www.ordnungspolizei.

org

MASSIMO ARICO

“WEG DER VERNICHTUNG”

Minsk, September 1, 1941
Fragezeichen auf Fragenzeichen gab es,
ohne daß der Berg von Schuld kleiner wurde.
Was übrigblieb,
müssen ganze Serien schlechter Gewissen,
nicht nur schlechter Gedächtnisse sein.

From an article of the Rheinische Merkur, 1963

INTRODUCTION
Daumanstrasse, Schirokaja-Strasse, Masyukovshchina, Drosdy, Puschkin-Kaserne, Maly
Trostenez……
As of July 1941 the names of these roads, villages and places, all located in the urban area of
Minsk or in its immediate vicinity, began to appear more and more frequently in the reports
issued by the units that had been tasked with securing their areas or managing their facilities:
usually, regular Wehrmacht units or, even, Wacht or Landesschutzen-Bataillone or detachments
of the Sichereitspolizei 1.

Wikimedia – Bundesarchiv – Aerial view of Minsk, 1941

And this happened we are
talking about temporary
camps, compulsory work
sites, POW camps, jails
and extermination centers,
that formed a unique
concentrationary network,
in which tens thousands of
civilians, prisoners of war,
communists and servants
of the former Soviet
administation had been
locked up, since the days
following the entrance in
Minsk of the first German
troops, on 28 June 1941 2.
And obviously and
rightfully, the Jewish
ghetto soon became a
part of such a repressive
and destructive universe.

I. PREAMBLES
The decision to estabilish the Jewish ghetto of Minsk was taken autonomously at the initiative
of the local Feldkommandatur 812 (Oberstleutnant Karl Schlegelhofer), by order issued on 19
July 1941, that is, just a few weeks before the shifting of powers, in Western Belorussia
including Minsk, from the Wehrmacht Military Administration, to the civil rule of the
Generalkommissar Wilhelm Kube (31 August).
According Schlegelhofer, all the Jews still living in Minsk – about 85.000 peoples – had to move
to a slum area, North-West of the town close to the old Jewish cemetery, within five days from
the issuing of the order 3. At the same time, the Judenrat was established and tasked with the
registration of the expected residents or, at least, those who had survived the first decimation

2
of the alleged communists and “intellectuals” and of the so-called anti-German elements,
carried out in the internment camp of Drosdy, towards the beginning of July 4.
Consequently, whether since that moment the executions perpetrated in Minsk during the early
weeks of July had had a somewhat “improvised” and uncoordinated charachter, or determined
by specific conditions, well, after the establishment of the ghetto the result was obtained to
concentrate a whole category of potential victims (the Jews), within the circumscribed
boundaries of a real “free-fire zone”: in July 1941 the city of Minsk became the focal point
(Schwehrpunkt) of the persecutory activities, selection and annihilation policies, perpetrated in
Belorussia by the EGB 5, in close cooperation with the Ordnungspolizei units, kindly offered by
the HSSPF Erich von dem Bach; among these there was the Polizei-Bataillon 322, two
companies of which, had just entered the town.

Wikimedia – Bundesarchiv – Jews in Minsk, 1941

After which, thanks to the
shifting of powers to the Civil
Administration, the various
police bodies were able to
define – once and for all –
their own specific
jurisdictions as far as the
ideological and annihilation
war was concerned: a
jurisdiction that, previously
and until that moment, had
been shared – even
efficaciously – with the
Wehrmacht security units.
It has been clearly
ascertained in fact that, apart
from rare exceptions 6, most
of the genocidal actions
perpetrated in Belorussia
during July and August 1941
– as well as in the subsequent months – were carried out through the coordinated use of both
the Sichereits- and the Ordnungspolizei units: and this happened also thanks to the direct
intervention of the highest SS and Police authorities, that in in that stage were fully engaged
with frequent inspections to the units.
Infact, as in Bialystok and Brest Litowsk had already happened on 12 and 13 July, and as it
would have occurred in Mogilev on 19 October, even in Minsk the intervention of a upper
authority (Daluege in this case), had a direct relation with the subsequent implementation of a
slaughter: a slaughter that, as we will see later, in no way was “justified” by any military or
security logic, but conversely it followed a tout-court genocidal perspective, and that just for
this reason, probably required a further outer “encouragment”.
And this “encouragment” punctually arrived on 29 August , with the meeting in Minsk between
the Chef der Ordnungspolizei, Kurt Daluege and the HSSPF von dem Bach, following which, the
next day, an order was dispatched to Gottlieb Nagel, the commander of the Polizei-Bataillon
322, concerning the preparation of a Jewish action in the ghetto, in coordination with the SS-
Obersturmbannführer Hans-Hermann Koch of the EGB 7: an action that – once informed the
commanders of the companies 1/322 and 3/322 – was launched on 31 August 1941.

