Baustista vs Borromeo Facts 1.

The truck of petitioner Roberto Tan Ting driven by Abelardo Bautista, the other petitioner, and the Volkswagen delivery panel truck owned by respondent Federico . Borro!eo, "nc. were involved in a traffic accident along #pifanio de los $antos Avenue. "n said traffic accident, %uintin &elgado, a helper in Borro!eo's delivery panel truck, sustained in(uries which resulted in his instantaneous death. Borro!eo had to pay &elgado's widow the su! of )*,*** representing the co!pensation +death benefit, and funeral e-penses due &elgado under the .ork!en's /o!pensation Act. 1pon the aver!ent that the said vehicular accident was caused by petitioners' negligence, Borro!eo started suit to recover fro! petitioners the co!pensation and funeral e-penses it paid to the widow of %uintin &elgado. At the scheduled hearing, neither petitioners nor their counsel appeared. Borro!eo was thus allowed to present its evidence e- parte. n the sa!e day, the !unicipal court rendered (udg!ent in favor of Borro!eo and against the petitioners in the principal su! of )*,***, and )344 attorney's fees, and costs.

tortfeasor.@

5o need then there is to establish any contractual relationship between %uintin &elgado and herein petitioners. "ndeed, there is none. The cause of action of respondent corporation is one which does not spring fro! a creditorBdebtor relationship. "t arises by virtue of its subrogation to the right of %uintin &elgado to sue the guilty party. $uch subrogation is sanctioned by the .ork!en's /o!pensation Caw aforesaid. "t is as a subrogee to the rights of its deceased e!ployee, %uintin &elgado, that Borro!eo filed a suit against petitioners.

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Pelayo vs Lauron Facts 1. n 5ove!ber 02, 1D49, a physician na!ed Arturo )elayo filed a co!plaint against Earelo Cauron and Fuana Abellana. n the night of ctober 12th of the sa!e year, the plaintiff was called to render !edical assistance to the defendant's daughterBinBlaw, who was about to gie birth. After the consultation of &r. #scaGo, it was dee!ed that the operation was going to be difficult for child birth, but regardless, &r. )elayo proceeded with the (ob of operating on the sub(ect and also re!oved the afterbirth. The operation went on until !orning, and on the sa!e day, visited several ti!es and billed the defendants the (ust a!ount of )344 for the services rendered to which defendants refused to pay. "n answer to the co!plaint, counsel for the defendants denied all of the allegation and alleged as a special defense, that their daughterBinBlaw had died in conseAuence of the said childbirth, that when she was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a separate house without any relation whatever with the!, and that, if on the day when she gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay there was accidental and due to fortuitous circu!stances. Therefore, he prayed that the defendants be absolved of the co!plaint with costs against the plaintiff.

2.

Issue 1. . 5 there is obligation on the part of Borro!eo, "nc. to pay &elgado's widow death benefits6 0.

Ruling 1. 7es, there is. 2. Borro!eo paid the widow of its e!ployee, %uintin &elgado, co!pensation +death benefit, and funeral e-penses for the latter's death while in the course of e!ploy!ent. This obligation arises fro! law 8 $ection 0 of the .ork!en's /o!pensation Act. The sa!e law in its $ection 9 also provides that :;i<n case an e!ployee suffers an in(ury for which co!pensation is due under this Act by any other person besides his e!ployer, it shall be optional with such in(ured e!ployee either to clai! co!pensation fro! his e!ployer, under this Act, or sue such other person for da!ages, in accordance with law= and in case co!pensation is clai!ed and allowed in accordance with this Act, the e!ployer who paid such co!pensation or was found liable to pay the sa!e, shall succeed the in(ured e!ployee to the right of recovering fro! such person what he paid> ?@

Issue 1. Ruling 0. 5o. According to article 14HD of the /ivil /ode, obligations are created by law, by contracts, by Auasicontracts, and by illicit acts and o!issions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. bligations arising fro! law are not presu!ed. Those e-pressly deter!ined in the code or in special laws, etc., are the only de!andable ones. bligations arising fro! /an the defendants be held liable to pay for the obligation6

"t is evident fro! the foregoing that if co!pensation is clai!ed and awarded, and the e!ployer pays it, the e!ployer beco!es subrogated to and acAuires, by operation of law, the worker's rights against the

contracts have legal force between the contracting parties and !ust be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. +Arts. 14D4 and 14D1., The rendering of !edical assistance in case of illness was co!prised a!ong the !utual obligations to which the spouses were bound by way of !utual support. +Arts. 1*0 and 1*2., "f every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing so!ething +art. 14HH,, and spouses were !utually bound to support each other, there can be no Auestion but that, when either of the! by reason of illness should be in need of !edical assistance, the other was under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health !ay be restored, and he or she !ay be freed fro! the sickness by which life is (eopardiIed. The party bound to furnish such support was therefore liable for all e-penses, including the fees of the !edical e-pert for his professional services. "n the face of the above legal precepts, it was unAuestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the daughterBinBlaw of the defendants during her childbirth, was the husband of the patient and not her father and !otherB inBlaw of the defendants herein.

1.

