Critical Node Identication of Smart Power System Using Complex Network Framework Based Centrality Approach

A. B. M. Nasiruzzaman and H. R. Pota

School of Engineering and Information Technology University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy (UNSW@ADFA) Northcott Drive, Canberra, ACT 2600, Australia Email: nasiruzzaman@ieee.org, h.pota@adfa.edu.au

AbstractA method of critical node identication in a power system is presented in this paper. Maximum ow in a network is used to measure centrality of various nodes in the power system. The proposed approach is an improvement of previous methodology in the sense that it does not take into consideration shortest electrical distance as path to ow power. Instead of using normal steady-state condition maximum possible ow is considered. Simulation of various standard test systems are carried out to identify critical nodes.

I. I NTRODUCTION There are some critical components in various networks which when removed from the system either accidentally or deliberately can make the system vulnerable to failure or hazard. In the case of a power system either link or node removal can cause serious impact on normal system operation. Removal of transmission lines from the system shifts the load of that line to other intact lines in order to match the load demand of the network. But this may overload other portions of the network which can trigger relay operation to disconnect some more links from the system. So, a cascading effect can occur and eventually a large portion or the whole network may suffer from total power loss. In the case of node removal much more serious and fast network loss may occur. Generally, nodes i.e., generating stations or substations are connected to other nodes via several links. Malfunction of one node can cause removal of some lines to aid in cascading failure. Complex network theory has been used to model and analyze several aspects of power system networks. The structural vulnerability of the North American power grid was studied after the August 2003 blackout affecting the United States [1]. Similarly, the large scale blackouts and cascading failures motivated the analysis of Italian power grid based on the model for cascading failures [2]. Vulnerability analysis models [3] [5] were initially proposed for complex abstract networks analysis and were then used in power systems [1], [2], [6] [8]. The application of the original ideas in [3] [5] did not capture essential power system characteristics since the ideas were based on abstract networks. Therefore, there are good

prospects for researchers to further investigate the complex problems by considering power system characteristics and complex network theory together. Particularly, electric power networks are quite different from those abstract networks. They are governed by Ohms and Kirchhoffs laws. The special characteristics result in a unique pattern of interaction between nodes in power grids. In order to measure the performance of the power grid globally and locally, the concept of network efciency was introduced in [4]. The model of cascading failure in power grid was also discussed. It modeled the power system as Boolean network. A weighted line betweenness was used to nd out critical links which considered only generations and neglected load of the system [9]. A betweenness index based on the position and power owing in the line was proposed to identify critical lines in a power system [10]. It was observed that the system is quite robust to random attacks and there is hardly any effect on the efciency if lines are randomly selected and removed but it was fragile to targeted attacks. It considered reactance as the weight of the network and neglected resistance when modeling. A hybrid approach for structural vulnerability analysis of power transmission networks, in which a DC power ow model and overloading of lines is embedded into the traditional methodology to form a new scheme for power grids vulnerability assessment and modeling, was proposed [11]. Admittance was considered as weight matrix. In our past research [12], we modeled the power system as a directed graph with graph weights corresponding to line admittance value. AC load ow was conducted to measure the betweenness of lines in order to rank the critical lines. The redistribution of load on nodes due to cascading failure of certain important nodes was demonstrated in [13]. A simple model was introduced to explain why large but rare cascade triggered by small initial shocks are present in most of the complex communication or transportation networks [5]. It was shown that it is only the breakdown of a selected minority of the nodes that can trigger the collapse of the system. A vulnerability index was proposed based on power owing in