II. AUSTRIA FELIX

That which was called to perpetrate the first “reduction” of the ghetto of Minsk was an Austrian
battalion with German cadres, formed in Vienna-Kagran on 15 April 1941, from a three-
companies training unit, that since its entry in the Soviet territory – between 5 and 6 July 1941
– had had the opportunity to show its genocidal tendencies, carrying out the second massacre
of the Jewish community of Bialystok (12 July) 8. This was the structure of the battalion in
August 1941:

Bataillon-Stab: Maj. Gottlieb Nagel, Adj. Oltn. Josef Uhl;

3
Kraftfahrzeugstaffel: Hptm. Frömsdorf;
Nachrichtenzug;
1/322: Hptm. Reinhold Jörke;
2/322: Hptm. Sigfried Binz (since July 1941);
3/322: Oltn. Gerhard Riebel.

The events that happened in the subsequent hours, retraces a well-experimented plot, with
monotonous analogy.
On 31 July, while the personnel of the 3/322 was engaged in the cordoning of the ghetto, the
policemen of the 1/322, together with officers of the Sipo and a NSKK company, carried out a
door-to-door rounding up of the Jews between 15 and 60 years, which often with lashes and
sticks 9 were pushed up to a square, previously bombed – probably the inner courtyard of the
prison of Minsk – where most of the women with the childrens, were soon separated from their
men, and later ordered to back home: the exception was a group of 64 women that,
apparently, would have been caught, within their homes, without the yellow star. After which,
about 700 Jews remained under surveillance in the prison of Minsk, where they spent their last
night 10.

Fair use Yad Vashem Archives – www.yadvashem.org – Jews in Minsk, 1943

That same evening, coming
from Bereza Kartuska, also
the 2/322 arrived in Minsk,
so much so that it was
assigned, the following day,
to reinforce the depleted
ranks of the battalion, that
had been weakened by an
unusually high percentage of
sick (79, about 16% of the
total 11).
According to what was
verified by the Court of
Friburg during the
proceeding against Uhl,
Riebel and Hülsemann,
towards evening of August
31, the battalion Adjutant
Uhl was tasked by Nagel to
proceed with the
organization of two firing squads, to be used the next day, to which, replying to the objections
raised by the same Uhl, Nagel explained of having complied with the orders of Montua, the
commander of the Polizei-Regiment “Mitte, who, in his turn, would have transmitted him a
command issued from the above. Consequently, according to this logic, none of them would
have been considered responsible for what would have happened in the subsequent hours 12.

The following day, 1 September, after having slept in the open courtyard of the prison, many of
the Jews arrested the day before begun to be loaded onto the trucks of the Kraftfahrzeugstaffel,
that shuttled towards a semi marshland area, not far from the town, where previously, some
common graves had been dug. At the same time, the remaining victims, to which a further
group of about 200 Jews had been added 13 – probably arrested some days before, and
detained in the same jail – were aligned and forced to march towards their fate.
Apart from the firing squads, in waiting for them, there were also officers of the
Sichereitspolizei and some officers of the Battalion-Stab, among which Nagel and Uhl, the latter
expecially quite reluctant and distressed 14.
As the the trucks reached the common graves – three at least and large enough to contain
some hundreds of corpses – the victims were pushed in small groups, along a specially-
prepared slope of soil, up to the bottom of the trench, where the firing squad was in wait.
In order to speed up the operations, the truck approached the edge of the pits in reverse, so
that the victims could be unloaded directly onto the slope. The procedures were carried out

4
among shouting and confusion and especially one of the platoon leaders of the 3/322, the
Oberleutnant Rasche – who was well-known for his anti Semitism – would have regularly beaten
the victims with blows of the stick, in order to encourage them to enter the pits 15.
At that point, the victims were ordered to lie down, face to the ground, while behind them, the
firing squad pointed the rifles to neck. After which, the platoon leader gave the order of fire.

Fair use Yad Vashem Archives – www.yadvashem.org

The establishment of ghetto 20.7.1941
Overall, 914 executions were perpetrated by the
Polizei-Bataillon 322, the 64 women included.
According to the KTB of the 3/322, the policemen of
this company killed 330 of these victims, among which
there were 40 women 16. All the others were obviously
murdered by the 1/322.
In parallel with this action, carried out by the Polizei-
Bataillon 322, another slaughter would have been
perpetrated in the same hours in the ghetto of Minsk,
or maybe some day later, by hand of the EK 8 –
supported by the Feldgendarmerie and, possibly, even
by Ordnungspolizei personnel attached to the
kommando – with further 2.278 victims 17.

Hereafter we propose the testimony of the Ltn.

Friedrich Soier, former commander of the second
platoon of the 3/322, released on 19 October 1965
before the Department 18 of the Austrian Ministry of
Interiors, and transmitted to the ZStL, which was
investigating the case 18. Rather more meaningful and
credible appears, the testimony of this officer,
compared to the reluctant statements released by his
former German comrades: and this because since
1957, the repression of the Nazi crimes in Austria had
been closed de facto, and although the statute of
limitations for murder had been formally abolished in
1965, this measure did not had any practical effect.

