parties. Although the Allied presence cast a strong shadow over the developing party system, Allied policies on political parties forced Germans to rethink long-held notions of political parties and move towards the notion of catch-all parties, which had not been part of a German political consciousness before 1945. Popular acceptance of these measures is supported by various postwar opinion polls. Nevertheless, right-wing political groups/parties dotted the political landscape in postwar western Germany.58 Placing Otto John Affair into this Context Evidence existed demonstrating Otto Johns commitment to rooting out spies. Johns BfV had uncovered Ludwig Weiss, a high-placed government administrator, as a spy for Polish intelligence. Weiss would serve a four year sentence for his efforts. Within the Blank Office, the BfV revealed two additional Polish agents. Under Johns direction, the BfV exposed the entire East German Institut fr wirtschafts-wissenschafts Forschung as a massive spy-ring. As for Johns trip to the United States, it had nothing to do with military affairs and had taken place under the supervision of American intelligence.59 Johns personal files did not leave much to go on. There were no written recommendations within these files for his selection as president of the BfV. Within these same files was also a brief explanation of how John came to be the West German nomination for the newly created Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. According to this report, nine candidates were considered: Werner Jakobi, Franz Thedieck, Reinhard Gehlen, SchneiderOlpe, Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz, Martini, Admiral Conrad Patzig, Fabian von Schlagrendorf, and Freiherr von Fritsch. Johns candidacy was first discussed on November 14, 1950, with the Allied Security Directors. The Allied Security Directors (Shute, General Haydon, and Cotony) had no reservations about Johns candidacy. There was also Globkes letter of December 19, 1950, clearly stating that Der Herr Bundeskanzler ist damit einverstanden, dass Dr. John mit der kommissarischen Leitung betraut wird. Another letter dated December 11, 1950, placed John in his new position effective as of December 1, 1950. Nevertheless, Dr. John didnt formally began his duties as head of the BfV until November 13, 1951.60 Gehlen and Heinz often struggled in their relationships with Johns BfV. Heinz moved into the Blank Office (Amt Blank) in late 1953 and established the West German military intelligence service. Heinzs background could not have endeared him to John. Heinz had been a conservative nationalist, a supporter of the Kapp Putsch, and a member of the Nazi Storm Troops (SA). However, Heinz also worked under Admiral Canaris and became an active member of the resistance during the war. While Gehlens commitment to fighting communism could hardly be questioned, his image as a defender of democracy was weak at best. Gehlen and Heinz led organizations which investigated all aspects of espionage, including communist front organizations active on West German territory. A regular bump into the domain of Johns BfV seemed a foregone conclusion.61

Sefton Delmer Writing for the London Daily Express, Sefton Delmer, Johns former boss in the Political Warfare Office, revealed after Johns defection several documented attempts by the Soviets to lure John into the East and to work with them. During his visit with John in March 1954, John relayed to him that Wolfgang zu Putlitz had attempted to recruit him for the East. Putlitz had been a German diplomat and spy who went over to the Soviets. Putlitz assured John that he would be welcomed in the East and well treated. According to Delmer, John rebuffed this and all such attempts. Furthermore, John notified British intelligence of von Putlitzs presence and activities in West Germany.62 As Delmer understood the events of July 20, 1954, John had arranged to meet with two officials with British intelligence at the Maison de France for dinner. Dropped off at the Maison de France, John never went inside but walked a bit further to Uhland Street where he met up with Wolfgang Wohlgemuth. Three days later on July 23, John explained his decision over East German radio. For Delmers ears, Johns radio broadcast from East Berlin carried the same click and clang of typical Communist propaganda. John sounded tired and his voice faltered. Contrary to the line accepted by most journalists, Delmer did not believe Johns radio broadcast constituted proof of his alleged voluntary defection to the East. Everything Delmer knew about Otto John contradicted the message John broadcast.63 Otto Johns Second Press Conference Otto John took to the podium again on August 11, 1954, in response to Adenauers August 6 speech. The entire press conference later appeared under the title Ich whlte Deutschland (1954). Laced with traditional anti-West invectives, Johns broadcast did not strike listeners in the West as anything other than traditional East German political propaganda. Underscoring his voluntary participation in this press conference, John went so far as to suggest that it had been called on his initiative. His purpose in calling this press conference had been to respond to the western