Thayer Consultancy

ABN # 65 648 097 123

Background Brief Chinas Air Defence Identification Zone - 1 Carlyle A. Thayer November 25, 2013

[client name deleted] We seek your assessment regarding China's announcement on Saturday [23rd November] in setting up its first-ever air defence identification zone in the East China Sea. Queries Q1- More than 20 countries already have similar air defence zones. In what ways is China's zone cause for concern? For instance, how does China's self-identification zone rules and boundaries compare with that of other countries especially the United States and Japan? Anything unusual? ANSWER: China's Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) is special in two ways. First, China's ADIZ encompasses the air space above Japan's Senkaku Islands and it overlaps with Japan's ADIZ. This is a direct challenge to Japanese sovereignty. Further, China is demanding that all aircraft comply with its newly issued regulations. In contrast, the United States only requires planes heading directly to the U.S. to comply with its regulations on identification and communication. Q2 - Many think China's zone could possibly raise the risks of armed conflict with Japan. Do you agree and why? Is it possible that the zone, in spelling out clear rules, could instead contain the risks? Chinese and Japanese aircraft and naval vessels have engaged in numerous encounters since September last year. How would the zone change the way China would handle such encounters? ANSWER: The air space above the Senkaku islands is quite small when compared to the entire air space included in China's ADIZ. If China sends military aircraft to challenge Japanese Self-Defense Force aircraft over the Senkaku islands this would be a high risk venture that could provoke a clash or cause an accident. Such an eventuality would be nothing less than a high altitude game of chicken. China attempt unilaterally to impose its ADIZ regulations on Japanese air space increases the risk of misadventure in the air rather than containing such risks. The application of China's ADIZ elsewhere also has drawn protests from South Korea, Taiwan and the United States. China's ADIZ directly challenges the right of over flight by aircraft that are not flying directly to China. China's actions are a needless provocation.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, Chinas Air Defence Identification Zone - 1, Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, November 25, 2013. All background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the mailing list type UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key. Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.

Thayer Consultancy
ABN # 65 648 097 123

Background Brief Chinas Air Defence Identification Zone - 2 Carlyle A. Thayer November 27, 2013

[client name deleted] What is your assessment of the recent move by the US to fly B-52 bombers into the Air Defence Indentification Zone (ADIZ) just announced by China? Are you surprised at all? It seems to be quite a bold move given the fact that Washington for a long time seemed hesitant to take sides or show explicit support in such territorial disputes. Is this an indication about the US actions in the region? ANSWER: The United States has been quite clear that its defense treaty with Japan covers the Senkaku islands. This includes the land feature, territorial sea and air space. Chinas Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) covers a wider area than just the air space over the Senkakus. The US reaction was to up the ante and put the ball back in China's court. China is on notice that its actions challenge not just Japan but the United States as well. The recent flight of the B-52 bombers was a routine assertion of the right to freedom of navigation over international air space by the US. In its reaction to Chinas ADIZ the US pointedly made clear that the US ADIZ only challenged aircraft heading directly towards the United States. Air craft transiting the US ADIZ were left free to travel. The US takes the same position on international airspace as it does on international waters. The US Navy mounts calibrated challenges to nations that attempt to restrict the transit of military vessels in their Exclusive Economic Zones. The US position regarding other territorial disputes in the East China and South China Seas is not to take sides in sovereignty disputes. Since the US administered the Senkaku islands after the Second World War as part of Okinawa and later transferred them back to Japanese control, this makes this case special. The US recognizes Japanese administration over the Senkaku islands. The US actions will be quietly applauded in the region since China has indicated that it reserves the right to impose ADIZs over other maritime regions including the South China Sea. If China promulgates an ADIZ over the South China Sea this could affect Vietnamese military air patrols over the Spratly islands. Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, Chinas Air Defence Identification Zone 2, Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, November 27, 2013. All background briefs are

2 posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the mailing list type UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key. Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.