.hether or not the respondent is oblige to pay the continued service rendered by the petitioner.

Ruling 1. 7es. The /ourt decision is that the (udge!ent should be rendered against &on #ugenio )o!ar for the pay!ent to the plaintiff of the su! of 044 Ee-ican pesos. The /ourt ruled out that if there is a tacit and !utual consent as to the rendition of the services, the defendant is still obliged to pay such co!pensation to the petitioner even if there is no written contract entered between the two parties on the basis of AuasiBcontract. .hen one party knowingly receives so!ething for nothing, the courts !ay i!pose a Auasi contract. 1nder a Auasi contract, neither party is originally intended to create an agree!ent. "nstead, an arrange!ent is i!posed by a (udge to rectify an occurrence of un(ust enrich!ent. n the services rendered by the petitioner in the province of Caguna, it follows that there was a bilateral obligation on the part of both parties because the defendant accepted the benefit of the service rendered by the petitioner and that in turn the petitioner e-pected hi! to pay his rendition of service. )rovided in Article 00 of the /ivil /ode, #very person who through an act of perfor!ance by another, or any other !eans, acAuires or co!es into possession of so!ething at the e-pense of the latter without (ust or legal ground, shall return the sa!e to hi!. The fact that the defendant consented to accept an interpreterMs services on various occasions, rendered in his behalf and not considered as free, it is (ust that he should pay the reasonable pay!ent because it is wellBknown principle of law that no one should be per!itted to enrich hi!self to the da!age of another. Maritime Company vs Reparations Committee Facts 1. )laintiff Eariti!e /o. of the )hilippines would deny that it is controlling in its suit to hold defendant Reparations /o!!ission liable for the freight charges as the consignee of reparations goods, notwithstanding that under $ection 11 of the Reparations Act, ocean freight and other e-penses incident to i!portation shall be paid by the endBuser and not by such agency= that defendant is e-e!pt fro! such obligation. "n plaintiff's co!plaint, it alleged that ship!ents of reparation goods were loaded in 2 of its vessels consigned to the defendant wN freight charges. Then ca!e to allegation that said vessels arrived in Eanila and discharged all such ship!ent of reparations goods wNc were duly received by defendant in good order and condition but defendant failed and refused to pay not withstanding repeated de!ands.

Perez vs Pomar Facts 1. The petitioner &on Vicente )ereI filed before the /ourt of First "nstance of Caguna a co!plaint asking the court to deter!ine the a!ount due to hi! for the services he rendered in the Tabacalera /o!pany and that the defendant #ugenio )o!ar be conde!ned to the pay!ent of da!ages a!ounting to J2,044, gold, together with the costs of suit. )rior to this event, the petitioner was asked to be an #nglish interpreter between the defendant and the !ilitary authorities and that after that incident, the petitioner continued to render his services to the respondent and that he obtained passes and acco!panied )o!ar upon his (ourneys to so!e of the towns in )rovince of Caguna+ e.g conferences between the respondent and the colonel co!!anding the local garrison, conferences with /aptain Ce!en in the town of )ilar, !a(or in co!!and in )agsan(an about the ship!ent of goods fro! Eanila, and that the plaintiff was assured by the respondent that in every rendered service to the said co!pany, there would be such pay!ent. Thus, causing hi! to abandon his soap business and suffered da!ages in the su! of J2,044. The defendant filed for dis!issal of the co!plaint denying the allegations stated by the petitioner. Ke also stated that )ereI borrowed fro! ti!e to ti!e !oney a!ounting to J1L3 for his soap business, that )ereI purposes in acco!panying hi! is to e-tend his business and !ercantile relations, free transportation, and that )ereI had acted as interpreter of his own free will without any offer of pay!ent and therefore no legal relation between the! e-isted. Issue

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Issue

1. Ruling 1.

. 5 the contention of the plaintiff will prosper6

5o. it is a funda!ental reAuire!ent that the contract entered into !ust be in accordance with, and not repugnant to, an applicable statute. "ts ter!s are e!bodied herein. The contracting parties need not repeat the! and they do not even have to be referred to. #very contract thus contains not only what has been e-plicitly stipulated, but the statutory provisions that have any bearing on the !atter. The principle is thus wellBsettled that and e-isting law enters into and for!s part of a valid contract wNo the need for the parties e-pressly !aking reference to it. nly thus could its validity insofar as so!e of its provisions are concerned to be assured

NHA vs Grace Baptist Church Facts 1. n Fune 12, 1DH9, Respondent Orace Baptist /hurch wrote a letter to 5KA !anifesting their intent to purchase Cot * and 1L of the Oeneral Eariano AlvareI Resettle!ent )ro(ect in /avite. The latter granted reAuest hence respondent entered into possession of the lots and introduced i!prove!ents thereon. n February 00, 1DD1, 5KA passed a resolution approving the sale of the sub(ect lots to respondent /hurch for L44 per sAuare !eter, a total of )*24,344. Respondents were duly infor!ed. n April H, 1DD1, respondent church tendered a check a!ounting to )33,234 contending that this was the agreed price. 5KA avers stating that the price now +1DD1, is different fro! before +1DH9,. The trial court rendered a decision in favour of 5KA stating that there was no contract of sale, ordering to return the said lots to 5KA and to pay 5KA rent of 044 pesos fro! the ti!e it took possession of the lot. Respondent /hurch appealed to the /A which affir!s the decision of RT/ regarding :no contract of sale@ but !odifying it by ordering 5KA to e-ecute the sale of the said lots to /hurch for L44 per sAuare, with 9P interest per annu! fro! Earch 1DD1. )etitioner 5KA filed a !otion for reconsideration which was denied. Kence this petition for review on certiorari "ssue . 5 5KA can be co!pelled to sell the lots under !arket value6 1. 0.