the connecting lines of a node [14]. These models are initial attempts to explain and model the cascading event in a power system. Power ow may vary from time to time depending on load demand and generations available. So instead of using a xed power ow model we can use a dynamic one. Also, power does not always ow via the shortest path from source node to sink node which was the main assumptions of previous researchers. This limitation was identied and a new maximum-ow based centrality approach was proposed to identify critical lines in a power system in [15]. In this paper we apply this concept to nd out critical nodes of the power system. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes a model for analyzing power system within the context of complex networks. Section III describes critical node identication procedure using maximum ow based approach. Some concluding remarks are given in Section IV. II. M ODELING OF A P OWER S YSTEM FOR C RITICAL N ODE I DENTIFICATION To analyze the power system within the context of complex network theory, the rst step is to model the system as a graph [16]. From the perspective of network theory, a graph is an abstract representation of a set of objects, called nodes or vertices, where some pairs of the objects are connected via links or edges. The power system of today is a complex interconnected network which can be subdivided into four major parts of generation, transmission, distribution and loads [17]. To portray the assemblage of various components of power system, engineers use single-line or one-line diagrams which provide signicant information about the system in a concise form [18]. Power is supplied form the generator nodes to the load nodes via transmission and/or distribution lines. Since for a given operating condition, power ows only in one direction, a directed graph can be easily constructed from the singleline representation of the power system considering various generators, bus bars, substations, or loads of the system as nodes or vertices and transmission lines and transformers as edges or links between various nodes of the system. The principle of mapping is described as follows: all impedances between any bus and neutral are neglected, all transmission and/or distribution lines are modeled except for the local lines in the plants and substations, all transmission lines and transformers are modeled as weighted lines, the weight is equal to optimum power owing in the network, and parallel lines between buses are modeled as an equivalent single line. To illustrate mapping of a single-line diagram to a graph, a simple 5 bus test system [17] is used here. Fig. 1 depicts the the test system with 5 bus bars and 7 links connecting them. Columns 15 of Table I gives the system data for the network of Fig. 1. Fig. 2 is the corresponding mapped graph from the original 5 bus system. It contains 5 nodes/vertices which correspond to the slack, voltage-controlled, and load bus bars

V=1.06 pu

30 MW, V=1.03 pu

0.08+j0.24 0.02+j0.06
20 MW 15 Mvar

0.01+j0.03
50 MW 30 Mvar

0.04+j0.12
20 MW 10 Mvar 40 MW, V=1.045 pu

60 MW 40 Mvar

Fig. 1.

Simple 5 bus test system.

TABLE I S YSTEM D ATA FOR THE N ETWORK IN F IG . 1 From Bus 1 1 2 2 2 3 4 To Bus 2 3 3 4 5 4 5 R in pu 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.08 X in pu 0.06 0.24 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.03 0.24
1 B 2 in pu 0.030 0.025 0.020 0.020 0.015 0.010 0.025

Optimum Power 16.13 7.52 4.61 13.21 47.70 50.95 13.71

of the original system. The transmission lines are represented by the 7 links/edges which connects various nodes. The weight of the lines in Fig. 2 is the optimum power owing in the lines. The fuel cost functions for three thermal power plants in buses 1, 2, and 3 in $/h required for optimal power ow solution are given by:
2 C1 = 200 + 7.0P1 + 0.008P1 2 C3 = 140 + 6.8P3 + 0.007P3 2 C2 = 180 + 6.3P2 + 0.009P2

0.08+j0.24

(1)

The real power limits of these generators are given as: 10M W P1 85M W 10M W P2 80M W 10M W P3 70M W (2)

The optimum power ow calculation for this network is continued until the absolute value of difference between the scheduled slack generation, determined from the coordination equation, and the slack generation, obtained from the power ow solution, is within a pre-specied limit. In this case, we have taken this limit as 0.001 MW. The optimum power owing in different lines is taken as weight of the directed transmission lines, which, in this case, represents the maximum power ow limits of various lines. The maximum power ow limits for various lines in this network is given in column 6 of Table I.

7.52 MW 16.13 MW

50.95 MW

47.70 MW

Fig. 2.

Physical topology graph of simple 5 bus system.

Any power system network can be represented by a graph G = (V, E, W ) comprising of a set V , whose elements are called vertices or nodes, a set E of ordered pairs of vertices, called edges or lines. From the node set V , we can nd two subsets S and L, where, s S represents source nodes in the power network and l L is the set of load nodes in the system. An element e = (x, y ) of the edge set E , is considered to be directed from x to y , where, y is called the head and x is called the tail of the edge. A set W , whose elements are weights of edge set elements. There exists a one-to-one correspondence between set E and set W . Networks can have weights on their edges which indicate that some edges are stronger or more prominent than others. In some cases, these weights can represent capacities of the edges to conduct a ow of some kind [19]. In the case of a power network the edge weights can represent the strength of the lines to aid in power ow through the network. Alternatively, every line has some maximum capacity of power ow which can act as a weight of edges if needed. In our current modeling in this paper, the maximum power transfer capacity of a line is considered as the weight of the lines. For the network in Fig. 1, V = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, E = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3), (2, 4), (2, 5), (3, 4), (4, 5)}, and W = {16.13, 7.52, 4.61, 13.21, 47.70, 50.95, 13.71}. Also, S = {1, 2, 3} and L = {2, 3, 4, 5} III. C RITICAL N ODE I DENTIFICATION OF P OWER G RID A. Shortest Electrical Path In a power grid with n buses represented as a graph G = (V, E, W ), the shortest electrical path between any two buses is the path which has minimum electrical distance between them. As a distance measure, we have several options. Power World Simulator [20] provides several important distance measure options like per unit series reactance, magnitude of series impedance, length of the transmission lines, number of nodes in the path etc. In this paper, we have used absolute measure of impedance, |Z |, as weight of the line. For example, if we want to nd shortest electrical path between buses 2 and 3, several paths are possible as given in Fig. 3. We can clearly see that the shortest path between buses 2 and 3 is 2 3 whose weight is 0.19 pu. Several efcient algorithms are available to nd all possible shortest path in a network. In this paper we have used bioinformatics toolbox of MATLAB to nd shortest electrical

