Shunning Aff

U.S. Violations Undermines its Credibility

U.S. human rights violations undermines its credibility to push for rights internationally Halperin, 7 (Morton H., Testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs'

Subcommittee on International Organi ations, Human !ights, an" O#ersight, $Human !ights an" %.S. Foreign &olicy,' ()*+)+,,(, ---.american.rogress.org/issues/+,,(/,(/hal.erin0testimony.html1 The %nite" States shoul" also acti#ely -or2 -ith the %nite" 3ations an" es.ecially the Human !ights Council to hel. to a"#ance human rights an" to .rotect human rights acti#ists. Here, as else-here, -e nee" to recogni e that by failing to obser#e internationally recogni e" human rights oursel#es -e re"uce American cre"ibility to cham.ion human rights for others. I un"erstan" that many in the Congress an" else-here are trouble" by the first year of o.erations of the ne- Council. I share those concerns. Ho-e#er, it is far too soon to gi#e u. on the Council or to cut its fun"ing. I am confi"ent that human rights acti#ists in Cuba, 4gy.t, an" A erbai5an share this #ie-.

Human Rights Should be Vie ed Conse!uentially

Human rights concerns should be eighed pragmatically "ennedy, # (6a#i", &rofessor of 7a- at Har#ar", Har#ar" Human !ights 8ournal, $The
International Human !ights Mo#ement9 &art of the &roblem:' #ol. *;, S.ring +,,+, ---.la-.har#ar".e"u/stu"ents/orgs/hr5/iss*;/2enne"y.shtml1

I. Thin2ing &ragmatically About Human !ights My .ur.ose in .ulling these concerns together is to encourage other -ell)meaning legal .rofessionals to a"o.t a more .ragmatic attitu"e to-ar" human rights. My ho.e is that -e -ill "e#elo. a stronger .ractice of -eighing the costs an" benefits of their articulation, institutionali ation an" enforcement. Of course, the best human rights .ractitioners are alrea"y intensely strategic an" .ractical in thin2ing about their -or2. <ut it is often tem.ting (for those -ithin an" -ithout the mo#ement1 to set .ragmatic concerns asi"e, to treat human rights as an ob5ect of "e#otion rather than calculation. An" e#en the most intense .ractical e#aluations of human rights initiati#es too often sto. short of consi"ering the full range of .otential "o-n si"es or negati#e 2noc2 on conse=uences in their enthusiasm to mo#e for-ar" -ith efforts -hose u. si"e .otential seems so a..arent.

Rights should be vie ed conse!uentially $ must determine hether they are useful or not "ennedy, # (6a#i", &rofessor of 7a- at Har#ar", Har#ar" Human !ights 8ournal, $The
International Human !ights Mo#ement9 &art of the &roblem:' #ol. *;, S.ring +,,+, ---.la-.har#ar".e"u/stu"ents/orgs/hr5/iss*;/2enne"y.shtml1

C. Some Criticisms 7eft Off the 7ist In 2ee.ing -ith this focus on usefulness, I ha#e left off the list criticisms of human rights that are not cast in .ragmatic terms. For e>am.le, the "ebate about -hether human rights $really e>ist' or are $5ust' the .ro"uct of efforts to articulate an" use them. Although I fin" it har" to ta2e too seriously the i"ea that rights e>ist in some -ay, let us assume that they "o, an" that the human rights mo#ement is getting better an" better at "isco#ering an" articulating them. If it turne" out that "oing so cause" more misery than it alle#iate", as a goo")hearte" legal .rofessional, I -oul" a"#ocate our "oing all -e can to 2ee. the e>istence of rights a secret. In a similar -ay, if it turns out that rights are $5ust' a fantasy, a social construction, an" so forth, that tells us nothing about -hether they are useful or not. If they are more useful than not, more .o-er to the society that constructe" them.

