ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as AGGRAVATING or MITIGATING according to the

e nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. Art. 15. Their concept. Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. They are the relationship, intoxication and the degree of instruction and education of the offender. The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended party in the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degrees of the offender. The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstances when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. The alternative circumstances are: a. RELATIONSHIP b. INTOXICATION c. DEGREE OF INSTRUCTION AND EDUCATION OF THE OFFENDER a. RELATIONSHIP This is taken into consideration when the offended party is the: a. spouse b. ascendant c. descendant d. legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister e. relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender As a rule, relationship is MITIGATING in crimes against property by analogy to the provisions of Art. 332. - Under Art. 332 of the RPC, no criminal, but only civil, liability shall result from commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses, ascendants, and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line; brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together. - Relationship becomes actually an exempting circumstance since there is no occasion to consider a mitigating or an aggravating circumstance because there is no criminal liability. It is aggravating in CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS in cases where the offended party is a relative of a higher degree than the offender, or when the offender and the

offended party are relatives of the same level, as killing a brother, a brother-in-law, a half-brother or adopted brother. When the CRIME AGAINST PERSONS is any of the SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES (Art. 263), even if the offended party is a descendant of the offender, relationship is an AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE. - But the serious physical injuries must not be inflicted by a parent upon his child by excessive chastisement. When the crime is less serious physical injuries or slight physical injuries, ordinary rule applies; relationship is MITIGATING if the offended party is a relative of lower degree and AGGRAVATING if the offended party is a relative of a higher degree than the offender. When the crime against persons is homicide or murder, relationship is aggravating even if the victim of the crime is a relative of lower degree. Relationship is mitigating in trespass to dwelling. Relationship is neither mitigating nor aggravating, when relationship is an element of the offense. In crimes against chastity, relationship is always aggravating. - Because of the nature and effect of the crime committed, it is considered AGGRAVATING although the offended party is a relative of lower degree. b. INTOXICATION MITIGATING a. if intoxication is not habitual, or b. if intoxication is not subsequent to the plan to commit a felony. AGGRAVATING a. if intoxication is habitual; or b. if it is intentional (subsequent to the plan to commit a felony) - It is intentional when the offender drinks liquor fully knowing its effects, to find in the liquor a stimulant to commit a crime or a means to suffocate any remorse. When the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication. - This clause means that the offenders mental faculties must be affected by drunkenness. - The accuseds state of intoxication must be proved. WHEN THE INTOXICATION IS HABITUAL - A habitual drunkard is one given to intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks. The habit should be actual and confirmed, but it is not necessary that it be continuous or by daily occurrence.
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PEOPLE v. RENEJANE [158 SCRA 258 (1988)] Nature: Appeal from a decision of RTC Cebu. FACTS: On Nov 1, 1981, at 11PM, Laborte and Maraasin were invited to the house of Beniano to partake of some food and drinks. After a considerable length of time, Paulino Laborte stabbed policeman Mario de Jesus. It was followed by another stabbing done by Beniano Renejane. Likewise, the police officers companion, Regino Maraasin was also stabbed by Rodolfo Ripdos. It was alleged that previously, in Oct, the police officer apprehended Renejane for illegal possession of marijuana and that Maraasin was suspected of having been the informer. Renejane, as his motive, must have harbored a grudge against the comrades. HELD: Denials made and alibi advanced by the appellant cannot prevail over their positive identification. Furthermore, Renejane had a motive in the killing. Intoxication is aggravating if it is habitual or intention. The fact that the accused drank liquor prior to the commission of the crime did not necessarily qualify such action as an aggr circumstance. The affair was an ordinary drinking party. Neither can this be considered as a mitigating circumstance in the absence of proof that the intake of alcoholic drinks was of such quantity as to blur the appellants reason and deprive him of a certain degree of control. This has been strengthened by the fact that treachery has been established. Therefore, the means of execution employed were deliberately or consciously adopted. Moreover, the aggr circumstance of the act being in disregard of rank is appreciable in the case at bar. Wherefore, judgment appealed from is affirmed. Penalty modified from reclusion perpetua to reclusion temporal in its max period to reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE v. CAMANO [115 SCRA 688 (1982)]

Nature: Mandatory review from the judgment of CFI Camarines Sur Feb. 17, 1970 bet. 4 & 5 p.m. in Nato, Sagnay, Camarines Sur: Camano, after drinking liquor, stabbed Godofredo Pascua w/a bolo while the latter was walking along the barrio street almost in front of the store of one Socorro Buates. Pascua sustained 2 mortal wounds w/c caused his death. Afterwards, Camano went to the seashore of the barrio where he found Mariano Buenaflor leaning at the gate of the fence of his house in a kneeling position w/both arms on top of the fence & his head stooping down. Camano then hacked Buenaflor w/the same bolo sustaining 8 wounds w/c caused latters death. No proof of any altercation between the accused & victims prior to the incidents.

3 yrs before the incident, the victims had a misunderstanding w/the accused. Camano asked for Pascua to tow his fishing boat w/the motorboat owned by Buenaflor but the two refused to do so. Camano resented such refusal. Even if they were seen drinking together later on, the friendly attitude was more artificial than real. Camano refused to associate w/the 2 & a neighbors attempt to reconcile the 3 was repeatedly refused. And in instances when Camano was drunk, hed even challenge Buenaflor to a fight & announce his evil intention to kill them. Prosecution: Camano surrendered upon demand of the peace officers. He admitted that he owned the bolo used in the killing & such was hidden under the table of his house. Patrolman Baluyot found the bolo at the place indicated by Camano. The bolo was still stained w/human blood. He likewise admitted that killed Pascua & Buenaflor in self-defense but he refused to sign his statement. He was charged w/murder attended by evident premeditation & treachery. Defense: Camano claims that he went fishing early morning of Feb. 17. Buenaflor, upon seeing that he had a big catch, demanded a percentage for the fishery commission. Camano refused to pay & saw Buenaflor called him hard headed. He went home afterwards. After dinner, he prepared to go out to sea again. While standing in the yard of his house, he saw Buenaflor & Pascua having a drinking session w/a group of men at the score of Socorro Buates. He claims that the Buenaflors group approached him & w/o any provocation, Pascua boxed him. Buenaflor punched him also. He claims that when Pascua was about to bolo him, he was able to grab the bolo from Pascua. Pascua then fell on the ground & the rest of the group ran away except for Buenaflor who approached him. Buenaflor was also armed w/a bolo w/c prompted Camano to bolo him. Buenaflor ran away once he was wounded but Camano ran after him claiming that former had a gun at home w/c he might use to shoot Camano later on. Thus, he hacked Buenaflor to death. He denies killing Pascua & claims that the fight was due to a heated argument & their drunkenness. CFI Camrines Sur: sentenced Camano to death. Claims of Camano are w/o evidentiary support & are mere fictions. His cousin & lone witness, Nemesio Camano is not credible either. His testimonies had a lot of inconsistencies. Besides, if Camano were really innocent, he should have produced more witnesses considering that the crime was committed in broad daylight w/many people witnessing it. But only Nemesio was presented. Nemesio & Camanos testimonies were changed many times too. Evidence show that he is guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt w/evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength & intoxication. Appeal: Camanos counsel claims that the accused is only guilty of homicide & not murder.