13.71 MW

Fig. 4. Network efciency deterioration of IEEE 30 bus system with targeted node and line removal.

path between various buses which uses Johnsons algorithm that has a time complexity of O(N log (N ) + N E ), where N and E are the number of nodes and edges respectively [21]. B. Node Removal and Network Efciency of Power Grid Removal of nodes with high degree, i.e., nodes which have more connections than nodes with low degree causes more damages in the network. In addition, targeted links removal also can cause signicant deterioration of performance of a network. Link or node which is most critical is an open research question [22]. A targeted node and link removal from IEEE 30 bus system and the calculated network efciency, E , given in [10] is shown in Fig. 4, which suggests in our case node removal have much serious consequence. E= 1 n(n 1) 1 |Zij | (3)

i=j V

where, |Zij | is the absolute value of the series impedance of the shortest electrical path between buses i and j . C. Maximum Flow Based Critical Node Analysis Given a power grid, we can nd how much maximum power can be transferred through the network from a source node s S to a load node l L, where s = l V from the maximum-ow problem [23]. There are many algorithms to solve this problem [19]and in this paper we have used MATLABs bioinformatics toolbox which uses Goldberg algorithm so solve maximum ow problem. The idea behind this problem is to push as much power possible to transfer from the source node s to load node l within the network modeled as a graph G = (V, E, W ). Various extremities in the network are explored with all source and load combinations. Solutions of maximum ow problem for various source-load combinations are given in Fig. 5. For example, in the network of Fig. 5(b) to transfer power from source bus 1 to load bus 3 two possible paths are 1 3 and 1 2 3. The path 1 3 has a capacity of 7.52 MW. In the path 1 2 3, path 1 3 has a capacity of 16.13 MW, but the maximum limit of path 2 3 is 4.61 MW. So, only 4.61 MW of power is transferred via

1
0.25

3
0.03

1
0.25

3
0.03

0.06

0.06

0.25

0.13

0.13

2 1
0.25

5 4
0.03

2 1
0.25

5 4
0.03

0.06

0.06

0.25

0.19

0.19

0.13

0.13

2
Fig. 3.

Several possible paths between nodes 2 and 3 of the simple 5 bus system.

TABLE II VARIOUS P OWER IN M AXIMUM F LOW N ETWORK OF F IG . 1 From Bus 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 To Bus 2 3 4 5 3 4 5 2 4 5 Maximum Power 16.13 12.13 23.65 23.65 4.61 17.83 61.41 0.00 50.95 13.71 Intermediate Bus Bus 2 Bus 3 0.00 0.00 4.61 0.00 16.13 10.44 16.13 7.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.61 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Powers Bus 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.52 0.00 0.00 13.71 0.00 0.00 13.71

Fk =
Bus 5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
sS lL

sl Fk

0.25

9 0.1

9 0.1

0.25

9 0.1

0.19

9 0.1

0.19

(4)

Bus 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

where, s = l = k . Also let, FG is the net maximum power owing in the networks with source node s S and load node l L, which is dened mathematically as: FG =
sS lL sl FG

(5)

path 1 2 3. So, the maximum possible power transfer in the network of Fig. 5(b) is 7.52 + 4.61 = 12.13 MW. In this maximum ow of 12.13, node 2 carries power 4.51 MW. There is no possible ow from node 3 to 2. This case is illustrated in Fig. 5(h). Similar data for the simple 5 bus system is given in Table II. Now, the importance of a node has within a network can be quantied by how much power is transferred via the node within various possible maximum ow networks. This gives us a measure of centrality, called betweenness in social science [24], which can be used to identify critical lines in the network. D. Denition Let, Fk is the net maximum power owing through intermediate node k in the networks with source node s S and load node l L. Then Fk could be dened mathematically as:

The ratio of these two power could be used as a measure of importance, called betweenness, of various nodes of the system. The betweenness of node k is dened as: CB (k ) = Fk FG (6)

sl is the maximum possible ow through node k in the Fk network G = (V, E, W ) with source node s and load node l. sl FG is the maximum ow in the network G = (V, E, W ) with source node s and load node l. The numerator of the centrality equation is the sum of maximum possible ow through vertex k in various sourcenode combinations of network where k is neither source nor load The denominator is the maximum ow in the network for various source-node combinations where k is neither source nor load. This gives us a normalized measure of betweenness for vertex k , which was originally proposed in [15] for unidirectional networks. But now since bi-directional power ow is a vision of modern smart power system we have modied the equations for our use.