According to Soier:
“First of all, all around the ghetto a line of policemen was deployed, mainly formed with
personnel of the battalion. After which, details of the SD and police officers – includyng myself
– entered the ghetto and ordered the Jews to leave their homes. Those who not obedyed
voluntarily were obliged to leave by force.
The Jews were pushed up to a square, previouly targeted by bombing [probably the inner
courtyard of the prison of Minsk, A/N]. Among them there were not only men, but even women
and children.
I don’t remenber exactly who, was tasked with the surveillance of the Jews gathered in the
square. In any case, immediately after the rounding-up, our company was uploaded onto the
trucks and we were sent back to our quarters.
All night long the Jews remained in the square. Then the next morning, when we returned to
the square, most of the women and the children, had been already released. At that point,
about 1.000 Jews had remained in wait in the square, of both sexes, but especially men.
Our company had just 3 or 4 truck, so as, as much Jews as possible were loaded onto each of
it, together with a few policemen: our comrades had to guard at the prisoners, and then, they
were used to form the execution squads.
After which, we travelled out of Minsk just for some miles, and then we arrived to an open field
North of the highway. There was a slightly hilly terrain where, previously, three graves had
been dug, 10 or 15 meters in lenght, 2 m in width and about 2.5 m deep. Also high officers of
the SS were present at the killing field.
The graves I had above mentioned, had been planned or dug by men that, clearly, were
already experienced in the slaughter of large masses of victims. The trenches in fact, had a

5
side that sloped to the bottom, so that the Jews were not obliged to jump inside from the edge,
but they could run along the ramp, directly towards the bottom of the pit.
The trucks approached the graves in reverse, and once they were close enough to the edge,
the Jews were forced to get off. In each of the pits, there were 12 policemen of the firing squad.
The Jews had to run towards them in groups of 12, so that each policeman had a victim in front
of him.
The Jews were clothed, and then were ordered to lie down, face to the ground. In the trench in
which I were, the command of fire was given by the Oltn. Rasche, who ordered: 1 – 2, Fire!
Then, a unique round of bullets was shot.
At a certain point, I was ordered by the Oltn. Ri. – but I cannot exclude that he was the Oltn.
Rasche – to finish the wounded with a deathblow. I think this happened in three cases, when I
saw the Jews that, although mortally hurt by the squad, had not been killed on the blow.
Then, when Rasche was called out of the trench, I was ordered by the Oltn. Ri. to take
command of the firing squad in that pit, a thing which I did, by giving twice the order of fire.
Finally, Ltn. Busche arrived to replace me.
Wikimedia – Bundesarchiv – The prison of Minsk
That day, 350 Jews, of both
sexes, but mainly men, were
killed in the three common
graves in which the firing
squads of our company had
been committed.
I would to emphasize that,
during the executions, no
unnecessary acts of cruelty
were perpetrated.
After the first group, the
trucks came back to the
square for taking other
victims. How many time the
lorries travelled back and
forth, this I don’t remember,
but I do not think this
happened so many times.
Although they were present
on the killing field, none of the SS-men took part in the executions.

Hereafter we propose an excerpt of the KTB of the 3/Polizei-Bataillon 322 19.

31.8.1941
15.00 Durchfüehrung einer Judenaktion im Ghetto der Stadt Minsk. Die 9.Kompanie [3/322,
A/N] übernahm die äussere Absperrung, während die 7 Kompanie [1/322, A/N], NSKK Kompanie
und der SD, die durchsuchung vornahmen. Es wurden alle Juden im Alter von 15 bis 60 Jahren
festgenommen. Darüber hinaus alle Jüdinnen, die nicht den vorgeschriebenen gelben Fleck and
ihren Bekleidung trugen. Ingesamt wurden festgenommen und ins Polizei Gefängnis überführt:
916 Juden beiderlei Geschlechts.
1.9.1941
5.30 Durchführung der Execution der am Vortage festgenommen Juden etwa 10 km ostwärts
Minsk, nördlich der Autobahn Minsk-Smolensk-Moskau. Es wurden 3 Executionskommandos
gestellt. Das Kommando der 9 Kompanie [3/322 NdA] erschoss ingesamt 330 Juden (davon 40
Jüdinnen).

III. KEINE VERANTWORTUNG ZU UEBERNEHMEN

As far as the judicial path of the Polizei-Bataillon 322 is concerned, a good reference work is the
article written in 1986, 25 years after the facts, by Alfred Aedtner, former
Kriminalhauptkommissar and member of the Sonderkommission of the ZStL, published on the
weekly magazine "Der Spiegel", and to which you can refer for in-depth examination 20.
Hereafter, we propose a limited summary 21.