press. John labeled absurd claims that he had worked for the East for years. John accused the West Germans of putting aside the cause of reunification for furthering the careers of former Nazis (John referred to this as renazification) and assisting the United States in preparing a political and military crusade against Communism. The Organization Gehlen and the Blank Office were heavily staffed with former SS and SD officials, John alleged. Within this context, John interpreted the European Defense Community as setting the stage for a war against the East by a European -- read German -- proxy. Responding to questions about his recent visit to the United States and with Allen Dulles in the Pentagon, John believed Americans driven by an hysterical fear-psychosis (hysterischen Angstpsychose) which propelled preparations for the war against Communism. Overall, John appeared determined to remain in the East and that his decision to defect had been entirely voluntary. 64 Back to the European Continent The day after the press conference, August 12, Soviet officials escorted Otto John to Schnefeld airport in East Berlin. John climbed on board the awaiting Dakota and flew to Moscow. During his first twelve days, John stayed in a small town outside Moscow,

specifically, Serebjany Bor. While John seemed to have forgotten where he stayed in his own memoirs, he did recall the extravagant efforts of Soviet authorities to provide him with everything he needed. After almost two weeks, the Soviets sent him to Gagra, a resort town on the Black Sea. After a few days, it was time to get down to business.65 Dr. Otto Johns Ich whlte Deutschland Otto Johns Ich whlte Deutschland carried all the trade marks of East German propaganda but it also carried the name of West Germanys former chief of counter-intelligence. Published by the Ausschuss fr Deutsche Einheit (Committee for German Unity), it contained a brief history of Otto Johns life, a transcript of the press conference held shortly after Johns appearance in East Berlin, reprints of newspaper headlines recounting the various rumors of Johns disappearance, and letters from allegedly sympathetic parties. Combined with his exposure to journalists from a number of western European news agencies, John, in their reports, did not appear to have acted under duress or to have been under the influence of drugs or alcohol.66 On the other hand, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency offered an alternative image of Otto John at this time. In a report dated January 28, 1955, John Peet, a British journalist who defected to the Communist bloc, stated that he is helping Otto John write a book presumably Ich whlte Deutschland. Peet remarked that John is frequeantly so thoroughly intoxicated that his conversation becomes unintelligible.67 Otto Johns September 29, 1954, Radio Broadcast John responded to the furor in the Bundestag over his departure via East German radio. John interpreted the recent Bundestag debate about his defection as evidence of a severe political crisis within the Federal Republic. West Germans, John held, sustained dangerous illusions about the foreign and domestic politics of the Adenauer government. The people remained unaware of the growing dangers behind West German rearmament and the problem of reunification. A line of thinking reminiscent of Adolf Hitler, the policy could well lead to war. America had already provoked a war with Korea. American policy in West Germany included the integration of former Wehrmacht generals into the ranks of the American military. Militarism ruled the day, John declared. The European Defense Community, consequently, represented another aspect of American policy in Europe in pursuit of continued remilitarization.68 Otto Johns Office Safe Otto Johns safe revealed another interesting document composed shortly after his trip to the United States. Within his short essay, Verfassungsschutz in der Bundesrepublik (Protecting the Constitution in the Federal Republic), John outlined his ideas about the character of West German society and politics. The Ministry of the Interior took Johns statement to the press on August 11, 1954. Although the essay dealt at length with various pieces of legislation, its core could be gleamed from an early paragraph: The dangers of political contamination are not yet recognized in the Federal Republic despite the bitter experiences with the National Socialism and the enormous Communist efforts pushing for the Bolshevization of Germany and the world. Only a society completely unaware of the refined