or planting, after pay!ent of the inde!nity provided for in articles 3*9 and 3*H, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. Kowever, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land and if its value is considerably !ore than that of the building or trees. "n such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper inde!nity. The parties shall agree, on case of disagree!ent, court shall fi-.@

0.

5/B$A vs /A and )5B Facts 1. 5ational /o!!ercial Bank of $audi Arabia +5/B$A, filed a respondent )hilippine Banking /orporation +)B/, to recover pay!ent of the proceeds of a letter of credit issued by 5/B$A fact that both the head office and Eakati branch of )B/ proceeds. case against the duplicate in view of the collected the

2.

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3.

9.

The Regional Trial /ourt +RT/, of Eakati ruled in favor of 5/B$A. )B/ filed a Eotion for Reconsideration. The !otion, however, did not contain a notice of hearing. )B/ tried to cure the defect by subseAuently filing a Eotion to $et :Eotion for Reconsideration@ for Kearing nine days after the period for filing the 5otice of Appeal had e-pired which was vigorously opposed by 5/B$A. 5/B$A called for the strict application of the )hilippinesQ rules of procedure to prevent any !ore delay in the disposition of the case, which has been pending for !ore than seventeen years. n the other hand, )B/ invokes a (ust and fair deter!ination of the case.

2.

L.

Issue 1. Ruling 1. 5o, because the contract has not been perfected. The /hurch despite knowledge that its intended contract of sale with the 5KA had not been perfected proceeded to introduce i!prove!ents on the land. n the other hand, 5KA knowingly granted the /hurch te!porary use of the sub(ect properties and did not prevent the /hurch fro! !aking i!prove!ents thereon. Thus the /hurch and 5KA, who both acted in bad faith shall be treated as if they were both in good faith. "n this connection Art **Hprovides> : the owner of the land in which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing

. 5 the obligation ste!s fro! a contract with a prescription of 14 years or a AuasiBcontract of $olutio "ndebiti which has a prescription period of 9 years

Ruling 1. bligation ste!s fro! a contract which was the Cetter of /redit.

$olutio indebiti applies where> +1, a pay!ent is !ade when there e-ists no binding relation between the payor, who has no duty to pay, and the person who received the pay!ent, and +0, the pay!ent is !ade through !istake, and not through liberality or so!e other cause.

"n the case at bar, )B/ and 5/B$A were bound by their contract, the letter of credit, under which 5/B$A obliged itself to pay )B/, sub(ect to co!pliance by the latter with certain conditions provided therein. As such,the cause of action was based on a contract, and the prescriptive period is ten, not si- years.

iga!an vs "illanueva Facts 1. n Earch 2, 1DDH, respondent Alicia Villanueva filed a co!plaint for a of !oney against petitioner $ebastian $igaBan. Respondent alleged she was a businesswo!an engaged in supplying office !aterials eAuip!ents to the )5 = while petitioner was a !ilitary officer co!ptroller of the )5 fro! 1DD1B1DD9. su! that and and

an overpay!ent of her loan obligation to petitioner and that the latter should refund the e-cess a!ount to the for!er. The alleged interest should not be included because there was no agree!ent between the! regarding the pay!ent of interest. "t concluded that since respondent !ade an e-cess pay!ent to petitioner in the a!ount of )994,444.44 through !istake, petitioner should return the said a!ount to respondent pursuant to the principle of solution indebiti H. )etitioner appealed to the /A but the /A affir!ed the ruling of the RT/. )etitioner filed a !otion for reconsideration to the appellate court, hence this petition.

0.