Thayer Consultancy
ABN # 65 648 097 123

Background Brief Chinas Air Defence Identification Zone - 3 Carlyle A. Thayer November 27, 2013

[client name deleted] We request your assessment of Chinas recent move to announce the demarcation of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, and the deployment of an aircraft carrier group to the South China Sea. ANSWER: Chinas promulgation of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) is a deliberate and calculated act to break the present Sino-Japanese stalemate over the Senkaku Islands. Since September last year China has steadily but carefully escalated pressure on Japan over the Senkakus. Japan has stood firm and not backed down at each challenge. Prior to this latest move China sent an unmanned drone aloft, Japan responded by stating it would shoot drones down if they entered Japanese air space. By announcing the ADIZ China is trying to muddy the legal waters over Japans claim to sovereignty over the Senkakus, its territorial sea and air space. Chinas actions are carefully calibrated. They are designed to push the envelope of Chinas claims while appearing defensive. Japan has so far lodged a diplomatic protest. Japan must also send a military patrol over the Senkakus or appear to be acquiescing to Chinas demands. This action would put the onus on China to respond. Such actions, however, are akin to a high-altitude game of chicken. If Japan tries to diffuse the situation through diplomatic means China will attempt to expand discussions to include its sovereignty dispute with Japan over the Senkakus. At present Japan denies any that there is any such dispute and refuses to discuss the matter.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, Chinas Air Defence Identification Zone - 3, Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, November 27, 2013. All background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the mailing list type UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key. Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.

Thayer Consultancy
ABN # 65 648 097 123

Background Brief China Air Zone Designed to Break Island Stalemate Carlyle A. Thayer November 29, 2013

China Air Zone Designed to Break Islands Stalemate, Says Thayer 2013-11-28 23:08:56.993 GMT By Scott Johnson Nov. 29 (Bloomberg Brief) -- Carlyle Thayer, an emeritus professor at the Australian Defense Force Academy in Canberra, spoke to Bloomberg Brief on Nov. 28 about Chinas new air- defense zone and rising tensions over the disputed islands known as Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese. Q: Why did China announce an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea -and particularly, why now? A: Well, I think there are two answers. Theres the immediate tactical situation and the long-term strategic. Ill deal with them in reverse order. This is just another step by China to exert and use international law -- the Pentagon calls it legal warfare -to advance Chinas claims to sovereignty or control over bodies of space -- water like the South China Sea and in this case the East China Sea, and over the Senkakus. In other words, by establishing an air defense identification zone that includes the Senkakus -- yes, Japan isnt going to relinquish [them], but over the long term -- its establishing that there is a dispute. We consider it ours. Weve passed legislation and issued regulations to that effect in the hopes of ensnaring Japan at some point in talks. Japan adamantly insists there is no dispute, so it doesnt want to go that route. Its a long- term Chinese strategy. I think the shorter term is that since September last year when the Senkakus controversy went on the boil again, China used all manner of naval means -including mainly paramilitary, coast guard and civilian surveillance aircraft, but also military warships -- to exert extraordinary pressure in cat-and- mouse games with Japan around the Senkakus. That seems to have achieved a stalemate. Then about a month ago China launched an unmanned drone, and Japan responded by saying it would shoot it down if it entered its airspace. So tactically the air defense identification zone is not something that was just pulled out of the bag quickly. It was being looked at, I think, over a long period of time. So the timing was, we have this stalemate. Xi Jinping has just had this important party plenum in China. I think an agreement was reached to step up the pressure on Japan.

