Teleological moral systems are characterized primarily by a focus on the consequences which any action might have (for

that reason, they are often referred to as consequentalist moral systems, and both terms are used here). Thus, in order to make correct moral choices, we have to have some understanding of what will result from our choices. When we make choices which result in the correct consequences, then we are acting morally when we make choices which result in the incorrect consequences, then we are acting immorally. The idea that the moral worth of an action is determined by the consequences of that action is often labeled consequentialism. !sually, the "correct consequences" are those which are most beneficial to humanity # they may promote human happiness, human pleasure, human satisfaction, human survival or simply the general welfare of all humans. Whatever the consequences are, it is believed that those consequences are intrinsically good and valuable, and that is why actions which lead to those consequences are moral while actions which lead away from them are immoral. The various teleological moral systems differ not only on e$actly what the "correct consequences" are, but also on how people balance the various possible consequences. %fter all, few choices are unequivocally positive, and this means it is necessary to figure out how to arrive at the correct balance of good and bad in what we do. &ote that merely being concerned with the consequences of an action does not make a person a consequentialist # the key factor is, rather, basing the morality of that action on the consequences instead of on something else. The word teleology comes from the 'reek roots telos, which means end, and logos, which means science. Thus, teleology is the "science of ends." (ey questions which teleological ethical systems ask include) What will be the consequences of this action? What will be the consequences of inaction? How do I weigh the harm against the benefits of this action?

Types *ome e$amples of teleological ethical theories include) Ethical Egoism: an action is morally right if the consequences of the action are more favorable than unfavorable only to the moral agent performing the action. Ethical Altruism: an action is morally right if the consequences of the action are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone except the moral agent.

Ethical Utilitarianism: an action is morally right if the consequences of the action are more favorable than unfavorable to everyone.

Act and Rule Consequentialism +onsequentalist moral systems are usually differentiated into act#consequentialism and rule# consequentialism. The former, act#consequentialism, argues that the morality of any action is dependent upon its consequences. Thus, the most moral action is the one which leads to the best consequences. The latter, rule#consequentialism, argues that focusing only on the consequences of the action in question can lead people to committing outrageous actions when they foresee good consequences. Thus, rule#consequentialists add the following provision) imagine that an action were to become a general rule # if the following of such a rule would result in bad consequences, then it should be avoided even if it would lead to good consequences in this one instance. This has very obvious similarities to (ant,s categorical imperative, a deontological moral principle. -ule#consequentialism can lead to a person performing actions which, taken alone, may lead to bad consequences. .t is argued, however, that the overall situation is that there will be more good than bad when people follow the rules derived from consequentialist considerations. /or e$ample, one of the ob0ections to euthanasia is that allowing such an e$ception to the moral rule "do not kill" would lead to a weakening of a rule which has generally positive consequences # even though in such instances following the rule leads to negative consequences.

Problems 1ne common criticism of teleological moral systems is the fact that a moral duty is derived from a set of circumstances lacking any moral component. /or e$ample, when a teleological system declares that choices are moral if they enhance human happiness, it isn,t argued that "human happiness" is intrinsically moral itself. &evertheless, a choice which enhances that happiness is moral. 2ow does it happen that one can lead to the other3 +ritics also often point out the impossibility of actually determining the full range of consequences any action will have, thus rendering attempts to evaluate the morality of an action based upon those consequences similarly impossible. .n addition, there is much disagreement over how or even if different consequences can really be quantified in the way

necessary for some moral calculations to be made. 4ust how much "good" is necessary to outweigh some "evil," and why3 %nother common criticism is that consequentialist moral systems are simply complicated ways of saying that the ends 0ustify the means # thus, if it is possible to argue that enough good will result, then any outrageous and horrible actions would be 0ustified. /or e$ample, a consequentialist moral system might 0ustify the torture and murder of an innocent child if it would lead to a cure for all forms of cancer. The question of whether or not we should really be committed to taking responsibility for all of the consequences of our actions is another issue which critics bring up. %fter all, if the morality of my action is dependent upon all of its consequences, then . am taking responsibility for them # but those consequences will reach far and wide in ways . cannot anticipate or comprehend.