$o!eti!e in 1DD0, respondent clai!ed that the petitioner approached her inside the )5 office and offered to loan her the a!ount of )3*4,444. $he accepted the offer since she needed capital for her business. The loan agree!ent was not reduced in writing and there was no stipulation as to the pay!ent of interest for the loan. n August 21, 1DD2, respondent issued a check worth )344,444 to petitioner as partial pay!ent of the loan. Two !onths later she issued another check in the a!ount of )044,444 as pay!ent of the re!aining balance. )etitioner told her that she since she paid a total a!ount of )L44,444 for the )3*4,444 worth of loan, the e-cess a!ount of )194,444 would be applied as interest for the loan. 5ot satisfied with the a!ount applied as interest, the petitioner pestered her to pay additional interest. Ke threatened to block her transactions with the )5 if she wonMt co!ply. The respondent conceded since all her transactions with the )5 need the approval of the petitioner. Thus, she paid addtMl a!ounts in cash and checks as interest for the loan. $he asked the petitioner to give her receipts but he told her that thereMs no need for a receipt because thereMs !utual trust and understanding between the!. Thereafter, the respondent consulted a lawyer regarding propriety of paying interest on the loan despite the absence of agree!ent to that effect. Ker lawyer told her that petitioner could not validly collect interest on the loan because there was no agree!ent between her and petitioner. 1pon being advised by her lawyer that she !ade an overpay!ent, she sent a de!and letter to petitioner asking for the return of the e-cess a!ount. But the petitioner (ust ignored the de!and letter. Respondent prayed that the RT/ render (udg!ent ordering petitioner to pay respondent+1, )994,444.44 plus legal interest fro! the ti!e of de!and= +0, )244,444.44 as !oral da!ages= +2, )34,444.44 as e-e!plary da!ages= and +*, an a!ount eAuivalent to 03P of )994,444.44 as attorney's fees. "n his answer to the co!plaint, the petitioner denied that he offered a loan to respondent and !entioned the !istakes co!!itted by the respondent regarding the pay!ent of the loan and that there was no overpay!ent. After the trial, the RT/ rendered a decision holding that respondent !ade

Issue 1. Ruling 1. 7es, $olutio "ndebiti applies in this instant case. . 5 the principle of $olutio "ndebiti applies

2.

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3.

Under Article 1960 of the Civil Code, if the borrower of loan pays interest when there has been no stipulation therefor, the provisions of the Civil Code concerningsolutio indebiti shall be applied. Article 21 ! of the Civil Code e"plains the principle of solutio indebiti. #aid provision provides that if so$ething is received when there is no right to de$and it, and it was unduly delivered through $ista%e, the obligation to return it arises. &n such a case, a creditor'debtor relationship is created under a (uasi'contract whereby the payor beco$es the creditor who then has the right to de$and the return of pay$ent $ade by $ista%e, and the person who has no right to receive such pay$ent beco$es obligated to return the sa$e. )he (uasi' contract of solutio indebiti har%s bac% to the ancient principle that no one shall enrich hi$self un*ustly at the e"pense of another. )he principle of solutio indebiti applies where +1, a pay$ent is $ade when there e"ists no binding relation between the payor, who has no duty to pay, and the person who received the

9.

L.

pay$ent- and +2, the pay$ent is $ade through $ista%e, and not through liberality or so$e other cause. .e have held that the principle of solutio indebiti applies in case of erroneous pay$ent of undue interest. &t was duly established that respondent paid interest to petitioner. /espondent was under no duty to $a%e such pay$ent because there was no e"press stipulation in writing to that effect. )here was no binding relation between petitioner and respondent as regards the pay$ent of interest. )he pay$ent was clearly a $ista%e. #ince petitioner received so$ething when there was no right to de$and it, he has an obligation to return it.

be co!pensated through inde!nity which is civil in nature. #MPI $mployees Cre%it Cooperative Inc&' vs "elez Facts 0. n February 1H, 1DD*, the prosecuting attorney filed with the Regional Trial /ourt, Eisa!is riental, Branch 2L, an infor!ation for estafa against /ar!en Eandawe for alleged failure to account to respondent #riberta Villegas the a!ount of )94H,320.*9. Respondent Villegas entrusted this a!ount to /ar!en Eandawe, an e!ployee of petitioner &E)"B#//", for deposit with the teller of petitioner. $ubseAuently, on Earch 0D, 1DD*, respondent #riberta Villegas filed with the Regional Trial /ourt, Eisa!is riental, Branch 04, a co!plaint against /ar!en Eandawe and petitioner &E)"B#//" for a su! of !oney and da!ages with preli!inary attach!ent arising out of the sa!e transaction. "n ti!e, petitioner sought the dis!issal of the civil case on the following grounds> a. that there is a pending cri!inal case in RT/ Branch 2L, arising fro! the sa!e facts, and that the co!plaint failed to contain a certification against foru! shopping as reAuired by $upre!e /ourt /ircular 5o. 0HBD1. Thus, :every person cri!inally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.R This is the law governing the recovery of civil liability arising fro! the co!!ission of an offense. /ivil liability includes restitution, reparation for da!age caused, and inde!nification of conseAuential da!ages. The offended party !ay prove the civil liability of an accused arising fro! the co!!ission of the offense in the cri!inal case since the civil action is either dee!ed instituted with the cri!inal action or is separately instituted. Rule (((' ection ( of the Revised Rules of /ri!inal )rocedure, which beca!e effective on &ece!ber 1, 0444, provides that> :.hen a cri!inal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising fro! the offense charged shall be dee!ed instituted with the cri!inal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the cri!inal action.@ Rule (((' b. ection ) further provides that

2.

n &ece!ber 10, 1DD9, the trial court issued an order dis!issing /ivil /ase 5o. /VBD*B01*. n Fanuary 01, 1DDL,respondent filed a !otion for reconsideration of the order. n February 01, 1DDL, the trial court issued an order granting respondent's !otion for reconsideration, thereby recalling the dis!issal of the case. Kence, this petition for certiorari seeking for the annul!ent of the order of the Trial /ourt, granting the !otion for reconsideration of respondent #riberta Villegas, and thus reversing the previous dis!issal of /ivil /ase 5o. /VBD*B01*.