Maj. Gottlieb Nagel:

6
Born in Württemberg in 1892, volunteer of war in 1914, police service in 1920, member of the
NSDAP since 1 May 1933, SS-Sturmbannführer since 1 December 1940. Commander of the
Polizei-Ausbildungs-Bataillon "Wien-Kagran" since February 1941 and of the Polizei-Bataillon
322 until August 1942. Prisoner of war, he was subjected to de-nazification in 1948 and was
finally dismissed from service. After the war he lived in Stuttgart. Passed away in November
1978.
Oltn. Josef Uhl 22:
Born at Gaggenau, Baden, in 1909. Member of the NSDAP and enrolled in the SS. Police service
since 1930, police officer (Ltn.) since 1939, Adjutant of the Polizei-Ausbildungs-Bataillon "Wien-
Kagran"/Polizei-Bataillon 322 from 1940 to March 1942, after which he requested - and
obtained - of being transferred to a police school. Back in service after 1946 as
Personalreferent at the Ministry of Interiors of Baden, and later, chef of the Personalabteilung of
the Landespolizeidirektion Südbaden. After the war he lived in Friburg.
Hptm. Reinhold Jörke:
Member of the NSDAP. Polizeihauptmeister since 1 May 1933. Enrolled in the SS. Commander of
the 1/322. Having socialist tendencies, he had been described as "SPD-Bonzen", in a report
produced by the 35 SS-Allgemeine-Standarte (Kassel) 23. Passed away some years after the
war, before the beginning of the Friburg trial.
Hptm. Sigfried Binz:
Born in 1898. Member of the NSDAP. Against him, in Spring 1933 a proceeding was opened by
the NSDAP-Kreisgericht Berlin-Spandau, for having fraudulently self-declared his militancy in
the NSDAP, as "alter Kämpfer" predated to 1928. Enrolled in the SS since Autumn 1939. From
July 1941, commander of the 2/33, in replacement of Hermann Lippmann. Passed away some
years after the war, before the beginning of the Friburg trial.
Oltn. Gerhard Riebel 24:
Born in Darmstadt. Member of the Allgemeine-SS since 30 April 1933. Trasferred to the SS-VT in
April 1939. Volunteer in the ordinary military service. Graduated at the SS-Junker-Schule in
1938 with the rank of SS-Obersturmfüher. Trasferred in regular service to the Schutzpolizei in
1939 at the age of 24, with the rank of Oberleutnant. Commander of the 3/322. After the war
he liveed in Darmstadt and remained in police service as Steuerinspektor at Bensheim an der
Bergstrasse (Darmstadt, Hesse).

The Zentralestelle Ludwigsburg

The first traces about a possible

involvement of the Polizei-
Bataillon 322 in war crime and
mass murders, emerged in 1958
during the investigations of the
Bavarian LKA against Erich von
dem Bach, that led to the
hearing, as ordinary witnesses, of
several former policemen of the
battalion. Consequently, in 1960
those early clues were
transmitted for competence - by
virtue of the residence in
Stuttgart of the main suspect,
namely the former battalion
commander Gottlieb Nagel - to
the LKA of Baden-Württemberg,
that through the
Sonderkommission der ZSTL
(folder ZStL 202 AR-Z 52/59),
requested to the Public Prosecutor of Stuttgart, the opening of the preliminary investigations,
as well as the issuing of arrest warrants for Nagel and the Battalion Adjutant Uhl. Both the
arrests were carried out on 6 October 1960, while further investigations followed (ZStL 202 AR-
Z 650/61), as soon as new witnesses (about one hundred), were summoned to the hearings. In
this way, between February 1961 and February 1962, the arrests of Gehrard Riebel and Gerd
Hülsemann were executed, the latter, former platoon leader of the 1/322 and still in service as