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Issues & Ratio:

1. WON evident premeditation should be appreciated. NO. Evident Premeditation is present when the offender had carefully planned the killing. Requisites: a) time when offender determined to commit the crime; b) act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination; c) sufficient lapse of time bet the determination & execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act & to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. No proof of the requisites in this case. Trial court merely concluded that crime was premeditated due to the incident w/c occurred 3 yrs ago. But such did not establish the time when Camano decided to commit the crime. It can only establish his motive for killing the victims. Previous incidents wherein Camano challenged Buenaflor to a fight did not reveal a persistence of criminal design since theres no proof that he was making plans in between those threats & the consummation of the crime. 2. WON treachery should be appreciated YES. Amado Payago, one of the men drinking w/Pascua & Buenaflor during the incident, testified that Camano attacked Pascua from behind. Such is a measure w/c ensures the accomplishment of criminal act w/o any risk to the perpetrator arising from the defense that his victim may put up characterizing treachery. Payagos testimony is further strengthened by the nature & location of the wounds sustained by Pascua w/c show that the point of entry of the stab wounds were at the back & point of exit were in front. Buenaflor was hacked while he was in a kneeling position. The attack was sudden, unexpected & lethal such as to disable & incapacitate him from putting up any defense. 3. WON abuse of superior strength should be absorbed in treachery. YES.

No proof that Camano was a habitual drinker although he used to get drunk every now & then. Even Pagayos testimony does not establish the habitual drinking of Camano. The intoxication not being habitual & since accused was in a state of intoxication at the time of the commission of the crime, intoxication should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.

5. WON death is a cruel & unusual penalty & not proper in the case at bar. NO. Camanos counsel claims that the penalty violates Art. IV, Sec. 21 of the Consti w/c provides that excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. Harden vs. Dir of Prisons: DP is not cruel, unjust or excessive. Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death but the punishment of death is not cruel w/in the meaning of that word as used in the Consti. It implies something inhuman & barbarous, something more that the mere extinguishments of life.

Held: Camano guilty of murder, there being 1 MC & no AC, penalty of RT imposed. Aquino dissenting: Premeditation is aggravating thus accused should be sentenced to 2 RPs. Makasiar concurring: Voluntary surrender will also mitigate guilt of the accused. He had a choice to surrender or not when demanded by the policemen who didnt place him under arrest nor did they have any arrest warrant.

4. WON the alternative circumstance of intoxication should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. NO. ITS MITIGATING. Camanos counsel claims that there was no proof of accuseds intoxication at the time of the killing other than Payagos testimony that he saw Camano drinking in his house about 30 meters away. No police report/doctors certification was presented either. Furthermore, theres no proof that accused purposefully got drunk to facilitate the commission of the offense. If intoxication should be appreciated it should be used as mitigating circumstance since it diminished his capacity to know the injustice of his acts & comprehend fully the consequence of his acts. Mitigating if accidental, not habitual or intentional & not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. It must be indubitably proven. Aggravating if habitual or intentional. Habitual drunkard is one given to intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks. Habit should be actual & confirmed. Not necessarily a daily occurrence but it must lessen the individuals resistance to evil thought & undermine will power making its victim a potential evildoer.

c. DEGREE OF INSTRUCTION AND EDUCATION OF THE OFFENDER Low degree of instruction and education or lack of it is generally mitigating. High degree of instruction and education is aggravating, when the offender avails himself of his learning in committing the crime. LACK OF INSTRUCTION, AS MITIGATING - Lack of instruction cannot be taken into account where the defendant admitted that he studied in the first grade in a public elementary school. Art. 15 applies only to him who really has not received any instruction. Not illiteracy alone, but also lack of sufficient intelligence are necessary to invoke the benefit of the alternative circumstance of lack of instruction, the determination of which is left to the trial court. Lack of sufficient instruction is not mitigating when the offender is a city resident who knows how to sign his name. Lack of instruction must be proved positively and directly and cannot be based on mere deduction or inference. The question of lack of instruction cannot be raised for the first time in appellate court.
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 Ordinarily, LOW DEGREE OR LACK OF INSTRUCTION IS MITIGATING IN ALL CRIMES. Exceptions: (1) crimes against property such as estafa, theft, robbery arson except theft of large cattle and robbery with homicide. (2) crimes against chastity (3) treason because love of country should be a natural feeling of every citizen, however unlettered or uncultured he may be (4) murder because to kill is forbidden by natural law which every rational being is endowed to know and feel. HIGH DEGREE OF INSTRUCTION, AS AGGRAVATING Degree of instruction is aggravating when the offender availed himself or took advantage of it in committing the crime.

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ABSOLUTORY CAUSES AND OTHER SPECIAL SITUATIONS Absolutory causes are those where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed. a. ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION ENTRAPMENT Ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan The means originate from the mind of the criminal. INSTIGATION The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a coprincipal. The law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. A public officer or a private detective induces an innocent person to commit a crime and would arrest him upon or after the commission of the crime by the latter. The accused must be acquitted.

bills were marked w/ notations CC-NE-1 and CC-NE2, photographed and dusted w/ ultra-violet powder. The complainant went to the officer along w/ CIC Balcos who pretended to be her nephew. She again requested the officer to process her claim but was again asked if she already had P100. In answer, Yoyongco brought out the 2 P50 bills & handed them to the appellant. As she took hold of the money, CIC Balcos grabbed her hand & arrested her. In the PC headquarters, Atty Aranetas hands were examined for the presence of UV powder & result was positive. Appellant contends that the bills, w/c she never accepted, were rubbed against her hand and dress. HELD: There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused was induced to commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the crim intent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. Wherefore, appellant is guilty of the crime of bribery, a violation of Sec 3 RA No 3019 known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Considering though that this case was pending since 1971 and she is a mother of four and the amount involved is only PhP100, it is recommended that petitioner be granted either executive clemency or the privilege of probation if she is qualified. Decision affirmed.