Ethical Egoism
Only a small minority of ethicists have considered ethical egoism to be a viable normative theory, and very often ethicists who on first glance appear to be offering an ethical egoist position turn out to be offering a version of rule utilitarianism instead (a theory we will be discussing below). Nonetheless, at times people do make decisions that are best represented by ethical egoist reasoning, and so it is worthwhile to consider the theory, if only as a way of understanding a common error of ethical reasoning. The ethical egoist makes this fundamental normative claim: all moral decisions should be made on the basis of a consideration of what serves the interests of the moral agent him or herself, that is, the person who is making the decision. ccordingly, the proper basis for moral !udgment, for the ethical egoist, can be accurately e"pressed in the form of the following normative principle: One ought to do whatever is in one#s own best interests. $t is important to be clear about what the ethical egoism is not saying. %irst, the ethical egoist is not saying that we, as moral agents, ought to act selfishly, that is, that we should never promote the interests of others. cting in the interests of others is &uite consistent with ethical egoism, so long as acting in other people#s interests is at the same time acting in one#s own interests. 'iven the fact that very often what is good for others is also good for ourselves, it is a fair bet that an ethical egoist would do things in many circumstances that promote the interests of others. (econd, an ethical egoist is not saying that a moral agent should do what he or she wants to do. Our desires are often inconsistent with our best interests, as is clear from the fact, for e"ample, that many people desire to smoke even though they understand that smoking is not in their long)term interests with regard to their health. *ather, the proposed criterion for moral !udgment for the ethical egoist is what is sometimes called +enlightened self)interest+: the most reasonable !udgment, in light of all available evidence, concerning what in fact will promote one#s interests, both physically and psychologically. s we noted earlier, it is not enough simply to propose an ethical viewpoint, one must also offer an argument for why the ethical view should be accepted. (o, why should we accept ethical egoism- The argument for ethical egoism is typically based on a factual theory of human motivation, sometimes called psychological egoism: the claim that in fact all voluntary action is motivated by the fundamental aim of achieving some good for oneself.

ccording to psychological egoism, altruism is an illusion. .e never truly act for the benefit of others. Those actions that appear to be altruistic always turn out, upon closer e"amination, to be motivated by self)interest. (o the parent who suffers the economic burdens and the inevitable trials and tribulations of parenthood, in what appears to be a self)sacrificing manner, is really looking for their own self)satisfaction))such as the satisfaction of pride in the accomplishments of one#s child. On the basis of this theory of human motivation, the ethical egoist concludes that we should, as a matter of moral obligation, seek our own interests. This argument for ethical egoism raises the issue of the naturalistic fallacy: isn#t the ethical egoist fallaciously arguing for a normative claim on the basis of a descriptive claim- /learly this is what the ethical egoist does. 0ut against this charge, the ethical egoist might make this point: if it is true that we all in fact seek our own interests, it is unlikely that we could do anything else. Thus, even if one could reasonably suggest that we should seek some other aim as a basis for moral action, the suggestion would be pointless, since we simply could not follow it. Thus, the best we can do as moral agents is to seek to fulfill our own interests in the most reasonable and circumspect manner possible. This point is well taken only if psychological egoism is true. 0ut there are good reasons to &uestion whether it is true. One reason is the fact that there are countless cases on record of self)sacrifice: parents who sacrifice their well) being, at times their very lives, for the sake of their children, soldiers who in battle sacrifice themselves for the sake of their comrades in arms. These cases clearly suggest the implausibility of psychological egoism. Typically the psychological egoist will e"plain such cases by claiming that the aim of an apparent self)sacrifice is a feeling of satisfaction. as indicated above in regard to parenting. 0ut in cases where someone sacrifices their life for the sake of others, we must conclude, if the psychological egoist is right, that the satisfaction that the person receives briefly before their death outweighs the satisfactions of living out their natural lives))a rather far)fetched idea. The error behind psychological egoism seems to be a confusion of wants and interests. $t does appear to be true that we always do what we want to do in some sense of the word +want.+ .hen we claim that we do what we do not want to do, typically this refers to an unpleasant means that we utili1e to achieve a wanted end. $ might not want to go to the dentist, considering the e"perience in its own right. 0ut $ do want healthy teeth, and in the light of my understanding that the unpleasant e"perience of going to the dentist is necessary for dental health, $ want to go to the dentist for the sake of the end. The same might be said of the self)sacrificing act. The self)sacrificing altruist does not want to die, but in light of the fact that one#s own death is necessary to save others, the altruist might be said to want to sacrifice his or her own life for