%ust e&amine the actual impacts of protecting human rights $ hether a social consensus e&ists is irrelevant "ennedy, # (6a#i", &rofessor of 7a- at Har#ar", Har#ar" Human !ights 8ournal, $The
International Human !ights Mo#ement9 &art of the &roblem:' #ol. *;, S.ring +,,+, ---.la-.har#ar".e"u/stu"ents/orgs/hr5/iss*;/2enne"y.shtml1

Tra"itional "ebates about -hether human rights "o or "o not e>.ress a social consensus, in one society or across the globe, are similarly besi"e the .oint. In"ee", -e coul" see them as u."ate" -ays of as2ing -hether human rights really e>ist. 7et us say they "o e>.ress a social consensus?

ho- "oes this affect their usefulness: &erha.s being able to say they e>.ress consensus -ea2ens them, thins them out, s2e-s their usefulness in #arious -ays, .erha.s it strengthens them. To "eci"e, as my gran"mother use" to as2 $-hether that@s a goo" thing or a ba" thing' -e still nee" to 2no- -hether once strengthene" or s2e-e" or -ea2ene" or -hate#er they are useful, an" if so for -hat an" for -hom. Similarly "ebate about -hether human rights $tal2' is or is not coherent. 7et@s say the human rights #ocabulary, institutional a..aratus, e#en the soul of the human rights a"#ocate, is ri""le" -ith contra"ictions that -oul" not stan" u. to logical scrutiny for a minute. Ano-ing only this "oes not mo#e us any closer to an un"erstan"ing of -hether they are .art of the .roblem or the solution. &erha.s ambi#alent .orosity is their secret strength?to the e>tent human rights is useful, -e shoul" then be grateful for the contra"ictions. &erha.s incoherence is a fatal -ea2ness, but if human rights creates more .roblems than it sol#es, this -oul" be all to the goo".

'ther Concerns 'ut eigh

'ther obligations override the duty to shun $ self preservation and interests of state (eversluis, )* (4ric H. A.ril *BCB. $On Shunning %n"esirable !egimes9 4thics an"
4conomic Sanctions.' &ublic Affairs Duarterly, A.ril, #ol. E, no. +1 Fhat 2in"s of obligations can o#erri"e the "uty to shun: A clear e>am.le is the obligation of self).reser#ation. If to shun the only grocer in to-n means to star#e, then my "uty of self) .reser#ation o#erri"es the "uty to shun. On the le#el of relations bet-een states the essential interests of the state ha#e a similar claim. If there are such essential interests of a state (for e>am.le, .reser#ation of bor"ers an" internal security1, then the "uty to .rotect those interests may -ell o#erri"e a "uty to shun. An argument that too much %nite" States .ressure on the So#iet %nion regar"ing human rights -oul" un"ermine the relationshi. bet-een these countries necessary for -oul" .eace -oul" be of this 2in". Another e>am.le might be an argument that a nation ought not to alienate a tra"ing .artner -ho is the only source of a #ital im.ort. Fhile these arguments might surely be use" in ba" faith to a#oi" an incon#enient "uty to shun, that "oes not ren"er them in#ali". Thus there may be, but nee" not be any hy.ocrisy or inconsistency in shunning one nation for a certain attac2 on the moral or"er but not shunning another for an e=ually serious attac2