2 Again, Chinas strategy is to use legalisms and act defensively, claim it contributes to stability. But in this particular case it declared a zone not only that overlaps with Japans quite considerably, but to a small extent South Koreas as well. The tactical one was how to break this stalemate over the Senkakus in line with the longer-term objective of finally getting Japan to say there is a dispute, that the history needs to be resolved. Q: How great is the risk of a further escalation in the conflict? A: I actually put it quite low because I think, again, using the argument of legal warfare and Chinas portrayal of its actions as defensive, Chinas provocat ions are really designed to get an overreaction from the other side or a back-down or an incremental shift in the status quo. So when China announced the ADIZ, it immediately sent up a patrol but it didnt tell us where it went, and the ADIZ is a very broad area so that China can say were asserting it. The U.S. flies its B-52s through and goes over the Senkakus, and China doesnt start scrambling aircraft. It really makes a dissembling kind of comment that they monitored and were aware, and security was maintained. So some of this was really for show. The real risk, though, is if - and I suspect, why Japan has been absent -- is because if Japan puts planes over the Senkakus to assert its sovereignty, and China replies, then you have the law of physics that two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time, and what I call a high-altitude game of chicken. Either they clash, because no one could write a manual and instruct pilots for every possible contingency in these high-speed circumstances, so itd be highly dangerous and highly risky. All we have to do is look back at the EP-3 incident of April 2001, where a very fast Chinese jet slammed itself into a very lumbering EP-3 U.S. reconnaissance plane because the pilot was engaging in close and dangerous maneuvers to intimidate the EP-3. He miscalculated. On the other hand, it will now be two armed fighters. The EP-3 is unarmed. It will be armed Japanese planes, armed Chinese planes, and the risk is there, how do you prevent this from escalating? Q: How might this play out in the coming months between China and Japan, and also the U.S.? A: Well I think the U.S. is probably -- Im speculating -- putting the pressure on Japan to play it cool. Thats why we havent seen Japanese aircraft over the area, and thats to prevent the direct conflict between the two. I think it will have to be to work out a modus vivendi, where both sides engage in a kind of charade. China will say it has its air defense identification zone up there. It will have to respond to civil air liners, in a sense, not complying -- the Japanese ones. But these arent direct threats to China. Theyre not flying at China or trying to enter its airspace. Theyre flying in parallel. Just as China both objected to and reacted against American close-in surveillance in this exclusive economic zone at sea, we dont hear any more complaints. China made its point and then allowed the U.S. to continue its surveillance, and the U.S. probably is being a bit more circumspect. I think that same model would apply, at the moment, over the air. Theres always the risk -- Im not discounting that -- of a clash, but I think the larger thing is its a political game. China is staking out, over the long term, This is our territory, this is our zone, its within the first island chain, and we

3 want to control aircraft that are in it. To the extent that it intimidates or creates a precedent, then China can incrementally advance its interests. Q: Do you see other potential consequences of Chinas actions, apart from the risk of military conflict? A: One, it serves to take the Senkakus and raise the level of temperature. All across the board it means, once again, Chinese intentions have to be weighed against its actions. Its probably furthering a notion of a milder f orm of a China threat because of its behavior. It extends along East Asia, where weve had South Korean complaints, Taiwanese complaints, as well as Japan and the U.S., and I think to Southeast Asia. In a sense its unprecedented in that other nations have established air defense zones, but Im not aware of anyone both establishing one over the sovereign territory of another country -- Japans Senkakus - or declaring an air defense zone that overlaps considerably with another countrys. Finally, the other air defense identification zones, historically, have been in a highly different context. This is a context where there is a dispute between China and Japan. It may not be the legal one that Japan says doesnt exist, but there is a dispute over those islands, and this just adds a new dimension of uncertainty and risk. Q: Do you see this affecting the balance in Chinas disputes in the South China Sea? A: Well, China has already announced that it reserves the right or it is considering establishing additional air defense identification zones. That would be to look at the United States and Canada, and how theyve sealed off themselves in Alaska, Guam and Hawaii. China may eventually work its way down the coast, and since it has that huge island, Hainan, it could implement similar ones. Thats whats being talked about. To do so in the South China Sea, the $64,000 question is whether it would be a limited air defense zone around Hainan island, or whether China would try to expand it to include all the area within the nine-dash line. This is just sheer speculation. They havent done it. But its notable that since the northern ADIZ was announced that their aircraft carrier is now conducting training missions. In the South China Sea, China has what we call extended lines of communication. In the northeast, interior lines, meaning up north youre very quick from land to sea. You dont have to refuel. You can get there quickly. You can stay in the air longer. You can return and refuel. In the South China Sea, China doesnt have that massive air power. Yes, they can deploy aircraft there, but then their loitering time wouldnt be great, and theyd be operating at extended distances. If they experienced trouble, they have a long way to go back, rather than up north. The South China Sea poses questions, like what does Vietnam -- which already flies combat air patrols over the Spratlys -- do. The Philippines is probably not in the picture yet because its air force is virtually non-existent, but it would affect U.S. deployments out of the Philippines, on this rotational arrangement, when they finally are agreed. Probably Singapore and Malaysia, if not Indonesia. So it takes on a wider group of countries than Northeast Asia, and it seemingly runs counter to the positive diplomatic trends that we witnessed in October, with all the Asean summits, Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, the president and premier of China coming out to the region. It would extend creating an uncertainty in Southeast Asia, inflame countries that have disputes, because they would argue that its an infringement on their freedom of overflight as well.