the sake of others. 0ut now, psychological egoism fallaciously infers from the fact that we can understand all acts as proceeding from personal wants to the conclusion that all acts proceed from an assessment of personal interests. This inference is invalid deductively, and inductively there is little evidence to support it. 2eople who sacrifice themselves for others may want, in the sense e"plained above, to sacrifice themselves, but this in no way implies that they have a personal interest in the sacrifice, or that they act from a perceived personal interest. The most straightforward way of interpreting such actions is that they are instances where people sacrifice their own interests for the sake of others. The psychological egoist, because of the confusion of wants and interests, searches for some manner of understanding the motives of such acts in terms of self)interest, and is led by faulty logic to the implausible e"planations of self)satisfaction considered above. 3thical egoism, then, is based on a theory of human motivations that is &uite implausible, and thus the theory itself has little to recommend its adoption. .e should also note that if ethical egoism is not a viable ethical theory, then collective ethical egoism is e&ually unacceptable. (uch a collective form of egoism would say that one ought simply to serve the common interests of one#s social group, whether that group is one#s community, one#s religious denomination, or one#s nation, irrespective of how one#s actions affect people outside one#s social group. $f psychological egoism is false, then we can act for the interests of people outside our social group, and there is no basis for the claim that we ought not do so when the effects of our acts on those interests are significant. This leads us to the normative theory of utilitarianism.

Utilitarianism
The utilitarian, like the ethical egoist or the collective egoist, is a teleologist in approach: the utilitarian will claim that the moral status of what we do is determined by the conse&uences of what we do. 0ut unlike the ethical egoist or collective egoist, the utilitarian will insist that the principle of e&uality should be applied to the interests of ob!ects of moral concern. $n other words, the interests of all ob!ects of moral concern must be considered on an e&ual basis in all ethical deliberation. One#s own interests, or the interests of people within one#s own social group, should not be given a favored status over the interests of others. This is not to say that these interests are irrelevant to moral !udgment. $t would be as illegitimate to disregard one#s own interests in moral !udgment as it is to disregard the interests of others. The claim of the utilitarian is simply that the weight given to the personal or group interests of the moral agent in moral deliberation ought to be a function of the degree to which those interests

are affected by the action under evaluation, not on the basis of who has those interests. Thus, if $ am attempting to determine the moral status of my actions, and my interests will be affected by my actions to the same degree that the interests of each of nine other people are affected, then $ ought to give my interests no greater weight in moral deliberation than the interests of any one of these other nine people. .hy should we accept this view- 2erhaps the best argument for utilitarianism is, simply, the failure of ethical egoism and collective egoism as viable ethical theories. $f there is no basis, and as we saw there appears to be none, to claim within a teleological framework that we ought morally to favor our own interests or those of one#s social group in moral !udgment, then the correct moral viewpoint is that all interests should be treated with e&ual weight. Thus, the nonmoral value of the conse&uences of action for anyone who is affected by an action must be taken into account in moral !udgment. The ne"t step in the development of utilitarian theory is to consider what sorts of nonmoral values define our interests as ob!ects of moral concern. $n other words, what sorts of conse&uences provide the criterion by which we can decide the amount of good or evil that is produced by our actions. /lassical utilitarians such as 4eremy 0entham (5678)5798) and 4ohn (tuart :ill (57;<) 69) argued that the proper moral criterion was happiness, and that happiness can be understood as the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain. This view is sometimes called +hedonic utilitarianism+ (from the 'reek word hedone= pleasure). .e should note that 0entham#s and :ill#s understanding of pleasure was &uite broad. ny e"perience that we would call +pleasant+ was considered pleasurable: listening to music, reading good literature, achieving success and satisfaction in one#s career. (imilarly, +pain+ was used to describe any disagreeable e"perience, whether it involved physical pain or psychological pain, such as emotional anguish and disappointment. ccording to this view, then, a moral agent ought to aim at the production of pleasures and the alleviation of pains of whatever sort for anyone affected by the moral agent#s actions. There are a number of problems with hedonic utilitarianism. One problem is that the view interprets pleasure and pain so broadly that the terms lose any meaningful reference to a specific aspect of e"perience that could be used to determine the value of our e"perience. The terms +pleasure+ and +pain+ are used meaningfully when they point to specific feelings within e"perience, such as physical pleasure and pain, that can be distinguished from other sorts of feelings. 0ut when used as broadly as 0entham and :ill used them, the terms simply become synonyms for good and bad e"perience, and it becomes useless to employ them. '.3. :oore (5769)5>?7) argued that any attempt to define what constitutes