+uclear ,ar 'ut eighs

Any use of nuclear eapons ris-s e&tinction $ this nullifies all calculations of costs and benefits and must be avoided at all costs "ateb, *# ))) &rofessor of &olitics an" 6irector of the &rogram in &olitical &hiloso.hy at
&rinceton (George, The Inner Ocean, ..**,)***1 The highest -orth of Schell's boo2 lies in his insistence that -e shoul" all contem.late the nuclear situation from the .ers.ecti#e of .ossible human e>tinction an" be o#ercome by the obligation, no matter -hat, to try to a#oi" human e>tinction. Het as Schell says, human e>tinction (as -ell as the e>tinction of most s.ecies in nature1 is not the intention of anyone in .o-er. Fhat must be seen is that the absolute en" can come about e#en though no one inten"s it. IFe can "o it,I he says, Ionly if -e "on't =uite 2no- -hat -e're "oing.I Schell's -or2 attem.ts to force on us an ac2no-le"gment that soun"s far)fetche" an" e#en lu"icrous, an ac2no-le"gment that the .ossibility of e>tinction is carrie" by any use of nuclear -ea.ons, no matter ho- limite" or ho- seemingly rational or seemingly morally 5ustifie". He himself ac2no-le"ges that there is a "ifference bet-een .ossibility an" certainty. <ut in a matter that is more than a matter, more than one .ractical matter in a #ast series of .ractical matters, in the ImatterI of e>tinction, -e are oblige" to treat a .ossibility)a genuine .ossibility)as a certainty. Humanity is not to ta-e any step that contains even the slightest ris- of e&tinction. The "octrine of no)use is base" on the .ossibility of e>tinction. Schell's .ers.ecti#e transforms the sub5ect. He ta2es us a-ay from the ari" stretches of strategy an" as2s us to feel continuously, if '-e can, an" feel 2eenly if only for an instant no- an" then, ho- utterly "istinct the nuclear -orl" is. 3uclear "iscourse must #i#i"ly register that "istincti#e)ness. It is of no moral account that e>tinction may be only a slight .ossibility. 3o one can say ho- great the .ossibility is, but no one has yet cre"ibly "enie" that by some se=uence or other a .articular use of nuclear -ea.ons may lea" to human an" natural e>tinction. .f it is not impossible it must be treated as certain/ the loss signified by e&tinction nullifies all calculations of probability as it nullifies all calculations of costs and benefits.

Any nuclear use ris-s e&tinction "ateb, *# ))) &rofessor of &olitics an" 6irector of the &rogram in &olitical &hiloso.hy at
&rinceton (George, The Inner Ocean, ..**,)**+1 Abstractly .ut, the connections bet-een any use of nuclear -ea.ons an" human an" natural e>tinction are se#eral. Most ob#iously, a si able e>change of strategic nuclear -ea.ons can, by a chain of e#ents in nature, lea" to the earth's uninhabitability, to Inuclear -inter,I or to Schell's Ire.ublic of insects an" grass.I <ut the consi"eration of e>tinction cannot rest -ith the .ossibility of a si able e>change of strategic -ea.ons. It cannot rest -ith the im.erati#e that a si able e>change must not ta2e .lace. A so)calle" tactical or ItheaterI use, or a so)calle" limite" use, is also prohibited absolutely, because of the .ossibility of immediate escalation into a si0able e&change or because, e#en if there -ere not an imme"iate escalation, the .ossibility of e>tinction -oul" resi"e in the precedent for future use set by any use -hate#er in a -orl" in -hich more than one .o-er .ossesses nuclear -ea.ons. A"" other conse=uences9 the contagious effect on nonnuclear .o-ers -ho may feel com.elle" by a mi>ture of fear an" #anity to try to ac=uire their o-n -ea.ons, thus increasing the .ossibility of use by increasing the number of nuclear .o-ersJ an"

the unleashe" emotions of in"ignation, retribution, an" re#enge -hich, if not acte" on imme"iately in the form of escalation, can be counte" on to see2 e>.ression later. Other than full strategic uses are not confine", no matter ho- small the e>.losi#e .o-er9 each -oul" be a cancerous transformation of the -orl". All nuclear roads lea" to the .ossibility of e>tinction. It is true by "efinition, but let us ma2e it e>.licit9 the "octrine of no)use e>clu"es any first or retaliatory or later use, -hether si able or not. 3o)use is the imperative "eri#e" from the .ossibility of e>tinction.