1
7.52 MW 16.13 MW

3
50.95 MW

1
7.52 MW 4.61 MW

3
50.95 MW

13.71 MW

13.21

MW

4.6

13.21

MW

47.70 MW

47.70 MW

a) 1-2

b) 1-3

1
7.52 MW 16.13 MW

3
10.44 MW

1
7.52 MW 16.13 MW

3
7.52 MW

13.71 MW

W 1M 4 .6

W 1M

1
7.52 MW 16.13 MW

3
50.95 MW

13.71 MW

7.52 MW

2.9

1 MW 13.2

1 MW 13.2

1M 4 .6

1 MW 13.2

47.70 MW

16.13 MW

47.70 MW

c) 1-4

d) 1-5

e) 2-3

1
7.52 MW 16.13 MW

3
4.61 MW

1
7.52 MW 16.13 MW

3
0.50 MW

1
7.52 MW 16.13 MW

3
50.95 MW

13.71 MW

13.71 MW

4.6

1 MW 13.2

1 MW 13.2

1M 4 .6

1 MW 13.2

47.70 MW

47.70 MW

47.70 MW

f) 2-4

g) 2-5

h) 3-2

1
7.52 MW 16.13 MW

3
50.95 MW

1
7.52 MW 16.13 MW

3
13.71 MW

13.71 MW

MW 13.21

4.6

MW 13.21

47.70 MW

47.70 MW

i) 3-4

j) 3-5

Fig. 5.

Network efciency deterioration of IEEE 30 bus system with targeted node and line removal.

E. Example For the network in Fig. 1 the betweenness of node 2 is: F2 CB (2) = FG (7) FG =
sl FG s{1,2,3} l{2,3,4,5} 12 13 14 15 =FG + FG + FG + FG 23 24 25 + FG + FG + FG 32 34 35 + FG + FG + FG

where, F2 , the summation of maximum powers owing through intermediate node 2 in the networks with source node s {1, 2, 3} and load node l {2, 3, 4, 5} can be found as: F2 = =
sl F2 s{1,2,3} l{2,3,4,5} 13 14 15 F2 + F2 + F2 + 34 35 F2 + F2

13.71 MW

W 1M 4 .6

W 1M

(9)

=16.13 + 12.13 + 23.65 + 23.65 + 4.61 + 17.83 + 61.41 + 0.00 + 50.95 + 13.71 =224.07 So, the betweenness of node 2, CB (2), is 36.87/224.07 = 0.16. Similarly, betweennesses for other buses could be found which is given in Table III. F. Simulation of Various Standard Test System Various standard test systems are simulated to identify critical lines in the system [25]. The top ten critical lines for

(8)

= (4.61 + 16.13 + 16.13 + 0.00 + 0.00)M W = 36.87M W and FG for the overall network in Fig. 1 can be found as follows:

13.71 MW

W 1M

W 0M 0 .5

13.71 MW

W 2M

W 1M 4 .6

TABLE III B ETWEENNESS OF S IMPLE 5 B US S YSTEM Bus k 1 2 3 4 5 Betweenness CB (k ) 0.00 0.16 0.10 0.16 0.00

TABLE IV C RITICAL N ODES OF IEEE 30 B US S YSTEM Node 4 6 2 3 12 Betweenness 0.6851 0.4177 0.3587 0.3381 0.3276 Node 15 10 28 27 9 Betweenness 0.1699 0.1482 0.1409 0.0974 0.0948

IEEE 30 bus system are tabulated in Table IV. Results for other standard test systems like IEEE 57, 118, 300 bus test systems will be presented in the conference presentation. IV. C ONCLUSION This paper is a step to analyze power system as a complex network. Some critical nodes are identied using maximumow algorithm. Resource can be allocated to regularly monitor and service the critical nodes of the system and large scale blackouts can be prevented. The method is applicable for bi-directional power ow in modern smart grid system, and used to identify critical nodes rather than links which have prominent inuence in network vulnerability. The vulnerability analysis using Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) of transmission lines and consideration of loop ow is our future work. R EFERENCES
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