A person has planned or is about to commit a crime and ways and means are resorted to by a public officer to trap and catch the criminal. Not a bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker.

ARANETA v. CA [142 SCRA 532 (1986)] Nature: Petition to review the decision of CA. FACTS: Complainant Gertrudes Yoyongco is the widow of Antonio Yoyongco, an employee of NIA. She approached the appellant, Atty Aquilina Araneta, a hearing officer of the Workmens Compensation Unit at Cabanatuan City, to inquire about the procedure for filing a claim for death compensation. Learning the reqirements, Yoyongco prepared the forms and filed them at the Unit. When she went again to follow up on the status of the application, she was told by the appellant that she had to pay PhP100 so that her claim would be acted upon. She told the officer that she had no money then but if she would process her claim, Yoyongco would give her the PhP100 upon approval. To this, Atty Araneta refused and said that on previous occasions certain claimants made similar promises but they failed to live up to them. Yoyongco then went to her bro-in-law, Col. Yoyongco (hala ka), the Chief of Criminal Investigation Service, Phil Constabulary, and informed him the demand of the appellant. The Col then gave her 2 PhP50 bills and instructed her to go to Col Laureaga. The latter concocted a plan to entrap the appellant. The 2 PhP50

CABRERA v. PAJARES [142 SCRA 127 (1986)] Nature: Administrative Matters in the SC Cabrera is the defendant in a civil case w/c Pajares was trying. The case filed by Cabrera's dad & halfsiblings for the annulment of the sale made to Cabrera of 28 ha. of land in Camarines Sur. Cabrera was advised by his counsel to accommodate any request for money from the judge so that latter won't give him a hard time Sept. 1984: Pajares intimated that he needed money & so Cabrera gave him P1k. After 2 mos/before Christmas of 84: Pajares & Cabrera met in front of the Naga Hall of Justice & the Pajares told Cabrera that he needed money again. This time, Cabrera asked the assistance of the NBI in entrapping Pajares. He submitted 10 P100 bills for marking to be used in the entrapment. Such bills were marked w/orange flourescent crayon & dusted w/orange flourescent crayon by the NBI. A female agent bet 35 & 40 yrs old was sent to Naga to take part in the operations. Jan. 22, 1985, 8:15 a.m.: Cabrera went to Pajares chamber w/NBI agent Angelica Somera who pretended to be Cabreras wife. Cabrera told the
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judge that he decided not to settle the case but instead he filed a MFR appointing a surveyor to delineate a portion of the land in dispute for his halfsiblings in settlement. Then Pajares asked O ano ngayon ang atin. Cabrera then got the envelope w/the marked money & gave it Pajares. Cabrera then rushed out of the chamber on the pretext that he forgot the keys in the car as a signal to the other NBI agents. As soon as they got in, Somera pointed out where the money was. It was inserted between the pages of a diary on the judges table. Photos were taken. NBI Forensic Chemist Vallado established that the envelope & the money in it were those marked by the NBI. Pajares & his diary were both found positive of orange fluorescent powder. (so thats how they do it! Hehehe.) Pajares defense: he took the money thinking that it was for the surveyor. (yeah, yeah!) And he claims that when he realized it was for the surveyor, he threw it back to Cabrera telling him, Bakit mo sa kin yan ibibigay? Ikaw na ang magbigay niyan kay Surveyor Palaypayon. He further claims that the envelope fell on the open pages of his diary & thats where the NBI agents found it.

pictures. This rules out the possibility that the agents were responsible for putting the envelope in his diary. The photos look like snapshots rather than formal pictures. The plan to entrap the judge was cleared w/Exec. Judge Hon. Juan Llaguno before whom Cabrera swore to his statement. Not likely for a judge to approve a frame-up of a colleague. Not likely either for NBI Regional Dir. Epimaco Velasco to authorize a frame-up considering that according to Pajares himself, Velasco is his close friend. There was a discussion about how the envelope was folded, etc. But its probable that the judge unfolded it when it was handed to him. Pajares claims that he was outraged by the frame-up & that he protested. But the photos of his arrest show that he was smiling. He claims it was in derision (mockery, scorn) & that hes jolly by nature. But a smile is not a normal reaction to express outrage. (I dont quite understand why this should be mentioned. So what if he was smiling?)

Issues & Ratio: 1. WON Pajares accepted the money knowing that it was
given to him by reason of his office. YES. Surveyors fee was P2k & it would have been paid by Cabrera & the plaintiffs equally at P500 each & not by Cabrera alone. Besides, Pajares had no reason to believe that the money was Cabreras share of the surveyors fees. His claim that a survey plan was needed for the final disposition of the case has no basis either because the plaintiffs were seeking the annulment of the sale, thus a survey was not necessary. Evidence shows that judge did not really try to return the envelope to Cabrera but instead, he placed it between the pages of his diary. Such evidence is based on: o Someras testimony & affidavit. o Photos showing that the envelope was placed between the pages of the judges diary. A hand was shown in one of the photographs & was identified as that of NBI agent Artemio Sacaguing. Sacaguing confirmed this claiming that he was in the act of picking the diary from the table. o Testimony of Manuel Tobias, chief agent of NBI sub-office in Legaspi o Melquiades Volante, Pajares branch clerk of court, corroborated Pajares statement claiming that the judge did try to return the envelope to Cabrera. However, he issued another affidavit repudiating his first testimony. He claims that he was just pressured by Pajares to testify & that he did not really see the incident. o Constancio Elquiero, a janitor, corroborates Pajares statement. However, the testimonies of the 3 law enforcement agents should be given more credence since theyre presumed to have acted in the reg performance of their duties. o Photos appear to have been taken as soon as the agents got into the judges chamber. Even the judge himself complained that as soon as the agents barged into his office, they began to take