means and methods used to promote radical anti-democratic ideologies offers a possible explanation. The greater part of the population in the Federal Republic refuses to face the consequences of political contamination and remains apathetic towards state arrangements working for their defense. This statement and Johns recent press conference in East Berlin convinced the Ministry of the Interior that John had become a traitor.69 Otto Johns Alleged Weaknesses Another area under investigation had been Johns alleged homosexual activities. Baron Friedrich von Oppenheim recalled Johns behavior from late 1953 (October-November) in Colognes Atelier restaurant where John drank to the point that he could no longer stand and had to be carried from the restaurant. Oppenheim added that John had never been 100% sober. In December 1953 en route to England by ship, Oppenheim reflected again on Johns extensive drinking habits. As Oppenheim described it, John suffered from a Nazi-Komplex. Everywhere he looked, he saw Nazis and their increasing influence. Oppenheim summed up his view of John as follows: Dr. John is very unstable. He came into his post when he was too young and lacked the necessary experience.70 The American Estimate Originating with the American Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) in Heidelberg, Robert Shea passed the American Estimate of the Dr. Otto John Case on July 25, 1954, on to the West Germans. The reports conclusion read: It may be that John was a fool who got caught in a well-baited trap. That such a thing should happen is fantastic and can only be explained on the basis of Johns known character traits, plus the fact that less than two weeks ago a large number of prominent West German and Berlin protestant politicians circulated freely in the Sovzone in connection with the Leipzig Kirchentag (including militant anti-communists such as Tillmans, Ehlers and Metzger). John very likely overestimated his own position to the extent of believing that the Soviets would not dare harm him; he took a miscalculated risk in the pursuit of bait put up by persons who evaluated correctly Johns psychology and his desire to score a major personal coup following heavy attacks on his office in the recent Bundestag debates. No evidence for the use of drugs had been found. As for a post-hypnotic suggestion, the Americans present placed no faith in this theory at all. Overall, Johns actions were inconsistent with what was known of his personality.71 British Sources The Office of the British High Commission responded to similar questions put to them by State Secretary Ritter von Lex on October 28, 1954. According to British sources, John arrived in the United Kingdom via Lisbon in October-November 1944. Interned through November 11, 1944, John worked in the German division of the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) under Sefton Delmer. In June 1945, the PWE merged with the Political Information Department (PID) and came under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office. In February 1946, John was transferred to the German division within the Prisoners of War division of the PID. The PID, in turn, passed into the hands of the Control Commission for Germany and Austria on July 1, 1946. Johns work with German POWs continued through May 31, 1948, at which time John severed his ties

with British authorities. Hope underscored one final point: John had not worked with British intelligence.72 The Case Against Otto John In August 1956, a federal prosecutor presented the court in Karlsruhe with a 100-page indictment of the former president of the BfV. John would be tried on the charge of treason. The indictment covered Otto Johns career, personal life, and psychiatric condition were all studiedincluding the possible problems with alcoholism and propensity for homosexual disposition. Johns relationship with Wohlgemuth received special attention. The evidence outlined Johns contributions to East German propaganda efforts against West Germany. In a series of press conferences, John continued the line of thought first presented over the airwaves and released later in Ich whlte Deutschlands. Whether compeltely true or not, Otto John had served East German propaganda efforts and evoked a serious controversy in West Germany. In return for his support, East German authorities provided him with a villa in Berlin-Schmckwitz, an office from the Committee for German Unity in the same building with the National Council of the National Front, a personal body-guard, and placed a vehicle at his disposal. In addition, John directed a number of personal letters to West German politicians, including Jakob Kaiser and Parliamentary President Eugen Gerstenmaier. Paralleling his radio broadcasts and newspaper accounts, John criticized the insane plans for West Germanys remilitarization. Within these letters, John described the proposed 500,000 man West German army as simply a new Wehrmacht leading to the creation of a military state. Arranged by the National Front for a Democratic Germany, John made comparable presentations in Schwerin, Wismar, Neubrandenburg, Brandenburg, Thale, Erfurt, Gotha, Pssneck, Arnstadt, Altenburg, and East Berlin. He spoke to more than 500 university students and professors in Jena, at the Professors Club in Leipzig, and at East Berlins Humbolt University. John spoke in Weimar during the Schiller festival and during commemoration ceremonies at the Buchenwald concentration camp. The East German press followed up with articles outlining Johns presentations. Circumstanial or not, the evidence proved damning. The court concurred and found John guilty of treason.73 An Alternative Approach: Forschungsbeirat fr Fragen der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands In a closed session in Berlins Bundeshaus on March 24, 1952, Jakob Kaiser presided over the opening meeting of the Forschungsbeirat fr