7
Polizeiobermeister at the Kreispolizeibehoerde Siegen 25. After which, even among may
difficulties and reticences, in May 1962 the request for indictment was formalized to the Court
of Stuttgart by the Public Prosecutor of Stuttgart, versus Nagel, Uhl, Riebel and Hülsemann.
At that point however, the defence attorney of Nagel requested the intervention of the First
Instance Chamber at the Court of Stuttgart (Schwurgericht), which removed the position of
Nagel, because of alleged health reasons. In this way, having missed the main defendant, the
whole proceeding was transferred, for competence, to the Public Prosecutor of Friburg, as this
was the city of residence of the second main defendat, that is Uhl.
Finally, after a new series of investigations by this prosecutor - due to retractations,
amendments and gaps in the memory of the witnesses - a new request of indictment was
issued in February 1963 against the three remaining defendants (LG Freiburg, 1 Ks (AK) 1/63),
even though extremely weakened compared to that of Stuttgart, and requesting inexplicably
mild penalities: 5 years for Rieble, 3 years for Hülsemann and acquittal for Uhl, with further
reductions related to the periods of preventive detentions.
Nevetheless, although scarcely significant, also these requests were rejected on 12 July 1963
by the Court of Friburg, that issued a ruling of complete acquittal, based on the questionable
legal principle of the Befehlsnotstand. Analogously, in Januar 1965 even the appeal, presented
by the Public Prosecutor of Friburg, was rejected with the same motivations by the
Bundesgerichtshof, with the sentence BHG - 1 StT 498/63 of 14.1.1964.
Wikimedia – Bundesarchiv – von dem Bach in Minsk, 1943
But the judicial path,
however, was not yet over.
The discovering in the
archives of Prague in
January 1965, of the War
Diary of the Polizei-
Bataillon 322, with all its
unquestionable contents,
gave the ZStL another
chance for the reopening
of the proceedings, by
mean of the folder ZStL
202 AR-Z 6/65, that
requested to the
prosecutor having
jurisdiction - in this case
that of Darmstadt, the city
of residence of Gerhard
Riebel, now risen to the
role of main defendant -
the opening of the preliminary investigations. In 1966, with the folder LG Darmstad 2 Js 376/65,
the request of Ludwigsburg was upheld by Darmstadt, that proceeded with the investigations
against Riebel and other 19 policemen - who, until that moment, had been considered ordinary
witnesses - and, one more time, versus Uhl, charged with three further indictment of murder.
In this case the investigations lasted for about six years. Then, the ultimate word was
sentenced by the Court of Darmstadt through the final verdicts dated 2 February 1972, 27 April
1972 and 2 October 1972, that based again on the Befehlsnotstand or the Putativenotstand,
finally aquitted all the defendants and buried for the second time the about 10-11.000 victims -
9.000 of which were Jews - assassinated by the Polizei-Bataillon 322 during its service on the
Eastern front.

IV. CONSIDERATIONS
Compared to many other slaughter that already were, or would be soon perpetrated in Soviet
Union, that of Minsk of 1 September 1941 was of a comparatively reduced magnitude: 914
victims, 93% of which males aged between 15 and 60 - that is, of a category potentially able to
produce a menace - in addition to a small group of women, arrested because supposedly found
without the Judensterne - and then guilty (of misdemeanor, btw), according to the rules of the
occupiers: all of this might suggest a kind of selective slaughter, somehow based on

8
expendable pretexts and, therefore, scarcely contaminated by ideological and/or racial
motivations.
Nevertheless, in spite of any appearance, what emerges beyond a glance just a bit less than
superficial, is a real genocidal context, that produced a comparatively limited number of
victims just because it had been plotted with times and tools rather reduced, and also probably
because, so it has been decided, but that, not for these reasons, should be considered less
than heinous or worse, in some way justified.
It is worthwhile to highlight some fundamental facets.

1) First of all, the context in which, the slaughter was perpetrated, was not inci-dental, but
directly connected with the presence in town of several leaders of the SS and Police (and not
only): in fact, in addition to Daluege and von dem Bach, also General von Schenckendorff, the
Generalkommissar Kube and the BdO "Ostland" Jedicke were present at the ceremony for the
shifting of powers from the military to the civil authorities 26. And it's a given that, in summer
1941, a contemporary presence of "prominenten" in a same area - even though charachterized
by different degrees of ideological approach - produced , more often than not, brutal slaughter
of the Jewish population. In a certain sense, this was a way for fixing the points of no return,
real "cornerstones of the genocide", around which to develop, in ways, times and with varying
degrees of virulence and in coherence with the local circumstances, the subsequent stages of
the annihilation. As far as the city of Minsk is concerned, it was the main Soviet town taken by
the German troops until that moment, and it numbered a large Jewish community, of which it
would not been so easy "to get rid" (nor, perhaps, even convenient - during that very first
stage, at least), also because the potential victims were immersed within a large non-Jewish
majority, partly hostile, partly doubtful and partly favourable to the new rulers. Time, as
consequence, was needed to arrive to the complete annihilation, as well as pondered choices.
But in any case, a signal was necessary, to anyone able to understand it. In short, time was
needed for oiling the mechanism of the destruction and, possibily, for phisically filling the room
of those who would have been exterminated.

2) The second point is directly connected with the first. Demonstrated as it has been
demonstrated, the relation "presence of authorities/implementation of genocidal events", it
remains to determine what, and to whom, the signals transmitted by the authorities were
addressed. Well, we can probably state that the main recipients of the message were not the
detachments that had formed the first genocidal wave - that is the Einsatzgruppen - since they
had already proven to get by on their own resources, without whatsoever outer
encouragement, and also, of having well-present the goals and the limits of their actions.
Conversely, it is plausible that instead, it had been necessary to call, to their own
responsibilities 27 all those units and structures choosen to form the second genocidal wave -
namely, the police troops and specific units of the Waffen-SS, as well as the local auxiliaries
and some Wehrmacht security units, if necessary: in short, a large group of units well able to
furnish that large mass of apprentices of the destruction, that physiologically were lacking to
the Einsatzgruppen, but that instead, were indispensable for transferring the idea of the
Genocide from theory to reality.
With the direct intervention of the leaders, the beginning of the strategy of annihilation was
therefore pointed to those would have been tasked to perpetrate it (at least until the
introductions of more rational methods of destructions). And in this sense, the above
mentioned relation end by becoming a real syllogism:

A. the presence of authorities

B. the execution of genocidal events
C. the authorities gave the go-ahead with the Genocide

3) The alleged necessity to proceed with the destruction of the so-called intellectuals - often
speciously considered a potential source of danger - carried out on the basis of omnipresent (?)
black lists, is totally groundless in the case of the slaughter of Minsk of September 1, 1941: and
this because the whole Jewish intellighenzia of Minsk had been already exterminated, as
confirmed by the EM 32 of July 24, 1941 28. And even admitting a furtuitous survival of several
alleged intellectuals, or subjects compromised with the former Soviet regime, well, the German
auhorities could not be aware of this for sure, since they were persuaded of having done a
careful investigation of the suspects (EM 21 of July 13, 1941). All of this, of course, unless they

9
had wanted to take the place of God, paraphrasing the Genesis and destroying fifthy innocents,
just to find out a single culprit 29.

4) The Jewish population of Minsk could not reasonably represent, during that stage at least,
any immediate and concrete menace for the occupiers. The fact that the Jewish ghetto had
been already established, greatly facilitated the control over those that, rightly or wrong, could
be considered potentially hostile. And although a wall was never raised around the perimeter of
the ghetto, but "just" a fence and watchtowers with sentries, the fact of having all the eggs in
the same baske", and what is more, well identified by unequivocal marks, erased the
inconvenience of having wandering Jews scattered in the rears. Under this point of view, at
least, the security problem had been solved once and for all.

V. EPITAPHS
These are some significant statements of policemen, former members of the Polizei-Bataillon
322, released during the hearings before the investigators.

Testimony by Gerhard Riebel to the ZStL AR-Z 52/59 30:

”Ich erinnere mich eines Besuches von "I remember an inspection of General Daluege
General der Polizei Daluege bei mir im at the POW camp of Bialystok, in which I was
Gefangenlager in Bialystok, bei dem ich um serving together with my front unit, and a
eine Verwendung bei einem Fronttruppenteil question I made him, about the use and the
nachsuchte und mit der Begrünung, dass ich tasks to which my battalion had been
mit dem Einsatz und Aufgabengebiet, wie er assigned, that were in contradiction with my
meinem Bataillon zugewiesen sei, mit meinem feeling of soldier.
soldatischen Empfinden im Widerspruch As reply I received a rebuke, that made me
stände. clear about what Daluege categorically
Als Entgegnung musste ich eine Rüge in expected by all his officers and soldiers, that
Empfang nehmen, dergestalt, dass mir is, the unconditioned obedience to the orders,
Daluege kategorisch erklärte, dass er von to which we were bounded by the oath of
seinen Offizieren und Polizeisoldaten erwartet, allegiance."
dass sie die ihnen übertragenen Befehle
bedingungslos ausführten, an die sie sich
durch ihren Eid gebunden fühlten”.

Testimony by Josef Uhl to the ZStL AR-Z 52/59 31:

”Als Beamter und Staatsdiener war ich zu "As public official and State servant, I had
unbe-dingten Gehorsam und z. Treue been educated to the unconditioned
gegenüber Regie-rung und Verfassung obedience towards the Governement and the
erzogen. Schliesslich hatten wir alle einen Constitution. Moreover, all of us had taken the
Diensteid geleistet, dar uns verpflichtete. Ich oath of allegiance. As a consequence, I could
kannte demgemäss nicht anderes, als den recognize nothing else except the obedience
Anordnungen und Befehlen der jeweiligen to the orders and to the authority of the
Regierung zu gehorchen. Deshalb habe ich Government. That is why, I have never try to
auch nicht versucht, mich um die Ausführung avoid my duty, nor, even less, to refuse the
von Befehlen, insbesondere um die Mirwirkung implementation of an order, also when this
beziehungsweise Anwesenheit bei implied my presence or participation to the
Erschiessungen zu druecken, zu umgehen executions."
oder schliesslich regelrecht zu verweigern”.

Testimony by A.S. to the ZStL AR-Z 6/65 32:

”Er (Jörcke) machte uns eindringlichst darauf "He (Jörcke), has sharply drawn our attention
aufmerksam, dass die Befehle about the fact that any order, entirely and
hundertprozentig und bedingungslos zu without any objection, had to be executed and
erfuellen seien, weil jede Befehls- that, anyone had preferred to disobey, then,
verweigerung unnachsichtlich nach sich ziehe, he would have been sent before the SS- und
dass der Mann vor das SS- und Polizeigericht Polizeigericht and sentenced to death without
gestellt werde, wo er zweifellos mit der any doubt.”