2. Whether this was an entrapment or instigation operation. ENTRAPMENT. Instigation & entrapment distinguished: o Instigation: officers of the law/their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense w/c he otherwise wouldnt commit & has no intention of committing. Accused cannot be held liable. Its a trap for unwary innocent. o Entrapment: criminal intent/design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused & law enforcement officials merely facilitate the commission of the crime, the accused cannot justify his conduct. Trap for the unwary criminal. Instigation is not actually an issue since Pajares claims that this was a frame-up. However, this claim has no basis as proven by the evidence presented.
3. WON Pajares is guilty of acts unbecoming of a judge. NO. GUILTY ONLY OF INDIRECT BRIBERY. Evidence only shows that he accepted the money & that he knew it was being given to him by reason of his office as per the investigation conducted by Investigating Justice Mendoza. Unfortunate since the Court has always stressed that members of the judiciary should display not only the highest integrity but must at all times conduct themselves in such manner as to be beyond reproach & suspicion. For the judge to return the peoples regard of him as an intermediary of justice between 2 conflicting parties, he must be the first to abide by the law & weave an example for the others to follow. He should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of law. But Mendozas recommendation of merely suspending the judge for 2 yrs & 4 mos as the proper administrative penalty by virtue of Pajares serious misconduct prejudicial to the judiciary & public interest cannot be upheld. Court approves Mendozas recommendation to acquit nd Pajares for lack of evidence of the 2 charge of having committed acts unbecoming of a member of the judiciary.

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Held: Pajares dismissed from the service w/forfeiture of all retirement benefits & pay & w/prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the govt or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. Clerk of Court ordered to return the ten marked P100.00 bills to Cabrera. b. EFFECT OF PARDON RPC, Art. 23. Effect of pardon by the offended party. A pardon of the offended party does not extinguish criminal action except as provided in Article 344 of this Code; but civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is extinguished by his express waiver. R.A. No. 8353. Anti-Rape Law of 1997. Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon - The subsequent valid marriage between the offender and the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed. In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty. Provided, That the crime shall be extinguish or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio. A pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action because a crime is an offense against the State. In criminal cases, the intervention of the aggrieved parties is limited to being witnesses for the prosecution. Compromise does not extinguish criminal liability. The offended party in crimes of adultery and concubinage cannot institute criminal prosecution, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. - the pardon here may be implied, as continued inaction of the offended party after learning the offense. - both offenders must be pardoned by the offended party. c. ABSOLUTORY CAUSES Art. 6(3). - There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly or over acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance. Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article. Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any legally married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of

committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment. These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with their parents. Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article. Art. 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling. Any private person who shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter's will shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos. If the offense be committed by means of violence or intimidation, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos. The provisions of this article shall not be applicable to any person who shall enter another's dwelling for the purpose of preventing some serious harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third person, nor shall it be applicable to any person who shall enter a dwelling for the purpose of rendering some service to humanity or justice, nor to anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inn and other public houses, while the same are open. Art. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. No criminal, but only civil liability, shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons: 1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line. 2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and 3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together. The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the commission of the crime. Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
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complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be. In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes. d. ACTS NOT COVERED BY LAW AND IN CASE OF EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT Art. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation. In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense. PEOPLE v. VENERACION [249 SCRA 244 (1995)] Nature: Petition for certiorari to review a decision of RTC of Manila Aug 2, 1994 - cadaver of a young girl identified as Angel Alquiza was seen floating along Del Pan St. near the corner of Lavesares St., Binondo, Manila. She was wrapped in a sack & yellow table cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet & left hand protruding from it was seen floating along. Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey and Henry Lagarto y Petilla were later charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information dated August 8, 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial Region Trial Court - rendered a decision on January 31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the "penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law." February 8, 1995 City Prosecutor of Manila filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be imposed" against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua). Feb. 10, 1995 the motion was denied by the court.

Issue: WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death under RA 7659, after finding the accused guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide. YES. No question on the guilt of the accused. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs. The RTC judge found the accused beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and homicide. 11 of RA No. 7659 provides: Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows: Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation. 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under 12 years of age or is demented. The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death. When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. . .

Under the law the penalty imposable for the crime of rape with homicide is NOT reclusion perpetua but Death. The law provides that when by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death A court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in specific & well-defined instances. People vs. Limaco - as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions. It is a well settled rule that the courts are not concerned w/ the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose the proper penalty and civil liability provided for by the law on the accused.
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V. PERSONS WHO INCUR CRIMINAL LIABILITY Art. 16. Who are criminally liable. The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies: 1. Principals. 2. Accomplices. 3. Accessories. The following are criminally liable for light felonies: 1. Principals 2. Accomplices. The treble division of persons criminally responsible for an offense rests upon the very nature of their participation in the commission of the crime. The ACCESSORIES are not liable for light felonies because in the commission of light felonies, the social wrong as well as the individual prejudice is so small that penal sanction is deemed not necessary for accessories RULES RELATIVE TO LIGHT FELONIES: a. Light felonies are punishable only when they have been consummated. b. But when light felonies are committed against persons or property, the are punishable even if they are only in the attempted or frustrated stage of the execution. c. Only principals and accomplices are liable for light felonies. d. Accessories are not liable for light felonies, even if they are committed against persons or property. Only natural persons can be the active subject of crime because of the highly personal nature of the criminal responsibility. Only a natural person can be the offender because: a. The RPC requires that the culprit should have acted with personal malice or negligence. An artificial or juridical person cannot act with malice or negligence. b. A juridical person, like a corporation, cannot commit a crime in which a willful purpose or a malicious intent is required. c. There is substitution of deprivation of liberty (subsidiary imprisonment) for pecuniary penalties in case of in case of insolvency of the accused. d. Other penalties consisting in imprisonment and other deprivation of liberty like destierro, can be executed only against individuals. Officers, not the corporation, are criminally liable. Juridical persons are criminally liable under certain special laws. In all crimes there are always 2 parties: ACTIVE (the criminal) and PASSIVE (the injured party). A. PRINCIPALS Art. 17. Principals. The following are considered principals:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; 2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it; 3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished. When a single individual commits a crime, there is no difficulty in determining his participation in the commission thereof. But when 2 or more persons are involved, it is necessary to determine the participation of each. PAR. 1. PRINCIPALS BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION The principal by direct participation PERSONALLY TAKES PART IN THE EXECUTION OF THE ACT constituting the crime. Two or more persons who took part in the commission of the crime are principals by direct participation, when the following requisites are present: 1. That they participated in the criminal resolution 2. That they carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution by acts which directly tended to the same end. First requisite Participation in the criminal resolution Two or more persons are said to have participated in the criminal resolution when they were in conspiracy at the time of the commission of the crime. It is well settled that a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another where, between them, there has been conspiracy or unity of purpose and intention in the commission of the crime charged. CONSPIRACY A conspiracy exists when 2 or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The conspiracy contemplated in the first requisite is not a felony, but only a manner of incurring criminal liability. In order to hold an accused guilty as coprincipal by reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he performed an over act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to executing the conspiracy. Mere knowledge without cooperation or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute conspiracy. Silence does not make one a conspirator The existence of conspiracy does not require necessarily an agreement for an appreciable length of time prior to the execution of its purpose, since from the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of
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the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. Conspiracy arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Formal agreement or previous acquaintance among several persons not necessary in conspiracy. Must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. When there is no conspiracy, each of the offenders is liable only for the act performed by him. It is not enough that a person participated in the assault made by another in order to consider him a co-principal in the crime committed. He must also participate in the criminal resolution of the other. When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. There is collective criminal responsibility. Conspiracy may cover persons previously undetermined. A person in conspiracy with others, who had desisted before the crime was committed by the other, is not criminally liable. When there is conspiracy, it is not necessary to ascertain the specific act of each conspirator. There could be no conspiracy to commit an offense through negligence. In cases of criminal negligence or crimes punishable by special law, allowing or failing to prevent an act to be performed by another, makes one a coprincipal. Second requisite that the culprits carried out their plan and personally took part in its execution, by acts which directly tended to the same end. The principals by direct participation must be at the scene of the crime, personally taking part in its execution. The acts of each offender must directly tend to the same end. One serving as guard pursuant to the conspiracy is a principal by direct participation. When the second requisite is lacking, there is only conspiracy.