4 Run {BRIEF EA <GO>} to subscribe on the Bloomberg terminal. Contact us at econbrief@bloomberg.net for advertising and reprint requests, or to subscribe if you are not a customer of the Bloomberg professional service. Provider ID: 5297cd080ec003855297cd080ec00386

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, China Air Zone Designed to Break Island Stalemate, Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, November 29, 2013. All background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the mailing list type UNSUBSCRIBE in the Subject heading and hit the Reply key. Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.

BRIEF
QUOtE OF tHE DAY

Economics Asia

11.29.13

FRIDAY

www.bloombergbriefs.com

On China: At least the government is honest in announcing to the world what needs to be done and that they are prepared to do that. Around the world, how many stories like that, can you see? Not many.
Khiem Do, head of Asian multi-asset strategy at Baring Asset Management

South Korea, Japan Output; India GDP; GrainCorp

WHAT TO WATCH: South Koreas industrial production jumped 3 percent year-on-year in October, compared with a ASIAN DAYBOOK: median estimate of a 0.9 percent gain. Japans industrial output By Scott Johnson may have risen 6.3 percent last month from a year earlier, according to forecasts, 7:50 a.m. Indias economic growth probably held below 5 percent for a fourth straight quarter, as GDP rose 4.6 percent in the three months through Sept. 30, 8 p.m. (See page 4.) China flew warplanes over its new air-defense zone yesterday after Japan and South Korea sent aircraft into the area. ECONOMICS: Japans jobless rate, consumer prices, 7:30 a.m. Australias privatesector credit, 8:30 a.m. Japans housing starts, 1 p.m. Thailands foreign reserves, 3:30 p.m. Thailands exports, imports, current account, 3:30 p.m. Taiwans final thirdquarter GDP, 5 p.m. Macau is likely to report GDP, trade and lending data today.

EQUITY MARKET
1-Day Change (%) Trading Volume (Standard Deviation From 6-Month Avg.) Hang Seng Nikkei 225 DAX
CAC 40 FTSE 100 Bovespa

GOVERNMENT: The Thai Democrat party pledged to support protests aimed at ousting Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. COMPANIES: Australia rejected the A$2.2 billion planned acquisition of Graincorp Ltd. by Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. MARKETS: U.S. markets were closed for the Thanksgiving holiday. European stocks rose with the euro. (All times are local for Hong Kong.) WEEK AHEAD AnaLysis by Tamara HEndErson, BLoombErg Economist

NASDAQ S&P 500 Dow Jones -2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0

Investors Await RBAs Decision, Chinas PMI Report

Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee and robust U.S. data rekindled Fed tapering jitters. Foreign institutional investors sold $1.1 billion of equities in India, Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam in the week ended Nov. 27, compared with net purchases of $42 million in the previous week. The Indian rupee led regional currencies against the U.S. dollar, gaining 0.7 percent. The Australian dollar trailed Fed Tapering Angst Worsens Financial Conditions the region, losing 0.0 118 3.2 percent. -0.2 Key events and 117 data releases next -0.4 week include the 116 -0.6 Reserve Bank of Australias -0.8 115 monetary policy -1.0 meeting, Austra114 lias GDP, Indone-1.2 sias CPI, Chinas 113 -1.4 manufacturing Jun-13 Jul-13 Aug-13 Sep-13 Oct-13 Nov-13 PMI and South Bloomberg Asian Financial Conditions, Index (rs) AXJ Currencies Against U.S. Dollar, Index (ls) Koreas exports.
continued on next page

CALENDAR (HONG KONG TIME)

TIME EVENT SURVEY PRIOR

JN JN AU AU JN JN TH TA SL IN

7:50 7:50 8:30 8:30 13:00 13:00 15:30 17:00 17:30 20:00

Industrial Prod MoM Industrial Prod YoY Private Credit MoM Private Credit YoY Housing Starts YoY Housing Starts Current Account Bal GDP YoY CPI YoY GDP YoY

2.0% 6.3% 0.4% 3.5% 5.2% 0.999M $250M 1.60% 6.1% 4.6%

1.3% 5.1% 0.3% 3.3% 19.4% 1.044M -$534M 1.58% 6.7% 4.4%

BCAL<GO>

ONE ON ONE Carlyle Thayer on Chinas new air defense zone and the risks of escalating tensions with Japan. (See page 8.)