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Todesstrafe zu rechnen habe.”

Although indicative of a rather common attitude, or maybe of mere judicial defensive strategy,
also the alleged obligation to obey is nothig but misleading. Infact, the inconsistency and
speciousness of these and other statements - and even of the same Befehlsnotstand - has been
demontrated by Adalbert Rückerl, the director of the ZStL, in his book "NS-Verbrechen vor der
Gericht", from which we learn that there is not a single documented case where a policeman
has been sentenced to jail or to death for having refused to kill a Jew 33.
Conversely, there are some cases of disobedience to the orders, that received nothing more an
immediate verbal reaction: one in particular the resolute refusal, opposed to Jeckeln by Maj.
Heinrich Hannibal, to put the Polizei-Bataillon 303 at his disposal for the slaughter of Vinnitsa,
of 19 September 1941 34.

At this point, everything that has been said so far, confirms to us that, regardless the
magnitude, the slaughter of Minsk was a genocide, ideological and racial.
Just a few hours were needed and a handful of policemen, to proceed with the murdering of
914 civilian Jews.
Much more time and much more resources would have been necessary to perpetrate the
genocide of the Jewish people.
But that day in Minsk, on September 1, 1941, a step had been moved. The path of destruction
had been traced.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aedtner, Alfred: An Ort und Stelle eschossen. Der Kriminalist Alfred Aedtner über die
Massenmorde des Polizeibataillons 322. In Der Spiegel, 44/1986.
Angrick, Andrej/Voigt, Martina/Ammerschubert, Silke/Klein, Peter: “Da hätte man
schon ein Tagebuch führen müssen”. Das Polizeibataillon 322 und die Judenmorde im Bereich
der Heeresgruppe Mitte während des Sommers und Herbst 1941. Berlin, 1994. Quoted AVAK.
Breitman, Richard: Official Secrets. What the Nazis planned, what the British and Americans
knew. New York, 1998.
Curilla, Wolfgang: Die Deutsche Ordnungspolizei und der Holocaust im Baltikum und in
Weissrussland, 1941-1944. Paderborn, 2006.
Gerlach, Christian: Kalkulierte Morde: die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in
Weissrussland 1941-1944. Hamburg, 1999.Kohl, Paul: Der Krieg der deutschen Wehrmacht und
der Polizei 1941-1944. Sowjetische Überlebende berichten. Frankfurt am Main, 1995.
Klee, Ernst/Dressen, Willi/Riess, Volker: “Schöne Zeiten”. Judenmord aus der Sicht der
Täter ung Gaffer. Frankfurt on Main, 1988.
Klemp, Stefan: “Nicht Ermittelt”. Polizeibataillone und die Nachkriegsjustiz. Ein Handbuch.
Essen, 2005.
Kwiet, Konrad: From the Diary of a Killing Unit. Providence, 1993
Langerbein, Helmuth: Hitler’s death squads. The Logic of Mass Murder. College Station,
2003.
Lichtenstein, Heiner: Himmlers grüne Helfer. Die Schutz- und Ordnungspolizei im “Dritten
Reich”. Cologne, 1990.
Longerich, Peter: Politik der Vernichtung. Eine Gesamtdarstellung der nationalsozialistischen
Judenverfolgung. Munich, 1998.
Mallmann, Klaus-Michael/Riess, Volker/Pyta, Wolfram: Deutscher Osten 1939 –1945. Der
Weltanschauungskrieg in Photo und Texten. Stuttgart, 2003.
Westermann, Edward B.: Hitler’s Police Bataillons. Einforcing Racial War in the East.
Lawrence, 2005.
Westberg, Lennart: Zwei Polizistenschicksale im Zweiten Weltkrieg – Befehlsverweigerung
und Widerstand. In Archiv für Polizeigeschichte 3/1991.

FOOTNOTES
1
Kohl, pages 78 and 91, Gerlach, pages 506-508.