:After the cri!inal action has been co!!enced, the separate civil action arising therefro! cannot be instituted until final (udg!ent has been entered in the cri!inal action.@ Kowever, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 20, 22, 2* and 01L9 of the /ivil /ode arising fro! the sa!e act or o!ission, the rule has been changed. 1nder the present rule, only the civil liability arising fro! the offense charged is dee!ed instituted with the cri!inal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the cri!inal action. There is no !ore need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil actions under Articles 20, 22, 2*and 01L9 of the /ivil /ode of the )hilippines Rule 111, $ection 2 reads>

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Issue 1. . 5 the civil case could proceed independently of the cri!inal case for estafa without having reserved the filing of the civil action.

Ruling 1. 7es. A case for estafa is an independent civil action and !ay proceed independently and separately fro! the cri!inal case.

:The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising fro! the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 20, 22, 2* and 01L9 of the /ivil /ode of the )hilippines arising fro! the sa!e act or o!ission which !ay be prosecuted separately even without a reservation.@

As a general rule, an offense causes two +0, classes of in(uries. The first is the social in(ury produced by the cri!inal act which is sought to be repaired thru the i!position of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal in(ury caused to the victi! of the cri!e which in(ury is sought to

the cri!e beyond reasonable doubt, then the sa!e evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by !ere preponderance of evidence. Hun Hyung Par* vs $ung +on Choi Facts 1. #ung .on /hoi +/hoi, was charged for violation of Batas )a!bansa Blg. 00, otherwise known as the Bouncing /hecks Caw, before the Eetropolitan Trial /ourt of Eakati for issuing a postdated check in the a!ount of )1,HL3,444. The sa!e was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. /hoi filed a de!urer to evidence after the prosecution rested its case. The Eakati Eetropolitan Trial /ourt granted the &e!urrer and dis!issed the case. Kun Kyung )ark +)ark, appealed the civil aspect of the case to the Regional Trial /ourt +RT/, of Eakati, contending that the dis!issal of the cri!inal case should not include its civil aspect. RT/ held that while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove respondentQs cri!inal liability, it did not altogether e-tinguish his civil liability. 1pon a !otion for reconsideration, however, the RT/ set aside its decision and ordered the re!and of the case to the EeT/ for further proceedings, so that the defendant !ay adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case. n the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the sa!e evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the de!urrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceeds. The only recogniIed instance when an acAuittal on de!urrer carries with it the dis!issal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act or o!ission fro! which the civil liability !ay arise did not e-ist. Absent such deter!ination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case !ust perforce continue. "n the instant case, the EeT/ granted the de!urrer and dis!issed the case without any finding that the act or o!ission fro! which the civil liability !ay arise did not e-ist. /hoi did not assail the RT/ order of re!and. Ke thereby recogniIed that there is basis for a re!and. "ndicatively, /hoi stands by his defense that he !erely borrowed )1,344,444 with the re!ainder representing the interest, and that he already !ade a partial pay!ent of )1,3D4,444. )ark counters, however, that the pay!ents !ade by /hoi pertained to other transactions. Oiven these conflicting clai!s which are factual, a re!and of the case would afford the fullest opportunity for the parties to ventilate, and for the trial court to resolve the sa!e.

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Issue 1. .hether or not the re!and of the case to the EeT/ for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case

Ruling 1. 7es, the re!and is proper in the instant case.

.hen a de!urrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is sub!itted for (udg!ent on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is dee!ed to have waived the right to present evidence. At that (uncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil aspect, unless the enforce!ent of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been waived or reserved. "n case of a de!urrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused !ay adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the de!urrer. $uch denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the Auanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. "n other words, a court !ay not deny the de!urrer as to the cri!inal aspect and at the sa!e ti!e grant the de!urrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove

#ayap vs Facts 1.

en%iong

&ayap was charged with reckless i!prudence resulting to ho!icide, less serious physical in(uries and da!age to property. "t was alleged that &ayap was the driver of a cargo truck which figured in an accident with a /olt Oalant driven by Cou Oene $endiong causing instant death to the latter and less serious physical in(uries to the latter's passenger. The ET/ granted &ayap &e!urrer to #vidence saying that prosecution failed to establish that &ayap was really the one driving the cargo truck. The ET/ further stated that prosecution also wasn't able to prove the death and in(uries of the victi! as there were not death certificate and !edical certificates sub!itted as evidence. The ET/ gave credence to the evidence of the &ayap, showing that it was the victi!'s car which swerved into the cargo truck's lane thereby being the pro-i!ate cause of the accident. The ET/ relied on the accident sketch contained in the police blotter to support this conclusion. Aggrieved, $endiong filed a petition for certiorari under 93 with the RT/. The RT/ affir!ed the acAuittal of &ayap but ordered the case re!anded to the ET/ for the hearing of the civil aspect. $endiong filed a petition for review +*0, with the /A. the /A concluded that it was the RT/ which had (urisdiction and not the ET/. The /A e-plained that according to /uyos v Oarcia, (urisdiction over da!age to property cases should be deter!ined by the i!posable fine and not the penalty for the physical in(uries and following B) 10D, ET/ only has (urisdiction over those felonies with i!posable fine not e-ceeding 14,444. $ince in this case, no proof of total da!age was given and $endiong clai!s 1.3E in civil da!ages, the sa!e should have been brought before the RT/.