Source: Bloomberg; ADXY, BFCIAXJ Index

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11.29.13 www.bloombergbriefs.com

Bloomberg Brief | Economics Asia

ONE ON ONE

Scott Johnson, BLoomberG BrieF

Chinas New Air Defense Zone Designed to Break Status Quo With Japan, Says Thayer
Carlyle Thayer, an emeritus professor at the Australian Defense Force Academy in Canberra, spoke to Bloomberg Brief about Chinas new air defense zone and rising tensions over the disputed islands known as Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese.

Q: Why did China announce its air defense identification zone in the East China Sea and particularly, why now? A: Well, I think there are two answers. Theres the immediate tactical situation and the long-term strategic. This is just another step by China to exert and use international law the Pentagon calls it legal warfare to advance its claims to sovereignty or control over bodies of space water like the South China Sea and in this case the East China Sea, and over the Senkakus. By establishing an air defense identification zone that includes the Senkakus Japan isnt going to relinquish [them], but over the long term its establishing that there is a dispute. Japan adamantly insists there is no dispute, so it doesnt want to go that route. Its a long-term Chinese strategy. The shorter term is that since September last year when the Senkakus controversy went on the boil again, China used all manner of naval means to exert extraordinary pressure in cat-and-mouse games with Japan around the Senkakus. That seems to have achieved a stalemate. Then about a month ago China launched an unmanned drone, and Japan responded by saying it would shoot it down if it entered its airspace. Tactically the ADIZ is not something that was just pulled out of the bag quickly. It was being looked at, I think, over a long period of time. So the timing was, we have this stalemate, and Xi Jinping has just had this important party plenum in China. I think an agreement was reached to step up the pressure on Japan. Again, Chinas strategy is to use legalisms and act defensively, claim it contributes to stability. But in this particular case it declared a zone not only that overlaps with Japans quite considerably, but to a small extent South Koreas as well.

Q: How great is the risk of a further escalation in the conflict? A: I actually put it quite low because, using the argument of legal warfare and Chinas portrayal of its actions as defensive, Chinas provocations are really designed to get an overreaction from the other side or a back-down or an incremental shift in the status quo. So when China announced the ADIZ, it immediately sent up a patrol but it didnt tell us where it went, and the ADIZ is a very broad area so that China can say were asserting it. The U.S. flies its B-52s through and goes over the Senkakus, and China doesnt start scrambling aircraft. It makes a dissembling kind of comment that they monitored and were aware, and security was maintained. So some of this was really for show. The real risk, though, is if Japan puts planes over the Senkakus to assert its sovereignty, and China replies, then you have the law of physics that two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time, and what I call a high-altitude game of chicken. No one could write a manual and instruct pilots for every possible contingency in these highspeed circumstances, so itd be highly dangerous and highly risky. Look back at the EP-3 incident of April 2001, where a very fast Chinese jet slammed itself into a very lumbering EP-3 U.S. reconnaissance plane because the pilot was engaging in close and dangerous maneuvers to intimidate the EP-3. He miscalculated. It will now be two armed fighters. It will be armed Japanese planes, armed Chinese planes, and the risk is, how do you prevent this from escalating? Q: Do you see other potential consequences of Chinas actions, apart from the risk of military conflict? A: One, it serves to take the Senkakus and raise the level of temperature. All across the board it means, once again, Chinas intentions have to be weighed against its actions. Its probably furthering a notion of a milder form of a China threat because of its behavior. It extends along East Asia, where weve had South Korean complaints, Taiwanese complaints, as well as Japan and the U.S.,

and I think to Southeast Asia. In a sense its unprecedented in that other nations have established air defense zones, but Im not aware of anyone both establishing one over the sovereign territory of another country Japans Senkakus or declaring an air defense zone that overlaps considerably with another countrys. Finally, the other air defense identification zones, historically, have been in a highly different context. This is a context where there is a dispute between China and Japan. It may not be the legal one that Japan says doesnt exist, but there is a dispute over those islands, and this just adds a new dimension of uncertainty and risk.
This interview was edited and condensed. The full version is at {NSN MWZXMW6JTSFO<GO>.