Fragen der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands. Consistent with Kaisers own aspirations to sustain a bridge with East Germany, the council existed to address two basic issues: to prepare a future economic program for the day when unity was achieved alongside a comprehensive and reliable balancing of the East German economy. Despite obvious political ties with Kaisers Bundesministerium fr gesamtdeutsche Fragen, Franz Thedieck played a key role in the new councils actual functioning. For the purpsoes of this article, the councils reports, planning, and data could well have served as an additional catalyst and possible explanation for Otto Johns actions. Despite the absence of the BfV in the documentation, the trend suggested a growing apprehension regarding Soviet reforms within the SBZ, including both agricultural and industrial reforms. Placed within the context of

June 17, 1953, German unity appeared an increasingly distant goal. Adenauer may have been resigned to Germanys division but probably not Kaiser and, possibly, Otto John.74 After Otto Johns appearance in East Berlin in July 1954, however, he made no mention in any of the aforementioned asctivities of this possible link with Kaisers Forschungsbeirat. Instead, it appears John joined the ranks of East German Socialist Unity Party members on the East German Committee for German Unity. According to the Archiv Friesdorf in Bad Godesberg, East German press reports, inclunding Neues Deutschland, announced the committees existence back in January 1954. Criticized as exercising little more than a propaganda function, as of late July 1954, its rank-and-file included both Field Marshall von Paulus and Otto John. Johns plethora of speaking engagements seemed ample opportunity to make a connection between the two groups. Nothing ever emerged.75 Conclusions So, why did Otto John go into East Berlin? The preponderance of the evidence weighs in against a simple defection or the victim of a kidnapping. Rather, it appears he went over voluntarily. Once there, Soviet and German authorities apparently wanted to keep him. John, however, cooperated extensively with his public speaking tours and radio broadcasts. Nothing in Johns past played a role in his public presentations. In sum, the preponderance of the evidence favors a simpler conclusion: Given the context of his decision to go into East Berlin, two key threads merge within the July 20th ceremonies. First, despite his links with the German Resistance, John remained a minor player. Johns actions in wartime exile and during the Nuremberg Trials provide repeated attempts to enhance his own sense of place in history. Second, despite his rise in the West German administration, John seemed anxious to prove his worth. Events provoked an emotional response to a deep-seated insecurity. Once in the East, however, Johns actions suggest again the possible belief in playing a more central role in guiding affairs through his public image. When that failed to pan out, he wanted to return to the West. After returning to the West, Otto John devoted the rest of his life seeking his own rehabilitation.
1 2

Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung. Band 7. 1954 (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1993), pp. 333-334. Rebecca West, The New Meaning of Treason (New York: Ballantine, 1964 (1947)). John O. Koehler, Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), p. 166. Hansjoachim Tiedge, Der berlufer: Eine Lebensbeichte (Berlin: Das Neue Berlin Verlagsgesellschaft, 1998), pp. 41, 94, 102, 205, and 207. Michaela W. Richter, The Verfassungsschutz (Washington: AICGS German Issues, 1998), p. 45. 3 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/15490, American Military Tribunal, June 8-9, 1948 (Militrgerichtshof Nr. III, Fall X,... Nuremberg, Germany, [8-]9 June 1948. 9-12:00 a.m.) Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Nachlass Kurt Rheindorf, N1263/353. 4 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Bundesministerium des Innern, B106/15490. 5 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/15490, American Military Tribunal, June 8-9, 1948 (Militrgerichtshof Nr. III, Fall X,... Nuremberg, Germany, [8-]9 June 1948. 9-12:00 a.m. Otto John, Falsch und zu spt. Der 20. Juli 1944. Epilogue (Munich, 1984). 6 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Bundesministerium des Innern, B106/15490 and Nigel West, MI6: British Secret Intelligence Operations, 1909-1945 (New York: Random House, 1983), pp. 187-189, and Philip Knightley, The Master Spy (New York: Vintage, 1990), pp. 108-109. For additional insights into how British authorities handled German POWs see Heiner Wembers Umerziehung im Lager: Internierung und Bestrafung von Nationalsozialisten in der britischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands (Koblenz: Klartext, 1991). 7 Bundesgesetzblatt, (Bonn : Bundesanzeiger-Verlags-GmbH., [1959]), pp. 682. 8 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B136/1755, and Walter Imle, Zwischen Vorbehalt und Erfordernis. Eine historische Studie zur Entstehung des nachrichtendienstlichen Verfassungsschutzes nach 1945 (Munich: tuduv-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1984), p. 289.

Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B136/1755. United States, National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD), American Embassy Madrid to Department of State, February 14, 1951, and American Embassy Bogota to Department of State, December 7, 1950. 10 United States, National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD), American Embassy (Bonn) to Department of State (Washington, D.C.), December 16, 1955. 11 Ibid. 12 Otto John, Falsch und zu spt. Der 20. Juli 1944. Epilogue (Munich, 1984), Zweimal kam ich heim. Vom Verschwrer zum Schtzer der Verfassung (Dsseldorf-Wien, 1969), and Twice Through the Lines (New York: Harper and Row, 1969). 13 Otto John, Twice Through the Lines (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 158-159. 14 Bob de Graaff, The Stranded Baron and the Upstart at the Crossroads: Wolfgang zu Putlitz and Otto John, Intelligence and National Security Vol. 6, No. 4 (1991), pp. 669-700, and Wolfgang zu Putlitz, The Putlitz Dossier (London: Allan Wingate, 1957), pp. 220-224. 15 Ibid. 16 David E. Murphy, Sergei Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War (1997), pp. 185-201. 17 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/63053. 18 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/63053, In dem Ermittlungsverfahren gegen Dr. Wohlgemuth wegen Freiheitsberaubung in staatsfhrdender Absicht u.a. erscheint die Zeugin [Lucie] John ... Kln, den 28. Juli 1954. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/63053, In dem Ermittlungsverfahren gegen Dr. Wohlgemuth wegen Freiheitsberaubung in staatsfhrdender Absicht u.a. erscheint die Zeugin [Lucie] John ... Kln, den 28. Juli 1954. Otto Johns activities were also observed by von Dohnanyis widow and son, their statement to the states attorney on August 7, 1954, did not significantly add to the details of the events at hand. This statement is also part of B106/63053. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/63053, In dem Ermittlungsverfahren gegen u.a. ... Albert Wilhelm Eberhard Radke ... Kln, den 30. Juli 1954. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/63053, Verhandelt ... Detlev von Platen ... Bonn, dem 2.8. 1954 and [Witness] ... Detlev von Platen ... Bonn, den 4. August 1954. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/63053, [Witness] Kurt Rheindorf ... Bonn, den 4. August 1954. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Bundesarchiv, Nachlass Kurt Rheindorf, N1263/350. For an interesting German perspective, see Walter Schellenbergs Hitlers Secret Service (New York: Harper, 1977). Schellenberg served as the Heinrich Himmlers specialist for foreign intelligence. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid.

53 54

Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/63053, [Witness] Wera Schwarte ... Bonn, den 5. August 1954. Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/63053, Aus dem Panzerschrank Dr. Johns ... Kln, den 10. August 1954. 58 Maria Mitchell, "Materialism and Secularism: CDU Politicians and National Socialism, 1945-1949," The Journal of Modern History, Volume 67, Number 2, June 1995. Daniel E. Rogers, Politics after Hitler: The Western Allies and the German Party System (New York: New York University Press, 1995). Office of the Military Government, United States, Office of the Political Advisor, "Report No. 131. 4 August 1948. Opinion Surveys Branch," POLAD 820/6 (Bundesarchiv, Koblenz), and Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1947-1966 (Bonn: Allensbach, 1967). Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS), Files of the Office of the Director of Intelligence (ODI) 7/20-3/70, "Report on Nazi Underground Organizations," dated February 1947 (Bundesarchiv, Koblenz). These groups included the Danube (composed for former German intelligence personnel), the Armee der Rache, Odessa, Dach, Sturmgruppe Nordwest, and Vierundvierzig (appealing to former Schutzstaffel and Wehrmacht members), one composed of former members of the Strm Abteilungen (SA), two for former Luftwaffe personnel (Skylark and the Green Devils), as well as others composed of the disgruntled and the young, for example, the Proppen Club, Schwarze Adler, Sonnenrad Division, and SOMA. Konrad Adenauer, Teegesprche 1950-1954 (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1984), p. 652. Nicht-etablierte Kleinparteien," in Alf Mintzel and Heinrich Oberreuter's (Hrsg.) Parteien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fr politische Bildung, 1992), p. 369-70. Uwe Backes/Eckhard Jesse, Politscher Extremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: Bundeszentrale fr politische Bildung, 1993), pp. 299-300. 