the reception of the defense' evidence on the civil aspect. This is because at the !o!ent the de!urrer is granted, only prosecution's evidence +both as to the cri!inal and civil aspect, is on record. Kowever, the grant of a de!urrer !ay still be reviewed by the courts but only on grounds of OA&C#F under rule 93. "n this case, there being not finding of OA&C#F on the part of the ET/, the de!urrer stands.

0.

The acAuittal of an accused does not carry with it the e-tinction of civil liability when a. b. c. acAuittal was based on reasonable doubt court deter!ines that there is only a civil liability the civil liability of the accused does not arise or is not based on the cri!e for which he was acAuitted.

0.

2.

n the other hand, acAuittal of an accused carries the e-tinction of civil liability when d. there is a finding on the final (udg!ent in the cri!inal action that the act or o!ission fro! which the civil liability !ay arise did not e-ist or the accused did not co!!it the acts or o!ission i!puted to hi!. "n this case, the acAuittal by the ET/ was based on findings that the act or o!ission fro! which the civil liability !ay arise did not e-ist and that petitioner did not co!!it the acts or o!ission i!puted to hi!= hence, petitioner's civil liability has been e-tinguished by his acAuittal.

*.

e.

Issue 1. 0. .hether or not a grant of a de!urrer is reviewable 8 5C7 15&#R 93 Thus, because there was no civil liability to hear, the case should not have been re!anded to the ET/.

.hether or not re!and to the ET/ of the case for the deter!ination of civil liability was proper 8 5

Ruling 1. A grant of a de!urrer to evidence is tanta!ount to an acAuittal and cannot be reviewed on appeal otherwise, the constitutional guarantee against double (eopardy is offended. A de!urrer !ust be filed after the prosecution rests its case. "t entails and appreciation of the evidence of the prosecution and when the sa!e if found insufficient to support a conviction beyond reasonable doubt, the de!urrer is proper. nce granted, the court !ust enter a partial (udg!ent of conviction but !ust continue with the trial for

1143 of the /ivil /ode, which reads as follows> Lasam vs Facts 1. The defendant was the owner of a public garage in the town of $an Fernando, Ca 1nion, and engaged in the business of carrying passengers for hire fro! one point to another in the )rovince of Ca 1nion and the surrounding provinces. &efendant undertook to convey the plaintiffs fro! $an Fernando to /urri!ao, "locos 5orte, in a Ford auto!obile. n leaving $an Fernando, the auto!obile was operated by a licensed chauffeur, but after having reached the town of $an Fuan, the chauffeur allowed his assistant, Bueno, to drive the car. Bueno held no driver's license, but had so!e e-perience in driving. The car functioned well until after the crossing of the Abra River in Tagudin, when, according to the testi!ony of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, defects developed in the steering gear so as to !ake accurate steering i!possible, and after IigIagging for a distance of about half kilo!eter, the car left the road and went down a steep e!bank!ent. The auto!obile was overturned and the plaintiffs pinned down under it. Er. Casa! escaped with a few contusions and a dislocated rib, but his wife, FoaAuina, received serious in(uries, a!ong which was a co!pound fracture of one of the bones in her left wrist. $he also suffered nervous breakdown fro! which she has not fully recovered at the ti!e of trial. The co!plaint was filed about a year and a half after and alleges that the accident was due to defects in the auto!obile as well as to the inco!petence and negligence of the chauffeur. The trial court held, however, that the cause of action rests on the defendant's breach of the contract of carriage and that, conseAuently, articles 1141B114L of the /ivil /ode, and not article 1D42, are applicable. The court further found that the breach of contract was not due to fortuitous events and that, therefore the defendant was liable in da!ages. 2. mith 0. :5o one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen, were inevitable, with the e-ception of the cases in which the law e-pressly provides otherwise and those in which the obligation itself i!poses such liability.@

0.

A caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics>

a.

2.

The cause of the unforeseen and une-pected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to co!ply with his obligation, !ust be independent of the hu!an will.

b.

"t !ust be i!possible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it !ust be i!possible to avoid.

*.

c.

The occurrence !ust be such as to render it i!possible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a nor!al !anner.

3.

d.

And the obligor +debtor, !ust be free fro! any participation in the aggravation of the in(ury resulting to the creditor.@

*.