1ngagement (est 2 Sanctions 3ail

4he empirical evidence necessitates economic engagement based on the situation, not absolute principles 3orcese, # (Craig, <A, McGillJ MA, CarletonJ 77.<., Otta-aJ 77.M., HaleJ Member of the <ars
of 3e- Hor2, Ontario an" the 6istrict of Columbia. Hale Human !ights K 6e#elo.ment 7a8ournal, $Globali ing 6ecency9 !es.onsible 4ngagement in an 4ra of 4conomic Integration,' ; Hale H.!. K 6e#. 7.8. *, 7e>is)3e>is %ni#erse1

Clearly, assessing the merits of these t-o contrasting #isions ) economic engagement as .anacea #ersus economic engagement as #illain ) is an em.irical e>ercise. Het, the em.irical e#i"ence, such as it is, is neither entirely "ismissi#e nor com.letely su..orti#e of either .osition, at least -hen e>amine" -ith an eye to human rights. Instea", these "ata ten" to su..ort a nuance" a..roach to constructi#e engagement, one that might be terme" Ires.onsible engagement.I In .articular, engagement is a..ro.riate so long as it "oes not in"uce the #ery human rights ills it is sai" to cure. Fhere constructi#e engagement #ia economic integration augments the staying .o-er of a human rights)abusing regime, or .rom.ts it to engage in a""itional human rights abuses, the net im.act of that integration may not be .ositi#e. In these circumstances, the a..ro.riate .olicy res.onse -ill be economic "isengagement. Accor"ingly, un"er a res.onsible engagement mo"el, there remains an im.ortant role for economic sanctions, both as a means of affecting the beha#ior of nation)states an" to sta#e off the .ossibility that citi ens of one country are contributing to the .ersistence of a re.ressi#e regime in another nation.

Shunning causes in5ustices $ it should be avoided if it ill negatively impact oppressed people (eversluis, )* (4ric H. A.ril *BCB. $On Shunning %n"esirable !egimes9 4thics an"
4conomic Sanctions.' &ublic Affairs Duarterly, A.ril, #ol. E, no. +1 Finally, shunning can itself cause in5ustices. Shoul" -e shun a nation that #iolates the rights of some or all of its citi ens if the bur"en -ill fall .rimarily on those #ictims: For e>am.le, sanctions against South Africa are often re5ecte" on the groun"s that they -ill hurt the South African blac2s the most. Het it is not clear -hat -eight this argument has. Certainly shunning -ill cause economic har"shi. for South Africa, har"shi. -hich the o..ressi#e regime may -ell transfer to the blac2 .eo.le. <ut the o..resse" .eo.le may -elcome that a""itional bur"en, since it may, as it -ere, lighten their o#erall bur"en by recogni ing their .light an" their -orth (lLtlr"e, "ignity1 as human beings. It may gi#e them the moral encouragement nee"e" to carryon their struggle. Finally, the cries of the blac2 .eo.le against a.arthei", along -ith their stri2es an" boycotts, seem to be e#i"ence that they themsel#es are -illing to ma2e the sacrifices to fight a.arthei". In other cases, ho-e#er, the bur"en of shunning may in no -ay hel. the o..resse" .eo.le. Then shunning itself -oul" clearly be un5ust an" shoul" not be "oneJ alternati#e sanctions must be "e#ise" -hich -ill affect the offen"ing members of the society.

US sanctions ma-e human rights violations even orse Hadar, *) (7eon T. Ha"ar is an a"5unct scholar of the Cato Institute, Tra"e &olicy Analysis
3o. * March +M, *BBC, %.S. SA3CTIO3S AGAI3ST <%!MA9 A Failure on All Fronts, htt.9//---.cato.org/.ubs/tra"e/t.a),,*.html1

&resent %.S. .olicy to-ar" <urma is not going to bring meaningful change in the human rights .ractices of the regime an" -ill .robably ma2e the ba" situation in <urma e#en -orse. Sanctions strengthen the han" of the ruling authorities by creating a sca.egoat for their o-n internal .olicy failures an" narro-ing the o..ortunity of .ri#ate in"i#i"uals in <urma to e>.an" their economic, social, an" cultural contacts -ith the citi ens of the Fest.