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2
A number of camps, for POW, transit and extermination (Maly Trostenez), were or would been
established in the area of Minsk: in addition to those already mentioned, there were the
detention centers of Kolasstrasse and Logoisker-Strasse, the Stalag 352, the Güterbanhof and
the aviation camp.
3
Gerlach, pages 523-524, Kohl, pages 246-247.
4
Towards the beginning of July, the whole male population of Minsk, aged between 15 (or 18)
and 45 (or 50) had been deported to the POW camp of Drodsy, about 5 km north of the town,
for being submitted to an ideological screening, during which among the Jews – both the
civilians and the POWs – about 3.000 people were selected: so-called “intellectuals”,
professionals and elements of alleged Communist faith, or members of the former Soviet
apparatus. Epstein, pages 80-81. Then, the selected prisoners were transferred to a quarry and
executed by a kommando of the EGB, of the GFP and probably, of the EG zbV (TK “Bonifer”).
Curilla, pages 463-464, Gerlach, pages 507-507. See the EM 21 of 13 July 1941, in which is
reported the establishing of the camp, and the clearing of 1.050 Jews, after careful
investigations. Then, according to the EM 32 of 24 July, the whole Jewish intellighenzia of
Minsk, had been cleared: this report was preceded (22 July), by a despatch by Nebe to the
Heeresgruppe “Mitte”, according to which, in Minsk gibt es keine jüdische Intelligenz mehr.
Gerlach, page 509. The camp of Drosdy was emptied within 19 July, after the transferring to
West of the prisoners of war, and the freeing of most of the Belorussian civilians and the Jews
that survived the selection. The remainder inmates – some thousands of civilian, including
many non-Jews – were transferred to the camp of Masyukovshchina (Stalag 352).
5
Gerlach, page 549.
6
The slaughter of Bialystok of 27 June 1941, exclusively perpetrated by a police battalions, was
one of these exceptions. See our previous article.
7
AVAK, page 342, Longerich, page 370. Gerlach, page 228, identifies Koch as a commander of
the SK 7c (formerly, VK “Moskau”) of the EGB. Actually, it is not clear what, the role of Koch
was, in July 1941: nevertheless, whether he was tasked to coordinate the action in the ghetto
of Minsk, it is plausible that he was the referent at the section IV.B 4 of the Stab/EGB, or maybe
an officer at the SK 7b. Manfred Ziedler, Der Minsker Kriegsverbrechen Prozess vom Januar
1946, page 228, identifies him as “an officer of a Sonderkommando of the EGB”.
8
This slaughter, that followed that of the Synagogue perpetrated on 27 June by the Polizei-
Bataillon 309, will be examined in a future article.
9
Curilla, page 556. LG Friburg I AK 1/63 of 12.7.1963.
10
Breitman, page 50, Curilla, page 555, Klee/Dressen/Riess, page 28, Klemp, page 291.
11
AVAK, page 342, Breitman, page 50.
12
Curilla, page 556, Langerbein, page 141.
13
Breitman, page 50.
14
Langerbein, page 141. Uhl would have urged Nagel to leave the scene of the massacre, but
he was allowed only after thirty minutes had passed. LG Friburg I AK 1/63 del 12.7.1963.
15
Curilla, page 556, Langerbein, page 141.
16
Klee/Dressen/Riess, pages 28-29. KTB 3/322, 1.9.41. Curilla, page 557.
17
EM 92 of 23 Septembe 1941, page 39, Curilla, page 557, Longerich, pages 370, 683. It is not
clear whether in this total of 2.278 victims, also the 914 of September 1 were enclosed: it is
plausible however, that being this action been perpetrated solely by the Ordnungspolizei, the
total reported in the EM 92 is the number of victims produced by the EK 8 during its own
specific action.
18
In ZStL: 202 AR-Z 6/65 Bd. II, Bl. 391ff of 19.19.1965. AVAK, page 379. As far as the
executions are concerned, Longerich, page 683, quotes also the testimony of another
policeman, Alois Fisher, releaset to the ZStL on 27.10.1965.
19
Klee/Dressen/Riess, pages 28-29.
20
Alfred Aedtner “An Ort und Stelle erschossen”. Der Spiegel 44/1986, pages 76-99.
21
AVAK, pagg. 362-366. See also Klemp, pages 292-294, who resume the judicial aspects of
Aedtner’s article.
22
About Uhl see Lichtenstein, pages 60-61.
23
AVAK, pages 353, 382. Report by 35 SS-Standarte to SS-Abschnitt XI-XVIII of 24 March 1933.
24
About Riebel see Lichtenstein, page 61.
25
After having served 4 years in Soviet captivity, after his release Hülsemann continued his
police duty at the Ministry of the Interiors of Nordrhein-Westfalen. Lichtenstein, page 61.
26
Gerlach, page 568.
27
See, for example the speech of Gen.Maj. Retzlaff, IdO “Wien”, on the eve of the departure
from Vienna of the Polizei-Bataillon 322 (6 June 1941): " ... daß sich jeder vom Bataillon bewußt

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sein soll, den slawischen Völkern gegenüber als Herrenmensch aufzutreten und zu zeigen, daß
er Deutscher sei". Aedtner, page 89. See also Westermann, page 2, Curilla, page 546, Kwiet,
pages 78-79, Breitman, page 45.
28
See note nr. 4.
29
Genesis 18, 22-32.
30
AVAK, pag. 353.
31
AVAK, pag. 354.
32
AVAK, pag. 356.
33
Aedtner, page 85, Westermann, page 236, Kwiet, page 87.
34
Klemp, pages 54-57, Westberg, page 81, Curilla, page 935. Maj. Hannibal reached the apex
of his military career with the rank of SS-Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Polizei, as
commander of a police kampfgruppe in Eastern Prussia, in 1945. He passed away in Hamburg
in 1971, at the age of 82.

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