59 Henning Khler, Adenauer: Eine politische Biographie (Propylen, 1994), p. 841. 60 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/63055. For more information about Franz Thediecks past see Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Nachlass Jakob Kaiser, N1018/89. 61 Schwarz, Hans-Peter, Die ra Adenauer 1949-1957 (1991), pp. 236-239, and Reinhard Gehlen, Verschlusache (Mainz: v. Hase & Koehler Verlag, 1980), pp. 49-55. 62 Sefton Delmer, Die Deutschen und ich (1962), pp. 692-712. Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B136/1755. 63 Sefton Delmer, Die Deutschen und ich (1962), pp. 692-712. 64 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Amtszeit Theodor Heuss, B122/192, and Otto John, Ich whlte Deutschland (1954), pp. 3-5. See also Rolf Steininger, Eine vertane Chance: die Stalin-Note vom 10. Mrz 1952 und die Wiedervereinigung: eine Studie auf der Grundlage unverffentlichter britischer und amerikanischer Akten (Berlin : J.H.W. Dietz, 1985). Otto John, Ich whlte Deutschland (1954), pp. 14-28. See also Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Nachlass Kurt Rheindorf, N1263/354. 65 Sefton Delmer, Die Deutschen und ich (1962), pp. 704-50, and Otto John, Twice Through the Lines (1969), pp. 258-271. 66 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Nachlass Kurt Rheindorf, N1263/354. 67 Central Intelligence Agency, FOIA Documents, Reference: F-1998-01676, Released July 2002. 68 Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, B106/63055. 69 Bundesarchiv Zwischenarchiv (Sankt Augustin), VS - B106/143. The German text is as follows: Die Gefahr der politschen Volksverseuchung sind in der Bundesrepublik trotz der bitteren Erfahrungen mit dem Nationalsozialismus and trotz der ungeheueren und ungeheuerlichen kommunistischen Bestrebungen nach der Bolschewisierung Deutschlands und der Welt noch nicht richtig erkannt. Nur eine vllige Ahnungslosigkeit gegenber den raffinierten Mitteln und Methoden der radikalen anti-demokratischen Ideologien kann eine Erklrung dafr sein, dass der allergrsste Teil der Bevlkerung in der Bundesrepublik der politischen Volksverseuchung gegenber so gleichgiltig und den zu ihrer Abwehr geschlaffenen staatlichen Einrichtungen so ablehnend gegenbersteht. Es muss sehr viel mehr getan werden, um die Bevlkerung in der Bundeserpublik davon zu berzeugen, dass auch der Schutz der politischen Volksgesundheit eine notwendige staatliche Aufgabe ist, ab deren Erfllung alle im eigensten Interesse nach Krften mitwirken sollten. 70 Bundesarchiv Zwischenarchiv (Sankt Augustin), VS - B106/142. Oppenheims statement: Dr. John sei sehr labil. Er sei zu jung in seine Stellung gekommen und sei ihr nicht gewachsen gewesen. Da er gemerkt habe, dass ihm in Bonn die Felle wegschimmen und die Englnder sich von ihm distanzierten, habe er die Nerven verloren und nicht mehr ein noch aus gewusst. Hinzu komme die Einwirkung des Eriegnisses der Berliner Tage auf seine sensible Natur. Mglicherweise habe er dort auch Alkohol getrunken gehabt. 71 Archiv fr Christlich-Demokratische Politik (Sankt Augustin), Nachlass Gerhard Schrder, I-483/ 083/3, Affre John/Schmidt-Wittmack 19541957. Bundesarchiv Zwischenarchiv (Sankt Augustin), VS - B106/142. United States, National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD), Parkman (Berlin) to Secretary of State, July 21, 1954, and Cecil B. Lyon to Elbrick, July 22, 1954. 72 Ibid and Otto John, Twice Through the Lines (1972), p. 177. 73 Bundesarchiv Zwischenarchiv (Sankt Augustin), VS - B106/142. 74 Bernd Adolf Idstein, Die Anfnge des Forschungsbeirat fr Fragen der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands, in Deutschland Archiv 28. Jg. 1995. S. 1048-1064. Bundesarchiv (Koblenz), B137/I-30. 75 Bundesarchiv (Koblenz), B137/I-7. Betr.: Auschuss fr Deutsche Einheit, Archiv Friesdorf (Bad Godesberg) to Link, 16 October 1954, and Vermerk. Betr. Auschuss fr Deutsche Einheit, Berlin W.8. Friedrichstr. 119/121. 31.7.1954.