"ssue 1. . 5 the trial court is correct in its findings that the breach of contract was not due to a fortuitous event6

Ruling 1. 7es. "t is sufficient to reiterate that the source of the defendant's legal liability is the contract of carriage= that by entering into that contract he bound hi!self to carry the plaintiffs safely and securely to their destination= and that having failed to do so he is liable in da!ages unless he shows that the failure to fulfill his obligation was due to causes !entioned in article

As will be seen, these authorities agree that so!e e-traordinary circu!stance independent of the will of the obligor, or of his e!ployees, is an essential ele!ent of a caso fortuito. Turning to the present case, it is at once apparent that this ele!ent is lacking. "t is not suggested that the accident in Auestion was due to an act of Ood or to adverse road conditions which could not have been foreseen. As far as the records shows, the accident was caused either by defects in the auto!obile or else through the negligence of its driver. That is not a caso fortuito.

3.

.e agree with counsel that neither under the A!erican nor $panish law is a carrier of passengers an absolute insurer against the risks of travel fro! which the passenger !ay protect hi!self by e-ercising ordinary care and

diligence.

9.

There can be no doubt that the e-penses incurred by the plaintiffs as a result of the accident greatly e-ceeded the a!ount of the da!ages awarded. But bearing in !ind that in deter!ining the e-tent of the liability for losses or da!ages resulting fro! negligence in the fulfill!ent of a contractual obligation, the courts have :a discretionary power to !oderate the liability according to the circu!stances@

L.

As pointed out by that court in its wellBreasoned and wellBconsidered decision, by far the greater part of the da!ages clai!ed by the plaintiffs resulted fro! the fracture of a bone in the left wrist of FoaAuina $ancheI and fro! her ob(ections to having a decaying splinter of the bone re!oved by a surgical operation. As a conseAuence of her refusal to sub!it such an operation, a series of infections ensued and which reAuired constant and e-pensive !edical treat!ent for several years. .e agree with the court below that the defendant should not be charged with these e-penses.

$lcano vs Hill Facts 1. Appeal fro! the order of the /ourt of First "nstance of %ueIon /ity dated Fanuary 0D, 1D93 in /ivil /ase 5o. %BH140, )edro #lcano et al. vs. Reginald Kill et al. dis!issing, upon !otion to dis!iss of defendants, the co!plaint of plaintiffs for recovery of da!ages fro! defendant Reginald Kill, a !inor, !arried at the ti!e of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Earvin Kill, with who! he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, na!ed Agapito #lcano, of which, when cri!inally prosecuted, the said accused was acAuitted on the ground that his act was not cri!inal, because of :lack of intent to kill, coupled with !istake.@ "t was only upon !otion for reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the grounds that the following order was issued, the /ourt finds the sa!e to be !eritorious and wellBfounded. Kence, plaintiffsBappellants appealed in the $upre!e /ourt the following resolutions> TK# )R#$#5T A/T" 5 "$ 5 T 5C7 AOA"5$T B1T AC$ A V" CAT" 5 F $#/T" 5 1, R1C# 14L, 5 . R1C# 111, F TK# R#V"$#& R1C#$ F / 1RT, A5& TKAT $#/T" 5 2+c, F R1C# 111, R1C#$ F / 1RT "$ A))C"/ABC#= TK# A/T" 5 "$ BARR#& B7 A )R" R F1&OE#5T .K"/K "$ 5 . F"5AC R R#$BA&F1&"/TA= TK# )R"5/")C#$ F %1A$"B&#C"/T$, ART"/C#$ 01L9 T 01D* F TK# /"V"C / &#, AR# "5A))C"/ABC# "5 TK# "5$TA5T /A$#= and TKAT TK# / E)CA"5T $TAT#$ 5 /A1$# F A/T" 5 AOA"5$T &#F#5&A5T EARV"5 K"CC B#/A1$# K# .A$ R#C"#V#& A$ O1AR&"A5 F TK# TK#R.

delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate fro! cri!inal negligence. $uch distinction between cri!inal negligence and :culpa e-tra contractual@ or :cuasiBdelito@ has been sustained by decision of the $upre!e /ourt of $pain and !aintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Eaura, an outstanding $panish (urist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 01LL, acAuittal fro! an accusation of cri!inal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subseAuent civil action, not for civil liability arising fro! cri!inal negligence, but for da!ages due to a AuasiBdelict or Qculpa aAuiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.@, +Report of the /ode, /o!!ission, p. 190., The e-tinction of civil liability referred to in )ar. +e, of $ection 2, Rule 111, refers e-clusively to civil liability founded on Article 144 of the Revised )enal /ode, whereas the civil liability for the sa!e act considered as a AuasiBdelict only and not as a cri!e is not e-tinguished even by a declaration in the cri!inal case that the cri!inal act charged has not happened or has not been co!!itted by the accused.

0.

2.

Issue 1. . 5 the present civil action for da!ages is barred by the acAuittal of Reginald in the cri!inal case e-tinguished6

Ruling 1. 5o, it is not a bar.