4 others, whom she knew also. After conspiring in whispers, Mandap & Salangsang held her hands while Carpio & Manalili held her feet & forced her to lie on the ground. Nunag undressed her & had sexual intercourse w/ her. After him, Mandap followed. She lost consciousness & only regained it while Manalili was abusing her. The 5 accused left w/ a threat that they would kill her & her family. After the incident, the complainant missed her menstruation period whenit became due and noticed that her stomach was getting bigger. Yet she didnt tell anybody until her family noticed. In Oct 1978, she gave birth prematurely to female twins who died after baptism. Accused Nunag admitted having sexual intercourse w/ Lopez but denied the charge of rape. He asserted that it was while he was sleeping when she came on to him and they went to the ricefield to relieve their lasciviousness. She asked money after the act and he gave her PhP4.00 and went home. Accused Salangsang offers the same testimony but asserts that he gave Lopez P2 instead. Accused Manalili also contends that it was Lopez who came on to her but he refused to give her money. It was only Carpio & Mandap who denied having sexual intercourse w/ her. RTC found them guilty of the charge & sentenced Nunag, Mandap & Salangsang to suffer reclusion perpetua while Carpio & Manalili, who were both above 16 & below 18 at the time of the commission of the offense, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 10 yrs of prision mayor as min to 17 yrs & 4 mos of reclusion temporal as max. HELD: Finding that Lopez, a poor barrio girl who looked timid and inexperienced in the ways of the world, had no motive whatsoever to testify falsely against the appellants, each of the 5 accused must be found guilty of 3 distinct and separate crimes of rape, the first 3 men by direct act & participation & the other 2 by indispensable cooperation. Nunag, Mandap & Salangsang sentenced to suffer 3 penalties of reclusion perpetua while Manalili & Carpio both being above 16 but below 18 yrs at that time, sentenced to suffer 3 indeterminate penalties of 10 yrs of prision mayor as min & 17 yrs 4 mos of reclusion temporal as max. Judgment affirmed w/ modification.

PEOPLE v. NUNAG [173 SCRA 274 (1989)] Nature: Appeal from the judgment of CFI Pampanga. 1989 FACTS: Complainant, Lorenza Lopez, then about 15.5 y.o., declared that in the 2nd wk of May 1978, at 730PM, while she was watch a TV program in the house of her neighbor, Laxamana, she saw the accused Mario Nunag, 1 of her neighbors, coming towards her. Nunag, staggering & drunk, came to her & asked her to go w/ him. Because she refused, Nunag held her by the hand & poked a knife at her stomach & threatened to kill her. Nunag placed something in her mouth & led her to a nearby ricefield, about 15m. away from Laxamanas house. Very soon thereafter, the accused was joined by

PEOPLE V. DELA CERNA [1967] FACTS: Rafael filed an ejectment suit against dela Cernas father wherein the court ruled in his favor. Later he was shot by the accused while the former and his family were bringing sacks of corn. He was taken away by his family to tend his wounds but Dela Cerna and company followed them and Rafael was shot again resulting to his death. Maquiling, one companion of Dela Cerna, shot Casiano, a relative of Rafael. HELD: Dela Cerna cannot be held liable for the death of Casiano because the conspiracy was to kill Rafael only. The rule has always been: co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy; for other acts done outside the contemplation of the coPage | 10

conspirators or which are not the necessary and logical consequence of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable. Although Maquiling got the gun from Dela Cerna, the latter only gave it to the former as per their agreement to shoot Rafael As to the other companions, facts prove their active participation in the killing. They are all principals. PAR. 2. PRINCIPALS BY INDUCTION Those who directly force or induce others to commit it. The principal by induction becomes liable only when the principal by direct participation committed the act induced. 2 WAYS OF BECOMING PRINCIPAL BY INDUCTION 1) BY DIRECTLY FORCING ANOTHER TO COMMIT A CRIME a. By using IRRESISTIBLE FORCE b. By causing UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR 2) BY DIRECTLY INDUCING ANOTHER TO COMMIT A CRIME. a. By giving price, or offering reward or promise. b. By using words of command. REQUISITES: 1. That the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and a. A thoughtless expression without intention to produce the result is not an inducement to commit a crime. b. The inducement may be by acts of command, advice, or through influence, or agreement for consideration. 2. That such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the material executor. - The words of advice of the influence must have actually moved the hands of the principal by direct participation. PRINCIPAL BY PROPOSAL TO COMMIT THE INDUCEMENT FELONY There is an inducement to commit a crime. The principal by The mere proposal to commit inducement becomes a felony is punishable in liable only when the treason and rebellion. The crime is committed by person to whom the proposal the principal by direct is made should not commit the participation. crime; otherwise, the proponent becomes a principal by inducement. The inducement The proposal to be punishable involves any crime must involve only treason or rebellion.

EFFECTS OF ACQUITTAL OF PRINCIPAL BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION UPON THE LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL BY INDUCEMENT 1) Conspiracy is negated by the acquittal of codefendant. 2) One cannot be held guilty of having instigated the commission of a crime without first being shown that the crime has been actually committed by another.