Bloomberg Brief Economics Asia Newsletter Ted Merz Executive Editor tmerz@bloomberg.net +1-212-617-2309 Bloomberg News Dan Moss Executive Editor dmoss@bloomberg.net +1-202-624-1881 Economics Asia Newsletter Editors Nipa Piboontanasawat Anne Riley npiboontanas@bloomberg.net ariley17@bloomberg.net +852-2977-6628 +1-212-617-0061 Jennifer Bernstein Scott Johnson jbernstein@bloomberg.net sjohnson166@bloomberg.net +852-2977-6733 +852-2977-4702 Staff Economists Tamara Henderson Michael McDonough thenderson14@bloomberg.net mmcdonough10@bloomberg.net +65-6212-1140 +1-212-617-6815 Joseph Brusuelas Richard Yamarone jbrusuelas3@bloomberg.net ryamarone@bloomberg.net +1-212-617-7664 +1-212-617-8737 David Powell Niraj Shah dpowell24@bloomberg.net nshah185@bloomberg.net +44-20-7073-3769 +44-20-7330-7383 Newsletter Nick Ferris Business Manager nferris2@bloomberg.net +1-212-617-6975 Advertising Jeff Maniatty jmaniatty@bloomberg.net +1-203-550-2446 Reprints & Lori Husted Permissions lori.husted@theygsgroup.com +1-717-505-9701 To subscribe via the Bloomberg terminal type BRIEF <GO> or on the web at www.bloombergbriefs.com To contact the editors: econbrief@bloomberg.net This newsletter and its contents may not be forwarded or redistributed without the prior consent of Bloomberg. Please contact our reprints and permissions group listed above for more information 2013 Bloomberg LP. All rights reserved.

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Xut bn RFI (http://www.viet.rfi.fr)

Vng phng khng ca Trung Quc : Mt s khiu khch khng cn thit

ng ngy 2013-11-30 15:07

Trng Ngha M - NHT - TRUNG Ngy 23/11/2013, Trung Quc n phng loan bo thnh lp mt vng nhn dng phng khng trn Bin Hoa ng, bao trm c bu tri trn khu vc qun o Senkaku/iu Ng tranh chp vi Nht Bn cng nh trn vng bi ngm Iodo di quyn kim sot ca Hn Quc nhng b Bc Kinh i ch quyn. Quyt nh ny ca Trung Quc lp tc b phn i, t Hoa K, Nht Bn cho n Hn Quc, i Loan Washington, ri Tokyo v Seoul u cng khai thch thc Trung Quc khi cho phi c qun s ngang nhin thm nhp vng phng khng, bt chp cc yu cu thng bo trc ca Bc Kinh. Rt nhiu quc gia u t quan ngi trc ng thi ca Trung Quc, nhn nh rng quyt nh ny c nguy c dn n cc s c ng tic, gy nn tnh hnh bt n nh trong khu vc. Cu hi t ra l hin c hn 20 quc gia c khu phng khng tng t, nhng ti sao vng do Trung Quc thnh lp li lm dy ln nhiu mi quan ngi nh vy. Cc quy nh do Trung Quc t ra khc g so vi cc nc khc, v d nh Hoa K v Nht Bn ? Trong mt nhn nh u tin ngy 25/11 v vng nhn dng phng khng ca Trung Quc, chuyn gia Carl Thayer thuc Hc vin Quc phng c phn tch mt s im khc bit lin quan n vng phng khng ca Trung Quc. Carl Thayer : Vng nhn dng phng khng ca Trung Quc (ADIZ) c bit trn hai mt. Trc ht, vng ADIZ ca Trung Quc bao gm c khng phn pha trn qun o Senkaku ca Nht Bn v chng ln vi vng ADIZ ca Nht Bn. y l mt thch thc trc tip i vi ch quyn ca Nht Bn. Mt khc, Trung Quc hin ang yu cu tt c cc my bay phi tun theo quy nh mi do h ban hnh. Ngc li, M ch yu cu cc phi c bay trc tip n M thc hin cc quy nh v vic nhn dng v thng tin m thi. Nhiu ngi ngh rng khu vc ca Trung Quc c th lm tng nguy c xung t v trang vi Nht Bn. K t thng Chn nm ngoi, phi c qun s v tu hi qun ca hai nc i u vi nhau rt nhiu ln trong khu vc gn Senkaku/iu Ng. i vi gio s Carl Thayer, vic Trung Quc p t vng phng khng trn vng Senkaku/iu Ng qu thc l mt ng thi khiu khch nguy him.