The acAuittal of Reginal Kill in the cri!inal case has not e-tinguished his liability for civil case and AuasiBdelict, hence that acAuittal is not a bar to the instant action against hi!. According to the /ode /o!!ission> :The foregoing provision +Article 01LL, through at first sight startling, is not so novel or e-traordinary when we consider the e-act nature of cri!inal and civil negligence. The for!er is a violation of the cri!inal law, while the latter is a :culpa aAuiliana@ or AuasiB

"irata vs ,choa Facts 1. "n $epte!ber 1DL3, Borilla was driving a (eep when he hit Arsenio Virata thereby causing the latter's death. The heirs of Virata sued Borilla through an action for ho!icide through reckless i!prudence in the /F" of RiIal. Virata's lawyer reserved their right to file a separate civil action the he later withdrew said !otion. But in Fune 1DL9, pending the cri!inal case, the Viratas again reserved their right to file a separate civil action. Borilla was eventually acAuitted as it was ruled that what happened was a !ere accident. The heirs of Virata then sued Borilla and choa +the owner of the (eep and e!ployer of Borilla, for da!ages based on Auasi delict. choa assailed the civil suit alleging that Borilla was already acAuitted and that the Virata's were !erely trying to recover da!ages twice. The lower court agreed with choa and dis!issed the civil suit. 0.

Neplum' Inc& vs ,r-eso Facts 1. n 0D ctober 1DDD, the trial court pro!ulgated its (udg!ent +the QFudg!ent', in /ri!inal /ase 5o. D9B0*9 acAuitting the accused of the cri!e of estafa on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused and her counsel as well as the public and private prosecutors were present during such pro!ulgation. The private prosecutor represented the interests of the petitioner who was the private offended party in /ri!inal /ase 5o. D9B0*9.' n 10 5ove!ber 1DDD, the petitioner, through the private prosecutor, received its copy of the Fudg!ent. n 0D 5ove!ber 1DDD, petitioner filed its 03 5ove!ber 1DDD Eotion for Reconsideration +/ivil Aspect, of the Fudg!ent. /onsidering that 0L 5ove!ber 1DDD was a $aturday, petitioner filed its Eotion for Reconsideration on 0D 5ove!ber 1DDD, a Eonday.' n 0H Fanuary 0444, a Friday, petitioner received its copy of the 0* Fanuary 0444 rder of the Trial /ourt denying for lack of !erit petitioner's Eotion for Reconsideration. n 21 Fanuary 0444, a Eonday, petitioner filed its 0H Fanuary 0444 5otice of Appeal fro! the Fudg!ent. n the sa!e day, petitioner filed by registered !ail its 0H Fanuary 0444 A!ended 5otice of Appeal. n 1L February 0444, the Trial /ourt issued its /hallenged rder, which petitioner received through the private prosecutor on 00 February 0444, denying due course to petitioner's 5otice of Appeal and A!ended 5otice of Appeal.

0.

2.

*. Issue 1. Ruling 1.

2. .hether or not the heirs of Virata !ay file a separate civil suit. *. 7es. "t is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties !ay choose between an action under the Revised )enal /ode or of AuasiBdelict under Article 01L9 of the /ivil /ode of the )hilippines.

3.

9. .hat is prohibited by Article 01LL of the /ivil /ode of the )hilippines is to recover twice for the sa!e negligent act. Therefore, under the proposed Article 01LL, acAuittal fro! an accusation of cri!inal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subseAuent civil action, not for civil liability arising fro! cri!inal negligence, but for da!ages due to a AuasiBdelict or Qculpa aAuiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.

L.

H.

Issue 1. .ithin what period !ay private offended parties appeal the civil aspect of a

(udg!ent acAuitting the accused based on reasonable doubt6 "s the 13Bday period to be counted fro! the pro!ulgation of the decision to the accused or fro! the ti!e a copy thereof is served on the offended party6 0. Ruling 1. ur short answer is> fro! the ti!e the offended party had actual or constructive knowledge of the (udg!ent, whether it be during its pro!ulgation or as a conseAuence of the service of the notice of the decision. . 5 there is a need for reservation of the civil aspect of the case *.

delicto.

And this is precisely what herein petitioner wanted to do> to appeal the civil liability arising fro! the cri!e S the civil liability e- delicto.

0.

At the outset, we !ust e-plain that the 0444 Rules on /ri!inal )rocedure deleted the reAuire!ent of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately fro! cri!inal ones. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 20,;0L< 22,;0H< 2*;0D< and 01L9;24< of the /ivil /ode shall re!ain :separate, distinct and independent@ of any cri!inal prosecution based on the sa!e act. Kere are so!e direct conseAuences of such revision and o!ission>

a.

The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the /ivil /ode need not be reserved in the cri!inal prosecution, since they are not dee!ed included therein.

b.

The institution or waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising fro! the cri!e charged does not e-tinguish the right to bring such action.

c.

The only li!itation is that the offended party cannot recover !ore than once for the sa!e act or o!ission.

2.

Thus, dee!ed instituted in every cri!inal prosecution is the civil liability arising fro! the cri!e or delict per se +civil liability e- delicto,, but not those liabilities fro! AuasiBdelicts, contracts or AuasiBcontracts. "n fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the e- delicto civil liability in the cri!inal prosecution re!ains, and the offended party !ay S sub(ect to the control of the prosecutor S still intervene in the cri!inal action in order to protect such re!aining civil interest therein. By the sa!e token, the offended party !ay appeal a (udg!ent in a cri!inal case acAuitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but only in regard to the civil liability e-