PEOPLE v. DE LA CRUZ [97 SCRA 385 (1980)]

Agapito de la Cruz was found guilty as principal by inducement of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, and sentencing him to death. The facts are such that Agapito met up w/ Mohamad Sagap Salip, Alih Itum and a certain Asmad and proposed to them the killing of Antonio Yu & the kidnapping of the Antonios younger bro Yu Chi Chong, for ransom. Agapito happened to be the oversser of Antonios rubber & coconut land for no less than 10 yrs He gave them instructions as to how and where to locate the Yu brothers at a given time and how they were to ambush the brothers. (But he didnt directly participate in actual crime) But Antonio had to go somewhere and so the younger Yu went with Isabelo Mancenido to Isabela (Isabelo Isabela hehe.. funny..). The younger Yu was ambushed as instructed but when Yu Chi Chong tried to escape by striking Angih with a piece of wood, Angih got so pissed he shot Yu several times, killing him. The gun shots alerted the villagers so the kidnappers fled. When the villagers left after seeing the body (they said theyll come back in the morning with police in tow), the kidnappers took the body and threw it in the ocean. Antonio testified and provided the possible motive for Agapito to commit such crime. Agapito was assigned manager and administrator of the farm but when the younger Yu came back, Agapito was demoted to overseer. Further, profits were higher with Yu as manager and Antonio became stricter with Agapito. Agapito was convicted as mastermind or principal by inducement

Issue: WON Agapito should be convicted as mastermind or principal by inducement in the absence of the elements of conspiracy to the crime charged. HELD: NO. The requisites necessary in order that a person may be convicted as a principal by inducement are: o That the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and o That such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the material executor The foregoing requisites are indubitable present in this case
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Jamas Jumaidi & Oyong Asidin, 2 discharged witnesses, testified that Asmad & Amil contected them to go to Basilan to do a job for Agapito. When the group was brought face to face with him, he lost no time in lating down the strategy for the killing of Antonio Yu and the kidnapping of Yu Chi Chong for ransom. It was he who knew when the truck of the intended victims would go to Latawan to load the copra to be delivered to Isabela. He knew the route the truck would take & the approximate time that it was to pass by. He even selected the ambush place. Clearly, he had positive resolution to procure the commission of the crime. He, too, presented the strongest kind of temptation, a pecuniary gain in the form of ransom, w/c was the determining factor of the commission of the crime by his co-accused. W/o him, the crime would not have been conceived, much less committed. Clearly, he was a principal by induction, with collective criminal responsibility with the material executors. One is induced to commit a crime either by a commans (precepto) or for a consideration (pacto), or by any other similar act w/c constitutes the real and moving cause of the crime & w/c was done for the purpose of inducing such criminal act & was sufficient for that purpose. The person who gives promises, or offers the consideration & the one who actually commits the crime by reason of such promise, remuneration or reward are both principals. The inducer need not take part in the commission of the offense. 1 who induces another to commit a crime is guilty as principal even though he might have taken no part in its material execution.

and principal by direct participation have collective criminal responsibility. Principal by indispensable cooperation has collective criminal responsibility with the principal by direct participation. PEOPLE v. MONTEALEGRE [161 SCRA 700 (1988)]

Edmundo Abadilla was eating in a resto when he detected the smell of marijuana smoke coming from a nearby table. Intending to call a policeman, he quietly went outside and saw Pfc. Renato Camantigue. Camantigue joined Abadilla in the resto and they both smelled the marijuana smoke from the table of Vicente Capalad and Napoleon Montealegre. Camantigue collared the 2 & said Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano? He forced them up, holding 1 in each hand but Capalad pulled out a knife & started stabbing Camantigue at the back. Camantigue let go of Montealegre to get his gun but Montealegre restrained Camantigues hand to prevent the latter from defending himself. They grappled & fell on the floor. Capalac fled and Camantigue pursued him firing some shots. Then he stopped and asked to be brought to a hospital. Capalac was found slumped in the street, with a bullet to his chest. Both he and Camantigue died the next day. Montealegre on the other hand, escaped through the confusion. He was later apprehended.

PAR. 3. PRINCIPALS BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished. REQUISITES: 1. Participation in the criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime charged; and 2. Cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act, without which it would not have been accomplished. e offender must fall under any of the three concepts defined in Article 17. the offenders are criminally liable in the same manner and to the same extent. The penalty to be imposed must be the same for all. criminal responsibility. Principal by induction, except that who directly forced another to commit a crime,

Issue: WON Montealegre was rightly considered a coprincipal for having corroborated with Capalad in the killing of the police officer. YES. The two acted in concert, with Capalad actually stabbing Camantigue 7 times and Montealegre holding on to victims hands to prevent him from drawing the pistol and defending himseld, as Abadilla had testified. While it is true that Montealegre did not himself commit the act of stabbing, he was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having prevented Camantigue for resisting the attack against him. Montealegre was a principal by indispensable cooperation under A17(3), RPC. The requisites of this provision o Participating in the criminal resolution, i.e., theres either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose & intention immediately before the commission of the crime charged; & o Cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act w/o w/c it would not have been accomplished. But although there was no evidence of prior agreement between Capalad & Montealegre, their subsequent acts should prove the presence of such conspiracy. The Court has consistently upheld such view in previous cases (People v. Laganson, People v. Cercano, People v. Garcia Cabarse, Dacanay v. People) Montealegre was correctly convicted of the complex crime of murder, qualified by treachery, w/ assault upon a person of authority.
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PEOPLE vs. QUILLOSA [G.R. No. 115687, Feb. 17, 2000] FACTS: On Jan.1, 1991, at about 5 AM, prosecution witness Roberto Vasquez was on his way to church when he saw the victim Ambrosio Ilocto, also known as "Mang Bosiong", walking some four or five meters ahead of him. Suddenly, three men blocked Mang Bosiongs way. While appellant Reynaldo Quillosa held Mang Bosiongs right hand, the second man held his left hand, and the third man stabbed Mang Bosiong, with a knife, three times. When Mang Bosiong fell, appellant remarked, "Leo that is enough, he would die." Then the three (3) men fled. Quillosa was apprehended, charged and later the RTC convicted Quillosa of the murder of Ambrosio Ilocto, imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00. HELD: We have long held that the testimony of a single eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction so long as it is clear, straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court. Minor and inconsequential flaws in the testimony of the witness strengthen rather than impair his credibility. As to appellants participation in the killing, the Court in previous cases have held that holding the hand of the victim to render him immobile while he is being stabbed amounts to an act of indispensable cooperation without which the crime would not have been accomplished. Appellants act of holding the right arm of the victim, while another held the left arm, thus enabling their third companion to stab the victim, shows that they acted together with one purpose and design to kill the victim. As to the crime committed, we find that treachery attended the commission of the offense, hence the crime is murder. For treachery to be present, two conditions must be shown: (1) the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate; and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution.In this case, appellant and another person held the hands of the victim to enable their companion to stab him while he was in a defenseless position. While abuse of superior strength was alleged in the Information, it is already absorbed in treachery and need not be appreciated separately. Evident premeditation was not proven by the prosecution. B. ACCOMPLICES Art. 18. Accomplices. Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in Art. 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. In quasi-collective criminal responsibility, some of the offenders in the crime are principals and the others are accomplices.