http://www.viet.rfi.fr/print/88054?print=now

1/12/2013

Vng phng khng ca Trung Quc : Mt s khiu khch khng cn thit

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Carl Thayer : Khng phn qun o Senkaku rt nh so vi ton b khng phn bao gm trong vng phng khng ADIZ ca Trung Quc. Nu Bc Kinh gi my bay qun s n thch thc my bay ca Lc lng T v Nht Bn trn qun o Senkaku, iu s l mt hnh ng phiu lu vi ri ro cao, c th kch ng mt cuc ng hoc gy ra tai nn. Mt tnh hung nh vy chng khc g mt tr chi liu mng trn khng. Vic Trung Quc tm cch n phng p t cc quy nh v vng ADIZ ca mnh khng phn Nht Bn lm tng nguy c xy ra s c trn khng thay v lm gim cc him ha ny. Vic Trung Quc m rng vng phng khng qua nhng ni khc cng to nn phn ng chng i t Hn Quc, i Loan v Hoa K. Vng nhn dng phng khng Trung Quc trc tip thch thc quyn qu cnh khng phn ca cc chic phi c khng trc tip n Trung Quc. Hnh ng ca Trung Quc l mt s khiu khch khng cn thit. nh gi v ng thi gn y ca M, c pho i bay B-52 i qua vng nhn dng phng khng mi ca Trung Quc, Gio s Thayer cho rng Washington chng t bng hnh ng c th hai lp trng xuyn sut ca mnh : bo v quyn t do lu thng c trn khng v khng nh gi tr ca Hip nh Phng th M-Nht. Trong nhn nh hm 27/11, ng Thayer ni r : Carl Thayer : Hoa K ni kh r rng rng hip c phng th vi Nht Bn bao gm c qun o Senkaku, t t ai, lnh hi n khng phn. Vng phng khng ca Trung Quc trm ln mt khu vc rng ln hn l khng gian trn qun o Senkaku. Phn ng ca M l xoy mnh thm v y bng tr li sn Trung Quc. Trung Quc hin c cnh bo rng hnh ng ca h thch thc khng ch Nht Bn m c Hoa K. Cc phi v B-52 gn y l hnh ng thng xuyn nhm khng nh quyn t do lu thng trn khng phn quc t ca Hoa K. Trong phn ng ca mnh i vi vng phng khng ca Trung Quc, Washington ni r l vng ADIZ ca M ch nhm vo cc my bay trc tip i n Hoa K, cn phi c ch qu cnh vn c t do di chuyn. M c cng mt lp trng i vi khng phn cng nh hi phn quc t. Hi qun M thng tin hnh cc chin dch c thit k thich hp nhm vo nhng quc gia c mu toan hn ch quyn qu cnh ca tu qun s trong vng c quyn kinh t ca h. Quan im c hu ca M l khng ng v bn no trong cc tranh chp lnh th khc trong vng Bin Hoa ng v Bin ng. Nhng do vic Hoa K qun l qun o Senkaku sau Th chin Th hai trong t cch l mt phn ca Okinawa trc khi giao li cho Nht Bn kim sot, vng Senkaku l mt trng hp c bit : M cng nhn quyn qun l ca Nht Bn i vi qun o ny. Cc hnh ng ca M s cc nc trong khu vc kn o hoan nghnh, v l Trung Quc ni rng h t dnh quyn p t mt vng nhn dng phng khng khc trn cc vng bin khc, trong c c Bin ng. Nu Trung Quc thit lp mt vng phng khng trn Bin ng, iu c th nh hng n cc phi v tun tra ca Vit Nam trn vng qun o Trng Sa.

http://www.viet.rfi.fr/print/88054?print=now

1/12/2013

Vng phng khng ca Trung Quc : Mt s khiu khch khng cn thit

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My bay F-15 tham gia vo phi v M-Nht - REUTERS /A. Garofalo

URL ngun: http://www.viet.rfi.fr/chau-a/20131130-vung-phong-khong-cua-trung-quoc-mot-su-khieukhich-khong-can-thiet

http://www.viet.rfi.fr/print/88054?print=now

1/12/2013