Sanctions damage targeted populations more than governments 3orcese, # (Craig, <A, McGillJ MA, CarletonJ 77.<., Otta-aJ 77.M., HaleJ Member of the <ars
of 3e- Hor2, Ontario an" the 6istrict of Columbia. Hale Human !ights K 6e#elo.ment 7a8ournal, $Globali ing 6ecency9 !es.onsible 4ngagement in an 4ra of 4conomic Integration,' ; Hale H.!. K 6e#. 7.8. *, 7e>is)3e>is %ni#erse1

In a similar #ein, in a stu"y focusing on the utility of sanctions for mi""le .o-ers, 3ossal argue" that Isanctions are, on balance, a normati#ely ba" .olicy instrument9 not only are they generally ineffecti#e in .ro"ucing .olitical change in the target nation, but they also are a #iolent, blunt, an" gen"ere" tool of statecraft.I C, 3ossal #ie-e" sanctions intro"uce" by mi""le .o-ers li2e Cana"a an" Australia as Irain "ances,I "escribe" as measures satisfying "omestic constituencies -ithout ha#ing a..reciable im.act on the .olitical beha#ior of the sanctione" country. C* More than ineffecti#e, sanctions ha#e a "iscernable negati#e im.act on the most #ulnerable .o.ulations, lea#ing the .olitical elite untouche". These conclusions are affirme" by a no- #ast literature on the often)"e#astating humanitarian Isi"e)effectsI of sanctions. C+

US sanctions undermine human rights efforts and deny people around the orld e&posure to American values Hadar, *) (7eon T. Ha"ar is an a"5unct scholar of the Cato Institute, Tra"e &olicy Analysis
3o. * March +M, *BBC, %.S. SA3CTIO3S AGAI3ST <%!MA9 A Failure on All Fronts, htt.9//---.cato.org/.ubs/tra"e/t.a),,*.html1

Sanctions Fall Har"est on &eo.le of <urma Fhat really matters is that the <urma sanctions ha#e not -or2e" to achie#e their .olitical goals of "omestic change. The S7O!C/S&C6 5unta remains in control an" is not facing any serious challenge to its .o-er. As many of the businesses o.erating in <urma ha#e .ointe" out , the sanctions6 main victims are the (urmese people themselves. Fhen it comes to a"#ancing .olitical an" economic reforms, %.S. com.anies in <urma are .art of the solution, not the .roblem. IThe .resence of %.S. com.anies abroa" hel.s to .romote the #alues -e as a nation es.ouse, inclu"ing human rights an" fair labor stan"ar"s,I note" 4rnest <o-er, .resi"ent of the %.S.)AS4A3 Council an" one of the lea"ing o..onents of sanctions. %.S. com.anies train -or2ers an" transfer technology more rea"ily than "o their Asian an" 4uro.ean com.etitors. They .romote "emocratic #alues, set a .ositi#e e>am.le, an" im.ro#e the general =uality of life by .ro#i"ing fair .ay, safe -or2ing con"itions, an" health an" e"ucation benefits. American foreign in#estment in <urma Iis an e>tremely effecti#e means of a"#ancing economic an" social "e#elo.ment, an" shoul" not be aban"one" in fa#or of measures -hich ha#e no chance of success,I argue" <o-er.(EE1

US sanctions do more harm than good, they have caused more death than Hiroshima and +agasa-i combined S1A4471 8'S4 May **, 9*** (MICHA47 &A%7SO3, S4ATT74 &OST)I3T477IG43C4!
!4&O!T4!, $History of %.S. sanctions sho-s most ha#en't -or2e",' htt.9//seattle.i.n-source.com/ira=/sanction.shtml1
For more than t-o millenia, countries ha#e been attem.ting to influence one another's beha#ior by im.osing economic sanctions. In NE+ <.C., officials in Athens "enie" tra"ers from the state of Megara access to Athens' harbor an" its mar2et.lace. That first recor"e" use of economic sanctions "i"n't -or2, an" instea" hel.e" .reci.itate the &elo.onnesian Far, a horrific an" lengthy conflict that brought an en" to the fle"gling Gree2 "emocracy. 3early +,;,, years later the use of economic sanctions has become