good and bad e"perience commits the naturalistic fallacy, and is therefore pointless. The best that we can say with respect to the moral criterion for !udgment under a utilitarian perspective is that moral agents should aim at the production of good e"perience, and the avoidance of bad e"periences. This more recent viewpoint is often called +ideal utilitarianism,+ and it is currently the accepted viewpoint among most working utilitarian ethicists. .e have considered an issue concerning the correct moral criterion for !udgment within utilitarianism. There is another issue concerning how this criterion should be applied in moral !udgment, an issue that has given rise to two distinct versions of utilitarian theory, commonly called act and rule utilitarianism. ct utilitarianism was the common approach among utilitarians up until the 5>?;s (although there is reason to believe that 4ohn (tuart :ill argued at times from a rule utilitarian perspective). (ince then, rule utilitarianism has been adopted by some ethical theorists, so that today both theories are used in ethical discussions. Act Utilitarianism ct utilitarianism offers the most straightforward way of applying the utilitarian criterion of moral !udgment. ccording to this view, the criterion should be applied to each individual action of a moral agent when determining the action#s moral value (that is, whether the action is right or wrong, permissible or impermissible). This procedure of moral !udgment can be e"pressed in what is commonly called theprinciple of utility, the basic normative principle of utilitarianism. This principle has been e"pressed in a number of different ways by utilitarian ethicists, but we might settle upon an e"pression of the principle that is consistent with ideal utilitarianism as follows. One ought to seek to produce the greatest possible balance of good over evil, or the least possible balance of evil over good, for all who will be affected by one#s actions. +@tility+ is the technical term used by utilitarians to refer to the degree to which an action produces good andAor avoids evil. Thus if action is productive of a greater good than action 0, is said to have a greater utility than 0. Bikewise, if and 0 both produce evil, but produces a lesser evil then 0, then is said again to have greater utility than 0. Thus, returning to the e"ample of Truman#s dilemma, if it is the case that dropping the bomb cost fewer lives than a land invasion would have, dropping the bomb would be said to have had a greater utility than a land invasion. ccording to act utilitarianism, then, the moral value of an action is determined by, or is a function of, the nonmoral value that will be produced by

the action for all parties affected in comparison with the nonmoral value that is produced by all alternative actions that a moral agent might take in a given moral situation. $t is important to stress, here, that determining the moral value of an action according to act utilitarianism re&uires a consideration of all available alternatives. n action is not right or obligatory simply because it produces good conse&uences. Nor is an action necessarily wrong if it produces bad conse&uences. The key to moral !udgment is to weigh the relative utility of alternatives. Thus, an action that produces good conse&uences can, upon e"amination, be morally wrong or impermissible if there is some alternative that produces a greater good, and, as in the e"ample of Truman#s decision, an action that produces evil conse&uences can be morally right or obligatory if it produces the lesser evil of all alternatives available to a moral agent. Applying Act Utilitarianism To avoid confusion, it is important to sort out a couple of different issues that can be addressed from a utilitarian perspective. One issue, the issue that is our primary focus in this course, is the reasonable determination of the moral value of an action in a moral situation. This is the &uestion of moral obligation that is pertinent in deliberation: .hat among all alternative actions is the right action to perform in a moral situation- The answer, from the perspective of act utilitarianism, is that the right, or obligatory, action is the one that will produce the best possible conse&uences, as we have seen. nother somewhat different &uestion that can be addressed from an act utilitarian perspective is the &uestion of moral responsibility: $s a moral agent who has already performed an action morally responsible for the action, that is, is it reasonable to blame, or praise, the agent for their action. .e will consider in some greater detail the basis for such !udgments later on in the course. .e should note here, however, that it is fallacious, from an act utilitarian perspective, to determine the moral responsibility of an agent based on information that was unavailable to the agent at the time they made their decision. The crucial point is summed up in the traditional proverb +Cindsight is 8;A8;.+ n action that a given moral agent reasonably believes will produce the best possible conse&uences could very well turn out to have disastrous conse&uences. $t would be un!ust, however, to blame a moral agent for an action the conse&uences of which the agent could not possibly foresee. /onse&uently, in determining moral responsibility from an act utilitarian perspective it is important that a !udgment be made in light of the information available at the time, and such a !udgment might be &uite different from the one that we would make from the privileged standpoint of hindsight of what action