The participation of an accomplice presupposes the commission of the crime b the principal by direct participation. When there is no conspiracy between or among the defendants but they were animated by one and the same purpose to accomplish the criminal objective, those who cooperated by previous or simultaneous act but cannot be held liable as principals are accomplices. An accomplice does not have a previous agreement or understanding or is not in conspiracy with the principal by direct participation. CONSPIRATOR ACCOMPLICE They know and agree with the criminal design. Conspirators know the Accomplices come to know criminal intention about it after the principals because they have reached the decision and themselves have only then do they agree to decided upon such cooperate in its execution. course of action. Conspirators decide Accomplices merely assent to that a crime should be the plan and cooperate in it committed. accomplishment Conspirators are the Accomplices are merely authors of a crime instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense. REQUISITES: 1. That there be community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; 2. That he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and 3. That there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice. The community of design need not be to commit the crime actually committed. It is sufficient if there was a common purpose to commit a particular crime and that the crime actually committed was a natural or probable consequence of the intended crime. The cooperation of an accomplice is not due to a conspiracy. When the acts of the accused are not indispensable in the killing, they are merely accomplices. The accomplice merely supplies the principal with material or moral aid without conspiracy with the latter. The wounds inflicted by an accomplice in crimes against persons should mot have caused the death of the victim. RULES: 1. The one who had the original criminal design is the person who committed the resulting crime.
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2. The accomplice, after concurring in the criminal purpose of the principal, cooperates by previous or simultaneous acts. When the cooperation is by simultaneous act, the accomplice takes part while the crime is being committed by the principal by direct participation or immediately thereafter. 3. The accomplice in crimes against persons does not inflict the more or most serious wounds. The moral aid may be through advice, encouragement or agreement. There must be a relation between the criminal act of the principal and the act of the one charged as accomplice. PRINCIPAL by ACCOMPLICE COOPERATION Cooperation is Cooperation is indispensable in the indispensable in commission of the act. commission of the act.

occupants of the jeep. Appellant Ortillano likewise, fired his armalite, not at the occupants of said jeep but downwards hitting the ground. Then they ran away from the scene and boarded another vehicle and went in so many places until they were apprehended. Mandolado was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength while Ortillano was penalized by imprisonment for being an accessory ISSUE: WON Ortillano is an accessory HELD: NO. Julian Ortillano should be convicted, not as an accessory, but as an accomplice. An accomplice cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, provided he has no direct participation in its execution or does not force or induce others to commit it, or his cooperation is not indispensable to its accomplishment. In the case at bar, Ortillano, by his acts showed knowledge of the criminal design of Mandolado. He was present when the latter tried to attack the driver of the Ford Fiera with a knife and fired at the vehicle hitting a female passenger. When Mandolado cocked his gun and ordered Tenorio to stop the jeep, their 2 other companion, Simon and Erinada, immediately jumped off the jeep and ran away but Ortillano stayed. In a display of unity with Mandolado, Ortillano fired his armalite while they were riding in the jeep of the victim. And Ortillanos act of firing his gun towards the ground manifested his concurrence with the criminal intent. In other words, his simultaneous acts supplied moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way. His presence served to encourage Mandolado, the principal, or to increase the odds against the victims.

not the

PEOPLE vs. MANDOLADO [123 SCRA 133 (1983)] FACTS: Julian Ortillano and Martin Mandolado, appellants, as well as Conrado Erinada and Anacleto Simon, were on a bus bound for Midsayap, North Cotabato. All 4 were trainees/draftees of AFP They alighted at the bus terminal in Midsayap. Being all in uniform, armed & belonging to the same military outfit, they got acquainted & decided to drink ESQ rum, at the said bus terminal. After drinking for about an hour, Mandolado got drunk and went inside the public market. Subsequently, he returned, grabbed his .30 caliber machine gun and started firing. His companions tried to dissuade him but he nonetheless continued firing his gun. Sensing trouble, Conrado and Anacleto ran away, hailed and boarded a passing Ford Fiera with some passengers on board. Appellants followed and boarded also the vehicle and forced the driver of the Ford Fiera to bring them to the Midsayap crossing. All the while, Mandolado was harassing the driver and firing his gun. They for off at the Midsayap crossing and waited for a ride. When Herminigildo Tenorio, driving a privately owned jeep where Nolasco Mendoza was on board, passed by the 4 boarded the jeep. The whole time, Mandolado was still causing trouble and firing his gun. Upon learning that the jeep was bound for Cotabato City and not Pikit, North Cotabato, appellant Mandolado got angry, "cocked" his gun and ordered the driver to stop. While the jeep was coming to a full stop, Conrado and Anacleto immediately jumped off the jeep and ran towards their detachment camp. Appellants also got off the jeep but then Mandolado fired his .30 caliber machine gun at and hit the