the %nite" States uses sanctions in an effort to "issua"e nations from ta2ing un"esirable actions )) su..orting terrorism, .roliferating -ea.ons of mass "estruction, #iolating human rights, traffic2ing in "rugs or "es.oiling the en#ironment . (See ma. sho-ing nations un"er sanction.1 <ut li2e the Megarians, many of the targets of %.S. sanctions )) countries such as Ira=, Iran an" Cuba )) "o not change their beha#ior in the face of sanctions, accor"ing to numerous stu"ies. To"ay, the %nite" States' use of
increasingly common )) an" contro#ersial. 7i2e the Athenians,

economic sanctions )) generally "efine" as restrictions on foreign commerce for .ur.oses of foreign .olicy or national security )) is un"er fire. 7a-ma2ers in Congress ha#e intro"uce" .ro.osals that -oul" ma2e it har"er to im.ose economic sanctions, an" &resi"ent Clinton has ta2en ste.s to e>em.t foo" an" me"icine from sanctions. His a"ministration has .le"ge" to su..ort broa"er reform of sanctions .olicy. The .ressure to change sanctions .olicy has come largely from business interests, inclu"ing The <oeing Co. an" Fashington state's agricultural in"ustry, -ho com.lain that they are losing e>.ort mar2ets all o#er the -orl" because Congress an" the .resi"ent are too =uic2 to

<ut the business community has foun" an unli2ely ally in human rights acti#ists, -ho argue that economic sanctions often hurt innocent ci#ilians, most notably in Ira=. The acti#ists ha#e struc2 a chor" in Seattle, lea"ing to anti)sanctions .rotests an" #igils. Acti#ists ha#e le" grou.s of .hysicians an" others to Ira= -ith me"icine, e=ui.ment an" me"ical te>ts, hich is not allo ed ithout State :epartment approval. ISanctions ha#e become a chea. -ay of "oing foreign .olicy, e>ce.t the costs are often really =uite terrible,I says 8ohn Mueller, a .olitical scientist at the %ni#ersity of !ochester, -ho argues that sanctions shoul" be narro-ly focuse" on technologies usable by the military, an" shoul" not inclu"e foo" an" me"icine. IIt's not li2e blo-ing u. a buil"ing, -here you can count cor.ses, but it's much -orse,I sai" Mueller, referring to estimates that tens of thousan"s of Ira=i chil"ren ha#e "ie" from malnutrition)relate" "iseases because of a lac2 of foo" an" me"icine. ;+umerically, the deaths in .ra! are orse than Hiroshima and +agasa-i combined.; A *BB( stu"y by the Institute for International 4conomics foun" that since *B(,, unilateral %.S. sanctions ha" achie#e" foreign .olicy goals only *E .ercent of the time. The stu"y also conclu"e" that sanctions are costing the %nite" States O*; billion to O*B billion annually in .otential e>.orts. Sanctions ha#e not le" to "emocratic changes in Cuba, Ira= or Iran, an" the unambiguous threat of sanctions "i" not "eter In"ia an" &a2istan from testing nuclear -ea.ons last year. Still, there ha#e been successes. Most recently, 7ibyan strongman Moammar Ga"hafi agree" to turn o#er for trial t-o sus.ects in the *BCC bombing of &am Am
im.ose sanctions.

Flight *,E, -hich 2ille" +(,. The %nite" 3ations in return sus.en"e" sanctions against 7ibya, -hich inclu"e" cri..ling bans on international air tra#el an" sales of -ea.ons an" oil in"ustry e=ui.ment. IFinally, "i.lomacy an" sanctions ha#e .ro"uce" the result -e -ante",I Clinton sai". Sanctions also .laye" a role in hel.ing to force the a.arthei" go#ernment of South Africa to allo- "emocratic elections, an" State 6e.artment officials claim economic sanctions hel.e" force Serbia to the negotiating table o#er the -ar in <osnia an" limite" Ira='s ability to rebuil" its military after the *BB* Gulf Far. A recent stu"y by the Center for Strategic an" International Stu"ies cite" three other successes9 bloc2ing the !ussian transfer of so.histicate" cryogenic roc2et engines to In"ia after tra"e sanctions -ere threatene" in 8uly *BBEJ halting South African arms shi.ments to Syria after a %.S. threat to -ithhol" ai" in 8anuary *BB(, an" im.osing targete" sanctions against China to cease e>.orts of sensiti#e military e=ui.ment. 4stimates of the brea"th of economic sanctions #ary -i"ely. The 3ational Association of Manufacturers claims that N+ .ercent of the -orl"'s .o.ulation li#es in countries sanctione" by the