was actually the right one to take. %or e"ample, considering Carry Truman#s dilemma, it would be &uite consistent upon act utilitarianism to make the !udgment on hindsight that it was wrong to drop the atomic bomb on 4apan, but that Truman should not be blamed for taking the wrong action since he could not have foreseen the ultimate conse&uences of his action. *eturning, now, to the issue of moral deliberation, what should a moral agent do when faced with a moral dilemma- The answer of act utilitarianism is that the moral agent should do that which, in light of all available evidence and information, the moral agent determines, in their best !udgment, is the morally right action))the action that will produce the best conse&uences for all concerned. :oral !udgment, then, is a risky business. .e can never be certain, given our less than perfect foresight, of what the conse&uences of our actions will be. (till, we do constantly predict the conse&uences of our actions, and we do believe that these predictions can be made reasonably in light of past e"perience. .hen $ go to the store, $ predict that there will be food available there to purchase for my dinner. .hen $ decide to go to college, $ predict based on available statistics that over the course of my working life the choice is the right one to make from the standpoint of future earnings. The act utilitarian will argue that in moral !udgment as well, reasonable predictions can be made, and thus although such !udgments always will be uncertain, they can still be reasonable. $nvariably, because of the relative uncertainty of prediction, moral !udgment from an act utilitarian perspective involves considering the relative probabilities of the conse&uences of our actions. $n some cases, when accurate statistics are available, the mathematics of probability can provide a precise way of dealing with these issues. Thus if a state legislature is considering whether to raise the speed limit on highways by five miles per hour, statistics showing death rates from automobile accidents as a function of the legal speed limit can be used to determine the probability that the death rate in accidents will rise by a certain amount if the speed limit is raised. $n most moral situations, accurate statistics will not be available, in which case a moral agent will need to rely on a less precise, intuitive sense of probabilities. Though intuitive assessments of probabilities are imprecise, they still can be reasonably made based on the available evidence of past e"perience. $t is reasonable to !udge, for e"ample, that there is a greater probability that the grocery store $ go to will have lettuce available for purchase than, say, imported /amembert cheese. Bikewise, in moral !udgment, it is far more likely that an accident victim will survive an accident if $ call for help and render what first aid $ can than if $ simply ignore the victim and hope that a police officer notices him soon. Thus act utilitarianism would !ustify the guidance of the principle of beneficence in such an instance.

.hether or not precise calculations of probability are possible, act utilitarianism places upon any moral agent the derivative obligation to seek any and all available evidence or information that is relevant to determining the probable conse&uences of one#s action, and consider in a serious and conscientious manner, in light of this information, what the probable conse&uences of one#s actions will be. To do anything less would constitute a forfeiture of one#s obligations as a moral agent to make the best !udgment possible. Thus, if Truman had failed to seek the best e"pert advice concerning the probable conse&uences of dropping the atomic bomb as opposed to ground invasion))if he decided on a whim to drop the bomb))he could be blamed for moral negligence based on act utilitarian principles, even if his action turned out to be the right one.

A teleology is any philosophical account that holds that final causes exist in nature, meaning that design and purpose analogous to that found in human actions are inherent also in the rest of nature. The adjective "teleological" has a broader usage, for example in discussions where particular ethical theories or types of computer programs are sometimes described as teleological because they involve aiming at goals.[citation needed] Teleology was explored by lato and Aristotle, by !aint Anselm during the ""th century A#, and later by $mmanuel %ant in his &riti'ue of (udgment. $t was fundamental to the speculative philosophy of )egel.

A thing, process, or action is teleological when it is for the sa*e of an end, i.e., a telos or final cause. $n general, it may be said that there are two types of final causes, which may be called intrinsic finality and extrinsic finality.["] A thing or action has an extrinsic finality when it is for the sa*e of something external to itself. $n a way, people exhibit extrinsic finality when they see* the happiness of a child. $f the external thing had not existed that action would not display finality. A thing or action has an intrinsic finality when it is for none other than its own sa*e. +or example, one might try to be happy simply for the sa*e of being happy, and not for the sa*e of anything outside of that.