PEOPLE vs. DOCTOLERO [193 SCRA 632 (1991)] FACTS: The 3 accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio (all surnamed Doctolero) threw stones at Saguns house and called to all the men in the house to come out. Epifiana and Lolita and Jonathan (1 year old child of Lolita) were struck and stabled by the accused inside the house of Sagun. Epifiana and Lolita died while Jonathan was slightly injured. The same accused while already on the road, hacked and stabbed Marcelo which caused his death. HELD: There is no question that while the 3 accused were still stoning at the house, they heard the 2 women protesting and Ludovico went inside and brutally killed the 2 women inside the room of the said house. It is impossible to claim that Virgilio and Conrado did not know what their brother was doing. They knew and they just stood by and did nothing to stop their brother. Their presence gave Ludovico encouragement in the commission of the crime. Thus, the 2 are accomplices. Once can be an accomplice even if he did not know of the actual crime intended b the principal provided he was aware that it was an illicit act.
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C. ACCESSORIES Art. 19. Accessories. Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners: 1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime. 2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery. 3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. An accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor cooperate in the commission of the felony, but, with knowledge of the commission of the crime, he subsequently takes part in 3 ways: a) by profiting from the effects of the crime; b) by concealing the body, effects or instruments of the crime in order to prevent its discovery; and c) by assisting in the escape or concealment of the principal of the crime, provided he acts with abuse of his public functions or the principal is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilt of some other crime. knowledge of the commission of the crime Mere possession of stolen property does not make the accused an accessory where the thief was already convicted. Entertaining suspicion that a crime has been committed is not enough. Knowledge of the commission of the crime may be established by circumstantial evidence commission of the crime the crime committed by the principal must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. without having participated therein either as principals or accomplices take part subsequent to its commission The accessory takes part AFTER the crime has been committed. SPECIFIC ACTS OF THE ACCESSORIES 1. BY PROFITING THEMSELVES OR ASSISTING THE OFFENDER TO PROFIT BY THE EFFECTS OF THE CRIME - The accessory must receive the property from the principal. He should not take it without the

consent of the principal, or else, he is not an accessory but a principal in the crime of theft. - When is profiting by the effect of the crime punished as the act of principal, and not the act of accessory? When a person knowingly acquired or received property taken by the brigands. 2. BY CONCEALING OR DESTROYING THE BODY OF THE CRIME TO PREVENT ITS DISCOVERY. BODY OF THE CRIME corpus delicti which means that a specific offense was in fact committed by someone 3. BY HARBORING, CONCEALING OR ASSISTING IN THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL OF THE CRIME 2 CLASSES: a. Public officers who harbor conceal or assist in the escape of the principal of any crime (not light felony) with abuse of his public functions REQUISITES: (1) The accessory is a public officer; (2) He harbors, conceals, or assists in the escape of the principal; (3) The public officer acts with abuse of his public functions. (4) The crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light felony. b. Private persons who harbor, conceal or assist in the escape of the author of the crime guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt against the life of the President, or who is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. REQUISITES: (1) The accessory is a private person. (2) He harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the author of the crime. (3) The crime committed by the principal is either: (a) treason, (b) parricide, (c) murder, (d) attempt against the life of the president, or (e) that the principal is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1612 ANTI-FENCING LAW OF 1979 WHEREAS, reports from law enforcement agencies reveal that there is rampant robbery and thievery of government and private properties; WHEREAS, such robbery and thievery have become profitable on the part of the lawless elements because of the existence of ready buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen properties; WHEREAS, under existing law, a fence can be prosecuted only as an accessory after the fact and punished lightly;
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WHEREAS, is imperative to impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft. NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree as part of the law of the land the following: Section 1. Title. This decree shall be known as the Anti-Fencing Law. Section 2. Definition of Terms. The following terms shall mean as follows: (a) "Fencing" is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. (b) "Fence" includes any person, firm, association corporation or partnership or other organization who/which commits the act of fencing. Section 3. Penalties. Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder indicated: (a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than 12,000 pesos but not exceeding 22,000 pesos; if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed. (b) The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the property robbed or stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but not exceeding 12,000 pesos. (c) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property involved is more than 200 pesos but not exceeding 6,000 pesos. (d) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property involved is over 50 pesos but not exceeding 200 pesos. (e) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period if such value is over five (5) pesos but not exceeding 50 pesos. (f) The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period if such value does not exceed 5 pesos. Section 4. Liability of Officials of Juridical Persons. If the fence is a partnership, firm, corporation or association, the president or the manager or any officer thereof who knows or should have known the commission of the offense shall be liable.

Section 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing. Section 6. Clearance/Permit to Sell/Used Second Hand Articles. For purposes of this Act, all stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buy and sell of any good, article item, object of anything of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before offering the same for sale to the public, secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where such store, establishment or entity is located. The Chief of Constabulary/Director General, Integrated National Police shall promulgate such rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this section. Any person who fails to secure the clearance or permit required by this section or who violates any of the provisions of the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall upon conviction be punished as a fence. Section 7. Repealing Clause. All laws or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Section 8. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect upon approval. Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of March, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-nine. ACCESSORY DISTINGUISHED FROM PRINCIPAL AND FROM ACCOMPLICE 1. The accessory does not take direct part or cooperate in, or induce, the commission of the crime. 2. The accessory does not cooperate in the commission of the offense by acts either prior thereto or simultaneous therewith. 3. That the participation of the accessory in all cases always takes place after the commission of the crime. Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article. The exemption is based on the ties of blood and the preservation of the cleanliness of ones name, which compels one to conceal crimes committed by relatives. An ACESSORY is exempt from criminal liability, when the principal is his: 1. spouse, 2. ascendant, 3. descendant,
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4. legitimate, natural or adopted brother, sister or relative by affinity within the same degree. - even if only two of the principals guilty of murder are the brothers of the accessory and the others are not related to him, such accessory is exempt from criminal liability. - a nephew or niece is not included An accessory is NOT EXEMPT from criminal liability even if the principal is related to him, if such accessory (1) PROFITED by the effects of the crime, or (2) assisted the offender to profit by the effects of the crime

PEOPLE vs. TALINGDAN [84 SCRA 19 (1978)] FACTS: Bernardo and Teresa lived together but for quite some time their relationship has gotten bitter. Bernardo knew that Teresa had an illicit relationship with Talingdan. Their child testified that on the day the killing occurred, there were 4 men inside their house and Bernardo knew about it but continued plowing his field. Later, when Bernardo came inside the kitchen, Talingdan and Tobias fired at Bernardo and the 4 climbed the stairs of the Batalan. Seeing that the victim was alive they fired at him again. Teresa came out after from her room and pulled her child to question her. Teresa threatened to kill her if she would reveal the incident. HELD: One who conceals or assists in the escape of the principal in the crime can be held guilty as accessory. There is morally convincing proof that Teresa is an accessory to the offense. She was inside the room when her husband was shot. As she came out after the shooting, she inquired from the child if she was able to recognize the assailants and when the latter identified the 4 accused as the culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone but she went to the extent of warning her not to tell anyone or else she would kill her. Later when the police came, she claimed she had no suspects in mind. She, thus, became active in her cooperation with the 4 accused.

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