Sanctions are im.ose" or threatene" against (; countries, ranging from Angola to Paire, for beha#iors ranging from su..ort for terrorism to failure to a"e=uately .rotect sea turtles, accor"ing to a stu"y by Clinton's 4>.ort Council. IFhat you'#e got no- is a situation -here if the e>ecuti#e branch -ere to im.lement e#erything in sanctions la-s, there's har"ly a country on 4arth -e -oul"n't ha#e trouble -ith,I sai" !e.. 8im Mc6ermott, 6)Fash., a sanctions critic. The State 6e.artment
%nite" States. Accor"ing to the Congressional !esearch Ser#ice, by the en" of *BB( there -ere *B* "ifferent sanctions being im.ose" by the %nite" States.

agrees that the use of sanctions has multi.lie" in the *BB,s. That agency says the %nite" States has a..lie" sanctions for foreign .olicy .ur.oses **; times since Forl" Far I, inclu"ing M* times since *BBE. IHo-e#er you "o the arithmetic, there certainly ha#e been =uite a number of sanctions initiati#es coming out of the Congress recently, an" some of them ha#e been relati#ely high .rofile,I sai" Assistant Secretary of State Alan 7arson. Some of the sanctions are =uite e>tensi#e. The %nite" States maintains broa" unilateral sanctions against Cuba, Iran, Ira=, 7ibya, 3orth Aorea an" the Su"an, although there are no- some e>em.tions for foo" an" me"icine. Together -ith the %nite" 3ations, the %nite" States also su..orts broa" multilateral sanctions against Angola, 7iberia, !-an"a, Sierra 7eone, Somalia an" Hugosla#ia. <ut there are a raft of countries sub5ecte" to more s.ecific sanctions, res.on"ing to a .articular beha#ior, an" barring a .articular im.ort or a certain ty.e of go#ernment assistance. For instance, Gambia an" <urun"i ha#e been "enie" money from the O#erseas &ri#ate In#estment Cor.. because of military cou.s there. 4uro.ean go#ernments ha#e been increasingly reluctant to im.ose sanctions )) .referring the same strategy of engagement that the %nite" States es.ouses -hen it comes to China )) an" so, increasingly, sanctions are being im.ose" unilaterally. The Clinton a"ministration argues that although multilateral sanctions are .referable because they are more effecti#e, unilateral sanctions are often the only alternati#e. IIf -e are unsuccessful in buil"ing a multilateral regime, an" im.ortant national interests or core #alues are at issue, -e must be .re.are" to act unilaterally,I sai" %n"ersecretary of State Stuart 4i enstat. IFe cannot .ermit other countries to #eto our use of sanctions by their failure to act.I Many scholars an" members of Congress call economic sanctions a 2in" of foreign .olicy on the chea., because sanctions are generally less e>.ensi#e an" less contro#ersial than military inter#ention. IThis has been a .henomenon of the last fi#e years, an" it has come about because members of Congress, an" sometimes the a"ministration, -ant to sho- "is.leasure to #arious countries -ho ha#e a"o.te" human rights .olicies -ith -hich -e "isagree, or ha#e curtaile" free"om of religion, or ha#e threatene" their neighbors,I sai" Sen. !ichar" 7ugar, !)In"., the lea"ing congressional critic of %.S. sanctions .olicy. I

&utting a sanction on a country al-ays seems to be an ine>.ensi#e -ay to a""ress

the .roblem. . . . %nfortunately, almost none of these sanctions ha#e brought about change . . . an" I thin2 they ha#e le" to a si able loss of foreign tra"e.I